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An uncomfortable but profound question is being asked around Washington DC these days: has American capitalism failed, and if so, can it be rescued? This inquiry is central to a debate playing out in the heart of the U.S. political establishment as policymakers, experts, and others grapple with the geostrategic challenges of our time.

At the heart of this discussion is a small but increasingly influential center-right think tank, American Compass, and its founder, Oren Cass. A leading conservative domestic-policy wonk and former policy director for (now Senator) Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential campaign, Cass started American Compass to “restore an economic consensus that emphasizes the importance of family, community, and industry to the nation’s liberty and prosperity.” Better yet, as described by the Washington Post when the think tank was first launched, Cass and his followers are mounting:

…a frontal assault on the most hallowed principle of modern conservative economic policy — that market transactions should be given preeminent weight when setting public policy. [...] Cass and his allies, however, stand for the opposite idea: only democratic politics permits the collective judgment of the people to be heard, distilled and implemented. That judgment has a healthy respect for markets and economic freedom, but it has the wisdom to know when liberty becomes license and when the freedom of some is injurious to the health of society. In those cases, Cass and American Compass hold, it is not only proper for society to intervene in the market but also necessary for it to do so.

In the three years since its founding, American Compass has come far. Just one week ago, the organization held a fully-attended forum within the Russell Senate Office building that saw the participation of four Republican senators (Tom Cotton, Marco Rubio, J.D. Vance, and Todd Young), packs of congressional staffers, numerous influential commentators, policy wonks, and more. It is worth emphasizing how significant this is: in U.S. politics, proximity to political power is de facto power in and of itself. That a small think tank can host such an event within the literal halls of power is no small feat.

At this event, Cass and his team gave out multiple copies of their recently completed and appropriately named handbook, Rebuilding American Capitalism: A Handbook for Conservative Policymakers. This 104-page tome, loaded with analyses and policy proposals covering a broad number of issues—globalization, industry, finance, family, education, labor—is both a political platform and a definitive answer to the question raised at the outset: yes, American capitalism has failed, and yes, it can be rescued.

All this is timely and of particular concern to foreign policy practitioners and American strategists, especially given the return of great power competition and the coming multipolar geopolitical environment.

Great Power Competition Requires Great Industrial Capacity

The cold reality is that strategic competition between great powers in the modern era requires not only ample resources—a large, healthy, and growing population; a strong agricultural base; access to key mineral resources—but also sufficient financial and industrial capabilities.

As history has advanced, great power competition has increasingly required greater technical expertise. Technological advancement means new innovations, devices, and weapons, which must be designed, built, maintained, and upgraded. Moreover, the production of all these requires a sufficiently large industrial base that must be supported, conserved, and prioritized. Ensuring a steady supply of technical experts and financing is thus also essential—and increasingly so—to great powers.

The totality of this dynamic was made most clear in the European World Wars of the twentieth century. Warfare relied not just on millions of armed and trained men, as has long been the historical norm, but also on a wide variety of vehicles, machines, and gadgets. All of these devices—themselves products of an inherently scarce supply of experts—in turn, relied upon vast manufacturing and logical systems of production: industrial-scale farming, mining, refining, fabrication, shipping, and so on, all of which had to be supported by a strong financial sector and credit-worthy government. This dynamic was just as clear throughout the Cold War: the United States’ primary advantage throughout the conflict, and the reason for much of its current global primacy, is because it led the world in technological development throughout the twentieth century, which itself was largely derived from its mammoth post-World War II industrial capacity and economic model.

This longstanding historical norm—the struggle over resources, productive capacity, and technical know-how—was broken with what may now be called the post-Cold War Interregnum. The United States, left as the world’s hegemon after the fall of the Soviet Union, chose to embark on a mission to promote and support an integrated globalized economy. The result, it was declared, would nominally be mutually beneficial to all participants, with economic liberalization giving way to political liberalization, the advance of democratic progress, human rights, and economic prosperity for all.

The Free Market Nightmare…

This dream failed to materialize. In the Foreword of Rebuilding American Capitalism, Cass bluntly describes what the neoliberal, overly pro-free market economic policy of the post-Cold War era has produced in practice:

Comparative advantage is supposed to allow a developed economy like America’s to focus on the most advanced technologies, but the U.S. trade balance in advanced technology products has swung from a $60 billion surplus in 1992 to a $190 billion deficit in 2020. Innovation is supposed to drive productivity but, in the manufacturing sector, productivity growth has turned negative, with factories producing less per worker in the early 2020s than the early 2010s.

The economic system’s malfunction has dire human consequences. Whereas 40 weeks of the typical male worker’s income in 1985 could provide the middle-class essentials for a family of four, by 2022 he needed 62 weeks of income—a problem, there being only 52 weeks in a year. Nearly half of Americans report having fewer children than they want and, outside the most highly educated and compensated households, affordability is the most frequently cited obstacle. The average American can no longer expect to earn more than his father did at the same age. Poorer regions can no longer expect to catch up with wealthier ones. The bottom 50% of households had less wealth in 2019 than in 1989, though the top 10% added $29 trillion. Life expectancy is falling.

The fundamental issue at hand is not capitalism itself. As Cass notes, “the first 200 years of American history, as a backwater colonial republic grew into a continent-spanning industrial colossus and home of the world’s middle class,” demonstrates that the economic model can function quite well. The problem, rather, in Cass’ words, is an ideological belief that took hold which posited that economic activity should occur with zero government involvement, based on the grounds of maximizing individual autonomy: “...free individuals exercising free choice in the market, each presumably able to optimize his own life. The failure of families to form reflected merely a preference for other pastimes.” People, in other words, vote with their wallets. The result, which has amounted to companies opting to off-short and out-source industry in the pursuit of greater efficiency and higher profits, justified by delivering lower costs to consumers, has been:

 …a disaster for the nation. Globalization crushed domestic industry and employment, leaving collapsed communities in its wake. Financialization shifted the economy’s center of gravity from Main Street to Wall Street, fueling an explosion in corporate profits alongside stagnating wages and declining investment. The decline of unions cost workers power in the market, voice in the workplace, and access to a vital source of communal support. These trends [...] contributed to rising inequality, slowing innovation, narrowing of opportunity, and loss of middle-class security.

Aside from devastating damage to Americans’ economic livelihoods and futures, the United States has also de facto surrendered away its industrial-technological capacity, and with it, the country’s ability to self-renew its competitive advantage. Off-shoring manufacturing has not only resulted in the loss of millions of jobs and falling productivity growth but also a decline in our ability to produce new technologies. To quote Sridhar Kota and Tom Mahoney, “once manufacturing departs from a country’s shores, engineering and production know-how leave as well, and then innovation ultimately follows.” Studies have shown this to be true, with spending on research and development moving abroad to be closer to production and engineering. With the departure of that industrial capacity goes not only America’s ability to produce needed armaments on a war footing but also its ability to innovate and its technological-military advantage.

The Department of Defense has likewise sounded the alarm on these developments. In their FY20 Industrial Capabilities Report, which transcribes the department’s “priority industrial base risks and vulnerabilities,” the Pentagon provides a stark warning:

Together, a U.S. business climate that has favored short-term shareholder earnings (versus longterm capital investment), deindustrialization, and an abstract, radical vision of “free trade,” without fair trade enforcement, have severely damaged America’s ability to arm itself today and in the future. Our national responses – off-shoring and out-sourcing – have been inadequate and ultimately self-defeating, especially with respect to the defense industrial base.

This off-shoring/out-sourcing trend, when combined with environmental concerns, is limited not just to production but also to basic resource acquisition. Consider that U.S. leaders have neglected to maintain the country’s access to the critical minerals and materials necessary not only for retaining our military advantage but also for high-tech manufacturing and renewable energy technologies. Without these resources, twenty-first-century industrial leadership and real economic progress itself become impossible. America closed down its own primary rare earth minerals mine in Mountain View, California in the 1990s. Since then, China has come to account for 90 percent of global rare earth production, establishing its dominance in both mining and refining and leaving America to depend on a strategic competitor for 80 percent of its critical mineral imports. Once again, the Department of Defense has sounded the alarm on this matter, also noting in its 2020 Industrial Capabilities Report that:

[Emerging] technologies pose new problems for defense contractors and for the Pentagon in securing a trusted supply chain for critical items such as processed rare earth elements and microelectronics, where gaps and unanticipated interruptions can be triggered by the loss of a sole supplier for purely economic reasons, or by an embargo or military action by an adversary. Events of either type can jeopardize a sustainable industrial base.

The United States—having shorn its industrial-technological capacity and forfeited control over key resources and supply chains—is thus ill-prepared for an era of great power strategic competition. The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War—arguably a de facto proxy war between the West and Russia over Ukraine’s agricultural bounty, energy and mineral resources, industrial base, and ability to project power over certain geographical regions—illustrates current circumstances. Whether it be in ammunition, shipbuilding, or weaponry, it is now reasonable to worry that the United States does not have the material capacity to fight a large-scale industrial war.

…and the Danger to American Democracy

But perhaps most damning of all—even more than wrecking the industrial basis necessary for the United States to remain a pre-eminent geostrategic and economic actor in international affairs—is what the failure of the neoliberal agenda has meant for the U.S. political system itself.

When first established in the United States, corporations were oriented toward encouraging national development and pursuing economic achievements that no individual or family firm could do alone. Consider, for example, that Alexander Hamilton, the first U.S. treasury secretary and the father of U.S. finance and industry, helped co-found the Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures in 1791. This early corporation aimed to promote industrial development along the Passaic River in New Jersey, resulting in regional industrialization for over 150 years.

However, this model ran into problems from the 1880s through the 1930s. Corporations, simply put, were spectacularly successful—too successful, even. Such was their financial and industrial power—and their consequent political power—that they began to supersede or even capture the power of the state. The resulting situation, with a handful of individuals wielding disproportionate influence over the levers of government and public policy, was antithetical to republican governance.

