Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Pascal Boniface décrypte dans cette vidéo agrémentée de cartes, de photos et d’infographies, le concept de prolifération nucléaire, depuis que les Etats-Unis et l’URSS se sont dotés de l’arme atomique à la fin des années 1940, jusqu’à l’accord de 2015 avec l’Iran, en passant par les cas de l’Irak, de la Corée du Nord, du Pakistan, de l’Inde ou encore d’Israël.

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In 2017, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres proposed a new management paradigm to better enable the UN to address global challenges by giving decision-makers at the country level greater authority over their resources and thus greater speed and flexibility in setting and responding to priorities; reducing duplicative structures and increasing support for the field, including through the creation of new Departments of Operational Support (DOS) and Management Strategy, Policy, and Compliance(DMSPC); increasing accountability, and transparency; and reforming planning and budgeting processes.

While the reform is still a work in progress, it has continued to gain momentum, and implementation has become more systematic. More work is needed to fully realize the potential of the management reform, and ensure that it aligns with parallel reforms underway in the UN peace and security architecture and development system.

IPI, in partnership with the French Ministry for Armed Forces, held a virtual conversation among high ranking UN management officials and experts on September 17th to examine the implementation of the reform and its impact on peace operations, both from the perspectives of UN headquarters and the field.

Setting the backdrop for the discussion, Rear Admiral Hervé Hamelin, Deputy Director for International Security Affairs, Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy, French Ministry for Armed Forces, said that while the reform aims to respond to changes in peace operations mandates on operating environments, “stakeholders, more particularly from the field, continue to consider that it is not implemented to its fullest potential. Additional challenges continue as well to divide the international community, more particularly the capacity of member states to overcome divisions during the current 75th session of the UN General Assembly that will be key for the implementation of the reform on human resources.”

Wolfgang Weiszegger, former Director of Mission Support for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and author of the IPI paper Implementing the UN Management Reform: Progress and Implications for Peace Operations, gave a stark overview of how field operation management needs have piled up and why serious reform was needed. “If a UN field operation needs as little as a paper clip or as much as finance personnel, an aircraft, or a maritime fleet, management or support staff, DOS at UN headquarters, and mission support staff in the field better be included and involved in all discussions, and at each and every step of the way you need analysis, planning, execution, and evaluation processes. Otherwise, the resources required to implement a mission’s mandate just won’t be available at the right time and at the right quantity, quality, and cost. There’ll be no sufficient personnel, financial assets, infrastructure, materiel assets in place when and where they’re needed. That’s why it would be important to determine and leverage the converging streams of the management reform also with the streams of the peace and security reform, and the development reform since nothing works in isolation, and synchronicities and interdependencies need to be leveraged.”

Reviewing what had occurred so far in response to the reforms, Mr. Weiszegger said, “Managers have been empowered, accountability strengthened, processes streamlined, delegations of authority decentralized, and trust with member states improved, just to name a few.” A critical part that remained to be done, he stressed, was determining whether it has had a positive impact on people on the ground and people in areas of distress and conflict. But in general, he concluded, “The management reforms have taken off, are on the right track, and emphasis must now be placed on keeping the momentum going.”

Eugene Chen, Programme Management Officer in the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General, flagged the high priority of the Secretary-General’s reform agenda by saying that its “ultimate objective” was “to maintain the relevance of the United Nations. The reforms seek to achieve this by enhancing the effectiveness and accountability of the organization in program delivery through all three tracks of reform, including management, peace and security, and development. The management reform focuses on decentralizing the management of the Secretariat and empowering senior managers, including heads of missions, such that the responsibility for implementing mandates is now aligned with authority to manage resources. The structural changes to the management architecture at headquarters are a catalyst for the decentralization.”

Mr. Chen detailed some of the changes and counseled against thinking that the reform was simply a rearrangement of functions rather than the sweeping fundamental shift that it is in the relationship between headquarters and the field. “Authority for the management of human and financial resources is delegated directly to senior managers, including heads of mission. Missions are therefore no longer mere extensions of the will of headquarters departments, but are now firmly in the driver’s seat. The newly established headquarters departments have no day-to-day decision-making authority over mission budgets and staffing but instead are responsible for supporting missions and other Secretariat entities through policy and guidance, advisory services, and administrative and logistical support.” He said that there are also new formalized mechanisms with representative field participation to ensure that policies and procedures are in line with recommendations from the field.

Mr. Chen argued that the new system was put to an early unexpected test with the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic, and had proved its value. “COVID-19 has therefore served as an important test to validate both the underlying concept and the new structures put in place via management reform.”

Picking up on that point, Rick Martin, Director, Division for Special Activities, UN Department of Operational Support (DOS) said, “I shudder to think where we would be with our previous structures and authorities in responding to the pandemic that has impacted across the Secretariat and particularly in our field missions.” The UN was particularly vulnerable, he noted, with peace operations in nine of the 11 countries most affected by COVID-19, and more than 1200 confirmed cases and 18 colleagues lost, many of them police and military officers living and working in congregate high-density situations.

