Central Europe

423776 Kunduz Rysbek

The Second Annual Summer School of Young Politicians concluded on 19 June 2019. It was organized by the Legal Prosperity Foundation and supported by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek. Twenty-five young leaders participated in the six-day intensive school, including members of local councils and local governments, young members of various political parties, media representatives, and civic activists from all regions of Kyrgyzstan. The participants learned about different political systems, platforms of various political parties, equal access to decision-making for persons with disabilities, strategic communications and campaigning, debating and legal analysis.

The young leaders also had a chance to meet with members of the Kyrgyz National Parliament and learn about the process of drafting legislation, campaigning, and media technologies used during electoral processes.

The 2019 Summer School included two participants with hearing and vision impairments, whose special needs were fully incorporated into the training at all stages.   The Young Politicians School was created in 2017, following the results of the study Youth Access to Power: Opportunities and Limitations, conducted by the Legal Prosperity Public Foundation in Kyrgyzstan.

Since 2017 the Young Politicians School has become a solid educational platform for aspiring youth of Kyrgyzstan, which aims to explore and heighten their potential, eventually promoting their participation in decision-making processes.

SARAJEVO, 21 June 2019 – Concluding his two-day visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister, Miroslav Lajčák,  stressed the need to explore all avenues to get the country back on track, including through adopting key reforms.

During his visit, the Chair met with its political leadership, including all three members of the Presidency, Milorad Dodik, Šefik Džaferović, and Željko Komšić; the BiH Parliamentary Assembly House of Peoples (BiH PA HoP) Speaker, President of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and former member of the BiH Presidency, Bakir Izetbegović;and the BiH PA HoP Deputy Speaker, leader of the Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ-BiH) and former member of the Presidency, Dragan Čović.

The Chairperson also met with the President of the Central Election Commission (CEC), Branko Petrić, and a member of CEC, Irena Hadžiabdić, as well as with the President of Our Party (NS), Predrag Kojović; the President of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), Vukota Govedarica; and with Nenad Vuković, member of the Presidency of the Party of Democratic Progress (PDP). During the meetings, the Chair sought to learn more about current developments - and also stressed the need to re-engage in dialogue so as to allow the country to break through the impasse which has hampered progress and exacerbated social divisions.

Chairperson Lajčák urged his interlocutors to form a functioning government at the federal and state level without any delay and to intensify efforts to advance the reform agenda.

“It is a reality that differences exist, but parties should look to the future, from increasing employment, improving healthcare, ensuring quality education without discrimination and enacting environmental policies, to fighting corruption and organized crime, increasing transparency and professionalism of the judiciary, and promoting reconciliation and protection of human rights.”.

However, the Chairperson emphasized that to make progress, political commitment, coherent and comprehensive strategies and uncompromised long term dedication are key. He also called on national partners to take steps towards creating a positive political climate and moving away from divisive rhetoric.

“What we need now, more than ever, is real leadership, a strong vision, and commitment without compromise to the future of this country and its people,” he stressed.

The Chairperson emphasised the OSCE’s readiness to continue to assist the country in its reform efforts through its Mission on the ground. The OSCE Mission to BiH works as a reliable and impartial partner, to support the country in building a stable, prosperous and democratic state that serves the interests of all its citizens.

During his time in Sarajevo, the Chairperson engaged with civil society and members of the international community to hear their perspectives on how they see the country’s development. He also had the opportunity to meet with the staff of the OSCE Mission to BiH and take stock of the Mission’s activities in the country.

Chairperson Lajčák participated in the presentation of the BiH report of the OSCE Survey on the Well-being and Safety of Women - the first of its kind undertaken in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. The report provides a detailed picture of the physical, sexual and psychological violence suffered by women and girls in South-Eastern Europe and Eastern Europe. Stressing that Violence against Women is still far too prevalent in BiH and the wider region, the OSCE Chair noted that, with better data, advocacy, training and institutional reform, there is a higher chance of stamping it out.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

WASHINGTON, DC, 20 June 2019 - The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Stéphane Visconti of France and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America) hosted consultations between Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and Armenian Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan on 20 June in Washington.  The Co-Chairs met separately and then jointly with the Ministers.  They also briefed Acting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Reeker on the situation on the ground and the status of settlement talks.  Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Andrzej Kasprzyk also took part in these meetings.

During their discussions, the participants exchanged views on recent developments on the ground and core issues of the settlement process.  The Foreign Ministers clarified their positions and expectations with respect to implementation of the humanitarian and security measures proposed by the mediators during their last trip to the region. 

Noting with regret recent casualties, the Co-Chairs urged the sides to take immediate measures to restore an atmosphere conducive to peace and favorable to substantive talks.  They called on the sides to reaffirm their commitment to observe the ceasefire strictly and to refrain from any provocative action, including the use of snipers and engineering works along the line of contact and the international border.

During their conversation with the Co-Chairs, the Foreign Ministers agreed upon the importance of taking full advantage of the existing direct communication links in order to react swiftly to reduce the risk of escalation.

The Foreign Ministers agreed to meet again in the near future under the auspices of the Co-Chairs.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• One civilian was injured by shelling in Donetsk city.
• The Mission saw fresh damage from shelling to facilities part ofa children’s hospital in Donetsk city.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, including multiple launch rocket systems near Miusynsk.
• The SMM saw for the first timeanti-tank mines near Shyrokyne and unexploded ordnance near Novooleksandrivka.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement area and elsewhere. Its freedom of movement was also denied at checkpoints near Novoazovsk and Novolaspa, in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (30), compared with the previous reporting period (about 125 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol)and at southerly and northerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, however a similar number of explosions (about 115), compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded south-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Man injured by shelling in Donetsk city

At a hospital in the Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of the city), medical staff told the SMM that a man (58 years old) with a shrapnel wound on his right leg had been admitted to hospital on 14 June. At the hospital, the man told the SMM that on 14 June at around 19:00, while walking on Levchenko Street in the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district, he had heard two explosions and had sustained injuries from a round that had impacted 20m from him. On 14 June, the SMM observed damage to a house located in the same area (see SMM Daily Report 17 June 2019). 

