Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Social protection plays a central role in achieving several of the social and environmental goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. As a result, this policy area is gaining increased recognition at the nexus of global climate change and development debates. Various social protection instruments are deemed to have the potential to increase the coping, adaptive and transformative capacities of vulnerable groups to face the impacts of climate change, facilitate a just transition to a green economy and help achieve environmental protection objectives, build intergenerational resilience and address non-economic climate impacts. Nevertheless, many developing countries that are vulnerable to climate change have underdeveloped social protection systems that are yet to be climate proofed. This can be done by incorporating climate change risks and opportunities into social protection policies, strategies and mechanisms. There is a large financing gap when it comes to increasing social protection coverage, establishing national social protection floors and mainstreaming climate risk into the sector. This necessitates substantial and additional sources of financing.
This briefing paper discusses the current and future potential of the core multilateral climate funds established under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in financing social protection in response to climate change. It further emphasises the importance of integrating social protection in countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to access climate finance and provides recommendations for governments, development cooperation entities and funding institutions.
To date, investments through the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Adaptation Fund (AF), and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) for integrating climate change considerations into social protection programmes, policies and mechanisms are generally lacking, even though social transfers and subsidies have often been used to implement climate change projects. Yet, these climate funds can support governments in mainstreaming climate risk into social protection-related development spheres and aligning social security sectoral objectives with national climate and environmental strategies. This, in turn, can help countries increase their capacity to tackle the social and intangible costs of climate change.
This paper makes the following recommendations:
• Funding institutions should make explicit reference to opportunities for financing projects on social protec¬tion under their mitigation and risk management portfolios.
• National governments and international cooperation entities should use climate funds to invest in strengthening social protection systems, work towards improved coordination of social protection initiatives, and utilise the potential of NDCs for climate-proofing the social protection sector.
• Proponents of social protection should make the most of two major opportunities to boost climate action in the social protection domain: the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) and the momentum to build back better after the COVID-19 crisis.

Social protection plays a central role in achieving several of the social and environmental goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. As a result, this policy area is gaining increased recognition at the nexus of global climate change and development debates. Various social protection instruments are deemed to have the potential to increase the coping, adaptive and transformative capacities of vulnerable groups to face the impacts of climate change, facilitate a just transition to a green economy and help achieve environmental protection objectives, build intergenerational resilience and address non-economic climate impacts. Nevertheless, many developing countries that are vulnerable to climate change have underdeveloped social protection systems that are yet to be climate proofed. This can be done by incorporating climate change risks and opportunities into social protection policies, strategies and mechanisms. There is a large financing gap when it comes to increasing social protection coverage, establishing national social protection floors and mainstreaming climate risk into the sector. This necessitates substantial and additional sources of financing.
This briefing paper discusses the current and future potential of the core multilateral climate funds established under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in financing social protection in response to climate change. It further emphasises the importance of integrating social protection in countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to access climate finance and provides recommendations for governments, development cooperation entities and funding institutions.
To date, investments through the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Adaptation Fund (AF), and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) for integrating climate change considerations into social protection programmes, policies and mechanisms are generally lacking, even though social transfers and subsidies have often been used to implement climate change projects. Yet, these climate funds can support governments in mainstreaming climate risk into social protection-related development spheres and aligning social security sectoral objectives with national climate and environmental strategies. This, in turn, can help countries increase their capacity to tackle the social and intangible costs of climate change.
This paper makes the following recommendations:
• Funding institutions should make explicit reference to opportunities for financing projects on social protec¬tion under their mitigation and risk management portfolios.
• National governments and international cooperation entities should use climate funds to invest in strengthening social protection systems, work towards improved coordination of social protection initiatives, and utilise the potential of NDCs for climate-proofing the social protection sector.
• Proponents of social protection should make the most of two major opportunities to boost climate action in the social protection domain: the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) and the momentum to build back better after the COVID-19 crisis.

Our overarching contribution in this chapter is the claim that a shared “moral topography” (Taylor, 1994) of lower classes can create forms of collective ‘consciousness’ which may lead to collective action. In order to establish that a shared moral topography is an incremental prerequisite for creating practical spaces for self-organisation, the chapter outlines Charles Taylor’s concept of morality, “moral topography”, “moral space and actions” as well as the concept of “identity”. Empirical data show that the moral topography of domestic workers in Chennai (Tamil Nadu, India) is characterized by a shared meaning and collective experiences of injustice. Further empirical evidence demonstrates that due to this common understanding of injustice, domestic workers in Chennai start organising themselves informally and establishing trade unions. Through self-organisation, domestic workers meet a demand for social security which the state fails to provide.

