Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Peacekeeping mission mandates now routinely include language on women, peace, and security (WPS). Despite this progress, negotiations in the Security Council on the inclusion of WPS language in mandates have at times been contested, and it is not always clear that more detailed or “stronger” language on WPS in mandates translates to changes in peacekeeping missions. The language included in mandates can even perpetuate stereotypes, including the assumption that every uniformed woman is responsible for implementing a mission’s WPS mandate.

This paper explores the different elements of the WPS agenda that are included in peacekeeping mandates, assesses the factors that influence the inclusion of language on WPS, examines the drivers behind the implementation of the WPS agenda in the field, and assesses the impact that mandate language has on uniformed women peacekeepers. It concludes by considering how the Security Council and other stakeholders could advance the WPS agenda through mission mandates, including by:

• Proposing WPS language early in the Security Council’s mandating process;
• Facilitating engagement between country experts and WPS experts in member states’ permanent missions to the UN;
• Using informal consultations to understand the needs of women affected by conflict;
• Including language in mandates that reflects the contributions of both women and men to operational effectiveness; and
• Ensuring that approaches to WPS in the Security Council consider the full spectrum of gender.

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España coincide en distintos espacios multilaterales o supra-nacionales de desarrollo con un grupo reducido de donantes de la UE con los que además concuerda en una visión relativamente común del sistema multilateral. Éstos podrían ser sus principales aliados en su estrategia de fortalecimiento del sistema multilateral de desarrollo en la etapa post-COVID-19.

The proposal for a European Health Union is currently being discussed by the Council of the European Union and includes the strengthening of the European Centre for Dis­ease Prevention and Control (ECDC) as well as the extension of its mandate. In light of this, the ECDC and the European Union (EU) member states can make the case for a new role for the ECDC. While the political weight of the member states is needed, the ECDC can seize the opportunity of expanding its regional and bilateral partnerships to promote health systems strengthening through development projects. In doing so, the ECDC would be contributing to sustainable development and the 2030 Agenda.

El Gobierno va a actualizar la Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional en 2021. La reflexión estratégica que se inicia, ¿servirá sólo para mejorar la atención que se presta a los riesgos habituales para la seguridad (luces cortas), o se abrirá a explorar nuevos escenarios de riesgo para la prosperidad (luces largas)?

An important anniversary is coming up in the Kingdom of Denmark: 12 May 2021 marks exactly three hundred years since the Protestant preacher Hans Egede set sail, with the blessing of the Danish monarch, to missionise the island of Greenland. For some Greenlanders that date symbolises the end of their autonomy: not a date to celebrate but an occasion to declare independence from Denmark, after becoming an autonomous territory in 2009. Just as controversial as Egede’s statue in the capital Nuuk was US President Donald Trump’s offer to purchase the island from Denmark. His arrogance angered Greenlanders, but also unsettled them by exposing the shaky foundations of their independence ambitions. In the absence of governmental and economic preconditions, leaving the Realm of the Danish Crown would appear to be a decidedly long-term option. But an ambitious new prime minister in Nuuk could boost the independence process in 2021.

Candida Splett: Im Zuge der Corona-Pandemie sind durch Grenzschließungen und Produktionseinbrüche Lieferketten unterbrochen worden. Was hat das ausgelöst?

Melanie Müller: Vielen Ländern ist bewusst geworden, wie abhängig sie von Lieferbeziehungen sind, sei es beim Import oder beim Export. Und auch die zentrale Rolle Chinas als Zwischenhändler in den globalen Lieferketten ist in den Fokus gerückt. In vielen Staaten, auch in der EU, denkt man nun darüber nach, wie man diese Abhängigkeiten reduzieren und damit die Versorgungssicherheit erhöhen kann.

Heißt das, dass wir die Globalisierung zurückfahren müssen?

