Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Interdependencies among the goals and targets make the 2030 Agenda indivisible and their integrated implementation requires coherent policies. Coordination across different sectors and levels is deemed as crucial for avoiding trade-offs and achieving synergies among multiple, interlinked policy goals, which depend on natural resources. However, there is insufficient evidence regarding the conditions under which coordination for integrated achievement of different water- and land-based Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) functions effectively. The paper investigates the land and water governance in the Ethiopian lower Awash River basin and identifies key interdependencies among related SDGs. It assesses in how far the interactions and coordination among various decision-making centres are effective in managing the interdependencies among different goals. Systems for using and managing water and land exhibit features of polycentric governance as this process involves decision-making centres across different sectors and at various levels. Key action situations for land and water governance in operational, collective and constitutional choice levels are interlinked/networked. Each action situation constitutes actions that deliver one of the functions of polycentric governance, such as production, provision, monitoring etc. as an outcome, which affects the choices of actors in an adjacent action situation. The study shows that the existing institutions and governance mechanisms for water and land in Ethiopia are not effective in managing the interdependencies. Non-recognition of traditional communal rights of pastoralists over land and water and ineffective policy instruments for ensuring environmental and social safeguards are leading to major trade-offs among goals of local food security and economic growth. The autocratic regime of Ethiopia has coordination mechanisms in place, which fulfil the role of dissemination of policies and raising awareness. However, they are not designed to build consensus and political will for designing and implementing national plans, by including the interests and aspirations of the local communities and local governments. The study recommends efforts to achieve SDGs in the Ethiopian Awash River basin to focus on strengthening the capacities of relevant actors, especially the district and river basin authorities in delivering the key governance functions such as water infrastructure maintenance, efficient use of water, and effective implementation of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Further, urgent efforts for scaling up of recognition, certification and protection of communal land rights of pastoralists and clear definition of rules for awarding compensation upon expropriation, are required.

Interdependencies among the goals and targets make the 2030 Agenda indivisible and their integrated implementation requires coherent policies. Coordination across different sectors and levels is deemed as crucial for avoiding trade-offs and achieving synergies among multiple, interlinked policy goals, which depend on natural resources. However, there is insufficient evidence regarding the conditions under which coordination for integrated achievement of different water- and land-based Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) functions effectively. The paper investigates the land and water governance in the Ethiopian lower Awash River basin and identifies key interdependencies among related SDGs. It assesses in how far the interactions and coordination among various decision-making centres are effective in managing the interdependencies among different goals. Systems for using and managing water and land exhibit features of polycentric governance as this process involves decision-making centres across different sectors and at various levels. Key action situations for land and water governance in operational, collective and constitutional choice levels are interlinked/networked. Each action situation constitutes actions that deliver one of the functions of polycentric governance, such as production, provision, monitoring etc. as an outcome, which affects the choices of actors in an adjacent action situation. The study shows that the existing institutions and governance mechanisms for water and land in Ethiopia are not effective in managing the interdependencies. Non-recognition of traditional communal rights of pastoralists over land and water and ineffective policy instruments for ensuring environmental and social safeguards are leading to major trade-offs among goals of local food security and economic growth. The autocratic regime of Ethiopia has coordination mechanisms in place, which fulfil the role of dissemination of policies and raising awareness. However, they are not designed to build consensus and political will for designing and implementing national plans, by including the interests and aspirations of the local communities and local governments. The study recommends efforts to achieve SDGs in the Ethiopian Awash River basin to focus on strengthening the capacities of relevant actors, especially the district and river basin authorities in delivering the key governance functions such as water infrastructure maintenance, efficient use of water, and effective implementation of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Further, urgent efforts for scaling up of recognition, certification and protection of communal land rights of pastoralists and clear definition of rules for awarding compensation upon expropriation, are required.

Interdependencies among the goals and targets make the 2030 Agenda indivisible and their integrated implementation requires coherent policies. Coordination across different sectors and levels is deemed as crucial for avoiding trade-offs and achieving synergies among multiple, interlinked policy goals, which depend on natural resources. However, there is insufficient evidence regarding the conditions under which coordination for integrated achievement of different water- and land-based Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) functions effectively. The paper investigates the land and water governance in the Ethiopian lower Awash River basin and identifies key interdependencies among related SDGs. It assesses in how far the interactions and coordination among various decision-making centres are effective in managing the interdependencies among different goals. Systems for using and managing water and land exhibit features of polycentric governance as this process involves decision-making centres across different sectors and at various levels. Key action situations for land and water governance in operational, collective and constitutional choice levels are interlinked/networked. Each action situation constitutes actions that deliver one of the functions of polycentric governance, such as production, provision, monitoring etc. as an outcome, which affects the choices of actors in an adjacent action situation. The study shows that the existing institutions and governance mechanisms for water and land in Ethiopia are not effective in managing the interdependencies. Non-recognition of traditional communal rights of pastoralists over land and water and ineffective policy instruments for ensuring environmental and social safeguards are leading to major trade-offs among goals of local food security and economic growth. The autocratic regime of Ethiopia has coordination mechanisms in place, which fulfil the role of dissemination of policies and raising awareness. However, they are not designed to build consensus and political will for designing and implementing national plans, by including the interests and aspirations of the local communities and local governments. The study recommends efforts to achieve SDGs in the Ethiopian Awash River basin to focus on strengthening the capacities of relevant actors, especially the district and river basin authorities in delivering the key governance functions such as water infrastructure maintenance, efficient use of water, and effective implementation of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Further, urgent efforts for scaling up of recognition, certification and protection of communal land rights of pastoralists and clear definition of rules for awarding compensation upon expropriation, are required.

