Diplomacy & Crisis News

Il y a comme une évidence à associer les cinéastes Pierre Creton et Dominique Marchais. L'un comme l'autre ont fait d'une certaine vision du territoire, du local, leur propre monde ; et, de ce monde, un univers que leurs films exposent et réinventent à la fois. En octobre dernier sortait Va, Toto !, (...) / Cinéma, France, Écologie, Culture, Environnement, Agriculture - 2018/05

The costs of expanding the alliance outweigh the benefits.

It’s time to expand the UN Security Council.

China’s race towards nuclear parity with the United States and Russia is transforming international strategic stability. As Washington contemplates how to address two nuclear peers, some argue the United States needs a larger nuclear arsenal than China and Russia’s combined strategic forces.

This would be a tragic mistake. An extensive nuclear buildup would reduce deterrence and security by hollowing out U.S. conventional forces. Instead, Washington must realistically assess the danger and find cost-effective methods to shore up deterrence.

As the ultimate guarantor of a nation’s security, nuclear weapons generally provide an excellent return on investment. That doesn’t mean they are cheap, however.

The United States is currently modernizing its entire nuclear force, including warheads, ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), strategic bombers, and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) most recently estimated that this effort will cost $634 billion for the ten-year period starting in 2021. By 2030, CBO projects nuclear modernization to account for 12 percent of the budget of the Department of Defense (DOD).

If China reaches nuclear parity with the United States and Russia, Washington would need to double the size of its arsenal to equal Beijing and Moscow’s combined forces. The United States and Russia currently have about 1,550 deployed nuclear weapons. In 2020, CBO estimated that building out the U.S. nuclear arsenal to 3,000 to 3,500 warheads in a survivable manner would cost as much as $172 billion just to purchase the delivery systems. That’s more than DOD’s entire procurement budget this year. Moreover, that figure excludes the costs of building additional warheads as well as sustainment costs, the latter of which could be an additional $8 billion a year (or nearly 1 percent of DOD’s current budget).

Even this is an overly optimistic assessment; matching Russia and China nuke for nuke would be much more difficult and costly. Already, supply chain issues are delaying America’s current nuclear modernization plans. The defense industrial base would struggle to double the size of America’s arsenal and non-nuclear military investments would almost certainly suffer as a result. Moreover, Moscow and Beijing would not stand idle if Washington undertook this nuclear expansion. Instead, they would expand the size of their arsenals, requiring Washington to spend even more time and resources building additional nuclear capabilities.

None of this is affordable at a time when the United States is dealing with Russian aggression in Ukraine and an unprecedented Chinese military buildup in the Indo-Pacific. Deterring China is an especially daunting challenge given the pace of its military expansion. Beijing already boasts the largest navy in the world and a sophisticated set of conventional capabilities designed precisely to deter or defeat the U.S. Joint Force. Simply put, devoting more money to nuclear weapons would leave the United States and its allies outmatched in the Indo-Pacific.

Fortunately, the United States doesn’t have to pursue this self-defeating policy. For all the talk about a “no limits” partnership, a unified Chinese-Russian nuclear attack is inconceivable for the foreseeable future. As I write about in my book, Atomic Friends: How America Deals With Nuclear-Armed Allies, combining multiple nations’ nuclear arsenals into a single force is an extraordinary challenge. At the very least, it would require China and Russia to have a unified military command.

As NATO’s experience demonstrates, this is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. A unified nuclear force requires one nation to cede some control over its strategic weapons to the others. Given the consequences of nuclear war, even the closest allies won’t give up their nuclear buttons. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States pushed the UK and France to put their atomic weapons under NATO command. Since NATO is led by an American general, this essentially meant under U.S. control. Although the UK nominally agreed to this, the British prime minister retained the exclusive right to decide when to use—and not use—London’s nuclear weapons. France wouldn’t even entertain the idea. No Russian or Chinese leader will give up their nuclear weapons to the other side, especially given the potential gains of sitting out a nuclear exchange with the United States.

At the absolute most, then, America’s arsenal needs to be capable of withstanding a nuclear attack from Russia or China, retaliating against that country, and still retaining enough forces to deter the other one. This shouldn’t be a problem given that U.S. ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) remain undetectable, and—according to the Department of Defense—each one carries twenty submarine-launched ballistic missiles with multiple, independently targeted warheads. One or two SSBNs should be more than sufficient to deter the remaining adversary after a nuclear exchange.

There are also lower-cost options to hedge. As the United States acquires its new strategic bomber, the B-21, it can retain the existing nuclear-capable B-2 bombers, much as it has with the B-52, which was first deployed in 1961. Similarly, it can expand the number of bases capable of hosting strategic bombers. During a crisis, the bombers can disperse to more areas, making it difficult for an adversary to eliminate them in a first strike.