Das ist in den meisten Bereichen nicht realistisch. Ein Beispiel: Wir wissen bereits jetzt, dass sich durch die zunehmende Digitalisierung und auch die Energiewende der Bedarf an bestimmten metallischen Rohstoffen in den nächsten Jahren weiter erhöhen wird. Dieser Bedarf kann nicht über Recycling allein gedeckt werden. Da Deutschland selbst keine metallischen Rohstoffe in relevanter Größenordnung abbaut, muss es sie importieren. Umgekehrt sind viele Länder des globalen Südens dringend auf den Export angewiesen, Südafrika etwa als Hauptproduzent von Platin, das in der Automobilindustrie eingesetzt wird. Ohne diese Exporte würden dem Land wichtige Einnahmen verloren gehen. In afrikanischen Staaten wird allerdings darüber diskutiert, wie man die Wertschöpfung vor Ort erhöhen kann, indem man Rohstoffe nicht nur abbaut, sondern selbst weiterverarbeitet. So könnten sie sich unabhängiger vom Export machen.

Was sind die wichtigsten Schritte auf dem Weg zu mehr Versorgungssicherheit in der EU, wenn man auf die Lieferketten schaut?

Nicht die einzelnen Nationalstaaten, sondern die EU muss sich dem Thema Versorgungssicherheit nähern, und zwar mit einer mittel- bis langfristigen Perspektive. Dabei geht es nicht nur um eine Diversifizierung von Lieferketten, sondern auch darum, sie menschenrechtskonform bzw. sozial- und umweltfreundlich zu gestalten. Denn Störungen in Lieferbeziehungen entstehen nicht nur in Pandemien, sondern auch durch politische Unruhen oder durch die Verletzung von sozialen oder Umweltstandards, die zum Beispiel zu Streiks führen können. Ebenso können Umweltprobleme Produktionskosten erhöhen – etwas, das uns als Abnehmer auf die Füße fällt. Wenn wir uns nun also mit der Widerstandsfähigkeit von Lieferketten beschäftigen, sollten wir auch die Situation im globalen Süden in unsere Strategien mit einbeziehen.

Was muss nun also geschehen?

In den letzten zehn Jahren hat sich schon viel getan: Dass in der EU und in Deutschland heute über Lieferkettengesetze diskutiert wird, ist das Resultat einer längeren Entwicklung. Die Vereinten Nationen etwa haben 2011 bereits Leitprinzipien für Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte verabschiedet, die OECD setzt schon länger entsprechende Standards. Entscheidend ist, dass wirtschaftliche Akteure nicht mehr nur für das Handeln im eigenen Unternehmen verantwortlich gemacht werden. Sie sollten vielmehr gesetzlich verpflichtet werden, sich mit der Menschenrechtslage in Zulieferbetrieben und deren staatlichem Umfeld zu beschäftigen.

Was steht einer Einigung über das deutsche und das europäische Lieferkettengesetz noch im Wege?

Da geht es um Fragen wie: Welche Unternehmen sollen in die Pflicht genommen werden, müssen Unternehmen sich eine Menschenrechtsagenda geben, wer evaluiert deren Erfolg und werden die Berichte der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich gemacht? Das ist eine ganze Reihe technischer Fragen, die enorme politische Implikationen haben. Streit gibt es auch über das Verhältnis des deutschen zum europäischen Lieferkettengesetz. Manche sagen, wir brauchen das europäische Gesetz zuerst. Ich meine, dass Deutschland sich bereits jetzt einen gesetzlichen Rahmen geben sollte. Wir sind ein zentraler politischer Akteur in der EU und können Vorreiter sein. Sollte die EU-Verordnung dann weitreichender ausfallen, können wir nachbessern.

Worauf kommt es bei der Umsetzung des Lieferkettengesetzes an?

Die Unternehmen müssen mehr darüber lernen, worauf sie konkret achten müssen. Wie kann man überprüfen, ob in einem Land Rechtsbrüche stattfinden, was kann ich überhaupt nachvollziehen und was nicht? In unserem Projekt »Transnationale Governance-Ansätze für nachhaltige Rohstofflieferketten im Andenraum und im südlichen Afrika« untersuchen wir Lieferketten, die zum Teil so intransparent sind, dass die Endabnehmer sie nur schwer nachvollziehen können: In einer Weltregion wird das Metall abgebaut, in der nächsten geschmolzen, in einem Land in Europa wird daraus dann vielleicht ein Draht hergestellt, der im nächsten Land in ein Produkt eingebaut wird. An jeder der zahlreichen Stufen der Bearbeitung kann es zu Menschenrechtsverletzungen kommen. Das ist selbst bei einfacheren Produkten wie Computermäusen kaum nachvollziehbar. In unserem Projekt wollen wir komplexe Lieferketten bei metallischen Rohstoffen zunächst nachvollziehen, um dann Vorschläge machen zu können, wie sie transparenter und vor allem nachhaltiger gestaltet werden können. Die Transparenz ist also ein wichtiges Ziel. Und schließlich müssen wir Staaten, von denen wir wissen, dass dort regelmäßig Menschenrechte verletzt werden, dazu bewegen, das Problem einzudämmen.