Fresh damage from shelling to facilities part of a children’s hospital in Donetsk city 

In the Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city,about 90m north-west of the Donetsk Children’s hospital No. 4, which provides day-time medical care, the SMM saw broken branches and a partially burned tree (assessed as fresh), assessed as caused by the impact of a round (unable to assess the type of weapon or direction of fire). About 50m south-west of the tree, at a one-storey laundry building of the hospital, the SMM saw nine shattered north-north-east facing windows and several holes on the north-north-east facing wall, and debris on the ground, as well as a hole in the washing machine inside the building. About 15m east of the laundry building, at a one-storey building of a heating plant which provides hot water to the hospital, the SMM saw broken roof sheeting, two shattered windows and bricks that had crumbled and debris on the ground below, all on the north-north-west facing side of the building. The SMM also saw two shattered north-facing windows and three shattered east-facing windows on the same building. The SMM assessed the damage to both buildings as fresh and caused by shrapnel from the same explosion. 

Medical staff at the hospital told the SMM that a security guard and a staff member at the heating plant had heard an explosion at 04:30 on 19 June. 

Disengagement areas[2]

On 18 June, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) among uninhabited damaged houses, about 400m north of the southern edge of the disengagement area and about 600m west-south-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, near previously reported positions of the armed formations. About 100m further south-west, the same UAV spotted five members of the armed formations, one loading and unloading items from a military-type truck.

During the day on 19 June, positioned about 1km north of Kalynove-Borshchuvate(non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard eight shots of small-arms fire, assessed as within the 5km periphery of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).  

On 19 June, positioned north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

16 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of nine multiple launch rocket systems (types undetermined)at a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 5 June 2019).

19 June

The SMM saw an anti-tank guided missile system (ATGM) mounted on an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

18 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in the  north-eastern outskirts of Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in Ocheretyne (31km north-west of Donetsk). 

19 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (T-64BM) in a compound on the south-eastern edge of Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).  

Non-government-controlled areas

14 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a tank on road M-14 near a checkpoint of the armed formations on the north-eastern edge of Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol).

16 June 

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 24 tanks and four surface-to-air missile systems at a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 5 June 2019);
• 12 tanks and four surface-to-air missile systems, 13 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) and nine pieces of self-propelled artillery or mortars (types undetermined) at a training area near Miusynsk (see above); and
• 12 tanks at a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 7 June 2019).

Other weapons observed[4]

Non-government-controlled areas

16 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 26 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) and 22 pieces of self-propelled artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

19 June

The SMM noted that nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and three self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) were presentand that 28 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and 26 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were again missing.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in government-controlled area of Luhansk region

19 June

The SMM noted that the site was abandoned and that 30 tanks (T-64) and 15 mortars (11 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and four BM-37, 82mm) were again missing. 

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

16 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of three probable armoured combat vehicles south-east of Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol).

18 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol). 

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-2) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk);
• three IFVs (two BMP-2 and one BMP-1) in Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk); and
• an IFV (BMP-2) near Chermalyk(31km north-east of Mariupol).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted for the first time a 150m-long extension of a Ukrainian Armed Forces trench (not visible in imagery from 19 April 2019) about 600m south-east of the south-eastern edge of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-east of Donetsk), near recently observed trench extensions.

On 19 June

The SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk). 

Non-government-controlled areas

18 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted fortified previously reported trenches and positions, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, north of Stepove (27km west of Luhansk) (not visible in imagery from 10 May 2019). 

An SMM long range-UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk) and
• nine IFVs (six BMP-2 and three BMP-1) in a training area near Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

19 June

The SMM saw two IFVs (a BMP-1 and a BMP-2) in Holubivka (see above). 

On 16 June, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 58 recent craters caused by undetermined weapons, in an area between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations, about 2.8km south-west of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) (not visible in imagery from 6 June 2019). 

On 18 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) and eight trucks (Kamaz and Ural) in an area between the forward positions of the armed formations near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) and the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Pyshchevyk.

Anti-tank mines seen for the first time near Shyrokyne and unexploded ordnance (UXO) near Novooleksandrivka

On 18 June, on the north-eastern outskirts of Shyrokyne, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted 28 anti-tank mines in a field, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 400m south-east, the same UAV spotted for the first time seven anti-tank mines across road M-14, and another 11 anti-tank mines laid out in two rows across the same road and in a field about 350m east, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 600m east of the latter mines, the same UAV spotted for the first time 25 anti-tank mines (including one burned out) laid out across the same road, all assessed as belonging to the armed formations.    

On 18 June, in the area between the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk and the checkpoint of the armed formations in Verkhnoshyrokivske the SMM saw again a tailfin, assessed as part of a 120mm mortar, stuck in the middle of a road regularly used by civilians.

On 19 June, on road T-0504 used regularly by the SMM, around 50m west of the T-junction leading south to Novooleksandrivka (government-controlled, 65km west of Luhansk), the Mission saw for the first time a tailfin, assessed as from a mortar round, embedded in the asphalt around 1m north of the southern edge of the road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities and repairs to a water pipeline Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and repairs to a water pipeline near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring inKherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro,Chernivtsiand Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint at the northern entrance to Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage south into the town, citing “military training”. 
• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk) two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage west into the village, citing orders from their superiors “not to let anybody enter the village”. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 18-19 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over government- and non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.[7]
• An SMM mini-UAV experienced on two occasions GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 47km south of Donetsk). 
• At a hospital in Horlivka (non-government controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), medical staff refused to provide information related to a civilian casualty to the SMM without the official permission from senior members of the armed formations. 

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[5]The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The Mission noted that one such site continues to be abandoned.

