Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

How does armed conflict affect social cohesion, that is, the social fabric of societies? This question is central if we want to understand better why some countries experience repeated cycles of violence. It is also a crucial question for the design of peacebuilding interventions. In recent years, considerable scientific work has been put into studying the social legacies of armed conflict. This literature review brings these academic studies together in a novel way.
In this discussion paper we conduct an extensive review of the empirical academic literature on how armed conflict affects social cohesion. We take a holistic perspective and analyse each of the three constituent elements of social cohesion – trust, cooperation and identity – in detail and along both a vertical (state-society relations) and a horizontal (interpersonal and intergroup relations) dimension. Regarding conflict, the focus lies on intrastate conflict and civil war, but the review also includes the few studies that focus on armed conflict between states or groups (interstate and non-state conflict). Overall, this review brings together insights from 39 published, peer-reviewed, empirical studies, most of which analyse the effects of conflict based on comprehensive survey data or behavioural experiments. Strengths and shortcomings are discussed and future avenues for research are identified.
Contrary to the initial optimism of the potentially positive legacies of armed conflict expressed by some scholars, our main finding holds that the literature by now mainly points towards such conflict harming social cohesion. Most clearly, there is quite a large body of literature showing that social trust is negatively affected by experience of violence. Research on political trust and social identities is still nascent but currently also points towards negative effects. The literature on cooperation is more mixed with studies finding both support for an increase or a decrease in cooperative behaviour. However, several (and particularly newer) studies demonstrate that an increase in cooperation can often be explained by prosocial behaviour towards the in-group but not the out-group, calling into question whether this should be interpreted positively for social cohesion overall. Political participation does, however, seem to be one aspect of social cohesion in which effects of the “post-traumatic growth” mechanism can indeed be traced in several contexts.

How does armed conflict affect social cohesion, that is, the social fabric of societies? This question is central if we want to understand better why some countries experience repeated cycles of violence. It is also a crucial question for the design of peacebuilding interventions. In recent years, considerable scientific work has been put into studying the social legacies of armed conflict. This literature review brings these academic studies together in a novel way.
In this discussion paper we conduct an extensive review of the empirical academic literature on how armed conflict affects social cohesion. We take a holistic perspective and analyse each of the three constituent elements of social cohesion – trust, cooperation and identity – in detail and along both a vertical (state-society relations) and a horizontal (interpersonal and intergroup relations) dimension. Regarding conflict, the focus lies on intrastate conflict and civil war, but the review also includes the few studies that focus on armed conflict between states or groups (interstate and non-state conflict). Overall, this review brings together insights from 39 published, peer-reviewed, empirical studies, most of which analyse the effects of conflict based on comprehensive survey data or behavioural experiments. Strengths and shortcomings are discussed and future avenues for research are identified.
Contrary to the initial optimism of the potentially positive legacies of armed conflict expressed by some scholars, our main finding holds that the literature by now mainly points towards such conflict harming social cohesion. Most clearly, there is quite a large body of literature showing that social trust is negatively affected by experience of violence. Research on political trust and social identities is still nascent but currently also points towards negative effects. The literature on cooperation is more mixed with studies finding both support for an increase or a decrease in cooperative behaviour. However, several (and particularly newer) studies demonstrate that an increase in cooperation can often be explained by prosocial behaviour towards the in-group but not the out-group, calling into question whether this should be interpreted positively for social cohesion overall. Political participation does, however, seem to be one aspect of social cohesion in which effects of the “post-traumatic growth” mechanism can indeed be traced in several contexts.

