Central Europe

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed military presence in the Petrivske disengagement area and again saw anti-tank mines and military presence in the Zolote disengagement area.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions including repairs to the wooden ramps in the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored a transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Zaichenko, Donetsk region.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 560 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 75 explosions). Almost half of the ceasefire violations were recorded at northerly, southerly and westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), including explosions assessed as outgoing and impacts of mortar rounds.

On the evening of 20 March, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 200-500m east-south-east and about 1.5km south-west of the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk  (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region,the Mission recorded fewerceasefire violations, including about 290 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 890). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north, west and north-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 19 March, inside the disengagement area near Zolote, an SMM mid-range unmanned  aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMP-1 and a probable BMP-1), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, each about 250, 500 and 900m south of the  disengagement area’s northern edge.

On 19 March, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 33 anti-tank mines (TM-62), laid in six rows running east to west for about 500m, about 550m north of its southern edge and about 1km west of its eastern edge, as well as at least 37 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows from east to west for about 350m, in an area about 700m west of the aforementioned 33 anti-tank mines. On the same day, the same UAV again spotted  at least 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62), laid in two rows running east to west across road T1316 about 1.1km south of its northern edge.

During the day on 20 March, positioned on the western edge of Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and north-east of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 146 ceasefire violations, including 21 undetermined explosions (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). Positioned on the northern edge of Zolote, western edge of Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and west of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions and six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire assessed as near the disengagement area.

On 19 March, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 1km east of its western edge and about 1km north of its southern edge as well as three people in camouflaged clothing assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces and a military truck (Ural) near previously reported positions about 700m east of the disengagement area’s western edge and 1.5km north of its southern edge.

During the day on 20 March, positioned 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 54 ceasefire violations, including 52 shots of small-arms fire  assessed as near the disengagement area.[3]

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation. 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Government-controlled areas

19 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Chermalyk (77km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

19 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 22 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 March 2019).

20 March

The SMM saw three tanks (T-72) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

20 March

The SMM noted that:

• 24 towed howitzers (18 2A65 Msta-B,152mm and six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 13 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) 31 mortars (18 2B11 Sani, 120mm, 12 M-120-15 Molot, 120mm and one BM-37 82mm) and 23 self-propelled howiters (2S1 Gvozidka, 122mm ) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

19 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Opytne (12km north-west of Donetsk);
• three armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (probable BMP variants) near Orlivske (82km south of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP-1) near Pyshchevyk;
• five IFVs (three BMP-2 and two BMP-1) near Chermalyk; and
• three IFVs (BMP-1) near Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a 150m eastwards extension to a previously observed trench system near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk) (not visible on imagery from 5 March 2019).

20 March

The SMM saw a probable anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) being transported near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

19 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• at least 12 IFVs (BMP-1) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk) and
• an APC (MT-LB) near Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk).

On 20 March, the SMM observed freshly refurbished and reinforced military trenches around 300m long on both sides of a local road about 2km south of Ohulchansk (25km east of Luhansk). 

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the water supply network nearDonetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk), as well as to enable an assessment of a water conduit in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) and repairs to the power transformer station near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). TheMission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an international organization to replace the broken planks on the floor of the wooden ramps connecting the broken parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

SMM facilitated and monitored the transfer of persons convicted before the conflict

The SMM also facilitated and monitored a transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region. Both a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer and a member of the armed formations told the SMM that 60 persons (including a woman) had been transferred.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 19 March 2019).The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) two armed members of armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “risks to the security of the SMM”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

414983 Belarusian criminal justice professionals participate in the discussion during the seminar. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

International rule of law standards for the individualization of criminal responsibility were the topic of a seminar organized on 21 March 2019 in Minsk for participants from across Belarus.

The seminar was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Institute for Re-training and Continuing Education of Judges and Personnel of Prosecutor’s Offices, Courts and Justice Institutions (IRCE) at the Belarusian State University.  It was the fifth in a series of seminars on rule of law issues co-organized as part of the two-year, European Union-funded project “Promoting Democratization and Human Rights in Belarus”.

The training event involved 34 participants (22 men and 12 women), most of them judges. They learned about domestic and international standards and practice related to the individualization of criminal responsibility – the process through which the investigative and prosecution bodies and the court choose the preventive measure or criminal sanction appropriate to the person and their crime – during the pre-trial, trial and sentencing phases.

“Fundamental principles of criminal justice based on the rule of law include applying criminal sanctions that are commensurate to the offence in each individual case and weighing aggravating and mitigating factors and the circumstances of the offence and the alleged offender ,” said Carolyn Hammer, Rule of Law Officer at ODIHR.

IRCE Professor Aliaksandr Barkou said: “The seminar was dedicated to the discussion of a key issue in the practice of sentencing and applying measures of criminal responsibility – that is, the choice of a sanction that would ensure the achievement of objectives of criminal responsibility while respecting the principle of rule of law, justice and humanism. Participants discussed the issues of restricting the use of punishments in the form of deprivation of liberty and pre-trial detention. Particular attention was paid to considering the convicted person’s character, which is either conducive to or, on the contrary, prevents him or her from reform and resocialization.”

In addition to the training of some 200 legal professionals during thematic seminars, the project’s rule of law activities will also include exchange visits on rule of law and other justice-related issues.

414974 Tome Shekerdjiev (l), Project Manager at the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), introduces an ODIHR resource toolkit on building a comprehensive criminal justice response to hate crime to criminal justice and human rights professionals participating in the training session. On the right is Katarzyna Gardapkhadze, ODIHR First Deputy Director. Warsaw, 20 March 2019. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Innovative methods for researching unreported hate crimes and hate incidents were the focus of a training session for criminal justice and human rights professionals organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on 20 and 21 March 2019 in Warsaw.

The event, co-organized by the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland, was a follow–up to the ODIHR project “Building a Comprehensive Criminal Justice Response to Hate Crime”.    

“The survey on the nature and scale of unreported hate crimes against members of selected communities that we piloted last year in Poland has demonstrated significant discrepancies between the number of hate crimes included in the official data and the situation on the ground,” said Katarzyna Gardapkhadze, ODIHR First Deputy Director. “We have prepared a detailed survey methodology, allowing for its replication in other OSCE participating States. At this training session, we will demonstrate and promote the use of this newly developed tool.”