Inwieweit engagieren sich Staaten des globalen Südens bereits für nachhaltige Produktionsprozesse?

Der Erkenntnisprozess ist bereits da, viele Staaten im globalen Süden haben eigene Verpflichtungen und Regelungen verabschiedet. Zudem gibt es eine lebhafte Zivilgesellschaft, die sich genau dafür einsetzt, und auch einen von Ecuador und Südafrika angestoßenen Prozess auf UN-Ebene mit dem Ziel eines »Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights«. Einige Länder haben allerdings Angst, Wettbewerbsvorteile einzubüßen, wenn sie nicht so billig wie möglich produzieren. Dabei vergessen sie, dass auch schlechte Produktionsbedingungen häufig Kosten verursachen.

Was kann Deutschland tun, um sie zu unterstützen?

Wir können Staaten und Firmen vor Ort direkt dabei unterstützen, bestehende Regelungen umzusetzen, ebenso wie zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure, die auf Missstände aufmerksam machen. Man kann auch helfen, die Informationsbasis zu verbessern. Und schließlich ist Prävention wichtig: Wenn zum Beispiel eine neue Mine eröffnet werden soll, kann man von vornherein darauf achten, Risiken abzuschätzen und zu reduzieren. Da geht es zum Beispiel darum, die relevanten Institutionen und Verwaltungen in den Ländern zu stärken oder Korruption im Rohstoffsektor einzudämmen.

Melanie Müller leitet das Projekt »Transnationale Governance-Ansätze für nachhaltige Rohstofflieferketten im Andenraum und im südlichen Afrika«.

Das Interview führte Candida Splett von der Online-Redaktion der SWP.

Ondanks recente economische groei in veel Afrikaanse ontwikkelingslanden, en zowel overheidsinterventie op nationaal niveau en grootschalige ondersteuning op internationaal niveau, blijft structurele transformatie van deze economieën grotendeels uit. Een groot deel van de productie, handel en investeringen blijft geconcentreerd in lage value-added activiteiten die weinig werkgelegenheid genereren. In dit artikel laat Kasper Vrolijk zien dat dit komt omdat overheden in deze landen industriepolitiek inzetten om output te verhogen, maar innovatie en technologieoverdracht daarbij onvoldoende benadrukken.

Ondanks recente economische groei in veel Afrikaanse ontwikkelingslanden, en zowel overheidsinterventie op nationaal niveau en grootschalige ondersteuning op internationaal niveau, blijft structurele transformatie van deze economieën grotendeels uit. Een groot deel van de productie, handel en investeringen blijft geconcentreerd in lage value-added activiteiten die weinig werkgelegenheid genereren. In dit artikel laat Kasper Vrolijk zien dat dit komt omdat overheden in deze landen industriepolitiek inzetten om output te verhogen, maar innovatie en technologieoverdracht daarbij onvoldoende benadrukken.

Ondanks recente economische groei in veel Afrikaanse ontwikkelingslanden, en zowel overheidsinterventie op nationaal niveau en grootschalige ondersteuning op internationaal niveau, blijft structurele transformatie van deze economieën grotendeels uit. Een groot deel van de productie, handel en investeringen blijft geconcentreerd in lage value-added activiteiten die weinig werkgelegenheid genereren. In dit artikel laat Kasper Vrolijk zien dat dit komt omdat overheden in deze landen industriepolitiek inzetten om output te verhogen, maar innovatie en technologieoverdracht daarbij onvoldoende benadrukken.

