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Diplomacy & Crisis News

Germany’s Far Right Sees Its Opening (Again)

Foreign Policy - lun, 03/07/2023 - 20:11
The AfD is on the rise nationally, notching a mayoral win and matching the Social Democrats in polls. Can it last?

Why France Is Burning

Foreign Policy - lun, 03/07/2023 - 20:00
A shocking video sparked massive riots and has reignited the debate on police violence in the banlieues.

Why China’s Tech Dominance Is Not Inevitable

Foreign Policy - lun, 03/07/2023 - 17:59
Technologist Dan Wang on the impact of U.S. sanctions on Beijing.

Nepal Shaken by Fake Bhutanese Refugee Scam

Foreign Policy - lun, 03/07/2023 - 17:20
A weary Nepali public hopes for a rare victory against corruption.

Gaz lacrymogène, des larmes en or

Le Monde Diplomatique - lun, 03/07/2023 - 16:58
Les protestataires du monde entier font une expérience commune : l'inhalation de gaz lacrymogène. En un siècle, cette arme présentée comme inoffensive s'est imposée comme l'outil universel du maintien de l'ordre. / Armement, Commerce des armes, État, Histoire, Industrie de l'armement, Police, (...) / , , , , , , , , - 2018/05

‘Strategic Autonomy’ Is a French Pipe Dream

Foreign Policy - lun, 03/07/2023 - 12:06
Emmanuel Macron is pushing a European policy that flatters France and annoys everyone else.

How America Broke Its War Machine

Foreign Affairs - lun, 03/07/2023 - 06:00
Privatization and the hollowing out of the U.S. defense industry.

America’s Navy Remains Crippled by Service and Repair Delays

The National Interest - lun, 03/07/2023 - 00:00

The U.S. Navy performed without parallel in World War II, and more than met the challenges of the first Cold War. But both conflicts are firmly in the past. Today, we now face a formidable maritime and industrial power rival in China. The technological and geopolitical challenges we now face demand that the United States act much more urgently and faster. Nowhere is this more clear than in our Navy.

America desperately needs more ships, but maintenance delays result in, as one retired admiral put it, “the equivalent of losing half an aircraft carrier and three submarines each year.”

The USS Connecticut, a premier submarine, commissioned for service in 1998, struck an underwater mountain in the South China Sea in 2021. It won’t be back in service until 2026, according to the Navy. This is about three times as long as the sixteen months it took to build the Pentagon, the physical building, in the first place. By coincidence, the estimated cost of repair for the USS Connecticut is $80 million—equal to the cost of building the Pentagon ($1.1 billion in today’s dollars).

The Pentagon is a big place. Room for 25,000 workers. Parking spots for 9,700.

Defense officials and experts at the Hay Seward Initiative consider the US submarine force a crucial advantage over a numerically larger Chinese navy. But the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) said in a 2022 summary concerning U.S. capabilities against China that the Navy lost 10,363 operational days from 2008 through 2018—the equivalent of more than twenty-eight years—“as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards.”

Currently, an alarming eighteen of the Navy’s forty-nine fast-attack subs are out of service, awaiting repair and servicing. Fast-attack subs fire torpedoes and Tomahawk cruise missiles, which are essential to winning a potential fight against China over Taiwan or South China Sea lanes.

Maurer of the GAO explains that the Navy may be giving top priority “for scarce shipyard space” to aircraft carriers and ballistic-missile submarines, “which means attack subs are more likely to rack up idle time waiting to get into an available dry dock.”

This is totally unacceptable. The Connecticut is one of the United States’ three nuclear-powered Seawolf-class vessels, the service’s largest attack subs. The Navy describes the class as “exceptionally quiet, fast, well-armed, and equipped with advanced sensors.” It has eight torpedo tubes and can hold as many as fifty weapons in its torpedo room.

Ronald O’Rourke, a naval analyst with the Congressional Research Service, indicated that the delay is “a product of the complexity of modern warships – and thus the complexity of the work needed to repair damage to them.”

As I highlighted in Power Rivals: America and China’s Superpower Struggle, both the Navy and Congress need to address this issue without delay. The Pentagon, likewise, needs to be much more agile and nimble. Speed, flexibility, and time are just as important as the number of ships and subs. Advanced technology and complexity are great, but not if it leads to key assets sitting in dry dock.

Calls for bureaucratic reform are not new, and experts have long warned of the dangers of a culture that cripples organizations, as officials check boxes rather than get results.

The time for renewal, reform, and rebuilding is past due. It is high time to push for change in a bureaucratic Washington that is too much talk and little action.

Luckily, Washington has allies in South Korea and Japan that are building some of the highest quality and affordable naval assets in the world.

Buying ships from these countries, or building U.S.-designed vessels in their shipyards, perhaps including the Philippines in the mix as well, could be a cost-effective way of catching up with China.

All three countries have mutual defense treaties with the United States. So why doesn’t Washington team up with them to outbuild China?

The problem is largely political; U.S. law currently prevents the Navy from buying foreign-built ships, even from allies, or from building its own ships in foreign countries due to both security issues and to protect America’s shipbuilding industry.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon estimates China’s navy to have around 340 warships, while the United States has fewer than 300. It likewise estimates the Chinese fleet will grow to 400 in the next two years, while the U.S. fleet will take until 2045 to hit 350.

Voters should have a clear message for Washington: if more money is going to be spent on defense, then make sure it is being spent effectively.

Carl Timothy Delfeld is the co-founder of the Independent Republican and Hay Seward Initiative, managing director of Blackthread LLC, a former U.S. Treasury advisor, former U.S. Director of the Asian Development Bank, and author of Power Rivals: America and China’s Superpower Struggle.

Image: U.S. Navy/Flickr.

Washington’s Myopia is Undercutting its Indo-Pacific Partners

The National Interest - lun, 03/07/2023 - 00:00

Over the last few weeks, Washington has been abuzz with everything India. On June 22, President Joe Biden, cabinet secretaries, and the U.S. Congress gave a rousing reception to the visiting Indian prime minister Narendra Modi. For his part, the prime minister cheered Republican and Democratic congressmen with his quip that he could “help them reach bipartisan consensus,” referring to the across-the-aisle support India enjoys in Washington.

It was certainly an apt decision to honor the Indian leader, given that the U.S.-India partnership has significantly expanded under President Biden. Both the White House and several members of the Biden administration, from the National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to the Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell, have characterized it as the “most important bilateral relationship of the twenty-first century.”

