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In a somewhat surprising move, Turkey has decided to support the bid of Sweden to join NATO. Stockholm’s impending ascension will make it the 32nd country to join the transatlantic alliance.

Speaking on July 10, NATO Chief Jens Stoltenberg announced that Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had dropped (or at least put aside) his previous reservations and “agreed to forward the accession protocol for Sweden to the Grand National Assembly as soon as possible, and work closely with the Assembly to ensure ratification.” This news was unexpected by many, especially considering the fact that only several hours earlier Erdoğan was demanding EU membership for Turkey as a precondition for its support of Sweden’s NATO ascension.

Stockholm’s initial bid to join the alliance was put forward in May 2022 as a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, Ankara was hesitant to back the Scandinavian country’s application due to the latter’s perceived failure to crack down on members of the PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party). Sweden has some of the most generous asylum laws in the EU and has accepted millions of refugees over the last several decades, including many Kurds. Ankara claims that some of these individuals have ties to the PKK and are subsequently operating out of Sweden to plot attacks and sow political chaos in Turkey. Erdoğan has also criticized Sweden’s refusal to resolutely condemn nationalist demonstrations that feature the burning of the Quran.

But the various obstructions were apparently cleared up after Stoltenberg met with both Erdoğan and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson later in the day. There have not been any subsequent announcements regarding Turkey’s desire to join the EU. It instead appears that the other factor influencing Ankara’s decision to stall Sweden’s bid—the desire to secure a deal for F-16 jets from the United States in return for promises that they will not be used to threaten Greece—has played a larger role. The Biden administration had been working on a four-country deal that would clear the way for F-16 sales, so progress on that front could certainly have been used as leverage for getting Turkey to sign on to Sweden’s NATO membership.

The geopolitical haggling should come as no surprise and is simply a reaffirmation of the age-old maxim that something is never had for anything. More importantly, though, Sweden’s impending ascension is proof of the increased commitment to collective security that has swept across Europe in the wake of Russia’s invasion. Sweden brings with it a population of 10 million, a GDP of well over $500 billion, and has recently committed to increasing its defense spending to at least 2 percent (a benchmark that every NATO member is supposed to be meeting).

Unfortunately, this fact will have no impact on encouraging the United States to divest itself from Europe and support the creation of a more independent security framework for the latter. The collective GDP of Non-U.S. NATO currently stands at $20.1 trillion compared to Russia’s $1.6 trillion, and its population is 585 million (dwarfing Russia’s 146 million). Despite another economically developed member state signing onto the transatlantic alliance, Sweden’s additional inputs amount to a mere drop in NATO’s already massive resource pool. The logic of an independent Europe has existed since 1991, but the political will to reduce the United States’ wildly inflated defense role on the continent is as much lacking in Washington as it is in Berlin or Brussels.

The discussion over F-16 sales in this regard is more consequential than the simple process of back-and-forth compromise that is inevitably a part of every international deal. Rather, the weight of U.S. arms sales and the prospect of securing favorable terms on the part of Ankara is indicative of a major factor dictating U.S. security engagement with Europe in particular and the world more generally. U.S. military spending currently stands somewhere around $800 billion in comparison to non-U.S. NATO’s $300 billion. Still, of the portion of non-U.S. NATO spending and resources, Turkey is far and away the largest contributor. Ankara’s purchase of Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles back in 2019 was a major snub to Washington. It also resulted in sanctions being placed on Turkey.

The prospect of EU membership is undoubtedly a strong economic incentive for Turkey, but getting back in the good graces of the United States may have also played a role. It is not outlandish to imagine the United States telling Erdoğan to shelve the EU talk for the time being, accept some political posturing from Sweden, be content with general statements against Islamophobia, and subsequently receive a favorable deal for U.S. jets. Shortly after Turkey gave the okay to Sweden’s ascension, the Biden administration announced the completion of the F-16 deal, as well as U.S. support of Ankara’s military modernization efforts.

No one, including those in the halls of power, is trying to hide the role of U.S. defense sales in dictating broader transatlantic policy. Moral qualms aside, there is nothing inherently shady about Washington selling arms to exert geopolitical influence; however, it is important to acknowledge this dynamic if one wants to understand international developments in their entirety.

There can be no doubt regarding the reality of U.S. hegemonic control over the European security environment. That is not to discount Washington’s ideological ties to the continent, nor is it to approach the commitment to liberal democracy with cynicism—the borderline brinkmanship of U.S. and European support of Ukraine should dispel any doubts over whether or not the West is genuine in the belief of its principles. But the unfolding of events suggests that it is Washington that walks away the true winner, both economically as well as ideologically.

From the artic edges of Scandinavia through the continental heartland and onto the edges of Anatolia, there has been an outpouring of newfound commitments to defending the principle of national sovereignty. But while the invasion of Ukraine has certainly drawn the European continent closer together, it has also reinforced U.S. control over that increasingly solidified bloc. Whether or not this is of any real benefit to the United States’ citizenry—the only citizenry to which its government is constitutionally beholden—is, of course, another issue entirely.

Dominick Sansone is a Ph.D. student at the Hillsdale College Van Andel Graduate School of Statesmanship. Previously a Fulbright recipient to Bulgaria, his writing on politics in the Black Sea region has been published by The National Interest, the Euromaidan Press, The American Conservative, and RealClear Defense, among other publications. He also previously wrote as a contributing columnist focusing on Russia-China relations at The Epoch Times.

Image: NATO/Flickr.

The governments of the Middle East, particularly the Gulf states, seem more and more convinced that a dramatically diminished U.S. interest in the Middle East region is in the works, up to an abandonment, if not total abandonment, of them, resulting in an uncertainty of security commitments to them. After decades in which, in exchange for low cost and abundant supplies of oil, the U.S. security umbrella was informally guaranteed to the Gulf monarchies, those same princes, kings, and emirs are growingly doubting the reliability of the U.S. side of that understanding. None is more uneasy in this than Saudi Arabia, the most significant country in the region. Washington’s perceived failure to respond forcefully to Iran-armed-and-sponsored Houthi drone and missile strikes against Saudi Arabia in 2019 and against both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2022 was just the most tangible example undergirding Gulf concerns about U.S. resolution.