Die Zahl der Flüchtlinge weltweit steigt seit Jahren an, eine Umkehr dieses Trends ist auch in Zukunft nicht absehbar. Noch immer werden die meisten Flüchtlinge von Nachbarstaaten aufgenommen. Dabei nehmen langandauernde Fluchtsituationen zu, die sowohl Flüchtlinge als auch aufnehmende Länder vor große Herausforderungen stellen. Die internationale Gemeinschaft versucht seit Jahrzehnten, Lösungen für sol­che Fälle zu finden – bislang mit begrenztem Erfolg. Seit einigen Jahre gilt die Förde­rung von Resilienz, also von Widerstandsfähigkeit, als richtungsweisender Ansatz; unter anderem wird er in Jordanien und Libanon verfolgt. Wie ist dieser Ansatz zu bewerten? Kann er auch für andere langandauernde Fluchtsituationen als Modell dienen, beispielsweise in den Nachbarländern Afghanistans?

Turkey went through a terrible summer from an ecological point of view: The country has been experiencing unprecedented wildfires caused by heat waves and droughts that have devastated forests in the southwestern part of Anatolia, while floods have been hitting the north and east. The disasters obviously also have unprecedented economic and social consequences, all of which are raising concerns about Turkey’s vulnerability to environmental crises and climate change and Ankara’s ability to cope with them.

Already in 2011, the Turkish authorities, in the National Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan, realized that Turkey’s location in the Mediterranean basin made it more susceptible to arid conditions and heat waves resulting from climate change, citing the 4th IPPC report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In its 6th report, published in August, the IPPC concludes that climate change is already creating many extreme weather and climate events in all regions of the world and that they are intensifying in an unprecedented way.

Despite these bitter observations, Ankara has long refrained from ratifying the Paris Agreement. The legally binding international treaty was signed with the central objective of limiting global warming to well below 2°C and continuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. But recently, President Erdoğan declared the country’s intention to ratify the Paris Agreement before the UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26), which is to open in Glasgow on 31 October.

The mindset of the Turkish government can help to explain its inadequate efforts to address the climate crisis, but to understand this resistance on the part of Ankara, one should look at Turkey’s problematic position in the global climate change regime.

Lack of domestic commitment

Climate change has never been a priority for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Its growth-oriented economic and energy policies of the past 20 years have followed a development model that prioritizes economic gains while ignoring their environmental consequences. Already realized projects such as the Istanbul Airport or planned projects such as the Istanbul Canal are only a few examples of this vision. Another is the priority given to the use of coal. It is still the third-largest source of primary energy in Turkey after oil and natural gas, and coal-related emissions have increased by almost 32 percent over the last decade. Total greenhouse gas emissions increased by 137 percent between 1990 and 2018, and the government does not currently have a target year for peaking emissions or for reducing emissions in absolute terms. Moreover, Turkey contends, like many other less-developed countries, that it only has a negligible responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions – and hence should do less than fully industrialized countries, which have a huge historical responsibility for anthropogenic climate change.

Turkey’s special circumstances

In 1992, when the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate change (UNFCCC) was adopted, as a member of the OECD – and without any objection from Turkish officials at that time – Turkey was listed in both Annex I and Annex II of the UNFCCC. These countries, which are generally richer and more developed, are expected to take the lead in combating climate change. But most importantly, Annex II countries should also provide financial support to “developing” countries that are in the “non-Annex I” group and have fewer obligations. Turkey was therefore theoretically obliged to reduce its emissions and help “developing countries” such as Brazil, South Korea, and China. As a result of Turkey’s diplomatic efforts, the country was finally removed from Annex II in 2001, but it is still listed in Annex I, which means that Turkey is not obliged to contribute to climate finance, but it cannot benefit from financial support either.