[6]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[7]The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

VIENNA, 20 June 2019 – The 2019 Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC), organized by the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, will take place from 25 to 27 June 2019 in Vienna, under the motto “For People, Dialogue and Stability:  Strengthening Comprehensive Security in the OSCE Area”.

Bringing together diplomats and officials from national capitals in Vienna, this annual high-level OSCE conference provides a forum for a deep and wide-ranging discussion on current security threats and challenges for Europe and the role of the OSCE in successfully addressing them.

The opening session in the morning of 25 June 2019 will be addressed by Miroslav Lajčák, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic; Catherine Ashton, The Rt. Hon. Baroness of Upholland and Former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; Dr. Heinz Fischer, Co-Chair of the Ban Ki-moon Centre and 11th State President of the Republic of Austria; and OSCE Secretary General, Thomas Greminger.

Journalists are invited to follow the keynote segment of the opening session from 9:00 to 9.30 on Tuesday, 25 June, at the Hofburg Conference Centre's Neuer Saal.

Media interested in attending the keynote segment should register by e-mail to press@osce.org, by 18:00, Monday, 24 June. 

Further information and the agenda are available here.

423716 Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Presence in Albania OSCE Presence in Albania

The Albanian government, the OSCE Presence in Albania and the Swiss Embassy signed on 18 June 2019 an agreement for implementing a project to support the Albanian parliament and citizen engagement in decision-making.

The project Support to Parliament and Civic Education in Albania– implemented by the OSCE Presence in Albania with Swiss funding – will focus on making the parliament administration more efficient and effective, on improving the parliament’s legislative, representative and oversight functions, and on making citizens more active in relations with the parliament.  

“The OSCE Presence in Albania has been the closest partner of the Albanian Assembly and the Albanian people throughout their challenges, and will remain a strong supporter of Albania’s institutions and citizens as they tackle their highest priority tasks for a functional democracy,” said Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania Ambassador Bernd Borchardt, who signed the agreement on behalf of the OSCE Presence.

The agreement was also signed by Albania’s Minister of State for Relations with Parliament Elisa Spiropali and Swiss Ambassador Adrian Maître, with the attendance of the Secretary General of the Albanian Assembly, Genc Gjonçaj.

Minister Spiropali thanked the OSCE for its uninterrupted support to the Albanian parliament, and the Swiss Embassy for the Swiss contribution.

“This agreement is part of the Swiss Cooperation Strategy in Albania, in terms of building democratic institutions that are representative and well-functioning. The project aims to develop the Parliament into a better-performing institution. Our project is inclusive of all political actors,” said Swiss Ambassador Maître.

Since its establishment, the OSCE Presence in Albania has worked to promote democratization, the rule of law, and human rights as well as to consolidate democratic institutions in line with OSCE principles, standards and commitments. The support to the parliament is considered a cross-cutting and cross-programmatic endeavour within the OSCE support to Albania, in areas including law-making, legislative reform, parliamentary procedures and capacity building, electoral reform, civic engagement, gender equality and promotion of good governance.

The new project is part of the Swiss Cooperation Strategy for the years 2018-2021. This is the first time Swiss support extends to the highest legislative body in the country. The funding comes from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.

VIENNA, 20 June 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, expressed his deep sorrow following the death of journalist and blogger Vadim Komarov, who died last night in the hospital. He had been in a coma since suffering a violent attack on 4 May in Cherkasy, Ukraine.

“I am deeply shocked by the death of Vadim Komarov, who was brutally attacked last month in Cherkasy and suffered from serious head injuries,” Désir said. “Vadim Komarov was a well-known media professional who reported about issues of public importance for many years, including by exposing corruption and uncovering abuses of power.”

“I strongly condemn this horrendous attack. Those responsible for this crime must be identified and face justice. I reiterate my call on the Ukrainian authorities to complete the investigation in a vigorous and swift manner. It is regrettable that about one-and-a-half months after the attack the law enforcement have not yet identified the perpetrators nor reported any progress on the investigation. Violence and attacks against journalists are unacceptable and must stop. Impunity would be a victory for those who wanted to silence Komarov and to intimidate the press. All OSCE participating States should take effective and resolute actions to prevent and end impunity for such crimes,” Désir said.

“I send my sincere condolences to his family, colleagues and friends,” the Representative said.

Earlier, the Representative condemned the attack on Komarov (see: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/418895).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

Journalists from Turkmenistan’s print, online and broadcast media participated in an OSCE-organized training course on how to cover political, economic and humanitarian issues, which took place in Ashgabat from 18 to 20 June 2019. It provided practical tips on how to cover key national and international events, including elections, visits and parliamentary sessions and how to present economic news in a format understandable to audiences.

The training course offered an opportunity to discuss the role of journalism in the multimedia age and new trends in the media such as data journalism and multimedia formats.

International experts presented basic principles of journalistic ethics and storytelling as a key element of modern media. The participants learnt about modern techniques to search and verify information, and exchanged views on how to recognize fake news and analyse sources of information.

“Our training course is focused on the coverage of political, economic and humanitarian issues, and these are the key aspects of the OSCE’s comprehensive security concept,” said Natalya Drozd, the Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat. “Providing reliable and quality coverage of topical issues is the most important task of any journalist, and the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat is committed to continuing its support in enhancing the capacity of Turkmenistan’s journalists.”

The participants discussed the specifics of media projects on humanitarian topics and gender-sensitive journalism and worked in groups to prepare a detailed scenario of a multimedia project.

423632 Marina Živaljević

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro, together with UNHCR and the government authorities, donors, partner countries, the Council of Europe Development Bank, participated in the 14th Regional Housing Programme (RHP) steering committee meeting on 18 June 2019 in Podgorica.

The participants assessed the progress of the RHP, the sustainability of its strategic impact.

With nearly 5,170 families provided with housing so far, the stakeholders expressed their satisfaction with the implementation pace. In Montenegro, 395 housing solutions have been provided to 1,504 most vulnerable persons.

