Central Europe

418202 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

An OSCE-supported two-day roundtable discussion on the development of renewable energy sector in Turkmenistan took place in Ashgabat from 25 to 26 April 2019.

The event brought together 25 officials from the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection, the Mejlis (parliament), the Ministry of Finance and Economy, the Academy of Science and the State Committee on Statistics of Turkmenistan. Professors from the Mary Turkmen State Energy Institute and representatives of other relevant institutions and nature protection public organizations also participated in the discussion. The aim was to discuss with national stakeholders different scenarios of renewable energy development, which could be further incorporated into the National Strategy on Renewables.

The event was organized by the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat in co-operation with the USAID Turkmenistan Country Office.   

Opening the roundtable discussion, Natalya Drozd, the Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, referred to the 2013 Ministerial Council decision on improving the environmental footprint of energy-related activities, which called on the OSCE participating States to pursue energy diversification “with a focus on renewable energy and energy efficiency, when developing their respective national energy policies”.

“By adopting the National Programme for Energy Saving 2018-2024 and joining the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Turkmenistan reaffirmed its commitment to promoting the development of renewable energy and increasing energy efficiency”, said Drozd. “The OSCE Centre in Ashgabat is ready to provide expert advice to further support the development of the National Strategy on Renewables.”

The roundtable discussion was facilitated by international experts from Kazakhstan. They shared efficient strategies and policies in the area of renewable energy and elaborated on the legal, institutional and financial aspects of renewable energy development. They highlighted the role of high technologies for the efficient production and distribution of renewable energy.

The roundtable participants reviewed draft scenarios of renewable energy development from the perspective of the Government’s priorities. They also discussed their subsequent integration into the National Strategy on Renewables.

On 26 April, the Centre also organized a lecture on best practices of efficient energy production and consumption at the International University of Oil and Gas of Turkmenistan (IUOG). The lecture was attended by instructors and students of the IUOG and was broadcast at the Mary Turkmen State Energy Institute and the Turkmen State Institute of Transport and Communication by means of a video teleconference.

418178 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

The first in a series of four OSCE-supported training seminars for representatives of the government, civil society and judiciary on human rights protection mechanisms concluded in Kazakhstan’s Zhambyl Region on 26 April 2019.

Some 536 representatives of the Taraz, Merke and Asa administrations of the region, as well as judges, prosecutors, law enforcement officers and members of civil society participated in the four-day seminar. They were familiarized with the international human rights commitments of Kazakhstan and the role of national and international human rights institutions in the protection of human rights and freedoms. The participants learned about new developments in labour legislation that have major implications for employees, as well as about the right to access information by lawful means.

The seminar was organized by the Human Rights Commission under the President of Kazakhstan and the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in co-operation with the Zhambyl Regional administration. The event was part of the Office’s long-term efforts to support national human rights institutions in promoting fundamental freedoms and international human rights in Kazakhstan.

BRATISLAVA, 25 April 2018 - It was with deep concern that the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship received the news about the decree signed by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, on simplifying the procedure of granting Russian citizenship to Ukrainians residing in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. 

The Slovak Chairmanship believes that this unilateral measure could undermine the efforts for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in and around Ukraine, and calls for adherence to the OSCE principles and commitments by all its participating States.The Chairmanship invites all sides to refrain from unilateral steps and to jointly continue searching for ways how to fully implement the Minsk agreements.

Additionally, the Chairmanship reiterates its call for a sustainable, full and permanent ceasefire and its firm support for the work of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, which plays an essential role in reducing tensions on the ground, and in fostering peace, stability and security.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations and saw fresh craters near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
• The Mission saw mines near Vesela Hora and Novoselivka, unexploded ordnance near Debaltseve and mine hazard signs near Novohryhorivka, Horlivka and Chermalyk, some for the first time.
• The Mission saw the body of a deceased man at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk and continued to observe hardships faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at checkpoints of the armed formations in Kreminets, as well as in southern Donetsk region near Verkhnoshyrokivske, Oleksandrivske, Novoazovsk and Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 160 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol). On the evening and night of 23-24 April, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded in total 59 ceasefire violations, including nine undetermined explosions and 33 projectiles in flight, all at an assessed range of 0.5-1km south, south-south-east and south-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (40 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), at westerly directions of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and at easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) (see also Disengagement areas section). Positioned near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) and at two locations in Popasna on the afternoon of 24 April, the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions (including two at an assessed range of 600-800m) and about 320 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire assessed as in the vicinity of road T-0504, and was unable to cross the contact line using this road as a result.

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 24 April, positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), near Molodizhne and at two locations in Pervomaisk, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions and about 640 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and cannon (30mm) fire within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.

On 23 April, the SMM observed impact craters close to the disengagement area near Zolote. An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 17 fresh impact craters on both sides of a local road leading from Molodizhne to the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area, about 2.5km north-east of Molodizhne and about 100m south of the disengagement area’s southern edge, assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 24 April 2019). The same UAV spotted 20 fresh impact craters about 550m south of the disengagement area’s southern edge and 1.9km west of its eastern edge, about 250m from houses in Pervomaisk, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds. It also spotted a previously observed position with one recoilless gun (SPG-9) and three members of armed formations present about 100m south of the disengagement area’s southern edge and about 1km north-east of Molodizhne.

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

18 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 April 2019).

23 April

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a mortar (probable 2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and a probable anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Stavky (30km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four tanks north of Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 April 2019);
• three mortars (82mm) about 1km north of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk); and
• a probable mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) about 1km south-west of Molodizhne and two probable tanks (T-72) about 1.5km west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 6 April 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

24 April

The SMM saw a tank (T-64) loaded on a flatbed transporter near Kasianivka (22km north of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas18 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 19 tanks in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 April 2019);
• eight tanks in a training area near Miusynsk (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 April 2019); and
• 22 tanks, four surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) as well as 66 armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[4] in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 3 April 2019).

Other weapons observed:

On 18 April, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 16 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) and 15 pieces of self-propelled artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka. On the same day, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 12 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk.[5]

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[6]

At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

24 April

The SMM saw that seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) continued to be missing.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

24 April

The SMM noted that eight tanks (three T-64 and five T-72) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[7]

Government-controlled areas

22 April

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• again an aircraft communications automatic jamming station (R-934B) near Novomykhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk); and
• two ACVs and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near Novoselivka.

24 April

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Semyhiria (58km north-east of Donetsk); and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

23. April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• five IFVs (BMP-1) and an ACV near Sentianivka; and
• an APC (MT-LBM) near Kalynove-Borshchuvate.

24 April

The SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) towed by a truck near Kypuche (formerly Artemivsk, 46km west of Luhansk).