A number of factors feeds the perception of U.S. abandonment, from the direct public and private pronouncements of key Biden administration officials to the changing state of U.S. foreign policy discourse. Yet in merits particular attention in Riyadh is the U.S. treatment of Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (colloquially, MBS)—the country’s crown prince, prime minister, and the designated heir to the throne.

Martyring MBS

Never a very warm relationship, the U.S.-Saudi bond has always been one of mutual and calculated advantage while still remaining the bedrock and anchor of U.S. standing and policy in the Gulf. Despite a few structural tensions regarding differing religious views, forms of government, and relations to Israel, the two countries have been in close embrace based on their security-for-oil bargain.

That, however, arrangement is now at risk from the Saudi perspective and perhaps even in America’s view—not that it will no longer guarantee the security of its Gulf partners, but that the guarantee will be more calibrated in light of the Chinese political, economic, and military challenges in the Indo-Pacific and globally. Gulf capitals worry (or fear) that the United States is neither a dependable partner nor perhaps even an honest broker, and their apprehension is grounded in U.S. words and deeds. As a result, these countries are increasingly taking an even more tenuously transactional view of their previously bedrock relation with Washington.

That uneasy, somewhat transactional relation with the Saudis was rocked by the horrific murder and dismemberment of journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents (apparently with the knowledge and probable direction of MBS) inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. A Saudi citizen and occasional columnist for the Washington Post, Khashoggi had turned from a supporter of MBS to an ardent critic. That horrendous execution shocked Western capitals, particularly Washington, with the Post ensuring regular and protracted coverage.

In response, during the November 2019, Democratic Party primary debate in Atlanta, then-Presidential Candidate Joe Biden labeled MBS and even more broadly all Saudi Arabians “the pariahs that they are” and their government of having “very little social redeeming value,” adding that “under a Biden-Harris administration, we will reassess our relation with the Kingdom, end U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, and make sure America does not check its values at the door to sell arms or buy oil.” This attack by the likely next U.S. president only martyred the Saudi royal at home: who was this impudent foreign infidel to assault our prince, country, and society?

Ethics entirely aside, the assassination was a foolhardy and ultimately counterproductive move. Whereas Khashoggi’s occasional columns were critical of the Saudi regime, especially MBS, and had imperceptible effects on the U.S.-Saudi relationship, his murder, fanned by Turkey’s president (for foreign policy reasons) and by Khashoggi’s fiancé Hatice Cengiz (for obvious personal reasons), had substantial and prolonged effect in the United States and abroad.

Unfortunately for Biden, oil prices spiked in 2021–2022. The United States could itself have produced more oil and eased the skyrocketing price, but only with environmental effects unacceptable to Biden’s Democratic Party allies. Biden was forced, hat in hand, to fly to Riyadh in July 2022 and in effect beg MBS to increase Saudi production, which the Prince very publicly did not do. In fact, he did the opposite, leading OPEC+ to a production cut of 2 million barrels a day in coordination with—salt in the wound—Russian President Vladimir Putin. Very embarrassingly, on arrival Biden was forced also to greet MBS—which normally would have meant an embrace but, given the pariah remark, caused Biden to attempt clumsily at best to settle for a “fist bump” which MBS graciously accepted and reciprocated but did not forget. The Price of Alienating Saudi Arabia This breach in the relationship stands at odds with both America’s and Saudi Arabia’s national interests. If continued, it will have adverse impacts on both, and will also provide China and perhaps other challengers like Iran with a rare opportunity to advance their interests at the both the United States’ and Saudi Arabia’s expense. However appalling the Khashoggi murder, it cannot be allowed to rupture a critical geopolitical relationship for both parties. Ironically, in many respects, MBS has taken Saudi Arabia down precisely the right road from both the Saudi and the U.S. perspectives. Under his Vision 2030, he has advanced tertiary education, defanged the religious police (the mutawa), and sought to “bring Saudi Arabia back to moderate Islam.” He has moved to diversify the bases of the Saudi economy away from sole dependence on oil and into technologically competitive goods and services, liberated women from harsh social, economic, and personal restrictions, provided them access to education and to the work force, and has all but broken the original deal with the desert tribes. He has run roughshod over other Saudi princes and families in doing this, but their fate is a domestic matter—it is not, or should not be, a core matter of U.S. national interest.

The potential for an accord between Saudi Arabia and China, however, should be. Just this last December, President Xi Jinping made an unusual trip to Saudi Arabia to meet and then sign agreements with King Salman and MBS—precisely to forge closer ties with the kingdom and then its Gulf neighbors, and to open another front against the United States and its interests. MBS gave him a conspicuously grand welcome and reception. Moreover, MBS has indicated that if Washington is not more willing to warrant Saudi fundamental national interests then he has other options. All of these are detrimental to U.S. interests, in particular closer relations with China, whose investments in the kingdom have mushroomed from almost nothing to around $12 billion over the past fifteen years and $5 billion this June alone.

Other developments paint a grim picture for U.S. interests. Along with Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia is now a Dialogue Partner in the China-founded and Beijing-based Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Thousands of Saudi and other Gulf state students are now studying in China rather than the United States. In May, Saudi Arabia joined Egypt and the UAE in warmly readmitting Syria into the Arab League, notwithstanding President Bashar al-Assad’s slaughter of Syria’s Sunni population.

The attempt by the United States to forge a nuclear deal with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s, primary adversary, and to do so on terms the Saudis clearly regard as injurious to their vital national security interests has opened yet another potential fissure. It is a potential fracture which the Chinese have happily exploited as they midwifed a resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, its heretofore sworn adversary. The United States can in part thank its public rebuke of MBS for that remarkable about-face and China’s new standing. The recently closer ties among the U.S.-aligned Gulf states after their rift with Qatar (and the consequent deterioration of the Gulf Cooperation Council comity) has increased even more the stakes inherent in the Saudi-U.S. relation as has the recent feint of MBS and his Omani allies toward his border nemeses the Houthi’s in Yemen.

