Diplomacy & Crisis News

Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to Beijing this month for meetings with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping and other senior Chinese leaders mostly met the low expectations for the event. Blinken’s journey helps to rejuvenate high-level Sino-U.S. dialogue at a time when the bilateral relationship is at a nadir and might even be drifting toward war in either the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. The meeting seemingly offers hope for recovery and stabilization of relations. U.S. president Joe Biden said Blinken “did a hell of a job” in Beijing and that “We’re on the right trail here.” Of his meeting with Blinken, Xi said “This is very good.”

Alas, there is abundant reason to be skeptical.

The modest breakthrough has landed the relationship in front of a much bigger and thicker wall. Top-level communication is necessary but not yet sufficient for repairing a damaged relationship. The damage stems primarily from policies by each country that the other loathes. The problem is that neither country may be willing and able to change these policies that antagonize the other.

China’s List of Grievances

Prior to meeting with Xi, Blinken spoke with the PRC’s highest-ranking foreign affairs official, former Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Wang provided an efficient list of China’s top grievances with the United States. As paraphrased by the PRC media, “Wang asked the US to stop hyping the `China threat’ narrative, lift illegal unilateral sanctions on China, stop pressuring China’s technology and development and stop willfully interfering in China's internal affairs.”

“Hyping the China threat” refers to the U.S. concern that China aspires to displace America as the most strategically influential country in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing contends that the United States erroneously assumes China will naturally seek regional hegemony due to its newly-acquired relative economic and military strength. China, however, is an exceptional great power that will “never seek hegemony, expansion, or a sphere of influence,” according to the CCP government.

The second major Chinese grievance is the United States making it harder for China to acquire key leading-edge technologies, alluded to in the reference to Washington suppressing China’s “technology and development.” Chinese officials and government-approved commentators have for years accused the United States of trying to “contain” China, and recently Xi himself has openly accused Washington of “comprehensive containment, encirclement and suppression of China.” For Beijing, tech bans have become one of two spearpoints of containment. Already working to restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductors, the Biden administration is also considering a ban on U.S. companies from investing in certain technology sectors in China. From Beijing’s standpoint, this is “politicizing and weaponizing economic, trade and technological issues under the guise of national security” when “the real purpose of the US is to deprive China of its right to development.”

The third PRC grievance, “interfering in China’s internal affairs,” includes U.S. criticism of the mass incarceration of Uighurs in Xinjiang province and the dismantling of civil liberties in Hong Kong. It also includes what Beijing sees as the most pressing dispute in Sino-U.S. relations and the other spearpoint of containment: Washington’s support for the government of Taiwan. The new PRC foreign minister, Qin Gang, said in March that Taiwan is “the first red line that must not be crossed in China-US relations.” Wang Yi reportedly told Blinken, “On the Taiwan question, China has no room for compromise or concession.”

The United States is unlikely to address these PRC grievances to anywhere near Beijing’s satisfaction.

The View from Washington

China has amply proved itself an increasingly formidable potential U.S. adversary. It is undergoing a huge military modernization and expansion. It leverages its vast economic power to undermine U.S. global influence. It aspires to world leadership in emerging technologies. And it opposes important aspects of the U.S.-sponsored international order.

The Biden administration’s 2022 National Defense Strategy characterizes the PRC as “coercive and increasingly aggressive,” seeking to “refashion” the world to “suit its interests and authoritarian preferences,” to the detriment of U.S. interests. Obviously, Washington does not accept Beijing’s Chinese exceptionalism or its “will never seek hegemony” rhetoric. Rather, Washington sees the United States and China as competitors for regional and global leadership. The diplomatic aspect of this competition requires America to continue calling out aggressive and expansionist PRC behavior before the international audience, just as Beijing asserts its own counternarrative. Nor is it reasonable to expect the United States to reverse its restrictions on helping its chief potential adversary achieve global technological—and consequent military—superiority.

For Washington to stop “interfering in China’s internal affairs” in the sense of not criticizing China is an impossible ask. Shaming illiberal states for infringing on civil liberties is now a part of America’s political culture, and the CCP leadership has infamously thin skin. Bashing China is now a bipartisan sport in U.S. domestic politics, with the politicians of both major parties scrambling to appear hawkish.

Only a day after the Blinken-Xi meeting, Biden seemingly unintentionally offended Beijing by casually referring to Xi as a “dictator” who was surprised and embarrassed by the spy balloon incident. A PRC government spokesperson immediately responded that Biden’s remark was “extremely absurd and irresponsible. . . . seriously infringing on China’s political dignity, which is an open political provocation.” The White House, in turn, indicated it will not retract the statement.

Beijing demands the United States must stop selling armaments to Taiwan and cease all contact between U.S. and Taiwan government officials. The U.S. position, however, is that arms sales are justified by Beijing’s permanent threat to use force against Taiwan. A U.S. law, the Taiwan Relations Act, requires Washington to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services . . . to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” Neither the PRC threat nor the U.S. law are going away anytime soon. Washington also maintains that the “one China policy” is satisfied by the lack of formal U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations and does not preclude all contact between U.S. and Taiwan officials. In any case, members of Congress have repeatedly demonstrated that they will honor Taiwan leaders even against opposition from the U.S. executive branch.

American Frustrations

The U.S. side is similarly unlikely to get what it wants.

The most urgent American concern in the bilateral relationship is the need for crisis management. This appeared to be at the top of Blinken’s Beijing agenda.

Related U.S. concerns are perceived aggressive PRC activity toward Taiwan and in the South China Sea, which from the U.S. point of view increase the possibility of an accidental or unintended war.

Beijing could demonstrate goodwill to Washington by ceasing the hostile military signaling toward Taiwan and by quietly accepting the U.S. Navy’s “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea instead of threatening collisions with U.S. ships and aircraft. This, however, is almost unimaginable.

The Chinese government has framed both Taiwan and the South China Sea as do-or-die issues: the CCP either proves its legitimacy to rule China by establishing control over “Chinese” territory coveted by foreigners or fails on both accounts. Regime legitimacy, and thus security, is on the line. So is national security, as Taiwan outside of PRC control anchors the string of islands that form choke points between China’s east coast and the Pacific Ocean. Only by owning the South China Sea can Beijing keep unwanted foreign warships and warplanes away from China’s east coast. There are economic incentives as well: the South China Sea contains fish and hydrocarbons, and if captured, Taiwan would be the PRC’s richest and best-educated province.

Most importantly, the PRC seems to know no alternative way to attempt to de-escalate tensions with the United States over Taiwan and the South China Sea other than demonstrations of military bravado.

There is no hint of Chinese willingness to accommodate the U.S. desire for crisis management. China suspended contact between the two countries’ militaries after U.S. congresswoman Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022. In May, PRC defense minister Li Shangfu refused to meet with U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin on the sidelines of a conference in Singapore. Repeating a phrase PRC officials often use when discussing foreign relations, a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson explained that the United States “must correct its mistaken actions” for military dialogue to resume.

This position resurfaced during the Biden visit to Beijing, during which China did not agree to the U.S. proposal to restart bilateral military engagement. PRC officials and commentators have elaborated that, in their view, the Americans want China to agree to allow the USA to challenge Chinese “core interests” with impunity. The PRC position is that if the USA wants to avoid crises, it should stop arming Taiwan and cease operating military units in Chinese-claimed waters and airspace.

Qin Gang said in March that the U.S. government’s “so-called `establishing guardrails’ for China-US relations and ‘not seeking conflict’ actually means that China should not respond in words or action when slandered or attacked. That is just impossible!”

Furthermore, Beijing likely sees the U.S. desire for crisis management as merely additional leverage for seeking concessions from Washington in bilateral disputes—an approach similar to Beijing canceling cooperation on climate change to express anger over particular unrelated U.S. policies.

Beijing has been emphasizing that Washington must keep the commitments Biden made during his talks in 2022 with Xi in Bali, the first face-to-face meeting between the two men since Biden’s election as president. Immediately before his meeting with Blinken, Xi said: “the two sides have agreed to follow through the common understandings President Biden and I had reached in Bali.” Qin Gang and Wang Yi also mentioned the Bali commitments.

What does Beijing think Biden promised in Bali? A PRC media report offers a summary: “The US does not seek a new Cold War, does not seek to revitalize alliances against China, does not support ‘Taiwan independence,’ does not support ‘two Chinas’ or `one China, one Taiwan,’ and has no intention to have a conflict with China, . . . the US side has no intention to seek "decoupling" from China, to halt China's economic development, or to contain China.”

Signposts of Failure

This is a signpost of impending failure. Each of these points suggests misunderstanding on Beijing’s part, to be followed by disappointment. From a U.S. perspective, Biden has kept his word. But as the Chinese should well know by now, Washington’s interpretation of what is allowable under a “one China policy” is far looser than Beijing’s. The U.S. government is clearly and openly committed to strengthening alliances to counter possible PRC military moves and is implementing an industrial policy to reduce vulnerability to China (as China is also doing in reverse). Americans would argue these are prudent defensive actions, not proof of “seeking a New Cold War.” And American officials say they are “de-risking” rather than “de-coupling,” even if the PRC insists on calling it containment.