Die »Takfiristen« sind eine stark sektenartige Strömung des Jihadismus, deren An­hänger glauben, dass fast alle Muslime außer ihnen selbst ungläubig sind. Aufgrund ihrer geringen Zahl hatten viele von ihnen die Hoffnung aufgegeben, einen erfolg­reichen »Jihad« gegen die Feinde des Islam führen zu können. Dies änderte sich mit der Ausrufung des Islamischen Staates (IS) im Juni 2014, als viele Takfiristen aus Europa, den Kaukasusländern, Saudi-Arabien und Nordafrika nach Syrien und in den Irak zogen und sich dem IS anschlossen – während andere diesen Schritt ablehnten, auf den bewaffneten Kampf verzichteten und in ihren Heimatländern blieben. Seit­dem stellt sich die Frage nach der Gefährlichkeit der Takfiristen erneut. Der Anschlag in Wien am 2. November 2020 hat der Debatte neue Nahrung verschafft, denn der Attentäter verkehrte vor seinem Ausreiseversuch nach Syrien im Jahr 2018 in einer takfiristischen Moschee in der österreichischen Hauptstadt. Er ist das jüngste Beispiel dafür, dass die Takfiristen ein integraler Bestandteil der jihadistischen Bewegung sind und eine teils unterschätzte Gefahr darstellen.

To avoid catastrophic effects on natural and human systems, bold action needs to be taken rapidly to mitigate climate change. Despite this urgency, the currently implemented and planned climate mitigation policies are not sufficient to meet the global targets set in Paris in 2015. One reason for their current inadequate rollout is their perceived negative distributional effects: by increasing the price of goods, climate mitigation policies may increase both poverty and inequality. In addition, they may disrupt labour markets and increase unemployment, especially in sectors and areas dependent on fossil fuels. As a result, public protests in many countries have so far blocked or delayed the implementation of climate policies.
New avenues of research, discussed in this Briefing Paper, are turning the tide. First, it has been shown that carbon pricing may not be regressive in developing countries, contrary to the evidence in advanced economies. In a similar positive direction, findings from global-level and cross-country studies assessing the effects of climate mitigation policies on labour markets estimate that reaching climate goals will actually generate a small net increase in jobs. Nonetheless, the price effect of carbon pricing and the impact on the labour market of climate policies will both create losers: increases in prices would worsen poverty as lower-income households would need to pay more to purchase the same goods; similarly, specific countries, sectors, areas and workers (such as low-skilled ones) will witness job disruption or loss.
Second, social protection policies can be implemented to compensate households and workers negatively affected by climate policies and to address negative distributional effects. Compensation for higher prices can be achieved through the use of cash transfers to households, which can be funded by revenues from climate policies such as carbon taxes. Full compensation can be achieved by using only a small share (about 30%–50% according to case studies) of the tax revenues generated. The remaining share could be used for other purposes, such as climate-friendly investments. Similarly, when looking at labour market effects, social protection, especially labour market policies such as retraining and unemployment relief, become critical in addressing the needs of negatively affected workers.
Clearly, the achievement of environmental and social goals need not be mutually exclusive. With appropriate policy mixes, both poverty and environmental degradation can be reduced. This policy implication needs to be communicated more widely to increase the acceptance of climate polices. This is partially already achieved by recent plans such as the European Green Deal. From a research and policy perspective, more studies in developing countries are needed, including evidence on non-market climate policies and extending beyond the short-term effect of higher prices on the purchasing power of households. Finally, international cooperation can play an important role in policy coordination, financing and building social protection systems in lower-income countries.