Among the gains he listed from the reforms were:

• Having supply chain management integrated across procurement and logistics management. “They were in separate departments in the past, and that shouldn’t matter, but unfortunately in our world it does.”
• Aligning what has traditionally been the medical treatment capacities with occupational safety and health. “I can tell you that quite often when we talk about the pandemic now, we talk less about the medical response and more about occupational safety and health, given the threat to the health of our personnel.”
• Creating a single entry point on uniform capability support for peace operations.
• Having a more consolidated approach in standing capacities now for training.
• Streamlining recruitment and onboarding processes.
• Closing gaps in what resources peace operations are able to access on an immediate basis.
• Providing support to the resident coordinators, who are now being brought into the Secretariat.
• Establishing a standing search capacity of existing staff across the whole Secretariat that can de deployed to an incident or transitional requirement needing additional capacity.
• “A genuine convergence between the Secretary-General’s reform pillars—management reform, peace and security architecture, and the development system reforms—which has been made possible by having a single Department of Operational Support.”

Olga de la Piedra, Director, Office of the Under-Secretary-General, UN Department of Management, Strategy, Policy and Compliance (DMSPC) said that the enhanced delegation of authority to the heads of missions had allowed her department to bring decision- making closer to the point of delivery so rapidly that some people in the field were slow to act on it. “One of the paradigms that are still shifting is for our colleagues to realize that they do have the authority to take certain decisions that they didn’t have in the past. We saw at first that it was very gradual, but over the last six months, we’ve seen colleagues embrace this delegation of authority more actively, and decision-making is moving much faster.”

Heralding an example of a peacekeeping practice becoming a model for the whole organization, she said that DMCPC now has a clear mandate for oversight over conduct and discipline functions across the global Secretariat. “So the rigorous approach it had been implementing for peacekeeping in the past is now standardized across the Secretariat at large. This is learning from peacekeeping adapted to the whole organization.”

Amadu Kamara, Director of Mission Support, UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and Director of the UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS) said the UN’s operations in Somalia provided a good testing ground for the reform. “We support, for example, about 30,000 military personnel engaged in active combat. It’s doesn’t get more dynamic than that. So it was obvious that the regulatory framework was not compatible with the dynamics and rigors of the operating environment. The management efforts with the enhanced delegation of authority to heads of UN entities have afforded scope for UNSOS and UNSOM to address many arising issues, which previously would have had to be referred to multiple operational units and liaisons at headquarters for consideration and consultation without the attendant urgency required to meet demands on the ground.”

Mr. Kamara said that the new flexibility helped mission heads with specific chores like staff recruitment but also in more philosophical ways. “One of the benefits of the management reform, often unrecognized, is that this has led to a subtle shift in the mindset of administrators from a rules- and regulations-based mentality to using the regulatory framework as an enabling mechanism for operational decision-making.”

Suggesting further reforms, he said the delegation of authority might have to be “customized” to suit particularly volatile environments like Somalia and that consideration should be given to applying a probationary period for newly hired personnel. “To put it succinctly, our recruitment is out front, we take a very long time, we are very laborious to be careful to do recruitment, but once that person comes on to the ground and it doesn’t work out, we can never get rid of them. Not everybody can work in the field, and you will never know who will fit in until they actually do the job.”

Jake Sherman, IPI Senior Director of Programs, moderated the discussion.

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Shinzo Abe, Premier ministre à la plus longue longévité dans l’histoire du Japon d’après-guerre, a laissé son empreinte sur la politique étrangère du pays - de l’attention qu’il a portée à la défense d’un ordre mondial libéral à sa stratégie pour un "Indo-Pacifique libre et ouvert" (Free and Open Indo-Pacific). L’Institut Montaigne a échangé avec le professeur Yuichi Hosoya de l’université Keiō pour recueillir une analyse exclusive de l’héritage du…

Au cours des décennies passées, il est devenu courant de comparer l’Union européenne à l’Angelus Novus évoqué par Walter Benjamin dans ses écrits sur l’histoire : "une tempête le pousse vers un avenir auquel il tourne le dos, alors que devant lui, les ruines s’accumulent jusqu’au ciel…". Le 16 septembre 2020, la présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen, qui prononçait devant le Parlement européen son premier discours sur l’état…

Mira Milosevich-Juaristi. Comentario Elcano 30/2020 - 17/9/2020

Los resultados de las elecciones legislativas celebradas en Montenegro auguran un esperado cambio político. ¿Cuáles han sido las claves de la victoria de los partidos de la oposición?