Our overarching contribution in this chapter is the claim that a shared “moral topography” (Taylor, 1994) of lower classes can create forms of collective ‘consciousness’ which may lead to collective action. In order to establish that a shared moral topography is an incremental prerequisite for creating practical spaces for self-organisation, the chapter outlines Charles Taylor’s concept of morality, “moral topography”, “moral space and actions” as well as the concept of “identity”. Empirical data show that the moral topography of domestic workers in Chennai (Tamil Nadu, India) is characterized by a shared meaning and collective experiences of injustice. Further empirical evidence demonstrates that due to this common understanding of injustice, domestic workers in Chennai start organising themselves informally and establishing trade unions. Through self-organisation, domestic workers meet a demand for social security which the state fails to provide.

Our overarching contribution in this chapter is the claim that a shared “moral topography” (Taylor, 1994) of lower classes can create forms of collective ‘consciousness’ which may lead to collective action. In order to establish that a shared moral topography is an incremental prerequisite for creating practical spaces for self-organisation, the chapter outlines Charles Taylor’s concept of morality, “moral topography”, “moral space and actions” as well as the concept of “identity”. Empirical data show that the moral topography of domestic workers in Chennai (Tamil Nadu, India) is characterized by a shared meaning and collective experiences of injustice. Further empirical evidence demonstrates that due to this common understanding of injustice, domestic workers in Chennai start organising themselves informally and establishing trade unions. Through self-organisation, domestic workers meet a demand for social security which the state fails to provide.

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Im Zuge der Corona-Pandemie und durch den Sturm auf das Kapitol ist die Bedrohungswahrnehmung im Hinblick auf rechtsextremistische Gruppen und Anhänger von Verschwörungstheorien markant gestiegen. Die erneuten Anschläge in Frankreich und Österreich im November des vergangenen Jahres haben gezeigt, dass auch die Gefahr durch den jihadistischen Terrorismus akut bleibt. Die Ende 2020 aktualisierte EU-Agenda für Terrorismusbekämpfung umfasst vor diesem Hintergrund ein breites Themenspektrum. Sie zeugt aber auch von der Heterogenität der Unions­kompetenzen und den unterschiedlichen Interessen der EU-Mitglieder. Einerseits bleiben die Befugnisse der EU bei der Rehabilitation von inhaftierten terroristischen Gefährdern oder bei der gesamtgesellschaftlichen Prävention beschränkt. Andererseits treibt die EU einen gemeinsamen Regulierungsrahmen für Meinungsäußerungen im Online-Raum voran. Dieser Ansatz ist zugleich Teil einer erneuerten transatlan­tischen Agenda. Die aktive Bekämpfung des Rechtsterrorismus wird jedoch eher in flexiblen Koalitionen vorangetrieben werden können.

Im Zuge der Corona-Pandemie und durch den Sturm auf das Kapitol ist die Bedrohungswahrnehmung im Hinblick auf rechtsextremistische Gruppen und Anhänger von Verschwörungstheorien markant gestiegen. Die erneuten Anschläge in Frankreich und Österreich im November des vergangenen Jahres haben gezeigt, dass auch die Gefahr durch den jihadistischen Terrorismus akut bleibt. Die Ende 2020 aktualisierte EU-Agenda für Terrorismusbekämpfung umfasst vor diesem Hintergrund ein breites Themenspektrum. Sie zeugt aber auch von der Heterogenität der Unions­kompetenzen und den unterschiedlichen Interessen der EU-Mitglieder. Einerseits bleiben die Befugnisse der EU bei der Rehabilitation von inhaftierten terroristischen Gefährdern oder bei der gesamtgesellschaftlichen Prävention beschränkt. Andererseits treibt die EU einen gemeinsamen Regulierungsrahmen für Meinungsäußerungen im Online-Raum voran. Dieser Ansatz ist zugleich Teil einer erneuerten transatlan­tischen Agenda. Die aktive Bekämpfung des Rechtsterrorismus wird jedoch eher in flexiblen Koalitionen vorangetrieben werden können.