Mending the Relationship

The estrangement in the Saudi-US relation needs to be repaired. While it does not rise to the same strategic level of importance as the relation with China, it is necessary nonetheless even if only because of the opportunity any fracture affords precisely to China.

But the relation is important in its own terms and not just economically or (given the U.S. bases) militarily. The U.S. has vital geopolitical interests in a stable, friendly Gulf. Iran is a threat to those interests. So is China should it find Gulf bases or even refueling arrangements and with them the opportunity both to project force and economic power into a region hitherto prohibited to it and to thrust yet another dagger into a soft spot for the United States. Although it may be too late for Biden, he can try his best.

Likewise, it is not yet too late for his successors or co-equal branches. The now Republican-majority House should make a better relationship a clear objective. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs ought to take a trip to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries full of sincere interest and earnest expressions of amity, with particular attention to MBS. It should clarify that the United States will indeed “reassess our relation with the Kingdom” but in a way opposite to the way then-candidates Biden and Kamala Harris had in mind. House Democratic members should join rather than abjure let alone repudiate such a gesture.

Arabia and its Gulf neighbors should be reassured that—notwithstanding U.S. legitimate concerns about China and the Indo-Pacific—the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, and MBS matter a lot, and the U.S. will act accordingly.

Gerald F. Hyman is a Senior Associate (non-resident) at the Center for Strategic & International Studies. He has published articles in several opinion outlets, including Foreign Policy, The National Interest, The Hill, and the Diplomat. Between 2002 and 2007, he was Director of USAID’s Office of Democracy & Governance.

Image: Shutterstock.

Following a court order, Lebanese journalist Dima Sadek has been sentenced to one year as a result of a lawsuit filed by Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Gebran Bassil. Sadek, a well-known critic of the FPM and its ally Hezbollah, has faced endless attacks for her criticism of both parties including death threats.

The news is still early, and developments are still unfolding. This lawsuit was originally filed three years ago in 2020 at the height of Lebanon’s protest movement. At the time, Bassil was at the center of ridicule by angry demonstrators who were accusing him of corruption alongside other establishment figures.

Judge Rosine Hajili, a legal official at the Court of Appeal in Beirut, issued the decree to sentence Sadek to one year in prison and said she must pay a fine of 110 million Lebanese pounds (about $6,700). This led to a backlash in solidarity with Sadek and with contempt for FPM. There is a genuine concern that this move by the court only increases Lebanon’s climate of fear and makes people think twice before speaking out against establishment politicians. Sadek tweeted a video explaining the recent news and how it originated from her criticizing FPM members attacking two men from the city of Tripoli.

“In Feb. 2020, two young men from Tripoli were assaulted by the FPM,” Sadek said in her Twitter video. “One was attacked by [former member of parliament and FPM member] Ziad Aswad’s bodyguards, and the other, named Zakaria al-Masri ... was beaten up and forced to repeat ‘Aoun is your God and the God of Tripoli,’“ as he claimed in his written testimony, she said.

“Bassil is suing me in the case of Zakaria al-Masri,” she continued. “In both cases, I said that these were racist and Nazi acts.”

The National Interest reached out to Sadek for further comment. As of now, there has been no reply. Bassil’s office did return requests for an explanation on this matter. His lawyer, Majed Boueiz, elaborated on why they chose to pursue the lawsuit against the prominent journalist and said that it wasn’t her criticism that invoked legal action. Rather, it was her “defamation, libel, and slander that the journalist Dima Sadek made by trespassing and overstepping on the freedom of others.”

Boueiz said it was not the lawsuit that threatens freedom of expression or the values of democracy, but the actions of Sadek herself. “Pursuing this lawsuit isn’t against what Lebanon is known for, and does not contradict with our beliefs, principles, and laws. On the contrary, the act that the journalist Dima Sadek did is what contradicts with our principles, beliefs, and what Lebanon is known for.”

Yet, most see this as another political move by the FPM to shut down all kinds of descent by any means necessary.

Already, supporters of Sadek are showing their solidarity online by denouncing this move by the local judiciary. George Wardini, managing director of the PolyBlog social media platform, spoke about the sentence and the precedent it is setting for freedom of speech in Lebanon. “Three years ago, when this lawsuit was filed, the opposition and reform-minded people were actually on the offensive. We had taken the initiative and control over the narrative. Politicians feared us. They stayed at home and wouldn’t go to restaurants because they were being confronted by the public. Three years later, the fact that Gebran Bassil, who was the main recipient of our public rage and anger, was able to put a one-year prison sentence on Dima Sadek, who is hailed as one of our bravest figures, is a dangerous precedent.”

Indeed, if someone like Sadek, a recognized powerful media personality, can’t escape the legal ramifications of condemning politicians for poor behavior and actions, what chances do others have? Member of Parliament Najat Saliba spoke with TNI, highlighting the value freedom of conscience provides and condemning the actions taken against Sadek.

“Definitely, I am against what happened. I think the freedom of expression and press should be one of the most principles and guidance that we cherish and protect. Also, considering the party that is putting charges, and considering what Dima Sadek represents, I think they have gone too far.”

The probability of Sadek seeing a day in prison is low. She can legally appeal the court’s sentencing and avoid this debacle altogether. Nevertheless, this latest round by the Lebanese judiciary hurts the once proud free-thinking atmosphere that Lebanon was respected for—no matter how any political actor would like to spin it.

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

Image: Shutterstock.