Elected politicians of the time period were keenly aware of this in their efforts to restrain corporate power. Senator John Sherman, the statesman behind the eponymous 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, declared, “if we would not submit to an emperor, we should not submit to an autocrat of trade.” Senator Joseph O’Mahoney stated in 1934 that “many of the modern corporations engaged in interstate commerce are greater and more powerful than most of our sovereign states.” President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s attorney general, Francis Biddle, declared in 1944 that “When the industrial life of a country passes into the hands of a few individuals, their power over the direction of public affairs exceeds the power confided by the people to their elected representatives in the government itself.”

It is with great trepidation then that we hear contemporary elected officials talk about multinational corporations in the current political environment. Senator John Kennedy in 2019 declared that Google and Facebook “aren’t just companies. They’re countries.” Large commodity traders can determine the fate of entire nations through their control of energy and food. A number of banks and financial institutions are so powerful that they are, as the term goes, “too big to fail.”

It is through this lens, then, that the ongoing political debate of U.S. economic policy and the mission of American Compass, Oren Cass, and his various allies and followers must be understood: at stake is not only the future of U.S. geoeconomic (and thus, geopolitical) power, the livelihood of its citizens, and the fate of the current international order, but also, implicitly, the fate of the United States as a sovereign republic.

Can America Save Itself?

The challenge that Oren Cass and his colleagues have undertaken is thus great but not insurmountable. If anything, several recent political trends are in their favor.

Abroad, the war in Ukraine put the reality of America’s poor military-industrial situation in stark relief, triggering something of a political awakening. Leading Washington think tanks, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies to the Center for New American Security, have published reports and studies of varying quality proclaiming the newfound need for industrial policy. Elbridge Colby—a former deputy assistant secretary of defense who led the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (and is widely considered to be a future secretary of defense)—has been warning that a war with China could be lost if the U.S. industrial base isn’t up to par. For a high-level official (who notably was also special assistant to the president for the defense industrial base in 2017–2018) to issue such warnings is quite telling, especially given consistent signs that he’s correct. Overall, Washington officialdom—and consequentially, policymakers—have suddenly discovered that the industrial base really matters.

Domestically, political progressives focused on economic policy are also beating the same drum as Cass and his followers. This neo-Brandeis movement, focused on reviving 1930s-style antitrust enforcement, has gradually gained power and scored victories. It is telling, as leading antitrust policy wonk Matthew Stoller notes, that the Wall Street Journal editorial page has written 64 attacks on Federal Trade Commission chair Lina Khan in less than two years. Stoller’s own organization, the American Economic Liberties Project, something of a left-wing counterpart to Cass’ American Compass, has also been making great strides in influencing Congress, the Biden administration, and Washington officialdom and policy thinkers more broadly. For once, reforming America’s economic model appears to be a genuine bipartisan cause.

Time will tell how Cass, American Compass, and its ideological allies fare in the coming years. The success of last Wednesday’s forum paints a rosy picture. There remains, however, a few major concerns with Cass’ agenda that this humble observer cannot shake off: a broader reform of American capitalism and its current economic incentive structure will mean addressing thorny political issues.

Consider some practical national security concerns in the world of technology. Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook, and Apple may be hulking giants with more power than some countries, which needs to be restrained. But it is precisely their size and scale that allows them to render services—such as cybersecurity for the ordinary user/consumer—that otherwise wouldn’t be possible. Would a thousand small companies, rather than a handful of large ones, be able to mount a comparable cybersecurity defense effort against foreign adversaries? Would Americans’ personal data really be safer if it were shared with smaller companies, as some argue, if foreign actors could acquire those smaller companies? It is doubtful. Like telecom companies, Big Tech firms may be natural monopolies, requiring political compromise and extremely detailed regulation.

Likewise, consider what the re-orientation of economic incentives in the U.S. economy might look like in practice. The push for globalization and the off-shoring of American industry and jobs, for instance, was driven by the argument that everyone would benefit from lower costs. Yes, jobs are lost, but consumer ultimately benefits from cheap food, consumer goods, cheap labor, and so on. Cass and cohort would propound, correctly, that this trade was certainly not worth it if it came at the cost of American livelihoods and the country’s industrial base (with its strategic value)—to say nothing of American democracy itself.

That is certainly true, but consider what reversing some of this would look like in practice. Suppose, for example, that fair trade laws were to be reintroduced, as Mattew Stoller argues. This would certainly go a long way in checking the power of large retailers and “empowering Main Street over Wall Street,” as it were. But it would also mean an increase in prices for the ordinary consumer, who might very well revolt at the ballot box.

This, perhaps, is the real question that American Compass, and Americans more broadly, must wrestle with: are U.S. voters ready and willing to accept that a higher cost of living and some economic pain in the short and medium term, if not longer, is the literal price for the preservation of U.S. democracy?

It is hard to say now, for this thesis has yet to be tested. Pessimists would contend, not unfairly, that the prospect is dubious. But given Americans’ historical tendency toward grit, endurance, and hope for a better tomorrow, the answer may yet surprise us all.

Carlos Roa is the Executive Editor of The National Interest.

Image: American Compass/Twitter.

The conflict between Iran and Israel has substantially intensified over recent years, with its scope broadening daily. Israel’s worries about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, regional influence, and military advancements have positioned it as a key player in responding to these perceived threats. As such, with the aim of strengthening deterrence against Iran, Jerusalem has designed a strategy of death by a thousand cuts, which includes intensifying covert operations against Iranian interests.

Unlike its previous strategy, which focused on sabotaging Tehran’s nuclear program and assassinating its nuclear scientists, Israel now appears to have extended its web to target other scientists and officers in charge of missile and drone programs, as well as members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force. Additionally, Jerusalem is utilizing its diplomatic capacities to further operationalize this strategy of “death by a thousand cuts” by expanding its relations with Iran’s neighboring states—especially those that do not have good relations with Iran. Strengthening relations with Azerbaijan and the Kurdistan Region, normalizing relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and reopening its embassy in Turkmenistan are among its actions in this regard. 

Given all this, what has Iran done? It seems that Iran’s response to Israel’s actions can be evaluated in the framework of two short-term and long-term approaches. Tehran’s short-term approach to Jerusalem’s actions has mainly included a case-by-case response, including targeting positions and assets related to Israel in the sea or a third country. In this regard, drone attacks on Israeli ships in the Persian Gulf and missile attacks on the Mossad headquarters in Erbil have been carried out. In addition, Iran’s long-term policy toward Israel has always been based on creating a defensive front in the Eastern Mediterranean. By propping up Palestinian groups such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement alongside Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iran has endeavored to turn Lebanon and the Gaza Strip into defense embankments against Israel. 

How Iran’s West Bank Strategy Came to Be

The term “Arming the West Bank” was raised for the first time in the middle of the 2014 Gaza War. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that he considered the only way to rescue Palestine was by “arming the West Bank like Gaza.”

A month after the end of the conflict, the notion was raised again in Khamenei’s meeting with Ramadan Abdullah, the former secretary-general of the Islamic Jihad Movement. In this meeting, Khamenei stressed the need for “serious planning to join the West Bank in confronting Israel” with the aim of increasing Israel’s security concerns.

These statements were welcomed by Palestinian militant groups. Among others, Khaled Qaddoumi, Hamas’s representative in Tehran, considered this approach to be a serious and important option for resistance groups in Palestine—if supported by Iran, they could change the balance of power in what Palestinians see as the occupied territories.

In Iran’s view, this approach stands out because of how vulnerable Israel is to it. Not only is the West Bank relatively close to Israel’s three key cities and military-economic centers—Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa—but also the presence of Jewish settlers and more than two million Palestinians provides a rich environment for Iran to open a new front. Unlike Iran’s other deterrence measures, arming the West Bank would inflict more deadly blows on Israel by reducing the geographical distance as much as possible. The approach could paralyze Israel’s security system and blockade Israel within its own borders by expanding the geography of the conflict.

How Would the Strategy Be Implemented?

Iran has plenty of options on the table to pursue this approach: it can transfer small arms and light weapons through non-state allied intermediaries, provide training to facilitate the production of light weapons inside the West Bank itself, finance the purchasing of weapons from arms dealers, and more.

Tehran, however, faces a few obstacles in attempting to pursue this strategy. The borders of the West Bank, for one, are strongly patrolled by Israel and Jordan, impeding any easy arms shipments. Similarly, the Palestinian National Authority will not look kindly upon the arming of its domestic political rivals and the potential diplomatic damage that this could result in.

On the other hand, Iran was seriously involved in Syria and Iraq and had focused on defeating Saudi Arabia in regional conflicts. Despite these obstacles, some reports show that at the same time, Qassem Soleimani, the late commander of the Quds Force, in contact with the commanders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, emphasized the arming of the West Bank as Iran’s priority in the occupied territories. Also, while many experts were talking about the impossibility of this strategy due to many hurdles, former Iranian diplomat Hussein Sheikh al-Islam rejected this issue and said: “We know how to deliver weapons to the West Bank. We have already delivered weapons to other fronts.”

As some news sources, quoting Israeli security officials, have revealed, Lebanese Hezbollah, the main non-state ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has transferred light weapons to the West Bank. In addition, the smuggling of arms through dealers or other people to the West Bank has grown significantly in recent years. The latest example in this regard was the arrest of Imad al-Adwan, a Jordanian lawmaker, by Israeli police on charges of trying to smuggle weapons to the West Bank.

The idea of negotiating with Israel has faded among the Palestinians for various reasons (such as the continuation of settlements, the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by Donald Trump, and the inauguration of the most right-wing government in Israel). In return, they have turned to individual armed struggle, which has gained unprecedented popularity among the young generation of Palestine, especially after the intensification of arms smuggling to the West Bank.