Ancillary to the meeting, a reception was held to celebrate World Refugee Day. The Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Maryse Daviet, said: “As this project progresses, lessons from the regional housing programme should support other efforts to provide durable housing solutions to the most vulnerable displaced persons elsewhere in the world.”

On the following day the steering committee members visited a RHP housing estate in the municipality of Nikšić, which provides homes for 62 families.

The RHP is a joint initiative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia. Its aim is to contribute to resolving the displacement situation of the most vulnerable refugees and displaced persons, and to foster the institutional capacity of the partner countries in order to ensure sustainable return.

SARAJEVO, 20 June 2019 – The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) presented in Sarajevo today the results of the OSCE-led Survey on the Well-being and Safety of Women for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

This survey was conducted by the OSCE in 2018 with the goal of providing comparable data on different forms of violence women experience throughout the course of their lives. The research also examined violence that women experience in conflict and non-conflict settings, as well as the impact violence has both on women and on larger societies, including its lasting consequences.

“Violence against women is a social, not an individual problem. While manifestations might change over time, the root causes are deeply ingrained in our societies,” said OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Miroslav Lajčák, in BiH on an official visit. “The OSCE recognizes violence against women as both a threat to individuals and a broader security concern and is committed to combating it, as outlined in last year’s important Ministerial Council Decision on preventing and combating violence against women. Violence against women and girls must not be overlooked any longer,” stressed Lajčák.

The results for Bosnia and Herzegovina show that three out of five women think that violence against women is common in their communities. Also, four in ten women in BiH stated that they experienced psychological, physical or sexual violence since the age of 15 by a partner or other persons. Nearly half of the women interviewed believe that domestic violence is a private matter, and more than 40% do not know what to do if they experience violence. Unfortunately, the majority of women do not report the violence they experience, identifying shame, financial repercussions/issues, lack of information, mistrust in services and overall fear as reasons for not reporting their experiences to relevant institutions.

Samra Filipović-Hadžiabdić, Director of the BiH Agency for Gender Equality said that this survey should be considered as a call for action. “In BiH the situation is complex because there is no unique strategic or harmonized legislative framework for the fight against gender-based violence. Because of that, the BiH Agency for Gender Equality and the BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees will continue to work on ensuring an equal system of prevention and protection for victims of violence in the country, harmonizing legislative and institutional framework with the aim of securing protection, status and access to services for victims of violence.”

The survey was conducted in seven OSCE participating States: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova, Ukraine. It was also conducted in Kosovo. Overall, more than 15,000 women were asked about different forms of violence they have experienced over the course of their lives. In BiH 2,321 women aged 18 to 74 were interviewed.

423503 Communication and Media Relations Section

A three-day workshop on how to establish an Advance Passenger Information (API) system for preventing the movement of foreign terrorist fighters and enhancing aviation security was held in Yerevan from 17 to 19 June 2019.  Some 20 representatives from relevant Armenian agencies involved in passenger processing, together with police and customs officials and members of the civil aviation authority and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attended the event.

The workshop, which focused on drafting a roadmap for setting up an API system, was organized by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department (TNTD), with the support of Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

International experts from Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, together with representatives of the UN, airline companies and commercial service providers shared their experiences and best practices in working with API data and establishing the system. They emphasized the importance of strong inter-agency co-operation and a comprehensive legal framework that allows for the collection of passenger data while fully respecting citizens’ right to privacy.

An API system is an electronic system through which biographic data from a traveller’s passport and flight details are collected by airlines and transmitted to the relevant entities such as border control agencies before departure or arrival.

The collection and processing of API data by government structures has grown in importance since the adoption of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2178 (2014), which calls for the establishment of individual API systems. This obligation has been further reinforced with the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2396 (2017) and Amendment 26 to the Chicago Convention, making an API system mandatory.

“During our API workshops, we aim to provide local authorities with a good understanding of how an API system works and to help them to identify technical assistance and financial opportunities available for the implementation of such a project,” said Simon Deignan, OSCE Programme Manager.

This was the eleventh workshop on API in the OSCE region organized since December 2016. The TNTD plans to conduct additional workshops across the OSCE area in 2019 and 2020.

WARSAW, 20 June 2019 - On World Refugee Day and amid ever more restrictive interpretations of international legal standards to protect people in search of international protection, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) calls on governments to do more to ensure the primacy of human rights for all those seeking safety in our countries, so far away from home.

“Saving the lives of those in danger is an obligation and not a crime, or even a favour,” said ODIHR Director Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir. “We need greater co-operation between national governments, border control authorities, and civil society to ensure that more human lives are not lost.”

Even when refugees and migrants have reached safety, they often face intolerance and discrimination in hosting societies. “The right to life is paramount. But refugees also have the right to live free from fear of violence and discrimination,” said Gísladóttir. “Refugees can and do make an important contribution to our countries. However, this is only possible if we welcome their skills and experience into our societies.”

ODIHR’s Director also expressed solidarity with the civil society organizations and individuals who work to protect their rights, saying:

“These people are playing a vital role, but they are increasingly subjected to judicial harassment and criminalization, smear campaigns, threats and even attacks, right across the OSCE region. We must come to the defence of those who are defending the most vulnerable in our societies.”

The work of those defending migrant and refugees’ rights is particularly important at present, as pushbacks at borders become more frequent and some states make access to asylum procedures increasingly difficult, setting up legislative and administrative barriers as a deterrent to asylum seekers.

ODIHR works with countries across the OSCE to help defend migrant rights, and ensure that migration policies and legislation are effective and take into account the different needs of women and men as well as the special needs of children. At the same time, ODIHR also works to safeguard human rights defenders, enabling them to continue helping refugees and migrants, every day.

SARAJEVO, 19 June 2019 – The 6th South East Europe Media Conference, organized by the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFoM) in co-operation with the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), concluded today in Sarajevo. The event gathered around 200 journalists and media professionals from the region and abroad to discuss media developments, safety of journalists, the legal environment for media freedom, and sustainable solutions for public service broadcasters.