The momentum gained through the Blinken visit to China will soon stall because the policies that drive the downturn in U.S.-China relations are likely to stay the same. Both sides think these policies are necessary to uphold fundamental national interests. The domestic politics in both countries support these policies. And unfortunately, these policies reflect a new era of great-power rivalry within the same region in which the adversarial aspects of bilateral relations are ascendant.

Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.

Image: Shutterstock.

With Russia’s waning momentum and influence in the wake of a slew of setbacks in the Ukraine war, concerns over an imminent Chinese attack on Taiwan have somewhat subsided. However, China’s recent charm offensives indicate its strategic calculations for an attrition war with Taiwan. To win such a war, China recognizes the necessity to accumulate as many bargaining chips as possible before entering into negotiations. One crucial aspect of this process is the restoration of its significantly damaged global reputation.

China has sought to claim the mantle of peacemaker since its reversal of the Zero Covid policy. Externally, it has actively presented itself as an unbiased alternative to the United States. After brokering an agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China ventured into the highly sensitive Israel-Palestine conflict. Additionally, its unexpected vote in favor of a UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, accompanied by the endorsement of French president Emmanuel Macron, highlights China’s potential mediating role in resolving the Ukraine conflict.

Internally, China is undergoing a diplomatic system overhaul. The removal of outspoken “Wolf Warrior” spokesman Zhao Lijian was followed by a carefully orchestrated visit to China by former Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou. Furthermore, Beijing’s propaganda efforts are toning down the domestic fervor surrounding the idea of forcibly taking Taiwan. Despite its routine boilerplates against perceived “Western smear campaigns,” China appears to be adopting a more restrained and moderate diplomatic approach, aiming to convince the world that it still prioritizes peaceful means over force in its approach towards Taiwan.

However, China’s recent diplomatic shift belies its strategic adjustment towards the self-governing island. The lessons learned from the Ukraine war have led Xi Jinping to realize that if a military juggernaut like Russia can fail to annex Ukraine, the challenge of seizing a better-defended Taiwan would be even greater for China. This is especially true considering the island’s vital geopolitical and economic significance to the United States and the Western world. Consequently, China has recognized that a swift Blitzkrieg, as Russia had envisioned for Ukraine, is less feasible in the case of Taiwan. Instead, an attrition war, whose effect was validated during the Sino-Japanese War, would be a more practical strategy for China’s current status as an economic giant. Additionally, through salami tactics, China could chip away Taiwan’s outlying islands bit by bit.

An important giveaway of China’s plan for an attrition war with Taiwan can be gleaned from its recent contact with Ukraine. Following a long-awaited phone call between Xi Jinping and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, China dispatched a special envoy with a peace plan—built on its highly controversial twelve-point peaceful proposal on Ukraine—to the battle-scarred country. However, the mediation ended up with a public rejection from Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba that Ukraine would not surrender territory to Russia in exchange for ending the war. While the specific details of the meeting were not disclosed, Kuleba’s remarks suggest that China’s proposal may have involved territorial concessions by Ukraine. If the land-for-peace approach proves successful in the Ukraine conflict, it is highly likely that China would employ a similar strategy in future negotiations during an attrition war with Taiwan. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the assumption of China’s ability to outlast Taiwan and its Western allies in an attrition war hinges on its integration into the global economy and a robust self-sufficiency system.

China learned a crucial lesson from the Ukraine war: in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the best way to minimize or avoid economic sanctions from Western countries would not be through decoupling, but rather by further binding itself to the global value chains. Germany’s opposition to banning imports of Russian gas and oil, due to its high dependence on Moscow’s energy supplies, is a prime example. The European Union also demonstrated caution when imposing sanctions on Russia in order to minimize repercussions for EU citizens and businesses. To defend itself from potential surgical sanctions that may be imposed by Western countries, China is willingly accepting economic olive branches extended by EU powers such as France and Germany.

However, China’s endeavor to leverage its gargantuan economy does not make it bulletproof to Western sanctions. To counter China’s economic coercion, the U.S.-led Western bloc unveiled its “de-risking” strategy as a precautionary response during the G7 summit, aimed at minimizing the potential costs of a sudden escalation over Taiwan. This undoubtedly intensified China’s self-sufficiency movement, prompting it to expand its envisioned sanctions-proofing system to include its neighbors.

Exemplified by its Xi’an summit with Central Asian leaders, Beijing is accelerating the formation of a G7-like alliance. This alliance aims to strengthen economic ties as well as foster a collective security consensus. In response to G7’s planned diversification of supply chains to reduce their reliance on China, the country is also diversifying sources of its self-sufficiency system as it realizes it would largely be on its own if no preparation is made to sustain its potential war economy. Central Asian nations, seeking a reliable security partner in the absence of Russia, could play a practical role in aiding China, particularly given their limited relations with Taiwan. Assurances from Central Asian leaders that they would not interfere in China’s approach to the island have solidified the scaffolding of the regional-scale self-sufficiency system that China is establishing.

Speculations about the quick decline of U.S. combat power during a confrontation with China may bolster the latter’s confidence in taking Taiwan through an attrition war. Nonetheless, the resistance from Taiwan and the backlash from Western countries cannot be underestimated. Understanding these challenges, China is bound to unite all available forces and exploit any cleavage between the United States and its allies. One particularly workable and valuable target is certain EU countries that are actively seeking economic development through cooperation with China. Macron’s advocate for “strategic autonomy” to ensure the EU has more options beyond simply aligning with the United States on issues like Taiwan is one significant achievement that China has snatched.

As China is shifting towards an attrition war strategy, it is imperative for the U.S.-led Western bloc to adapt accordingly. The “de-risking” tactic cannot fundamentally resolve the underlying reliance on China within global supply chains. Instead, the United States should rev up the development of Taiwan’s self-sufficiency system. Rather than focusing solely on marginal improvements in the already tight economic ties between Taiwan and other democracies, the U.S.-led Western bloc ought to provide Taiwan with a stronger diplomatic endorsement to spur more “swing countries” in Asia, such as Vietnam and Malaysia, to participate in the island’s self-sufficiency system.

It is anticipated that China’s economic coercion would continue to be effective in the event of a war with Taiwan. When that day comes, the reluctance of major EU powers like France and Germany to provide sufficient assistance during the early stages of the Ukraine war is likely to re-emerge. The only feasible way that Taiwan could outlast China in an attrition war relies on its endurance until a turning point where its counter-offensive achieves success is reached. But before that, it must establish a self-sufficiency system that is at least on par with, if not stronger than, that of China.

Jiachen Shi is a Ph.D. student in political science at Tulane University. He received his M.A. in international relations from the University of Liverpool. His articles have been featured in The Diplomat.

Image: Courtesy of the Office of the President of Kazakhstan.

A conversation with Stephen Kotkin.

Pour justifier leur défaite à la présidentielle de 2016, les démocrates américains ont avancé toutes sortes de raisons : l'iniquité du système électoral, les « fausses nouvelles », ou encore les Russes, accusés de collusion avec M. Donald Trump. Cette focalisation sur Moscou occulte les véritables causes (...) / États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Royaume-Uni, Russie, Armement, Élections, Géopolitique, Médias, Parti politique, Politique, Relations internationales, Stratégie, Diplomatie - 2018/05

On Friday evening Moscow time, the Kremlin—and the world—was stunned to witness what seemed like the beginnings of a coup against the government of President Vladimir Putin. The man leading the charge, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has a long history with the Kremlin. A former restauranteur, Prigozhin eventually, with the help of government contracts, built himself into an oligarch. But what he is most known for today is having founded the private military corporation Wagner Group. Since its inception in the early 2010s, it has seen action around the world, most notably in Africa and in the Russo-Ukrainian War, where it has played a large role in patching holes in sometimes weak Russian lines.

For the past few months, tensions between Prigozhin and the Kremlin—though Prigozhin has until recently been careful to critique the Russian Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, and not Putin himself—have risen, with Prigozhin claiming that Shoigu was purposefully denying Wagner ammunition. On Friday, those tensions reached a boiling point as Prigozhin posted a video that he claimed showed the aftermath of a Russian missile attack on a Wagner camp (though analysts have found that, based on videos of the same camp from one day before, nothing had changed).

Within twenty-four hours, Prigozhin and his forces proceeded to leave Ukraine and reached within 200 kilometers of Moscow. As of the time of writing on Saturday evening, according to news reports and Prigozhin’s own Telegram messages Belarussian president Alexander Lukashenko has apparently negotiated a ceasefire and potential resolution. Prigozhin claimed that his forces will return to Ukraine—though what Putin has promised in return is unclear.