As a consequence, during the Conference of the Parties in Paris in 2015, Ankara said it would not sign the agreement if its demand was not taken into account. Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande had to intervene to convince President Erdoğan to sign the agreement. But before ratifying the Paris Agreement, Ankara wanted to be removed from the list of developed countries of the UNFCCC and receive financial assistance for climate change mitigation. Obviously, Turkey’s behavior carries a cost in the form of ecological costs to Turkey and the surrounding region as well as negative impacts on the Turkish economy and global efforts against climate change.

Getting Turkey on board

The effects of climate change will require significant changes in geo-economic policies at the European and global levels. The EU is already progressively integrating climate factors into its external economic relations, which will change the way it trades with its partner. The EU’s planned carbon border tax, called the Border Carbon Adjustment Mechanism, would be a significant tool in this strategy and affect Turkey’s trade relations with the EU if Turkey fails to decarbonize its economy. Turkey conducts half of its trade with the EU. The decarbonization would therefore also be an economic and strategic requirement for Turkey in terms of its trade and other relations with the EU.

The ratification of the Paris Agreement will be the first positive step toward joining the international coalition to fight climate change, and it should also been seen as part of Turkey’s charm offensive toward the West. This effort will not be complete if Ankara does not make concrete mitigation commitments by submitting a new and more ambitious version of its Nationally Determined Contributions.

It seems that Ankara can be motivated to take such moves and be actively involved in the fight against climate change through financial assistance. The EU can play an important role here. It should effectively use its financial and diplomatic powers to secure these outcomes. After all, bringing Turkey on board in the global fight against climate change is also in the interest of the EU, which has the leadership role in achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement. This would not only contribute toward global mitigation efforts, but also increase Turkey’s resilience and preparedness for the ecological crises that will only worsen with climate change.

This text was also published by fairobserver.com.

Die Serviceabteilung Finanzen vereint die Bereiche Rechnungswesen, Beschaffung, Drittmittel und Controlling und bietet interne Dienstleistungen für den Vorstand, die MitarbeiterInnen sowie die Gäste des Instituts an. Die Abteilung entwickelt innovative Instrumente zur Unterstützung der wissenschaftlichen Arbeit des DIW Berlin und setzt sie um. Dabei sorgt der Bereich Rechnungswesen für den reibungslosen Ablauf aller finanztechnischen Prozesse. Der Bereich Beschaffung kümmert sich um alle Beschaffungs- und Vergabevorgänge des Instituts. Der Drittmittelbereich betreut die Drittmittelprojekte von der Antragsphase bis zur Endabrechnung. Der Bereich Controlling verantwortet die Budgetplanung und das interne Berichtswesen, berät bei operativen Maßnahmen und bereitet strategische Entscheidungen vor. Die Abteilung verwaltete im Geschäftsjahr 2020 ein Budget von 33,8 Mio €, davon wurden 14,3 Mio € durch Drittmittelprojekte erwirtschaftet.

Die Serviceabteilung Finanzen sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine/n

MitarbeiterIn Drittmittelverwaltung (w/m/div)

(39 h/Woche), Teilzeit möglich

für die Abwicklung aller mit nationalen und internationalen Drittmittelprojekten verbundenen administrativen Aufgaben und Prozesse von der Antragsphase bis zur Abrechnung.

Anfang September haben sich die Gesundheitsminister der G20 darauf verständigt, die globale Impfstoffverteilung zu verbessern. Warum ist die weltweite Verteilung so langsam?

Ilona Kickbusch: Weil sich zumindest die reichen Staaten erst um die eigene Bevölkerung gekümmert haben. Jetzt, wo sie höhere Impfraten haben, sind sie auch bereit, Impfstoffe zu teilen. Anfangs hat der sogenannte Covax-Mechanismus, um Impfstoffe weltweit zu verteilen, nicht so gut funktioniert. Mittlerweile läuft es besser. Die reicheren Länder haben gemerkt, dass es nicht nur darum geht, Geld zu geben, sondern auch Impfstoffe zu teilen. Wenn die Impfstoffproduzenten schon alles vorverkauft haben, nützt auch das Geld nichts.

Maike Voss: Es gab keine gute gemeinsame Vorbereitung auf Gesundheitskrisen. Mechanismen wie Covax wurden erst in den ersten Monaten der Pandemie entwickelt. Wir haben also erst in der Krise angefangen, internationale Systeme aufzubauen. Die hätten wir vorher gebraucht.

Welche Schwachstellen der globalen Gesundheitspolitik hat die Corona-Pandemie noch aufgezeigt?

Kickbusch: Zunächst einmal haben die meisten Länder, die für alle Mitgliedsländer der WHO verpflichtenden internationalen Gesundheitsvorschriften nicht umgesetzt. Dann galt sehr schnell »My Country First«: Grenzen wurden hochgezogen, Lieferketten unterbrochen oder Verträge über Lieferungen von Masken nicht eingehalten. Es war ein Beispiel der Nichtzusammenarbeit. Gleichzeitig trat aber auch die Schwachstelle eines Entwicklungshilfemodells hervor: Globale Gesundheitspolitik lässt sich nicht mit Wohltätigkeit lösen. Es braucht ganz neue Finanzierungsformen.