During the training session, experts involved in conducting the original research presented a step-by-step guide on how to design, finance and implement a victimization survey using the respondent-driven sampling technique. The technique relies on respondents’ self-recruitment and allows users to research communities that are hard to reach with traditional sociological survey methods.

“Employing this methodology for researching hate crimes against Muslims, Sub-Saharan Africans and Ukrainians in Poland produced information and evidence that we would not have been able to gather otherwise,” said Hanna Machińska, Poland’s Deputy Commissioner for Human Rights. “Thanks to the survey, we not only know the scale of underreporting in Poland, but we have also learned about the reasons victims hesitate to report incidents and how they struggle with the consequences of hate crimes.”

The methodology of mapping unreported hate crimes using respondent-driven sampling is part of ODIHR’s recently launched toolkit on addressing hate crimes. The toolkit includes training packages, methodologies and guidelines on how public institutions and civil society can address hate crimes based on the project experience in Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Poland.      

VIENNA/STRASBOURG/WARSAW, 21 March 2019 – Too many people with an ethnic or migrant background are still being held back in the job market. This is despite laws against racial discrimination and for equal opportunities in employment that have been in place for decades, the heads of three European human rights institutions said in a joint statement on today’s International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

Michael O’Flaherty, Director of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Jean-Paul Lehners, Chair of the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), and Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), emphasizedthe need for change to ensure respect for the fundamental human rights everyone should enjoy equally across Europe. They call for enforcing international and national antidiscrimination legislation, including tougher sanctions, and amendments to working practices to promote the diversity Europe needs to remain relevant in today’s global economy.

“Racism in any form is toxic to the creation of a fair, equal and rights respectful society,” said FRA Director O’Flaherty. “We have the laws but too often they fail to deliver. We need to step up our policies and practices to reduce the barriers ethnic minorities face when trying to enjoy their basic right to employment.”

He pointed to a recent FRA minorities’ and migrants’ surveythat underlined the scale of the problem. Almost a third of respondents reported they had been discriminated against when looking for a job. Half of these thought it was because of their skincolouror appearance, while one-third said it was because of their name.

“Access to employment is a key to successful and sustainable inclusion of all people into society,” said ECRI Chair Lehners. “Through the recommendations that ECRI addresses to the Council of Europe member states, we aim to motivate all stakeholders to open up even more to diversity and build an inclusive working culture. Employees will benefit from this through an improved working environment, and employers through better results. At the same time, we are active to prevent new discrimination risks that could arise from the use of new technologies such as artificial intelligence.”

ODIHR Director Gísladóttir said: “A person's ethnicity or skincolourare all too often grounds for discrimination, preventing them from having equal access to thelabourmarket and equality in the workplace. Roma and Sinti, the largest ethnic minority in Europe, experience high levels of discrimination when seeking employment, and this is a strong factor contributing to economic, social and political exclusion. Governments must make real efforts to counter discrimination against Roma or any group.” 

Gísladóttir stressed that all OSCE participating States have committed themselves to adopting effective legislation to combat racial and ethnic discrimination in all fields, including employment, and, in its Action Plan to Improve the Situation of Roma and Sinti in the OSCE area, to creatingspecializedinstitutions and mechanisms to ensure the implementation of such laws. 

Today’s International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination points to a clear need to tackle pervasive racial discrimination in all areas of life. As it is also the International Decade for People of African Descent, we should stamp out the widespread and entrenched prejudice and exclusion that too many black people continue to face simply because of their skincolour, the institution heads said.

With the rise of automated decision-making, policymakers should also be mindful of the risk of built-in biases appearing in computer-based tools used in recruitment or insurance risk assessments, for example. 

Positive measures like diversity audits in workplaces, public sector recruitment drives among minorities andanonymizedrecruiting processes are simple practical measures that can help make a difference.

The United Nations designated 21 March the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 1966, in memory of the 69 people killed six years earlier in Sharpeville, South Africa, during a peaceful demonstration to protest the apartheid system.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission followed up on the explosion of a device in Luhansk city.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM spotted for the first time anti-tank mines near government-controlled Novoselivka.
• The Mission continued to observe hardship faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including at a permanent storage site and a heavy weapons holding area in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.
• In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on reports of arson at two stores. 

 

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 75), compared with the previous reporting period (145 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), assessed as possible live-fire exercise in violation of the ceasefire and the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone, and at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 890 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (ten explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations and explosions were recorded at southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

 

Explosion of device in Luhansk city

In Luhansk city, in a parking area adjacent to 55 Klubna Street, the SMM saw a crater surrounded by scorch marks and debris on the ground, as well as multiple cracks in the windscreen of a car in the parking area. About 15m from the crater, on the same street, the SMM saw eight shattered windows on the first, second and third floors of two five-storey apartment buildings. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by the explosion of an unknown device placed underneath a car in the abovementioned parking area. Four residents of one of the abovementioned buildings told the SMM that at around 01:00 on the night of 18-19 March, they had heard an explosion in the parking area and later observed damage to two cars at the same location.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 18 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

During the day on 19 March, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 bursts and shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-3km south and west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.[3]

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) on 19 March, the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

19 March

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Roty (66km north-east of Donetsk) and
• an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) being towed by an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Zelene Pole (40km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

13 March

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a tank (T-64) about 60m from a residential building in Stepanivka (62km west of Luhansk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) at a training area near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

18 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three tanks (T-64) close to a probable mortar position next to houses in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 85km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

18 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Peredove (68km south-west of Donetsk).

19 March

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) and a tank (type unknown) in Vesele (87km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

19 March

The SMM saw six tanks (type unknown) firing in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

19 March

The SMM noted that:

• 31 tanks (T-64) were present and
• 12 mortars (PM-120/PM-38, 120mm), 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm), 26 self-propelled howitzers (20 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and six 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and 80 tanks (T-64) remained missing.

At a heavy weapons holding area in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

19 March

The SMM noted that the site was empty and seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

19 March

The SMM noted that the site was abandoned and 13 anti-tank guns (MT-12) continued to be missing.

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

19 March

The SMM noted that the site was abandoned and ten tanks (seven T-64 and three T-72) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

18 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) (type undetermined) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) and an APC (BTR-80) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk) and
• an APC (BTR-80) near Novoselivka (31km north of Donetsk).