What really caused Prigozhin to begin his self-proclaimed “March of Justice” is likewise unclear. While he originally claimed to be only hunting Shoigu and spoke repeatedly about not being against Putin, his drive toward the Kremlin seemed to belay that possibility. After all, any attempt to kill, usurp, or otherwise remove Putin’s minister of defense by force would clearly be seen as an attack on Putin himself.

Speculations that this was all some grand, 4D-chess-style play by Putin himself to eliminate Shoigu can be dismissed. Prigozhin’s spear penetrated deep into Russia, humiliating the Russian armed forces which were either unable or unwilling, for whatever reason, to fire on his troops (with the exception of a few pilots). If Putin wished to eliminate Shoigu, firing him would have been far less of a hassle.

But where do things go from here, how does this latest incident affect both Russia’s and the West’s future? While nearly anything can happen, there are only four potential scenarios.

The Likeiest Scenarios

The first scenario can be called “the Truce Holds.” Here, Prigozhin returns to the front, possibly keeping some troops in Rostov, and resumes fighting. What happens to him in the medium and long term, however, is open to some speculation, pending further details. Likewise, the nature of the agreement between Putin and Prigozhin and what it entails has yet to be seen. Perhaps Putin agrees to fire Shoigu (which would be something of a political earthquake, as Shoigu is the only person to have served in the top levels of the Russian Federation’s government since its founding). Whatever the ultimate outcome, however, Prigozhin is unlikely to remain in Russia. He has at this point eliminated multiple Russian Air Force targets—possibly killing the pilots—and humiliated Putin’s government on the world stage. Exile of a sort seems like the likely outcome.

The second scenario, “Mop Up,” sees the truce break. Prigozhin either immediately or in the near future rebels yet again. This time, however, he is captured or killed. The Russian government then proceeds to mop up the rest of Wagner as a semi-independent force. Putin’s credibility would still take a hit—after all, a private military company he allowed to come into existence would have driven over 200 km into his own country in a coup attempt, pulled back, and attacked a second time—but he would remain in power, for now. Russia’s war in Ukraine would be hampered, however, as Wagner’s forces made up a not insignificant amount of troops there. Depending on the nature and scale of the mop-up, Russia would be forced into either a temporary or even permanent defensive posture for the remainder of the conflict. Moreover, even if Prigozhin was killed, Putin would likely not last much longer in office—having created the conditions for repeated potential coup attempts by private military forces is too great a stain on his record. He’d be quietly pushed to retire before the next presidential election.

The third and unlikeliest scenario, “President Prigozhin,” sees the truce break—but here, the Russian armed forces melt like butter as Wagner resumes its advance and storms the Kremlin. It is not an impossibility; on the open highway from Rostov to Voronezh, Prigozhin faced effectively no resistance. He also, on his now-paused march, seemingly altered his goals (or at least publicly moved closer to his private ones): in response to an address by Putin demanding that he stand down, Prigozhin said that those against Wagner “today are those who gathered around scumbags.” As it is unlikely that Prigozhin drove to Moscow for a stern talk and a handshake, in this scenario he takes the Kremlin and installs himself or a politically presentable chosen ally as the new president of Russia.

If he manages to do this smoothly—without serious opposition from the armed forces or the intelligence services, which is unlikely—it would be fairly bad for Ukraine. Prigozhin has critiqued the Ministry of Defense for a while now on their running of the war—from the refusal to transition to a war economy to a, in Prigozhin’s view, reluctance to truly fight aggressively. The Wagneritr is also significantly more ideological than Putin; whereas Putin mostly gave meandering addresses about how sinister the West is, Prigozhin would likely put in place a “positive” vision for Russia. A Prigozhin in charge, either directly or indirectly, would likely immediately put the country onto a serious war footing instead of adopting Putin’s strategy of keeping the war as far away from the population as possible.

The Worst Case Scenario

Yet what if Prigozhin makes it to Moscow but fails to secure power? Perhaps Putin escapes to St. Petersburg and vows to fight on, or perhaps the Wagnerites and the Russian armed forces begin to fight in earnest on the outskirts of the city? This development, the fourth scenario, could only be described as the “Second Russian Civil War.” It is likely that, similar to the first Russian Civil War, the combatants would not remain limited to a  two-sided conflict of government against rebels. Ramsam Kadyrov, the leader of Russian Chechnya who has until now been loyal to Putin, may sense an opportunity to truly make a kingdom for himself. Certain elements in Tartarstan or elsewhere, which have itched for their own ethnically-based states, may work for independence. China, which has had an eye on Siberian water for years, may—in the name of securing their border—move to take control of some strategic parts of Siberia.

The West, for its part, would need to consider how to proceed. A breakup of Russia into civil war would be disastrous, which is why realist thinkers like Henry Kissinger have urged the West to avoid such. A fracturing of Russia’s eleven time zones would open up a new chess board on the budding Cold War between the United States and China, exacerbating tensions and, ultimately, likely sucking Washington into conflicts there.

The United States would also likely have to reel in NATO and European allies. Questions that Washington has never had to confront will need to be answered. In the event of a Russian civil war, Ukraine would likely recapture all its territory. But what if it wants to go further: should Washington stop an angry Ukraine from performing its own “special military operation” in a shattered Russia’s frontiers? What happens if Poland, seeing Russian authority collapse, begins looking hungrily at the territories east of the Curzon line, which it lost under Josef Stalin?

Plus, there is the question of Russia’s nuclear stockpile. Russia, after all, possesses more nuclear weapons than any other country: what happens if they fall into the hands of any of the Tartar nationalists, Wagnerites, Islamic extremists, or other warlords who could emerge from the conflict?

Caution is Warranted

As of the time of writing, events appear to be defaulting toward the first scenario and least destabilizing scenario. Yet the situation on the ground is fluid—Prigozhin’s currently-declared exile to Belarus, among whatever other concessions have been promised, depends heavily on Putin keeping his word. Whether that is enough for Prigozhin is yet to be determined.

Ultimately, when coups get underway, the fog of war intensifies, making it difficult to see what will happen. In the event of “Mop Up,” the scenario otherwise most favorable for Putin, his authority may still be so weakened that someone else tries another coup in the months to come. “President Prigozhin” could see Prigozhin briefly control Russia, only to be challenged by yet someone else. And a full-scale “Second Russian Civil War” produces questions which been asked only in the nightmares of Western strategic planners. The last Russian Civil War produced the Soviet Union, after all. There is no reason to believe that this one would produce anything better.

Anthony J. Constantini is writing his Ph.D. on populism and early American democracy at the University of Vienna in Austria. Previously he received an M.A. in International Relations from St. Petersburg State University. In 2016 he was the War Room Director for the NRSC.

Image: Shutterstock.

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi completes his state visit to the United States, and after the historic conclave of the national security advisors of the United States, Japan, and the Philippines in Manila, the United States continues to develop its latticework (to use the turn of phrase adopted by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan) of “flexible partnerships, institutions, alliances and groups of countries” across the world to balance China. The challenge now facing the U.S. policy establishment, however, is how to prevent these partnerships from being derailed.

Twenty years ago, in these pages, David M. Lampton bemoaned an American tendency to conduct bilateral relations with other states on the basis of the “Christmas tree” approach: “hanging all sorts of conditions (oftentimes very minor or petty issues) as a price for other states to pay for the continuation of normal, bilateral relations.” To combine the two metaphors, a latticework approach cannot hold up if too many weights are placed on it.

The fact that a coalition of states might find extremely close alignment on a particular issue (or set of issues) and seek ways to facilitate common action does not, therefore, mean that there is complete harmony of interests or agreement on all questions. Yet over the last several decades, the United States has often operated from the premise that Washington can present partners with a laundry list of disparate preferences and demand compliance. Even two decades ago, it was clear that “a country may earnestly desire to be a partner of the United States, but this in no way means that it ceases to pursue its own national interests.” Today, when the rise of China and greater coordination among the states of the Global South offers greater hedging opportunities, other countries have options while the United States has diminished leverage.

A “latticework” approach to international affairs means that the mix of obligations and commitments to other partners will differ on a case-by-case basis. For instance, the Japan-Republic of the Philippines-United States security consultation, which Josh Rogin argues might herald the emergence of a JAROPUS coalition, is grounded firmly in the assessment of a shared threat arising out of China’s efforts to extend its maritime sphere of influence. It does not automatically follow that JAROPUS will move in lockstep with the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partnership, even though AUKUS also exists to respond to China’s improved maritime capabilities in the Indo-Pacific basin. AUKUS implies a level of defense technological-industrial integration, for instance, that is not a step the JA or ROP parts of the JAROPUS triad are prepared to take. Nor do these two coalitions (JAROPUS and AUKUS) assume the emergence of a common security alliance with India (via the QUAD (Japan, Australia, India, U.S.) format.