Wie kann die WHO diesen Problemen künftig begegnen?

Voss: Hier ist zunächst nicht die WHO in der Pflicht. Es sind eher die Mitgliedstaaten, die ihre Versprechen einlösen müssen — vor allem was die Finanzierung der WHO angeht. Es gibt zwar einen großen Konsens darüber, dass sie besser grundfinanziert werden muss. Wir sehen aber eher wenig konkrete Schritte in diese Richtung. Die WHO braucht unter anderem eine bessere Unterstützung für ihr Health Emergencies Programme WHE. Dahinter steckt ein Team, das darauf spezialisiert ist, Pandemieausbrüche frühzeitig zu erkennen und zu verhindern. Zu diesem Zweck wurde Anfang September auch der »WHO Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence« eröffnet. Dann liegen noch verschiedenste Reformvorschläge auf dem Tisch, die jetzt geprüft, diskutiert und umgesetzt werden müssen. Dabei geht es unter anderem darum, wie man noch besser mit anderen Sektoren zusammenarbeiten kann, also zum Beispiel Tier, Mensch, Gesundheit neu zusammen zu denken. Diese Interdisziplinarität gilt es zu institutionalisieren.

Kickbusch: Deutschland hatte die Erhöhung der regulären Mitgliedsbeiträge der WHO schon vor der Pandemie auf die Agenda gesetzt. Es ist natürlich so, dass jedes Land sagt, wir wollen die WHO stärken. Sobald es aber an den eigenen Geldbeutel geht, sinkt die Bereitschaft. Inzwischen müsste das reguläre Budget wahrscheinlich schon verdoppelt werden. Schaut man sich an, was uns Covid-19 schon gekostet hat, handelt es sich dabei aber vergleichsweise um Peanuts. Und was viele nicht wissen: Der größte Geldgeber der WHO sind nicht mehr die USA, sondern Deutschland.

Die Bundesregierung betont die Bedeutung von globaler Zusammenarbeit und internationalen Organisationen zur Bewältigung der Corona-Pandemie. Gleichzeitig blockiert sie bei der Welthandelsorganisation WTO die Freigabe von Impfstoffpatenten. Wie passt das zusammen?

Voss: Als größter Geber der WHO wird Deutschland international sehr geschätzt. Dass es den Vorstoß von Südafrika und Indien innerhalb der WTO, die eine zeitweise Aussetzung des Patentschutzes für Corona-Impfstoffe fordern, blockiert, halte ich für problematisch. Auf der einen Seite geht es natürlich darum, die Schlüsseltechnologie mRNA zu schützen. Hier sind die Argumente der Bundesregierung ganz nah an den Argumenten der Wirtschaft. Andererseits würde der Verzicht auf Patente die globale Pandemiebewältigung beschleunigen. Als Verfechter des globalen Multilateralismus befindet sich Deutschland hier im Widerspruch. Die nächste Bundesregierung sollte diesen auflösen.

Kickbusch: Trotz der gegensätzlichen Positionen in der Patentfrage, sind die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Südafrika außerordentlich gut. Deutschland unterstützt Südafrika gerade dabei, Produktionsstätten für Impfstoffe aufzubauen. Die USA haben sich für eine Lockerung des Patentschutzes ausgesprochen, weil es kein Patent ist, das sie im Land halten. Daher können sie sich auch so positionieren. Gleichzeitig lehnen sie aber ein globales Gesundheitsabkommen vehement ab. 

Welche Aufgaben kommen auf die künftige Bundesregierung zu?

Kickbusch: Wichtig wird die G7-Präsidentschaft Deutschlands im nächsten Jahr sein — und dafür wiederum die Zusammensetzung der neuen Bundesregierung. Wie wird sie globale Gesundheit definieren und wie viel dafür einsetzen? Deutschland könnte viel bewirken, wenn die G7 und G20 in puncto globale Gesundheit konsistenter zusammenarbeiten. Dafür muss sie aber zunächst in der Bundesregierung selbst eine Form der Zusammenarbeit für globale Gesundheit schaffen, klären wie es innerhalb und zwischen den einzelnen Ministerien organisiert werden soll. Hier spielen auch Finanzierungsentscheidungen eine Rolle: Welches Ministerium bekommt das Geld für die globale Gesundheit?