Mit klarer Mehrheit hat das japanische Parlament am Mittwoch Yoshihide Suga zum Nachfolger Shinzo Abes gewählt. Der hatte nach rund acht Jahren aus gesundheitlichen Gründen seinen Rücktritt erklärt. Mit seiner bereits am Montag erfolgten Wahl zum Präsidenten der regierende Liberaldemokratische Partei LDP war Suga die Wahl zum Regierungschef schon sicher. Aufgrund seiner Rolle als langjähriger Vertrauter Abes steht er für politische Kontinuität. Auch er selbst definiert die Fortsetzung von Abes Politik als seine »Mission«. Und wie Abe als Regierungschef hat auch Suga mit rund acht Jahren Amtszeit einen Rekord aufgestellt, nämlich den als am längsten amtierenden Chefkabinettssekretär, einem zentralen Posten mit Ministerrang. In dieser Position bewies er Geschick als innenpolitischer Strippenzieher und trug so zur Stabilität der Abe-Regierung bei, deren Sprecher er zugleich war.

Auf der anderen Seite mangelt es Suga aber an außenpolitischer Erfahrung, auch wenn er durch seine Teilnahme an den Sitzungen des Nationalen Sicherheitsrats durchaus mit den strategischen Prioritäten der Abe-Regierung vertraut sein dürfte. Doch gerade hier, in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, muss er sich angesichts Chinas machtpolitischen Auftretens und Nordkoreas militärischer Aufrüstung beweisen.

Mehr als nur Kontinuität gefragt

Wie viel Aufmerksamkeit er der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik schenken wird, ist allerdings ungewiss. Die Prioritäten für seine Amtszeit hat Suga bereits klargemacht: Er will die Corona-Pandemie bekämpfen und die angeschlagene japanische Wirtschaft ankurbeln. Die enormen außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen lassen sich aber nicht beiseiteschieben. Geschick und Führung wird Suga vor allem in vier Bereichen beweisen müssen.

Erstens muss seine Regierung den künftigen Kurs gegenüber China festlegen, das in Japan als Bedrohung wahrgenommen wird. In den vergangenen Jahren hatte die Abe-Regierung hier sowohl auf eine Politik der Konfrontation als auch der Kooperation gesetzt. So wollte sie sich ein Mindestmaß an bilateraler Stabilität für die wirtschaftliche und politische Zusammenarbeit sichern. Innerhalb der LDP mehren sich die Stimmen, die eine härtere Gangart gegenüber China fordern. Dies wird bestärkt durch Chinas wachsende Präsenz in den Gewässern um die umstrittenen Senkaku-Inseln – die von Japan kontrolliert, aber von China beansprucht werden – sowie das harte Durchgreifen in Hongkong und die Menschenrechtsverstöße gegen die Uiguren. Im Juli verabschiedete die LDP eine Resolution, in der sie die Regierung aufforderte, den für April geplanten, aber durch die Pandemie verschobenen Staatsbesuch Xi Jingpings endgültig abzusagen. Suga muss nun entscheiden, ob er dieser Forderung nachkommen und wie er die Politik gegenüber Beijing insgesamt ausgestalten will.

Zweitens muss Suga schnell ein gutes Verhältnis zum US-Präsidenten Donald Trump aufbauen, denn in Japan besteht Konsens darüber, dass das Sicherheitsbündnis mit den Vereinigten Staaten von zentraler Bedeutung ist. Er muss auf Trump zugehen, gleichzeitig aber auch darauf gefasst sein, dass dieser im November die Präsidentschaftswahlen verliert. Sollte Trump gewinnen, stehen Tokio wohl schwierige Verhandlungen über Japans finanzielle Beiträge zur Stationierung der US-Truppen bevor.  Ein gutes persönliches Verhältnis zu Trump, wie es Abe pflegte, könnte Spannungen in den Verhandlungen abfedern.

Abschreckung und Diplomatie

Drittens stehen in Japans Verteidigungspolitik aufgrund der wachsenden Bedrohung durch nordkoreanische und chinesische Raketen wichtige Entscheidungen an. Zum einen muss Suga über die Weiterentwicklung der japanischen Raketenabwehr entscheiden. Im Juni hatte Verteidigungsminister Taro Kono die geplante Anschaffung des Raketenabwehrsystems »Aegis Ashore« abgesagt. Doch ersatzlos streichen will Tokio das Projekt nicht – deshalb werden nun andere Optionen diskutiert, wie die Anschaffung weiterer Schiffe für die seegestützte Raketenabwehr. Unumstritten sind derart kostspielige Investitionen aber nicht, vor allem weil unklar ist, ob sie gegen Nordkoreas und Chinas wachsende Raketenfähigkeiten überhaupt noch ausreichend Schutz bieten. Deshalb wird in der LDP parallel darüber diskutiert, ob Japan Langstreckenraketen anschaffen sollte, die Vergeltungs- oder möglicherweise sogar Präventivangriffe auf gegnerische Raketenbasen ermöglichen. Einige LDP-Politiker würden die Anschaffung derartiger Waffen gerne in den neuen Nationalen Verteidigungsrichtlinien festschreiben, die bis Ende des Jahres überarbeitet werden sollen. Die Diskussionen darüber lösen in der antimilitaristisch eingestellten Bevölkerung allerdings Unbehagen aus.