On 24 April, positioned about 1km north of the Donetsk central railway station (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM saw a black and white mini-UAV flying at an altitude of about 80-100m, about 50m north-north-west of the SMM’s position, flying from a north-north-westerly direction, before hovering near the SMM patrol. The SMM left the area.

Presence of mines near Vesela Hora and Novoselivka, unexploded ordnance near Debaltseve and mine hazard signs near Novohryhorivka, Horlivka and Chermalyk

On 22 April, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time 14 anti-tank mines (types undetermined) laid out in two rows across road H-21 near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and two anti-tank mines (TM-62) on the western side of the same road about 120m north-west of the aforementioned mines. The same UAV again spotted at least 44 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) on the same road and in a field close to the latter two anti-tank mines.

On 23 April, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 30 anti-tank mines (types undetermined) laid out in two rows running from north to south for about 70m in a field and another 150 anti-tank mines (types undetermined) laid out in two rows running from north to south for about 420m, all about 3km east of Troitske (government-controlled, 30km north of Donetsk). The same UAV again spotted about 600 anti-tank mines (types undetermined) running from north to south for about 500m, about 3.5km east of Novoselivka (government-controlled, 31km north of Donetsk) and again about 500 anti-tank mines (types undetermined) laid out in three rows running from north to south about 4km north-east of Novoselivka. 

On 24 April, on the southern edge of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as a 122mm rocket from an MLRS (BM-21) embedded in the asphalt on the northern side of road M-03 about 200m east-south-east of a bridge above railway tracks, which is used daily by civilians and the SMM.

On the north-western edge of Novohryhorivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time an improvised mine hazard sign, with “passage forbidden mines” written in Russian, attached to a wooden gate across a road leading to Nyzhnie Lozove (non-government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk).

About 650m south-east of a checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), on the south-eastern side of road T-0513, the SMM again saw a white improvised mine hazard sign with “mines” written in Russian, attached to a wooden stick in the ground.

On the eastern edge of Chermalyk, the SMM again saw a red mine hazard sign, with “Stop Mines” in Ukrainian, attached to a rope extended across a road leading to a cemetery.

Demining activities in Myrna Dolyna

The Mission again saw six people in protective gear bearing the logo of an international organization in a field 50m west of a local road in Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled, 67km north-west of Luhansk).

Hardship for civilians at checkpoints along the contact line

At the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw the body of a deceased man covered with a blanket and lying on the ground behind containers. Medical staff from an international organization told the Mission that the man was 81 years old and had died of natural causes while waiting at the checkpoint. A couple (in their forties), who introduced themselves as neighbours of the man, said that he was a resident of a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and had collapsed while waiting to travel to government-controlled areas to collect his pension.

At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), a representative of an international organization told the SMM that a 35-year-old man had died from natural causes at a bus stop nearby after travelling across the contact line. (These two cases would respectively be the eighteenth and nineteenth cases of civilians dying of natural causes at checkpoints along the contact line recorded by the Mission since the beginning of the year.)

At 12:30, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw about 500 people queuing to exit and about 200 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. Two women and a man (all about 50 years old) told the SMM that they had been queueing for three hours to exit government-controlled areas.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to power lines near Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km east of Donetsk) and Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). The SMM monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

SMM monitoring and facilitating the distribution of coal in Travneve

The Mission continued to monitor and facilitate adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the delivery of coal by an international humanitarian organization in Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk).

Border areas outside of government control

Positioned at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw a woman entering Ukraine and a woman with a toddler exiting Ukraine.

Positioned at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM saw six cars (two with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and 34 cars (nine with Ukrainian and 12 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 13 with “DPR” plates), three minivans (with “DPR” plates), 76 covered cargo trucks (33 with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation and 19 with Belarusian licence plates, as well as 17 with “DPR” plates), and ten tanker trucks (four labelled as flammable, all with Russian Federation licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two occasions, at a checkpoint of the armed formations north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from proceeding south towards Novoazovsk and east towards the border with the Russian Federation, citing “orders from his superior”.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on the eastern edge of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from proceeding further.
• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), and west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing small-arms fire in the area and the security of the SMM”. While present, the SMM saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint towards Sakhanka and Pikuzy.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that no demining activities had taken place between the checkpoint and the bridge.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM for about 20 minutes before allowing the Mission to proceed through the checkpoint into non-government-controlled areas.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on road H-15 near the Kargil plant in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after inspecting its trailer.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The ACVs mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[6]  The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[7] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

417866 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe donated 25 computers and a printer to the Judicial Training Centre of Tajikistan’s Supreme Court to enhance the quality of training conducted for judges and prosecutors. The handover ceremony took place on 19 April 2019 in Dushanbe.

The OSCE has a long-standing relation of co-operation with the Supreme Court for building the capacity of the judiciary to uphold OSCE commitments. Joint areas of work include issues related to juvenile justice, media freedom, presumption of innocence, torture prevention, and a wide range of international standards of human rights protection.

“We are glad to contribute to the improvement of the training environment, which will allow for research and access to legal information. It will also help to improve the conduct of training seminars and enhance web-based learning opportunities for judges and prosecutors,” said Robert Heuer, Head of the Human Dimension Department of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

The Director of the Judicial Training Centre, Soleh Zavkizoda, thanked the OSCE for the support and said: “The donated equipment will improve the capacity of the Judicial Training Centre. We co-operate with the OSCE in a constructive manner in all areas that are in line with the OSCE commitments.”

The donation was made at the request of the Judicial Training Centre. The OSCE supports the Government of Tajikistan in the implementation of Recommendations of the Universal Periodic Review Procedure for 2017-2020 and the National Action Plan on Juvenile Justice System Reform 2017-2021.

417995 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe SDGs SDGs:  8 - Decent work and economic growth

A study visit to Armenia for Tajik state officials was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe from 15 to 19 April 2019. The aim of the study visit was to provide the officials with the opportunity to learn about innovative strategies for economic growth.

A group of six representatives from the Executive Office of the President of Tajikistan, the Ministry of Industry and New Technologies, the State Committee of Investment and the State Property Management, the Administration of Dushanbe city and the Sifat Innotech Invest Company took part in the visit.

The study tour began with visits to Synergy International, Microsoft Armenia, Microsoft Innovation Center, Tumo, Synopsis and technological centres along with the Enterprise Incubator Foundation. The delegations shared their respective experience and used the opportunity to inform each other on steps currently being taken to promote a comprehensive policy-oriented approach towards digitalization of economy in both countries.

The Tajik delegation had meetings and onsite visits in Yerevan as well as to technological centres in Gyumri and Vanadzor. The delegation familiarized itself with the benefits of digital platforms and their utilization, which are widening opportunities of infrastructure development.