Voss: Für eine konsistente Zusammenarbeit auf globaler Ebene muss die Bundesregierung zunächst die Zielkonflikte in Berlin auflösen. Viel zu oft wird das internationale Handeln Deutschlands, aber auch anderer Länder, dadurch bestimmt, welches Ressort sich innerhalb der Absprachen im Land durchgesetzt hat — und unterschiedliche Ressorts haben unterschiedliche Interessen. Globale Gesundheitspolitik ist aber kein Feld, das nur von einem Ministerium oder Politikbereich bespielt wird. Außerdem muss die neue Bundesregierung die globale Gesundheitsstrategie vom Oktober vergangenen Jahres umsetzen. Dass dies noch nicht sichtbar begonnen wurde, ist zum Teil verständlich, da die entsprechenden Akteure aufgrund der Pandemie mit anderen Dingen beschäftigt waren. Dafür sollte es aber nun umso schneller gehen.  

Prof. Dr. Ilona Kickbusch berät die Weltgesundheitsorganisation unter anderem im Aufbau des WHO Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence Hub.

Das Interview führte Cetin Demirci von der Online-Redaktion.

Bernabé López García y Said Kirhlani. ARI 80/2021 - 27/9/2021

El partido Reagrupamiento Nacional de Independientes (RNI) ha obtenido una triple victoria en las elecciones parlamentarias, municipales y regionales celebradas en Marruecos el 8 de septiembre de 2021.

Die Wahl zum 20. Deutschen Bundestag kommentiert Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Noch nie war die Bundesrepublik Deutschland politisch so vielfältig und so gespalten. Keine mögliche Regierungskoalition hat ein klares Mandat erhalten; jede Koalition muss sich erst Legitimität erarbeiten. Ich hoffe, dass sich die neuen Regierungsparteien nicht auf den kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner einigen, sondern die Aufgaben klug und mutig untereinander aufteilen und die notwendige Entschlossenheit zur Veränderung haben. Deutschland steht vor den schwierigsten Herausforderung seit langer Zeit. Die neue Bundesregierung muss schnell wegweisende Entscheidungen zum Klimaschutz, zur digitalen Transformation und zur sozialen Erneuerung treffen. Wenn ihr dies nicht gelingt, wird Deutschlands wirtschaftlicher Wohlstand auf dem Spiel stehen und Europa Gefahr laufen im Systemwettbewerb mit China und den USA ins Hintertreffen zu geraten. Die neue Bundesregierung sollte sich daher schnell finden und in den ersten 100 Tagen ein überzeugendes Programm mit Schwerpunkt Zukunftsinvestitionen, Entbürokratisierung und einer stärkeren Integration Europas angehen. Wir brauchen endlich mehr Mut zur Veränderung. Dazu gehört, den mächtigen Interessensgruppen die Stirn zu bieten und die größte Hürde für Reformen – die Besitzstandswahrung in Deutschland – zu überwinden.

Even after the Brexit treaties have come into effect, the conflict over how to deal with Northern Ireland is still straining relations between the European Union and the United Kingdom. From London’s perspective, the Northern Ireland Protocol leads to unacceptable economic, political, and social disruptions, which is why it is calling for a fundamental renegotiation. The EU, for its part, is accusing the British government of failing to fully comply with its obligations under the protocol. The recent exten­sion of some of the protocol’s grace periods has mitigated the conflict somewhat, but it only works to postpone the difficult decisions into the future. A serious political dispute continues to simmer in the background, with negative implications for the still difficult UK-European relationship. But simply insisting on London’s legal obliga­tions is insufficient – the EU should show flexibility in implementation but demand that London unequivocally accepts the protocol.

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In partnership with the Government of Sweden, IPI cohosted a high-level discussion entitled “Securing Women’s Leadership in ‘Post-Pandemic’ Life” on September 23rd. The event highlighted the leadership of women and explored how this can be amplified and formally recognized. It also built upon IPI’s 2020 Women, Peace and Leadership Symposium which focused on women’s vital contributions to the crisis response across the globe.

The COVID-19 pandemic has both revealed and exacerbated global inequalities, especially along gender lines and not least in already challenging contexts characterized by fragility and conflict. Despite this, little attention has so far been given to the long-term negative consequences that the crisis risks having for women’s political and peacebuilding leadership as well as economic empowerment and human rights.

As the global community continues to grapple with the recovery and simultaneously seeks to build resilience against future crises, there is a unique opportunity to develop ways to rectify structural gender inequalities and explore how women’s leadership can be amplified and formally recognized both in general and in conflict situations. This includes harnessing the experiences from the pandemic itself where innumerable women have played, and continue to play, key leadership roles in ushering their communities through the crisis.