The emergence of new armed groups in the West Bank, such as the Jenin Brigade, the Balata Brigade, and, most notoriously, the Lions’ Den, shows a change in approach in this region. In the past two years, the beginning of a new round of conflicts in Nablus, Jenin, and Sheikh Jarrah and numerous attacks against checkpoints, soldiers, and Israeli settlements have led some analysts to consider the continuation of this situation as the beginning of the Third Intifada. Iran openly supported the actions of armed groups in the West Bank. Esmail Qaani, the commander of the Quds Force, praised the Palestinian youth of the West Bank and said: “Before the West Bank was armed, few actions were taken against Israel in this area, but today, in some days, more than 30 operations are conducted.” Ramzan Sharif, the spokesman of the IRGC, also announced that these groups are fully supported by Iran.

From a macro perspective, it seems that Iran is pursuing two strategic objectives via its policy of arming the West Bank: the unity of Palestinian groups in confronting Israel and the addition of a new front in the battle with Israel. The importance of unity among the Palestinian groups lies in the fact that after the end of the Second Intifada, the West Bank was out of the conflict with Israel, and the armed groups were active only in the Gaza Strip. In the current situation, the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip can lead to the formation of a joint command structure in order to coordinate information and operations between Palestinian groups under the supervision of Iran and Hezbollah. This happened for the first time in the war of 2021, known as Saif al-Quds. 

Also, the gradual expansion of West Bank arming will increase Iran’s capabilities in any possible action against Israel. Especially if the pursuit of this policy is accompanied by the transfer of more advanced weapons such as rockets, mortars, and short-range missiles. In this case, Israel can be attacked from at least three fronts: southern Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank. As it stands, it seems that the third decade of the twenty-first century in the Middle East should be called the era of intensification of the Cold War between Tehran and Jerusalem and the confrontation between the two strategies: Arming the West Bank and death by a thousand cuts. Especially after the normalization of Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia and speculation about the continuation of de-escalation with Arab neighbors, Iran’s capacity to focus on confronting Israel will increase.

Dr. Amir Hossein Vazirian holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Tarbiat Modares University in Tehran, Iran. His research interests are primarily focused on Iran’s foreign and security policy and Middle East Studies.

Image: Shutterstock.

For more than a year now, the question of whether Taiwan is next if Russia is allowed to take over Ukraine has been repeatedly asked. Some have argued that defeating Russia may save Taiwan, while others have urged against equating the actions taken by Vladimir Putin with the possible ones that Xi Jinping may take.

The conversation is worth having. There are merits to the assertion that in responding to the invasion of Ukraine, the West can demonstrate that it is a cohesive and effective force. Likewise, there are also merits to the claim that the strategic significance of Ukraine and Taiwan—as well as the threats posed by China and Russia—are intrinsically different.

Yet there is another discussion that is equally, if not more, important. It centers around the question: would the West respond with equal determination if China invades Taiwan? Today, alarmingly, it seems unlikely.

On April 26, China’s Xi Jinping and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy held their first war phone call, leading to much speculation regarding China’s role as a potential global peacemaker. Such speculation, understandably so, worried and frustrated many in the United States. These ill feelings originate not solely from the fact that China would likely prioritize Russian interests, but also because if China, the United States’ biggest economic and political competitor, were to become the peacemaker of the deadliest conflict in Europe since World War II then what would that mean for the state of global affairs and the position held by the United States?

What appears evident is that the illustrated harms faced by China due to Ukraine’s propped-up military resilience exist mostly in the imagination of American think tankers and politicians. Realizing this does not require getting inside the heads of Chinese officials. The strength of the Sino-European relationship is illuminating enough.

Consider that while in the United States we talk about China and Russia as simultaneous threats, in France, Emmanuel Macron comes back from his Beijing visit saying that the European Union will not become a U.S. “vassal,” claiming that the union must resist involvement in U.S.-China disputes over Taiwan. German companies, despite Washington’s attempts to isolate Beijing, continue to venture into China out of economic necessity. Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Ursula von der Leyen said that the EU wants to “de-risk” but not “de-couple” from Beijing—particularly given a 98 percent dependency on China for rare earth minerals. Other examples abound.

On the other hand, among Republican senators, for instance, the “China is Watching” claim has been perpetually shrieked. Yet not even the most vocal China hawks have made a significant push to have European statesmen or, at the very least, Ukraine, publicly state that China should be watching closely or that China-led peace deals should be treated as ridiculous. In refusing to amount such opposition, the same individuals that argue that China and Russia are parts of the same threat are exhibiting either incompetence or dishonesty. If China and Russia are indeed two sides of the same coin, as they suggest, then why is it that Americans are alone in treating them as such?

In light of these concerns, on March 2, I asked Irish ambassador Geraldine Byrne Nason, Italian ambassador Mariangela Zappia, and the Danish ambassador Christina Markus Lassen two simple questions: is China our biggest threat in the long-term, and is Taiwan an independent country?

The Irish ambassador responded by saying that “we have to be careful with pushing Russia and China into a corner,” completely inverting the logic used by those concerned with Chinese expansion in the United States, as she implied that cooperation with China is worth pursuing. The real threats, Nason claimed, are “the climate crisis and the nuclear threat.”

Similarly, both the Italian and the Danish ambassadors refused to make statements about whether Taiwan is an independent country, with the Italian ambassador claiming that “cooperation with China is benefitting all of us” and that “China is a rival in values” that follows a “predatory approach to governance.”

If the direct responses from three ambassadors and other comments by EU leaders (Macron, von der Leyen, etc.) are anything to go by, then in the eyes of a good number of European leaders, China is far from perfect but the most prescient threat they face is Russian. Intelligently, unlike Washington, they have been able to prioritize their resources and efforts in accordance with their needs. As such, Europe finds itself in what is really a favorable position: Europeans can rely on American assistance vis-à-vis Russia, but ensure that when it comes to playing in a different arena—primarily the Indo-Pacific—they can sit down and observe.

Meanwhile, when the same logic is used in the United States by those who argue that we must not push Russia toward China and that we must prioritize deterring America’s—not Europe’s—main threat, our partners from across the Atlantic are quick to display their indignation.

Aside from Russia, the status quo leaves the United States in the worst position. Despite our consistent and generational support to Europe, the idea of them sacrificing close to as much as what we have sacrificed for them seems implausible.

If countries were people, this would be labeled a toxic relationship. But countries are not people, they are countries. When cleansed from rhetoric, the reality is that the Europeans are not our friends, they are our allies—in specific scenarios under specific circumstances.

If the United States wants to deter China, we need our European partners to express with the same confidence seen regarding Ukraine that China cannot be a peacemaker, and that Chinese expansion poses a threat to them and their partners.

Some may be quick to suggest that in 2020, China became the EU’s main trading partner, meaning that they would never take a stronger position. Still, the reality is that in 2021, according to the EU itself, the United States is just 1.5 percent away from China in terms of trading goods, and militarily, they have grown accustomed to our support.

So, yes, we can push, just like China does.

At the minimum, individual European leaders should reciprocate what NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said four months ago when he said that “China doesn't have much credibility because they have not been able to condemn the illegal invasion of Ukraine.” Additionally, Washington must pressure Europeans into exhibiting their opposition to Chinese expansion as a precondition for increased, or even continued, support. It is that simple.

If Europe cannot do this, if they continue to be characterized by softness toward China, then they are taking America’s defense of their sovereignty for granted. It is essential then to delineate our priorities—weakening China matters more to us than weakening Russia—and openly emphasize that a refusal to oppose Chinese expansionary efforts is disloyalty toward us. Given the nature of reciprocity, this is not too harsh; it is reasonable.

If pursued effectively, this framework could lead to the United States spending and focusing less on Ukraine, or European countries taking stronger positions regarding China. Both options are better than the status quo.

To prevent future conflict, the West must constrain the Chinese Communist Party’s expansionary efforts. To do this, we do not just need Europe, but we also need them more than they need us in Ukraine. They know this, and we should make them act like it.

Like China, it is time that we place conditions and set standards when cooperating. We must let Europe know that it is a two-way street— if we stand with them, they must demonstrate that they will stand with us.

Juan P. Villasmil “J.P. Ballard” is a commentator and analyst who often writes about American culture, foreign policy, and political philosophy. He has been featured in The American Spectator, The National Interest, The Wall Street Journal, International Policy Digest, Fox News, Telemundo, MSNBC, and others.

Image: Shutterstock.

Lebanon’s political problems and solutions have a strong tendency of repeating. This reality has become increasingly apparent in the ongoing failure to elect a new president—an arena where the international community is once again making some significant moves to effectively save the country. Indeed, as Beirut continues to bicker over candidates and other long-running feuds, the country’s political elites likely expect and hope to rely on their international backers to resolve strictly Lebanese problems. While undesirable, international action likely constitutes the only path toward a new government in Lebanon today given current political obstacles.

Recent French efforts are at the forefront of international action in Lebanon today. French president Emmanual Macron recently dispatched his new envoy for Lebanon—former Foreign and Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian—to meet with Lebanese elites and encourage constructive dialogue on the presidential file. Le Drian is a major political actor in France, carrying substantial international influence and skill, which reflects Paris’s seriousness in resolving Beirut’s gridlock. The envoy described his trip to Lebanon as “a consultative mission ... to ensure the country moves on from the political impasse.”

Yet interestingly, Le Drian expressed that he would not push for any candidate in his visit—including a third-party option that could lead to consensus between Lebanon’s major political blocs. This comes as a surprise given Paris has privately supported Hezbollah-backed Suleiman Frangieh for months following its public-facing support for reformist elements in recent years. Whether Le Drian’s comments reflect another shift in France’s position remains to be seen, although Frangieh’s viability is certainly questionable at best following former finance minister and senior International Monetary Fund (IMF) official Jihad Azour’s strong showing in the last presidential vote on June 14.