“Familiarization with the digital infrastructure in Armenia was a unique experience for us, where we learned the strategy and tactics of transforming the economy into a digital format,” noted Manizha Muhammad, Director of Sifat Innotech Invest Company. “As a representative of the private sector, which is involved in the development of the digital transformation of Tajikistan, our company plays a leading role in developing software for ministries and departments of the country. Moreover, this study visit served as a platform for co-operation with the representatives of state institutions of our country with whom we will work in the future to digitize the economy.”

The visit was a good opportunity for establishing collaboration with Armenian IT campuses, centers for creative technologies and techno parks, in order to learn about innovated strategies. The members of the Tajik delegation also took note of the role of education in the field of information technologies taking place in Armenia for youth.

MINSK, 24 April 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 24 April 2019:

“First, I would like to congratulate the citizens of Ukraine on the recent presidential elections. They were held in accordance with the international standards and requirements.

I welcome the statement of President-elect Volodymyr Zelensky, saying that "we will act in any case in the ‘Normandy format’ and we will continue the Minsk process."

Let me also make a personal comment. I highly praise the very accurate work of public opinion surveyors in Ukraine throughout the election campaign.

I would also like to remind here that two years ago in the Luhansk region, an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission member, Joseph Stone, died as a result of the explosion of the Mission’s vehicle. I fully support the efforts of Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan, SMM Chief Monitor, to ensure that such incidents will never happen again.

The SMM in Ukraine is the largest mission in the history of the OSCE. I call on the sides to do their utmost to ensure the safety of the personnel and assets of the SMM and to maintain the necessary conditions for the Mission’s unhindered activities in accordance with its mandate.

In this regard, I wish to note that on 18 April 2019 a long-range unmanned aerial vehicle of the SMM OSCE crashed near the contact line in the Donetsk region as a result of jamming. This is the third case over nearly one year.

Unmanned aerial vehicles are sophisticated and expensive equipment financed from the budget of the Mission’s participating states, that is, by the taxpayers of these countries.

I also want to note some positive trends. On 21April 2019, sixty detainees not related to the conflict were transferred from certain areas of the Luhansk region to continue serving their sentence in the government-controlled areas of Ukraine.

In the Security Working Group, the discussion focused on the sides’ recommitment to ceasefire on the occasion of the forthcoming Easter festivities. However, the participants could not reach consensus on the text of a joint statement.

The Humanitarian Working Group continued its discussions on the exchange of detainees and the conditions of their detention.

The Economic Working Group, with the participation of Florence Gillette, the newly appointed Head of the ICRC Delegation to Ukraine, addressed in particular burning issues of water supply, including major repairs of the Petrovsky water pipeline in the Luhansk region.

The Political Working Group discussed current topical questions.”

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw fresh damage to a house in non-government-controlled Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and to two sheds in government-controlled Chermalyk.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw fresh craters and pieces of unexploded ordnance near Molodizhne.
• The Mission continued efforts to locate its long-range UAV that crashed near the contact line in Donetsk region on 19 April.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted near Zaichenko and near Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 160 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), at easterly, southerly and westerly directions of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) and south-east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk). On the evening and night of 22-23 April, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded in total 73 ceasefire violations, including nine undetermined explosions and 24 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 0.3-1km south and south-west.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north-east, west-south-west and north-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) (see also the disengagement areas section).

 

Fresh damage to civilian properties in Chermalyk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

The SMM followed up on reports of damage to civilian properties in Chermalyk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

At 46 Naberezhna Street in Chermalyk, about 300m west from the contact line, the Mission saw several fresh marks on the south-east-facing brick wall of a shed located about 15m south of an inhabited one-storey house. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms fire or shrapnel; however, it could not determine the direction of fire. Next to the above-mentioned shed, the SMM also saw burned remnants of another wooden shed. The Mission could not determine the cause of damage. A man (in his fifties), who introduced himself as the owner of the property, told the SMM that on the evening of 22 April, while he had been at the house, he had heard explosions and small-arms fire in the area and that afterwards he had seen that the wooden shed was on fire.

At 25 Krylova Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the Mission saw a hole in a west-facing window of a one-storey inhabited house. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by a bullet (calibre undetermined).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 22 April, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded 13 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). During the day on 23 April, positioned 1km north of Kalynove-Borshchuvate, the Mission heard 26 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 4-5km north-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

23 April

The SMM saw a towed howitzer (type undetermined) in Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

23 April

The SMM saw that 15 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were present, and that 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and nine tanks (T-72) continued to be missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

21 April

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a 100m-long trench (not seen in imagery from 9 January 2019), running from east to west, about 1km south of Pivdenne (formerly Leninske, 40km north-east of Donetsk), reducing the distance between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations from about 290m to 170m; as well as a 20m-long trench running from east to west (not seen in imagery from 28 October 2018) about 300m south of Pivdenne, both assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and
• an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) near Zalizne (42km north-east of Donetsk).

22 April

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an aircraft communications automatic jamming station (R-934B) near Novomykhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and
• an ACV near Chermalyk.

23 April

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Fresh impact craters and unexploded ordnance near Molodizhne

The Mission saw two fresh craters on both sides of a local road leading from Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) to the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, about 2.5km north-east of Molodizhne and about 250m south of the disengagement area’s southern edge. The SMM observed at least ten additional fresh craters in a field 40m south-east of the road and numerous fresh craters in a field 40m north-west of the same road. It assessed the craters as caused by 82mm mortar rounds. On the road, the Mission saw two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) embedded in the tarmac which it assessed as 82mm mortar tailfins.

Presence of mines

On 22 April, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted three rows of at least 36 anti-tank mines across road H-21 about 200m east of the bridge near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

Ongoing recovery efforts of lost SMM long-range UAV

On 21 April, the Mission flew two mid-range UAVs over areas west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and north-east of Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk) where its long-range UAV is assessed to have crashed on 19 April (see SMM Spot Report 19 April 2019). The SMM was unable to locate any debris from the long-range UAV.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to power lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). The SMM monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the removal of a reported piece of UXO from the yard of a house in Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk).

SMM monitoring and facilitating the distribution of coal in Travneve

The Mission continued to monitor and facilitate adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the delivery of coal disbursements by an international humanitarian organization in Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM monitored security situation south-east of Kherson region

On 21 and 22 April, the Mission observed calm situations at the crossing points between Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson), Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 23 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), and west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “mine clearance activity”. While present, the SMM saw civilian vehicles passing through the checkpoint in both directions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM for about 35 minutes before allowing the Mission to proceed through the checkpoint into non-government-controlled areas.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]  The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported training seminar on the fundamentals of anti-corruption practices and international organizations’ rankings of Kazakhstan concluded on 22 April 2019 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Some 25 representatives of the Almaty-based media representatives took part in the seminar.