Speakers:
H.E. Ms. Ann Linde, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden
H.E. Ms. Olta Xhaçka, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Albania
H.E. Ms. Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of Namibia
Ms. Katrina Fotovat, Senior Official, Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues, U.S. Department of State
Dr. Sarah Taylor, Women, Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action Compact, UN Women
Ms. Åsa Regnér, UN Assistant Secretary-General and Deputy Executive Director of UN Women

Moderator:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, IPI President

Whether financial crisis, migration or Corona – the past decade has shown that Germany cannot easily implement its international goals without the EU. This fact is hardly taken into account in the German cybersecurity strategy adopted on 8 September. Germany's positioning in European and international cybersecurity policy is listed as the last of four prioritised fields of action. These fields are largely of a domestic nature. This also applies to the German discourse on the topic of IT security: representatives of digital civil society, the Association of the Internet Industry (eco) as well as some computer science professors criticise the planned development of an active cyber defence – including the possibility of digital counterattacks, so-called hackbacks.* However, they primarily discuss domestic federal competences or fundamental rights issues such as the separation requirement. There are four reasons why the EU would have to be much more involved in order for the strategy to work.

European imperatives

First, the number of serious cybersecurity incidents affecting EU services of general interest continues to rise. Diplomatic action, travel restrictions and asset freezes – for example, Russian intelligence officers blamed for cyberattacks – have proven cumbersome, incoherent and ineffective here in the past. A purely national perspective means that EU member states do not react uniformly to cyber incidents.

Secondly, the EU is not only the framework for German policy, but also inextricably intertwined with it through the direct effect of European law. The 2014 ruling on data retention by the European Court of Justice not only formulated requirements for data protection, but also for data security. In the same way, the EU Cybersecurity Act of 2019 is a regulation and thus obliges all member states to implement it. However, the importance of EU law and the case law of the European Court of Justice is underestimated in the German cybersecurity strategy. Yet these are central reference points for German legislation. On the other hand, Germany cannot impose cyber sanctions against third countries or their so-called proxies without the EU.

Thirdly, the German government cannot reduce the EU to a coordinating role, if only because internal market protection is inconceivable without the Commission acting as a safeguard of EU treaty obligations. The security and stability of the Union is not the task of the member states alone. For example, the EU Commission will set up a joint cyber unit by 2023 to take joint action against attackers. Part of the necessary investment will be provided through the Digital Europe programme. The development of cyber defence capabilities will be financed by the European Defence Fund. In her State of the European Union address on Wednesday, EU President Ursula von der Leyen also announced a cyber resilience act to define common standards.

Fourth, transnational cybercrime cannot be solved effectively on a purely national level. Europol and the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) are regarded by other states as role models in the international fight against cybercrime precisely because of their transnational investigative successes. The call for a European investigative agency modelled on the FBI is therefore becoming louder in cyber security policy.

Overall, it becomes clear here that cyber security in the EU is no longer a national matter, but must be understood as a component of its shared sovereignty.

Germany in a global context

However, the necessary integration in the German cybersecurity strategy is not limited to the EU; it must also be coupled with strong transatlantic cooperation between the EU and the US within the newly established Trade and Technology Council. Far too often, transatlantic cooperation is thought of in terms of a national bilateralism between Germany and the USA. The first argument in favour of this is that Alliance solidarity obliges the German government to maintain an active cyber defence even in peacetime. However, a demanding technical, legal and political attribution can neither be coordinated without the European External Action Service nor realised without US cooperation. For this, Germany must in turn act in close coordination with its EU partners such as France, the Netherlands, Denmark or Sweden. Germany's transnational critical infrastructure in itself effectively precludes it from going it alone in cyber defence, not least because the expertise for sophisticated technical solutions is not sufficiently available in Germany.

A convincing security strategy therefore requires close cooperation with international experts as well as the knowledge imparted at the EU level via Europol in coordination with the Cybersecurity Research Centres and the European Union Agency for Cyber Security (ENISA). Sustainable influence on global standards and norm setting in the multi-stakeholder forums of Internet governance can also only be successful in the long term if democratic states coordinate among themselves in data protection and data security policies. In the face of increasingly complex global politics, the new German government should promptly Europeanise the cybersecurity strategy so that it sees itself as part of the EU Cyber Strategy 2020 and, in a global context, serves to cooperate with its democratic allies.

*Dr. Matthias Schulze was part of this initiative.

This text was also published by fairobserver.com.

Enrique Feás. ARI 79/2021 - 23/9/2021

La nueva estrategia de política comercial de la UE, basada en el concepto de “autonomía estratégica abierta”, es un intento nada sencillo de usar esta potente herramienta de la UE como instrumento activo de defensa y promoción de sus intereses y valores estratégicos ante un mundo cada vez más complejo y multipolar.

Since its foundation in 1961, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – nerve centre of the aid effort of the “rich” countries – has played a central role in the PostWar aid system. This book traces the history of the institution and reflects on its future. How intense diplomacy led to the creation of the OECD itself and the DAC is disclosed here for the first time. How the DAC works, how it shaped development finance by defining and measuring Official Development Assistance (ODA), and how it has pursued its founding mission to increase the volume and effectiveness of aid, are key to the story.
The end of the Cold War brought on major aid fatigue. In response, the DAC proposed human development goals that eventually became the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It also prioritised policy frontiers such as gender equality, fragile states, sustainable development and policy coherence. More recently, the universal 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have succeeded the MDGs. China has become a leading source of development finance, population in SubSaharan Africa is set to double to 2 billion by 2050 out of a world total of 10 billion, and “global public bads” such as climate change and worldwide pandemics are putting not only development but our civilisation at risk. In this environment of unprecedented challenges and contested cooperation, the DAC seeks its place in the evolving global development architecture.