It can seem very tempting to take all these developments and conclude that the end result is the creation of an all-encompassing alliance, akin to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In fact, a few years ago, my students at the Naval War College developed a timetable for the creation of an Indo-Pacific Area Treaty Organization, or IPATO. But even NATO is based on a series of limits: geographically confined to the North Atlantic area, and among states that share a vast, intertwined network of economic interests and general agreement on questions of values and governance. Yet NATO allies have often been very resistant to expanding their commitments to assisting the United States in other areas of the world.

The U.S.-India relationship shows the challenges of navigating a “latticework” relationship. When it comes to the rise of China as a regional and global challenger, the United States and India share common strategic assessments and concerns. For an America that seeks to reroute critical supply chains around a Chinese competitor, India is part and parcel of any robust Asian supply chain that bypasses China. Yet India’s strategic interests diverge from those of Washington when it comes to Russia and Iran. And on a whole host of issues related to understandings of human rights and what constitutes democratic governance, India is prepared to push back against U.S. efforts to argue that American (or Western) standards form the universal yardstick by which all others are measured. The challenge for the Biden administration, in the run-up to the Modi visit, has been whether it is possible to ringfence U.S.-India collaboration in the first two areas from the criticisms, particularly from members of Congress, about India’s divergence from U.S. preferences in the latter areas.

The “minilateralist” approach that Jada Fraser and others have discussed argues in favor of creating focused coalitions that are defined by a small set of issues. It also means that the United States has to become more comfortable with multitiered arrangements, where, beyond a small core group of allies (such as the UK, Germany, or Japan) that share an overlapping shared vision across an entire spectrum of security, political, and economic issues, the United States recognizes a larger group of associates who commit to some but not all of the obligations. For instance, Ash Jain and Matthew Kroening lay out a strategy for economic statecraft for a new democratic community of nations that brings together both a core group of U.S. allies but envisions a broader set of associated powers who partner with the U.S. on selected sets of issues. But a multilateralist, tiered level-of-association approach shifts the basis of engagement away from the broad parameters of alliance towards negotiating focused and specific agreements with other countries—laying out not only specific duties but also the benefits both parties expect to receive—and with the understanding that other issues not covered in those agreements will not alter the bargain.

Congress, in particular, never likes minilateralist, association approaches—members are loath to give up the power to insist on compliance with every possible demand or request. The Biden administration resisted those tendencies with the Modi visit, because of the strategic importance of India to the U.S. strategy for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” basin. But in the context of the strategic competition with China, a black-or-white approach to partners can backfire, especially when Beijing is willing to deal in shades of gray.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is a professor of national security studies at the U.S. Naval War College and director of the national security program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Image: Image Courtesy of the White House/Twitter.

En décidant d'intervenir militairement en Syrie, Moscou a sauvé le régime de M. Bachar Al-Assad et lui a permis de récupérer la plus grande partie du territoire perdu. Le Kremlin cherche désormais à imposer sa vision d'un règlement politique, tout en gardant un point d'équilibre dans ses relations avec (...) / Syrie, Proche-Orient, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Guérilla, Conflit, Islam, Fondamentalisme, Russie, Stratégie, Droit international - 2018/05

Le Parlement grec a adopté mi-janvier de nouvelles mesures d'austérité. Ce vote exigé par les créanciers a permis, après accord des ministres des finances de la zone euro, le versement de 6,7 milliards d'euros à Athènes. Les effets de ce genre de plan sur la population sont désormais mieux connus. / (...) / Grèce, Ajustement structurel, Économie, Mouvement de contestation, Santé, Drogue - 2018/05

How elites with a Cold War mindset threaten the country’s democracy.

Though the weather in the District of Columbia presented a gloomy and unusually chilly June day, the welcome for Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s state visit was anything but. Though small groups of Sikh separatist activists and human rights protesters did appear near the White House, they were drowned out by the sizable and enthusiastic welcoming crowd of Indian-Americans assembled on the South Lawn.

The Biden administration hoped this week’s ceremonies would provide a stately capstone to over a decade of ever-closer strategic partnership between the United States and India. The hard work of cultivating New Delhi as an economic and security bulwark against China has paid off with a plethora of new joint initiatives. For Modi’s part, he successfully communicated India’s growing national and economic confidence and brushed off concerns about “democratic backsliding” by declaring that there is “no space for discrimination” in India.

The remarks from both Joe Biden and Narendra Modi following the prime minister’s welcome stressed shared, universal values, including democracy and pluralism. Ironically, the DC and New Delhi commentariat spent the last week debating the balance of hard interests that drive the “strategic partnership,” and wondering if “values” play any role at all.

Following a one-on-one conversation, Biden and Modi unveiled a number of advances in the U.S.-India strategic partnership across the board, from space exploration to semiconductors to supply chains to military cooperation. U.S. Navy vessels can obtain repairs in Chennai, Mumbai, and Goa. Both militaries will invite liaisons from each other officer corps—an outcome unthinkable during the distrust of the Cold War. Most importantly, India now has access to the coveted F414 jet engine through a coproduction agreement. Moreover, the leaders announced a $3 billion purchase of thirty MQ-9B Sea Guardian predator drones. Both deals will enhance Indian air strength and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities vis-à-vis China in the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean.

Yet, developments in defense cooperation, while significant, must be seen as incremental improvements. Not only do they build on the achievements of the Trump and Obama administrations, but the fact will remain that India still relies on Russia for between 60 to 85 percent of its military equipment. While this critical dependence is lessening, it will not disappear for some time, and the rate of its diminishment depends on the United States offering cheaper defense weapons systems and India’s sustained investment in the modernization of its own armed forces.

As others have noted, Modi positioned India as a tribune for and bridge to the “Global South.” Biden seeks to take advantage of this by supporting India’s UN Security Council membership proposal and African Union representation at the G20. Realizing the noticeable lack of cooperation from developing countries on the administration’s Ukraine policy, the White House is eager to offer greater stakes in preserving the U.S.-led international order.

Modi’s address to a joint session of Congress attempted to soften his image with progressives and tout domestic achievements to Indian voters back home. Contrary to the media portrayal of the prime minister as a right-wing populist and analogue to Donald Trump, Modi waxed on the themes of diversity, dignity, and democracy while emphasizing his efforts to expand access to healthcare, protect the environment, and accelerate “women-led development.” Topped off with a thick layer of avuncular geniality, sprinkled with folksy Hindi witticisms, and encouraged by an enthusiastic visitor gallery, Modi’s address made a resoundingly charming impression on the assembled senators and members of Congress. That is apart from a group of hard-Left representatives that boycotted the speech.

Among the good feelings on either side and Modi’s talk of a “New Dawn,” those unfamiliar with the history of Indian grand strategy might be forgiven for thinking Washington and New Delhi will eventually agree to a treaty alliance akin to Australia or Japan. Nevertheless, India is certain to continue its hallowed policy of strategic autonomy and carve out a place for itself as one pole in a multipolar order. This carving, however, will no doubt rely on American military cooperation and economic investment, just as India’s non-alignment during the Cold War did not prohibit significant Soviet arms purchases.

Envisioning the future relationship will require a willingness to overlook or manage differences without losing sight of shared interests. India obviously cannot be classed among the United States’ traditional treaty allies. Yet it does not make sense that it be counted among more authoritarian partners with fewer shared values, like Saudi Arabia or Egypt. The fact that the United States and India at least conceive of themselves as quintessential democracies is significant, even if they disagree over the meaning as such.

James Himberger is the Associate Editor of The National Interest. He can be followed at @Beaconsfieldist on Twitter.

Image: Shutterstock.

In a joint press conference with President Joe Biden on June 22, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi remarked that “even the sky is not the limit” for U.S.-India cooperation. India’s state visit is nothing short of historical, considering the widespread craze for Modi’s charisma as well as the number of agreements signed across various sectors like defense, semiconductors, critical minerals, space, climate, education, healthcare, and more. Out of all of those, the proposal to jointly produce the GE F-414 jet engines stands out. This is because only four countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and France—can make jet engines. Manufacturing behemoth China is yet to crack it. The jet engine technology is so precious that the United States has been careful to share it even with its allies. This, however, is about to change.

General Electric has signed a memorandum of understanding with India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to co-produce the GE F-414 engine for the Indian Air Force. While GE is pursuing necessary export authorizations with the U.S. government, the agreement is set to usher in a new phase of defense cooperation between Washington and New Delhi.

In the last six months, both countries have been working through the initiative for Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) to set channels for strong private sector cooperation in technologies of strategic consequences. When Secretary of Defense Austin visited New Delhi, India and the United States also agreed on a Defense Industrial Cooperation Roadmap. The jet engine deal marks the beginning of a promising collaboration on defense innovation and technology cooperation. It is also a significant step towards settling the two fundamental differences in an otherwise thriving defense relationship. First, the United States wants to increase military sales to India, while the latter presses on technology transfers for indigenization. Second, India’s role as a maritime power has been central to U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific, while India has prioritized the land border with China. The GE jet engine deal shows how both countries can balance these mutual concerns.