Zuletzt wird auch das angespannte Verhältnis zu Südkorea Sugas Fingerspitzengefühl fordern. Tokio und Seoul streiten sich über die Entschädigung ehemaliger Zwangsarbeiter aus der japanischen Kolonialzeit. Nach Tokios Lesart sind die Ansprüche abgegolten – nämlich durch den Grundlagenvertrag von 1965 und das zugehörige Abkommen zur Regelung von Schadensersatzansprüchen. Das Oberste Gericht Südkoreas widerspricht dem und argumentiert, individuelle Ansprüche seien durch den Vertrag nicht erloschen. Der Streit hat beidseitige historische Ressentiments aufflammen lassen, die zu einer Verhärtung der Fronten beigetragen haben. In Südkorea laufen derzeit juristische Prozesse, um von der japanischen Firma Nippon Steel beschlagnahmte Vermögenswerte zu verkaufen und dadurch ehemalige Zwangsarbeiter zu entschädigen. Damit würden die Beziehungen in eine ernsthafte Krise rutschen, denn Tokio hat bereits Vergeltungsmaßnahmen angekündigt.

Turnusgemäß findet die nächste LDP-Präsidentschaftswahl bereits im September 2021 statt. Will er über diesen Zeitpunkt hinaus im Amt bleiben, muss Suga neben innenpolitischen auch außenpolitische Erfolge vorweisen können. Gerade in diesem Bereich hatte sich sein Vorgänger profiliert. Er schaffte es, Japans Stimme auf der internationalen Bühne mehr Gewicht zu verleihen – durch außenpolitische Initiativen oder durch rege Besuchsdiplomatie. Ob Suga den gleichen Aktivismus an den Tag legt, bleibt abzuwarten.

Belarus is politically deadlocked. The peaceful movement protesting against veteran ruler Alexander Lukashenka and manipulation of the 9 August presidential election is too strong for the state to simply suppress it by force. As long as the political leadership continues to respond with repression the protest movement will persist and diversify. However, it lacks the institutional leverage to realise its demands. Lukashenka can rely on the state apparatus and the security forces, whose loyalty stems in part from fear of prosecution under a new leader. Lukashenka himself is determined to avoid the fate of leaders like Kurmanbek Bakiyev and Viktor Yanukovych, who were driven into exile following “colour revolutions”.

This stalemate is replicated at the international level. While the European Union refuses to recognise the result of the presidential election, the Kremlin regards Lukashenka as the legitimately elected leader. Moscow refuses to talk with the Coordination Council founded by the opposition presidential candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. The EU, for its part, interacts mainly with representatives of the protest movement because Minsk flatly rejects mediation initiatives from the West. Currently only Moscow regards Lukashenka’s announcement of constitutional reform and early elections as a path out of the political crisis. All other actors dismiss his constitutional initiative as merely an attempt to gain time.

Constitutional reform as a starting point

In fact, a constitutional reform could offer a solution. But it would have to be flanked by confidence-building measures and guarantees. The following aspects should be considered:

• An end to all forms of violence and repression against peaceful demonstrators; no prosecutions for protest-related offences;
• Release of all political prisoners, option of return for all exiles and deportees; reinstatement of persons dismissed from state employment;
• Convocation of a constitutional assembly integrating all relevant political and social groups;
• Constitutional reform to be completed within a maximum of twelve months;
• Parallel reform of the electoral code to ensure a transparent election process and appointment of a new Central Election Commission;
• Free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in accordance with OSCE criteria. 

The specific details of such a roadmap would have to be clarified in dialogue between the current state leadership and the Coordination Council, with the possibility of both sides agreeing to involve additional societal actors. Mechanisms would be needed to ensure observance. In this regard, granting all state actors an amnesty would be key. At the same time, acts of violence and repression occurring in the past weeks would need to be documented by an independent body. On the model of the truth and reconciliation commissions employed elsewhere, a reappraisal of recent history could lay the groundwork for a moderated process – also involving the churches – to overcome the divisions in society. It would also preserve the possibility of later prosecution if the roadmap was not followed.

What the EU could do

The EU could support such a process by suspending implementation of sanctions as long as implementation of the roadmap is proceeding. It should also prepare a phased plan to support reforms, the economy and civil society; certain aspects would be implemented immediately, with full implementation following conclusion of the constitutional reform and new elections. But the Belarusian actors must be fully in charge of preparing and realising such a roadmap. International institutions should restrict themselves to advising, upon request, on procedural matters. Such a function could for example be assumed by members of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.