"The testimonies we heard from journalists of the region, as well as from various media and legal experts, show that the media freedom situation in the region is serious. The development of a pluralistic and independent media is hindered by the concentration of media ownership, unfair competition rules for access to financing and commercial advertisement, and strong political interference in the editorial policies of many media. This is stifling the development of new, independent and critical media. At the same time, many journalists are still harassed, threatened or attacked because of their reporting,” said OSCE RFoM Harlem Désir.

The participants highlighted that safety of journalists continues to be one of the major challenges. “Journalists continue to be in danger simply for doing their jobs – and Bosnia and Herzegovina is no exception. They are sued, threatened and physically assaulted. The statistics point to a deteriorating media environment, but cold numbers do little to convey the harsh reality of this problem,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH Bruce G. Berton.

The conference served as a platform for the exchange of experiences and best practices with local and international experts and civil society organizations, among them RSF, ARTICLE 19, IFEX, the European federation of journalists and the European Broadcasting Union.

The Representative also underlined the need to support diversity, security and solidarity for media development in the region. 

Following the conference, a new set of recommendations will be sent by the RFoM to the authorities of the region, to help shape policies which support media development and pluralism, safety of journalists, sustainable and independent public service media, and a legal environment supportive of freedom of expression and media freedom.

“Media freedom, pluralism, quality information, and investigative journalism are key to the democratic future of the region,” the Representative stated. “My Office will continue to flag and monitor the media freedom situation as well as to provide legal assistance, to remind participating States of their OSCE commitments and obligations to improve and ensure respect for media freedom.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

SKOPJE, 19 June 2019 – On a trip to the Republic of North Macedonia, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák, today in Skopje, congratulated North Macedonia on its successes over the last year, in particular the Prespa Agreement on the issue of the country’s name and achieved reforms.

“The Prespa Agreement is a milestone achievement and really a textbook example of successful diplomacy and conflict resolution. It can pave the ground for a new level of good neighbourly relations,” he said.

“For a long time, it looked like the name issue was unsolvable, but with real leadership, real vision and real courage, a solution was found. And it gives us hope for other disputes,” the Chairperson stressed while underlining that “it is crucial to keep the momentum going”. “The recent historic achievement should not allow us to get complacent. On the contrary, now is the time to pick up the pace. And, that is a main reason why I am here – to find opportunities for doing just that,” he added.

One of these opportunities is continuing to focus on North Macedonia’s ambitious reform agenda on the path towards achieving its strategic priorities for the benefit of all communities. 

As the longest serving OSCE field presence, the Organization’s Mission in Skopje has assisted North Macedonia for the past 27 years in areas ranging from capacity building for early warning and conflict prevention and fostering improved inter-ethnic relations, to supporting reforms in areas such as elections, democratic policing, local governance and the judiciary, and promoting women’s leadership in the public sector and the participation of young people in regional dialogue.

“The Mission to Skopje stands ready to continue and enhance its co-operation with the authorities at this important time for the country,” emphasized Lajčák.

Discussions on the country’s strategic priorities were prevalent throughout Minister Lajčák’s meetings with the political leadership of North Macedonia, including President Pendarovski, Prime Minister Zaev, Deputy Prime Minister Osmani, Foreign Minister Dimitrov, and VMRO-DPMNE leader Mickoski.

The OSCE Chair also engaged with OSCE Mission staff and civil society to get a frank assessment of the overall situation from those closest to the ground.

And he had a chance to meet with children and teachers who are involved in the OSCE Mission-supported “Building Bridges” project – an initiative that brings together students from all communities and linguistic backgrounds - that Minister Lajčák considered particularly important as it helps to bridge ethnical and social divides. 

“Your spirit of co-operation is contagious,” Lajčák told the children and teachers present.

During meetings with people engaged in projects to raise environmental awareness through education funded by SlovakAid, the OSCE Chair warned against taking the environment for granted, as we may reach a point of no return: “And it does not go unnoticed that every week thousands of students take to the streets to demand urgent climate action,” he added.

While in Skopje, Minister Lajčák also addressed the National Convention on the EU, a multi-stakeholder platform aimed at supporting and discussing governmental reform policy. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw fresh damage from shelling to residential houses in Donetsk city.
• Small-arms fire in the direction of an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle flying east of Shyrokyne, in areas between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations
• The SMM observed small-arms fire impacts inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska and recorded ceasefire violations inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The SMM saw for the first time a piece of unexploded ordnance in an asphalt road near Marinka.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (125), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 280 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), at westerly and southerly directions of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and in areas south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage from shelling to residential houses in Donetsk city

At 70 Bashkyrska Street in the northern outskirts of Donetsk city, the SMM observed a single-storey residential house with its roof missing and its north- and west-facing brick walls partly burnt down. It saw a hole (1m in diameter) in the upper northern corner of the house, about 3m above ground, as well as two broken north-facing window panes and a broken west-facing window pane. It also saw that glass panes from a north-facing door were missing. At the same address, the SMM observed a second residential single-storey house, located 5m west of the first one, with two broken window panes and glass panes missing from a door, as well as multiple holes (0.5cm-5cm in diameter), all on its east-facing side, assessed as caused by shrapnel. The SMM assessed the damage to both houses as caused by a round of an undetermined weapon fired from a north-westerly direction. The owner of the second house (a woman in her thirties) told the SMM that her mother, who lived in the first house, had been absent when the damage occurred on the evening of 16 June, while she and her husband had been at home when she heard an explosion, gone outside and seen the roof of her mother’s house on fire.