However, over the last few months, some of the Biden administration’s regional policies in the Indo-Pacific have done more harm to its partners, particularly India and its geopolitical leverage in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Biden administration’s foreign policy cut a significant departure from its predecessors until last month, returning to Washington’s old ways: myopic democratic interventions, benevolent outreach to adversarial nations, and partisan bickering. Over the last few weeks, Washington’s primary Indo-Pacific partners, India and Japan, have borne the brunt of these missteps.

President Biden, in a last-minute change of plans, canceled his scheduled trip to Papua New Guinea and Australia to address the debt-ceiling crisis in Washington, with Republicans stalling the Democrats from raising the debt ceiling levels. While Secretary of State Anthony Blinken went ahead with his trip to Papua New Guinea and signed a crucial defense agreement with the Pacific Island nation, Biden canceling that leg of the tour was not the best messaging to a region increasingly falling under China’s orbit.

Nonetheless, Prime Minister Modi went ahead with his travel itinerary as scheduled and turned it into an opportunity to showcase India’s position on the global stage. New Guinea’s president hailed Modi as the leader of the Global South. Taking an implicit jab at the United States and China, the island-nation leader said, “we are victims of global powerplay, and you [Modi] are the leader of Global South. We will rally behind your leadership at global forums.” Prior to Biden’s cancellation, the Indian government had decided to accommodate his visit and cut short their visits as a courtesy to the incoming American presidential delegation.

While this was a minor setback for a coordinated approach toward Chinese expansionism in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean challenge is a more geopolitically complex Gordian knot.

In mid-May, Blinken threatened Bangladesh with sanctions if the Indian Ocean state did not host free and fair elections in the 2024 poll. Suppose the United States were to follow through with its threat. In that case, India and Japan will be in a quandary as they have consistently positioned Bangladesh as a gateway connecting the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia for supply chain and infrastructure connectivity initiatives. Geographically, Bangladesh is nestled between India’s state of Bengal to the west and India’s northeastern provinces to the east, bordering a thin strip of land the connects the rest of India to the northeast (also known as the “chicken’s neck”). Thus the densely populated country’s interaction with the rest of the world is directed through India or the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

Both New Delhi and Tokyo have invested in infrastructure in the region and have long-term plans to invest in Dhaka’s growth. Recently, Japan and India agreed to jointly develop the Matabari deep-sea port in Bangladesh to serve as a “strategic anchor” in the Indian Ocean. Though often underreported, Japanese investment plays a vital role in South Asian development. It is also undeniably India's Northeast region's major infrastructure and development partner. Through the Bay of Bengal-Northeast India Industrial Value Chain, the Japanese government envisions increased connectivity between India’s landlocked northeast and Southeast Asia, creating a single economic zone and an alternative trade connectivity project to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida articulating his government’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy in New Delhi in early March this year, called for increased integration of India’s Northeast with Bangladesh to transform the region into a single economic zone.

Moreover, Japan is attempting to capture the businesses moving out of the pricier markets of Southeast Asia, using the Bay of Bengal region. Japan’s regional strategy has neatly complemented the Modi government’s policies. Modi transformed the older “Look East” policy into an “Act East” policy of increasing strategic and economic engagement with Southeast Asia as a countervailing force to China’s involvement in the region.

Tokyo has slowly and steadily supported this transformation. A case in point is Tokyo and New Delhi hosting the India-Japan Act East forum to discuss cooperation on a range of projects that will increase connectivity in India's Northeast to Southeast Asia.

India’s Northeast has a history of civil unrest and strife, making it a challenging region for development. Furthermore, its landlocked topography and poor infrastructure limited its connectivity to both its neighboring countries and the rest of India. Only parties interested in the long game or have a vision for the region could invest in that part of the world, and in this case, it is Japan.

Interestingly, as an extension, both Japan and India are engaging the immediate eastern neighbor to Bangladesh and India, Myanmar. Sanctioned by the United States, Myanmar has limited partners on the world stage. Nonetheless, Japan and India have continued engagement with the military junta to prevent the nation from falling entirely under China’s influence.

However, once again, Indo-Japanese interests are affected by America’s sanctions

Earlier in May, India-Myanmar inaugurated the Sittwe port in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. India supported this port to enhance sea lane connectivity between India’s eastern states and Myanmar. However, since the sanctions, Indian companies have either had to depart Myanmar altogether or face global scrutiny for working with the military junta-led government.

As satellite images released earlier this year indicated, increased activity on the Great Coco Islands of Myanmar had the markings of Chinese military involvement. Situated less than thirty miles north of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands, any potential militarization of the Coco Islands by the Chinese could pose a significant threat to India’s security in the Indian Ocean. In this geopolitical equation, India cannot afford to disengage from Myanmar. And yet, America’s economic statecraft is undercutting India’s vital regional partnerships.

Henry Kissinger, who celebrated 100 years last May, summed up this dynamic well, "it may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal.” It is undoubtedly proving so for Japan and India, but more so for New Delhi in the Indian Ocean.

Against the backdrop of these measures comes the Biden administration’s attempts at thawing relations with China. While Biden departs from his predecessors as the only recent president to not ask for Kissinger’s advice, he is beginning to walk in the footsteps of a grand strategist by making attempts to mend ties with China.

From the dialogue in Vienna to Blinken rescheduling his trip to Beijing for last month to the official abandonment of economic “decoupling” for the less confrontational “de-risking,” Washington’s approach to China shows signs of softening. While members of IPEF agreed on moving ahead with a supply chain agreement in Detroit, in the same week, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai met with her Chinese counterpart to discuss trade and economic ties. Washington's blow-hot and blow-cold approach does not assure allies and partners of the consistency of its priorities and policies, particularly partners that it courts for strategic competition with China.

Furthermore, Washington’s skewed sanction policies toward democratic backsliding in a few states while calling for engagement with authoritarian China raise questions about the motives of such policies. While the United States has sanctioned Chinese officials allegedly involved in human rights abuses in Xinjiang, it continues to do massive business with Beijing. This selective condemnation only further isolates partners and strengthens Chinese engagement with the sanctioned nations.   

Director for Regional Affairs at the Pacific Forum, Rob York, called this misbegotten strategy “a holdover from America's unipolar moment that we [America] need to outgrow. America's moral authority, and the benefits of aligning with Washington, are no longer assumed but must be competed for, and sanctions must be employed far more judiciously than they have been.”

This type of awakening to multipolar realities of the world order should inform Washington of the pitfalls and shortsightedness of its foreign policies. America’s sanctions and other tools of economic statecraft should not be used for democratic interventions but to deter its enemies. If not, the United States will have few allies in its strategic competition with China.