Moscow might potentially see benefits in such a scenario. The Kremlin’s backing for Lukashenka risks fostering anti-Russian sentiment in Belarus’s traditionally pro-Russian society. In the current situation an extensive integration agreement would be a risky venture for Moscow. Massive Russian subsidies would be needed to cushion the deep economic crisis emerging in Belarus. Moreover, parts of Russian society could respond negatively if Moscow were to intervene politically, economically and possibly even militarily in Belarus. Conversely, an orderly transformation would allow Moscow to minimise such costs. But that would presuppose the Kremlin factoring societies into its calculations.

This approach would demand substantial concessions from all sides. But the alternative – in the absence of dialogue and compromise – is long-term political instability with a growing risk of violent escalation. The European Union should therefore use all available channels of communication to encourage a negotiated solution. It should refrain from supporting Baltic and Polish initiatives to treat Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as the legitimately elected president of Belarus. That would contradict its approach of not recognising the election result. It would also exacerbate the risk of transforming a genuinely domestic crisis into a geopolitical conflict.

This text was also published at fairobserver.com.

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“Where a crisis moves in, inclusion moves out, but there is no law of nature governing this,” declared Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde, making the point that although the COVID-19 pandemic threatens to set back the goals of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, it should instead be a factor motivating a redoubled effort to push for the agenda’s full implementation. “Diplomacy and dialogue are needed more than ever in the international response to the pandemic and in our efforts towards sustaining peace,” she said. “The Women, Peace, and Security agenda is crucial.”

Ms. Linde was the opening speaker at a September 16th high-level virtual forum co-sponsored by IPI and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs titled “Implementing Transformative Action: Prioritizing the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in a Time of Pandemic.” She noted that women’s organizations were already responding vigorously to the societal challenges posed by COVID-19, intensifying their own peace work, providing support for humanitarian aid flow, facilitating information exchange, and establishing “new ways of connecting.”

She argued that their work needs to be “recognized as the community resilience fabric it is and needs to be connected to the highest decision-making levels.” For example, she said, women civil society representatives should be entrusted with briefing the United Nations Security Council and other decision-making bodies on country-specific matters, as well as other security threats such as terrorism and climate change. “There is no need for the pandemic to be used as an excuse to decrease this participation.”

Rosemary DiCarlo, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, acknowledged that the pandemic had overshadowed many of the UN’s global priorities like the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of landmark Security Council resolution 1325 and had had a significant impact on global social-economic well- being and on key matters of peace and security, but particularly so for women. “Many of the economic costs of the pandemic are disproportionately affecting women, who are overrepresented in some of the sectors hardest hit by shutdowns, and ensuing layoffs and cuts. Gender-based violence, particularly in the home, surged around the world as COVID-19 lockdowns became necessary.”

Ms. DiCarlo said that digital technology had enabled UN officials in the field to maintain contact and consultation with otherwise marginalized women but had at the same time served to reveal the extent of their exclusion and discrimination. “Virtual spaces mirror the inequalities that exist in the offline world. Women and girls in conflict-affected settings often lack equal access to technology and are subject to online harassment and intimidation that can have real-world consequences for their safety.  Supporting access to technology and combating online bullying must therefore be prioritized as fundamental to ensuring women’s participation in public and political life.”

A top priority was funding, she said. Her department allocates 17 percent of its extra-budgetary resources to projects supporting women, peace, and security; it has created a “gender marker” to track the mainstreaming of gender issues in all of its initiatives, and the UN Peacebuilding Fund devotes 40 percent of its total investments to “gender-responsive” undertakings. “Allocating adequate, predictable, and sustained financing must be a joint priority for all of us to achieve the Women, Peace, and Security agenda.”

Alvin Botes, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, highlighted the disconnect between the forefront role that women play in peacemaking and the low level of their inclusion in peacebuilding leadership. “They are the majority in the health sector and informal economy, but at the same time, few have been included in national COVID-19 response plans,” he said.

Mr. Botes proposed that a certain percentage of both official development assistance for conflict–area countries and of spending by the UN Peacebuilding Fund be earmarked for women, peace and security, with dedicated budgets in National Action Plans or equivalent frameworks. He called for more partnerships between governments and women NGOs and greater involvement across the board of young women.

Amat al-Alim Alsoswa, former Minister for Human Rights in Yemen, said the experience of women in her country, site of what the UN has identified as the world’s leading humanitarian crisis, illustrated both the value of women peacebuilders and how they are ignored by people in decision-making positions. “Yemeni women have been active local mediators throughout the conflict, and, in response to COVID-19, women have worked through villages, municipal councils, and the private sector to manufacture and distribute PPE [personal protective equipment], masks, and protective clothing to medical staff and the public. They have also negotiated the release of prisoners from detention centers to reduce the spread of infection. Women doctors and nurses have been among the first responders at the peak of the pandemic, and young women entrepreneurs continue to be active participants.”  She paused for emphasis. “These efforts all were not initiated top-down.”