Small-arms fire in the direction of an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flying east of Shyrokyne

Positioned about 1km north-west of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km west of Mariupol) while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard seven bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as at a distance of 3.5km east and as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 3.5km east of the patrol’s position in areas between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Disengagement areas[2]

On 15 June, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska(government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed ten holes (1-2cm in diameter, 20cm-4m above ground) in and around an observation post of a Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position: two in its south-facing inner and two in its south-facing outer wall, as well as six more in two military barriers (one made of sandbags and the other of concrete) located immediately south of the observation post. The SMM assessed all holes as fresh and caused by small-arms fired (for previous observations from the area see SMM Daily Report 10 June 2019).

On the morning of 18 June, the SMM camera near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk)recorded an airburst 3-5km south-south-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area). During the day on 18 June, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM recorded an undetermined explosion 2-3km west, assessed as inside the abovementioned disengagement area. On the night of 17-18 June and during the day on 18 June, positioned in three locations, the SMM recorded 15 explosions and about 20 shots within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

18 June 

The SMM noted that:

• 92 tanks (36 T-64B, 26 T-64 and 30 T-72), seven towed howitzers (D-44, 85mm) and six mortars (three2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and the rest undetermined) were again missing; and 
• seven mortars (four M120-15 Molot, 120mm and three PM-38, 120mm) were missing for the first time.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Non-government-controlled areas

17 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMP-1 and a BMP-2) and an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) near Styla (34km south of Donetsk), and
• an IFV (probable BMP-1) near Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk).

Government-controlled areas

17 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) parked between residential houses in Svitlodarsk.

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two ACVs(types undetermined), an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).

On 17 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted for the first time a 450m-long extension of a Ukrainian Armed Forces trench (not visible in imagery from 21 April 2019) about 500m south-east of the south-eastern edge of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-east of Donetsk), as well as two additional trenches (100m each) running towards the north-east and south-east, assessed as new forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces located about 400m west of the nearest forward positions of the armed formations. 

Other weapons observed[4]

The SMM observed a towed anti-tank gun (type unknown) near Seleznivka (government-controlled, 97km north of Donetsk).

Presence of unexploded ordnance near Marinka and mine hazard signs near Marinka, Novomykhailivka and Olenivka

The SMM observed for the first time a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as a rocket from a multiple launch rocket system (BM-21, Grad122mm) and as not recent, embedded in the middle of the asphalt of road H15, 10m north-west of a fortification belonging to a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces located about 1km south of Marinka. 

The SMM observed a red and white mine hazard sign with instructions on what to do when finding a mine/UXO in Ukrainian, 5m east of a road next to an uncultivated field about 2km south of Marinka (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 19 December 2018).

The Mission observed for the first time three red mine hazard signs with the words “Danger, Mines” in Ukrainian, Russian and English placed 4m east from the edge of an asphalt road in an adjacent field, 200m, 400m and 1.5km north of Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed for the first time two wires, assessed as trip wires, attached to a red mine hazard sign in the median strip of road H20, about 1.2km south of a checkpoint of the armed formations in Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). It also saw that eight anti-tank mines previously observed in the eastern lane of the same road, about 200m north-east of the aforementioned mine hazard sign, were no longer present.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines in Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk) and to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 70 minutes, the SMM saw 17 cars (five with Ukrainian and nine with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates), two buses (with Russian Federation licence plates), and seven pedestrians (five men and two women, aged 20-50) entering Ukraine, and 20 cars (six with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) and two buses (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring inKherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro,Chernivtsiand Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• During the evening of 17 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over Novozvanivka (government-controlled, 70km west of Luhansk) and Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).[5]
• On 18 June, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km west of Mariupol), the SMM heard seven bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at its UAV, which it landed safely.
• On the same day, on three occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Shyrokyne. 
• On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol).

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During this reporting period, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre. 

[5]The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

MINSK, 19 June 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group, Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its working groups in Minsk on 19 June 2019:

“Today, the participants of the TCG and its working groups continued to discuss the ideas elaborated at our previous meeting. As you understand, this work requires thorough preparation.

In particular, thisregards the disengagement of forces and hardware in the area of ​​Stanytsia Luhanska. The intention to launch it voiced by the sides in Minsk two weeks ago, has not yet been implemented. The reason for this was ceasefire violations. It is worth noting, however, that such violations occurred after the sides had expressed this intention. Before that, there had been no cease-fire violations for a fairly long while.

I have a feeling that the sides really want to disengage their forces and hardware from Stanytsia Luhanska. I sincerely hope that it will take place, but today I cannot predict the exact date.

A similar situation concerns the cessation of fire. Despite the sides’ clear interest in a so-called "harvest ceasefire", today, unfortunately, they could not yet reach a common understanding on the text of the joint statement.

This ceasefire, along with broad mine action, is crucial for civilians residing in the conflict area.

A ceasefire is also indispensable for children who have recently finished the school year. Children have the right to a vacation without fear.

These issues were today in the focus of Security working group, and work on them will be actively taken forward.

Among other issues on the agenda, the Economic working group paid particular attention to water supply issues in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions on both sides of the contact line.

The Humanitarian working group continued discussions related to the exchange of detainees, search for missing persons, as well as the possibilities of improving the conditions of crossing the contact line via the checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska.

The Political working group exchanged views on its well-known agenda, namely the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and the modalities of local elections in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.”

BRATISLAVA, 19 June 2019 - Trends, challenges and opportunities related to inter-state security in the ICT/cyber space were the focus of a conference that brought together more than 200 representatives of governments, the private sector, civil society, academia and the UN for an OSCE-wide conference on 17 and 18 June 2019. The conference, Cyber/ICT Security for a Safer Future: The OSCE’s Role in Fostering Regional Cyber Security, was organized by the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, in co-operation with the Transnational Threats Department of the OSCE Secretariat.

Deputy Prime Minister of Slovakia Richard Raši opened the conference by emphasizing that cyber/ICT can act as “both an incredible opportunity and a major vulnerability.”“Malware and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, massive data breaches and misuse of artificial intelligence can all wreak havoc on our lives and economies and threaten critical infrastructure,” he said. “The OSCE, in line with its mandate on conflict prevention and its comprehensive approach to security, has pioneered multilateral co-operation to prevent conflict arising from the use or misuse of cyber/ICT.”