From Buyer-Seller Relationship to Co-Production

Defense cooperation between the United States and India has grown exponentially in recent years. India’s elevation as a Major Defense Partner status (in 2016) and Strategic Trade Authorization I (in 2018) strengthened the foundation of the defense partnership. However, impediments such as different national bureaucratic structures, acquisition models, and budget processes held both countries back.

Until the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative could figure out the institutional nitty-gritty as a “silent enabler,” the United States supplied arms to India via Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sale mechanisms. However, a buyer-seller relationship was not feasible for India in the long term—though cutting-edge, American weaponry is costlier than French and Russian counterparts. It was a major reason India could not make big-ticket purchases from the United States and instead chose France (for the Rafale jet over F-16s, for example) and Russia (for the S-400 missile system over PATRIOT PAC-3). On the contrary, India sought technology transfers to develop its defense-industrial base. For the United States, it was difficult to divulge sensitive technologies without adequate trust in the Indian defense ecosystem.

The jet engine deal shows a modus operandi to realize the true potential of the strategic partnership. The jointly-produced GE F414 will fit into India’s advanced light combat aircraft (HAL Tejas Mk-2) and the first batch of prospective fifth-generation stealth fighters (HAL AMCA). As Indian Air Forces aim to maintain forty-two squadrons (around 756 fighter aircraft) by 2035, thousands of jet engines will enter the production line over the next decade. Through this deal, the United States has made a long-term investment in the Indian defense market.

The jet engine deal, in addition to the General Atomics UAV deal, will also advance India’s goal for military modernization. From assembling components to performing maintenance operations, Indian companies will gradually learn the know-how of jet engines. Technology transfers have a long gestation period before the receiver can independently develop some part of the system. In the next few years, India’s defense industry will absorb immense skill to build the capacity to produce high-tech systems.

If the United States and India begin more joint production projects of such scale, their military industries will be engaged for decades. The United States wants a share of India’s defense market, while India needs access to advanced military technology.

Addressing India’s Conundrum: Land or Maritime?

America’s interest lies in seeing India as the central maritime power in the Indian Ocean region. In contrast, India’s present primary concern is the volatile Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. Though India has a development-centric approach to the Indian Ocean, a hot border has constrained New Delhi from committing desired military resources in the maritime domain. Time and again, U.S. policymakers acknowledged India’s border challenges but lacked a sustainable strategy to facilitate India’s proactive posture in the Indian Ocean.

The jet engine deal has also opened a pathway for India to mitigate the Himalayan threat while promoting its maritime assertiveness. Most fighter jets using the GE-F414 engine will be deployed at India’s land borders. Procuring MQ-9B SeaGuardians UAVs will also ramp up its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The development comes after Washington leased two Predator drones in 2020 for surveillance after the Ladakh standoff with China.

Future areas of defense-industrial cooperation include aerial combat, land mobility systems, ISR, and munitions. Considering the regional threat environment, India will primarily use these technologies in the Himalayan theater. But this is not all. The official iCET handout refers to an “initial focus” on these seemingly land-oriented technologies, after which both would identify their operational use cases in maritime security. Furthermore, deployed U.S. ships will now be able to access Indian shipyards for service and repair. Such access to the American fleet on Indian naval facilities is unprecedented.

The United States is farsighted in realizing that New Delhi will go maritime only when the 2,167-mile Sino-Indian land border is taken care of. India’s inroads in the Indian Ocean will also directly result from its economic rise and territorial security. A strong India on the land can also commit more to external balancing in the maritime domain, which supplements America’s wider Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Setting Future Goal Posts

Though the GE jet engine deal is a significant milestone, the United States and India can do much more to enrich the partnership. Some of the future goals posts for both countries can include the following.

First, the United States should strive to become the largest arms provider to India. Russia’s ability to act as a reliable arms supplier for India has diminished due to the prolonged war in Ukraine, a bottled-up economy, and subservience to China. America can fill the vacuum created by a weak Russia. At the same time, New Delhi can cultivate the Department of Defense and the military-industrial lobbies to maintain a level-headed realist India policy in the corridors of Washington.

Second, the United States and India should build on the outcomes of the visit to negotiate a Security of Supply Arrangement and Reciprocal Defense Procurement. The former will allow India to request prior delivery of orders with U.S. firms while the latter will promote synergy in research, development, and interoperability between the two countries. These agreements will facilitate working together during unanticipated disruptions and possibly open channels for wartime cooperation.

Amidst all the Modi-mania and euphoria regarding India, the United States policymakers must apply sober thinking. The United States is accustomed to leading its allies and having partners who toe the line on almost all issues. India, however, does not like to be led by superpowers; it instead strongly pursues issue-based alignments. Yet though their strategic worldview differs, the U.S.-India bonhomie cannot be more natural in today’s strategic environment and, one daresay, shared democratic values. Washington and New Delhi must be persistent because relationships of such importance are seldom a sprint but a marathon.

Ambuj Sahu is a doctoral scholar in the Department of Political Science at Indiana University Bloomington. He was previously trained as an electrical engineer at the Indian Institute of Technology Delhi. He tweets at @DarthThunderous.

Image: Image courtesy of GE.

In Lebanon, political paralysis and the inability to uphold basic tenants of democracy have become features of the country’s system. Last week’s twelfth parliamentary attempt to choose a new president was defeated in another spectacular fashion. The powerful Shia Hezbollah and some of its allies exited the chamber, breaking the necessary quorum to keep the vote going. This made the speaker of the Parliament, Nabih Berri, close the session due to an insufficient number of members being present. This has led some of Lebanon’s political parties to argue for a new model of governance, specifically one that makes Lebanon adopt neutrality vis-à-vis all wars. Is such an idea viable?

In an interview with former minister Melhem Riachi, who is also an MP representing the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF), he shared his belief that such a proposal is not a theoretical discussion or intellectual exercise. Rather, it is a necessity to rescue Lebanon from its self-inflicted wounds. We discussed why it has been difficult thus far to elect a president and break the now eight-month deadlock.

“It is normal, very normal. Because this is not a cause, it is the effect of many causes. Especially because Lebanon is facing many problems between its communities and how people see politics. It is also under the influence of regional and international developments.”

Lebanon has always felt the burdens or potentially the rewards of regional and global decisionmaking. As the regional tensions calm down following Syria and the Arab League’s rapprochement and Iran and Saudi Arabia’s resumption of diplomatic ties, it is natural for people to ask whether these developments will have a positive impact on Lebanon’s affairs at home. One example remains the presidency. Riachi acknowledged that although the question of who will make it to Baabda (the presidential home) is not solely up to the Lebanese, this should not stop the democratic process.

“We cannot elect a new president in a purely Lebanese way. We tried hard to make it so but it was impossible. Unfortunately, this is caused by an equilibrium of power. Our camp and theirs are equal in Parliament. That is why no one can elect a president alone.” When asked if the solution will come from outside or direct negotiations between both camps, Riachi said, “The real solution must be to go and vote, and vote and vote, again.”

Riachi talked about how the source of Lebanon’s problems lies in its roots, meaning the manner in which politics has been practiced and the country’s foundations have laid the groundwork for its current failure.

“I think it’s better we find a solution in the roots. Because the problem is in the regime, the way of our democracy; it is our constitution, we need to shake it all and rebuild it again all together with the principle of subsidiarity.”

He went on to say that Lebanon must now more than ever declare its neutrality to the world and request all foreign intervention to be stopped. “We need neutrality, we need to declare it, and get everybody away from Lebanon. When I say everybody, I mean everybody.” When asked to specify, Riachi replied, “The Iranians, the Saudis, the Americans, the French, everybody who tried to influence us. Everybody must go out. Our allies, and their allies.” Unfortunately, such a proposition is not so simple to implement.

Hezbollah has long received support from Iran and its allies, which is largely responsible for making it a regional player. For decades, the Saudis have backed Lebanese Forces and other opposition parties as a counterweight to Hezbollah and Iran’s regional influence that it designated as a threat. This was always a dilemma for Lebanon. How can sovereignty be respected when internal players from all sides are recipients of foreign support that bypasses the state? It can’t. Riachi accepts this as a historical reality and recognizes the need for change.

“Everybody must be out. This is a real neutrality to keep its people here. We have a huge wave of immigration, especially from the Christian community. This is dangerous, and it is more dangerous for the Muslims. Because the Muslims cannot live here without the Christians and vice versa.”

Lebanon has faced an increase in emigration since the economic crisis began in 2019. According to a study conducted by the Lebanese American University, emigration has pushed out the middle class which was largely comprised of the Christian community. Lebanon’s system is built on the concept of confessional consensus.