America’s land-based ICBMs can also be made more survivable—and powerful—relatively cheaply. Instead of building more missiles, the United States could simply build more silos to host them. Since China and Russia couldn’t be sure which silos had ICBMs at any one time, either country would have to expend more nuclear weapons in a first strike. Furthermore, to enhance each missile’s power, the United States could once again put multiple warheads on each missile, something it only stopped doing after the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.

The coming era of nuclear tripolarity presents significant challenges. In addressing the changed strategic environment, Washington must find creative solutions to challenges rather than pursue costly, robotic policies that leave America and its allies more vulnerable below the nuclear threshold.

Zachary Keck is a former managing editor of The National Interest and Congressional staffer. He is the author of Atomic Friends: How America Deals With Nuclear-Armed Allies. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Defense Department or the U.S. government.

Image: Shutterstock.

Vladimir Putin and Moscow’s central power have been weakened by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny. The fact that Prigozhin and his rebellious troops have not been punished will embolden others to challenge Putin’s authority. Russia may well descend into internal turmoil that would include a new round of breakaways by constituent republics similar to the one in 1991. Policymakers in Washington and other Free World capitals must prepare for this eventuality.

Putin has not delivered for the Russian people. After twenty-four years of Putin’s rule, Russia remains well behind Europe in both freedom and prosperity. And falling further behind. He is now asking Russians to die in a war against peaceful brother Slavs and suffer even more deprivations from foreign economic sanctions.

Neither has he delivered for the corrupt clique that controls Russia’s security, military, and economic levers of power. The Ukraine war has turned Russia into a pariah country and most of them suffered sanctions and asset freezes by Free World countries.

Putin also appears weak. He is losing in Ukraine. Before his invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s military was seen as second in the world, behind the United States. Now it is viewed as second in Eastern Europe, behind Ukraine even. At home, Prigozhin’s mercenaries captured one of Russia’s key military centers without firing a shot; several Russian military leaders waited and watched before they chose the regime’s side; and Putin did not have the power to punish Prigozhin and his mutineers.

This environment of discontent and weakness is likely to encourage more power challenges. Maybe from another military man. Or through renewed separatism among Russia’s republics.

Russia is a multinational empire. Over the centuries, the Grand Duchy of Moscow expanded by conquering peoples in Europe and Asia. But these peoples have not forgotten their national identity and dreams of freedom, similar to the peoples once part of Austria-Hungary or Yugoslavia.

Separatist movements in Russia were strong but ultimately unsuccessful in 1917 when Russia was losing in the First World War, and the incompetent and corrupt Tsarist regime had little popular support. They were successful in 1991 when fifteen republics, including Ukraine, the Baltics, and Kazakhstan, succeeded in breaking away after the Soviet Union had lost the Afghan war and was failing economically.

Russia’s heavy losses of life and treasure in the Ukraine war, isolation and sanctioning by the Free World, and the weakening of Moscow’s central authority are creating conditions in which separatist tendencies are likely to assert themselves again. Particularly since Russian minorities are thirty times more likely to die in Ukraine than Russians.

Russia’s twenty-one republics already have the legal construct they need to break away. Each has its own constitution, legislature, president or prime minister, court system, flag, and anthem. There are of course differences when it comes to their history, geography, and natural resources. Some are on Russia’s borders and are resource-rich, like Chechnya and other Caucasus republics, Tyva, Karelia, and Sakha. Others are in the Volga region, landlocked but with a strategic position and natural resources, and home to large numbers of Muslims and Buddhists, like Tatarstan, Kalmukya, and Mordovia.

A new wave of breakaways by Russian republics may be peaceful like the first wave in 1991. Or it may lead to a protracted civil war like the one in Yugoslavia.

Contrary to the claims of conspiracy theorists in Moscow, and they are many, Russia’s current troubles are not the result of evil plots in foreign capitals. They are the effect of Putin’s policies which are corrupt and oppressive at home, and revisionist and expansionist abroad.

Still, U.S. and Free World policymakers will have to address three thorny issues.

First, how to respond to the demands for recognition from Russian republics seeking self-determination.

Second, how to ensure that Russia’s 6,000 nuclear weapons are not used during the unrest. Matthew Kroenig raised the possibility that Russia may experience the first nuclear civil war.

Third, how to deter a Chinese land grab in resource-rich Siberia. The current borders were established only 160 years ago when a weak China was forced to cede to a strong Russia 350,000 square miles of Siberia (more than Texas, somewhat less than Egypt). Today the power balance is reversed. And especially in terms of population in the border region, where a Russian population of 6 million faces 90 million Chinese.

A new round of secessions by Russian republics may seem far-fetched today. But so did the first round at its time. It is important to prepare policy options for this eventuality.

Dan Negrea is the Senior Director of the Freedom and Prosperity Center at the Atlantic Council. He served at the U.S. Department of State as a member of the Secretary’s Policy Planning Office and as the Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of The National Interest or its editors.