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger highlighted the valuable role of regional organizations in contributing to cyber security.

“They can be incubators for new ideas and practical efforts that relate to Confidence-Building Measures as well as an implementer of globally accepted agreements,” he said. “The promotion of effective crisis communication channels, international co-operation, especially at the policy level, as well as measures to enhance national and regional cyber/ICT security capacities are core elements of efforts needed to advance cyber security at the national and regional levels.” 

Among the topics explored at the conference were cyber attacks, the disruption of critical infrastructure, electoral interference, the weaponization of Artificial Intelligence and disinformation campaigns. An interactive scenario-based discussion allowed government participants to better understand the implications and results of an attack on critical infrastructure, and provided hands-on experience in responding to such an incident. 

While focusing on the OSCE’s role in tackling regional cybersecurity challenges, including through the implementation of its pioneering 16 Confidence-Building Measures related to ICT/cyber security and the efforts of its Informal Working Group, the conference also had a strong global focus.

The conference hosted, on its margins, the very first consultations of the newly formed UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications (UN GGE).

A panel discussion, including the Chairs of the UN GGE, Ambassador Guilherme de Aguiar Patriota of Brazil; the UN Open-Ended-Working Group, Ambassador Jürg Lauber of Switzerland; and the OSCE Informal Working Group, Ambassador Károly Dán of Hungary, highlighted the complementary nature of the OSCE’s work in the context of ongoing global policy discussions related to cybersecurity.

The participation of Izumi Nakamitsu, the UN’s Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, as well as the Acting Head of the European External Action Service’s Policy Division, Rory Domm, in the conference reflected the need for strong multilateral co-operation in this area. 

The conference was designed with a strong people-focus. Among the side events held was a discussion on the need to break down remaining barriers for employment in the ICT/cyber sectors, in particular for women and girls.

Various speakers also stressed that efforts to advance national, regional and global cybersecurity should be firmly grounded in commitments to protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM again saw damage from gunfire to a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, and saw damage from shelling to residential houses in Khreshchatytske. It also observed damage to an agricultural building near Dokuchaievsk and craters in Prymorske and Sosnivske, as well as near Mykolaivka and Zaitseve.
• Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the Mission saw an anti-aircraft gun and a trench extension and recorded a ceasefire violation.
• The SMM spotted anti-tank mines near Nyzhnie Lozove and Vesela Hora.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement area and elsewhere.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 80), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 25 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in the area east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) and south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 280), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 50 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and in areas north of Hannivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

Damage from gunfire at a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

In Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), at a functioning school on Myru Street, the SMM saw fresh holes in three north-west facing windows (one on the first floor and two on the second floor) in a three-storey brick building. The Mission saw shattered glass on the floor inside the building below two of the windows. It assessed the damage as caused by gunfire. A school employee (woman, 50 years old) told the SMM that she had found the damage after 06:00 on 17 June. This is the tenth time that the Mission has reported on damage at this school since the beginning of the year (for the most recent observations at this location, see SMM Daily Report 15 June 2019).

Fresh damage from shelling at residential houses in Khreshchatytske

In Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), at a one-storey house at 3 Zoi Kosmodemianskoi Street, the SMM saw a shrapnel hole in a corrugated asbestos roof panel on the south-facing side of the roof. The Mission assessed the damage as caused by an airburst, but could not determine the direction of fire or weapon used. A resident of the house (woman in her sixties) told the SMM that in the early morning hours of 17 June she had been at home when she heard explosions near her house.

About 1.3km further south-east, on the south-eastern edge of Khreshchatytske, the SMM saw a fresh crater in soft soil on the side of a local road, assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round, fired from a westerly direction. About 30m north-north-west of the crater, it also saw two fresh holes on a concrete electrical pylon, assessed as shrapnel damage. Approximately 30m north-north-east from the aforementioned crater, the Mission observed a shattered south-facing window and a fresh hole in the south-facing wall of a one-storey house at 1 Stepova Street, assessed as shrapnel damage. Two residents of the house (a man and a woman in their sixties) told the Mission that on the night of 15-16 June, they had heard eight explosions near their house and that the electricity and gas supply to the village had been cut (and restored around noon on 16 June).

About 350m further east-south-east, 1m from the eastern edge of the road to Kachkarske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw another fresh crater in soft soil, assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction.

Damage to an agricultural building near Dokuchaievsk and craters near Prymorske, Sosnivske, Mykolaivka and Zaitseve

On 14 June, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an impact to the roof of an agricultural building south-west of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 21 April 2019).

On 15 June, in a residential area on the northern edge of Prymorske (non-government-controlled, 76km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted 11 fresh craters in the garden of a house, including three within 10m of the property, assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction.

About 3km further south-west, the same UAV spotted eight fresh craters in a field on the eastern outskirts of Sosnivske (non-government-controlled, 78km south of Donetsk), assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a north-westerly direction (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 28 May 2019).

About 7km further north-west, the same UAV spotted six fresh craters on an unpaved road about 1.3km south-east of Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 70km south of Donetsk): three assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds and three as caused by grenades (AGS-17/30, 30mm), all fired from a north-westerly direction.