As jobs became scarce and salaries fell, most Lebanese have worried about their financial security. As the crisis exacerbated, so did dependency on international aid. Remittances from Lebanese living abroad have grown annually. World Bank data shows a 27 percent increase since the fall of Lebanon’s pound (lira).

Nevertheless, there still must be a final decision taken from the Lebanese leadership on foreign policy. For too long, Lebanon has been like a gray piece on the Middle East geostrategic chess board. It belongs to no one, but everyone can use it. Changing this reality must be on top of the priorities for Lebanon’s future president and government. The question is simple: what should define Lebanon’s foreign policy in the Middle East?

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

Image: Shutterstock.

Leopard 2A6 and Leopard 2A4 suffer their first losses in Ukraine

Recent reports of the Spring Offensive in Ukraine have started off with mixed news for Ukraine. While there have been reports of some gains, the recent destruction of a dam has flooded an area south of Kherson, narrowing the territory where Ukraine can conduct their offensive. While Ukraine does have some amphibious vehicles, Russia’s numerous BMP-3s would likely be the dominant weapon in assaulting or repelling attacks in water logged regions. A ground offensive to take this now flooded territory has likely been halted, blunting the southern push against Russian fixed defences south of Kherson.

Images and video of newly supplied NATO weapons being destroyed have also appeared from the front line in Ukraine. The loss of what looks to be two Leopard 2A6s and one Leopard 2A4 was accompanied by the loss of several American made Bradley fighting vehicles. The loss of so many Bradleys will be surprising, but the loss of what was promoted as the iron fisted Leopard 2 tanks is something Russia will use to regain their reputation as a strong and capable military force.

During the 1991 Gulf War, there were very few losses of American tanks and vehicles to enemy fire. One of the most notable losses was a crew member who was killed when a Soviet made BMP-1 used its low velocity cannon designed in the 1950s to penetrate the turret of a Bradley fighting vehicle. While the Bradley is a remarkable machine, it is not invincible or as well protected as a tank. The advantage of the Bradleys were to move troops quickly to needed areas and support troops with its cannon. The Bradley’s also have two TOW missiles that can eliminate most Russian tanks, but direct fire or artillery fire on a Bradley will almost always take them out of a fight.

The Leopard 2s were always a mixed solution for Ukraine. In the past, versions of Turkey’s Leopard 2A4s were damaged and destroyed fighting militants in Syria. While the Leopard 2A6s are the most modern version of the tank given to Ukraine, they are not invincible, especially against artillery. The front of the 2A6s, while very well protected, does not extend with the same level of protection on the sides and back of the Leopard 2A6. There are only a limited number of high value weapons NATO countries can spare, and there are not an unlimited amount of Leopard 2 tanks available NATO allies can do without.

The confidence NATO has in the Leopard 2s are likely well founded, but with Ukraine now on the offensive against fixed positions, there will be big losses for the attacking side. While publicly unexpected, Ukrainian Forces have known that losses would also include some of the best weapons on the field. Heavy losses were expected, and images of burning NATO tanks should have been known to be used by Russia. The images of advanced Russian tanks exploding and losing their turrets formed much of the narrative of a weak and disorganised Russian military. Images and videos of NATO tanks perishing in much of the same manner will be used to change the narrative. The biggest loss for Ukraine will not be Leopard 2 tanks, but the will of the West to support its offensive against Russia over time.

Losing the support of NATO may come in different forms. A successful attack by Ukraine in pushing Russian forces back to the the 2014 lines may encourage many allies to push for a cease-fire, especially if weapons are depleted and local politics in ally countries turn against further combat support. As mentioned above, a change in narrative with the view of NATO tanks and equipment suffering losses to the once embarrassed Russian Army may turn ally and adversary opinions over once again as it did with Russia’s retreat from the assault on Ukraine’s major cities. Ukraine depends greatly on the morality of their cause, and NATO allies depend greatly on its popular support from their people. Losing Leopard 2 tanks in the field in horrific ways will most likely change the narrative rapidly.

Another form of lost support for Ukraine will come from a slow degradation of support for their cause within ally countries themselves. The anti-war movement in the United States seems to pass to both sides of the aisle. Scenes of a recently fallen Afghanistan are mixed with the aftermath of recent conflicts there and in Iraq as American servicemen and servicewomen are back home dealing with the after-effects of being in combat. Policies that do little to quell conflict in Ukraine also turn the public against the war. Lives could be saved if foreign drones were prevented from freely making it to Russia to be used as terror weapons. Policies should be changed to use North American energy reserves to displace the large war chest being paid for by still persistent exports of Russian Oil and Gas.

Actions by NATO allies to create the image of support hurt Ukraine’s ability to fight Russia if those actions do not lead to positive and practical outcomes. An absurd example comes by way of the treatment of Canadian NATO members who diligently have gone to Poland and Latvia to support NATO forces helping Ukraine. Canadian Forces in Europe have been ignored by their Government to the point of being a health and safety risk. Many Canadian soldiers in Poland were not given food to eat while in Poland, to the point of going into personal debt to compensate while contributing their lives to Canada, NATO and Ukraine. Canadian soldiers in Latvia were sent on training missions without protective gear, notably helmets. Their Government have ignored these issues, all while promising more Canadian Forces member’s help, money and now even a big plane. Canada said they would not meet NATOs minimum contributions as they gave more than any other nation to help Ukraine(not nearly as much as Poland), but the end result put well intentioned Canadian soldiers in danger. When assistance is given, but done to the detriment of your population who want to help, it obviously sours support for your united cause.

Ukraine’s successes or failures in pressing south to the Black Sea and fighting to re-gain territories lost in 2014 must be measured with the amount of support they realistically expect to achieve at each level of the conflict. If Ukraine can manage expectations of their successes with images of losses, they would have just managed one piece of the larger support puzzle. Objectives of success may differ in the minds of NATO allies. Accepting support from allies who’s good faith does not extend back home to their own population or troops will damage future campaigns without question. It is important to be careful in this regard.

Supprimer plus de mille emplois en France alors qu'elle réalise des milliards de bénéfices dans le monde : telle fut la méthode de l'entreprise Goodyear pour mettre au pas les syndicats. À Amiens, après une longue occupation de l'usine, le combat ouvrier a pris fin en 2014, et les premiers morts sont (...) / France, Entreprise, Inégalités, Mouvement de contestation, Pauvreté, Syndicalisme, Travail, Violence - 2018/05

President Xiomara Castro’s crackdown on armed gangs has met fierce resistance from those who control the streets.

A long and detailed Washington Post article about the work of the Department of Justice and FBI in investigating the insurrection at the Capitol on January 6, 2021 and related efforts to overturn the result of the 2020 presidential election shows officials being highly reluctant to include in any investigation the actions of Donald Trump, despite his key role in the events in question. An aversion to taking any action that could possibly be portrayed as having a political motivation left a major line of inquiry unexplored for about a year until the facts of the case left no choice but to perform what now constitutes the January 6 portion of Special Counsel Jack Smith’s investigation.

This picture is, of course, the opposite of what Trump’s defenders continue to assert is a political bias in the department that has made investigators and prosecutors eager to go after Trump and to single him out for disparate treatment. That assertion is being heard again this week on Capitol Hill, with Republicans inviting testimony from John Durham, who was given the job during Trump’s administration of trying to find a “political witch hunt” behind an earlier FBI investigation involving Trump’s relations with Russia and who failed to find any, being reduced to making criticisms about analytical rigor and the like. That failure was hardly surprising, given that the Department of Justice inspector general had already determined that the opening of the FBI’s investigation into the matter was justified, given what is in the public record about Trump’s relationship with the Russians along with important and still unanswered questions about that relationship.

The Post’s reporters evidently had well-placed sources inside the department. Their account is so detailed that the story tells itself in a way that would make it difficult to impart a spin to the narrative, even though it would be safe to assume that at least some of the sources were happy to have this reportage become public because it refutes the false accusations of investigations being politically biased.

Viewed from another angle, however, the account does not put the Department of Justice in an especially favorable light. Officials were so scared of being subjected to political criticism from pro-Trump elements that they dragged their feet in pursuing lines of inquiry that they probably should have pursued with alacrity. They viewed the politically safest way of investigating January 6 to be a “bottom-up” approach that gave priority to prosecuting individual rioters who attacked the Capitol. It was a small-fish approach that intentionally shoved aside any attention to big fish, notwithstanding evidence they already had of a more organized seditious conspiracy. It was not until Smith assumed his present duties that the scope and speed of the investigation reached levels that it would have reached months earlier were it not for the trepidation about a political backlash.

The principal consequence has been a delay in having open questions resolved and justice served. Whatever problems may arise from prosecutions bumping up against the 2024 political calendar are due less to any intentional bumping—by either pro-Trump or anti-Trump elements—than to timidity-based slowness within the department.