Since its foundation in 1961, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – nerve centre of the aid effort of the “rich” countries – has played a central role in the PostWar aid system. This book traces the history of the institution and reflects on its future. How intense diplomacy led to the creation of the OECD itself and the DAC is disclosed here for the first time. How the DAC works, how it shaped development finance by defining and measuring Official Development Assistance (ODA), and how it has pursued its founding mission to increase the volume and effectiveness of aid, are key to the story.
The end of the Cold War brought on major aid fatigue. In response, the DAC proposed human development goals that eventually became the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It also prioritised policy frontiers such as gender equality, fragile states, sustainable development and policy coherence. More recently, the universal 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have succeeded the MDGs. China has become a leading source of development finance, population in SubSaharan Africa is set to double to 2 billion by 2050 out of a world total of 10 billion, and “global public bads” such as climate change and worldwide pandemics are putting not only development but our civilisation at risk. In this environment of unprecedented challenges and contested cooperation, the DAC seeks its place in the evolving global development architecture.

Since its foundation in 1961, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – nerve centre of the aid effort of the “rich” countries – has played a central role in the PostWar aid system. This book traces the history of the institution and reflects on its future. How intense diplomacy led to the creation of the OECD itself and the DAC is disclosed here for the first time. How the DAC works, how it shaped development finance by defining and measuring Official Development Assistance (ODA), and how it has pursued its founding mission to increase the volume and effectiveness of aid, are key to the story.
The end of the Cold War brought on major aid fatigue. In response, the DAC proposed human development goals that eventually became the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It also prioritised policy frontiers such as gender equality, fragile states, sustainable development and policy coherence. More recently, the universal 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have succeeded the MDGs. China has become a leading source of development finance, population in SubSaharan Africa is set to double to 2 billion by 2050 out of a world total of 10 billion, and “global public bads” such as climate change and worldwide pandemics are putting not only development but our civilisation at risk. In this environment of unprecedented challenges and contested cooperation, the DAC seeks its place in the evolving global development architecture.

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On September 23rd, IPI hosted a Global Leaders Series event featuring H.E. Dr. Ahmed Awad Bin Mubarak, Minister of Foreign and Expatriates Affairs of the Republic of Yemen.

The talk shed light on the latest developments in Yemen, including the prospects for improved dialogue following the appointment of a new UN special envoy to Yemen and the anticipation of a re-energized diplomatic effort to reach a political settlement to the conflict.

Ambassador Dr. Ahmed Awad Bin Mubarak was appointed Minister for Foreign and Expatriates Affairs of the Republic of Yemen on December 18, 2020.

Prior to his appointment, he served as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Yemen to the United States of America in Washington, DC. He has also served as non-resident ambassador to Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. He was appointed as the Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations in 2018.

Dr. Bin Mubarak has participated in most of the UN peace talks in Yemen as an adviser to the negotiating team for the internationally recognized government of the Republic of Yemen.

He holds a Ph.D. in Business Administration from the University of Baghdad and received the Distinguished Graduate Shield from the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) of the National Defense University in Washington, DC.

This event was moderated by Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO of IPI.

Im Juni 2020 hat das Kabinett die Nationale Wasserstoffstrategie (NWS) verabschiedet. Die künftige Bundesregierung sollte diese weiterentwickeln und implementieren. Denn mit ihr sind ambitionierte Ziele im Rahmen der Energiewende verbunden. Wasserstoff (H2) kann als Energieträger dort eingesetzt werden, wo die elektrische Energieversorgung aus techno-ökonomischen Gründen nicht möglich ist, etwa im Schwerlastverkehr oder in der Seefahrt. Gleichzeitig ist H2 ein flexibel einsetzbarer Rohstoff für industrielle Prozesse, vor allem in der chemischen Industrie und bei der Stahlherstellung. Bereits heute werden 55 Terrawattstunden (TWh) H2 in industrielle Prozesse in Deutschland eingespeist, das ist mehr als das Vierfache des Stromverbrauchs von Berlin (12,8 TWh in 2020). H2 ist weder als Energieträger noch als industrieller Rohstoff neu. Allerdings wird bislang fast ausschließlich „grauer H2“ eingesetzt, der durch die Umwandlung fossiler Energieträger (v.a. Erdgas) gewonnen wird, wobei erhebliche Mengen an CO2 freigesetzt werden. Um den nationalen Klimazielen näherzukommen, setzt die NWS ganz auf „grünen“ H2. Dieser basiert auf Strom aus erneuerbaren Energiequellen (v.a. Solar-Photovoltaik und Wind).