L'homme, déjà âgé, qui vient de perdre sa femme. Pas beaucoup d'informations sur son caractère ni sur sa biographie. Aucune story. Le seul sujet du livre est la nouvelle période de sa vie où, d'emblée, il entre ; quand sa femme était à ses côtés, elle était aussi devant lui, sur l'horizon de son temps ; (...) / Littérature - 2005/11

Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan had been notoriously high for several years and culminated with an Azerbaijani offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020. The war lasted about a month and ended with several thousand deaths. Azerbaijan demonstrated its military superiority by capturing most of the land it lost in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1994. The war was ended by a Russian-brokered ceasefire which allowed for the free transfer of Armenians to Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijanis to Nakhchivan. The war was marked by several war crimes on both sides. Following the war, there have been numerous more border skirmishes, with the most potent one being in September of 2022, leaving hundreds total dead.

Currently, Nagorno-Karabakh is desperate; Azerbaijan has blockaded the only land corridor connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, preventing essential supplies such as food and water. The ceasefire in 2020 provided for Russian peacekeepers to monitor this corridor -called the Lachin Corridor- but as we all know, Russia has other military duties their troops must attend to. Azerbaijan has violated the terms of the 2020 ceasefire by preventing the exchange of people and goods to Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Armenia is part of a mutual defense treaty called the C.S.T.O. (Collective Security Treaty Organization), a mutual defense treaty with members Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The C.S.T.O. is the Russian version of NATO, and according to this organization, an attack against one is treated as an attack against all. The alliance entails that Russia must defend Armenia whenever Azerbaijan attacks Armenia. However, Russia has refused this request which highlights the failure of the C.S.T.O. This shows the true importance of this conflict; it highlights the changing dynamics of alliances in the Caucasus.

Armenia has had strong relations with Russia and the eastern bloc, even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ability of Azerbaijan to control its exports, there has been a massive switch in alliances. With Azerbaijan’s mass exportation of oil, they have become increasingly tied to the Western world by trade. Therefore, Azerbaijan is a powerful country supplied by other powerful countries such as Turkey. On the other hand, Armenia is a weak country supported by Russia. However, Russia is an ally of Armenia in name only. So Armenia has no nations to turn to under Azerbaijani aggression. Russia won’t help; the U.N. may condemn it, but will the U.N. send troops to keep the Lachin Corridor open? Probably not. The West would never help Armenia because Azerbaijan is a major trade partner. So Armenia has no options when it comes to allies.

The reason why many Western countries won’t side with Armenia becomes even more apparent when looking at a map of Oil Pipelines in the Caucasus.

The solid red line depicts the BTC (Baku-T’bilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline, which transports oil from Baku to Turkey, which it can then export to the rest of the world. However, the route is slow because it has to go through Georgia; it could be more direct by cutting out Georgia and connecting Azerbaijan to Turkey via the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan. If Azerbaijan connected its mainland to Nakhchivan, it would have a direct route to Turkey and be able to increase its oil exports dramatically. This route would also connect Turkey to the rest of the Turkic world, which includes central Asian countries bordering the Caspian Sea.

The future of the Caucasus seems straightforward at this point. Azerbaijan wants control over the Caucasus and a direct pipeline to Turkey. Azerbaijan has been conducting many small military aggressions over a long period rather than at once to avoid international condemnation. Azerbaijan will continue to do this until they achieve what they want, and due to the lack of support for Armenia, Azerbaijan will continue. If recent trends continue, Azerbaijan will get a pipeline to Turkey, the Turkic world will be connected, and Nagorno-Karabakh will be wholly blockaded.

What Armenia can do to stop this seems to be too little too late. Armenia does not have the capacity to return to its territorial extent before the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. However, control of the Lachin Corridor and Nagorno-Karabakh is more plausible. Realistically Armenia could expand its conscription beyond two years without extreme public outcry due to the extreme levels of nationalism and desire of the public to ensure Nagorno-Karabakh territorial sovereignty. All Armenia needs to do is guarantee the security of free passage of the Lachin corridor, which could be done by force. In a time when skirmishes between the two countries are constant, an operation by Armenia to guarantee international law is followed would not be that outrageous.

Depending on the length of the Russia-Ukraine war, Armenia may also be able to obtain Russian support in guaranteeing free passage of the Lachin Corridor. Armenia can also offer Russia significant oversight over its economy and politics in exchange for Russian intervention on the side of Armenia. Russia has two military bases in Armenia, which allows for the quick deployment of troops. Armenia has to choose just how much they are willing to sacrifice to achieve control over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Negotiation may also be a possibility between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia could offer Azerbaijan a contract to build a pipeline through Armenian Territory going to Nakchivan in exchange for the Lachin Corridor and de-facto sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan may be inclined to take this offer as a wholescale invasion of Armenian territory to connect mainland Azerbaijan to Nakchivan would cause too much international condemnation. Although most Western countries would support the lower oil prices caused by the shorter pipeline, an invasion of a sovereign nation is likely to invoke sanctions from many countries.

Ultimately only time will tell how the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict will be resolved, but it is undoubtedly in the interests of all that a peaceful diplomatic solution is arrived at.

 

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Aiden Wassermann is a foreign policy commentator and intern for the Studies Department. The views expressed here are his, and not necessarily those of the Foreign Policy Association.

How the memory of America’s era of dominance stunts U.S. foreign policy.

After months of diplomatic delays, Sweden can now join NATO—a genuine triumph for the Biden administration.

This development has enormous geostrategic implications for the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

One is a direct reduction of Russia’s ability to project naval power. With Sweden as the last link in the chain, the entire northern coast of the Baltic Sea is now inside the NATO alliance. All of the Baltic’s southern coast, except for Russian-ruled Kaliningrad and a sliver of Russian territory near St. Petersburg, is already in NATO hands. For the first time, the Russian fleet must travel through a narrow sleeve of water, over 1,000 miles of NATO territorial waters, to reach the open ocean. It also means that Russia’s Arctic fleet will have to travel past the northern coasts of Finland and Norway—now all NATO allies. To reach the Mediterranean and the Suez, Russia’s Black Sea fleet must first thread through waters controlled by Turkey, another NATO ally. All three of Russia’s Western fleets can no longer move without allied surveillance and could, theoretically, be stopped.