19 March

The SMM saw two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, 86km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014 and
• two ACVs (type undetermined) in Sosnivske (78km south of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) near a checkpoint of the armed formations near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

Mines seen for the first time near Novoselivka

On 18 March, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time at least 900 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out in three rows running from north to south over 2.7km, south of 92 recently observed anti-tank mines in a field about 3.5km east of Novoselivka, and about 2km further south, 41 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out over three rows from north to south close to previously observed mines (see SMM Daily Report 14 March 2019).   

Hardship for civilians at checkpoints along the contact line

At 11:30, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw around 150 people queuing to exit and around 550 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. Staff at a medical aid facility told the SMM that on the morning of 18 March, an 86-year-old woman from Luhansk city had passed away at the facility after having lost consciousness while queuing to exit government-controlled areas.

At 09:30, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw around 450 people queuing to enter and around 60 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas. At 12:10, the SMM observed the body of a deceased elderly woman being transferred into a mortuary vehicle.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the water supply network near Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk), as well as to enable an assessment of a water conduit in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 13 cars (six with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates”) entering Ukraine, and 15 cars (eight with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates), five trucks (three covered cargo and two open trailer with no visible cargo) (three with Ukrainian licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates”) and a bus (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 19 cars (six with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates, and five with “DPR” plates), six trucks (five covered cargo and one fuel tanker) (three with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates), a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and eight pedestrians entering Ukraine, and 41 cars (eight with Ukrainian, 18 with Russian Federation and three with Belarusian licence plates, and  12 with “DPR” plates), a minivan (with “DPR” plates) and 32 trucks (30 covered cargo, one fuel tanker and one open trailer) (14 with Ukrainian, 13 with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

SMM observed a calm situation south-east of Kherson

On 17 and 18 March, the Mission observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea (see SMM Daily Report 6 March 2019).

Follow-up on reports of arson at two stores in Kyiv

On 19 March, the SMM followed up on media and police reports of two arson attacks, on 17 and 18 March, on two confectionary stores belonging to the same chain at 49 Obolonskyi Avenue and 29 Khreshchatyk Street in Kyiv. At both locations, the SMM saw scorch marks on stone tiles and window sills, as well as windows that looked as if they had recently been replaced. According to police statements, investigations are ongoing in both cases and one suspect has been detained.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 19 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was unable to access a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region as its gate was locked and no guards were present to open it.
• The SMM was unable to access a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region as its gate was locked and no guards were present to open it.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO. 

Delay:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), five members of the armed formations (two of them visibly armed) refused to allow the SMM to pass through the checkpoint, citing “ongoing demining activities”. About 40 minutes later, the same SMM patrol attempted again to pass through the checkpoint and was allowed to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On 18 March, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to signal interference, while flying over government- and non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region.[6]
• Staff at a medical station in Klenovyi (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Luhansk) refused to talk to the SMM, saying that “the staff is not supposed to have any contact with the SMM”.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites in government-controlled areas and one in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

VIENNA, 20 March 2019 – Best practice examples of and perspectives on Security sector governance and reform (SSG/R) -  a priority theme for both Slovakia’s 2019 OSCE Chairmanship and the Swiss Chairmanship of the FSC – was discussed at today’s joint meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and the Permanent Council in Vienna.

The meeting, which was organized by both Chairmanships, builds on the OSCE’s long track record in supporting its participating States in this area. Furthermore, SSG/R is highly relevant in strengthening global security and in enabling sustainable development, in particular in the implementation of Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, on peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice and effective, accountable and inclusive institutions.

“Security sector governance and reform is critically important to the maintenance of peace and security and the prevention of conflict,” said Miroslav Jenča, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas, and the Departments for Political & Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations. “The United Nations, with its reformed and reinvigorated Peace and Security pillar, is committed to continuing the joint work and co-ordination with Member States and regional organizations, including the OSCE. Together, we multiply each other’s strengths and can advance the broad prevention and sustaining peace agenda.” 

Following Jenča’s address, OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan John MacGregor presented his office’s SSG/R-related work on the ground. He pointed to several positive examples of collaboration adding that OSCE field operations had the potential to do more once there was agreement among participating States on the concept of SSG/R.

“I am confident that having such consensus will allow us to do more in this field and equip us – the field operations – with more arguments in our deliberations with host authorities on the necessity to advance the implementation of the SSG/R concept,” he said. “In addition, it will allow us to attract more financial resources to support the host countries’ SSG/R processes. Finally, it will be easier to agree on a set of guiding principles on how to best provide support to these processes, which could then be used in our daily work.”

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, presenting his report on the OSCE’s approach to SSG/R, added: “An effective and responsive security sector is fundamental to dealing with today's complex and interdependent security challenges. A comprehensive response can only benefit from a well-functioning and well-governed security sector that is gender-responsive and demonstrates respect for human rights.”

His report, the first of its kind developed by the OSCE, provides recommendations to participating States and the OSCE’s executive structures on how to enhance SSG/R in the OSCE region. Among the key recommendations are strengthening SSG/R capacities in all the OSCE’s executive structures so as to meet the demand for support from participating States; better mainstreaming SSG/R into the Organization’s programmatic work; and for all states to engage collectively on developing a common understanding of SSG/R.

“A common understanding of SSG/R builds the fundament to ensure that our support to participating States is provided in the most effective and efficient way,” said Greminger. “With a more strategic approach to SSG/R, we can achieve significant synergies through strong collaboration among our executive structures and departments, and by strengthening our partnerships, above all with the UN but also with other international and regional organizations.”

The OSCE Secretary General’s report, The OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform, is available at www.osce.org/secretary-general/414725

MINSK, 20 March 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today concluded a three-day official visit to Minsk. In his discussions with the Belarusian authorities, he called on the government to undertake the reforms necessary for developing a more favourable and pluralistic media environment.

During the visit, Désir met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Makei; Minister of Information Aliaksandr Karliukevich; and Chair of the Committee on Human Rights, National Relations and Mass Media at the House of Representatives of the National Assembly Andrei Naumovich, to discuss challenges to media freedom and other areas such as the new concept of information security where the OSCE Representative may offer legal expertise and assistance.