Die NWS verbindet Klima- und Industriepolitik. Erklärtes Ziel ist es, Deutschland zum Vorreiter und Weltmarktführer bei Wasserstofftechnologien zu machen. Die Vision eines raschen Markthochlaufs für grünen H2 zur Dekarbonisierung von Industrie und Verkehr ist mit quantitativen Herausforderungen verbunden. Die Bundesregierung erwartet bereits 2030 einen Bedarf für grünen H2 von 90-110 TWh. Bis dahin sollen in Deutschland Erzeugungskapazitäten von 5 Gigawatt (GW) auf Basis von erneuerbaren Energien aufgebaut werden. Zum Vergleich: Im Juli 2021 wurde in Wesseling bei Köln einer der nach Angaben der Betreiberfirma Shell weltgrößten Elektrolyseure zur Erzeugung von H2 mit einer Kapazität von 10 Megawatt (MW) in Betrieb genommen. 500 derartige Anlagen wären rechnerisch notwendig, um die Kapazitätsziele für 2030 zu erreichen. Dies ist eine techno-ökonomische Herausforderung, weil Elektrolyseure nach wie vor nicht standardisiert sind und bislang nicht kostengünstig in Serie gefertigt werden.

Die NWS rechnet mit 14 TWh an grünem H2, der mit den bis 2030 voraussichtlich zur Verfügung stehenden Kapazitäten gewonnen werden kann; dies entspricht jedoch nur etwa 13% bis 16 % des erwarteten Bedarfs. Auch nach der Abkehr von fossilen Energiequellen wird Deutschland daher Nettoimporteur von Energie bleiben, vor allem wenn es um die Gewinnung von Antriebsstoffen und industrieller Prozesswärme geht. Bei der Frage, woher die angepeilten hohen Mengen an grünem H2 importiert werden sollen, bleibt die NWS recht vage. Angeführt wird eine Zusammenarbeit mit Nordeuropa (Offshore Wind) und mit Südeuropa (Photovoltaik und Wind). Die Kooperation mit Ländern des Globalen Südens wird in der NWS ebenfalls erwähnt, ohne jedoch auf die möglichen Interessenlagen, Chancen und Risiken einzugehen. In den letzten Jahren hat Deutschland Energiepartnerschaften mit einer Reihe von Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern begonnen, unter anderen mit Algerien, Marokko, Chile und jüngst Namibia. Weitgehend offen ist die Frage, unter welchen Bedingungen diese Länder bereit sein werden, ihre Potenziale an erneuerbaren Energien zu nutzen, um auf großer Skala grünen H2 für den deutschen und europäischen Markt bereitzustellen.

Die NWS muss daher um eine europäische und eine multilaterale Agenda ergänzt werden, die grünen H2 als Chance zur Bewältigung globaler Herausforderungen begreift und auf vielseitigen Nutzen setzt. Beispielsweise sind die Länder Nordafrikas zwingend darauf angewiesen, Beschäftigungschancen gerade für junge Menschen zu schaffen. Internationale Projekte, wie das von Deutschland unterstützte Ouarzazate-Solarprojekt in Marokko, zeigen aber, dass die Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten oft bescheiden sind, sobald Großanlagen die Bauphase abgeschlossen haben und in den Regelbetrieb gehen. Deutschland und Europa sollten in einem partnerschaftlichen Ansatz auf mögliche Exportländer zugehen und ausloten, welche Co-Benefits erzielt werden können, um den politischen Willen und die lokale Akzeptanz zur Einbindung in eine internationale Wasserstoffökonomie zu erhöhen. Wissenstransfer und Wissenschaftskooperation sind essentiell, um auch Entwicklungsländer zu befähigen, H2-basierte Lösungen zu entwickeln. Beispiele hierfür sind die Umstellung der Düngemittelproduktion von fossilen Rohstoffen auf H2 oder die Dekarbonisierung der (petro-) chemischen Industrie. Technologisch weiter fortgeschrittene Länder wie Südafrika oder Brasilien könnten Kernkomponenten für Elektrolyseure liefern. In den am wenigsten entwickelten Ländern kann H2 als Energiespeicher in Stromnetzen genutzt werden, die von intermittierenden erneuerbaren Energiequellen gespeist werden.

Vieles spricht dafür, in einem ersten Schritt systematischer als bislang geschehen die NWS und die europäische H2-Strategie zu verschränken. Dies würde die Kraft der europäischen Stimme im internationalen Konzert stärken. Denn für viele Entwicklungsländer steht mit China ein weiterer durchaus interessanter Partner für eine internationale Wasserstoffkooperation bereit.

Dieser Text ist im Rahmen der Reihe „Impulse zur Bundestagswahl“ erschienen.