To avoid catastrophic effects on natural and human systems, bold action needs to be taken rapidly to mitigate climate change. Despite this urgency, the currently implemented and planned climate mitigation policies are not sufficient to meet the global targets set in Paris in 2015. One reason for their current inadequate rollout is their perceived negative distributional effects: by increasing the price of goods, climate mitigation policies may increase both poverty and inequality. In addition, they may disrupt labour markets and increase unemployment, especially in sectors and areas dependent on fossil fuels. As a result, public protests in many countries have so far blocked or delayed the implementation of climate policies.
New avenues of research, discussed in this Briefing Paper, are turning the tide. First, it has been shown that carbon pricing may not be regressive in developing countries, contrary to the evidence in advanced economies. In a similar positive direction, findings from global-level and cross-country studies assessing the effects of climate mitigation policies on labour markets estimate that reaching climate goals will actually generate a small net increase in jobs. Nonetheless, the price effect of carbon pricing and the impact on the labour market of climate policies will both create losers: increases in prices would worsen poverty as lower-income households would need to pay more to purchase the same goods; similarly, specific countries, sectors, areas and workers (such as low-skilled ones) will witness job disruption or loss.
Second, social protection policies can be implemented to compensate households and workers negatively affected by climate policies and to address negative distributional effects. Compensation for higher prices can be achieved through the use of cash transfers to households, which can be funded by revenues from climate policies such as carbon taxes. Full compensation can be achieved by using only a small share (about 30%–50% according to case studies) of the tax revenues generated. The remaining share could be used for other purposes, such as climate-friendly investments. Similarly, when looking at labour market effects, social protection, especially labour market policies such as retraining and unemployment relief, become critical in addressing the needs of negatively affected workers.
Clearly, the achievement of environmental and social goals need not be mutually exclusive. With appropriate policy mixes, both poverty and environmental degradation can be reduced. This policy implication needs to be communicated more widely to increase the acceptance of climate polices. This is partially already achieved by recent plans such as the European Green Deal. From a research and policy perspective, more studies in developing countries are needed, including evidence on non-market climate policies and extending beyond the short-term effect of higher prices on the purchasing power of households. Finally, international cooperation can play an important role in policy coordination, financing and building social protection systems in lower-income countries.

To avoid catastrophic effects on natural and human systems, bold action needs to be taken rapidly to mitigate climate change. Despite this urgency, the currently implemented and planned climate mitigation policies are not sufficient to meet the global targets set in Paris in 2015. One reason for their current inadequate rollout is their perceived negative distributional effects: by increasing the price of goods, climate mitigation policies may increase both poverty and inequality. In addition, they may disrupt labour markets and increase unemployment, especially in sectors and areas dependent on fossil fuels. As a result, public protests in many countries have so far blocked or delayed the implementation of climate policies.
New avenues of research, discussed in this Briefing Paper, are turning the tide. First, it has been shown that carbon pricing may not be regressive in developing countries, contrary to the evidence in advanced economies. In a similar positive direction, findings from global-level and cross-country studies assessing the effects of climate mitigation policies on labour markets estimate that reaching climate goals will actually generate a small net increase in jobs. Nonetheless, the price effect of carbon pricing and the impact on the labour market of climate policies will both create losers: increases in prices would worsen poverty as lower-income households would need to pay more to purchase the same goods; similarly, specific countries, sectors, areas and workers (such as low-skilled ones) will witness job disruption or loss.
Second, social protection policies can be implemented to compensate households and workers negatively affected by climate policies and to address negative distributional effects. Compensation for higher prices can be achieved through the use of cash transfers to households, which can be funded by revenues from climate policies such as carbon taxes. Full compensation can be achieved by using only a small share (about 30%–50% according to case studies) of the tax revenues generated. The remaining share could be used for other purposes, such as climate-friendly investments. Similarly, when looking at labour market effects, social protection, especially labour market policies such as retraining and unemployment relief, become critical in addressing the needs of negatively affected workers.
Clearly, the achievement of environmental and social goals need not be mutually exclusive. With appropriate policy mixes, both poverty and environmental degradation can be reduced. This policy implication needs to be communicated more widely to increase the acceptance of climate polices. This is partially already achieved by recent plans such as the European Green Deal. From a research and policy perspective, more studies in developing countries are needed, including evidence on non-market climate policies and extending beyond the short-term effect of higher prices on the purchasing power of households. Finally, international cooperation can play an important role in policy coordination, financing and building social protection systems in lower-income countries.