Désir also met with representatives of the Belarusian Association of Journalists and the Belarusian Union of Journalists, as well as journalists and media experts. He visited the editorial offices of news agencies Tut.Byand BelaPAN and held talks with journalists affected by the BelTA case, on which the Representative had intervened previously. In particular, he met with the Editor-in-chief of Tut.By, Marina Zolotova, who recently received a high fine. “I am very impressed by the work and the efforts of independent journalists I had the opportunity to meet during my visit.”

“I also praise the open and constructive dialogue with the Ministers on media freedom issues in Belarus,” said Désir following his meetings. 

In his talks with the authorities, the Representative underlined that the current legislation still contains many provisions that restrict the work of media outlets and journalists. They include criminal defamation and insult, which negatively affect media freedom and create a broader “chilling effect” on the right to freedom of expression.

“The authorities should promote laws and regulations that protect the principles of freedom of speech and freedom of the media and facilitate greater media pluralism online and offline,” said Désir. 

The Representative further reiterated his call on the authorities to change the accreditation requirements for journalists, and introduce more effective ways to access information. “This is a long-standing issue which my Office has previously raised with the authorities on several occasions. Accreditation requirements should be reconsidered, so as to improve the working conditions of media actors rather than functioning as a work permit, preventing journalists from doing their work,” Désir said.

“I also encourage the authorities to start effectively de-monopolizing state-owned media outlets and transforming the state broadcaster into a genuine public service media outlet, as well as introducing mechanisms that will foster transparent competition in the market, and equal access of all media to state support and advertising market,” Désir added.

The Representative positively noted the high level of internet penetration in the country and its growing role in fostering new media, which provides an important platform for information and public debate. 

The Representative reiterated his call on the authorities to ensure unrestricted access to the Internet, following the continued blocking of news websites Charter97.org and Belaruspartisan.org.

Désir encouraged the authorities to prioritize freedom of expression and media freedom in any future regulation of online space and to reconsider existing measures that tighten state control of the internet, including the broad possibility to interfere with any information posted online. The Representative noted that it is important to refrain from excessive measures and practices regarding internet intermediaries, imposition of registration requirements and the users’ right to anonymity.

“Restrictions to online content must be narrowly defined and limited to content such as violent extremism, Nazism or racism to avoid a broad and disproportionate impact on freedom of expression,” said Desir, “Blocking powers that the executive authorities have must be overseen by independent judiciary,” he added. 

“My Office will continue the dialogue with the Belarusian authorities, and hope that this co-operation will bring constructive and lasting results that improve the media freedom situation in the country,” Désir said.

Désir expressed the readiness of his Office in providing Belarus with expert recommendations, in line with OSCE media freedom commitments and best practices, and encouraged the authorities to more actively engage civil society in discussions on the reform process.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

414875 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Presence in Albania OSCE Presence in Albania

Promoting gender-sensitive legislation in Albania was the focus of discussion at a workshop in Tirana on 20 March 2019. The event was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), in co-operation with the OSCE Presence in Albania and the parliament of Albania.

Legislators, parliamentary staff, and international and Albanian gender experts (36 women and 6 men) exchanged knowledge on gender equality in the parliament, focusing on practical steps for introducing gender-sensitive legislation. Event participants further explored ways to institutionalize gender analysis in the Albanian legislative process and parliamentary work more broadly.

“Gender equality in legislation is crucial to ensuring that our laws work for women and men,” said Ajla van Heel, ODIHR Adviser on Gender Equality. “Laws impact the lives of citizens directly and should, therefore, also reflect the needs, interests and priorities of various constituencies, including women and men in all their diversity.”

Ambassador Bernd Borchardt, Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania, said: “This workshop is a great opportunity to either learn or simply refresh knowledge about how laws should be drafted so that they produce the same results for all the members of society, on equal grounds for both women and men.”

Vasilika Hysi, Deputy Speaker of the Albanian parliament, said: “We are improving the laws on gender equality, but we aim to make sure that all laws have a gender perspective and have a good effect on women and men in Albania. This is not only a job of women parliamentarians, but of parliament as an institution.”

The workshop was organized as part of the ODIHR project on strengthening inclusive and accountable democratic institutions in the OSCE region and OSCE Presence in Albania’s parliamentary support project.   

“Today’s verdict in the case of Radovan Karadzic is another crucial step toward holding accountable those individuals most responsible for genocide and other atrocities committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

First and foremost, our thoughts are with the families of the victims, for whom the pursuit of justice has been long and painful. It is a complex and painful process, but a critically important one.

Holding individuals accountable for their criminal actions, even these many years after the war, is essential to building lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, upholding the rule of law and strengthening international jurisprudence.

In tandem with the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the judicial institutions in BiH continue to strive towards these goals, with hundreds of perpetrators of war crimes prosecuted to date in domestic courts. However, these institutions require support to continue their work on war crimes cases in an independent and impartial manner, free from political attacks or attempts at undue influence.

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to support the judiciary of BiH in its efforts to bring to justice those responsible for atrocity crimes. We strongly urge all citizens in the country and beyond - in particular, political and party leaders, media, local government officials, religious leaders and community activists—to respect today’s verdict and avoid inflammatory, divisive rhetoric.

It is only through the joint investment of all in the process of reconciliation that stability and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be achieved.”

SARAJEVO, 21 March 2019 – An assessment of the work of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) institutions in combating discrimination, prepared by the OSCE Mission to BiH, was presented today in Sarajevo, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Law on Prohibition of Discrimination.

The conference, which concludes tomorrow, gathered more than 100 representatives of the judiciary, legal professionals and representatives of relevant public institutions and civil society organizations from BiH and the region.

“This Report is a part of the OSCE Mission to BiH’s support to the BiH institutions to combat discrimination,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH Bruce G. Berton.

As a result of the adoption of the Law on Prohibition of Discrimination and its subsequent amendments, a significant number of discrimination cases have been brought before domestic courts and the Institution of Human Rights Ombudsman of BiH.

“These cases relate to various societal spheres, such as systemic discrimination in education, the workplace, employment opportunities, as well as access to social and health services,” said Berton.

The Report analyses the work of the judiciary, the BiH Ombudsman Institution and the BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, as key institutional actors in combating discrimination in BiH. In addition, the Report assesses the progress that has been achieved in applying anti-discrimination legislation over the past ten years.

“We still witness systemic discrimination, especially against the most vulnerable category of people in our country’s population, the returnees,” said Semiha Borovac, BiH Minister for Human Rights and Refugees.