How does armed conflict affect social cohesion, that is, the social fabric of societies? This question is central if we want to understand better why some countries experience repeated cycles of violence. It is also a crucial question for the design of peacebuilding interventions. In recent years, considerable scientific work has been put into studying the social legacies of armed conflict. This literature review brings these academic studies together in a novel way.
In this discussion paper we conduct an extensive review of the empirical academic literature on how armed conflict affects social cohesion. We take a holistic perspective and analyse each of the three constituent elements of social cohesion – trust, cooperation and identity – in detail and along both a vertical (state-society relations) and a horizontal (interpersonal and intergroup relations) dimension. Regarding conflict, the focus lies on intrastate conflict and civil war, but the review also includes the few studies that focus on armed conflict between states or groups (interstate and non-state conflict). Overall, this review brings together insights from 39 published, peer-reviewed, empirical studies, most of which analyse the effects of conflict based on comprehensive survey data or behavioural experiments. Strengths and shortcomings are discussed and future avenues for research are identified.
Contrary to the initial optimism of the potentially positive legacies of armed conflict expressed by some scholars, our main finding holds that the literature by now mainly points towards such conflict harming social cohesion. Most clearly, there is quite a large body of literature showing that social trust is negatively affected by experience of violence. Research on political trust and social identities is still nascent but currently also points towards negative effects. The literature on cooperation is more mixed with studies finding both support for an increase or a decrease in cooperative behaviour. However, several (and particularly newer) studies demonstrate that an increase in cooperation can often be explained by prosocial behaviour towards the in-group but not the out-group, calling into question whether this should be interpreted positively for social cohesion overall. Political participation does, however, seem to be one aspect of social cohesion in which effects of the “post-traumatic growth” mechanism can indeed be traced in several contexts.

Carmelo Mesa-Lago. DT 2/2021 - 5/2/2021

El Documento de Trabajo analiza las normas legales, los efectos potenciales, los obstáculos, el momento y las perspectivas de la unificación monetaria-cambiaria decretada en Cuba el 1 de enero de 2021.

Die große Koalition hat beschlossen, die Folgen der Corona-Pandemie mit weiteren finanziellen Mitteln abzufedern. DIW-Präsident Marcel Fratzscher kommentiert die Ergebnisse des Koalitionsausschusses wie folgt:

Im Fokus der neuen Corona-Hilfen stehen zu Recht die Schwächsten der Gesellschaft und diejenigen, die von der Pandemie am stärksten betroffen sind. Der einmalige Corona-Zuschuss für EmpfängerInnen der Grundsicherung ist wichtig, um sie beispielsweise beim Kauf von FFP2-Masken zu unterstützen. Eltern haben den größten Teil des Kinderbonus von 300 Euro im Jahr 2020 für ihre Kinder verwendet und ausgegeben. Auch deshalb ist ein weiterer Kinderbonus in diesem Jahr sinnvoll und eine - wenn auch nur kleine - Anerkennung der riesigen Herausforderungen, die Familien im Umgang mit Kita- und Schulschließung bewältigen müssen. Die Hilfen für Kunstschaffende sind ebenfalls ein wichtiger, wenn auch kleiner Schritt. Auch die Verlängerung der Mehrwertsteuersenkung für die Gastronomie bis 2022 ist ein wichtiges Signal für die Branche.

Dies wird bei weitem noch nicht das letzte Hilfsprogramm der Pandemie gewesen sein. Vor allem Solo-Selbstständige und MinijobberInnen brauchen mehr Unterstützung - ein temporärer Zugang zu Kurzarbeitergeld für beide Gruppen wäre notwendig, um ihre Situation zu stabilisieren.

Die meisten Corona-Hilfen kommen nach wie vor den Unternehmen zugute. Deshalb ist es für eine Ausgewogenheit der Hilfen wichtig, dass auch Familien und stark betroffene Menschen Unterstützung erhalten. Die jetzt beschlossenen Hilfen schlagen finanziell deutlich weniger zu Buche als viele der Unternehmenshilfen. Die Hilfen sind sehr gut investiertes Geld, weil sie die Akzeptanz für die eingeschlagene Strategie stärken. Eine starke Akzeptanz der Menschen ist der Schlüssel für eine erfolgreiche Bewältigung der Pandemie und ein schnelles Ende der zweiten Infektionswelle.

Raquel Jorge Ricart. ARI 16/2021 - 4/2/2021

Gestionar de forma coordinada los retos y oportunidades que la digitalización y las tecnologías emergentes y disruptivas presentan es una oportunidad para la adaptación de la acción exterior de España a las nuevas exigencias del multilateralismo y la necesaria anticipación a escenarios futuros en un ejercicio de prospectiva.