While blockchain technology (BT) has gained a great deal of publicity for its use in cryptocurrencies, another area of BT application has emerged away from the public eye, namely supply chains. Due to the increasing fragmentation and globalisation of supply chains in recent years, many products have to pass through countless production steps worldwide (from raw material extraction to the point of sale). Ensuring the quality and sustainability of production in preceding steps is a major challenge for many firms and thus, ultimately, also for the consumer. BT offers potential for achieving significant progress on this front. Put simply, the blockchain makes it possible to verify data decentralised within a network, store it in a tamper-proof and traceable format and make it accessible to all members of a network.
The potential benefits of BT lie firstly with the consumer, who is able to trace the origin of products, which makes sustainable purchases easier. Secondly, BT enables producers to automate parts of their supply chains and to verify cost effectively the quality and origin of their products. Thirdly, there are hopes that BT could make supply chains more inclusive for small and medium-sized suppliers, especially in developing countries. BT also offers a means of more easily creating confidence in intermediate goods supplied, thereby dismantling barriers to entry. Taken together, BT could thus help to make consumption and production more environmentally friendly, socially equitable and inclusive, and thereby foster sustainable development.
So far, pilot projects have received investment primarily from very large companies. Both the firms and their consumers can now audit a number of products in real time for manufacturing method and origin. While BT can securely store and chain together the inputted data, it cannot yet guarantee the accuracy of that data. This remaining challenge regarding the digital-analogue link could be addressed through links with other technologies, such as the Internet of Things (IoT). However, independent analogue audits are still the only means in most cases of checking compliance with labour, environmental, animal-welfare and other relevant standards. Consequently, the use of BT offers substantial potential benefits for sectors in which the digital-analogue link can be effectively bridged, such as the food and high-quality commodities sectors.
Small-scale suppliers in developing countries also frequently lack the digital education, equipment and infrastructure needed in order to deploy BT. This is where national and international development policy is needed to leverage the benefits of BT solutions for inclusive production. General technological standards can also help to counteract the monopolisation of technological developments by multinational concerns. In this way, policy-makers could help to harmonise the interests of consumers and producers with those of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the supply chain.

While blockchain technology (BT) has gained a great deal of publicity for its use in cryptocurrencies, another area of BT application has emerged away from the public eye, namely supply chains. Due to the increasing fragmentation and globalisation of supply chains in recent years, many products have to pass through countless production steps worldwide (from raw material extraction to the point of sale). Ensuring the quality and sustainability of production in preceding steps is a major challenge for many firms and thus, ultimately, also for the consumer. BT offers potential for achieving significant progress on this front. Put simply, the blockchain makes it possible to verify data decentralised within a network, store it in a tamper-proof and traceable format and make it accessible to all members of a network.
The potential benefits of BT lie firstly with the consumer, who is able to trace the origin of products, which makes sustainable purchases easier. Secondly, BT enables producers to automate parts of their supply chains and to verify cost effectively the quality and origin of their products. Thirdly, there are hopes that BT could make supply chains more inclusive for small and medium-sized suppliers, especially in developing countries. BT also offers a means of more easily creating confidence in intermediate goods supplied, thereby dismantling barriers to entry. Taken together, BT could thus help to make consumption and production more environmentally friendly, socially equitable and inclusive, and thereby foster sustainable development.
So far, pilot projects have received investment primarily from very large companies. Both the firms and their consumers can now audit a number of products in real time for manufacturing method and origin. While BT can securely store and chain together the inputted data, it cannot yet guarantee the accuracy of that data. This remaining challenge regarding the digital-analogue link could be addressed through links with other technologies, such as the Internet of Things (IoT). However, independent analogue audits are still the only means in most cases of checking compliance with labour, environmental, animal-welfare and other relevant standards. Consequently, the use of BT offers substantial potential benefits for sectors in which the digital-analogue link can be effectively bridged, such as the food and high-quality commodities sectors.
Small-scale suppliers in developing countries also frequently lack the digital education, equipment and infrastructure needed in order to deploy BT. This is where national and international development policy is needed to leverage the benefits of BT solutions for inclusive production. General technological standards can also help to counteract the monopolisation of technological developments by multinational concerns. In this way, policy-makers could help to harmonise the interests of consumers and producers with those of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the supply chain.