Another implication concerns manpower and technology. Sweden offers a sophisticated military infrastructure, especially its attack aircraft and anti-submarine capabilities. Finland, which directly borders Russia for almost 1,000 miles, possesses extensive defenses and a well-trained army. Once Sweden and Finland’s considerable capabilities become interoperable with NATO, the alliance will be significantly more potent than it was on the day Russian tanks tried to seize Kiev in February 2022.

The Western powers are now more united with the Baltic nations than ever before. Even during World War II, Sweden professed neutrality, and Finland, for a time, allied with Nazi Germany against the USSR.

Undoubtedly, the implications are concerning to policymakers in Moscow.

And NATO is more focused than ever before. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg laid out a clear strategic direction for the organization: victory for Ukraine. “...if we don't ensure that Ukraine wins this war, unless we ensure that Ukraine wins as a sovereign and independent nation, there is no question of membership to discuss,” Stoltenberg said.

It is highly unusual for NATO officials to speak with such clarity, indicating unanimity between member-states.

Indeed, if President Joe Biden had not made it clear that Ukraine was not yet ready to join NATO, one wonders if the European allies might have voted to admit Ukraine now.

NATO leaders have long been cowed by the idea that admitting Ukraine into NATO would lead to a direct war with Russia. Europe would be wise to avoid an open, as opposed to a proxy war, with Russia. While European leaders are starting to realize that the Russian bear’s teeth and claws are not as sharp as they once feared, it would be a mistake to believe that the Russians can no longer wreak vast harm across Europe, even without resorting to nuclear weapons. Now is the time for realism about Russia, not over-confidence.

That said, Russia’s military weaknesses have been laid bare. Moscow has trouble supplying its soldiers in the field with ammunition, fuel, medicine, and spare parts—much of its military supply chains rely on railroad and convoy transport vulnerable to artillery bombardment and drone strikes. Manpower is another Russian weakness. Its troops are poorly trained conscripts or recently freed prisoners. They can man Russia’s extensive World War I-style trench defenses but usually lose men and materiel without gaining ground when they launch their comparatively rare counterattacks. The war in Ukraine is now more than 500 days old, and the Russians have suffered between 100,000 and 200,000 casualties, depending on whose estimates you believe.

By contrast, the U.S. lost 57,000 soldiers in more than 5,100 days of fighting in Vietnam. That’s a quarter of the losses in ten times the time period. Yet, the Vietnam War helped bring down two U.S. presidents. LBJ declined to run for reelection in 1968 on account of war-weariness, and Nixon’s failed “Vietnamization” project weakened the public support he would later need during the Watergate scandal. How can President Vladimir Putin survive an unpopular war when two U.S. presidents could not?

At the very least, the recent mutiny launched by mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin suggests that Putin's regime is growing fragile. Still, Putin’s great unknown remains China.

Chinese president Xi Jinping shares the same convictions as Putin: to create a non-Western-centric, multipolar world order. But his relationship with Russia is a product of interests rather than deeply held values. The two countries share a 2,672-mile border, the exact location of which wasn't settled until the start of the twenty-first century following generations of negotiations. China needs Russia for water and military equipment; Russia needs China as a market for hydrocarbons and other raw materials. This is a shotgun wedding, not a romance.

Being isolated from the West is not attractive for China, given its hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after years of zero-COVID policies. As China's relationship with the United States has hit new lows, Chinese leaders want to avoid alienating the European Union, which is also one of China’s largest trading partners. Consequently, Xi and Chinese diplomats have been careful not to accept the Kremlin's talking points fully.

All of this leaves Putin in a quagmire. He cannot exit Ukraine without losing prestige and possibly power itself. Meanwhile, a newly enlarged and unified NATO presents Russia with its most powerful foe since Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century at the same time the Russian economy and population are shrinking. Nor can he hold ground in Ukraine during the warmer months, as demonstrated by the modest gains of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Putin, the purported grand chess player, cannot leave the game and cannot find a winning move. This week’s news of NATO enlargement continues to shrink his options.

Ahmed Charai is the Publisher of Jerusalem Strategic Tribune. He is on the board of directors of the Atlantic Council, the International Crisis Group, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the Center for the National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.

The Biden administration’s effort to isolate climate negotiations from broader foreign policy goals has become untenable. Rather than reconciling the conflicting objectives of its top foreign policy decisionmakers—Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and Special Climate Envoy John Kerry—the division of function has created a crisis of authority, leading to confused negotiations with China.

The divergent stances on China policy have been evident since the earliest days of the Biden administration. Secretary Blinken’s first international trip was to Japan and South Korea. During his trip to Tokyo, he highlighted the strength of America’s Pacific alliance and accused China of acting “coercively and aggressively” in the South China Sea. Kerry, by contrast, visited China just a month later to discuss green energy policy. The Chinese delegation took the opportunity to criticize Japan’s treatment of nuclear waste from the Fukushima power plant meltdown.

As relations sour between Beijing and DC, the role of climate envoy (tasked with cooperating with China on climate) and the position of secretary of state (responsible for upholding American interests abroad) continue to diverge. When US authorities discovered Chinese spy balloons drifting over the continental U.S. in early 2023,  Blinken canceled his first planned trip to Beijing. Canceling visits is an age-old practice in the diplomatic toolbox, serving as an effective yet non-escalatory form of retaliation. Yet within months of Blinken's announcement, Kerry accepted an invitation to visit China “in the near-term.”

In the past, DC policymakers have always disagreed on issues from free trade agreements to America's military engagements overseas. What makes the two diplomats’ conflicting China strategies unique is not the fundamental dispute over policy but the crisis of authority. Kerry spent four years as Secretary of State and boss to then-Deputy Secretary Blinken. Kerry can count on established rapport with foreign leaders and career officials in Foggy Bottom. The crisis of authority does not just come from overlapping responsibilities of the positions of climate envoy and secretary of state. It also comes from Kerry's history leading the organization and his relationship with Blinken.