Im Dezember 2020 vollendete Alberto Fernández das erste Jahr seiner Amtszeit als argentinischer Regierungschef. Seine Präsidentschaft fällt in eine extrem kritische sozioökonomische Lage, die noch verschärft wird durch eine besorgniserregende Ent­wicklung der Covid-19-Pandemie. Und dennoch herrscht in der südamerikanischen Republik eine gewisse institutionelle Stabilität, die umso bemerkenswerter erscheint, wenn man sich die Geschichte des Landes und die Gegenwart der Region vor Augen führt. Der verbündete Peronismus in der Regierung, eine konstruktiv agierende Al­lianz in der Opposition und die Geduld der Bevölkerung, die das wirt­schaftspolitische Scheitern der Vor­gängerregierung noch frisch in Erin­nerung hat, tragen dazu bei, dass sich das Land aktuell in einer dynamischen politischen Balance befindet. Doch länger­fristig könnten wachsende Armut, anhaltende Rezession und Inflation sowie Spaltungen innerhalb der peronistischen Bewegung den sozialen Frieden gefährden.

Am 2. Februar 2021 wurde Alexei Nawalny von einem Moskauer Gericht zu zwei Jahren und acht Monaten Gefängnishaft verurteilt. Als Vorwand für das Urteil dienten Verstöße gegen Bewährungsauflagen, die Nawalny begangen haben soll, als er sich in Deutschland von einer Vergiftung durch russische Geheimdienste erholte. Schon im Vorfeld der Verurteilung war es an zwei Wochenenden zu großen, nicht genehmigten Protesten in vielen russischen Städten gekommen. Auslöser waren die Verhaftung Nawalnys kurz nach seiner Ankunft in Moskau sowie sein wenig später erschienener Film »Palast für Putin«, in dem er dem russischen Präsidenten maßlose Korruption attestiert. Zur Unterdrückung der Proteste ließ die russische Führung ein beispielloses Aufgebot schwer gerüsteter Sicherheitskräfte aufmarschieren und landesweit bereits über 10 000 Menschen festnehmen.

In der Vergiftung Nawalnys und den Repressionen der letzten Wochen spiegelt sich eine langjährige Entwicklung des russischen Regimes wider, das spätestens seit Putins Rückkehr in den Kreml im Jahr 2012 immer autoritärer regiert. Zwar ist es auch in den letzten Jahren zu Massenverhaftungen bei Protesten und Verfolgung von Oppositionellen gekommen. Allerdings war der Kreml dabei bemüht, den Anschein eines angemessenen Vorgehens aufrechtzuerhalten. Moskaus gewiefte »Polit-Technologen« erfanden zudem immer neue Taktiken, um Unzufriedenheit und Proteststimmungen in der Bevölkerung einzufangen und zumindest teilweise in kontrollierbare Bahnen zu lenken. Dazu gehörten auch Experimente, bei denen gezielt ein gewisses Maß an Opposition zugelassen wurde. So wurde es Nawalny noch im Jahr 2013 ermöglicht, bei der Moskauer Oberbürgermeisterwahl anzutreten, wo er über 27 Prozent der Stimmen erhielt.

Gegenüber den Russinnen und Russen, die das Nawalny widerfahrene Unrecht auf die Straße treibt, hat die russische Führung ihre weicheren politischen Taktiken zugunsten von Einschüchterung und Abschreckung aufgegeben. Dabei werden auch die Erfahrungen im benachbarten Belarus eine Rolle gespielt haben, wo sich im vergangenen Sommer innerhalb kürzester Zeit eine gewaltige Protestwelle entfaltete. Die neue Härte des Kremls ist aber auch Ergebnis der Arbeit Nawalnys, dessen Widerstand sich jeglicher Eingliederungsversuche entzieht. Indem er die Korruption der herrschenden Elite und insbesondere Wladimir Putins anprangert, greift er die durch wirtschaftliche Schwierigkeiten ohnehin angeschlagene Legitimität des Regimes fundamental an.