Image: Shutterstock.

Over one year into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, various analysts have argued that the conflict has weakened Moscow’s influence over the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. One of these republics, energy-rich Turkmenistan, has been treading carefully with its tightly-controlled media, often parroting Moscow’s talking points. However, the country is now better placed than at any time in its history to diversify its energy consumer base outside of Russia. Accessing Turkmenistan’s gas reserves will be challenging, but doing so could bring significant benefits to both Ashgabat and the West.

The Case of Turkmen Energy Connectivity

Turkmenistan is a relatively closed country, with a long history of working with Russia in the energy sphere. However, since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Ashgabat has sought new partners, including the European Union and the United States. The EU itself has been searching for new energy sources following Germany’s freeze on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

This presents an opportunity for Turkmenistan, which has positioned itself to benefit from East-West cooperation. It has sought to improve and open up its economy by increasing transparency, strengthening its legal system, and encouraging private-sector capital formation. Additionally, there is Turkmenistan’s position along with the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, better known as Middle Corridor. This loosely-defined trade route links China and the markets of East Asia with Europe, crossing the Central Asian steppe, the Caspian Sea, and the Caucasus. That this route bypasses Russia, currently under heavy sanctions because of the Russo-Ukranian War, means that Ashgabat benefits from a significant increase in its geopolitical importance.

There is even greater interest when it comes to energy geopolitics and logistics. Several regional countries, including Azerbaijan and Turkey, have sought to capitalize on the further development of an energy transport system from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan.

Key to this would be the establishment of a Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP), which would also bypass Russia and provide energy supplies to Europe. Turkmenistan has also shown an interest in constructing the TCP by participating in various Southern Gas Corridor Advisory Council ministerial meetings. Ashgabat sees the TCP project as an excellent chance to develop its domestic energy industry.

Additionally, Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev, Turkmen president Serdar Berdimuhamedov, and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan met in 2022 to discuss the transportation of Turkmen gas to Europe. At the meeting, Erdogan highlighted that the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), a critical project carrying natural gas from Azerbaijan to Turkish markets and eventually to Europe, is operating at its total capacity of 32 billion cubic meters. The transportation of Turkmen gas to Turkey and Europe via the TANAP is the most convenient option currently available.

Further developing the TANAP and improving the connectivity of the Middle Corridor would greatly benefit the West. Even before the Russo-Ukrainian War, Europe has been searching for ways to diversify its energy sources. The EU acted on its ambitions by signing a deal with Azerbaijan in 2022 to double imports of natural gas by 2027. Azerbaijan could expand its ability to supply Europe with energy as Baku is cultivating closer relations with Turkmenistan. Connectivity with the TANAP would only further the EU’s energy security.

Pipelines will be critical because they are the only economically viable way to move natural gas in vast quantities, especially across the Caspian Sea. Turning natural gas into liquified natural gas is too costly for transport over such a short distance. Pipelines, meanwhile, have over time become more viable forms of transport. The Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, signed by Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan in 2018, significantly reduced barriers to pipeline construction.

There are, however, a few problems that impede successful trade cooperation with Turkmenistan. Domestic issues and China’s influence in Turkmenistan present risks for the United States and the EU. Infrastructure in Turkmenistan has historically been weak. Modernization and regulatory integration will also be a significant challenge, given the closed nature of Turkmenistan’s government and its close relations with Russia and China. Additionally, Turkmenistan’s underpaid and under-trained staff at border stations and related trade offices spur corruption and bribery.

Opening the Middle Corridor

Despite these challenges, Trans-Caspian corridor cooperation in a multipolar world—particularly amid the energy supply chain disruptions caused by the Russo-Ukrainian War—will become more critical.

China’s own political and economic stability depends on international trade, but its overland route through Russia (the Northern Corridor) and maritime passage through the Malacca Strait are prone to disruptions. In comparison, the Middle Corridor allows China to bypass these high-risk routes. Russia too would also benefit from the Middle Corridor, as it would provide new logistic opportunities despite the current disruptions to the Northern Corridor.

The Central Asian countries, however, would likely benefit the most from higher connectivity with the West and all major actors, including China and Russia. As a result, all powers—Russia, China, the EU, and the United States—have a reason for favorable attitudes toward such an initiative, which can provide a realistic opportunity for cooperation.

There are one or two issues. For example, consider Beijing’s view on Turkey’s involvement. The latter’s geographic location, and the fact that the Middle Corridor passes through its territory, make it an indispensable partner for the West in achieving Middle Corridor connectivity. China, however, is concerned about Turkey’s emphasis on Turkic integration, potentially aggravating separatism among ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang. This has caused tension in the past. Ankara would be wise to make the case that Middle Corridor cooperation is, first and foremost, a commercial venture with no political strings attached.