Le Drian took this message to each of the major Lebanese political actors, meeting with the leaders of each of the leading political parties and independent reformist camp, Maronite patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rahi, Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri, and Prime Minister Najib Mikati. He also met with General Joseph Aoun—the head of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and a rumored presidential favorite amongst many stakeholders working on the Lebanon file.

Some of Lebanon’s political elites have made clear that international pressure is unnecessary. Samir Geagea, head of the conservative Lebanese Forces (LF) party, did not mince words following his meeting with Le Drian: “The solution doesn't need French, American or Iranian intervention … What is needed is a sovereign domestic decision.” Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) head Gebran Bassil expressed similar sentiments in his meeting with Le Drian as well. Both are major Christian parties in Lebanon that are usually opposed to each other, until recently.

The French push follows a meeting on June 16 between Macron and Saudi crown prince Mohammad bin Salman (MbS) in Paris. The two leaders reportedly discussed Lebanon’s woes at length, calling for progress on the presidential file. Just days later, rumors of a potential conference in Riyadh in August or September began to appear in Lebanese media. Qatar and Egypt are supposedly playing a role in setting up what is being described as a “new Doha”—referencing the 2008 Doha Agreement that ended an eighteen-month political crisis that erupted into violence.

Thus, as Lebanese political elites and international actors claim to support a Lebanon-led initiative, global and regional powers are pulling strings in the background. While MbS has openly called Lebanon’s presidential issues an “internal affair” and has gradually backed Riyadh out of the Mediterranean country’s affairs, the crown prince has a vested interest in resolving disputes to avoid the political violence that evolved in 2008. Indeed, a Saudi-led (or supported) initiative to resolve Lebanon’s political dispute makes sense alongside the kingdom’s turn toward pragmatism and diplomacy in support of its Vision 2030 economic development agenda. 

The other major stakeholders likely understand this as well—including Iran. The question at play ultimately becomes one of getting Lebanon’s elites in the same room to make the necessary political deals that only international guarantees can backstop. Recent diplomatic exchanges across the region reflect a concerted effort to achieve this outcome—not limited to the Saudi foreign minister’s visit to Tehran and the Iranian foreign minister’s current Gulf trip.

Whether or not the Iran-Saudi deal helps facilitate such a meeting remains to be seen, although the warming of ties between the regional rivals certainly suggests the deal can be a net positive on any political efforts to subsequently lower the temperature in Lebanon. Indeed, while some have argued that Riyadh chose to cede Lebanon to Iran and Hezbollah in its re-normalization with Tehran, this is hardly a foregone conclusion. Rather, those with a stake in Lebanon likely prefer—at a minimum—a status quo arrangement that leads to some reforms without destabilizing the country further. This is particularly true of West Asia’s regional powers given no one side can sustain a full takeover of the country with their proxy of choice—including Iran and Hezbollah given the former’s economic woes.

Thus, all eyes should be on France’s current diplomatic push in relation to a regional effort to institute cross-party dialogue between the major Lebanese political actors. This probably will not result in a Frangieh or Azour presidency, particularly given both candidates appear to be positioned for the sake of such a dialogue on a consensus candidate at this stage. If this is truly the case, Aoun could become the next president of Lebanon, barring some procedural and constitutional hurdles, and understanding varying international support for his candidacy. Expect dealmaking on other issues as well—namely that of the prime minister’s office and central bank governor position that will open in July following Riad Salameh’s end-of-term.

Such a process highlights the repetitive nature of Lebanese politics—one that has continuously failed to address systemic shortcomings that regularly reproduce the same problems. International stakeholders would be wise to use any opportunity for dialogue to address the root causes of the issues at play. Unfortunately, the cyclical nature of the situation at hand will likely prevail, applying bandages to wounds that require much more attention and care.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

Image: Shutterstock.

« Ne vous est-il jamais arrivé, lisant un livre, de vous arrêter sans cesse dans votre lecture, non par désintérêt, mais au contraire par afflux d'idées, d'excitations, d'associations ? En un mot, ne vous est-il jamais arrivé de lire en levant la tête ? » L'éditeur ne s'est guère trompé en associant ces (...) / Espagne, Politique, Art, Bande dessinée - 2018/05

Entre 1973 et 1978, au Pérou, le salaire réel a diminué de moitié. Aujourd'hui, le salaire minimum est de 1 dollar par jour. Au-dessous de ce seuil se trouvent les chômeurs et ceux que l'on appelle, par euphémisme, les « sous-employés » : ensemble, ils représentent déjà plus de 50 % de la population (...) / Pérou, Droits humains - 1980/03

Why Europe has an edge over America and China.

Prigozhin’s rebellion ended quickly, but it spells trouble for the Kremlin.

Dangerous illusions buy China time and cover for the execution of President Xi Jinping’s multi-faceted plan for global domination. China has already made such progress; the China threat is now so great that the Free World cannot afford dalliance, wishful thinking, or repose. U.S. efforts to keep communication channels with Chinese leaders open make sense, but optimism regarding the fruits of engagement and diplomacy with China is not warranted.

China’s expansionist drive and bullying of neighbors; subjection of Hong Kong and Tibet and scheme for overtaking Taiwan; extreme human rights violations and techno-totalitarian control; relentless espionage and interference campaigns in democracies; collusion with Russia, Iran and bad actors across the globe; tremendous influence and anti-American positions in international forums; massive military build-up and preparation for war; and recent aggressive moves against U.S. planes and ships in the South China Sea, simply must give U.S. policymakers and negotiators pause.

Rather than hold on to fading hope that engagement and diplomacy will appreciably soften China’s stance, the United States must rise to the current challenge. Only by facing the hard truths about Chinese revisionism can America form principled and wise China policy.

Before believing that China, unlike Russia, is amenable to reasonable relations with democratic states, consider the China-Russia relationship. At their February 2022 meeting in Beijing, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin announced an “unlimited partnership,” which they said was aimed at countering U.S. influence. As he departed their March 2023 summit in Moscow, Xi told Putin, “Right now there are changes, the likes of which we haven’t seen for one hundred years.” Echoing that note, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said any Ukraine peace talks should discuss “the principles on which the new world order will be based.”

Such statements sent a chill down many a foreign policy analyst’s spine because a new world order, or even a major war, no longer seems entirely out of the realm of possibility. This juncture calls for a conscious rejection of complacency.

Shortly after the Moscow summit, which expanded China and Russia’s economic and strategic ties, Chinese defense minister General Li Shangfu announced that China and Russia would increase military and military-technical cooperation and arms trade. Although China doesn’t overtly supply Russia weaponry for use in Ukraine, China provides dual-use rifles, body armor, drones, and financial support for Russia’s ferocious assault. Trade between China and Russia rose to $190 billion last year, and China’s imports of Russian energy have increased to $88 billion since February 2022. The only “peace” China wants in Ukraine will advantage Russia and increase Chinese influence over Europe.

The Pentagon has warned that Russia and China are producing space weapons to attack U.S. satellites and to evade U.S. missile defense systems and that Russia is providing highly enriched uranium for China’s nuclear program. China’s space, cyber, and bio-weapons capabilities, dramatic nuclear weapons ramp-up, and intercontinental and submarine ballistic missile production paint an alarming picture. Alerts by Microsoft confirmed by U.S. officials that a Chinese-sponsored hacking group targeted critical infrastructure in the United States, including Navy telecommunications systems in Guam that are key to Pacific defense, highlight China’s likely instigation of cyber war as part of a move on Taiwan.

Optimism in certain circles that China can become a responsible member of the international community if only the West keeps pursuing economic and diplomatic compromise is refuted by China’s cultural genocide of the Uyghur minority, violations of treaties and international norms, and close strategic and military ties with North Korea, a fanatical totalitarian state that relies on severe, omnipresent repression and nuclear proliferation and brinkmanship.

When weighing China’s real intentions, consider China, Russia, and Iran’s anti-Western front. The three countries capitalize on instances of American retreat, back each other in the UN, and engage in the subversion of democracies. They benefit from expansive trade, weapons, technology transfers, joint military exercises, and mutual sanctions breaches. They recently participated in their third trilateral military drill in the Gulf of Oman and the North Arabian Sea.

There is no mistaking China’s dramatically enhanced position in the Middle East. Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian has announced that Iran’s “comprehensive strategic accord” with China is in effect. China provides technology for the repression of Iranian protestors and civilian life in general. Another dismal indicator of freedom’s trajectory came when Xi Jinping and Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman met in December and agreed on major energy, defense, infrastructure, and technology deals. Especially bad for human rights, Saudi-led Arab League states agreed to a statement endorsing China’s “efforts” and “position” in Hong Kong and “rejecting Taiwan’s independence in all its forms.” Subsequently, China managed to negotiate a détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

For China, these developments constitute steps forward in replacing the U.S.-oriented world order. China’s trade with the Middle East now exceeds that of the United States.

China’s tremendous success in making Western countries dependent on Chinese goods and supply chains and its principal commercial agreements and loans on every continent have greatly augmented China’s power. Moreover, China has benefited from decades of aggressive espionage, influence campaigns, and intellectual property theft, especially in the United States. In addition to corporate and political infiltration, China altered American universities via Confucius Institutes, sinology programs, and joint scientific research, which served China’s ideological and military-strategic priorities. So too, in Europe, as China made significant infrastructure, energy, and telecommunications investments, it worked hard to steer media narratives and capture European academic, business, and policy elites.

In South America, China, Russia, and Iran have significantly increased their presence and leverage and support of oppressive anti-American dictatorships. Venezuela even hosted Russian war games, which included China, Iran, Cuba, and others, in 2022. China is establishing airports, seaports, space facilities, and Confucius Institutes in the region. Honduras’s decision to drop diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of China and Brazil’s enthusiasm for deepening ties with China are sobering reminders of China’s sway.