“The fight against discrimination is a direct way to fight for the survival of returnees in their homes and for a society of equal individuals – of all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina on every inch of our territory. We are obliged to make that effort by the BiH Constitution and by the Decision on the constituent status of all citizens throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also by our common goal of membership in the European Union, which is based on the principles of equality,” she added.

The Report identifies the shortcomings which BiH has still to address in its anti-discrimination mechanisms, and offers a set of recommendations for each of the key institutional actors for improvement in this important field.

Ljubinko Mitrovic, Ombudsmen for Human Rights of BiH, welcomed the report as well-intentioned input aimed at improving the work of the Ombudsman Institution, to the satisfaction of citizens whose submissions to the Institution continue to increase. “This report represents a compelling overview of the situation in the Ombudsman Institution, and includes a number of constructive suggestions with the aim of improving our operation.”

414845 Communication and Media Relations Section

Digitalization and simplification of import, export and transit procedures was the focus of a workshop organized by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) together with the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and with the support of the World Customs Organization and the National Centre for Marketing and Price Study of the Foreign Ministry of Belarus from 19 to 21 March in Minsk, Belarus.

The workshop gathered some 30 participants from different government agencies of Belarus, research institutions, and the business sector. They discussed how to find the right approach to developing paperless trade and a single entry point for submission and receipt of trade documents in Belarus, while ensuring ease of use businesses and interoperability with trade partners. Such a single entry point is a key provision in the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.

Ambassador Vladimir Serpikov of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, Chief Negotiator in the process of accession to the WTO, said: “I am confident that the seminar will make an important contribution with regard to the adaptation of Belarus to key provisions of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, which is an important element in the negotiation process on the country’s accession to the WTO.”

Participants in the three-day workshop learned about and discussed best practices, new developments, and available international standards with regard to paperless trade and development.  Experts from the World Customs Organization, UNCITRAL, the Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union of the European Commission, as well as from government agencies of Belarus put a special focus on the technology neutrality and regional and international interoperability of national solutions.

“Paperless trade and development of a single window will ease procedural burdens and make trade procedures more predictable,” said Jonas Grätz, Economic Adviser at the OCEEA. “Even more so if the development of national systems is done on the basis of international standards and in a compatible and if possible co-ordinated approach with the main trading partners.”

The workshop was organized on the basis of the mandate accorded to the OSCE in a decision adopted by the OSCE participating States at the Ministerial Council in Hamburg in 2016. The decision encourages participating States to support full implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.

This activity is part of an OSCE extra-budgetary project on promoting connectivity in the OSCE. It is funded by Germany, Switzerland and Austria. Belarus is one of the beneficiary countries alongside Moldova and Kazakhstan.

KYIV, 20 March 2019 – The “Puzzle Connection” exhibition, with artworks by young people from across Ukraine, including young artists who had to leave their homes because of hostilities in the eastern part of the country, opens to the public at the Kyiv History Museum from 22 March to 7 April 2019. 

The exhibition is an outcome of a project initiated and implemented by the Youth Contact Group, an informal union of young people supported by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator to promote various forms of dialogue on burning issues among youth across Ukraine.

It will feature works by Mariya Boychenko, Mariya Bortsova, Denis Yermak, Nastya Mishchuk, Volodymyr Oliynyk and Maryna Tanevska, who produced their paintings and installations in a process of communication and dialogue on issues that are of importance for Ukrainian youngsters nowadays.

The displayed artworks focus on topics including re-socialization, problems of interaction with own self, relatives and wider society and the impact of internal and external limitations on day-to day existence. 

Media representatives are invited to attend the opening of the exhibition that will take place at 18:00 on Monday, 25 March 2019, at 7 Bohdan Khmelnytsky St., Kyiv, Ukraine (Kyiv History Museum).

Henrik Villadsen, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator of Ukraine, representatives of the diplomatic community and the artists participating in the project will attend the event.

Journalists wishing to cover the ceremony are requested to confirm their participation by e-mail to andrii.dziubenko@osce.org , by 14:00 on Monday, 25 April 2019. For additional information please contact Andrii Dziubenko, National Programme Co-ordinator at  +380506767734.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Peredove.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and observed military hardware inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• It observed electronic jamming systems in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka.
• The SMM saw for the first time mines and unexploded ordnance near government-controlled Marinka and Krymske and near non-government-controlled Kruta Balka, Ilovaisk, Hirne and Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and Zaichenko and government-controlled Peredove, as well as near Izvaryne and Sievernyi, areas close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including 145 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 50 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), in areas south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas west and south-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, however, fewer explosions (ten) compared with the previous 24 hours (about 35 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

While conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight in areas north-east of Peredove (government-controlled, 68km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard four single shots of small-arms fire about 1.5km south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM recovered the UAV safely.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 17 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1-2km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day of 18 March, positioned at various locations north and south of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions and 67 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 18 March, positioned near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 60 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south. A few minutes later, the SMM observed a grey, boomerang-shaped UAV (with a wing-span of about 40cm) flying at a height of about 60m in a northerly direction towards the Zolote disengagement area. A member of the armed formations present in the area told the SMM that the small-arms fire (see above) had been directed at the UAV.

On 17 March, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) inside the disengagement area near Zolote, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, on road T-1316, about 900m south of the disengagement area’s northern edge. On the same day, the same UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm), assessed as belonging to the armed formations, and at least 20 ammunition crates inside the disengagement area, about 100m north of its southern edge and about 800m west of its eastern edge.

During the day of 18 March, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area), as well as an undetermined explosion and a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned 2km north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard five shots of small-arms fire 1km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

16 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

14 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 16 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 14 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) and

• an anti-tank gun (MT-12) near Perevalsk (38km west of Luhansk).

17 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted six tanks (probable T-64) and a probable self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in Luhansk city.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

14 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 11 tanks (T-64), including one with its barrel missing, in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and
• 25 tanks (T-64), including one with its barrel missing, nine towed mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

11 March

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

16 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) near Pyshchevyk (84km south of Donetsk);
• three ACVs near Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk); and
• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (a BMP variant and a BMP-1) near Verkhnotoretske and
• two IFVs (BMP-2) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-1) and several dozen ammunition crates nearby near Myrne (63km south of Donetsk).