She contended that while the UN had pursued peace in Yemen “with dedication and sincerity, the well-established standards of Women, Peace, and Security, with respect to building sustainable peace, have been given no more than pro forma attention. This is a common trend; it’s not only related to peace negotiations. UN envoys’ mandates need to clearly include women in peace negotiations. It is not enough to give a voice to women, often after considerable additional pressure, unless they have their rights and also they can vote. Excluding women because one or more of the warring parties refuses to accept the woman’s presence is unacceptable.”

Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Founder and CEO of International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) and Director, LSE Centre for Women, Peace, and Security, said that independent women peacebuilders merited special consideration and explained why. “They are a very unique community of people. They run to the problem when others are running away. They are the bridge, they are interlocutors, they are trusted. They represent the voice of communities and people and marginalized sectors of society, which neither governments who are bombing their own people nor armed groups that are also bombing their own people, do. In a sense, women peacebuilders have taken on the responsibility to protect, without having the power of the gun, or having the power of the political elite. They need to be recognized as actors in conflicts, and as independent delegations at peace tables. That’s the next step of where we need to go.”

Kaavya Asoka, Executive Director, NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security, said during the question-and-answer period that despite the adoption of numbers of resolutions endorsing women’s rights and participation, seven out of ten peace processes still exclude women, and only 14 to 22 percent of peace agreements actually include gender provisions. Saying the movement was facing a crisis of political will, she asked, “How do we translate these rhetorical commitments that we’ve heard from the international community over a period of 20 years into real and concrete action? We’ve heard of technical solutions, like including women through virtual spaces, but the fact is what we actually need are political solutions to address the core problem of women’s participation that we continue to confront 20 years since the adoption of Resolution 1325.”

Foreign Minster Linde noted that much research had been done on the added durability of peace agreements where women were active participants. “When I was in Aden, I met so many women who had ideas, who had a lot of constructive ways of how to go forward in this terrible conflict. But they were not used in a way that would be so good for the peace process, and it makes me really frustrated. That’s also why I think the Women, Peace, and Security agenda needs to be pushed. All of us, both in government and in civil society, need to really push this issue, not as some little thing you do, as we say, ‘with your left hand’ but something that should be at the center, because it gets results, and it makes final peace agreements much more sustainable.”

Martha Delgado, Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights in the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pointed out that her country had officially adopted a feminist foreign policy and was an active member of the global network of focal points on women, peace, and security, promoting joint international efforts to implement its agenda. “We need to recover from the current pandemic with a renewed commitment not to leave anyone behind, and to fully realize that we need a more integrated, multi-sector and gender transformative framework to conflict prevention and resolutions on sustaining peace in which the leadership of women is a reality and not just an aspiration.”

The forum also served to launch an IPI Women, Peace, and Security issue brief by Masooma Rahmaty, IPI Policy Analyst, and Jasmine Jaghab, entitled Peacebuilding during a Pandemic: Keeping the Focus on Women’s Inclusion.

IPI Vice President Adam Lupel moderated the discussion.

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De nombreuses entreprises européennes jouent aujourd’hui leur survie : menacées par l’âpreté de la concurrence, la faiblesse des investissements et leur fragmentation.

Il faut maintenant penser un nouveau modèle, résolument européen, dans le contexte actuel où la crise économique et sociale qui se profile avec la pandémie de Covid-19 s’accompagne de mesures de soutien sans précédent : le 15 juin dernier, France, Allemagne…

This Policy Brief discusses Africa’s diversification and policies of economic transformation through the lens of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which is a potentially important vehicle for speeding up the continent’s diversification and a lever for win-win G20-Africa economic relations. The Brief argues in favour of broadening Africa-G20 cooperation that is currently limited to a few initiatives and an observer status for the African Union (AU) and New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Moreover, the AfCFTA presents opportunities for both G20 and Africa’s leadership to add value to development of Africa’s young and growing population as well as boost its legitimacy, credibility and relevance to global development through shaped future trade relations.

This Policy Brief discusses Africa’s diversification and policies of economic transformation through the lens of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which is a potentially important vehicle for speeding up the continent’s diversification and a lever for win-win G20-Africa economic relations. The Brief argues in favour of broadening Africa-G20 cooperation that is currently limited to a few initiatives and an observer status for the African Union (AU) and New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Moreover, the AfCFTA presents opportunities for both G20 and Africa’s leadership to add value to development of Africa’s young and growing population as well as boost its legitimacy, credibility and relevance to global development through shaped future trade relations.