Another issue is potential bottlenecks due to differing legal, regulatory, and logistical capabilities. These, however, are more easily solved via sufficient investment and actor participation. In November 2022, for instance, the Azerbaijani, Georgian, Kazakh, and Turkish heads of transport and foreign ministries agreed to a $7.5 billion roadmap for bottleneck removal to facilitate the Middle Corridor from 2022 to 2027.

This endeavor could further benefit from private sector participation from the United States and the EU. Washington, with an open multilateral approach and emphasis on predictability, could incorporate cooperation on global supply chains into a working group. The Supply Chain Ministerial Forum, comprising the EU and the United States, among other partners, would be a logical place to start by including Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and China. This group could work to identify and mitigate bottlenecks and other obstacles affecting energy transport along the Middle Corridor.

Another way the West could help is by providing technical assistance since the digitization of multimodal data and document exchange will also be critical for predictability and reliability. However, such should not be propelled unilaterally and rely on any one partner’s technology. While China has been successful with the digitization of its BRI projects, Central Asian countries could be wary of relying solely on Chinese technology, with risks of surveillance. The United States and the EU are well-equipped to contribute to the digitization of trade routes and give Central Asian countries assurance that they do need to rely solely on tech from Beijing.

While risks and obstacles inhibit Middle Corridor connectivity and subsequent Turkmen gas flowing to Europe, the benefits could outweigh the costs. Through this cooperative project, China can address trade route issues that will persist, especially while the Russo-Ukrainian War disrupts supply routes. Given current geopolitical realities, there is no better time for the West, China, and Central Asian countries, including Turkmenistan, to develop Middle Corridor connectivity.

Alex Little is an MS graduate of Georgia Tech and specializes in Russian and Central Asian affairs.

Image: Shutterstock.

There are only so many options for the future of the relationship between China and the United States. I’ve been able to identify three:

1. One of the two countries makes the active choice to initiate a military campaign against the other.
2. The two nations continue playing their ongoing game of chicken, hoping against hope to avoid an accident that leads to escalation.  
3. China and the United States work diplomatically to establish guidelines for a working relationship in the midst of an economic and ideological rivalry.

In truth, these three options can be boiled down to two- either preserve the status quo and allow “the fates” to decide if and when a conflict takes place, or engage diplomatically to disrupt the trend of increasingly frigid relations between the two superpowers.

To the extent that we can imagine a clear endgame for each of the aforementioned paths, choosing between “brinkmanship” and diplomacy is just as much a logic problem as it is a diplomatic matter. The United States and China will work together diplomatically or the risk of conflict between the two nations will continue to rise until either accident or malice makes fighting inevitable.

It is not difficult to glimpse this “small piece of the future that has already come to pass”, and the horror of conflict between superpowers armed with nuclear weapons is unimaginable. As a consequence, this is a call for direct diplomacy, even when that means making difficult choices.

Reports suggest that China is making a massive investment in Cuba in exchange for the ability to use Cuban territory to host a spy base. Certainly this represents an escalation from the American perspective, but just as clearly it mirrors what the United States has done through increased weapons sales to Taiwan. Those of us with a Western bias, myself included, might be uncomfortable with this comparison, but that discomfort does little to hide the similarities. 

If negotiations fail, or fail to occur in earnest in the first place, the United States faces grim prospects regarding a conflict over Taiwan. Wargames regularly project that American forces would struggle to respond to the initial attempt to occupy Taiwan due to China’s proximity, and that the vast ocean between the United States and the conflict would stress the demand for both resources and reinforcements. 

Taiwan is an independent country, and an American effort to resist a potential occupation would, by every measure, be a defensive war. That first fact being established  such a conflict would come with the demands and difficulties of an offensive operation. This factor, more than any other, explains the outcomes projected by the war games mentioned earlier.

Even with this context in mind, the United States remains the most powerful nation in the world, there is little room to argue otherwise. Still, the period of unquestioned global hegemony experienced following the end of the Cold War is coming to an end- this much is equally obvious. Momentarily putting China to the side, nations including India, Brazil, and South Africia are on upward trajectories, and each rising power will want some measure of respect, and decision making autonomy, in accordance with their heightened global role. 

The United States will need to work diplomatically and collaboratively with these nations in order to maintain, and hopefully deepen relationships with these rising powers. Not only are strongarm tactics distasteful, but the would-be targets have grown too large for such tactics to be effective. Now is the moment to initiate a new era of American diplomacy that emphasizes the strength of the American economy and the virtues of democratic government.

This sort of diplomatic approach will likely come with a re-entrenchment of America’s military positioning, but that does not mean ignoring the national interest. Continued support for Ukraine, for example, allows the United States to work with partners around the world against expansionism. Still, a diplomatic mentality means not exacerbating Putin’s insecurities once the invasion has been rebuffed. 