While blockchain technology (BT) has gained a great deal of publicity for its use in cryptocurrencies, another area of BT application has emerged away from the public eye, namely supply chains. Due to the increasing fragmentation and globalisation of supply chains in recent years, many products have to pass through countless production steps worldwide (from raw material extraction to the point of sale). Ensuring the quality and sustainability of production in preceding steps is a major challenge for many firms and thus, ultimately, also for the consumer. BT offers potential for achieving significant progress on this front. Put simply, the blockchain makes it possible to verify data decentralised within a network, store it in a tamper-proof and traceable format and make it accessible to all members of a network.
The potential benefits of BT lie firstly with the consumer, who is able to trace the origin of products, which makes sustainable purchases easier. Secondly, BT enables producers to automate parts of their supply chains and to verify cost effectively the quality and origin of their products. Thirdly, there are hopes that BT could make supply chains more inclusive for small and medium-sized suppliers, especially in developing countries. BT also offers a means of more easily creating confidence in intermediate goods supplied, thereby dismantling barriers to entry. Taken together, BT could thus help to make consumption and production more environmentally friendly, socially equitable and inclusive, and thereby foster sustainable development.
So far, pilot projects have received investment primarily from very large companies. Both the firms and their consumers can now audit a number of products in real time for manufacturing method and origin. While BT can securely store and chain together the inputted data, it cannot yet guarantee the accuracy of that data. This remaining challenge regarding the digital-analogue link could be addressed through links with other technologies, such as the Internet of Things (IoT). However, independent analogue audits are still the only means in most cases of checking compliance with labour, environmental, animal-welfare and other relevant standards. Consequently, the use of BT offers substantial potential benefits for sectors in which the digital-analogue link can be effectively bridged, such as the food and high-quality commodities sectors.
Small-scale suppliers in developing countries also frequently lack the digital education, equipment and infrastructure needed in order to deploy BT. This is where national and international development policy is needed to leverage the benefits of BT solutions for inclusive production. General technological standards can also help to counteract the monopolisation of technological developments by multinational concerns. In this way, policy-makers could help to harmonise the interests of consumers and producers with those of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the supply chain.

There is a widely held consensus that it will not be possible to feed the world without the help of the smallholders of Africa, Latin America and Asia, who number up to 570 million farms or 2 billion people. Given the sheer size of this figure alone, the sustainable development of smallholder farming will be key to achieving a range of other sustainability goals.
Debate rages over how smallholder households in low- and middle-income countries are to overcome these challenges given the rising global population and the increasing scarcity of farmland. Four main contentious issues have emerged from the debate over expedient development and promotion strategies: focus (holistic or support), technology (low- or high-input agriculture), institutional framework (primarily government-run or private-sector services) and alignment of market orientation (locally, regionally or globally aligned).
These four contentious strategy issues are meanwhile being melded into two “idealised” fundamental standpoints on agricultural policy: one of farm production that is based on ecological principles and local knowledge, input-extensive, aligned with regional (food) needs and funded by the public sector and, as its countermodel, farm production that is embedded in a global private-sector agricultural industry based on input-intensive modernisation.
At a local and practical level, this conceptional debate is often resolved through pragmatic compromises. Purely market-oriented approaches ignore the need for diversification and consideration of subsistence requirements, while concentrating too much on domestic markets sacrifices opportunities for specialisation and income generation. Although government service systems often have serious weaknesses, private service providers frequently have only a selective interest in specific businesses and products. As efficient as external inputs may be, poorer smallholders are rarely able to bear the costs and risks.
An analysis of local needs and opportunities often reveals a need for target-group- and location-specific combinations of strategic elements focused on the objective of intensifying smallholder farming in a socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable way. The search process required for this should be guided by the following basic strategic principles:
• Rather than being determined unilaterally by market requirements, funding should take equal account of smallholder livelihood systems and local ecosystems.
• The quest for sustainable innovations that will increase yields and have a broad impact calls for a publicly financed process of locally adapted agricultural research that gets various target groups involved.
• The respective benefits of private- and public-sector agricultural services should be combined in public-private partnerships and aligned with the needs of the producers.
• The widespread availability of cash incomes should also be supported, not just the production of food.
• If strategies like these are to succeed, rural areas must be connected up to the rising demand in the cities by means of infrastructure. To some extent, there is also a need for well-focused protection from global competition while taking the interests of poor consumers into account.