17 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

18 March

The SMM saw:

-    an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);

• three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM variant) near Muratove; and
• an IFV (BMP-1) near Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk)

Non-government-controlled areas

14 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 12 ACVs in a training area north of Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

16 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an automatic jamming system (R-330Zh, Zhitel) on a KamAZ-4310 and a radio-electronic jamming complex (Tirada-2) near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (60km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an 8m trench extension (not seen in imagery from 29 November 2018) and an automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17/30 Plamya, 30mm) in fighting position, as well as about five ammunition crates, near Vasylivka (20km north of Donetsk).

17 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-1) in Luhansk city.

Presence of mines and unexploded ordnance

On 15 March, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time eight anti-tank mines laid in a single row across a road next to a trench, as well as an anti-tank mine (probable TM-62M) 100m south-east of the aforementioned mines, also on a road next to a trench, all on the northern edge of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). It also again spotted 33 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62M) laid in two rows across the same road. About 150m further north-east, the same UAV spotted for the first time 12 probable anti-tank mines laid in two rows in close proximity to a gas pipeline in an overgrown field.

On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 90 anti-tank mines laid in three rows across 120m in a field, 300m west of civilian houses on the western outskirt of Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15m south-west of the city centre). 

On 16 March, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows across a road about 200m from civilian houses on the northern outskirts of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 18 November 2018).

On 17 March, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time at least 50 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) laid in two partially completed rows running north to south for approximately 200m near Ukrainian Armed Forces positions, south-west of Krymske (government-controlled, 42km north-west of Luhansk).

On 18 March, in Ilovaisk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-east of Donetsk) the SMM saw for the first time two metal objects assessed as probable projectiles from a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS, Grad-type, 122mm) protruding from the road surface near 57 and 85 Shevchenka Street, about 70m from the nearest building. At 171 Shevchenka Street, the Mission again saw a previously observed unexploded ordnance.

The SMM saw that fields south of Hirne (non-government-controlled, 56km east of Donetsk), where it had previously observed demining activity, were cultivated.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the water supply network near Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.

Border areas outside government control

Positioned at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a car (with Ukrainian licence plates) and two trucks (with Belarusian licence plates) entering Ukraine, and four trucks (all with “LPR” plates) and a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine. After five minutes a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

Positioned at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw no cross-border traffic. After five minutes a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:[4]

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) two armed members of armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “risks to the security of the SMM”.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area and not to approach the border crossing point closer than 200m.
• At a border crossing point near Sievernyi (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Luhansk) a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations requested that the SMM share their planned route before proceeding. The SMM refused and was only allowed to pass through the checkpoint after 40 minutes.

Other impediments:

• The SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire while flying a mini-UAV near Peredove (government-controlled, 68km south-west of Donetsk), assessed as aimed at the UAV (see above).
• On 17 March, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying along the contact line in the south of Donetsk region.[5]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

[4] The sentence on a denial of access to a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region in SMM Daily Report 16 March 2019 should have read: A member of the armed formations denied the SMM entry into a compound in Luhansk city, citing “security” reasons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

VIENNA, 19 March 2019 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today said that new laws introduced in Russia impose excessive restrictions on speech and information on the Internet, and could further limit media freedom in the country.

A set of laws on “disrespect” to the state and the spread of “fake news” passed by the Federal Assembly were yesterday enacted into law by President Vladimir Putin.

According to the first law, the dissemination of deliberately untrue information through the media or online can result in fines of up to 1.5 million roubles (approximately 20,500 euros) and the blocking of the information resource if it does not “immediately” delete this information at the request of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor).

The second law imposes a penalty of up to 300,000 roubles (approximately 4,100 euros) or up to 15 days’ detention for the online dissemination, in an insulting way, of expression that disrespects society, the state, official symbols, the Constitution, and public bodies.

“These laws allow for broader restrictions and the censorship of online journalism and online speech. The definitions of allegedly offensive content are vaguely worded and will impact freedom of expression,” said Désir. “Once again I express to the authorities of the Russian Federation my concerns over the adoption of laws that grant additional powers to government regulatory bodies to restrict online speech.”

The Representative has previously expressed concern about the draft laws in a statement (see: www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/406775)

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 8,661 to 9,601 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 103 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 19 this week compared to 21 last week: eight of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and eleven into Ukraine (84 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, eight families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and five were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when seven families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and nine into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (336 compared to 330 observed during the previous week). There were 175 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 161 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: “Stakhanov–Kyiv”, “Rovenky–Kyiv” and “Kyiv”.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a significant increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 611 to 707 (271 at the Gukovo BCP and 436 at the Donetsk BCP); 382 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 325 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 57 (compared to 45 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 247 to 205: of the total number of trucks scanned, 132 trucks (64 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 73 trucks (36 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from124 to 155 vehicles; 70 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 85 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 17 occasions, compared to 21 last week; the OTs assessed that fourteen trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and three to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis.

On 14 March at 18:55, a minivan with white on black licence plates, with the inscription “Police” and with blue flashing lights, arrived at Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation and drove behind the main building.  At 19:10, the van returned towards the Russian Federation. Because of the van’s curtains, the OT was unable to see the number of persons inside the minivan or notice any other details.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 12 February to 19 March 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

Banja Luka, 19 March 2019 - On the occasion of World Social Work Day, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the Association of Social Workers of Republika Srpska supported the Union of Social Work Students and the Faculty of Political Sciences of the Banja Luka University in holding an event today in Banja Luka entitled “Promoting the importance of human relationships”.

The Head of the OSCE Field Office in Banja Luka, Dmitry Iordanidi, emphasized the important role of social workers in the community. “Bosnia and Herzegovina is in need of qualified social workers and a social protection system that ensures social stability by providing the most vulnerable members of the society with access to the services necessary for the attainment of adequate standards of living,” he said.

The event, which gathered 200 participants, focused on the role of social workers, with a special emphasis on their needs and challenges, on methods of assistance, supervision and sharing of best practices. The event also included the announcement of a special report of the Institution of the Human Rights Ombudsman of BiH.

“For our citizens to get the best quality service, it is important that we invest in human resources, in those employed in social protection institutions and the non-governmental sector active in providing social welfare. Furthermore, it is important to provide them with a better and high-quality education,” said Sandra Dobrijević Šipka, Vice President of the Republika Srpska Association of Social Workers.