Bringing the conflict in Ukraine to an end is only truly valuable if that resolution secures a lasting peace. This will mean asking difficult questions about continued NATO expansion- avoiding conflict with China will likely mean asking equally difficult questions.

Perhaps the key challenge for the United States in the coming decades, both regarding China and regarding the world’s many other nations, will be understanding when and where to emphasize the various tools in America’s famed Arsenal of Democracy. In order to avoid conflict with China and strengthen ties with other rising powers, the United States should prioritize diplomats over dominance.

 

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Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association. The views expressed here are his and not necessarily those of the Association.

The political divisions and military rivalries that sparked civil war in Khartoum could erupt in post-Biya Yaoundé.

C'est connu : la culture, c'est beau, c'est grand, c'est l'outil idéal du vivre-ensemble. D'ailleurs, elle est sacralisée — la preuve, on a inventé l'« exception culturelle ». Qui oserait attaquer les démarches qui tendent si vertueusement à en favoriser l'accessibilité, la visibilité, l'appropriation, (...) / France, Idéologie, Capitalisme, Culture, Idées, Inégalités - 2018/05

New Delhi isn’t a party to the U.N. Refugee Convention—leaving migrants in legal limbo.

But for the Bundeswehr to fight will take a culture shift, not just weapons orders.

The most important lesson of the Wagner rebellion is the FSB’s failure.

Even in times of polarization, consensus has prevailed.

Regional unity amid Russia’s war in Ukraine was the top priority at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit.

Warnings about the dangers of artificial intelligence are ubiquitous. Last March, Elon Musk signed an open letter stating that AI threatened the future of humanity. The United Kingdom is planning to host a summit meeting this fall to discuss AI. What are the perils and promises of this new technology?

The Center for the National Interest invited two experts on AI to discuss the issue on Thursday, July 6.

Samuel Hammond is a resident senior fellow at the Niskanen Center. His research focuses on the effectiveness of cash transfers in alleviating poverty, and how free markets can be complemented by robust systems of social insurance. He previously worked as an economist for the Government of Canada specializing in rural economic development, and as a graduate research fellow for the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.

Dr. Keegan McBride is a departmental research lecturer at Oxford University, where he studies topics such as digital government, digital innovation, the use of AI in the public sector, digital well-being and happiness, and government interoperability and data exchange. Outside of these academic interests, Keegan is actively working with NGOs, particularly those that focus on reimagining a better, open, human-centric, and equitable digital future. He can also be found consulting and working with governments and private sector organizations on the topic of governmental digitalization.

Jacob Heilbrunn, editor of The National Interest, moderated the discussion.

Image: Shutterstock.

Over the weekend, two men from the town of Bcharre in Lebanon’s Qornet al-Sawda region were shot dead with little understanding of the cause. Their names were Haitam Tawk, thirty-eight, and Malek Tawk, in his fifties. The town erupted in anger and mourned the loss of their fellow residents. Developments are still unfolding and rumors about why it happened are circulating across social media. Reports say the killers came from the Danniyeh region. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) was deployed in the area to restore order and calm. But for how long can the army keep the peace if the judiciary fails to deliver appropriate legal action?

There is a combined effort by the LAF and those in a place of authority to mitigate further potential harm resulting from these killings. The press office of Lebanese caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati said action will be taken to apprehend the culprits. “We condemn this incident and those responsible will be arrested, so that justice can be done.”

Lebanese Forces member of parliament (MP) Sethrida Geagea, who represents the constituency of Bcharre, reached out to the Lebanese Army commander, General Joseph Aoun, to discuss the situation and how best to respond to secure justice for the victim’s families and maintain peace. Geagea and her fellow MP William Touk, who represents the same municipality, released a joint statement of condemnation, demanding judicial and military intervention.

“I contacted the army commander and asked him to send a force as soon as possible to the area where the crime occurred to conduct all necessary investigations.” As of now, the LAF is performing exceptionally well with local support.

Nevertheless, the greatest concern of the town’s residents is that the perpetrators may escape without ever seeing a moment in court. However unlikely, this consternation is warranted. Lebanon’s judiciary has failed countless times to serve its role as an independent arbiter of the law, allowing criminals of all kinds to walk away. A lack of justice and lawlessness persist across Lebanon with few exceptions. However, there is another fear that this round of violence will only cause greater mistrust among different religious communities and deepen sectarian suspicion.

Religious leaders quickly came out to express their own condemnation and add that this horrific act should not be seen through sectarian eyes. The mufti of Tripoli and the North district, Sheikh Mohammad Imam, and Archbishop of the Maronite Archdiocese of Tripoli, Bishop Youssef Soueif, released a statement asking residents of both towns to respond with patriotism and give the authorities time to work. They called on "our dear people in both regions to deal with this tragedy with spiritual and humanitarian consciousness, as well as with a high sense of national responsibility, based on full confidence in the Lebanese Army, security forces, and competent judiciary." 