The pusillanimity in investigating Trump has given rise to a double standard of sorts in matters involving political candidates—but again, in a direction opposite from what Trump’s supporters allege. The Post article mentions an episode from the past that evidently weighed heavily on the minds of prosecutors and investigators: the announcement by then-director of the FBI James Comey, just eleven days before 2016 presidential election, that the bureau was re-opening an investigation into Hillary Clinton’s use of an email server—only to determine later that there still were insufficient grounds for bringing any criminal case. Critics charged, with good reason, that this election eve announcement probably contributed to Clinton’s defeat. Officials in the FBI and Department of Justice, faced with considering Trump’s role in events of 2020 and 2021, did not want to do anything that might have similar political repercussions, or might be perceived as having them. They overcompensated not only in avoiding any politically ill-timed announcements about investigations but in failing for months to investigate certain important matters at all.

In shying away from timely and vigorous investigation of anything involving Trump, the timorous officials not only delayed serving justice but did not avoid political brickbats from Trump’s supporters anyway. Trump’s party had been pushing hard the theme of a supposedly politicized law enforcement bureaucracy even before its more recent hostile reactions to the indictment of Trump regarding the Mar-a-Lago documents. It is difficult to imagine that the themes and reactions would have sounded any different if the officials in the department had conducted investigations with the speed and intensity they deserved. And even a carefully researched article in the Washington Post is unlikely to change the minds of ordinary supporters of Trump who have internalized those themes.

False claims about political bias affecting the work of law enforcement and security bureaucracies undoubtedly are partly just partisan rhetoric. But there probably is a genuine difficulty in understanding the mindset and professional ethic of the public servants who work in those bureaucracies. The people making the claims are political animals; those against whom they are making accusations are not. The latter self-selected into work in which apolitical performance of duties is part of the organization’s code of conduct. Refraining from partisan bias is part of their professional raison d’être.

Of course, people working in bureaucracies have personal political views, which they express in the privacy of the voting booth and possibly openly after they retire. But the resistance to letting any such views contaminate their performance of duty as long as they wear a badge in an organization such as the Department of Justice is strong and reflexive. I have seen the strength of that resistance first-hand in the intelligence community, where part of the organizational code of conduct is neutrality with respect not only to parties and candidates but also to policies. It is thus not surprising that many professionals within the department would strive to the point of excess to avoid doing anything that could possibly be construed as departing from neutrality.

The false accusations about bias have multiple costs. They are, in the first instance, slurs against honest people doing their jobs with dedication. They impede the full and proper functioning of something like a law enforcement agency in the current matters involving Trump. They create a constituency for possible moves that really would weaponize law enforcement and make the Department of Justice a political servant of whoever happens to occupy the White House.

Even if those advocating such destructive moves do not get the opportunity to make them, the false accusations encourage over the long term more of the sort of mission-impairing hesitancy that the Post article describes. The damaging falsehoods centered on Trump will lead investigators and prosecutors in the future—faced with cases involving other politicians well after Trump has left the scene—to be afraid to pursue a case vigorously to wherever the facts may lead.

Paul Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was as a National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Professor Pillar also served in the National Intelligence Council as one of the original members of its Analytic Group. He is also a contributing editor for this publication.

Image: Shutterstock.

Last November, the research nonprofit OpenAI unleashed ChatGPT, its artificial intelligence (AI) powered chatbot, on the world. Mere months before, conversations about AI were relegated to academic conferences and science fiction conventions. But, as ChatGPT exploded to become the fastest-growing consumer application in history, AI rapidly became a kitchen table issue. Now, policymakers are shining a spotlight on the industry and asking the question: how much regulation is necessary to mitigate potential risks without stifling innovation?     

From government reports to briefings and hearings to legislation, AI is the topic du jour on Capitol Hill as lawmakers attempt to answer this question. While legislative proposals regarding AI vary widely, the ethos behind such proposals can generally be grouped into two categories. The first consists of proposals aimed primarily at mitigating potential risks of AI, which typically take a more heavy-handed approach to regulation in the name of consumer protection. The second takes a broader view of the AI ecosystem, attempting to foster innovation and global competitiveness with a more light-touch regulatory regime.

While both approaches are well-intentioned, the latter focusing on innovation and competitiveness holds greater promise. After all, the United States is not the only country developing AI systems, and amidst the Great Tech Rivalry it is essential that we remain globally competitive in cutting-edge technologies. If Washington is too heavy-handed in regulating AI, it risks becoming an innovation desert, like Europe.

The Heavy Hand…

The heavy-handed approach is typified by Representative Ted Lieu (D-CA). As one of the very few members of Congress holding degrees in computer science, Rep. Lieu has been one of the most vocal lawmakers on the question of AI regulation. Just before introducing the first federal piece of legislation itself largely written by an AI, Rep. Lieu opined in the New York Times:

The rapid advancements in AI technology have made it clear that the time to act is now to ensure that AI is used in ways that are safe, ethical and beneficial for society. Failure to do so could lead to a future where the risks of A.I. far outweigh its benefits…. What we need is a dedicated agency to regulate A.I.

Though Rep. Lieu admits that his proposal has little chance of actually passing through Congress this session—and concedes that the first step toward an AI regulator is a “study and report” approach—Lieu and many of his colleagues are hyperfocused on heading off consumer harm that largely remains theoretical. Such an approach seeks to create a regulatory regime based on what these technologies “could” or “might” do in the future.

This prospective framework is antithetical to rapid innovation. For evidence, we need only look to Europe.

Brussels has a long tradition of onerously regulating technologies in the name of mitigating risks to consumers. Take for instance the European Union’s comprehensive data privacy framework, the General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR has three primary objectives: protecting consumers with regard to the processing of personal data, protecting the right to the protection of personal data, and ensuring the free movement of personal data within the Union. To differing degrees, the GDPR arguably succeeded at the first two of these goals; the legislation created strong consumer protections around the collection and processing of personal data.

However, the GDPR has mostly failed to achieve the goal of ensuring the free movement of data. This is primarily because data, which flows seamlessly across physical borders, cannot be impeded nearly as easily. Tech platforms and applications have had a difficult time complying with the GDPR, which in turn has restricted the voluntary, free flow of personal information rather than ensured it.

According to one study that examined over 4 million software applications, the implementation of the GDPR “induced the exit of about a third of available apps.” Perhaps even worse, the GDPR has led to a dearth of technological innovation throughout Europe. That same study found that the market entry of new applications halved following the implementation of GDPR.

The European Parliament is now developing legislation that it intended to be “the world’s first comprehensive AI law.” While this proposed EU AI Act is not a one-size-fits-all policy akin to the GDPR and other European tech regulations, it will create strict rules for any system utilizing AI technology. Such strict rules around new applications for AI systems, imposed regardless of concrete, provable harms, are likely to strangle the little commercial innovation around AI that remains in Europe.

…versus the Light Touch

The United States cannot afford to follow in Europe’s footsteps and implement heavy-handed regulations that might hamper innovation for the sake of mitigating unproven harms. With China leading the way in both AI innovation and regulation, we must be considerate in our own approach to both. AI systems certainly present novel and unique risks in practically every aspect of human life. But these new technologies also present novel and unique opportunities that should not be handicapped by a heavy-handed approach driven by moral panic.

As two of my colleagues recently wrote in American Affairs, getting AI regulation right “requires a commonsense approach that can account for both the mind-bending dynamics of cutting edge AI systems, while also right-sizing the risks of AI regulations and AI gone wrong.” While Rep. Ted Lieu and his colleagues in the “sky is falling” camp go too far in the direction of onerous European-like tech regulation, there is another camp that recognizes the importance of a light-touch approach to supporting domestic innovation and global competitiveness.

A prime example of this is the recently introduced legislation from Senators Michael Bennet (D-CO), Mark Warner (D-VA), and Todd Young (R-IN). Based on the American Technology Leadership Act from the last Congress, this revised proposal would establish a new Office of Global Competition Analysis. The purpose of this new office would be to assess America’s global competitiveness in strategic technologies and provide policy recommendations on ways to protect and improve competitiveness. As Sen. Bennet stated, the goal of the legislation is to “lose our competitive edge in strategic technologies like semiconductors, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence to competitors like China.”

This second camp, as typified by Sen. Bennet and his colleagues, is less reactive, more constructive, considers the importance of global competition, and recognizes that caution is necessary to avoid imposing heavy-handed regulations that hinder innovation and hamper a nation’s ability to keep pace with AI advancements. To be clear, these lawmakers are not ignoring the real risks presented by AI systems. Rather, they are putting such risks into a global perspective and making a more well-informed calculus about the proper level of regulation.

Maintaining American Innovation

By fostering an environment that encourages both domestic and global competition around AI technologies, and by providing a regulatory framework that promotes responsible AI use, the United States can maintain its global leadership in this crucial field. By embracing light regulation focused on global competitiveness, policymakers can encourage investment, attract top AI talent, and foster an environment that enables American companies to lead in AI development. By allowing room for experimentation and adaptability, the United States can remain at the forefront of AI innovation, providing economic and societal benefits while maintaining a competitive edge on the global stage.