As the first-ever climate envoy and a long-time friend to the president, Kerry is uniquely positioned to shape his own role. While his role is not explicitly concerned with foreign policy, former Secretary of State Kerry has chiefly focused his efforts abroad. His overseas focus can be partly attributed to his pre-existing knowledge and relationships in the foreign policy sphere and the stubbornness of domestic policymaking bodies (i.e., Congress).

Despite having offices and employees at the Department of State, the climate envoy is outside the department's chain of command, reporting only to President Biden. Kerry’s position is a unicorn in the history of American statecraft. He is a cabinet-level official on par with Blinken, even sharing access to military aircraft for diplomatic visits. Yet, he leads no agency and requires no confirmation from the Senate.

The only historical comparison is President Eisenhower’s appointment of Harold Stassen as “special assistant to the president for disarmament” to aid in reconstructing post-WWII Europe. Stassen’s ad hoc appointment antagonized incumbent Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The following years were consumed by unnecessary bureaucratic competition that ultimately distracted American foreign policy. Order was only restored when Eisenhower effectively eliminated Stassen’s position.

While Kerry and Blinken appear to have a cordial relationship, the potential for conflict is even more troubling than the historical analog. Dulles was nearly 20 years senior to Stassen. Dulles had a more extensive network in DC and had a longer relationship with the President, which encouraged Stassen to act deferentially. The relationship between Kerry and Blinken is inverse. Here, the secretary of state is nearly 20 years junior to the special envoy. The secretary of state not only has less experience in DC—and formerly worked under the special envoy—he has fewer years leading his department.

Kerry's seniority does not mean he will have the president's support over Blinken if a serious dispute arises. However, it creates an ambiguous wrinkle in the foreign policy hierarchy. Will Chinese Climate Envoy Xie Zhenhua and senior Chinese foreign-policy official Wang Yi treat Kerry where they left off when Kerry was Secretary of State, or will they defer to Blinken? Will foreign negotiators be able to extract concessions from  Kerry that  Blinken would not have offered up and vice versa?

Though Kerry insists that he exclusively works on climate issues, climate concerns are inextricably linked to economic policy and security. Kerry’s position on the National Security Council questions the notion that his position is hermetically sealed from the rest of American foreign policy. The roles of climate envoy and secretary of state have become further blurred by Kerry’s speech at the Munich Security Conference and Blinken's appearances at COP 26 and COP 27.

While the US foreign policy establishment declares that Kerry only represents climate issues, Beijing disagrees, and they have repeatedly said so. In one meeting, Wang told Kerry that climate “cannot possibly be divorced” from geopolitical tensions. It comes as no surprise that Beijing is only willing to subsidize failed industrial reforms to lower China's carbon emissions in exchange for something from the US. Kerry seemed to acknowledge the challenges of persuading China to produce less carbon with few meaningful concessions, asserting “...[o]ur president has tried hard to separate climate from the other issues that are real that we obviously have with China, but we can’t get bogged down by that...” This comment directly contradicts statements by Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and even Kerry’s previous assertions that climate is a critical, stand-alone issue.

Foreign policy is messy. Overlapping issues like climate policy, industrial policy, trade policy, and security cannot be neatly separated from one another. Climate change's transnational nature makes it especially difficult for bilateral negotiations. The number of battleships or nuclear warheads a state possesses is easily verifiable. However, allocating greenhouse gas emissions (already an imperfect indicator of climate change) on a per-country basis is difficult. It becomes even more challenging to establish which country or people are responsible for what pollution considering that Europe and the US effectively outsource the production of consumer goods and resulting pollution to China.

Bilateral negotiations with competitor states are inherently zero-sum. China cannot be a competitor in one domain and an ally in another. Attempting to negotiate in a climate vacuum where no outside issues interfere is implausible. Expecting a former secretary of state to remove himself from statecraft altogether is impossible.

Now is not the time to win favor among domestic environmental constituents. The White House must restore a unified foreign policy front under the leadership of the office of the secretary of state. If the status quo continues, we risk paralyzing our diplomatic efforts with Beijing during one of the most pivotal times in Sino-American relations.

Daniel McVicar is a Research Director at the White House Writers Group. He is a regular contributor to Jamestown Foundation and has written for leading foreign policy outlets, including the Council on Foreign Relations.

Image: Courtesy of the U.S. Department of State.

Le hobo, ce vagabond qui se déplace clandestinement de ville en ville sur des trains de marchandises, multiplie les petits boulots et apprend la vie, est une figure récurrente de la littérature américaine, rendue célèbre par Jack London et plus tard par Jack Kerouac, qui furent eux-mêmes de ces (...) / États-Unis, Culture, Animal, Transports, Littérature, Pauvreté - 2018/05

In recent days, US Ambassador to Armenia Christina Quinn has said that the United States believes that the Armenian people will be able to live safely in Karabakh: “We believe it is possible and we hope all parties will work together to make it a reality.   The US believes that this is the right approach.  We call on all sides to make joint efforts to ensure the rights and security are established.”  Unfortunately, the American Ambassador to Armenia has faced a backlash within some extremist circles in Armenia for making this statement, yet that does not take away the truth of what she stated.

I have visited Azerbaijan four times and I can attest that Azerbaijan is a bastion for Christians in a region of the world dominated by countries like the Islamic Republic of Iran, who routinely imprison and torture Christians for seeking to practice their faith.    In Baku, I visited an operating Russian Orthodox and Catholic Church.   There are also numerous Christians who are thriving professionally in Azerbaijani society.   This is because Azerbaijan is a secular country, who believes in protecting all religious heritage sites and citizens, regardless if they are Muslim or not.   

Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev stated last Easter, “Preservation and promotion of ethno-cultural diversity, rich multicultural values and centuries old traditions of tolerance in our society is one of the main directions of the state policy of the country.  Azerbaijan is one of the few countries with exemplary state-religious relations, where all-round attention and care is paid to the cultural heritage of different peoples.  In the conditions of national-spiritual solidarity, Christians of Azerbaijan live their traditions, religious beliefs, language and culture, and as citizens of the country, they take an active part in all spheres of our socio-political and cultural republic.”