This problem has its historical roots in a land dispute between the two towns. Bcharre and Donieh are geographically located in a mountainous region where there are quarrels about property and water rights, especially after the snow begins to melt. Former Minister of Social Affairs Dr. Richard Kouyoumjian spoke with the National Interest on the old land feud and what course of action should be taken regarding the killers.

“It’s a chronic conflict; it’s been there for many years now. Every year after it stops snowing, there are conflicts over water between the two areas. It happens that one is Sunni Muslim and the other is Christian. But it is a land conflict over the ownership of a territory called Qornet al-Sawda, where there is plenty of water and everyone wants to benefit from it.”

Kouyoumjian further added that violence cannot be a legitimate tool to end this problem. “Using weapons and armed conflict is not the solution.”

Both towns say the water resources belong to them, and until this is independently arbitrated by the local magistrate and backed by the government, tensions will continue to grow with a high risk of more violence occurring. The former minister said to TNI, “Definitely, the criminals must be brought to justice, so that the victims can rest in peace and that the families can have closure. Also, to prove that there is some form of government left in Lebanon.”

Everyone is now waiting for what will happen next. For now, the army’s presence is the guarantor of stability in the region. But if the fallen are not honored and the courts fail to resolve this dispute, can everlasting peace be truly secured?

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

Image: Shutterstock.

We are now over two months past SpaceX’s historic Starship test launch. The massive rocket blasted off from Texas on April 20, but exploded several minutes after liftoff. SpaceX is already preparing for its next mission; CEO Elon Musk initially predicted a next test in 1–2 months, and a Federal Communications Commission application requested a six-month window beginning June 15.

But the launch blasted a hole into the pad and scattered debris across the launch site and nearby towns. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded Starship and opened an investigation. Environmental groups sued the FAA, claiming the agency violated the National Environmental Policy Act by not conducting a thorough enough review of the project.

It is litigation, not engineering or manufacturing, that could be the biggest imminent threat to Starship’s next test. Given that NASA’s impressive but costly Space Launch System lacks viability as a long-term, super heavy-lift option, the lack of a private-sector peer competitor in the near-to-medium-term, and the rapid rise of China as a space power and its in-development Starship equivalent, the United States heavily depends on Starship succeeding to ensure long-term civil and military leadership in space. A major, years-long delay—or license revocation—would be devastating to both SpaceX and the United States.

It is thus imperative that the parties work to produce a timely resolution of the legal and regulatory issues that engages with the local community on environmental impact, ensures that SpaceX has taken steps to ensure such damage to and around the site does not occur again, and allows for testing to move forward this year.

Go for Launch

In 2014, SpaceX chose Boca Chica to be Starbase, its next rocket development and testing facility. SpaceX rapidly developed the site, located just a few miles from the Rio Grande, and began testing Starship prototypes. The orbital test launch explosion was not the company’s first run-in with the FAA, which had previously said that a 2020 test of a prototype violated SpaceX’s launch license for the mission. But the FAA approved the next test after investigating the launch and approving corrective steps taken by SpaceX.

The FAA began an environmental review of Starship’s orbital launch plan, and by June 2022 the FAA released a Programmatic Environmental Assessment, requiring SpaceX to take over seventy-five actions to mitigate the environmental impact, including on wetlands and wildlife, and noise pollution. Just six days before the Starship test, the FAA granted Starship a five-year launch license, having determined that SpaceX had met all of its requirements. But the FAA did not conduct an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which could have added years to the application, finding it unnecessary.

Starship self-destructed a few minutes into its mission—a reminder that not even any nation or company as experienced as SpaceX avoids failure. In fact, CEO Elon Musk downplayed expectations by saying that the mission would be successful if it got off the pad. Given this context and Starship’s iterative design process that accounts for failures, this test was rightly considered progress.

The explosion rained debris across land and sea, affecting nearby towns and nature reserves and starting a fire in a state park. The rocket also blasted a crater into the launch pad that sent chunks of concrete, dust, and debris flying. There was no flame trench on the pad, which directs flames and exhaust away from the pad during launch. Musk said that SpaceX was taking steps to prevent damage during future launches.

The FAA grounded Starship and launched an investigation, which could stretch many months. Environmental and cultural groups sued the FAA, claiming the agency did not properly consider the environmental impact of Starship. The suit calls for the FAA to revoke the launch license. Weeks later, SpaceX sought to join the lawsuit as a defendant, and warned that the suit could result in the program being “significantly delayed.”