Luke Hogg is the director of outreach at the Foundation for American Innovation where his work focuses on the intersection of emerging technologies and public policy. He is also an innovation fellow at Young Voices. You can follow him on Twitter at @LEHogg.

Image: Unsplash.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Beijing from June 18–19 in an attempt to dial down tensions between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and rekindle high-level communication channels to steady their wobbling bilateral relationship. Blinken’s trip marks the first for a U.S. secretary of state to travel to China since 2018, and he is also the highest-ranking American official to visit since the inauguration of President Joe Biden in January 2021.

In the context of worsening U.S.-PRC relations, Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali last November and agreed to tackle their disagreements responsibly. Blinken originally planned to visit Beijing in February this year. But he scuttled the trip soon after the United States detected and shot down a high-altitude balloon that U.S. intelligence says was used for espionage over North America.

In the intervening months after downing the PRC’s spy balloon, U.S.-China relations declined precipitously. Military-to-military contacts between Washington and Beijing have stalled. Yet, dangerously close encounters between the two militaries by air and sea have not ceased, as shown by the recent near collisions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, the United States has stepped up its support for Taiwan while charging Beijing for considering to give lethal support to Russia for Putin’s aggressions on Ukraine and strengthening the Chinese espionage base in Cuba to intercept and eavesdrop on signals and communication messages crucial to U.S. national security.

Recognizing the dangers accompanying a lack of dialogue, the Biden administration has sought a “thaw” in relations with Beijing. Beijing, however, has countered, accusing Washington of promoting a duplicitous two-pronged approach—seeking dialogue to set up “guardrails” with China on the one hand and forcibly containing China’s legitimate strategic and economic interests on the other. Congress enacting restrictions on the semiconductor trade and mobilizing allies across Europe and Indo-Pacific against the PRC are notable examples.

Thus, when Blinken arrived in Beijing, it’s no wonder his hosts were eager to put the onus of redressing U.S.-China relations on Washington. PRC Foreign Minister Qin Gang claimed “that the China-U.S. relationship is at the lowest point” since 1979. Wang Yi, the top foreign affairs official of the Chinese Communist Party, attributed the “root cause” of deterioration to Washington’s “misperceptions toward China.” He demanded that the United States “reflect upon itself” and stop inflating the "China threat.” President Xi posited that the international community expects Washington and Beijing to “coexist in peace and have friendly and cooperative relations.” The Chinese leader asked Blinken to “make more positive contributions to stabilizing China-U.S. relations.”

Blinken’s Three Objectives and Outcomes

Secretary Blinken communicated that the Biden administration values a responsible relationship between Washington and Beijing. He set out three objectives for this trip, all predicated upon an overarching principle: “intense competition requires sustained diplomacy to ensure that competition does not veer into confrontation or conflict.”

First, it is necessary to reopen lines of communication so both powers can responsibly manage their relationship and avoid misunderstandings. Second, Blinken asserted the significance of advancing the interests and values of the United States and its allies and partners, including “speaking directly and candidly” about these concerns with Beijing. Thirdly, he believes the two nations can jointly “explore the potential for cooperation on transnational challenges.”

How many of these objectives did Blinken achieve in his two-day whirlwind visit to Beijing? According to the secretary’s press conference after his meeting with Xi Jinping and the State Department readout concluding the visit, there were no breakthroughs. This outcome was expected, but there are optimistic signs that communication is back on track, and both nations recognize the urgency to halt a downward spiral in relations. The State Department described the meetings as “candid, substantive, and constructive.” China’s Foreign Ministry reported “candid, in-depth and constructive talks at length on the overall bilateral ties and important issues.” Beijing also voiced the need to build “a stable, predictable and constructive relationship with the U.S.”

On areas of possible cooperation, the United States and China promised to reinforce “people-to-people” exchanges between students, scholars, and businesses, as well as increase direct flights between the two countries. Transnational issues like climate change, North Korea’s nuclear program, global economic stability, food security, international health, and the fentanyl crisis were also identified as areas for future discussion and collaboration.

Yet, for areas of contentions, deep fissures remain. Though Beijing has reassured the secretary that “it is not and will not provide lethal assistance to Russia for use in Ukraine,” and Blinken confirmed there is no evidence contradicting that, he still raised concerns that Chinese companies “may be providing technology” for Moscow to bolster their military capacity. Indeed, in China, the ubiquitous influence of the CCP makes it challenging to distinguish between transactions made by state-owned businesses from those of private enterprises.

As the United States and its allies stepped up efforts to ban China from access to advanced and sensitive technologies crucial to military and economic dominance, Beijing has as well taken punitive actions on American and foreign businesses operating domestically. Blinken sought to “disabuse” the Chinese view that the United States was aiming at “economically containing” or “decoupling” from China. He explained that the United States is merely “de-risking,” or “investing in our own capacities and in secure, resilient supply chains; pushing for level playing fields for our workers and our companies; defending against harmful trade practice; and protecting our critical technologies so that they aren’t used against us.” This is in line with the notion of “small yard and high fence” coined by Jake Sullivan, Biden’s national security advisor, referring to “implementing carefully tailored restrictions on the most advanced semiconductor technology exports to China, premised on straightforward national security concerns.” The PRC wasn’t persuaded, as Wang asked the Blinken to “lift illegal unilateral sanctions against China, stop suppressing China's scientific and technological advances.” Xi told Blinken “neither side should try to shape the other side by its own will, still less deprive the other side of its legitimate right to development."

Differences over Taiwan

The Taiwan Strait remains the most rancorous sticking point for the United States and China. Beijing asserted that Taiwan is the “core of China’s core interests,” which “has no room for compromise or concession.” Blinken, nonetheless, reiterated the one-China policy mantra derived from the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. He reminded Beijing of “the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.” The United States “does not support Taiwan independence” and is “opposed to any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side.” Washington insists on the peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences and meeting its responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act, including ensuring that the island democracy can defend itself from invasion.

Regarding crisis management, the Xi government has rebuffed Blinken’s persistent requests to restart the military-to-military engagement put on hold since Pelosi’s Taiwan visit last year. The confrontational incidents between their respective fighter jets in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait have made restoring these connections highly relevant. Still, Beijing may continue to act recklessly and brazenly in these scenarios to deter U.S. military movements.

Biden’s Optimism and Reality Check

It is unclear whether high-level diplomacy can meaningfully change the trajectory of U.S.-Chinese relations, which is still veering toward greater antagonism. But at the very least, resuming talks and contacts will allow each side to convey their intentions more clearly. Blinken’s visit will likely pave the way for more high-level official meetings between Washington and Beijing, including potential visits from Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, and Climate Envoy John Kerry in the coming months. Beijing is particularly interested in meeting with American officials in charge of economic policy given China’s economic slowdown and their anxiousness over Washington’s bans on foreign investment and export of high-technologies to China. Xi is reportedly looking forward to his first visit to the United States since 2017 to attend the APEC meeting in San Francisco, where he is expected to meet with Biden.

Domestic politics, however, are at play. The Biden administration has already received mounting criticisms from congressional Republicans for slow-walking the delivery of weapons to Taiwan and the investigations into the February spy balloon incident and the origins of COVID-19. While calling Xi a “dictator” kept in the dark about the spy balloon incursion, Biden argued that the incident was more “embarrassing than intentional” for Beijing. The president plans to meet with his Chinese counterpart again to talk about their “legitimate differences” and areas where they can get along.

The president’s optimism aside, it remains an objective fact that U.S.-PRC relations are so brittle and their mutual trust level so low that any new conflicts can plunge their fragile détente into another disequilibrium. The PRC’s growing power and ambitions cannot but lead to heightened anxieties and vigilant responses from Washington. The January and November 2024 Presidential Elections in Taiwan and the United States, respectively, will introduce new uncertainties. Beijing’s belligerent reactions toward Pelosi’s Taiwan trip last August and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s transits to America this April illustrated how the island’s upcoming political transition—assuming another more nationalist candidate is elected—may further sharpen Xi’s conviction that the situation requires further escalation or even invasion. Come November 2024, Biden’s intense competition with the PRC may not be sufficient to satisfy the burgeoning domestic and bipartisan anti-China sentiments and ensure his reelection. A more hawkish White House will derail the modus vivendi that Blinken has worked so assiduously to reconstruct.

The Biden administration needs to be more clear-eyed about the extent and practicality of stabilizing relations with the PRC after years of adversarial postures from both sides. Whether the American public is willing to accept the president’s approach and whether Beijing is genuinely willing to reciprocate Washington’s overtures is not at all assured.

Dean P. Chen, Ph.D., is an associate professor of Political Science at Ramapo College of New Jersey.

Image: Shutterstock.

Bilateral constraints haven’t gotten in the way of rapidly deepening ties.

NATO may soon have an alliance within the alliance.