Im Vorfeld zur Knesset-Wahl 2021 werben jüdische Parteien aktiv um die Stimmen der israe­lischen Araber, die 17 Prozent der wahlberechtigten Israelis stellen. Zugleich äußern arabische Israelis verstärkt das Bedürfnis nach einer Politik, die zur Verbesserung ihrer Lebensumstände beiträgt und ihnen mehr politische Beteiligung er­mög­licht. Während das arabische Parteienbündnis Vereinte Liste seinen traditionellen Op­posi­tionskurs beibehält und dabei die Abspaltung ihres Mitglieds Islamische Bewe­gung (Ra’am) in Kauf nahm, treten im Wahlkampf neue Akteure auf, die eine prag­ma­tischere arabische Poli­tik betreiben und auf Zusammenarbeit mit jüdi­schen Partei­en setzen. Der Konflikt und die Iden­ti­tät des jüdischen Staates Israel spielen für sie allen­falls eine Nebenrolle. Ähn­lich sieht es in der israelischen Kommunalpolitik aus. Dort wird eine interessens­basierte jüdisch-arabische Kooperation bereits praktiziert.

The recently proposed Green Deals and 'building back better' plans have affirmed the importance to make green transitions inclusive. This is particularly related to the labour market, which may witness significant changes. Empirically, this issue has until now received limited attention. The links between poverty and climate change are explored mainly through the lenses of climate change adaptation, or via the effects of rising energy prices on the purchasing power of poor households. We aim to address this gap by using results from a simulation of the global energy transition required to meet the 2-degree target, and compare this to a 6-degree baseline scenario. The simulation with a multi-regional input–output model finds that, overall, this transition results in a small net job increase of 0.3% globally, with cross-country heterogeneity. We complement this macro-level analysis with cross-country household data to draw implications of the effects on poverty through labour market outcomes. The few job losses will be concentrated in specific industries, while new jobs will be created in industries that currently witness relatively high in-work poverty rates, such as construction. We show that high in-work poverty in the industries of interest, and especially in middle-income countries, is often associated with low skills and an insufficient reach of social protection mechanisms. We conclude that green transitions must ensure that the jobs created are indeed decent including fair wages, adequate working conditions, sufficient social protection measures, and accessible to the vulnerable and poorest households.

The recently proposed Green Deals and 'building back better' plans have affirmed the importance to make green transitions inclusive. This is particularly related to the labour market, which may witness significant changes. Empirically, this issue has until now received limited attention. The links between poverty and climate change are explored mainly through the lenses of climate change adaptation, or via the effects of rising energy prices on the purchasing power of poor households. We aim to address this gap by using results from a simulation of the global energy transition required to meet the 2-degree target, and compare this to a 6-degree baseline scenario. The simulation with a multi-regional input–output model finds that, overall, this transition results in a small net job increase of 0.3% globally, with cross-country heterogeneity. We complement this macro-level analysis with cross-country household data to draw implications of the effects on poverty through labour market outcomes. The few job losses will be concentrated in specific industries, while new jobs will be created in industries that currently witness relatively high in-work poverty rates, such as construction. We show that high in-work poverty in the industries of interest, and especially in middle-income countries, is often associated with low skills and an insufficient reach of social protection mechanisms. We conclude that green transitions must ensure that the jobs created are indeed decent including fair wages, adequate working conditions, sufficient social protection measures, and accessible to the vulnerable and poorest households.

The recently proposed Green Deals and 'building back better' plans have affirmed the importance to make green transitions inclusive. This is particularly related to the labour market, which may witness significant changes. Empirically, this issue has until now received limited attention. The links between poverty and climate change are explored mainly through the lenses of climate change adaptation, or via the effects of rising energy prices on the purchasing power of poor households. We aim to address this gap by using results from a simulation of the global energy transition required to meet the 2-degree target, and compare this to a 6-degree baseline scenario. The simulation with a multi-regional input–output model finds that, overall, this transition results in a small net job increase of 0.3% globally, with cross-country heterogeneity. We complement this macro-level analysis with cross-country household data to draw implications of the effects on poverty through labour market outcomes. The few job losses will be concentrated in specific industries, while new jobs will be created in industries that currently witness relatively high in-work poverty rates, such as construction. We show that high in-work poverty in the industries of interest, and especially in middle-income countries, is often associated with low skills and an insufficient reach of social protection mechanisms. We conclude that green transitions must ensure that the jobs created are indeed decent including fair wages, adequate working conditions, sufficient social protection measures, and accessible to the vulnerable and poorest households.