Akhil Ramesh is a Senior Fellow at the Pacific Forum.

Image: Shutterstock.

Révolte des banlieues, les raisons d'une colère

Le Monde Diplomatique - dim, 02/07/2023 - 19:49
C'est sur le terrain sécuritaire que le gouvernement français exploite la récente révolte des banlieues. Outre la condamnation expéditive de centaines de jeunes à de la prison ferme et l'annonce de l'expulsion d'un certain nombre d'étrangers, il a fait approuver par l'Assemblée nationale la (...) / , , , , , , , , , , - 2005/12

The Ripple Effects of the Wagner Rebellion

Foreign Policy - dim, 02/07/2023 - 16:00
How Prigozhin’s actions are felt around the world.

Prigozhin Should Study Europe’s Greatest Mercenary

Foreign Policy - dim, 02/07/2023 - 13:00
Albrecht von Wallenstein was the Holy Roman Empire’s power broker—until he clashed with his superior.

Lessons for the Next Arab Spring

Foreign Policy - dim, 02/07/2023 - 12:00
Ten years after Egypt’s coup, Washington has yet to learn that authoritarian stability is an illusion.

Trading Chickens for a Fragile State

The National Interest - dim, 02/07/2023 - 00:00

Africa is littered with the economic debris of predatory trade practices like dumping. Amid the growing debate about the exclusion of South Africa from the African Growth and Opportunities Act, another trade twist arrives. South Africa’s minister for Trade, Industry & Competition, Ebrahim Patel, will soon decide whether or not to reimpose suspended antidumping duties on chicken from Brazil and various European countries after opting out a year ago. At stake is the future of the South African poultry industry and that of an increasingly unstable country. When chicken, the primary source of meat for South Africans becomes unaffordable, state fragility looms.

Alarmingly, the most industrialized country in Africa is sliding in political stability rankings: the “rainbow nation” boasts shaky infrastructure, widespread institutional corruption, and a staggering official unemployment rate of more than 32 percent. In addition to regular power outages, called “loadshedding,” the country labors under soaring input costs and monthly poultry imports from countries such as the United States, Brazil, and Argentina have more than doubled since October 2022. As a result, the South African poultry sector is under the whip.

If anyone needs hard proof of the crisis, look no further than Astral Foods, one of the country’s largest poultry producers, listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The company recently announced an 88 percent decline in operating profit, having incurred costs of $38.5 million due to blackouts. It had processed about 17 percent fewer broilers, resulting in a drop in production of about 1.1 million broilers a week. Soaring input costs mean domestic producers are subsidizing the price of chicken by about 8 cents per pound.

Since the South Africa trade minister postponed the imposition of antidumping duties in August last year for twelve months, the country’s economic crisis has deepened, smashing business confidence and jobs. Opening the door to dumping, as Patel did last year in the hope of containing food inflation, now becomes a question about how soon South Africa wants to be classified as fragile.

The country is already sitting in the “Elevated Warning” category of the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Ondex (FSI), along with fellow travelers such as Sri Lanka, Colombia, Senega, and Kyrgyzstan. On almost every key metric South Africa’s global risk ranking has degraded significantly over the past ten years. Even the ruling ANC party secretary-general Fikile Mbalula has conceded that South Africa is at risk of becoming a failed state.

Nigeria, another African giant, which for years has been crippled by similar challenges, now sits in the alarming “Alert” category of the FSI. Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil producer, but its power sector is a mess, with frequent blackouts affecting businesses and households.

The effect on Nigeria's poultry industry has been devastating. Compounded by the same pressures South Africa’s industry is experiencing, farms are closing and scarce jobs are being shed, according to the Poultry Association of Nigeria. One study suggests that about 25 million people in Nigeria, which has a population of 95 million, are supported down the poultry industry’s value chain, making its decline a contributor to that country's slide towards fragility.

Haiti, one of the poster children of failed states, can testify to the effect of dumping. Their local rice production collapsed in the face of cheap U.S. imports—dubbed “Miami rice”— in the 1990s. Haiti, already struggling with weak institutions and rampant corruption, sank further into fragility. Today it stands at the 11th worst spot on the FSI.

Imports of poultry from Brazil to South Africa rose from $114.3 million in 2020 to $171.5 million last year, according to Trade Data Monitor, its import market share soaring from 44 percent to nearly 73 percent. If the import tariff suspension is not ended in August there will simply be a continued decline in domestic production that threatens long-term domestic food security.

The South African government has a role to play in curbing this slide towards fragility, by urgently tackling the endemic power, corruption, and other systemic issues. These admittedly are hard problems to solve. An easier one is ensuring a fair and just trade regime that does not sell precious jobs down the river. While ensuring affordable chicken for the SA population is vital, so is safeguarding the local poultry industry and the jobs it provides

South Africa’s poultry crisis is not only a threat but a wake-up call. North America, Europe, and the UK have a stake in the outcome, beyond the chicken trade. Ghanaian president, John Mahama told the United Nations in 2016 that poultry imports were responsible for massive job losses and increasing migration.

Trading partners from Brazil, the UK, the EU, and the United States should not play chicken with South African state fragility.

Francois Baird is the founder of the FairPlay Movement against predatory trade.

Image: Shutterstock.

Advances in Rocket Propulsion Will Thrust America Past China’s Space Program

The National Interest - dim, 02/07/2023 - 00:00

In Star Wars, the spacecraft of the galaxy far, far away are propelled through space by massive engines glowing bright blue. Current spacecraft may pale in comparison, but the technology that powers these ships is becoming a reality. 

Other countries like China have devoted significant resources toward developing space capabilities. That’s why ensuring that the United States is leading in rocket technology is important to allow U.S. spacecraft to respond quickly to changes in low-Earth orbit and deeper in space. Developing different rocket technologies and fuel variety can equip the United States with a plethora of options for maintaining low-orbit spacecraft, traveling to Mars, and harvesting resources from space for transportation back to Earth in an economical time frame.

Innovations in rocket propulsion using several different types of designs can allow future spacecraft to reverse course, turn around, change directions mid-flight, and reach their destinations in a matter of months. Plasma rocket technology will be the key building block for long-distance space travel. The federal government should continue to champion this technology’s development for further utilization of space resources and defense applications. 

Plasma-based systems work by heating ions of fuel to create plasma and then directing that plasma using magnetic fields to be dispensed in a particular direction. This creates thrust to propel a craft forward, but plasma-based engines can vary plasma output and direction, creating much more potential for navigating the vacuum of space. 