This Policy Brief discusses Africa’s diversification and policies of economic transformation through the lens of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which is a potentially important vehicle for speeding up the continent’s diversification and a lever for win-win G20-Africa economic relations. The Brief argues in favour of broadening Africa-G20 cooperation that is currently limited to a few initiatives and an observer status for the African Union (AU) and New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Moreover, the AfCFTA presents opportunities for both G20 and Africa’s leadership to add value to development of Africa’s young and growing population as well as boost its legitimacy, credibility and relevance to global development through shaped future trade relations.

Die Covid-19-Pandemie hat politische Entscheidungsträger dafür sensibilisiert, welche Herausforderungen es mit sich bringt, in Krisenzeiten die gesundheitliche Regelversor­gung aufrechtzuerhalten. Wichtigster Ansatzpunkt für deren Bewältigung ist die Stär­kung der Gesundheitssysteme. Hier kann die Umsetzung des im Dezember 2018 ver­einbarten Globalen Paktes für sichere, geordnete und reguläre Migration (Globaler Migrationspakt) einen wichtigen Beitrag leisten. Ein Abgleich der Ziele dieses Paktes mit den von der Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) definierten Grundpfeilern von Gesund­heitssystemen zeigt, wie dieser Beitrag aussehen könnte. Es gibt zahlreiche Synergien und Handlungsmöglichkeiten. Das gesundheitspolitische Potential des Migrationspakts liegt insbesondere darin, den Zugang zu Gesundheitsdienstleistungen zu ver­bessern und den Fachkräftebedarf im Gesundheitssektor zu decken.

Belarus befindet sich in einer politischen Sackgasse. Die friedlichen Proteste der Belarussen und Belarussinnen gegen die Manipulationen der Präsidentschaftswahl vom 9. August und den langjährigen Amtsinhaber Alexander Lukaschenka sind so stark, dass die Staatsmacht sie nicht mit Gewalt zu unterdrücken vermag. Solange die politische Führung lediglich repressiv antwortet, wird die Protestbewegung nicht abflachen und immer neue Formen annehmen – ohne, dass sie über institutionelle Hebel zur Durchsetzung ihrer Anliegen verfügt. Lukaschenka hingegen kann sich auf den Staatsapparat und die Sicherheitskräfte stützen. Deren anhaltende Loyalität erklärt sich nicht zuletzt durch die Angst vor Strafverfolgung im Fall eines Machtwechsels. Lukaschenka selbst will um jeden Preis das Schicksal früherer Amtskollegen abwenden, die wie Kurmanbek Bakijew oder Viktor Janukowitsch vor »farbigen Revolutionen« aus ihren Ländern geflohen sind.

Diese Pattsituation zeigt sich auch auf internationaler Ebene. Während die EU die Ergebnisse der Präsidentschaftswahlen nicht anerkennt, sieht der Kreml in Lukaschenka den legitim gewählten Präsidenten von Belarus. Zudem führt Moskau keine Gespräche mit dem von der oppositionellen Präsidentschaftskandidatin Swjatlana Zichanouskaja gebildeten Koordinierungsrat. Hingegen kommuniziert die EU vorrangig mit Vertreterinnen und Vertretern der Protestbewegung, da das offizielle Minsk alle Vermittlungsangebote aus dem Westen ablehnt. Lukaschenkas Ankündigung einer Verfassungsreform mit anschließenden vorgezogenen Neuwahlen wird bisher nur von Moskau als Weg aus der politischen Krise unterstützt. Alle anderen Akteure betrachten die Verfassungsinitiative lediglich als den Versuch, Zeit zu gewinnen.

Verfassungsreform als Ausgangspunkt

Dabei könnte eine Verfassungsreform tatsächlich einen Weg aus der politischen Krise weisen. Sie müsste aber um vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen und Garantien erweitert werden. Hierzu könnten folgende Schritte gehören:

• Verzicht auf alle Formen von Gewalt und Repressionen gegen friedlich Demonstrierende sowie auf juristische Verfolgung aller Straftaten im Kontext der Proteste;
• Freilassung aller politischen Gefangenen, Option auf Rückkehr für ins Ausland geflohene oder abgeschobene sowie Wiedereinstellung für aus dem Staatsdienst entlassene Personen;
• Einberufung einer verfassungsgebenden Versammlung, die alle relevanten politischen und gesellschaftlichen Kräfte integriert;
• Durchführung der Verfassungsreform innerhalb von maximal zwölf Monaten;
• Parallele Reform des Wahlkodex zur Gewährleistung eines transparenten Wahlprozesses und Neubesetzung der Zentralen Wahlkommission;
• Durchführung freier und fairer Neuwahlen von Präsident und Parlament nach OSZE-Kriterien.