The event was co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in partnership with the Civil Service Affairs and Anticorruption Agency.

The participants were familiarized with ongoing reforms in the country and the government’s policies to combat corruption. This information was complemented by presentations on the work of international rating agencies that assess Kazakhstan’s anticorruption efforts. The experts reviewed Kazakhstan’s plans to join the group of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member-states and implementation of anti-corruption recommendations under the OECD’s Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plant.

The Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan is a sub-regional peer review programme that was launched in 2003 by the OECD. Under the programme, members of the network are reviewed and monitored on a continuous basis for the implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption. For Kazakhstan, the next assessment is due next month.

The training seminar was part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to promote good governance by focusing on anti-corruption activities in Kazakhstan. It is a follow-up to a similar event for journalists that took place in February 2019 in Nur-Sultan for capital-based media representatives.

Marina Živaljević

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro organized a training course to accredit Roma and Egyptian women activists as “confidential persons” who will serve as advocates for victims of domestic violence and early marriages. The three-day event was organized together with the Centre for Roma Initiative and concluded on 20 April 2019 in Podgorica.

The designation of a confidential person is a mechanism under the domestic protection procedure to provide victims of domestic violence with a trained advocate to explain their rights and assist them in dealing with official bodies. Such a person also makes house visits and talks with girls and women in informal settings to build their trust and confidence in institutions, both at the local and national level.

The training programme is accredited by the Agency for Social Welfare and Child Protection of Montenegro. For 10 selected community activists, the 50 euro participation fee was waived.

Sejla Pepic was one of the participants. She works as an education assistant in a primary school in Podgorica, where there are 600 Roma and Egyptian students. Her role is to provide a link between the Roma and Egyptian communities and institutions. “I find this training particularly useful, taking into consideration the size of the community I am interacting with on a daily basis. Focus should be placed on the work with parents and young girls and the importance of education needs to be emphasized. All of this should be accompanied by a clear presentation of legal consequences for those who prevent them from attending school as the common law and unwritten rules are still strongly observed in the Roma and Egyptian communities,” Pepic said.

Another course attendee, Elma Sahman from Bijelo Polje, said: “The reason why I enlisted in this training is to improve my knowledge, to realize my limits, to measure how much I do or do not know. My wish is to provide people in my community with positive examples and to try to transfer my knowledge. The most interesting part of the training was the information about the regulatory framework. Now I know what the law prescribes and what the entitlements of a confidential person are.”

Veljbana Naza works as a mediator in a primary school in Nikšić. “Children need support and motivation so they can continue with their education and are able to take their destiny into their hands. Roma and Egyptians in Montenegro should be informed about which institutions to address and how to prevent and confront domestic violence. Unfortunately, I suffered domestic violence and that is a fact I cannot undo. However, what I can do is to raise my kids and spread the word among other children that violence in any form is simply unacceptable and that they have to stand against it.”

This training follows activities implemented by the OSCE Mission to Montenegro with the support of the French Delegation in Vienna between 2015 and 2017. They were designed to raise awareness about early marriages and domestic violence among vulnerable groups, in particular Roma and Egyptian communities. The project is based on recommendations resulting from a mapping analysis conducted by the Mission in six Montenegrin municipalities, in particular those related to Roma and Egyptian communities.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw fresh damage from shelling to residential houses in Donetsk city.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission monitored the transfer of detainees not related to the conflict in Luhansk region.
• The SMM monitored the distribution of coal by an international humanitarian organization in Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted near Zaichenko, Bezimenne and Ozerianivka, as well as Izvaryne, near the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 60), compared with the previous reporting period (about 20). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), in areas south-south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and north of the Donetsk central railway station (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre). On the night of 21-22 April, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 200-500m from the camera.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 130), compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north-north-east of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage from shelling to residential houses in Donetsk city

In the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city, at 2 Kantemyrivskyi Avenue, the SMM saw a fresh crater, about 17m south-south-west of the one-storey house, broken branches on trees about 2.5m from the crater and two shell fragments within 7m of the crater. The SMM saw a shattered south-west facing window and an 8cm hole in the south-west facing wall beneath the window of the house. Most of the damage was observed north, north-west, north-east and south-east of the crater. All abovementioned damage was assessed as fresh and caused by shelling, but the SMM was unable to assess the direction of fire or the weapon used. The houses are located about 1km south of a checkpoint of the armed formations.

About 20m south-east of the abovementioned house, the SMM saw about 200 3-5cm holes on the asphalt driveway about 0.5-10m from a one-storey house at 2A Kantemyrivskyi Avenue, as well as a 40cm impact mark on the concrete foundation of a fence about 3m from the house and about 5m from the holes, assessed as caused by shrapnel. A resident of the house (woman, 30-40 years old) told the SMM that she had heard an impact at 05:00 on 21 April while inside her house. The SMM assessed that all the above-mentioned damage was fresh and caused by shelling from a westerly direction, but was unable to assess the weapon used.

About 5m further south-east, at 1A Leitenanta Nikolenka Street, the SMM saw about 150 holes in the west-facing wall, two 10-15cm holes in the concrete frame of a north-facing window and about 20 holes in the north-facing tin roof of a one-storey house, all assessed as caused by shell fragments. A resident of the house (woman, 60-70 years old) told the SMM that she had heard an impact at 05:00 on 21 April while inside her house. The SMM assessed that all the above-mentioned damage was fresh and caused by shelling from a westerly direction, but was unable to assess the weapon used.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 21 April, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a projectile in flight from east to west, at an assessed range of 0.5-1km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 22 April, positioned in four locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard about 75 undetermined explosions and about 100 shots and bursts of small-arms fire near the disengagement area. On the same day, positioned 1km north of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions and ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, at an assessed range of 2-5km north (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

22 April

The SMM saw nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 April

The SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

22 April

The SMM saw that three self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were present and all observed for the first time, and 31 self-propelled howitzers (three 2S1 and 28 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), two self-propelled mortars (2S9) and 22 anti-tank guns (MT-12) continued to be missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

22 April

The SMM saw that seven tanks (T-72) continued to be missing. 

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Non-government-controlled areas

20. April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Holubivske.

21 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two ACVs and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) on a truck near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk);
• an APC (MT-LB) and an ACV near Bohdanivka (44km west of Luhansk); and
• a wheeled excavator with a series of large excavations seen for the first time, including trenches 30m long by 30m wide and vehicle revetments, on the eastern edge of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

Government-controlled areas

20 April

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk); and
• an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-variant) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two IFVs (a BMP-2 and a BMP variant) and a probable armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in a residential area of Novhorodske.