China has spent about $1 trillion on Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. Despite setbacks, the BRI has advanced China’s imperialistic drive, leading not only to new security agreements and docks for China’s navy but also to the insidious expansion of Chinese information and surveillance technology. Among the deals that actuate Xi’s claim that “the East is rising and the West is declining” is the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, with which China is carving a path to the Indian Ocean, Cambodia’s Ream military base, which is becoming a base for Chinese operations, and China’s massive Pinglu Canal project, with which China seeks closer connectivity with Southeast Asia.

All of the above facilitates the worldwide reach of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) united front system and propaganda, including its quest for technological supremacy and control of the world’s data, rare earth minerals, and energy assets.

In international organizations, China energetically pursues predominance. From corrupting the UN, the WHO, and the World Bank, to realigning the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, to attempting to turn BRICS into an anti-U.S. coalition, China never lets up. Although the United States and ASEAN are enduring partners, it is notable that ASEAN’s Secretary General recently completed a four-day “working visit” to China, meeting many high-level officials, including China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi. When China hosted a summit with Central Asian countries this May, seeking to broaden China’s role in the region’s economies and security, Chinese diplomats derided President Joe Biden’s efforts to smooth relations and the G7’s supposed “bloc confrontation.”

Xi’s redefinition of the world order goes hand in hand with his redefinition of words; he insists China will free the world from U.S. “unilateralism” and lead the progress of “equity” and “justice.” But the mendacity of this rhetoric is revealed by China’s severe human rights violations against Uyghurs and Tibetans and the persecution of Christians, Falun Gong adherents, dissidents, and democracy advocates. U.S. leaders should stress to non-aligned countries the dire implications for their citizens if they align with the CCP. The “National Security Law” stamping out freedom in Hong Kong is the real face of the globalization of the Chinese Communist Party.

Having focused more on mutually profitable economic interaction than on the meteoric rise of China’s hard and soft power, democracies face a China formidable and emboldened enough to parade its ambitions. China is on a trajectory to surpass the United States in military might; U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson told the Senate Armed Services Committee that “the military balance is becoming unfavorable to the United States and our allies.” In addition to a spy balloon traversing America, brazen provocations and island-building in the South China Sea, territorial encroachments on neighbors, and major military air and sea exercises “encircling Taiwan,” China now issues explicit threats. Xi says China is preparing for war. Foreign Minister Qin Lang warns there will be “conflicts and confrontation” unless the United States stops “containment.”

The Biden administration’s recent engagement efforts and search for “guardrails” in the U.S.-China relationship—which include emphasizing economic relations while downplaying defense and human rights concerns, requests (often rebuffed) for high-level meetings, and pledges to “de-risk” rather than “de-couple”—have too many costs relative to hypothetical benefits. A June 14 letter from House Foreign Affairs chair Michael McCaul (R-TX) to Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted reports that the administration had “held back human rights related sanctions, export controls, and other sensitive actions to try to limit damage to the U.S.-China relationship.” Moreover, the letter complained that the State Department “refuses to provide answers on these issues to Congress as Secretary Blinken prepares to depart for a trip to China.” For his part, after raising concerns about China’s “provocative actions” in the Taiwan Strait, Blinken walked back, offering: “We do not support Taiwan independence.”

Recalling the futility of threatening Russia with major consequences “if” it “invaded” Ukraine, the United States and its allies should prioritize military spending and outline potential sanctions for egregious aggression. They should do all possible to preempt war while at the same time demonstrating a willingness to fight for Taiwan if necessary. A Chinese conquest of Taiwan would put the Indo-Pacific region into vulnerable disarray. The world would see that the Free World cannot prevent China from forcing its will on the Taiwanese people and ending their vibrant democracy.

It should be impossible to downplay China’s drive for global dominance by now. It would be unwise not to craft alliances and deterrence proportionate to China’s military buildup and expansionism. It would be unprincipled not to speak out against and penalize China’s terrible repression and backing of brutal dictatorships. It is both necessary and proper to reduce dependency on Chinese supply chains and sever academic and technological relationships that advance China’s weapons and surveillance systems.

In a world saturated with Chinese and Russian propaganda, America should renovate Voice of America-type programs for the digital age. The United States should step up its game in regional and international trade, organizations, and relationships in a world redefined by China's economic and geopolitical influence. America should project a generous, reliable, compelling presence in the world.

The scale and reach of the China threat are breathtaking and game-changing. Complacency, wishful thinking, and procrastination in dealing with it are luxuries the United States and its allies cannot afford.

Anne R. Pierce is an author of books and articles on American presidents, American foreign policy, and American society. She has a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, is an appointed member of Princeton University’s James Madison Society, and was a Political Science Series Editor for Transaction Publishers. Follow her @AnneRPierce.

Image: Shutterstock.

Iranian-made Shahed drones have caused mass destruction in Ukraine. With their Volkswagen-style engines, they can fly undetected for about 120 kilometers and deliver an explosive power of 40 kilograms. The components to make this drone? A mere estimated $20,000. Yet to shoot them down, Ukrainians are using American-made NASAM missiles that cost about… $400,000 per drone taken down. One can hardly blame the Ukrainians for resorting to using 1960s German Gepard anti-aircraft guns instead.

The lessons of the awful Ukraine war so far are many and varied. But something that has struck most observers is that while the Russians have been outmaneuvered, they have been holding their own against modern Western military equipment by using old tanks and artillery. In particular, American gear, while technologically advanced, is either not always the best choice on the battlefield, prohibitively expensive, or both.

A number of examples ought to be considered.

Which is the “Best” Tank?

The news that Germany and the United States agreed to supply Ukraine with Leopard 2 and M1 Abrams tanks created quite a stir. Both tanks, which are superior to their Russian counterparts, are similar in size and firepower. The American Abrams in particular is known to be battle-proven and virtually indestructible.

Yet there are a few issues with the Abrams tank. For one, an Abrams weighs up to seven tons more than the Leopard, which could easily get stuck in Ukraine’s muddy fields or bring down some of its light bridges. Another issue is that the latest version of the Abrams is optimized to run on jet fuel, which is understandably hard to replenish on the battlefield. Even more problematic, however, is that on-field repairs aren’t always possible for an Abrams. In fact, some logistical considerations make the prospect seem like a living hell. For example, a frontline battalion cannot fix an Abrams with broken optics. Replacing these requires pulling out entire subsystems and shipping them to a depot—potentially hundreds of miles away—while also ordering replacement subsystems. Finally, there is the cost dimension: producing an Abrams can top $10 million per unit, while the latest Leopard 2 costs around $6 million.

All things considered, the German Leopard 2 is a better choice in Ukraine over the American M1 Abrams. In fact, because of existing availability, the Leopard 2s have entered service, mainly via Poland and Canada, months ahead of the Abrams.

Airpower Isn’t Cheap

The United States, along with other NATO members, was initially reluctant to supply Ukraine with F-16 fighter planes; Washington took the view that doing so could escalate the conflict. The F-16 is, after all, a battle-proven jet with fifth-generation stealth technology. It is more than a match for any Russian fighter jet and can carry a vast array of air-to-ground missiles and loitering munitions.

However, the Swedish government has offered Ukraine its Saab JAS 39 Gripen plane. The Gripen (Griffin in English) is a fourth-generation fighter jet that can land on small runways and highways, and has highly effective sensors and electronic jamming equipment. While not battle-proven like the F-16, the Gripen has consistently scored highly in air-to-air war games. The result has been something of a lobbying battle over which jet to procure.

Yet despite Kyiv’s open preference for F-16s, a number of Ukranian pilots concede —in private—skepticism of whether such is the best choice.

Consider the costs. According to industry group Aviatia, the Gripen cost $7,800 per hour to fly, while the F-16 cost $12,000 per hour. Gripen maintenance is also much cheaper: while SAAB (which makes the Gripen) and Lockheed Martin (which produces F-16s) do not advertise the yearly maintenance cost of their fighter jets, practically all commentators agree the F-16 is more expensive. Executiveflyers.com estimates that an F-16’s maintenance comes at about $10 million per year. Yes, the Gripen is more expensive to produce than the F-16, as it sells for $17 million more per plane, but this is due to the existing scale: the F-16 has been produced and exported since the mid-1970s.

There is also a sizeable gap in terms of training. Swedish pilots and maintenance recruits are trained for twelve months to operate the Gripen. The F-16, by comparison, takes at least thirty-six months.

Finally, there are on-the-ground conditions to consider. As noted recently in The Economist:

Soviet runways were built like floor tiling: panels of concrete blocks with sealant in between. That allows them to withstand the expansion and contraction from extreme heat and cold. It also means that moss, stones and other debris accumulates in between. The Gripen, with smaller air intakes that sit higher up on the fuselage, would cope with this far better than the F-16 [...] Ukraine could resurface some airfields, but that would only invite Russian missiles. And while the F-16 can land on roads in a pinch, its lighter undercarriage is not as well suited to the stresses of short runway…

Don’t be surprised if Ukraine provisionally decides to buy Gripens as well as F-16s.

Yet regardless of which plane is chosen, the war in Ukraine has provided another valuable lesson. Air superiority, so valuable in all twentieth-century wars right up to Desert Storm, may no longer be achieved by manned aircraft alone. Sophisticated surface-to-air missiles make the airspace dangerous. Both Ukraine and Russia have hundreds of S-300 missile batteries. Ukraine has also recently obtained the Patriot battery system. All these systems are battle-tested and very effective against manned aircraft.

As a consequence, the combat duties of fighter aircraft have transformed; jets are now primarily used as short-flight, air-to-ground missile launchers. Dogfights are extremely rare. Downed aircraft by friendly fire is not uncommon—Ukrainians have taken to crudely inpainting the underside of their fighters with the national colors of blue and yellow.