Im Kreml scheint man überzeugt zu sein, die Menschen, die Nawalny mit seinen Videos erreicht, nicht mehr für sich gewinnen zu können. Ihre Zahl ist nach dessen Vergiftung im letzten Jahr noch einmal deutlich gewachsen. In einer repräsentativen Umfrage des Lewada-Instituts äußerten im September 20 Prozent der Befragten, dass sie Nawalnys Arbeit gutheißen. In den großen Städten dürfte der Anteil noch darüber liegen. Diese Russinnen und Russen bekommen nun auf der Straße und in den sozialen Medien das harte Durchgreifen des Staates ungeschönt zu sehen, der zur Sicherung seiner Macht unverhohlener denn je auf seine Sicherheitsorgane setzt. Seit Tagen kursieren unzählige Videos, die exzessive Gewalt russischer Polizeikräfte gegen friedliche Demonstranten und Journalisten bezeugen.

Die Stabilität des Regimes ist von dieser Entwicklung kurzfristig nicht bedroht: Das Niederschlagen neuer Proteste ist für die russische Nationalgarde eine lösbare Aufgabe. Die Zahl der Protestierenden ist zu klein, um den russischen Polizeiapparat in Verlegenheit zu bringen. Außerdem sind die Proteste bislang friedlich und gewaltfrei; zu Gegenwehr von Demonstrantinnen und Demonstranten kam es bislang nur in Einzelfällen. Auch eine Spaltung innerhalb der Eilte, die eine wesentliche Voraussetzung für Instabilität wäre, ist bislang nicht erkennbar.

Allerdings wird die Legitimität der politischen Führung in den Augen gerade vieler junger Russinnen und Russen irreparabel beschädigt. Durch seine massiven Repressionen bricht der Kreml mit diesem Teil der Gesellschaft. Damit lädt er sich für die kommenden Jahre eine schwere politische Hypothek auf. Die massiven Repressionen könnten bislang unpolitische Teile der Bevölkerung mobilisieren. Bereits nach Nawalnys Vergiftung im Sommer 2020 äußerten sich einige Prominente kritisch, die sich zuvor aus der Politik herausgehalten hatten. Auch die Wahlen werden für den Kreml unter diesen Bedingungen risikoreicher. Um zu gewinnen, muss er zu umfassenderen und offensichtlicheren Wahlfälschungen greifen, die aber in der Vergangenheit selbst häufig zum Auslöser von Protesten wurden. Mit den Dumawahlen im Herbst 2021 steht die nächste Herausforderung für den Kreml unmittelbar bevor.

Nachdem die USA am 22. November 2020 den multilateralen Vertrag über den Offe­nen Himmel (OHV) verlassen haben, hat nun auch Russland angekündigt, den Austritt vorzubereiten. Macht Moskau ihn wahr, würde es vollenden, was Präsident Trump begonnen hat. Zwar ist ungewiss, wie die anderen 32 Vertragsstaaten reagieren, doch hätte der OHV seinen strategischen Zweck auf jeden Fall eingebüßt. Die europäische Rüstungskontrolle verlöre einen weiteren Eckpfeiler, und die militärische Lage würde noch instabiler, als sie ohnehin ist. Weil er gemein­same Beobachtungsflüge über den Vertragsstaaten gestattet, bewahrt der OHV nämlich auch in Krisenzeiten ein Mindest­maß an militärischer Transparenz und Vertrauensbildung. Der Kreml bewiese erneut, dass ihm »strategische Augenhöhe« mit den USA wichtiger ist als die Sicherheits­kooperation mit den Europäern. Zwar ist die Biden-Administration nicht abgeneigt, in den OHV zurückzukehren, doch genießt dies weder Priorität, noch dürfte sie dafür die nötige Mehrheit im Senat finden. Der Vertrag wird nur zu ret­ten sein, wenn sich die Staats- und Regierungschefs Deutschlands und der euro­päischen Partner nachdrücklich dafür einsetzen.