21. April

The SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

On 22 April, on two occasions, positioned about 80m north of the bridge near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) the SMM saw a black UAV flying around 800m north-east of its position.

Presence of mines

Close to positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM mid-range UAV on 20 April spotted about 60 anti-tank mines laid in two rows running from north to south (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 27 September 2018).

On 21 April, east of Vesela Hora, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted four anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the western lane of road H-21, as well as again about 40 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) in a field about 50m south-west of the same road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline in Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk). Positioned in Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk), near to the repairs site, the SMM recorded one burst of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 700m-800m north-north-east.

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), power lines in Holubivske and near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk), Sosnivske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol) and Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33 km north-east of Mariupol), as well as assessments of hydraulic structures near Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM also monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

SMM monitoring of transfer of detainees not related to the conflict in Luhansk region

The SMM monitored the transfer of detainees not related to the conflict from non-government-controlled to government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.

SMM monitoring and facilitating the distribution of coal in Travneve

The SMM monitored and facilitated adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the delivery of coal disbursements by an international humanitarian organization in Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two cars with Ukrainian licence plates and one covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw six cars (one with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates), two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates and nine pedestrians exiting Ukraine. After about 15 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw seven pedestrians entering Ukraine and three pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from their superiors and ongoing shooting in the area”. While present, the SMM saw civilian vehicles passing the checkpoint in both directions.
• At a checkpoint west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM access to proceed further west of the checkpoint, citing “ongoing operations in the area.” While present, the SMM saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in both directions.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations in Ozerianivka (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Donetsk) a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage east, citing “orders from his commander”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM for about 25 minutes before allowing the SMM to proceed through the checkpoint into non-government-controlled areas.  

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]  The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 10,134 to 10,264 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 151 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 33 this week compared to 32 last week: 14 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 19 into Ukraine. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, four families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and six were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when five families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and five into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed increased in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (344 compared to 324 observed during the previous week). There were 182 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 162 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the “irregular” route “Stakhanov-Kyiv” was noted.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OT observed 922 trucks (874 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at the both BCPs, (346 at the Gukovo BCP and 576 at the Donetsk BCP); 526 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 396 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates.                                                                                          

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 44 (compared to 56 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP remains the same 179: of the total number of trucks scanned, 113 trucks (63 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 66 trucks (37 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 140 to 145 vehicles; 74 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 71 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 15 occasions; the OTs assessed that nine trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and six to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis.

On 20 April at 14.40, an ambulance arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side and underwent border control procedures before leaving towards Ukraine.

On 22 April at 20:39, an ambulance arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side and stopped in front of the main building. It underwent border control procedures for around ten minutes and then left towards Ukraine. The OT was unable to notice any other details.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 19 March 2019 to 23 April 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

KYIV, 23 April 2019 – Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Ertugrul Apakan today paid tribute to SMM medic Joseph Stone, who was tragically killed two years ago when an SMM armoured vehicle was struck by an explosion, most likely caused by an anti-tank mine in a non-government controlled area near Pryshyb in Luhansk region. “We will not forget our dear colleague Joseph Stone who lost his life in helping to bring about peace in eastern Ukraine,” he said.

Pointing out that over 56 civilians have been killed and 158 injured from mines and unexploded ordnance since Joseph Stone died two years ago, Ambassador Apakan called for full compliance with commitments made to remove mines and to stop laying new ones. “Only then, when people in eastern Ukraine are free of this scourge, will there be a fitting and lasting legacy for Joseph Stone and all the other innocent victims,” he said.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 19 and 20 April, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 20 and 21 April, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• An 11-year-old girl was injured by shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka on 14 April.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Kamianka.
• The SMM observed a weapon in a government-controlled area in violation of withdrawal lines.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM’s access was also restricted near Zaichenko.*
• The SMM observed a calm security situation in several regions of Ukraine during the second round of the Presidential Elections.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 19 and 20 April, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fever explosions (about 25), compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and   in areas east and east-north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 20 and 21 April, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 20), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk, in areas south of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and at southerly and northerly directions of Hnutove.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 19 and 20 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 70), compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and south and east of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Between the evenings of 20 and 21 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 50) compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Popasna.

Girl injured in shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 20 April, a woman (in her thirties) told the SMM that on 14 April at about 19:30 she had heard a loud explosion near her house at 9 Lizy Chaikinoi Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk) and that, after rushing to the living room and taking her 11-year-old daughter to safety, she had seen blood coming from the girl’s ear. She said that she had called an ambulance, which transported the girl to a hospital in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). According to the woman, on 15 April, her daughter was taken to a hospital in Luhansk city which had the necessary equipment to examine the girl (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 17 April 2019). On 15 April, the head doctor at the hospital in Pervomaisk had confirmed to the SMM that an 11-year-old girl from Zolote-5/Mykhailivka had been admitted to the hospital on 14 April with an injury to her ear. On 16 April, a man (in his fifties) living on the first floor of the house at 9 Lizy Chaikinoi Street told the SMM that a girl living on the ground floor had suffered an injury to her ear as a result of shelling on 14 April. The SMM observed positions of the armed formations at a distance of 300m from the house.

Small-arms fire aimed at SMM unmanned aerial vehicle near Kamianka

During the day on 20 April, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1.5-2km east-south-east of the patrol’s position, assessed as aimed at the UAV which was flying about 2km north-east of the patrol. The SMM landed the UAV safely and immediately left the area.*

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 20 April, positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km east-north-east (assessed as outside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area). Positioned at two different locations near the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard about 40 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire (about 20 assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area and about 20 unable to assess whether inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area). In the evening of 20 April, positioned in Popasna, the SMM heard about 45 undetermined explosions and four bursts of small-arms fire (unable to assesses whether inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area).

On the same day, positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

On 21 April, positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and near the Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

On 19 April an SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

19April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APC) near Ozarianivka.

20 April

The SMM saw:

• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2), an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-type), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) as well as an APC (Saxon) in Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-80) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-80) in Myrne (40km north-east of Mariupol); and
• an APC (BTR-70) in Stanytsia Luhanska.

On 21 April the SMM saw three IFVs (BTR-60) in Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 April

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-2) near a former school in Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk); and
• a military-type vehicle with a long barrel near Novyi (54km west of Luhansk).

Unexploded ordnance

On 20 April, the SMM saw for the first time a round of a recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) stuck in soft ground 3m south-west of the road at the western edge of Pisky.

On 20 April, while monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk), the Mission observed three men (in their thirties), two wearing helmets and protective body armour and one wearing clothes marked with “MChS”, examining the soft ground of a pedestrian walkway with metal detectors at a distance of about 15m from workers conducting the repair works (see below).