The alternative to manned aircraft is the use of drones. The Ukrainians have been ingeniously making thousands of inexpensive “suicide” drones. Comprised of cheap electronic parts, some made with 3D printers, they only have to last long enough to deliver their deadly cargo. American-made aircraft, including drones, now face additional competition that often delivers far more bang for the buck.

Do You Want to Ride into Combat in a Deathtrap?

Delivering combat infantry to and from the battlefield is a challenge in and of itself, and often requires a specialized vehicle. In Ukraine, there is the choice between the Australian Bushmaster—a smelly, powerful, loud, and heavily armored fighting vehicle—and the American Stryker M1126 Infantry Carrier Vehicle, which is of similar size, and power.

The major difference is that whereas the Bushmaster will stay and fight with infantry, the Stryker will deliver and leave. This is just as well, given that the Stryker is lightly armored and vulnerable to any gun more powerful than a machine gun. It has been described as “a deathtrap.” When used by U.S. forces, it usually enters battle alongside the powerful and well-protected Bradley Fighting Vehicle, a tank in all but name. That may not be an option in Ukraine. The Stryker also suffers from a variety of technical issues, as recounted in Responsible Statecraft: “the armor shielding it was fitted with proved largely ineffective and weighty, mud spattered from its rubber wheels into the engine during deployments caused innumerable maintenance problems, computer command displays inside the vehicle didn’t always work, soldiers in battle gear were being killed in rollover incidents because their seatbelts didn’t fit and (crucially), the bottom or the vehicle was thinly armored.” On top of all this, the Stryker is notoriously difficult and expensive to maintain.

The Bushmaster, in contrast, can sustain itself in the field for three days, has withstood Russian attacks, and costs $1.57 million per unit compared to the Stryker’s $4.9 million per unit. For a cash-strapped, war-time government like Ukraine that requires both effectiveness and low costs, it isn’t hard to see which vehicle is preferable.

Bang for Your Buck

It is worth repeating that all the systems mentioned above are not like-for-like, and offer different capabilities depending on the terrain and fighting conditions. Similarly, all the listed (estimated) unit prices do not take into account bulk-buying discounts (but also, crucially, the often costs of ongoing maintenance). It is also worth recognizing that American equipment often—but not always—utilizes super technology, and the price tag may reflect the expense that went into research and development.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian conflict delivers a clear warning to U.S. arms suppliers of the need to rationalize and simplify production and maintenance costs, along with system complexity. And this is without factoring in concerns that some arms suppliers are engaging in price gouging.

Ultimately, though a particular platform may be “the best,” that does not mean much if a particular platform isn’t sustainably usable on the battlefield, either because of its complexity, its costs, or because of the particular environment in which it has been deployed. Foreign, non-Western buyers may not—and often do not—have Western budgets, and will be looking for simpler and less expensive, yet as-effective, options. Policymakers in Washington—many of which come from electoral districts that play host to arms suppliers and employ constituents—ought to take note of this.

Patrick Drennan is a journalist based in New Zealand, with a degree in American history and economics.

Image: U.S. Army Flickr.

Les océans font l'objet d'une exploitation si intense qu'elle met en péril la reproduction de nombreuses espèces. L'accaparement des eaux poissonneuses de l'Afrique par les chalutiers industriels français, espagnols, chinois, coréens, japonais ou russes menace la sécurité alimentaire du continent. / (...) / Afrique, Pêche, Mer, Commerce, Botswana, Mauritanie, Sénégal, Relations Nord-Sud, Impérialisme, Criminalité - 2018/05

Délaissées au profit des métropoles, les villes moyennes comptent leurs plaies : isolement, faibles ressources, exil des jeunes et des diplômés, chômage, pauvreté. Pour leurs élus, l'égalité des territoires prévue par la Constitution n'est plus qu'un souvenir. Comme à Montluçon, où le combat pour une (...) / France, Intégration sociale, Pauvreté, Région, Service public, Transports, Ville, Chômage - 2018/05

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have been two of the quickest countries in the Middle East to take full advantage of the new multipolar world in which they have found themselves. Both nations have been able to successfully exploit all sides of conflicts to pursue their own interests. Riyadh in particular has forcefully and blatantly used its new and more powerful standing in the changing geopolitical environment to press its demands on superpowers with crude disregard for a quickly vanishing global hegemonic pecking order. In one of the most recent examples of this, Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly threatened “major economic consequences for Washington” if it retaliated against Riyadh’s oil cuts. Similarly, Abu Dhabi has felt emboldened enough to withdraw from a U.S.-led maritime coalition based in Bahrain due to frustration at the United States for not doing enough to deter Iran in the Strait of Hormuz.

In stark contrast to the aggressive posturing by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, Cairo sits idly by, fumbling its way through this new reality. This difficulty is for a variety of reasons; the most prominent of which is its rapidly sinking economy. This situation, however, affords the United States a unique opportunity to assist Egypt in improving the distressed state of its people, thereby regaining much of the goodwill Washington has lost over the past few years.

Back and Forth

One of the earliest signs of Egypt’s struggle to adapt to the changing geopolitical environment came when it was revealed that President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi ordered up to 40,000 rockets to be covertly shipped to Russia. This leaked intelligence was rejected shortly thereafter by Egypt. Later, it was reported that, instead, the sale of this artillery ammunition to the United States for transfer to Ukraine was approved. But although Egypt came out strongly against the veracity of the report regarding this supposed transfer of weapons to Russia, pundits and experts in Moscow and elsewhere seemed to believe that this transfer of weapons had been a real possibility. The lack of commitment and wavering to such a sale, even before the leaks were revealed, was manifested through the canceled “Bridge of Friendship” joint naval exercise between the nations scheduled for July 2022.

This behavior differs greatly from the UAE’s, whose president Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Russia’s largest and most important business/economic summit. Anwar Gargash, a diplomatic adviser to MBZ, described the latter’s attendance as a “positive calculated risk” within the UAE’s policy of de-escalation and dialogue. Similarly, Russian interior minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev—a top Russian official who is sanctioned by the West—visited Riyadh and held meetings with his counterpart Abdulaziz bin Saud. While diplomatic engagement on the one hand and selling weaponry on the other are not in the same class, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s cavalier attitude and ruthlessness in pursuing their own interests above all else, while giving themselves enough wiggle room and flexibility to not marry themselves to one side over the other, is evident.

Egypt, on the other hand, seems hesitant and indecisive about its own self-interest, alternating between marrying and divorcing one side over another ad infinitum. Consider that the cancelation of military exercises with Russia comes in conjunction with a strengthening of Egypt’s maritime partnership with the United States, as the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command transferred three patrol craft to the Egyptian Navy on March 21 during a ceremony in Alexandria. Yet this is also taking place while Egypt plans to drop the U.S. dollar in favor of local currencies in bilateral trade with India, China, and Russia, and amid reports that Cairo has formally applied to join BRICS.

All these dealings and heavy-footed maneuvering must be understood within the context of Egypt’s faltering economy. It was reported in late May that, due to a shortage of foreign hard currency, Egypt’s state grains buyer has deferred opening letters of credit to pay for its wheat purchases. Not much later on June 6, details emerged that Egypt has been struggling to raise cash for foreign debt repayments after it quadrupled its external borrowing over the past eight years. These repayments, which Egypt owes to the International Monetary Fund and foreign bondholders—mostly in the Gulf—amount to about $4.5 billion; more than half the annual revenue that comes in from the Suez Canal. On June 13 it came to light that Egypt is allocating $4.14 billion for its food subsidy program, which has been facing serious struggles since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since the start of the war, Egypt’s currency has depreciated by nearly half, and foreign investors have pulled more than $20 billion out of the country.

In short, whereas its Gulf neighbors can act with fluidity between great superpower rivals without fear of serious reprisal, Egypt is forced to go all in and move with less flexibility because of its dire economic straits. Cairo’s pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy allows for a middle road to be taken, but that can only work if the government is flexible enough to not fully commit one side over the other. A lumbering and heavy-footed state being pulled down by its economic troubles lacks such maneuverability.

Washington to the Rescue?

Up until this point, the United States has sought to pressure Egypt to act in certain ways by withholding military aid to Cairo. This policy would be effective if America were still the hegemon of a unipolar world. But in today’s multipolar world, aid can come from elsewhere, like China, with much greater ease. Multipolarity lends itself more to the carrot than the stick.

Cairo’s current troubles, however, present an opening. Sisi is already attempting to hold talks with whatever remains of his political opposition—a sign that he realizes the difficult position his country is in. Washington should take this opportunity to offer Sisi economic aid for improving the state of the Egyptian people, rather than simply threatening to withhold military aid. By helping Cairo get Egypt’s economy back on track, the United States can leverage the current moment to its advantage, rather than eventually seeing Egypt do as the Gulf states are doing, to Washington’s ultimate disadvantage.

U.S. policymakers ought to therefore consider doing so. A generous economic relief package specifically earmarked for the Egyptian people, rather than the military, along with a well-run PR campaign would not only be a major diplomatic win but would also help ensure that Cairo continues to seek assistance from the United States. Multipolarity may open up other options for countries, but it does not preclude remaining with a prior benefactor.

Sam Fouad is a Middle East analyst, editor, and a PhD candidate at The Catholic University of America. He has previously worked in communications, on political campaigns, and in a Senator’s office. His work has appeared in Responsible Statecraft, Newsweek, The New Arab, Inkstick Media, The Atlantic Council, The Globe Post, and Al Jazeera Arabic, among others. Sam holds a bachelor’s degree from Boston University and a master’s degree in international relations from UMass Boston.

Recently, Japan unveiled new export control measures for chipmaking equipment, encompassing twenty-three items across six categories, including lithography, etching, cleaning, deposition, and masking. While the specific targets of these measures were not explicitly mentioned, it is evident that China, being the largest importer of chipmaking equipment since 2020 and accounting for close to 40 percent of Japanese chipmaking equipment exports in 2021, is likely one of the intended targets.