Ad Astra’s Variable Specific Impulse Magnetoplasma Rocket (VASIMR), for example, can vary thrust power and can take either hydrogen, helium, or deuterium as fuel. This variety of fuel types would allow for extreme flexibility in space, as electrolysis would split water into usable oxygen and hydrogen for human consumption and fuel for the plasma rockets. As hydrogen is also one of the best shields against harmful radiation, its use as fuel for plasma rockets would reduce the likelihood of astronauts or sensitive machinery being damaged by space radiation and any potential radiation given off by the engines themselves. 

Plasma-based rockets have the potential to radically decrease travel times in outer space and in low-Earth orbit. Most rockets today are designed around chemical use, which caps their exhaust velocity around 5,000 meters per second. While that may seem fast, this causes multi-ton rockets to carry thousands of gallons of fuel to deliver a small payload to a distant planet. Capping exit velocity also leads to journeys that would take months, even years, to complete one-way. 

Using plasma-based rocket technology, like the Pulsed Plasma Rocket (PPR) developed by NASA and Hbar Technologies, has the potential to cut humans’ travel time to Mars down to only two months. Current investigations into PPR technology have shown that this type of engine may be capable of generating 20,000 pounds of force (lbsf). This force generation runs against the need for constant electron bombardment within the engine to produce plasma, meaning a consistent source of electricity is needed. 

While some fuels may fill niches during a space flight in order to preserve fuel consumption or reduce a spacecraft’s weight, ion and nuclear fission rocket technologies all are viable substitutes for plasma-based rockets. Today, ion thrusters are used to adjust satellites’ position in Earth’s orbit and are the main fuel source for probes on multi-year journeys into the solar system. Ion fuel systems have been recorded as having up to 90 percent fuel efficiency and can travel massive distances on a relatively small amount of fuel. 

Case in point, NASA’s Evolutionary Xenon Thruster has been operated for over 43,000 hours on 770 kilograms of xenon propellant as fuel. The drawback for fuel efficiency is that spacecraft using ion thrusters require a large amount of time to reach full acceleration. Small probes and satellites powered by ion thrusters can reach speeds of up to 200,000 mph but require multiple months to reach top speeds. 

Ion thrusters have the potential to power smaller spacecraft or act as a backup power source but have yet to be utilized for larger spacecraft. Fission reactors have the opposite problem: Their ability to produce a large amount of energy and rapidly accelerate a spacecraft runs up against the challenge of miniaturizing a fission reactor to be able to fit into a spacecraft. Fission engines combined with an electrical power source would ensure that thrust could be generated at all times, or at a moment’s notice, to change a craft’s direction. Both ion thrusters and nuclear fission may be combined with a rotating detonation rocket engine to generate enough initial energy to break through Earth’s gravitational pull to place spacecraft into orbit above Earth before beginning a journey to Mars.

Other nations like China have poured millions of state dollars into developing space resources, AI, robotics, and quantum computing for their satellites. By developing the technology to push our spacecraft further faster, the United States’ space capabilities will leave China in low-Earth orbit while the United States leads the way in traveling to Mars and advancing deeper into the solar system.

Roy Mathews is an Innovation Fellow at Young Voices. He is a graduate of Bates College and former Fulbright Fellow in Indonesia. He has been published in The Wall Street Journal, The National Interest, and the Boston Herald.

Image: Shutterstock.

A Central European Proposal for the Revival of Europe

The National Interest - dim, 02/07/2023 - 00:00

Over the past three decades, the world has undergone profound transformations. Political and economic restructuring has led to the erosion of the prevailing Western hegemony. However, it is incorrect to claim that the West is being replaced by a non-Western hegemonic force. Instead, what we observe is a leveling off in the ongoing competition between the West and the East.

Hungary and the other Central European states are growing increasingly concerned about Europe’s diminishing capacity to engage in this competition. There is a growing perception that excessive energy is being directed towards ideological disputes, which in turn diverts attention away from crucial areas of collaboration that could further enhance Europe’s strength.

A strong and dependable Europe, serving as an influential ally, is of paramount strategic interest to the United States. The Western alliance, compared to a strong engine with two parts, has driven progress over the past century. It is crucial to ensure that both parts have sufficient power to keep the momentum going. Considering this, Central Europe, located at the center of the continent and serving as its economic powerhouse, plays a significant role, making it a natural and indispensable partner for the United States.

The Era of Western Hegemony Is Coming to an End

The West’s dominance over international relations, resting upon three key pillars, is visibly diminishing.

The first pillar was the West’s longstanding dominant position as the global economic powerhouse for two centuries. The second pillar involved the establishment of institutional bodies in international relations and trade by the West, granting them the ability to shape the rules of globalization. The third pillar relied on the idea that the United States, as the hegemonic superpower after the collapse of the USSR, would collaborate with Europe to promote the neoliberal political and economic model, aiming for a more peaceful world. As the prevailing belief of that era declared, we had reached “the end of history.” However, all three pillars are now displaying signs of declining influence.

The premises of the third pillar in particular have failed remarkably. The imposition of the neoliberal political and economic model not only resulted in alienation from the rest of the world but, paradoxically, brought together its adversaries in increasingly closer cooperation. The events of the past year have undeniably demonstrated this, leading even some of the most avid proponents of “the end of history” to abandon their belief in it.

It is intriguing to note the similar narrative adopted by America, portraying the war in Ukraine as a conflict between democracies and autocracies—an ironic stance when considering the United States’ role in supplying arms to 57 percent of the world’s authoritarian regimes in 2022.

In this context, even the second pillar finds itself on shaky ground. The challengers to the existing order are actively constructing alternative systems for agreements, forming alliances, and establishing platforms to address conflicts. It seems inevitable that a tipping point will arise, where they will effectively bypass the institutional framework established during the past few decades of globalization and thrive within parallel systems.

A closer examination of the first pillar reveals equally worrisome prospects. In an extraordinary turn of events, the economic rivalry between the Western and non-Western worlds is approaching a state of equilibrium after two centuries, signifying a momentous shift in civilizations. The unfolding of these transformations can be observed through at least five significant areas: economic power, access to vital resources such as raw materials and energy, demographic trends, technological advancements, and military capabilities.

The East has witnessed a remarkable surge in its share of global economic output, at the expense of the West. Back in 1990, the Western world’s dominance over the world’s economic output was exceeding the 50 percent mark. Fast forward to today, and that figure has drastically decreased to a mere 30 percent. These trends will continue as the center of economic gravity continues to shift further toward the East.