Entre une vision traditionaliste de l’islam véhiculée par certains imams et une société occidentale qui dénonce leur oppression, les musulmanes attachées à leur foi se sentent souvent incomprises. L’islam, pourquoi c’est compliqué. « Il n’y a que Dieu qui juge. Chacun pratique sa foi comme il l’entend. » À 43 ans, Dudu s’est depuis longtemps fait une […]

The post Islam : des femmes ni soumises, ni visibles appeared first on Fondapol.

Rafael Vilasanjuan. ARI 15/2021 - 3/2/2021

Frente a la crisis del coronavirus, la vacuna se apunta como el principal remedio de salida, pero tan importante como tener la vacuna es la vacunación. En esta estrategia las grandes potencias se posicionan para apuntalar la diplomacia y establecer nuevas relaciones estratégicas.

Only a Europe that provides for its own defence can be a fully sovereign Europe. As is the case for the US, Europe would have to be capable of protecting its core security interests without depending on its transatlantic partner.

Structural incentives as well as recent developments militate in favour of establishing such intra-NATO status parity. Structurally, unilateral dependence, even among friends, comes at a price. This timeless incentive is reinforced by recent developments: the demise of the old West, with or without Trump; China’s twofold challenge; an emerging Sino-American rivalry; a resurgent Russia; the new world disorder; Macron’s offer to his European partners.

European self-defence has to meet four key requirements: broader and greater European integration, sufficient military capabilities, effective strategy, and political leadership.

Defence autonomy requires an independent nuclear deterrent capability. In the case of the EU, neither primary deterrence, reserved for a single state, nor extended deterrence, such as that provided by the United States, would be adequate.

Instead, Europe would have to create a novel type of “integrated deter­rence”. Underpinned by a solid community of solidarity and trust, this would be based on French nuclear forces, with the French president main­taining exclusive decision-making authority.

Germany and France would have to seize the initiative by “taking their bi­lateral relations to a new level”, as stated in the Aachen Treaty of January 22, 2019. They would have to lead by example, bring about the progressive integration of their armed forces and an alignment of their strategic cultures.

This would demand a great deal of Germany in terms of defence spending and redefining its “culture of military restraint”. To initiate such a process of rethinking and repositioning will require an open-minded debate on the role of the military for a Europe that “takes its fate into its own hands” (Chancellor Angela Merkel).

 

 

Candida Splett: Border closures and production stoppages associated with the Covid-19 pandemic disrupted supply chains. What consequences can be identified?

Melanie Müller: Many countries have realised how heavily they depend on supply relationships, be it for their imports, their exports or even both. It has also highlighted the central role of China in global supply chains. Many countries are now thinking about how to reduce their dependencies and improve their security of supply – as is the European Union.

Does that mean we have to turn back globalisation?

That would be unrealistic for most sectors. For example: We already know that the growth in digitalisation and green energy will increase demand for particular metals in the coming years. That demand cannot be met by recycling alone. Lacking meaningful extractable ore deposits of its own, Germany relies heavily on imports. On the other hand, many countries in the Global South are highly dependent on exports. For example, South Africa is the main source of platinum required by the car industry, and its exports generate crucial revenues. At the same time, there is a discussion among African countries about increasing local processing to boost the local share of added value.

What are the most important steps for improving the EU’s security of supply?

The EU needs to take a medium to long-term perspective on the question of security of supply and should not simply leave it to the individual member states. The point is not just to diversify supply chains, but also to incorporate the social, environmental and human rights aspects. Pandemics are not the only source of potential supply disruption. It could just as well be political unrest, or strikes over social or environmental standards. Environmental problems can also increase production costs – for which the consumer ends up paying. If we are truly interested in resilient supply chains, our strategies need to take account of the situation in the Global South.

So what needs to happen now?

Much progress has already been made in the past decade. The German and European discussion about supply chain laws is the outcome of a long process. For example in 2011 the United Nations adopted the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the OECD has been setting standards in this area for even longer. The crucial point is to hold economic actors responsible for activities outside their own enterprise. That means a statutory obligation to monitor the human rights situation in their supply chains and the political environment in which they operate.