Whereas in previous years the focus was on external causes for the low status accorded to social workers, attention was given this year to their self-representation and the elimination of their degradation in the BiH society, Tamara Gaćanović, the Chairperson of the Union of Social Work Students, said.

“A major challenge social workers face is suffering burnout and exhaustion due to the issues they face on a daily basis, such as fighting for the lives of their beneficiaries,” said Gaćanović.

The OSCE Mission to BiH works continuously to enhance the capacity of social protection professionals to improve the reach and effectiveness of their services and advocate for needed policy changes.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 15 and 16 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 16 and 17 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed fresh damage caused by gunfire to  residential buildings in Yasynuvata and Sakhanka.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. It saw military personnel inside the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including in non-government-controlled Zaichenko and near Izvaryne, close to the border with the Russian Federation.*
• In Kyiv, the Mission monitored a public gathering organized by National Corps.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 15 and 16 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 160 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) (including four explosions assessed as impacts 200-500m from the SMM camera) and at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 16 and 17 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, however, fewer explosions (about 50), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk, at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk and in areas east-north-east of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 15 and 16 March, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 15 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded west-south-west of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk) and inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Between the evenings of 16 and 17 March, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 35 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) and in areas near the Zolote disengagement area.

Damage to residential buildings in Yasynuvata and Sakhanka

At 22 Hoholia Street in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) on 16 March, the SMM saw a fresh impact on a west-north-west facing wall of a ground floor apartment in a residential building, as well as shrapnel damage, all assessed as caused by a 7.62mm bullet. Two residents in the building (man, 30-40 years old and woman, 60-70 years old) separately told the SMM that they had heard shooting at about 22:00 on 14 March.    

On 17 March, at 2b Konstytutsii Street in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a 2-3cm hole in the west-facing door and a 5cm hole in the west-facing door frame of the house, assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel. The SMM was not able to determine the type of weapon or calibre. A resident of the house, a woman (50-60 years old), told the SMM that she had heard small-arms fire during the night of 16-17 March and a loud explosion at about 09:00 on 17 March.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 15 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded ten projectiles in flight from north to south at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the morning of 16 March, positioned on the southern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 30 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-3km west-north-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-3km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The same morning, positioned on the northern edge of Zolote, the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions and 18 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, at an assessed range of 2-5km south-south-east and south (all assessed as inside the disengagement area) and an undetermined explosion and two shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 0.8km-1km south (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).  

During the day on 17 March, positioned at two different locations in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and about 40 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) as well as about 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and an undetermined explosion (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 16 March, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard four shots (two of small-arms fire and two assessed as rounds of 30mm cannon) at an assessed range of 2.5-5km south-south-west and south-west (assessed as inside the Petrivske disengagement area), and 16 shots (eight of small-arms fire and eight assessed as rounds of 30mm cannon) at an assessed range of 1-4km south, south-south-west and west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3] On the same day, the SMM also observed at least six Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers in positions inside the Petrivske disengagement area, in an area about 600m south of the northern edge of the disengagement area and about 2.5km east of its western edge.

On the evening of 15 March, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard one shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 16 and 17 March, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and on 17 March near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

16 March

The SMM saw

• six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at a compound in Rivnopil (65km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

15 March

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted three tanks (T-64) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

16 March

The SMM again saw eight MLRS (BM-21) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

16 March

The SMM saw:

• 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near the railway station in Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk) and
• 14 MLRS (BM-21) loaded on flatbed wagons and 14 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) at the railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

15 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three probable armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) near Novoselivka Druha (23km north of Donetsk).

16 March

The SMM saw two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Valuiske (20km north-east of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

15 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk)
• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (BMP-1) near Pionerske (19km east of Luhansk); and
• four IFVs (BMP variant) and two APCs (MT-LB) near Lobacheve.

Presence of mines and new mine hazard signs

On 15 March, the SMM saw for the first time three mine hazard signs, red with “Mine” written in Cyrillic in yellow letters, 3m outside of a compound of the armed formations in the north-western outskirts of Luhansk city. On 17 March, the SMM saw for the first time a rectangular yellow mine hazard sign with “Danger Mines” in white letters in Russian and Ukrainian on the south side of road T-0512 near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk). Behind the sign, the SMM saw at least seven fresh craters assessed as caused by rounds of 82mm mortars.

On 17 March, the SMM again observed six anti-tank mines (TM-62) fixed on a wooden plank on the southern side of road T-0504, about 60m east of the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

On the same day, the SMM noted that a previously observed piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the middle of an asphalted road near Orlivske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) was no longer present. (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 16 March 2019).

SMM facilitation of operation of civilian infrastructure

On 16 and 17 March, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints

At the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw no pedestrians or vehicles present. A member of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine told the SMM that the checkpoint was closed all day as some office containers were removed or replaced, adding that it would re-open on 18 March.

Border areas outside government control

On 16 March, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 28 cars (13 with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation, one with Latvian and one with Georgian licence plates, and seven with “LPR” plates) and 15 covered cargo trucks (ten with Ukrainian licence plates, four with “LPR” and one with “DPR” plates) and six pedestrians (four men and two women, 25-55 years old) queuing to exit Ukraine. After seven minutes a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On the same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 35 minutes, the SMM saw 14 pedestrians (nine men and five women, 25-55 years old) entering Ukraine and a man (30-45 years old) exiting Ukraine.

On 17 March, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw four pedestrians (three men and a woman, 30-60 years old) exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw two cars with Ukrainian licence plates, two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and one half-full bus with Russian Federation licence plates entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw 49 cars (two with Ukrainian, 21 with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates and 25 with “DPR” plates), 40 covered cargo trucks (31 with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates and seven with “DPR” plates) and one full bus with Ukrainian licence plates exiting Ukraine.