The geographical reality that most of the world’s raw materials and energy resources are located outside the West has further exacerbated our competitiveness. Although the United States enjoys a slight advantage in this regard, largely due to its vast shale oil and gas reserves, the West has been unable to fully compensate for this disadvantage. Notably, certain European governments, spearheaded by Germany, swiftly embarked on a green transition to meet Europe’s energy demands. However, the rapid policy changes outpaced technological advancements, resulting in green energy remaining considerably more expensive compared to other sources, thereby hindering our economic competitiveness.

Demographic trends also work against the West. Regardless of the metric used, the world’s population surpasses the 8 billion mark, with a staggering 7 billion individuals living in non-Western countries. Despite the efforts of Hungary and a handful of like-minded governments to implement family policies aimed at increasing fertility rates, the trends still indicate a deep demographic crisis in the West, particularly in Europe.

The realm of technology is also fiercely contested. Emerging players invest heavily in research and development, almost matching the expenditure of established giants. This head-to-head race involves various nations, with notable progress seen in Eastern electric cars and battery technologies—areas of significant importance for Central Europe.

Lastly, in terms of military power, the West undeniably maintains a substantial edge over the East. While this may initially seem advantageous, the prevailing consensus underscores the futility of exploiting this advantage, as doing so would entail dire global consequences—a tragic outcome not worthy of pursuing.

Preserving Europe’s Success Requires Overcoming Unnecessary Ideological Quarrels

Central Europe is now confronted with a profoundly transformed geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape. The future unfolds as a multipolar world, with the West being just one of several power centers. Despite this, Central Europeans are eager to see the West effectively compete with the non-Western world. Our aspiration is for a prosperous Europe, where we play a significant role in its achievements.

To navigate through this new reality, it is crucial to understand how Europe has succeeded in the past during major global changes. We must examine the approaches used to unite diverse European nations with varying values, identities, and interests in successful cooperation. In this regard, we can look at the thinking of the founding fathers of the European Union.

One such figure, Konrad Adenauer, was aptly called the “strategist of humility” by Henry Kissinger. Adenauer, a Christian-democratic statesman, skillfully combined humility with strength, insight, and strategic thinking. His famous quote, “we all live under the same sky, but not all of us have the same horizon,” captures the essence of his profound understanding of humility.

Adenauer recognized that the success of Europe does not require absolute agreement on every aspect of life. European integration is not an end in itself but a means to an end. He emphasized the importance of focusing on shared interests rather than fixating on differences. Failure to adopt this approach risks losing the opportunity for cooperation.

In an era where mutual understanding is crucial to navigating through challenging times, Europe finds itself entangled in divisive issues. One such concern revolves around identity and values. Western European nations and their Central European counterparts often differ in their approaches to immigration, the family unit, national roles, the essence of liberal democracy, and the protection of children. These topics often become intertwined, leading to a conflation of issues and a disregard for the diversity envisioned by Adenauer.

Another significant challenge arises in the realm of geopolitics. Some advocate for Europe to align exclusively with a great power, effectively decoupling from the rest of the world. However, we firmly believe that such an approach is fundamentally flawed. What we need instead is to focus on connectivity, actively avoiding peripheralization and fostering connections with a broad range of countries and market players. Throughout history, Europe has thrived by being open, acting as a mediator between the East and West, promoting peace, and engaging in fair trade. By re-embracing these principles, Europe can overcome the challenges it faces and build a prosperous future.

Five Points for a Successful Europe

When confronted with these contentious issues, we are faced with three fundamental choices. We can choose to settle the dispute once and for all by declaring one side the victor and the other the vanquished. Alternatively, we can find ourselves engaged in an enduring ideological war of attrition. However, there exists a third avenue worth exploring: removing these contentious matters from the agenda altogether and focusing on areas where genuine cooperation is possible.

Within the European Union, economic strength stands as the most significant political capital. Central European states, constituting 8 percent of the EU’s GDP, have emerged as the bloc's fifth-largest economic powerhouse. Notably, this economic ascent has been accompanied by an extraordinary growth rate outpacing that of Western Europe over the past twelve to thirteen years. Considering these factors, a Central European perspective not only deserves attention but also careful consideration from our Western partners.

Firstly, we propose to maintain the original idea that a successful European Union relies on the cooperation of independent and sovereign Member States. Preserving our national sovereignty, which Central European people have fought for over centuries, as well as the distinct political and cultural identities of European countries, is crucial. Europe, embracing the motto "united in diversity," recognizes the strength that comes from its diverse perspectives and viewpoints. This variety of voices strengthens the continent, making it more resilient and competitive, and importantly, allows Member States to accurately represent the views of their people.

Secondly, Europe should pursue EU expansion. The conflict in Ukraine has starkly highlighted the EU’s limited control over its immediate neighborhood, and enlargement could offer a partial solution. However, this can only succeed if we reduce the overcentralized bureaucratic power in Brussels. For instance, decisions on foreign policy still require unanimity, but Brussels aims to move towards qualified majority voting with the support of some larger Member States. Foreign policy is an essential aspect of sovereignty, and smaller states in our region are particularly keen on preserving it. Therefore, an integration where larger member states can effectively impose their will on smaller member states is far from desirable for those aspiring to join.

Thirdly, it is important for Europe to establish its own standing army as a means to defend itself, thereby reducing its dependence on the United States. By developing its own military capabilities, Europe can assume greater responsibility for its defense and share the burden with the United States. This would foster a more balanced partnership between Europe and the United States, making Europe stronger and more self-reliant while simultaneously promoting a more equal distribution of security responsibilities within the transatlantic alliance.

Fourthly, it is imperative to strengthen Europe’s competitiveness, and a critical factor in attaining this objective lies in securing affordable energy access. Without affordable energy, the decline of European industry and the precarious situation faced by the struggling European middle class would become inevitable. The green transition should be pursued gradually, avoiding outright bans on specific energy sources and suppliers.

Lastly, Europe must preserve its Christian values within its political framework. Central Europeans emphasize this not as a fashionable conversion program but because they believe that Christian values and teachings can be translated into political and economic principles that contribute to building a better, fairer, and safer Europe. These values establish a shared cultural foundation upon which European states can collaborate.

Central European states are not miracle workers, and expectations of miracles are unwarranted. However, by implementing these suggestions, Europe can preserve its competitive position in the changing global landscape, ultimately contributing to the strengthening of the West.

Balázs Orbán is a member of the Hungarian parliament and political director for Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, to whom he is unrelated.

Image: Shutterstock.

Advances in Rocket Propulsion Will Thrust America Past China’s Space Program

The National Interest - dim, 02/07/2023 - 00:00

In Star Wars, the spacecraft of the galaxy far, far away are propelled through space by massive engines glowing bright blue. Current spacecraft may pale in comparison, but the technology that powers these ships is becoming a reality. 