On the same day, the SMM observed for the first time two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Spartak: one in Chapaieva Street, about 4m north of a residential house, and one in Zhovtneva Street, at a distance of 400m south-east of the aforementioned one, both assessed as probable projectiles from a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS, Grad-type, 122mm).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 20 April, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to power lines near Spartak. On 20 and 21 April, the SMM monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside government control

On 20 April, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation licence plates and four with “DPR” plates), a van (with “DPR” plates) and a pedestrian entering Ukraine. During the same time, it saw 12 cars (one with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation licence plates and eight with “DPR” plates), four covered cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw eight cars (five with Russian Federation licence plates and three with “DPR” plates), one open truck carrying wood (with Ukrainian licence plates) and three buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw eight cars (two with Ukrainian, four  with Russian Federation licence plates and two with “DPR” plates), six covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian, one with Belarusian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) and one bus (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

Also on the same day, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw one pedestrian entering Ukraine and three pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

The SMM observed a calm security situation in several regions of Ukraine during second round of the Presidential Elections

On 21 April, on the occasion of the second round of the Presidential Elections in Ukraine, the SMM observed a calm security situation in Kyiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Dnipro, Kryvyi Rih, Kamianske, Vinnytsia and Chernivtsi, as well as government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

The Mission also observed calm situations at entry-exit checkpoints in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 20 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 20 April, at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), one armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders from superiors.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 20 April, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM safely landed the UAV and immediately left the area (see above).

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. Between the evenings of 19 and 20 April, the SMM cameras in Stanytsia Luhanska and at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SKOPJE, 22 April 2019 – Sunday’s presidential election in North Macedonia was well run and fundamental freedoms of assembly and expression were respected, and election day was peaceful, orderly and transparent. However, wide-reaching electoral reform is still very much needed, international observers concluded in a preliminary statement released today.

“This peaceful, generally well-run election demonstrated that the political will can be found to hold democratic elections,” said Sereine Mauborgne, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission. “This constructive approach must be maintained through the second round and beyond. I sincerely hope that following these elections real effort will be made to enact a coherent electoral law and finally address the long existing challenges.”

Some 1.8 million voters were eligible to cast their ballot in 3,396 polling stations across the country. However, the automatic exclusion of voters based on expired identification documents created an unreasonable barrier that affected some 11,000 citizens. While improvements in the accuracy of the voter register were noted, discrepancies between state databases and diverse data formats need to be addressed.

“Yesterday’s election was well organised and voters who participated in the election were able to make their choice freely,” said Marie-Christine Dalloz, head of the delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). “The delegation regrets that the turnout was low for a presidential election. A mature functioning of the political system and a reform of the electoral law would re-engage citizens and ensure their active participation in the election of their head of state. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission are ready to assist the authorities of North Macedonia in implementing the reforms.”

The campaign took place in a calm and peaceful environment, in which all participants were able to campaign without hindrance and fundamental freedoms were respected. State officials worked to maintain a clear distinction between their official and political activities, and to avoid using state resources in the campaign.

“We were pleased to see a campaign that addressed substantive concerns, with candidates engaging in debate on their visions for the future of North Macedonia,” said Reinhold Lopatka, head of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) Delegation. “All three candidates clearly advocated for further European integration; whatever future the people here may choose, democratic elections will be crucial. The clear efforts made by state officials to avoid mixing political and official activities are an important development, helping to level the playing field for candidates.”

The election administration carried out its work impartially and enjoyed the confidence of the majority of stakeholders. However, the transparency and efficiency of the State Election Commission was hindered by technical malfunctions of its information and communication systems, raising doubts over IT security.

ODIHR’s media monitoring found that the public broadcaster provided impartial coverage and the media overall presented diverse information on the candidates and the political parties supporting them, enabling voters to make an informed choice. Both public and other media broadcasters covered the campaign and were mostly neutral in their reporting, while online and print media sometimes lacked balance in their coverage.

Concerns continue over the legal framework. While the law does allow for democratic elections, the electoral code is not tailored to the requirements of a presidential contest. The absence of explicit campaign rules for candidates resulted in parts of the campaign being carried out on the basis of cross-party agreements that did not provide equal opportunities to all candidates.

“The election was smoothly run, and shows just how much can be achieved when there is genuine political will,” said Corien Jonker, Head of the election observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). “I hope that both the national authorities and political parties will continue to work in this spirit. The electoral reforms ODIHR has previously recommended need to be completed, with a focus on the transparency and accountability of campaign finance.”

It was the lack of uniform reporting of candidate expenditure, regulation of third-party campaigning, and reporting by political parties supporting candidates that reduced both the transparency of campaign finance and the effectiveness of oversight.

The international election observation mission comprises some 240 observers from 38 countries, including 189 long- and short-term observers deployed by ODIHR, 40 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA, and 12 from PACE.

For further information, please contact:

Andreas Baker, OSCE PA +389 70636321 or +45 601 08126, andreas@oscepa.dk
Katya Andrusz, ODIHR, +389 728 07826 or +48 725 880 257, katya.andrusz@odihr.pl
Chemavon Chahbazian, PACE Secretariat  +389 706 36302 or +33 6 50 68 76 55, Chemavon.Chahbazian@coe.int

KYIV, 22 April 2019 – The presidential election in Ukraine was competitive and held with respect for fundamental freedoms, the international observers concluded in a preliminary statement released today. The orderly transfer of power should offer the opportunity for strengthening democratic institutions and their accountability, although the campaign for both rounds lacked genuine discussion of issues of public concern, the statement says.

The media landscape and campaign coverage reflected the dominance of economic interests in public and political life, the observers said. The run-off was well-organized, despite operational challenges and a limited timeframe. The legal framework still contains shortcomings, and there was little will to resolve electoral complaints in a way that would guarantee effective remedy. Election day was assessed positively by the observers and, despite a few procedural problems, there was a marked improvement in the conduct of the counting and tabulation over the first round, the statement says. The incumbent conceded defeat shortly after the polls closed.

“The democratic and orderly transfer of power we witnessed yesterday is a great achievement by the Ukrainian people and paves the way for renewed efforts to advance necessary reforms to address burning issues and provide good governance. I thank my colleagues from different international institutions for their readiness to support this process,” said George Tsereteli, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission. “The authorities now have to seize the opportunity the citizens have offered them to provide the economic and security conditions in which to realize their aspirations.”

The election took place in the context of ongoing armed conflict and other hostilities in the east of the country and the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation. As a consequence, the election could not be organized in Crimea and certain parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions that are controlled by illegal armed groups.

“The Ukrainian people demonstrated very clearly yesterday their commitment to securing change through the democratic process,” said Angela Smith, Head of the delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. “Every effort should be made to facilitate in the future the voting rights of those Ukrainian citizens whose ability to cast their vote was seriously compromised by excessive administrative requirements.”