What stands in the way of German and European supply chain laws?

The biggest obstacles concern questions such as: Which companies should the obligations apply to? If companies are required to adopt a human rights agenda, who evaluates their success and are the reports open to the public? Such technical questions have enormous political implications. There are also disagreements over the relationship between the German and the European level. Some people say we need the European supply chain law first. I think Germany should go ahead with its own legal framework. We are a central political actor in the EU, and can set an example. If the EU regulation turns out to have a broader scope, we can always bring the national law into line.

What will implementation depend on?

Companies will have to learn more about what they should be looking out for: how to verify whether violations occur, which aspects are potentially detectable, and which remain hidden. Our Transnational Governance of Sustainable Commodity Supply Chains project investigates supply chains that are in some cases utterly opaque to the final purchasers. Ore is mined in one part of the world, smelted in another, and then the metal might be drawn into wire somewhere in Europe to be used in a manufacturing process in yet another country. Human rights violations can affect any of these numerous processing stages. Even with a simple product like a computer mouse it is practically impossible to trace the sources reliably. In our project we start by investigating selected complex supply chains for metals, seeking possibilities to make them more transparent and above all more sustainable. So transparency is an important objective. Finally, we have to persuade those countries where we know human rights violations to be prevalent to address and prevent the problem.

To what extent are states in the Global South already working towards sustainable production processes?

The process of realisation is already under way, and many states in the Global South have adopted their own commitments and regulations. There is also a vigorous civil society pushing in the same direction and a UN process initiated by Ecuador and South Africa to develop a Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights. Meanwhile, some countries fear losing their competitive edge if they can no longer operate as cheaply as possible. What they tend to forget, however, are the costs attributable to poor production conditions.

What can Germany do to support them?

We can give direct support to states and firms in the Global South that are implementing the existing rules as well as to civil society actors exposing abuses. Sharing knowledge is also relevant. Finally, prevention is important. For example if a new mine is proposed, the risks that come along with it must be assessed and reduced right from the start. The point is to strengthen the relevant institutions and agencies in these countries while curbing corruption in the resource sector.

Melanie Müller heads the project "Transnational Governance of Sustainable Commodity Supply Chains".

The interview was conducted by Candida Splett, head of the online editorial team.

After a year of continuous tensions, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Cavusoglu visited Brussels in January to discuss the future of Turkey-EU relations. He and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have both stated that 2021 is the year to set things right with the European Union. Many in Europe are sceptical, since the current state of democracy and rule of law in Turkey falls well short of the requirements for a candidate country. Furthermore, Turkey’s recent foreign policy moves have also clashed with the interests of its Western allies. While welcoming the intention to improve the overall atmosphere, European decision-makers also want to see credible gestures and concrete actions. Whether or not Turkey continues its charm offensive, Europe should get to work on the long-neglected task of defining its common policy towards Turkey. While Washington may play a helpful role, the real strategic thinking will have to take place in Europe, Brussels and elsewhere.

The EU member states still have no real consensus on common foreign policy making. For all the talk of strategic autonomy, sovereignty and »speaking the language of power« – as High Representative Josep Borrell likes to call it – Europe is not united around any particular line. France and Germany, whose historic rivalry led to the creation of the European Union, also have their differences over the future of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy. French President Emmanuel Macron objects to Europe’s de facto dependency on the United States, arguing that the Union should be self-reliant in security and defence. German officials including Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer are not necessarily convinced, emphasising that the EU needs the protective umbrella of the United States to guarantee its own security, stability and prosperity.

Turkey is crucial to EU interests

These difficulties around the design and implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy are also manifest in the discussions on relations with Turkey. As an accession candidate, neighbour and strategic ally on migration management and counter-terrorism, Turkey poses a key test for the European Union. Military involvement in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh exemplifies Ankara’s increasingly assertive foreign policy and regional ambitions. All these conflicts affect the Union’s immediate neighbourhood.