 

Wie eine entsprechende Roadmap konkret auszugestalten ist, wäre im Dialog zwischen der derzeitigen Staatsführung und dem Koordinierungsrat zu klären, wobei sich beide Seiten auch darauf verständigen könnten, weitere gesellschaftliche Akteure einzubeziehen. Unter anderem braucht es Mechanismen, die die Einhaltung der Roadmap sichern. Ein zentraler Schritt wäre, allen staatlichen Akteuren Straffreiheit zuzusichern. Gleichzeitig sollten alle in den letzten Wochen begangenen Gewalttaten und Repressionsmaßnahmen unabhängig dokumentiert und aufgearbeitet werden. Dies könnte – nach dem Beispiel von Wahrheits- und Versöhnungskommissionen in anderen Ländern – eine wesentliche Grundlage für einen unter Beteiligung der Kirchen moderierten Prozess mit dem Ziel sein, die gesellschaftliche Spaltung zu überwinden. Zugleich wäre damit aber auch die Möglichkeit einer späteren strafrechtlichen Verfolgung gegeben für den Fall, dass die Roadmap nicht eingehalten wird.

Möglichkeiten der EU

Die EU könnte einen derartigen Prozess unterstützen, indem sie während der Umsetzung der Roadmap darauf verzichtet, bereits beschlossene Sanktionen anzuwenden. Zudem sollte sie einen Stufenplan zur Unterstützung von Reformen, Wirtschaft und Zivilgesellschaft auflegen, den sie vorerst partiell und nach Abschluss der Verfassungsreform und Neuwahlen vollständig umsetzt. Grundsätzlich sollten die Erarbeitung und Umsetzung der Roadmap jedoch bei den belarussischen Akteuren liegen. Internationale Institutionen sollten nur auf deren Anfrage hin in prozessualen Fragen beraten. Eine solche Funktion könnten beispielsweise Mitglieder der Venedig-Kommission des Europarates übernehmen.

Auch Moskau könnte in einem derartigen Szenario Vorteile sehen. Denn indem der Kreml Lukaschenka Rückendeckung gibt, fördert er die Entstehung einer antirussischen Stimmung in der traditionell russlandfreundlichen belarussischen Gesellschaft. Die Durchsetzung weitergehender Integrationsabkommen wäre für Moskau in dieser Situation mit hohen Risiken verbunden. Zudem wären massive russische Subventionen nötig, um die sich abzeichnende tiefe Wirtschaftskrise in Belarus aufzufangen. Teile der russischen Gesellschaft wiederum könnten negativ darauf reagieren, dass Moskau politisch, wirtschaftlich und möglicherweise sogar militärisch in Belarus eingreift. Eine geordnete Transformation hingegen würde es Moskau erlauben, solche Kosten zu reduzieren. Voraussetzung wäre jedoch, dass der Kreml die gesellschaftliche Ebene in seinem Kalkül berücksichtigt.

Dieser Weg würde von allen Seiten substanzielle Zugeständnisse verlangen. Ohne Dialog und Kompromisse dürfte die innenpolitische Situation in Belarus jedoch auf lange Sicht instabil bleiben. Zudem wüchse die Gefahr einer gewaltsamen Eskalation. Die EU sollte daher alle verfügbaren Kommunikationskanäle nutzen, um das Szenario einer Verhandlungslösung weiter zu befördern. Sie kann baltische und polnische Initiativen, Swjatlana Zichanouskaja als neu gewählte Präsidentin zu behandeln, nicht mittragen. Dies würde ihrem Ansatz widersprechen, die Wahlen nicht anzuerkennen. Auch stiege das Risiko, dass sich die genuin innenpolitische Krise in Belarus in einen geopolitischen Konflikt verwandelt.

This year was expected to be an opportunity to assess the past twenty years of progress on the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda. Instead, it has been upended by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has dominated the international community’s attention and put recent gains for WPS at risk. One of the areas most at risk is the participation of women in peacebuilding efforts and peace processes, which is already a part of the WPS agenda where progress has been limited.

This paper looks into what actions states and international actors can take to ensure women’s participation in peacebuilding and peace processes during the pandemic. It draws on two virtual meetings—one at the ministerial level and one at the ambassadorial level—convened in partnership with the government of Sweden. Based on these meetings, the paper identifies five key factors that could help the UN and its member states keep the focus on women peacebuilders during the pandemic:

1. State leadership on WPS in multilateral fora: In the face of the pandemic, it is critical for UN member states to defend recent gains made in implementing the WPS agenda in multilateral fora, especially the Security Council.
2. Women’s participation in formal peace processes: While the pandemic has made it even more difficult for many women to participate in formal peace processes, the normalization of virtual convenings could be an opportunity to bring more women to the table.
3. Protection and security of women peacebuilders: The UN and its member states have a role to play in providing women peacebuilders both physical protection and international legitimacy and recognition.
4. Financing for women peacebuilders: The pandemic has made funding even more of a challenge for women peacebuilders. Donors should recognize the important role of women’s organizations in the pandemic response and recovery when deciding how to allocate funding.
5. Data-driven responses: There is a need for a coordinated, risk-sensitive approach to data collection to ensure that the COVID-19 response reflects an understanding of how the pandemic affects women.

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