Gathering in Kyiv

In Kyiv, on 16 March, the SMM monitored a public gathering by National Corps at Independence Square. The Mission saw about 3,000-3,500 people (70 per cent men and 30 per cent women, 14-70 years old), some of whom were expressing opposition to the government and alleged corruption amongst officials. The SMM saw about 100 law enforcement officers present on Independence Square. The protestors marched from the square to the building of the Presidential Administration at 11 Bankova Street where the SMM observed 200 National Guard officers present. The SMM saw an additional 60 National Guard officers and about 200 police officers in front of the National Bank at 11 Instytutska Street, in the area between the bank and the building of the Presidential Administration. The SMM saw protestors throwing soft toys at the National Guard officers outside the Presidential Administration building. No further incidents were observed.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 16 March, an armed member of the armed formations at a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “ongoing shelling” in the area.
• On 16 March, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing instructions to restrict the Mission’s access.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• On 16 and 17 March, at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations refused the SMM passage, demanding the SMM share their planned route before proceeding. On both occasions the SMM refused and were allowed to pass through the checkpoint after about 45 minutes and 20 minutes respectively.
• On 17 March, at a checkpoint in Heivka (government-controlled, 27km north-west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier refused to allow the SMM to pass, requesting a “password”. After about 20 minutes, the SMM was allowed to proceed through the checkpoint.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational. Between the evenings of 15 and 16 March, foggy weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of most SMM cameras.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

VIENNA, 18 March 2019 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his concern regarding the incident that took place last Saturday in the building of the national public service broadcaster RTS.

“Debate on the pluralism and independence of public service broadcasters is a necessity. The role of the public service broadcasters in providing quality and objective information to all citizens with no political interference is indispensable in democratic processes,” Désir said. “But, I am concerned about the forcible entry into the building of the public service broadcaster in Serbia. Disagreement with editorial policy should not be addressed through intimidation and pressures against journalists,” said the Representative. 

On 16 March, a group of people entered the RTS premises, demanding more objective reporting on the current political situation in the country. The Representative also noted that the entrance to the building of RTV Kraljevo was temporarily blocked last night by the group of protestors

Désir urged all sides to act with restraint without violence and to open an inclusive debate on the future of the public service broadcaster. “RTS is an important part of new media reform efforts and all stakeholders must be involved in this important process,” Désir said. 

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

Situation analysis at the borders, decision-making processes and implementation of operational plans were the main topics of a three-day training course organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, which was finalized with a graduation ceremony on 15 March 2019 in Dushanbe.

The training was conducted by experienced trainers from the Russian Border Advisory Group.

The course, attended by 25 Tajik border officials, including two female participants, helped to enhance their knowledge on risk analysis, operational planning, evaluation of relevant factors affecting the protection of state borders, as well as the use of technical means in the protection of state borders.

“The Office is helping to build the capacity of Tajik border officials by providing high-quality training courses in a number of key areas,” said Vyacheslav Abramets, Border Management Officer of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe. “The advanced courses, such as operational planning training with the involvement of experienced national and international experts will strengthen the capacity of Tajik Border Troops Officers and the OSCE will continue such efforts in the future."

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.

The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.

The SMM continued to observe hardship faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line.

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk and Donetsk regions.

Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also restricted at a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and at a checkpoint near Novolaspa.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 160 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (72 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol); at southerly and easterly directions of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), in areas close to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk); and at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 180 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west and north-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), south-west of Troitske (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north-east of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

In the early morning hours of 15 March, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km south-south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On the night of 14-15 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded two projectiles in flight, at an assessed range of 1-3km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 15 March, positioned in Zolote and on the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and three shots of small-arms fire near the disengagement area.

Positioned near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

15 March

The SMM saw:

a tank (T-64) on a flatbed trailer near Polkove (38km north of Mariupol), and

three tanks (T-72) on flatbed trailers near Andriivka (61km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

15 March

The SMM saw a tank (type undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

15 March

The SMM noted that:

four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were present and

12 anti-tank guns (D48, 85mm), 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S3, Akatsyia, 152mm) and 113 towed howitzers (45 D-20, 152mm; 56 2A36, Giatsint-B, 152mm; and 12 2A65 MSTA-B 152mm) were again missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

15 March

The SMM noted that 14 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

14 March

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (a BMP-2 and a BMP variant), five armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR variant) close to residential houses near Troitske, and

two IFVs (BMP-1) near Novoselivka (66km south of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two APCs (a BTR-60 and a Saxon) near Loskutivka (72km west of Luhansk).

15 March

The SMM saw:

an APC (Saxon) in Nyzhnoteple (26km north of Luhansk),

an IFV (BMP-2) in the western outskirts of Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk)

an IFV (BMP-2) on a flatbed trailer in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk),

an APC (BTR-80) near Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), and

an APC (BTR-70) at a checkpoint near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

On 14 March, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an electronic warfare system (P-15 1RL13 Flat Face-A) at an airfield near Rozivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

Presence of unexploded ordnance

The SMM saw for the first time four unmarked pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as  multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rounds, imbedded in asphalted roads in populated areas north-west and north-east of the Donetsk central railway station (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre): the first located approximately 2km north-west of the railway station, approximately 35m from the nearest residential building and 20m from a bus stop; the second about 70m further west; the third about 900m north-east of the railway station and about 60m from the nearest building; and the fourth about 400m further north-east and 10m away from the nearest building.

About 2km north-east of Orlivske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw for the first time an explosive remnant of war imbedded in the centre of an asphalted road often used by local residents and the SMM.

About 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw that two previously observed pieces of UXO, assessed as 152mm artillery rounds, were no longer present (see SMM Daily Report 15 March 2019). At the same checkpoint, a member of the armed formations told the SMM that the armed formations had removed the UXO on 15 March.

Hardship for civilians at checkpoints along the contact line

At 12:00, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a member of the armed formations punching a civilian (male, 40 years old) three times, and then kicking him once while he was down on the ground. After the member of the armed formations walked away from him, two first aiders attended to him and helped him sit on a bench in the nearby shelter.

At the same time, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw around 500 people queuing to exit and around 800 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a deteriorated water supply network near Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk); power lines in Novozvanivka (government-controlled, 70km west of Luhansk) and in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM also facilitated repairs at the pumping station near Vasylivka, on which about 1.2 million residents rely for their access to water, and to a power line in Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) and was informed that the repairs at both locations had been concluded. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

A member of the armed formations denied the SMM entry into a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region, citing “security” reasons.

At a checkpoint near Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, citing “ongoing special operations in the village”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge.

Delay:

At a checkpoint near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers refused to allow the SMM to access the village, citing orders from their commander. The SMM informed the JCCC. After about 30 minutes, they granted the SMM access.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that five such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.