Other countries like China have devoted significant resources toward developing space capabilities. That’s why ensuring that the United States is leading in rocket technology is important to allow U.S. spacecraft to respond quickly to changes in low-Earth orbit and deeper in space. Developing different rocket technologies and fuel variety can equip the United States with a plethora of options for maintaining low-orbit spacecraft, traveling to Mars, and harvesting resources from space for transportation back to Earth in an economical time frame.

Innovations in rocket propulsion using several different types of designs can allow future spacecraft to reverse course, turn around, change directions mid-flight, and reach their destinations in a matter of months. Plasma rocket technology will be the key building block for long-distance space travel. The federal government should continue to champion this technology’s development for further utilization of space resources and defense applications. 

Plasma-based systems work by heating ions of fuel to create plasma and then directing that plasma using magnetic fields to be dispensed in a particular direction. This creates thrust to propel a craft forward, but plasma-based engines can vary plasma output and direction, creating much more potential for navigating the vacuum of space. 

Ad Astra’s Variable Specific Impulse Magnetoplasma Rocket (VASIMR), for example, can vary thrust power and can take either hydrogen, helium, or deuterium as fuel. This variety of fuel types would allow for extreme flexibility in space, as electrolysis would split water into usable oxygen and hydrogen for human consumption and fuel for the plasma rockets. As hydrogen is also one of the best shields against harmful radiation, its use as fuel for plasma rockets would reduce the likelihood of astronauts or sensitive machinery being damaged by space radiation and any potential radiation given off by the engines themselves. 

Plasma-based rockets have the potential to radically decrease travel times in outer space and in low-Earth orbit. Most rockets today are designed around chemical use, which caps their exhaust velocity around 5,000 meters per second. While that may seem fast, this causes multi-ton rockets to carry thousands of gallons of fuel to deliver a small payload to a distant planet. Capping exit velocity also leads to journeys that would take months, even years, to complete one-way. 

Using plasma-based rocket technology, like the Pulsed Plasma Rocket (PPR) developed by NASA and Hbar Technologies, has the potential to cut humans’ travel time to Mars down to only two months. Current investigations into PPR technology have shown that this type of engine may be capable of generating 20,000 pounds of force (lbsf). This force generation runs against the need for constant electron bombardment within the engine to produce plasma, meaning a consistent source of electricity is needed. 

While some fuels may fill niches during a space flight in order to preserve fuel consumption or reduce a spacecraft’s weight, ion and nuclear fission rocket technologies all are viable substitutes for plasma-based rockets. Today, ion thrusters are used to adjust satellites’ position in Earth’s orbit and are the main fuel source for probes on multi-year journeys into the solar system. Ion fuel systems have been recorded as having up to 90 percent fuel efficiency and can travel massive distances on a relatively small amount of fuel. 

Case in point, NASA’s Evolutionary Xenon Thruster has been operated for over 43,000 hours on 770 kilograms of xenon propellant as fuel. The drawback for fuel efficiency is that spacecraft using ion thrusters require a large amount of time to reach full acceleration. Small probes and satellites powered by ion thrusters can reach speeds of up to 200,000 mph but require multiple months to reach top speeds. 

Ion thrusters have the potential to power smaller spacecraft or act as a backup power source but have yet to be utilized for larger spacecraft. Fission reactors have the opposite problem: Their ability to produce a large amount of energy and rapidly accelerate a spacecraft runs up against the challenge of miniaturizing a fission reactor to be able to fit into a spacecraft. Fission engines combined with an electrical power source would ensure that thrust could be generated at all times, or at a moment’s notice, to change a craft’s direction. Both ion thrusters and nuclear fission may be combined with a rotating detonation rocket engine to generate enough initial energy to break through Earth’s gravitational pull to place spacecraft into orbit above Earth before beginning a journey to Mars.

Other nations like China have poured millions of state dollars into developing space resources, AI, robotics, and quantum computing for their satellites. By developing the technology to push our spacecraft further faster, the United States’ space capabilities will leave China in low-Earth orbit while the United States leads the way in traveling to Mars and advancing deeper into the solar system.

Roy Mathews is an Innovation Fellow at Young Voices. He is a graduate of Bates College and former Fulbright Fellow in Indonesia. He has been published in The Wall Street Journal, The National Interest, and the Boston Herald.

Image: Shutterstock.

Can India Rupture the Semiconductor Market?

The National Interest - dim, 02/07/2023 - 00:00

In June 2023, India announced its decision to reopen the application process for businesses interested in constructing new semiconductor fabrication plants (commonly called fabs). The process will be undertaken by a new government agency, the India Semiconductor Mission (ISM), within the Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology (MeitY). The ISM is designated to implement a “long-term strategy” for developing semiconductors and display manufacturing “ecosystem.”

This “modified” government-approved $10 billion incentive program that aims to support (up to 50 percent) project costs will increase India’s attractiveness as a globally competitive partner. India is not yet comparable to major global semiconductor producers (and consumers) with deeper pockets (e.g., the United States, whose CHIPS Act provides $52 billion in subsidies for domestic semiconductor manufacturing). India’s wooing of the semiconductor industry notwithstanding, this is the second round: the government approved its first incentive policy in December 2021, and the application process closed in early 2022. Only a handful of companies applied, and little progress has yet occurred.

Things were looking up when the Indian conglomerate Vedanta signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Taiwanese technology giant (also a key Apple supplier) Foxconn for a $19.5 billion fab investment in Gujarat. But reportedly, the government will deny the project funding for not fulfilling its requirements.

In the wake of the new reapplication announcement, the speculation about funding rejection seems increasingly likely, and the joint venture might reapply. In addition, the chipmaking plans of the ISMC consortium, including Israel’s Tower, are similarly stuck owing to Tower’s delayed merger with Intel. The third applicant, a Singapore-based consortium led by IGSS Ventures, has also decided to resubmit its case.

Despite initial setbacks in the semiconductor manufacturing race, India expects to collaborate with major global partners, particularly Taiwan and the island’s high-tech companies known as the “national jewels.” Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s recent state visit to the United States, which enhanced defense and technology cooperation in a big way, should also act as a catalyst. Reportedly, ahead of the trip, the Indian approved the U.S. chipmaker Micron’s plan to invest $2.7 billion in a semiconductor testing and packaging unit in Gujarat. But will top Taiwanese players like the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC)—the largest and most sophisticated chip manufacturer—and United Microelectronics Corporation also enter the fray?