There is a widely held consensus that it will not be possible to feed the world without the help of the smallholders of Africa, Latin America and Asia, who number up to 570 million farms or 2 billion people. Given the sheer size of this figure alone, the sustainable development of smallholder farming will be key to achieving a range of other sustainability goals.
Debate rages over how smallholder households in low- and middle-income countries are to overcome these challenges given the rising global population and the increasing scarcity of farmland. Four main contentious issues have emerged from the debate over expedient development and promotion strategies: focus (holistic or support), technology (low- or high-input agriculture), institutional framework (primarily government-run or private-sector services) and alignment of market orientation (locally, regionally or globally aligned).
These four contentious strategy issues are meanwhile being melded into two “idealised” fundamental standpoints on agricultural policy: one of farm production that is based on ecological principles and local knowledge, input-extensive, aligned with regional (food) needs and funded by the public sector and, as its countermodel, farm production that is embedded in a global private-sector agricultural industry based on input-intensive modernisation.
At a local and practical level, this conceptional debate is often resolved through pragmatic compromises. Purely market-oriented approaches ignore the need for diversification and consideration of subsistence requirements, while concentrating too much on domestic markets sacrifices opportunities for specialisation and income generation. Although government service systems often have serious weaknesses, private service providers frequently have only a selective interest in specific businesses and products. As efficient as external inputs may be, poorer smallholders are rarely able to bear the costs and risks.
An analysis of local needs and opportunities often reveals a need for target-group- and location-specific combinations of strategic elements focused on the objective of intensifying smallholder farming in a socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable way. The search process required for this should be guided by the following basic strategic principles:
• Rather than being determined unilaterally by market requirements, funding should take equal account of smallholder livelihood systems and local ecosystems.
• The quest for sustainable innovations that will increase yields and have a broad impact calls for a publicly financed process of locally adapted agricultural research that gets various target groups involved.
• The respective benefits of private- and public-sector agricultural services should be combined in public-private partnerships and aligned with the needs of the producers.
• The widespread availability of cash incomes should also be supported, not just the production of food.
• If strategies like these are to succeed, rural areas must be connected up to the rising demand in the cities by means of infrastructure. To some extent, there is also a need for well-focused protection from global competition while taking the interests of poor consumers into account.

There is a widely held consensus that it will not be possible to feed the world without the help of the smallholders of Africa, Latin America and Asia, who number up to 570 million farms or 2 billion people. Given the sheer size of this figure alone, the sustainable development of smallholder farming will be key to achieving a range of other sustainability goals.
Debate rages over how smallholder households in low- and middle-income countries are to overcome these challenges given the rising global population and the increasing scarcity of farmland. Four main contentious issues have emerged from the debate over expedient development and promotion strategies: focus (holistic or support), technology (low- or high-input agriculture), institutional framework (primarily government-run or private-sector services) and alignment of market orientation (locally, regionally or globally aligned).
These four contentious strategy issues are meanwhile being melded into two “idealised” fundamental standpoints on agricultural policy: one of farm production that is based on ecological principles and local knowledge, input-extensive, aligned with regional (food) needs and funded by the public sector and, as its countermodel, farm production that is embedded in a global private-sector agricultural industry based on input-intensive modernisation.
At a local and practical level, this conceptional debate is often resolved through pragmatic compromises. Purely market-oriented approaches ignore the need for diversification and consideration of subsistence requirements, while concentrating too much on domestic markets sacrifices opportunities for specialisation and income generation. Although government service systems often have serious weaknesses, private service providers frequently have only a selective interest in specific businesses and products. As efficient as external inputs may be, poorer smallholders are rarely able to bear the costs and risks.
An analysis of local needs and opportunities often reveals a need for target-group- and location-specific combinations of strategic elements focused on the objective of intensifying smallholder farming in a socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable way. The search process required for this should be guided by the following basic strategic principles:
• Rather than being determined unilaterally by market requirements, funding should take equal account of smallholder livelihood systems and local ecosystems.
• The quest for sustainable innovations that will increase yields and have a broad impact calls for a publicly financed process of locally adapted agricultural research that gets various target groups involved.
• The respective benefits of private- and public-sector agricultural services should be combined in public-private partnerships and aligned with the needs of the producers.
• The widespread availability of cash incomes should also be supported, not just the production of food.
• If strategies like these are to succeed, rural areas must be connected up to the rising demand in the cities by means of infrastructure. To some extent, there is also a need for well-focused protection from global competition while taking the interests of poor consumers into account.

Sous l’administration Trump, la ligne n’avait jamais été interrompue entre Washington et Paris. Emmanuel Macron s’était en particulier efforcé de maintenir un contact étroit - à défaut d’être fructueux - avec Donald Trump. La relation au plan présidentiel a eu des hauts et des bas mais elle existait. S’agissant des autres échelons de l’Administration, les Français se sont trouvés comme les autres partenaires de l’Amérique, devant des interlocuteurs…