In the past few years decision‐making processes and the normative underpinnings of EU external relations have become subject to intense debate in the European institutions, member states and the wider public. Previous research suggests that there is variation in the extent to which individual domains of EU external relations are politicized and contested. This special issue aims to theorize further and investigate empirically this, using the example of European development policy and its relations with other external policies. It brings together a broad variety of research covering different arenas, objects and levels of politicization as well as different policy nexuses. The ten contributions to the special issue also combine various theoretical perspectives that include rationalist and constructivist approaches and different methods including statistical and discourse analyses. Individual articles both focus on politicization processes within the EU and member states as well as at the level of partner countries in Europe and Africa. Building on these different approaches and foci, they draw insights that help us to theorize the two mechanisms that may drive politicization dynamics in European development policies and that are at the core of this special issue – horizontal politicization and outside‐in politicization.

In the past few years decision‐making processes and the normative underpinnings of EU external relations have become subject to intense debate in the European institutions, member states and the wider public. Previous research suggests that there is variation in the extent to which individual domains of EU external relations are politicized and contested. This special issue aims to theorize further and investigate empirically this, using the example of European development policy and its relations with other external policies. It brings together a broad variety of research covering different arenas, objects and levels of politicization as well as different policy nexuses. The ten contributions to the special issue also combine various theoretical perspectives that include rationalist and constructivist approaches and different methods including statistical and discourse analyses. Individual articles both focus on politicization processes within the EU and member states as well as at the level of partner countries in Europe and Africa. Building on these different approaches and foci, they draw insights that help us to theorize the two mechanisms that may drive politicization dynamics in European development policies and that are at the core of this special issue – horizontal politicization and outside‐in politicization.

In the past few years decision‐making processes and the normative underpinnings of EU external relations have become subject to intense debate in the European institutions, member states and the wider public. Previous research suggests that there is variation in the extent to which individual domains of EU external relations are politicized and contested. This special issue aims to theorize further and investigate empirically this, using the example of European development policy and its relations with other external policies. It brings together a broad variety of research covering different arenas, objects and levels of politicization as well as different policy nexuses. The ten contributions to the special issue also combine various theoretical perspectives that include rationalist and constructivist approaches and different methods including statistical and discourse analyses. Individual articles both focus on politicization processes within the EU and member states as well as at the level of partner countries in Europe and Africa. Building on these different approaches and foci, they draw insights that help us to theorize the two mechanisms that may drive politicization dynamics in European development policies and that are at the core of this special issue – horizontal politicization and outside‐in politicization.

The China-EU Comprehensive Agreement of Investment (CAI) addresses important issues of market access, regulatory cooperation and sustainable development, but does not include sections on investment protection and ISDS. The ratification of the CAI could be difficult in the EU. Additional efforts are needed in further negotiating the CAI in the future.

The China-EU Comprehensive Agreement of Investment (CAI) addresses important issues of market access, regulatory cooperation and sustainable development, but does not include sections on investment protection and ISDS. The ratification of the CAI could be difficult in the EU. Additional efforts are needed in further negotiating the CAI in the future.

The China-EU Comprehensive Agreement of Investment (CAI) addresses important issues of market access, regulatory cooperation and sustainable development, but does not include sections on investment protection and ISDS. The ratification of the CAI could be difficult in the EU. Additional efforts are needed in further negotiating the CAI in the future.

Zusammenfassung:

Selbstständige erleiden in der Covid-19-Pandemie besonders häufig Einkommensverluste. Zu ihrer Unterstützung hat der Bund verschiedene Programme mit Liquiditätshilfen aufgelegt. Im Frühjahr 2020 startete der Bund die Soforthilfe, ein Programm, das für die von Umsatzrückgängen betroffenen Selbstständigen Einmalzahlungen von bis zu 15.000 Euro vorsah. Analysen zur Wirkung dieses ersten Programms anhand von Online-Umfragedaten mit über 20.000 Befragten zeigen, dass sich unter den Beziehenden der Soforthilfe die Wahrscheinlichkeit, selbstständig zu bleiben, moderat erhöht hat. Diese positive Wirkung erweist sich dann als signifikant, wenn die Hilfe binnen weniger Tage gewährt wurde. Gleichzeitig lässt der positive Effekt wenige Wochen nach Gewährung der Soforthilfe nach. Bei der weiteren Ausgestaltung solcher Hilfsprogramme sollten neben einer schnellen Gewährung vor allem auch monatliche Auszahlungen in Betracht gezogen werden, um die positive Wirkung der Hilfen zu verlängern.