In the post-COVID pandemic era, when supply chain disruptions continually challenge global trade, diversification is vital for both Taiwan—the world’s leading player in the global electronics industry — and India—the world’s fifth-largest economy with a young workforce and a top tech talent market. Unfortunately, India’s shaky infrastructure will obstruct development, particularly for an industry dependent on reliable, high-volume water supplies. On the plus side, both parties intend to redouble efforts to minimize such difficulties.

Modi envisions India as a globally competitive hub of Electronics System Design and Manufacturing (ESDM) under his “Make in India” and “Digital India” initiatives. Establishing the semiconductor wafer fabrication facilities will strengthen manufacturing and innovation and help establish a dependable value chain. According to some estimates, India’s semiconductor market will expand by about $85 billion and generate employment for 600,000 people by 2030, highlighting the industry’s vital role in global value chains.

For India, owning stakes in the high-technology ecosystem is crucial for not just removing supply chain obstacles for its rapidly expanding domestic consumption but also for strengthening its exports. Naturally, Taiwan features prominently in this vision. On the other hand, Taiwan’s dominance in the semiconductor industry—accounting for about 60 percent of the total global foundry market with the largest number of new fabs—has put a spotlight on Taiwan’s post-pandemic difficulties. Specifically, these problems include the ongoing U.S.-China trade war, the looming threat of Chinese invasion, and persistent water problems amid increased global demand.

In this context, Taiwan could effectively utilize India’s growing global profile, especially during and after its twin presidencies of the G20 and Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO); its high-tech and security-oriented relationship with the United States; and its current vision of capitalizing on the country’s scale and magnitude of opportunities. Moreover, as manufacturing companies start “de-risking,” Southeast Asia and India gradually become ideal alternative destinations. Partnering with India will undoubtedly ease the ramifications of localized chipmaking, which is on trend globally and has compounded the talent or skill shortage concerns.

Fortunately, their growing bonhomie reflects a new direction in ties. In 2018, Taiwan and India signed two bilateral agreements that covered both direct and indirect “third-location” investments, ensuring protection in line with international standards and a dedicated desk (called Taiwan Plus) to address Taiwanese investors' concerns and facilitate their operations in India. Since then, the bilateral trade has maintained a steady upward trajectory (about $8.45 billion in 2022, an increase of 9.8 percent from 2021).

In 2022, the director-general of the India-Taipei Association—India’s de-facto embassy in Taiwan—highlighted the Indian government’s plans to invest about $30 billion in building its own semiconductor supply chain to curtail India’s overdependence on imported chips. For now, India is not concerned about advanced chipmaking. Still, it seeks to produce “mature chips” used in everyday applications, such as electric vehicles, home appliances, and medical devices, that will likely face maximum pressure in the coming years. At the same time, India is looking to boost self-reliance in display manufacturing for home-grown production of household electronics, smartphones, and automobiles—the domestic consumption of display components will reach more than $10 billion by 2025.

In this context, India hosted a delegation of semiconductor manufacturers, including Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (PSMC), the world’s sixth-largest contract chipmaker and the third-biggest in Taiwan, in August 2022. Months later, the visit of the Taiwanese business delegation led by Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs Chern-Chyi Chen in late 2022 has given new momentum to the strategic cooperation, including the potential for a free trade agreement (FTA). Additionally, the inauguration of the Taiwan-India CEO roundtable and the signing of three MoUs, including one between Taiwanese memory chipmaker Adata Technology and the Electronic Industries Association of India (ELCINA), are noteworthy milestones in bilateral economic cooperation.

Furthermore, India’s “Act East” policy and Taiwan’s “New Southbound” policy will enable resource and talent sharing in these times of great shortage, especially in the resource-intensive semiconductor industry. India’s steady growth in clean energy and the government’s efforts to harness hydroelectric capacity should allay some concerns about energy shortages. Moreover, the turn toward sustainability—a much-needed semiconductor manufacturing component—will work in India’s favor.

Currently, over 100 Taiwanese companies have invested in India. Semiconductor collaboration could boost this figure higher. Taiwan has the expertise and experience to aid India in setting up its domestic manufacturing capabilities. First, Taiwanese companies could help train and upskill Indian talent. Second, India’s new extended reapplication window decision should encourage companies like PSMC to enter into joint production arrangements in India. Third, Taiwanese companies can also be useful for India in gradually establishing its own tech ecosystem: connecting with local fabless chip design houses; building assembly, testing, marking, and packaging (ATMP; referring to outsourced semiconductor assembly and test) plants; and then finally setting up the fabs.

Partnerships with giants like the PSMC, which has experience setting up plants in China, and the TSMC, which is currently spending $40 billion to build two fabs in Arizona, would drive higher growth for India and India-Taiwan strategic ties. Modi’s U.S. visit has invigorated India’s semiconductor plans and may attract Taiwanese contractors to invest in India, especially after top American firms enter the race. In March this year, India and the United States signed an MoU to create resilient, innovative semiconductor supply chains to boost India’s aspirations.

Notably, China-related geopolitical concerns figure in the semiconductor collaboration. India’s adversarial relationship with China is getting more fragile amid the tilt towards the US; China is watchful of India’s economic-technological cooperation with Taiwan. Taiwan’s “silicon shield,” affected by the China-U.S. hegemonic battle, has found safer pastures away from China. However, the weakening of China’s dependence on the Taiwanese semiconductor industry has raised security fears for the island.

Against such a scenario, Taiwan’s diversification plans would look to gain at least limited political support from India. Even if India is unlikely to forsake the “One China” policy, New Delhi has an increasingly favorable disposition toward Taiwan and has even expressed concerns about the militarization of the Taiwan Strait.

The event of a Taiwan invasion would have devastating effects on India’s economy and regional security. So New Delhi continues to walk a tightrope between China and Taiwan. Yet, today, the promise of new technologies pushes India toward Taipei. Whether shared democratic values and economic-technological convergence will develop greater strategic bonhomie is, however, an open question.

Dr. Jagannath Panda is a Contributing Editor for The National Interest. He is the Head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Sweden, and a Senior Fellow at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, The Netherlands.

Image: Shutterstock. 