On 16 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two fresh craters in a treeline about 1.3km north-east of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), assessed as caused by probable 122mm artillery rounds fired from a southerly direction.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 15 June, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted a 100m-long extension of a trench running from east to west, about 650m west-south-west of the armed formations checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), near previously reported positions of the armed formations (not seen in previous imagery from 2 June 2019). The same UAV also spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) among uninhabited damaged houses inside the disengagement area, about 110m east of the aforementioned trench (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 9 April 2019). On 16 June, outside the disengagement area, an SMM-mini UAV spotted a new 150m-long trench running from north to south close to civilian houses, about 700m north-west of the northern edge of the area (not visible in imagery from 2 June).  On the evening of 17 June, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge recorded a muzzle flash at an assessed distance of 1.5km north, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On 16 June, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted for the first time a defensive position, 5m west of previously observed trenches of the armed formations and about 900m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area. During the day on 16 June, the same camera recorded smoke near the ground at assessed ranges of 0.5-1km east-south-east and 1-1.5km south, within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery. On the evening of 17 June, the same camera recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1-1.5km east-south-east, assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery. During the day on 17 June, while in Popasna and positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and on the south-western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard about 190 undetermined explosions and about 190 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.

On 17 June, positioned north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines:

Government-controlled areas

17 June

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) about 20m from residential buildings in Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

15 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk) and
• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (BMP variants) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk).

17 June

The SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) about 20m from residential buildings in Novhorodske.

Non-government-controlled areas15 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80) about 40m from the playground of a functioning school in Lukove (72km south of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an APC (BTR-70 or BTR-80) near Nyzhnie Lozove (59km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• six IFVs (three BMP-1 and three BMP variants) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk) and
• two ACVs (type undetermined) near Zorynsk (54km south-west of Luhansk).

Presence of anti-tank mines near Nyzhnie Lozove and Vesela Hora

On 15 June, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted seven anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across road M-03 about 2.5km west of Nyzhnie Lozove. On 16 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted again four anti-tank mines laid across road H-21 near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk). About 750m further north-west, the same UAV spotted for the first time eight anti-tank mines laid in one row across the western lane of the same road.

SMM facilitated operation of civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 16 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying near Kamyshne (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Luhansk) and Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk).[5]

During the day on 17 June, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk).
 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During this reporting period, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

Marina Živaljević

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro supported the State Election Commission (SEC) in developing a strategic work plan identifying key activities for 2019 and 2020 by organizing a three-day workshop from 12 to 14 June in Podgorica. The workshop was attended by five commissioners and ten service staff members.

Closing the seminar, the Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Siv-Katrine Leirtroe, said that the SEC’s next steps will be to finalize the strategic plan. “The realization of this plan will support the building of public confidence in your Commission to administer elections in a fair and transparent manner, which is essential for voters of Montenegro,” said Leirtroe.

“Bearing in mind that 2020 is an election year; the SEC is committed to starting the preparatory activities this year,” said Veljo Čađenović, SEC Secretary . “Special attention in planning should be dedicated to improving the transparency of the work of the SEC and to strengthening personnel and administrative capacities,” he added.

OSCE Senior Election Adviser Bujar Basha encouraged the SEC to continue its work on drafting the strategic plan and to establish clear objectives for the next two years. “The best time to start developing the plan is immediately following this workshop,” said Basha.

Participants of the seminar agreed that the SEC needs a strategic plan as it would be very helpful for the institution to have a clear vision that can determine the SEC’s desired future. One of the challenges in planning will be potential electoral reform, since it will require, among other things, harmonization of secondary legislation with new legal solutions, as well as a greater need for education of election administration bodies at all levels.

This workshop is a continuation of the technical assistance provided by the Mission to the SEC over the past three years. The Mission most recently supported the SEC in developing an election operational plan in preparation for the upcoming 2020 parliamentary elections.

Communication and Media Relations Section SDGs SDGs:  7 - Affordable and clean energy 9 - Industry, innovation and infrastructure 17 - Partnerships for the goals

On 14 June 2019 in Baku, the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities together with the Director of the Port of Baku launched the project Promoting Green Ports and Connectivity in the Caspian Sea Region.

The project aims to support Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in strengthening green ports and connectivity in the Caspian Sea Region. Feasibility studies, expert workshops and delegation visits to leading international green ports will explore how to make best use of renewable energy, digitalization and trade and transport facilitation to promote sustainable connectivity. The project will be implemented in partnership with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, UNECE and leading private sector experts.

During a workshop on digitalization held with the Port of Baku, participants discussed plans to establish a digital platform to facilitate data exchange between Caspian Sea Ports in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. At the trade facilitation workshop, participants discussed how the ports would benefit from reduced border crossing times and enhanced co-operation between authorities.

"The new Port of Baku completely operates in line with the modern standards,” said the Director-General of the Port of Baku, Dr Taleh Ziyadov. “The co-operation between the Port of Baku and the OSCE, and the sister ports of the Caspian region which starts today is another crucial step in administering further environmental protection and accelerating more efficient and timely data exchange in the Caspian region.”

The Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, Vuk Žugić, said that through this innovative regional project, the OSCE will make a contribution to strengthening sustainability, connectivity, security and economic growth in the Caspian Sea region. “Producing more energy with less emission has become a major concern for a sustainable future. Renewable energy and energy efficiency are part of the answer to reduce the environmental footprint of the way we produce and consume energy. It is the way to go,” he said.

Ambassador Kamil Khasiyev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan Director of Regional Security, said that this project will address the facilitation of trade and transport between the three ports and the wider region, including other Central Asian States. “This project of the OSCE will serve as a concrete example of its relevance and value for enhancing regional security, stability and prosperity.”

Daniel Kroos, OSCE Energy Security Senior Programme Officer, said that economies in the region are likely to experience significant economic growth over the coming decades, sparked by growth in Asia and political and economic reforms. “The growing interdependence and stronger economic relations in the region provide an opportunity for increased collaboration on international and regional security and the need for a comprehensive approach encompassing energy, digital aspects and transport infrastructure to accommodate the fast-growing trade between Asia and Europe,” he said.

The OSCE’s work in this field is aligned with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and contributes to a range of Sustainable Development Goals: SDG 7, “Affordable and Clean Energy”, SDG 9, “Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure”, and SDG 17, “Global Partnerships”.

The project is financially supported by Azerbaijan, Germany, Italy and Iceland.