According to the US State Department’s last report on Religious Freedom, “The constitution stipulates the separation of religion and state and the equality of all religions before the law. It also protects the right of individuals to express their religious beliefs and to practice religious rituals, provided these do not violate public order or public morality. The law prohibits the government from interfering in religious activities; it also states the government and citizens have a responsibility to combat “religious extremism” and “radicalism.””

The report continued: “Local experts on religious affairs, religious leaders, and civil society representatives said the general public continued to show tolerance of, and in some cases financially supported, minority religious groups including Jews, Russian Orthodox, and Catholics.”  

The report added: “The constitution stipulates the separation of religion and state and the equality of all religions and all individuals regardless of belief. It protects freedom of religion, including the right of individuals to profess, individually or together with others, any religion, or to profess no religion, and to express and spread religious beliefs. It also provides for the freedom to carry out religious rituals, provided they do not violate public order or public morality. The constitution states no one may be required to profess his or her religious beliefs or be persecuted for them; the law prohibits forced expressions or demonstrations of religious faith.”

According to the US State Department, “There is no religious component in the curriculum of public or private elementary or high schools; however, students may obtain after-school religious instruction at registered institutions. The Administrative Code prohibits clergy and members of religious associations from holding “special” group meetings for children and young people or forcing children to practice religion. The religious freedom law provides that religious education of children “should not have a negative impact on their physical and mental health.”” 

Considering all of these facts, why should Armenians fear living among Azerbaijanis in Karabakh once peace is established between the two peoples?    Just as Jews, Bahais, Russian Orthodox, Georgians, Udi Christians, and Catholics manage to coexist peacefully with the Muslim population in Azerbaijan, why cannot the Armenians if they desire for peace to be upheld between the two peoples?   Thus, America’s Ambassador to Armenia should not have been condemned for stating the obvious.     

Les lectrices et les lecteurs du « Monde diplomatique » ont pour particularité qu'il faut, avant d'espérer recueillir leur avis sur notre journal, leur garantir que les réponses ne serviront pas les publicitaires. Par conséquent, disons-le d'emblée : ceci n'est pas un sondage. Ni une étude de marché… (...) / A propos du « Diplo », Presse - 2018/05

Countries will have to choose between America and China.

Republican anger at Mexico, long-simmering over the continuous immigration and narcotics crises on the United States’ southern border, is now spilling over into bellicosity. Led by Republican presidential candidate Ron DeSantis, some Republicans are advocating for military action against drug cartels on Mexican territory. Even the recent two-decade debacle of using the U.S. military to fight drugs coming from Afghanistan has not dissuaded these Republicans from what will likely be another futile martial approach.

DeSantis has proposed conducting unilateral raids into Mexican territory to disrupt fentanyl manufacturing, contributing to over 100,000 overdose deaths in 2022 alone. Supporting the offensive, a naval blockade of Mexican ports would intercept the producers’ raw materials imported from China. The first option resembles progressive president Woodrow Wilson’s failed attempt to capture Mexican outlaw Pancho Villa in 1916–1917, which ended in a humiliating U.S. military retreat from the territory of our southern neighbor. A naval blockade is risky since it's traditionally considered an act of war. Both Mexico and China, the latter a great power armed with nuclear weapons, would be incensed by this gambit. The international community would be in uproar over the violation of the freedom of navigation. Moreover, a blockade would significantly undercut Washington’s Asia policy. The U.S. Navy conducts regular missions in the South and East China Seas to deter Chinese forces from making good on their own grandiose territorial claims. A blockade of Veracruz or Tampico would make claims to uphold a “free and open Indo-Pacific” ring hollow.

As president, Donald Trump toyed with the idea of designating Mexican drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, which would then have opened the way for cross-border military action against them. His secretary of defense, Mark Esper, has since reported that he openly wondered why he could not launch missiles at drug-making facilities in Mexico. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed, and neither step was taken.

Presidential candidate Tim Scott voiced an even more ambitious and dangerous plan to deal with the cartels: “When I am president, the drug cartels using Chinese labs and Mexican factories to kill Americans will cease to exist. I will freeze their assets, I will build the wall, and I will allow the world’s greatest military to fight these terrorists.” Is he advocating for attacks on Chinese soil and property?

Although hot campaign rhetoric cools once a candidate wins the presidency and faces the demands of the office, the fact that the temperature is this high is counterproductive and perilous.

As the last twenty years have shown, military force authorization can be a slippery slope to unrestrained military adventurism. Instead of limiting operations to the capture or killing of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, per Congress’ 2001 joint resolution, then-President George W. Bush interpreted the declaration loosely to authorize unilateral military action against any nation that was unwilling or unable to combat terrorism. This policy included the invasions and occupations of two countries, spurring more retaliatory violence worldwide.

Bush’s usurpation of Congress’s constitutional war-making power resembled the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, promulgated by Teddy Roosevelt, the first progressive president, in 1904. Prior to the Roosevelt administration, the Monroe Doctrine proclaimed that the United States would stay out of Europe’s conflicts but oppose European colonization or re-colonization in the Western Hemisphere. Roosevelt amended the doctrine, proclaiming the right of U.S. intervention throughout the Americas if political instability or financial insolvency increased the chances of European intervention. This corollary emboldened other presidents to meddle in Latin America, including Wilson’s ill-starred foray into the Mexican Civil War.

The 2024 Republican candidates’ martial rhetoric on unilateral military action in Mexico echoes the failed policies of early twentieth-century progressives and the Bush administration after 9/11. Yet most Republican candidates have repudiated the Bush administration’s general interventionist foreign policy that led to the protracted quagmires in Afghanistan and Iraq.

A better policy would be to deal with drug use by cutting demand through changing culture and by remediation through medical treatment instead of aggressively and unsuccessfully trying to reduce supply using law enforcement or military action. Still, those solutions aren’t macho enough for a party whose base wants to blame Mexico for what is America’s drug addiction problem.

Ivan Eland, Senior Fellow with the Independent Institute and author of several books, including, No War For Oil: U.S. Dependency and the Middle East.