The actions taken by Japan can be interpreted as a strategic alignment with the U.S.-led “Chip-4 Alliance,” aiming to curb China’s semiconductor industry. An important question emerges: Will these measures effectively contain China, enabling the U.S.-led chip alliances to maintain their strategic advantages, or will they trigger a new crisis for the chip industry by inadvertently providing China with an opportunity to accelerate its collective efforts toward achieving chip self-sufficiency?

Chips are pivotal to a nation’s economic growth, societal advancement, and national security, acting as the “brains” or controlling units of modern society. They are especially critical for emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and big data analytics, which are key determinants of a country’s future technological competitiveness. Moreover, chips embody military-civil fusion technologies that can be employed in the development of advanced weaponry. Consequently, mastery over chipmaking supply chains has emerged as a central point of contention in the intense competition between the United States and China, two global powerhouses in a race for technological supremacy. 

The U.S.-led restrictions on China have prompted a shift in priorities within the semiconductor industry. National security is now taking precedence over economic efficiency, which was based on the global production network in chipmaking. These restrictions, which began under the Trump administration and have been reinforced by the Biden administration, include technological sanctions and export controls that prevent Chinese tech firms from acquiring advanced chips and restrict China’s access to key technologies and personnel in chipmaking. Amid escalating economic nationalism and in response to the 2021 supply chain disruptions in the automotive industry, the U.S.-led semiconductor alliances have enacted industrial policies to ensure the security of their chip supply chains. Such steps underscore the escalating concerns not just about safeguarding but fortifying national security as nations aim to preserve their sovereignty in an uncertain global landscape where trust and compliance with a rules-based order are on the decline. The fundamental premise here is that advanced technologies and equipment in chipmaking should not be supplied to countries that could potentially employ them to challenge the democratic world.

How Far Is China from Self-Sufficiency?

Following these restrictions, China is grappling with significant “chokepoints” that are stymieing its advancement in the semiconductor industry. As a relative latecomer to the field, China is at risk of falling further behind, particularly in next-generation technologies, if these chokepoints stay in place. This “chokepoint strategy”—akin to a kung fu master quickly executing a single sword move to sever their adversary’s throat—can readily be employed in warfare or geopolitical disputes. Here, a country or organization can identify and exploit vital points or bottlenecks—like a critical resource, transport route, or technology—in the competitor’s value chain. This metaphor vividly illustrates the risk of China being stifled or strangled, thereby hindering its ability to effectively compete and keep pace with the industry leaders in semiconductors.

The crux of the chokepoint strategy is that the party employing this strategy—in the case of semiconductors the United States and its allies—has monopolistic control over these chokepoints. By exercising this control, the United States and its allies can potentially disrupt the progress of China in chipmaking.

China has recognized the threat of chokepoints in its industrial capabilities. In 2018, the nation identified thirty-five technologies/products that could be subject to chokepoints. Advanced chipmaking tools and materials were included on this list. Fast forward five years, and with the United States and its allies having tightened their control over the chokepoints in China’s chipmaking, how prepared is China for self-sufficiency?

A simple response is “not much,” despite China having made certain strides in the domestic supply chain. Chinese start-ups span nearly all subsectors, from design software and databases to manufacturing equipment and semiconductor materials. However, regarding domestic substitution, the readiness is below 5 percent in most areas so far.

To upgrade its capacity for mature processing mode chipmaking, the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) has invested in four additional foundries in Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and Shenzhen since 2021. Although SMIC asserts that it can theoretically produce advanced 14nm chips using its existing DUV lithography systems, it is a considerable distance from reaching mass production. In the capital- and technology-intensive chipmaking industry, achieving mass production at a high yield rate is critical, as it can effectively lower the cost per chip. Transitioning to mass production and reaching a high yield rate requires significant time, manpower, and capital investment, provided the necessary equipment and tools are accessible.

The advanced lithography machine is a significant chokepoint in China’s chipmaking capability. In this area, domestic substitution is currently less than 1 percent. ASML, based in the Netherlands, remains the sole supplier of EUV lithography machines, which are vital for advanced chipmaking. Immersion DUV lithography machines, produced by both ASML and Nikon from Japan, are likely to be added to the export restriction list, which could trigger a significant upheaval in China’s chipmaking capability. Shanghai Microelectronics, a domestic competitor, can currently manufacture lithography machines that only support mass production of chips using a 90nm or larger processing mode.

China has made notable progress in the field of etching machines, achieving about 10 percent domestic substitution. China’s Advanced Micro Fabrication Equipment Company is the first in the country to produce etching machines for advanced chipmaking. With the use of domestically produced lithography and etching machines, and through multiple exposures, it is feasible for China to manufacture chips with a 65nm processing mode or smaller at a large scale with high yield rates. These domestically produced machines can meet the production needs of most chips used in military applications, power management, LCDs, Wi-Fi, automobiles, and a wide array of consumer electronic systems.

Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools represent another significant chokepoint in China’s chipmaking endeavors. Under the influence of U.S. sanctions, Huawei has found itself unable to update its EDA software, despite holding permanent EDA licenses. There have been reports of Huawei developing its own EDA tool, yet its efficacy and market acceptance remain uncertain.

Semiconductor materials could potentially become chokepoints if Japan implements export control measures. Out of the nineteen core semiconductor materials, Japanese companies command a market share of over 50 percent in fourteen. For instance, Japanese companies dominate the worldwide supply of photoresist used in lithography, holding over 85 percent of the market share. Amid the Japan-Korea trade dispute in 2019, Japan, by restricting the export of three types of materials to South Korea, instigated a disruption throughout the entire semiconductor value chain. China has progressed in low-end photoresist production, but still heavily depends on Japanese imports for almost all high-end photoresists. Due to these reasons, Japan’s export control measures are interpreted as targeting China in a more systemic and precise fashion than the U.S.-imposed sanctions.

A Chaotic Future?

While these restrictions may hinder China’s progress in chipmaking, their long-term effectiveness remains uncertain. Chips are highly complex products that require deep technical expertise in both hardware and software, and they rely on a tightly woven global production network.

The sophistication of chipmaking is evident in the significant investment in research and development. In 2021 alone, the industry invested a total of $71 billion in research and development (R&D), which overshadowed the total investment by China’s “Big Fund” of $51 billion since 2014. The R&D investment has been fuelled by the global innovation ecosystem, where customer demand for high-performance chips has been a driving force behind advancements in chip design and manufacturing. Nvidia, as an example, initially focused on providing GPUs (graphics processing units) for the gaming industry but has expanded its applications to other areas. Its growth has been propelled by increasing user demand in graphics-intensive gaming, bitcoin mining data analytics, and AI training and inference tasks. The CEO of Nvidia, Jensen Huang, has expressed concerns that being unable to access the Chinese market would significantly limit their opportunities for growth as China remains its largest market in gaming and data centers.

The global production network in chipmaking is constantly evolving, with companies striving to enhance their positions by acquiring new capabilities and engaging in higher value-added activities. Throughout history, there have been three major shifts in the chipmaking industry, each involving the relocation of lower value-added segments of the value chain to emerging economies or regions. In the first shift, chip manufacturing was transferred from the United States to Japan, while the United States maintained its dominance in chip design and intellectual property. The second shift witnessed Japan retaining higher value-added segments in materials and equipment, while manufacturing and packaging were transferred to South Korea and Taiwan. In the third shift, South Korea solidified its position in memory and display semiconductors, Taiwan specialized in foundries, and China took on the lower value-added packaging and manufacturing of chips of mature process mode. Each of these shifts not only led to industry restructuring but also redefined the structure of the value chain, creating opportunities for latecomers to bridge the gap. However, it should be noted that each of these shifts was generously supported by their respective governments in terms of policy and capital.

China frequently comes under criticism for its use of industrial policy and subsidies to support its domestic technology sector. However, despite these measures, China has been unsuccessful in significantly enhancing its semiconductor sector using its industrial policy.

Reflecting on the situation, several factors have hindered China’s progress in chipmaking. Apart from a deficiency in capital and talent within the industry, the largest barrier to China’s advancement is the absence of effective synergy among its upstream and downstream players in the value chain. Chips function as intermediate goods in the production of electronic and electric devices, a sector where China has a significant global presence. To maintain their competitiveness, Chinese downstream manufacturers have favored imported chips, which are cheaper, more powerful, and more energy-efficient than their domestically produced counterparts. Similarly, design tools struggle to secure orders from local chip designers; and domestic design software and IP, equipment, and materials face obstacles in being adopted by local foundries, as they often prefer superior imported alternatives. This lack of industry-level coordination stunts technological progress and results in disjointed industrial development.

The current structure of the semiconductor value chain is highly interdependent, though value distribution is uneven. The United States holds the largest market share (47 percent), primarily in chip design and core IP. It’s followed by South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and China (as of 2021). Specialized equipment manufacturers, who operate within a niche but highly protected market, can only survive within this global network. For instance, ASML has investments from several downstream companies within the network. Despite its monopoly, ASML only garnered about 6.5 billion euros in 2022, making up less than 2 percent of the total semiconductor industry revenue. This structure of the value chain presents formidable barriers to latecomers, such as China, who are seeking to gain a foothold in the market.

Now, technology sanctions and export controls have inadvertently opened a window of opportunity for Chinese firms to catch up. In response to the chokepoint strategy, the Chinese semiconductor industry is forced to strive for self-sufficiency by fostering interdependent relationships within the ecosystem. The timing also works in favor of Chinese enterprises. Had the sanctions been imposed a decade ago, Chinese companies would have had limited technological accumulation to enable catching up. Over the past ten years, however, China’s investments in nearly every subsector of chipmaking have witnessed rapid generational upgrades within closed feedback loops, bolstered by collective investment from a wide array of players such as the government, tech companies, digital platforms, and downstream manufacturers. Thus, China is poised to stimulate a catch-up in chipmaking.