America Needs a Strategy for Space-Based Solar Power

The National Interest - dim, 02/07/2023 - 00:00

In a scientific first, researchers from Caltech beamed power generated in outer space back to Earth. The Space Solar Power Demonstrator proves the scientific basis for a new, long-hoped for energy source: space-based solar power (SBSP). By capturing solar energy in outer space, without the many factors that make terrestrial solar intermittent, SBSP can unlock a whole new class of baseload energy technologies to provide clean energy and reduce carbon emissions. The rapid reduction in launch costs enabled by the growing commercial space sector means that it could be economic within the next couple of decades. Among other entities, the European Space Agency, China, Japan, and the U.S. Department of Defense are all actively pursuing research and development in this area. However, Caltech’s achievement is overshadowed by an uncomfortable fact: despite being the world’s leader in space activities, the United States is in danger of falling behind on SBSP and may lose this emerging sector to geopolitical competitors. In short, the United States needs a comprehensive strategy to develop and commercialize space-based solar power by combining the public and private sectors to solve complex engineering, economic, and regulatory challenges.

After a relatively stable decade in energy markets, major global changes are underscoring the dependence of modern economies on energy services. Pandemic-driven disruptions in energy markets, including an accelerated oil boom and bust, undermined near-term investment in energy supply. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has further exacerbated energy price volatility, raising the prospect of Europe losing its larger supplier of energy and the world losing its second-largest oil supplier. More broadly, the reemergence of global geopolitical competition, particularly between the United States and China, is leading to escalating competition over strategic industries, including energy and space. Finally, all of this is occurring against the backdrop of ever-worsening climate change and the ever-pressing need to reduce carbon emissions as much as possible as fast as possible. Even with the growth of wind and solar, and the emergence of other advanced energy technologies, the world needs all of the clean energy it can get. Further, as legacy thermal powerplants are retired at an increasing rate, the need for dispatchable and baseload power systems is becoming ever more acute.

Space-based solar power speaks to all of these needs in one package: it can be dispatched quickly to support system ramping, it can provide baseload power at very high capacity factors, it produces zero direct emissions, it is resilient, and it can achieve all of this simultaneously. The scientific first principles are simple. Solar power in space is about eight times more powerful than on the Earth’s surface because it does not need to go through the atmosphere, it is not blocked by clouds, and does not experience nighttime. If this solar power could be collected and beamed back to Earth, namely with long wavelength microwaves, terrestrial markets could gain access to a 24/7 clean energy source. Of course, the complexity of such an undertaking is not trivial. SBSP was first popularized by astrophysicist Gerard O’Neill in the 1970s, but progress has only occurred in fits and starts, in large part because costs remained prohibitive.

With the rise of commercial space innovators like SpaceX, the economic equation for SBSP is starting to flip. Reusable rocketry, off-the-shelf satellite equipment, and economies of scale are driving down the costs of space access. Additional innovations like commercial space stations and in-space assembling and manufacturing can support the construction of large, complex satellite installations. The potential for space mined resources from the Moon and asteroids can further reduce material costs. 

Many regions, especially those facing desperate energy situations, are starting to notice. The European Space Agency (ESA) is embarking on the ambitious Cassiopeia program to develop SBSP. Underlying this program are two studies by ESA finding that the first utility-scale demonstration project could cost less than $20 billion. While costly, such a price tag is on par with many first-of-a-kind energy megaprojects, such as the construction of two new nuclear reactors in Georgia. China sees SBSP as a way to become an energy and space superpower. It has plans for a low Earth orbit test in 2028 and a geosynchronous orbit test in 2030.

In the next several decades, the world could effectively build hundreds of gigawatts of baseload, utility-scale power plants, anywhere in the world. Certain configurations could enable SBSP stations to switch between power markets, enhancing system reliability and flexibly complementing variable renewable energy sources. Countries that have not been blessed with the economic advantages of energy resources could not only produce their own domestic energy securely, they could develop export markets by sending excess space power production to world markets. Beyond grid-scale power, SBSP can support many types of advanced energy activities, from remote defense operations to orbital satellites, to bases on the surface of the Moon or Mars. And all of this with limited carbon emissions—although space stations require rocket launches, the lifecycle emissions are likely to be comparable to other clean energy sources.

However, the United States is not currently on track to join in this energy abundance. Only a handful of American entities are working on SBSP, namely the Department of Defense and Caltech. NASA is funding several projects focused on power beaming, but only for space applications. No R&D nor commercialization roadmap exists for U.S. agencies and the private sector. Without broader coordination and a demand driver, there will simply be insufficient investment to support the development of utility-scale SBSP.

A broader American innovation ecosystem has yet to develop. Notably absent from these developments are some of the most important entities for developing commercialized energy technologies: the Department of Energy, national laboratories, and power sector customers. Space industry efforts alone cannot unlock this technology. Further, important policy and regulatory venues for such space energy systems, like the State Department, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and Federal Communications Commission, have yet to establish a sufficient legal foundation.

What would a comprehensive strategy look like? Early this year, we published an article in the journal Space Policy arguing that a technology development program can form the keystone of such a strategy. We proposed the use of a public-private partnership to progressively de-risk the technology while lowering prices. Starting from small-scale activities, an aggressive but feasible program could reach utility-scale, cost-competitive systems by the 2040s. The Department of Energy’s new Office of Clean Energy Demonstration, created in the recent infrastructure bill, would be a perfect host for such a program.

Beyond technology demonstration and cost reduction, such a program would also enable sustained policy development to establish a long-term regulatory framework. Regulatory challenges include the use of radio spectrum currently used by other satellites and terrestrial users, addressing concerns about the security and safety of microwave beaming, and the integration of SBSP into highly regulated energy markets.

The most important starting step is for the Biden administration and Congress to declare the development of space-based solar power a national priority to fight climate change, enhance energy security, and secure global competitiveness in two strategic sectors. Interagency coordination across NASA, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy can direct government investment to enabling technologies in the laboratory. Private-sector-led innovation, working closely with academia, can take these innovations into actual deployment, reducing costs through staged deployment.

Ultimately, SBSP could become one of the defining energy sources of the twenty-first century. By complementing other clean energy sources like wind, solar, and nuclear power, it can secure global mid-century decarbonization while ensuring the United States and its allies protect their energy security. And even if long-shot carbon-free technologies like nuclear fusion were to become commercially viable, SBSP’s unique characteristics would still justify the investment into it. As fantastical as it sounds, solar power beamed from space is exactly the kind of leadership-defining, world-changing bets that the United States should be making this century.

Alex Gilbert is a Fellow and Ph.D. student at the Colorado School of Mines, and Director of Space and Planetary Regulation at Zeno Power.

Leet W. Wood currently works in energy policy and regulation at a DC not-for-profit. He received his doctorate from George Mason University in 2019.

Image: Shutterstock.

How China’s Panda Diplomacy Opened Hearts, Minds, and Borders

Foreign Policy - sam, 01/07/2023 - 14:00
Beijing’s strategy isn’t always black and white—except when it is.

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