The FAA did conduct an extensive environmental assessment. The legal delays sought by the environmental groups, and a full EIS itself, are completely at odds with SpaceX’s typical breakneck development and iteration speeds. Relocating to other existing launch sites, like Cape Canaveral in Florida, Vandenberg in California, or Wallops in Virginia, would likely require investment, development, environmental reviews, and licenses, costing time and money.

I’m Not Like Other Rockets

Starship is critical to both civil and military U.S. presence in and leadership of space. In the short term, NASA selected a variant of the Starship spacecraft as a lander to bring Artemis astronauts to the lunar surface, needed for the Artemis III mission as soon as 2025. But the impact of a long-term license suspension or revocation would go far beyond a lander.

Starship’s launch came five months after NASA tested its own new super-heavy lift rocket, the Space Launch System (SLS), that intends to transport humans back to the Moon and ultimately to Mars. So far, NASA has spent twelve years and over $20 billion on the Artemis Program, the SLS, and Orion crew capsule. Each SLS launch is estimated to cost an eye-watering $4.1 billion. SpaceX envisions each Starship launch costing under $10 million. In other words, Starship will likely make Artemis obsolete. The Starship test mission is another reminder that beyond low-earth orbit (LEO), Artemis and SLS are here to stay for now. But Starship’s future role in cost reduction beyond LEO makes each delay now even more costly in the future.

Beyond NASA, Starship is part of a rapidly expanding private sector launch industry, Rocket Lab’s Electron rocket launches small satellites and its in-development Neutron will deliver larger payloads. Relativity Space’s forthcoming heavy-lift, partially-reusable Terran R, comes closer to Starship but is still smaller and can carry less payload.

But these launch systems developed by smaller start-ups are closer to competing with Falcon 9 than with Starship; mega-rockets are much more expensive and riskier. Mission failures can doom smaller companies. Virgin Orbit, which provided an operational launch system via air-launched rockets to deliver small satellites to orbit, went bankrupt this year, months after a failed test. It took many years and billions of dollars for Starship to reach this year’s test, and SpaceX must still contend with, and iterate after, an explosion.

Blue Origin’s forthcoming heavy-lift New Glenn has already won government launch contracts and should be commercially successful. But it can carry half of Starship’s cargo tonnage to orbit. There is no current private sector equivalent that could rapidly deploy satellite mega-constellations or deliver major logistical infrastructure to orbit like satellite and vehicle refueling stations, which could be critical as geopolitical tensions on Earth escalate into space. There may be a future peer commercial competitor to Starship, but surveying the current landscape, and understanding how much time and money goes into building a rocket of any kind, that is unlikely anytime soon.

The Chinese space program has grown rapidly in recent decades. The PRC launched its first astronaut into space in 2003 and built a space station, Tiangong, completed last year. Longer-term plans include building a permanent settlement on the Moon called the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), which it aims to build with Russia and other partner countries.

While the ILRS aims to rival NASA’s multilateral Artemis Program, China is closely watching Starship’s development. China is building its own next-generation super-heavy-lift rocket, the Long March 9. Starship development is still far ahead, but it is clear which rocket China is emulating, and it is not NASA’s SLS. Initially, Long March 9 was expendable. In November 2022, designers switched to a version with a reusable first stage. By March 2023, China announced that it will be fully reusable.

In other words, the result of the Starship test has geopolitical implications as well. Without Starship, it is not unreasonable to think that China could have a reusable super heavy-lift rocket capable of quickly delivering crew, cargo, and infrastructure to low-Earth orbit and beyond–and not the United States.

The Stakes

Falcon 9 was revolutionary, but revolutionary for the private sector. Starship could be revolutionary for humanity, with the potential to win the race to Mars, ahead of any government or other private-sector player. And it is important to the United States for its cargo capacity, reusability, and rapid turnaround capabilities. The Starship test certainly exceeded the expectations set by SpaceX. But the mid-air explosion has created a cloud of uncertainty over Starship’s immediate future. There is a lot at stake over the next few months—for SpaceX, for NASA, for South Texas, for Artemis partners, and for China, as the next Starship prototype is developed and investigations continue.

Policymakers should be closely watching the FAA investigation into the test mission and legal action against the agency. U.S. national security interests will be harmed by an investigation and litigation that stretch out over many years. The FAA had already investigated and cleared Starship initially, and it is not in SpaceX’s interest to have its launch complex cratered and incinerated with every test. It is critical that the sides are able to reach a resolution that addresses the environmental damage and remediation from the test, engages the local community, and allows for a resumption of testing later this year.

Alex Dubin is an Endless Frontier Fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation focusing on space policy.

Image: SpaceX.

For the last seventeen years, U.S. companies that invested internationally in critical minerals, particularly lithium, had one clear choice: Australia, where U.S. mining investment often averages $35 billion annually.

Those days are over. With the approval of the U.S.-Chile Bilateral Tax Treaty (BTT), Chile is poised to become a primary destination for critical mineral investment and an even greater ally for the United States in the region. Latin America’s economy will never look the same.