Reflections

Predicting a specific timeframe for China’s catch-up in semiconductors is challenging. However, a complete stifling of progress is unlikely. Geopolitical disruptions, coupled with technological upheavals, have led to reduced stability and predictability. Indeed, the “chokepoint strategy” carries its own set of challenges and risks. It may inhibit global cooperation and innovation and stall the overall growth of the semiconductor industry, potentially affecting Western participants. Moreover, it could provoke retaliatory actions from targeted adversaries, further destabilizing global supply chains, and potentially leading to escalating conflicts or even warfare.

For China, maintaining an open mindset in chipmaking is vital. The sector stands to benefit from the diverse inputs of all stakeholders. Furthermore, China needs to strike a delicate balance between competition and cooperation with its foreign competitors whenever possible. Regrettably, self-sufficiency often runs the risk of leading to self-isolation.

For Japan, the export control measures could potentially impact bilateral relations and may escalate trade tensions, especially considering the historical conflicts between Japan and China. Japan is a significant trading partner for China, and the Chinese market remains vital for Japanese manufacturers in semiconductors. In retaliation to Japan’s alignment with the United States in curbing China’s chipmaking, Beijing could consider restricting the export of critical minerals to Japan and Chinese consumers could potentially organize boycotts of Japanese products, as they have during previous bilateral conflicts.

Worst of all, an intensification of the chip wars could potentially lead to a complete decoupling in technology. Such technological decoupling entails not just the separation of supply chains, but also the establishment of different technological standards, innovation ecosystems, and markets by the disconnected parties. This could bear significant economic and social repercussions.

Dr. Marina Yue Zhang is an associate professor at the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney. Marina’s research interests cover China’s innovation policy and practice, emerging technologies, and network effects in digital transformation. She is the author of three books, including Demystifying China’s Innovation Machine: Chaotic Order, co-authored with Mark Dodgson and David Gann (Oxford University Press, 2022).

Image: Shutterstock.

For a moment, it seemed as though the Russian government would fall. On June 23, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the thuggish leader of Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary outfit, raged against the Russian military and threatened retaliation after it allegedly bombed a Wagner training camp. The Kremlin denied the incident—and opened a criminal case against Prigozhin for attempting to incite an armed rebellion. In response, Prigozhin launched an open war against Russia’s military leaders, seizing the city of Rostov-on-Don and vowing to march on Moscow to remove them from power.

Chaos ensued. Wagner advanced. Vladimir Putin’s plane departed from Moscow; the Kremlin’s press service insisted that the president remained behind. The roads to the capital were blocked. The Russian internet was censored. Russian military units between Prigozhin and Moscow offered little resistance, and rumors of defections flew. The vast majority of soldiers remained stationed along the battle lines in Ukraine, even as the rogue mercenary group drove by behind them. Chechen fighters loyal to pro-Putin strongman Ramzan Kadyrov appeared ready to enter the fight from the south.

Then Prigozhin blinked. He issued a statement backpedaling—declaring that he had not sought to overthrow Putin, only to “march for justice,” and claiming that he would not attack Moscow to avoid spilling Russian blood. (By this point, more than a dozen Russian soldiers had been killed during the push north, though it is clear that the offensive could have been far more violent.) Through the mediation of Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko, a deal was reached whereby Prigozhin would leave the country and enter exile in Belarus. Wagner units would return to their posts in occupied Ukraine. The crisis was defused. Putin survived. The “end of history” was once again averted.

The eleventh-hour deal came as a surprise to many Western observers, who noted that the Kremlin’s early statements seemed to reject the possibility of a compromise. Putin, who had a decades-long relationship with Prigozhin and had supported him throughout the war, could have extended an olive branch. Instead, he gave a televised address condemning Prigozhin and his followers as traitors—seemingly giving the Wagner leader no choice but to seize Moscow and overthrow the government. The agreement gives both sides an alternative.

Prigozhin’s terse statement—released on his Telegram channel—has been his explanation for why he chose to accept Lukashenko’s proposal. The reasons it lays out are entirely selfless: Prigozhin, a patriot, wished to avoid the needless loss of Russian life. It is far more likely, though, that his acceptance of the terms—even with his army on Moscow’s doorstep—was in recognition of the futility of the mission he had taken upon himself to carry out. A report from The Telegraph hinted at other motivations, including threats made against Prigozhin’s family.

In a narrow sense, Prigozhin might have succeeded in his objectives. He ended his offensive within Moscow Oblast, less than 200 kilometers (125 miles) from the capital. Russian troops remained garrisoned within the city, but their defenses would have been gravely inadequate against Wagner’s hardened and well-equipped veterans. Absent outside interference, Prigozhin could have captured Moscow in short order.

But then what? The rogue warlord’s next move would not have been at all clear. Putin, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Army Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov, and any other Russian leaders of importance would have fled the city before Prigozhin could capture them. The Russian state has famously abandoned Moscow before; the city’s fall would not cause the collapse of the government. Even if he had wanted to extend his northern march to St. Petersburg, Prigozhin would not have had the strength. While he nominally had a total of 25,000 troops at his disposal, the convoy traveling north only contained around 5,000—hardly enough to hold Moscow, a city of 13 million, even if the population had been totally compliant. If Russian troops had arrived in greater numbers from the front lines in Ukraine, Prigozhin could not possibly have held the city, even with additional Wagner reinforcements.

More importantly, by shooting his way into the Russian capital—and then fighting to defend it against the military—Prigozhin could have caused thousands of deaths, both among the soldiers on both sides and the civilians caught in the crossfire. In doing so, he would have abandoned any pretense of acting on behalf of the Russian people, or of having the country’s best interests in mind. One of the reasons that Wagner troops were able to travel north so quickly was the lack of opposition from the Russian military or police units between them and Moscow. The military’s inaction bodes poorly for Putin, but it also gave both sides a critical opening to defuse the crisis before it escalated further. If Prigozhin had fought an open battle in Moscow—or even a battle with Kadyrov’s troops near Rostov-on-Don—a deal between the two sides would have been much more difficult to reach.

In no conceivable universe would the crisis have ended with the installation of “President Prigozhin” in the Kremlin. Putin would never have voluntarily surrendered power, and if a civil war had erupted, one side would have had two million troops of various stripes and the other would have had 25,000. It is unclear how exactly this would have proceeded, but sooner or later, it would have inevitably ended in Prigozhin’s death. Even now, as Putin reasserts his grip on the country, the Wagner leader’s ultimate fate is unclear. In the past, Putin has said that he could never forgive betrayal—a term he applied to Prigozhin’s actions on the 24th. Even in his relative safety in Belarus, Prigozhin may wish to avoid open windows for the foreseeable future.

While the Kremlin has remained tight-lipped on the Prigozhin incident, the Lukashenko deal was clearly in Putin’s interests as well. Prigozhin would not have succeeded in toppling the Russian strongman in the short run, but he has already done incalculable damage to his position. By accepting the deal, Putin has cut his losses, gained an opportunity to reassert his authority within Russia, headed off prospective challenges to his leadership, and ultimately avoided a far greater tragedy.

The most enduring consequence of Prigozhin’s actions will likely be the shattering of Putin’s carefully cultivated image of invulnerability. Russia’s state-controlled TV channels cut off coverage of the attack immediately after it began, and pro-Wagner websites were swiftly censored, but the people of Rostov-on-Don and Voronezh—two major cities with more than one million inhabitants each—watched with their own eyes as Prigozhin’s troops seized control of city military installations. Worryingly, the two cities’ inhabitants welcomed the attackers, giving them food and water and cheering for them as they passed through. As Prigozhin left Rostov-on-Don for exile in Belarus on the night of June 24, he was thronged by civilian supporters, and Russian police re-entering the city after the mercenaries’ departure were blocked by an angry crowd chanting pro-Wagner slogans. If Putin’s position remains that the Wagnerites committed an act of treason, a number of Russians appear to be comfortable with treason.

Perhaps more ominously still, Russian civilians’ sympathies for Prigozhin and the Wagner Group appeared to be shared by some Russian military units during their drive north. Elements of “Storm-Z,” a second Russian mercenary company formed by Putin allies to rival Prigozhin, spoke in support of his campaign against the “rats in the rear.” Rumors that various Russian units had joined with the Wagner Group appear to be false, but these units did nothing to stop the mercenaries’ advance, either. Ordinary Russian conscripts seem unwilling to die for Putin—a development with uncomfortable parallels in Russia’s past.

Total fealty to the ruler has long been a feature of Russian military history. The Tsar’s army experienced mutinies and desertions during the First World War, but it never attempted to overthrow him. Joseph Stalin executed dozens of high-ranking officers during his purges, and for decades afterward, the Soviet military remained totally subservient to the Communist Party; one of the reasons for the failure of the 1991 coup attempt was its leaders’ reluctance to escalate the situation after Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin simply refused to meet their demands. Putin has sought to maintain this principle. Whatever their performance issues, Gerasimov and Shoigu have been unquestionably, unflinchingly loyal, even as their troops have not.

Ironically, the prioritization of loyalty over competence in the Russian military helps to explain Russia’s disappointing performance against Ukraine—a performance that necessitated the involvement of the Wagner Group in the first place. Given a freer hand and greater resources, Wagner quickly overshadowed the Russian military in effectiveness, forcing Ukraine out of Bakhmut after a months-long battle. Perhaps it is this gap in competency, coupled with frustration at how the Army is doing things, that drove Prigozhin to rebel.

But an effective mercenary is a double-edged sword. “The mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not,” Niccolo Machiavelli wrote in The Prince, advising his sovereign against their employment: “if they are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness.” Putin would have been wise to listen.

Trevor Filseth is a former foreign affairs writer for The National Interest.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

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