Recent tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean have again shown that Turkey does not hesitate to explicitly oppose its Western allies’ interests. According to both European and US officials, Turkey’s actions have a direct impact on the security and sovereignty of Greece and Cyprus. In response NATO established a bilateral military de-confliction mechanism between Greece and Turkey, and the two agreed to resume exploratory talks over territorial claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. While these are all positive developments, it will be difficult to establish a truly functioning Turkey-EU relationship as long as the member states cannot agree on the big picture.

What role for Washington?

The European Council decided in December 2020 that »the EU will seek to coordinate on matters relating to Turkey and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean with the United States«. This was taken as a part of the general reassessment of transatlantic relations following the election of Joe Biden, where Europe is seeking – and expecting – a more coordinated strategy on future challenges – including those posed by NATO allies. The new US president is expected to steer back to multilateralism and international organisations. On his first day in office he signed executive orders restoring US membership of the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organisation. This return to multilateralism will definitely put Brussels and Washington shoulder-to-shoulder on many issues, including the desire to increase NATO’s coherence. This is bad news for all those who claim that the West is in decline, including President Erdoğan of Turkey.

While there are certainly advantages to having a US president who cares about transatlantic relations, the burden of asserting conditionality on democracy and rule of law will still fall on the European Union itself. Washington has always privileged security over values – and expected the EU to play the part of propagating Western values in Turkey. Accordingly, the United States supported the establishment of a customs union, as well as Turkey’s application to join the European Union. But it remains the responsibility of the European Union to find a functioning common framework with Turkey, either as a part of its enlargement policy or within its neighbourhood policy.

It is simply – and obviously – not enough to sign a new deal on managing illegal migration and call it a day. Even if any step towards dialogue is indeed very positive, the European Union should not fall for an easy reset with Turkey. The domestic political dynamics in the country leave no places for reassurance for the European Union that Turkey will keep its intentions of a positive agenda. The ultimate goal must be to reshape the relationship: »to look for mutual strategic interests, the development of a cooperative and reciprocal relationship anchored in common values and principles«, as Josep Borrell recently put it. While short-term interests may be better served by a transactional approach, long-term stability in Turkey-EU relations demands a well-functioning framework rooted in common principles.

On 3 February 2016, the mutilated body of Giulio Regeni was discovered on the outskirts of Cairo. The Italian scholar had been conducting research in Egypt on the development of independent trade unions. This evidently attracted the attention of the country's security authorities, who fear any form of unmonitored civil society organisation as potential opposition.

Regeni was last heard from on the evening of 25 January 2016, the fifth anniversary of the start of the popular uprising against the Mubarak regime, a day when Cairo was swarming with security forces. Multiple witness statements and circumstantial evidence indicate that Regeni was subjected to inhumane torture by Egyptian security forces for days. Although an in-depth investigation by the Italian public prosecutor's office was able to identify four high-ranking employees of the Egyptian security apparatus as the main perpetrators, the authorities in Cairo have stubbornly refused to initiate criminal proceedings.

Europeans upgrade Egypt's status rather than pushing to uncover the truth

In the wake of the murder, European governments and parliaments have repeatedly demanded clarification of the incident. The German government, which itself has gathered intelligence on the case, has addressed Regeni's fate in a series of bilateral talks. However, the incident has not had any consequences for Europe's political and economic relations with the most populous country to their south.

And yet the gruesome murder of Giulio Regeni is not an isolated case. Ever since the military coup in 2013, led by then defence minister Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, the state of Egyptian civil society has deteriorated dramatically. International observers estimate that there are as many as 60,000 political prisoners languishing in the horrendously overcrowded Egyptian prisons. Local human rights activists report widespread and systematic use of torture at police stations.

According to Human Rights Watch, Egypt is among the ten states where the death penalty is most frequently imposed and carried out. And Reporters Without Borders cites Egypt under President Sisi as one of the countries harbouring the highest number of imprisoned journalists.