Doris Barnett, Head of the delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, said: “I am pleased that free elections are becoming the norm in Ukraine and that the people are making use of their right to vote. This election demonstrates that democracy in Ukraine has become more stable. I trust that the new political dynamics in the country can fulfill the high expectations of the voters. Now the country needs to focus on further economic development.”

Rebecca Harms, Head of the delegation from the European Parliament, said: “I would like to congratulate the citizens of Ukraine for their deep commitment to democracy, demonstrated in competitive elections in which they had a free choice. We also welcome the statesmanship demonstrated by the incumbent in accepting the democratic choice of Ukrainians on election night, even after the heated campaign. I sincerely regret that many Ukrainians could not vote because Russia has illegally annexed Crimea and the aggression continues in Eastern Ukraine. The European Parliament encourages and supports the incoming president in continuing, and even strengthening reform efforts, mainly in fighting corruption and poverty.”

The candidates did not conduct large-scale campaign rallies between the rounds, and campaigning was predominantly conducted on television, in online media and social networks, and through billboards and posters. Increased tensions between the two sides were reflected in massive and systematic negative campaigning and harsh mutual accusations, the statement says. There was a marked difference in the character of the conventional campaign of the incumbent, Petro Poroshenko, and that of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, which was conducted to a large extent by proxies and put little emphasis on his campaign platform.

Overall, the private television channels monitored provided imbalanced and biased coverage. The public broadcaster divided its prime-time news coverage equally between the two contestants. Zelenskyi largely avoided participating in campaign-related programming and coverage.

The misuse of state resources, both at the national and local levels, continued during the second round, the observers said. There remain a number of ongoing investigations into alleged vote-buying by Poroshenko’s campaign.

Despite time constraints, the Central Election Commission (CEC) handled preparations efficiently and met legal deadlines. The election laws regulate some but not all aspects of a second round, and the remaining gaps were not addressed by the CEC. It continued to hold regular open sessions, but also went on holding preliminary meetings before the sessions, which decreased transparency, the statement says.

“The run-off was organized well, but there is still a need to enhance the electoral legislation and practice,” said Ambassador Peter Tejler, Head of the election observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. “A genuine political debate and concrete steps to further improve elections will strengthen accountability of democratic institutions.”

Voter lists were updated to reflect changes between the rounds, and voters had a brief window to check their data online and to request corrections. Those who needed to temporarily change their place of voting had to submit new requests, even if they had already done so for the first round. This represents an unnecessary burden, especially for internally displaced persons, voters abroad and persons with disabilities, the observers said.

The CEC received seven complaints during the second-round period, all of which were denied consideration on technical grounds. All 11 cases lodged against the CEC and candidates in administrative court between the rounds were ruled inadmissible or dismissed, depriving complainants of access to effective remedy and undermining the transparency of the dispute resolution process. 

All candidates eliminated in the first round submitted their final campaign finance reports by the legal deadline, and the two run-off candidates submitted their interim finance reports. No violations have been identified on the basis of these interim reports, and the official analyses of all final reports will be published at a later date. Both second-round campaigns were partly financed from sources other than the candidates’ legal campaign fund accounts.

For further information, contact:

Anna Di Domenico, OSCE PA, +380 98 046 62 21 or +45 60 10 83 80, anna.didomenico@oscepa.dk
Thomas Rymer, ODIHR, +380 67 339 62 93 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl
Bogdan Torcatoriu, PACE, +380 96 429 48 91 or +33 6 50 39 29 40, bogdan.torcatoriu@coe.int
Doichin Cholakov, EP, +380 97 918 38 35 or +32 477 85 45 78, doichin.cholakov@europarl.europa.eu

417986 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported seminar on the mechanisms for the legal regulation and digital security of media on the internet took place on 19 April 2019 in Pavlodar, Kazakhstan.

Some 20 journalists and bloggers were familiarized with the national and international media framework, including practical and legislative aspects of media regulation on the Internet. The event included sessions on access to information, restrictions on freedom of expression, protection of personal data, work with different digital sources of information and fact-checking, and the protection of civil rights in the media field. Together with national experts, the participants examined court cases on hate speech, and instruments of working with the open government database.

The seminar was co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan and the NGO Legal Media Centre. Future seminars will be held in Aktobe in May 2019 and Taldykurgan in June 2019.

The event is a part of the Office’s activities aimed at promoting media freedom and freedom of expression in line with OSCE principles and commitments.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw fresh damage from shelling to residential houses in Donetsk city.
• In Donetsk region, an SMM long-range UAV crashed and an SMM mini-UAV sustained damage from gunfire.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted near Markyne, as well as in Novoazovsk and Dovzhanske, areas near the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 150), compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and north, north-west and west of the Donetsk central railway station (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 150), compared with the previous reporting period (about 20 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) north-east, east-south-east and south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle crashes near contact line in Donetsk region

At 01:26, 19 April, while near Vuhledar (government-controlled, 48km south-west of Donetsk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) encountered dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming.[2] This interference continued until 02:35, when, while attempting to navigate the UAV to its ground control station near Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), the SMM lost control of the UAV. The SMM assesses that it crashed at 02:36, in an area west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and north-east of Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk). It is premature to draw conclusions about the causes of the incident. The SMM is making urgent efforts to locate the UAV.*

Fresh damage from shelling to residential houses in Donetsk city

In a residential neighbourhood in north-western Donetsk city, at 35 Bohatyrska Street, the SMM saw fresh damage to the east-facing wall of a two-storey house, with most of the tiles broken and dislodged on an area of the wall, as well as a broken window covered in plywood. The Mission also saw fresh damage to the east-facing side of the roof above the damaged wall, with the metal roof bent upwards, as well as a shattered south-west-facing window in an outdoor toilet. About 0.5m east of the house, the SMM saw a fresh crater close to the damaged wall. A caretaker of the house (woman, 30-40 years old) told the SMM that the resident of the house was not present at the time of shelling.

About 15m east of the abovementioned house, at 13 Zoolohichna Street, the SMM saw two west-facing shattered windows covered with plastic sheeting on a two-storey house. Next to the house, the SMM saw an impact mark to a metal bathtub and pieces of shrapnel around the yard. A resident of the house (woman, about 90 years old) told the SMM that she had been inside the house with her daughter (50-60 years old) on the evening of 17 April when she had heard a loud sound. The SMM assessed that the damage at both houses was caused by shelling from a northerly direction, but could not assess the type of weapon used.