Image: Shutterstock.

Former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro resembled former U.S. president Donald Trump in so many respects that he became known as the “Trump of the tropics.” Bolsonaro’s brand of right-wing populism certainly paralleled much of what Trump exhibited in terms of policies, ideology, and rhetoric. But the resemblance became especially marked in the way each man threatened his country’s system of democracy and respect for free elections.

Fearing defeat in his re-election bid last autumn, Bolsonaro—just like Trump—made unfounded accusations of widespread voting irregularities and suggested that if he did not win then it must be because the election was rigged. He even made some of the same assertions as some Trump supporters did about supposedly rigged voting machines. After his election loss, Bolsonaro, like Trump, refused to accept the outcome of the vote as legitimate.

Bolsonaro’s inculcation among his followers of his lie about a supposedly rigged election led to a violent riot and ransacking of government offices in Brasilia, two years and two days after Trump’s corresponding election lie led his supporters to attack and ransack the U.S. Capitol. Similarly to how Trump later would sometimes talk about the Capitol rioters as “loving,” “great,” and “peaceful” people, Bolsonaro described the Brasilia rioters as “little old women and little old men, with Brazilian flags on their back and Bibles under their arms.”

Like Trump, Bolsonaro did not attend his successor’s inauguration—which in Brazil’s case meant not participating in the traditional transfer of the presidential sash from the outgoing to the incoming president. Like Trump, Bolsonaro instead flew to Florida.

But there the stories diverge. Trump is still a major and active political factor in the United States and currently is the clear frontrunner for the Republican presidential nomination in 2024. But Bolsonaro has just been barred by Brazil’s electoral court from running for any public office until at least 2030, because of his election lies. Specifically, the court determined that Bolsonaro had violated election laws when during last year’s campaign he held a televised meeting with foreign diplomats in which he made some of his baseless claims about the voting system being rigged against him.

The United States does not have any institution comparable to Brazil’s electoral court, with the power that the court has under Brazil’s constitution to sideline offender candidates. The U.S. Federal Election Commission has only a limited mandate to investigate violations of campaign finance law, and much of the time in recent years the commission has been crippled anyway by partisan division or lack of a quorum. The U.S. judicial system is geared more toward achieving justice between private parties than toward holding politicians accountable for offenses against democracy. The one determination in a U.S. court of law about the lies concerning supposedly rigged voting machines was in a case involving two private parties, with Fox News—the principal mass media purveyor of Trumpist election lies—paying a $787.5 million settlement to a manufacturer of voting machines.

None of this is to say that Brazilian judicial or political mechanisms can or should be installed in the United States. The establishment of a body comparable to Brazil’s electoral court would require an improbable constitutional change. Given how much the composition, and to a large extent the conduct, of the U.S. Supreme Court has become wrapped in partisanship, it is questionable whether even if such a constitutional provision existed, the resulting court would function the way the one in Brazil has. Moreover, giving a court such powers over politicians would lead to accusations that the court itself was undemocratic. Such accusations have been heard in Brazil, as they are heard today in Israel as a rationale for the Netanyahu government’s plan to curb the judiciary’s role in reviewing legislation.

Not just in Brazil, however, but in many Western democracies, a centralized role for courts and/or commissions to oversee elections in a fair and nonpartisan manner works rather well. For example, in the United Kingdom—the original source of much of American political culture—an electoral commission and independent boundary commissions that draw constituency lines perform those functions, not entirely without controversy but generally in a way that is widely accepted as democratic and unbiased.

An argument is sometimes made that a decentralized system of election administration, as prevails in the United States, is less vulnerable to serious corruption. But in practice, that decentralized system has seen parties that control state legislatures indulging in extreme gerrymandering and voter suppression laws. Such partisan manipulation is a major reason that in the Freedom House scorecard on political rights, the United States currently ranks behind 64 other countries—not only Western democracies such as the United Kingdom but many others worldwide, from Micronesia to Mongolia.

The Trump part of the story is not over, and more accountability regarding the attempt to overturn the 2020 election result may follow from special counsel Jack Smith’s ongoing investigation and a parallel inquiry by the district attorney in Fulton County, Georgia. But even criminal convictions of Trump in these cases would not bar him from running for office.

The story in Brazil is not over, either, and not only because Bolsonaro is also subject to further criminal investigations. Much will depend on the direction set by other politicians on the Brazilian Right. Some of them are already moving on to leaders other than Bolsonaro, although there also is talk of Bolsonaro’s wife or one of his sons running for president.

For Brazil, or any other country, to be a healthy democracy requires major parties both left of center and right of center that respect democratic norms. A Brazilian voter who values democracy but disagrees with the economic or social policies of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—or who consider Lula, who served time in prison on corruption charges, unfit for office—needs someplace to turn.

The United States also, to be a healthy democracy, needs responsible, democracy-respecting parties on both the Left and the Right, something it does not now have. A democracy cannot survive if the task of maintaining democratic norms falls on only one side of the political spectrum, whether that is the Left or the Right.

The different turns taken by the stories of the Trump of the tropics and the Trump of Mar-a-Lago may reflect not only the different constitutional mechanisms in Brazil and the United States but also how the national histories of the two countries lead its citizens to think about democracy and threats to democracy. Especially during the Independence Day season—and probably even more so as the nation approaches its semiquincentennial—Americans have a tendency toward smugness about their polity, notwithstanding that mediocre score from Freedom House. “World’s oldest democracy” and all that. Many Americans tend to take for granted their nation’s democracy and political stability, and they should not.

Brazil has not been as historically blessed. As recently as 1985 it was under a military dictatorship. Perhaps this has made Brazilians more conscious of how fragile democracy can be and of threats to it. Too many citizens of the United States are insufficiently conscious of how immediate is the threat to their own democracy.

Paul Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was as a National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Professor Pillar also served in the National Intelligence Council as one of the original members of its Analytic Group. He is also a contributing editor for this publication.

Image: Shutterstock.