But instead of holding Egypt's leadership politically responsible for this situation, the Europeans have repeatedly upgraded its status in recent years. Since Regeni's death, there have been a number of high-level state visits. Bilateral development loans and, not least, generous support under a comprehensive IMF agreement have been granted without any political conditions being imposed. Particularly worthy of note is that arms exports also continue to flow on a grand scale. Egypt is a major client not only for Germany and France. Even Italy continues to supply the country with weapons.

A policy with unforeseeable consequences

The Europeans justify this policy by citing the need to stabilise the country. They fear developments like those in Libya and Syria, which could be accompanied by massive violence, terrorism and renewed waves of migration. On the surface, their strategy seems sound, because Egypt has hermetically sealed off the country's maritime borders, preventing people from fleeing across the Mediterranean. European companies such as the German Siemens Group are profiting from lucrative business deals for large-scale infrastructure projects. And for European arms manufacturers, the military regime's drive for rearmament has provided a welcome economic boost.

The notion that human rights violations are simply the price to pay for a development dictatorship that is allowing Egypt to achieve stability and prosperity has however already proven to be a fallacy in the past. Ten years ago, mass protests in Tahrir Square in the heart of Cairo led to the collapse of the authoritarian Mubarak regime. The Europeans, who supported the president at the time, were forced to concede that the country's supposed stability was in fact extremely fragile. Is the same mistake being made today?

From the outside, it is not apparent that any decisive action has yet been taken to finally curb the endemic problems of mismanagement, corruption, lawlessness and poor governance that have long plagued Egypt. The few available reports from independent observers speak instead of increasing mismanagement by the military, rising poverty and growing social inequality. The situation has only been exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic, the true extent of which is evidently being hushed up by the regime.

It is extremely difficult to gain a reliable picture of what is going on in the country, as it is currently nearly impossible to report independently from Egypt or even to conduct research on the ground. Regeni's brutal murder set a precedent that discourages other scholars, journalists, civil society organisations, or political foundations from travelling there.

Extensive control of information is essential if the Sisi regime is to pursue its own interests. The regime has been successful in procuring fresh loans from international financial institutions such as the IMF by warning that the stability of the country is at risk. In the next breath it then turns around and emphasises Egypt's stability as a regional cooperation partner when cajoling European governments to sign arms contracts.

The evident realpolitik that forms the tacit conceptual framework for the continued cooperation by European governments with the Egyptian regime is thus increasingly becoming an unrealpolitik – a policy based on scarcely verifiable statements made by a regime that is playing for time, with the goal of maximising its own chances of survival. To that end, it seems willing to stoop to anything, even murdering a 28-year-old graduate student.

The German original was translated into English by Qantara.de.

Juan Tovar. ARI 14/2021- 2/2/2021

¿Cuáles son los retos y perspectivas de las relaciones de la UE con la Administración Biden?

Die Serviceabteilung Finanzen vereint die Bereiche Rechnungswesen, Beschaffung, Drittmittel und Controlling und bietet interne Dienstleistungen für den Vorstand, die MitarbeiterInnen sowie die Gäste des Instituts an. Die Abteilung entwickelt innovative Instrumente zur Unterstützung der wissenschaftlichen Arbeit des DIW Berlin und setzt sie um. Dabei sorgt der Bereich Rechnungswesen für den reibungslosen Ablauf aller finanztechnischen Prozesse. Der Bereich Beschaffung kümmert sich um alle Beschaffungs- und Vergabevorgänge des Instituts. Der Drittmittelbereich betreut die Drittmittelprojekte von der Antragsphase bis zur Endabrechnung. Der Bereich Controlling verantwortet die Budgetplanung und das interne Berichtswesen, berät bei operativen Maßnahmen und bereitet strategische Entscheidungen vor. Die Abteilung verwaltete im Geschäftsjahr 2019 ein Budget von 32,4 Mio €, davon wurden 11,9 Mio € durch Drittmittelprojekte erwirtschaftet.

Die Serviceabteilung Finanzen sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine/n

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Die Abteilung Konjunkturpolitik des DIW Berlin sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine/n

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