SMM mini-UAV sustains damage from gunfire

While conducting a mini-UAV flight on the south-eastern edge of Kurdiumivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 700m south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV which was flying about 700m south-west of the SMM’s position at an altitude of about 150m. The Mission landed the UAV and observed that one UAV propeller blade had sustained damage, assessed to be caused by a bullet from a rifle. The SMM left the area.*

Disengagement areas[3]

On 18 April an SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) north of the railway bridge and west of road T1316 inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On the same day, the same UAV again spotted three anti-tank mines (probable TM-62), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, west of road T1316 (the nearest of which was located 10m west of the road), as well as at least 30 anti-tank mines (types undetermined) west of road T1316 and at least 41 anti-tank mines (types undetermined), assessed as belonging to the armed formations, east of the same road laid in three rows (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 17 November 2018). The UAV spotted for the first time a red, triangular mine hazard sign on the western side of the same road about 70m south-east of the aforementioned 41 anti-tank mines.

During the day on 19 April, positioned about 600m south of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact and four bursts of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-3km north and north-north-west, as well as two undetermined explosions and about 50 shots and bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 700m-800m north and east-north-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the same day, positioned about 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-5km north-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

On 18 April, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three tanks (T-64) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted 19 tanks (types undetermined) near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

18. April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted ten tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

19 April

The SMM saw that one of the sites was abandoned and that six towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm), 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm), 20 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and 80 tanks (T-64) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

18. April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a mobile radar system (ST-68UM, Tin Shield) near Petrivske (61km south-west of Donetsk).

19. April

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Kyrylivka (26km north-east of Mariupol); and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

18 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• four ACVs near Mykhailivka (30km north-east of Donetsk);
• nine infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) near Boikivske, in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014;
• two APCs (MT-LB) and an ACV near Bezimenne (100km south of Donetsk);
• two probable ACVs (types undetermined) near Kozatske (86km south of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP variants) near Khreshchatytske (86km south of Donetsk;
• three IFVs (BMP variants) as well as an APC (MT-LB) in  Sosnivske (78km south of Donetsk); and
• two box-bodied utility trucks used for communications equipment near Bezimenne.

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• seven IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) near Lobacheve; and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Luhansk city.

Unexploded ordnance and mine hazard signs seen for the first time

The SMM saw for the first time an anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) embedded in a field about 5m south of the road and about 1.3km west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) on the road between Verkhnoshyrokivske and Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

At the southern entrance of Chernenko (government-controlled, 21km north-east of Mariupol), in a field 20m east of the road, the SMM saw a mine hazard sign for the first time,  with “Stop, Mines! Danger, Mines” written in Russian, attached to a wooden plank. On the road between Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol) and the junction for road T-0519, the SMM saw a mine hazard sign for the first time, with “The Area is Not Safe/Stop Mines” written in Ukrainian, attached to a tree about 2m north of the road.

Increased traffic at Hnutove entry-exit checkpoint

The SMM saw traffic higher than usual passing through the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol), following recent upgrades on the government-controlled side, including new booths, overhead structures and fresh tarmac (see SMM Daily Report 16 April 2019). The Mission saw about 100 cars and about 45 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas, and no traffic or pedestrians queuing to exit government-controlled areas.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to a water pipeline near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and to power lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). The SMM also monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two covered cargo trucks with “LPR” plates and six pedestrians entering Ukraine. After about 15 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.* 

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 28 cars (five with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation and three with Georgian licence plates 13 with “DPR” plates), two buses (with “DPR” plates, about 45-50 passengers each), nine covered cargo trucks (six with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) and four pedestrians entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw 30 cars (six with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates and 17 with “DPR” plates) and two buses (with “DPR” plates, 55-60 passengers each) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw three pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and three trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw four cars (two with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) and five covered cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk), the SMM saw no pedestrians or traffic entering or exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from proceeding south towards Novoazovsk, north towards Huselshchykove (non-government-controlled, 95km south-east of Donetsk) and east towards the border with the Russian Federation, citing “security reasons”.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations west of Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from continuing west towards Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), citing an “ongoing live-fire exercise” at a nearby training area. 
• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the JCCC told the Mission that mines on the road south of the bridge had not been cleared.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) an armed member of the armed formations stopped the SMM for about 20 minutes before allowing the SMM to proceed through the checkpoint into non-government-controlled areas.  

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight on the south-eastern edge of Kurdiumivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 700m south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The UAV Mission landed the UAV and observed that the UAV had sustained damage, assessed to be caused by a bullet. The SMM left the area. (see above)
• On the evening and night of 18-19 April, an SMM long range-UAV encountered dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government- and non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.[6] (see above)

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position. 

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4]  The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

At 2045 hrs, 18 April, the SMM launched a long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight over government- and non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region. At 0126 hrs, 19 April, while near Vuhledar (government-controlled, 48km south-west of Donetsk), the UAV encountered dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming.[1] 

This interference continued until 0235 hrs, when, while attempting to navigate the UAV to its ground control station near Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), the SMM lost control of the UAV. 

SMM assesses that it crashed at 0236 hrs, in an area west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and north-east of Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk).

It is premature to draw conclusions about the causes of the incident. The area of the presumed crash site is near the contact line and considered heavily mined, making SMM access difficult. During the day on 19 April, weather conditions prevented a medium-range UAV flight. The SMM is making urgent efforts to locate its long-range UAV, and will report relevant findings.

[1] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

SKOPJE, 19 April 2019 – The international observers for the presidential election in North Macedonia will hold a news conference to present their preliminary post-election statement on Monday 22 April, in Skopje.

The mission is a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

Sereine Mauborgne, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the OSCE short-term observer mission will deliver the statement followed by Marie-Christine Dalloz, Head of the PACE delegation, Reinhold Lopatka, Head of the OSCE PA delegation, and Corien Jonker, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission. They will subsequently be available to take questions from the media.

The international election observation mission comprises some 240 observers from 38 countries, including 189 long- and short-term observers deployed by ODIHR, 39 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA, and 12 from PACE.

You are invited to attend the news conference at 15:00 on Monday 22 April, which will take place in the Platinum Conference Room at the Double Tree by Hilton Hotel, Bulevar ASNOM 17, Skopje. NB While the news conference is open to all and no registration or accreditation is required to enter, only questions from journalists will be taken.

The press conference will be livestreamed at: www.facebook.com/osce.odihr and www.oscepa.org.

For further information, please contact:

Andreas Baker, OSCE PA +389 70636321 or +45 601 08126 , andreas@oscepa.dk
Katya Andrusz, ODIHR, +389 728 07826 or +48 725 880 257, katya.andrusz@odihr.pl
Chemavon Chahbazian, PACE Secretariat  +389 706 36302 or +33 6 50 68 76 55, Chemavon.Chahbazian@coe.int