On June 22, after years of delay, the U.S. Senate finally approved the BTT, thus addressing double taxation issues that currently hinder U.S. companies operating in Chile with up to 44 percent in income taxes. Beyond reducing tax barriers related to cross-border investment such as withholding tax rates on dividends, interest, and royalties, the treaty creates a framework to resolve international tax disputes, strengthen information-sharing mechanisms, and promote cooperation among the fiscal authorities of both countries. Unsurprisingly, the mining and energy sector is expected to benefit the most from this new treaty.

Latin America’s mineral extraction industry dates back hundreds of years. During the nineteenth century, when the world’s developing economies were industrializing, Latin America still relied principally on the export of raw commodities with critical minerals among them. But, compared to mining superpowers like Australia, Chile’s industrial development and technological advancements stagnated over much of the twentieth century.

Advances, hence, relied heavily on foreign expertise. The scene changed in the 1970s and 1980s when an increase in foreign investment, privatization, technical expertise, and stable legal mining operation frameworks transformed Chile into a country able to actively compete in the global minerals market.

Today, Chile’s reliance on critical mineral mining is no secret. Chile’s industry currently constitutes approximately 11 percent of GDP and represents more than half of the country’s total exports. Chile is also responsible for over 21 percent of the global supply of lithium and 28 percent of the global supply of copper.

What sets Chile apart from the rest of the mineral-rich region? It does, after all, compose only one-third of the renowned “lithium triangle” shared with Bolivia and Argentina. The answer is infrastructure, commercial viability, and institutional frameworks. A far greater percentage of Chile’s total critical mineral reserves are exploitable compared to Argentina and Bolivia. Additionally, the stability and predictability of Chile’s carefully curated institutional framework has enhanced the rule of law and attracted substantial investment in infrastructure and technology, ultimately fostering the favorable business environment that exists today.

Beyond this, the approval of the BTT makes Chile the most beneficial destination for U.S. investments, particularly for U.S. companies investing in the mining and energy industry that have now become the principal beneficiaries of the foreign tax credits provided by the treaty. The combination of the BTT and the Inflation Reduction Act, which provides a $7,500 tax credit to electric vehicle companies that source raw materials from free-trade partners like Chile, presents even more incentive for U.S. investments in the sector. In other words, more bang for your buck. Not only will Chile become a magnet for U.S. investment, but its commitment to high environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards will elevate the country’s place in the global industry for years to come, surpassing regional and global competitors, setting a new industry standard, and reshaping the global market for critical minerals.

Of course, this process is not without its challenges. In April, President Gabriel Boric presented the government’s new lithium strategy to assert state control in the industry. Despite Chile’s relative success with the state-owned copper company Codelco, Boric’s proposal has raised concerns about the government’s capabilities to efficiently run lithium operations or attract the foreign investment needed for the successful scaling of the industry. The plan, as it stands, still holds a degree of uncertainty about where and to what extent private companies will be encouraged to invest their resources.

Successful sustainable exploitation of this critical industry depends fully on Chile’s capability to collaborate with the international community to further spur innovation, acquire new technology, and attract operational expertise. The BTT is directly conducive to this and will propel Chile to the forefront of the green energy transition. Nonetheless, the influx of investment clears the way for Chile to scale up its sustainable mining operations, foster innovation, and create a robust supply chain that caters to the growing global demand for clean energy solutions, including electric vehicles and energy storage systems. By capitalizing on its natural resources, leveraging U.S. expertise, and making the most of its strong institutions, Chile can solidify its position as a pioneer in the green energy sector. Against a backdrop of political instability in neighboring South American governments, Chile could emerge as a beacon of stability and a catalyst for positive change across the continent, making significant contributions to the broader green energy transition.

This could—and likely should—change perceptions of Chile in Washington. As the 2024 U.S. elections draw nearer, it will be important to U.S. political leaders to strengthen ties with Chile. Indeed, many energy companies that stand to benefit from the BTT are important political players in the United States. Partnership on critical minerals has the potential to enhance Chile's bargaining power in future bilateral negotiations with the United States and solidify its position as a global leader in critical minerals and green investments within the region.

As Chile charts its path forward following the final adoption of the BTT and the potential surge in U.S. investments, key questions arise regarding the future of Chile's mining development and its collaboration with the United States. How will Chile navigate the growing global demand for critical minerals while maintaining a balance between economic prosperity and environmental sustainability? Will the influx of resources and expertise from U.S. investments pave the way for technological advancements and innovation within Chile's mining sector? As Chile solidifies its position as a pioneer in the green energy sector, these questions will shape the nation's trajectory and influence the broader global market for critical minerals.

Ignacia Ulloa Peters is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council's Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Isabel Chiriboga is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council's Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Image: Shutterstock.

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