Diplomacy & Crisis News

Dans le cadre d'une stratégie révolutionnaire, le recours à la force plutôt qu'au droit est-il légitime ? Tandis que d'autres courants souhaitaient une transition institutionnelle, la victoire des bolcheviks en 1917 consacra le triomphe de la voie insurrectionnelle. Plusieurs ouvrages d'acteurs et (...) / URSS, Révolution russe 1917, Histoire, Violence, Politique - 2018/05

Ursula Le Guin (1929-2018) a choisi d'écrire de la science-fiction, domaine largement masculin, et en a profité pour proposer des mondes divergents, aux couleurs de la contre-culture des années 1970. Elle a ainsi contribué à saper les codes de notre société, par la grâce d'un imaginaire fastueusement (...) / Art, Femmes, Littérature, Personnalités, Science, Société, Fiction - 2018/05

Turkey’s latest extortion attempt won’t dissuade Swedes.

The Kremlin is trying to take control of the Wagner Group’s Middle Eastern empire.

Paul Scharre expands on his FP cover essay.

Deterring Russia requires more than just promises.

How to prove the Putin regime’s war crimes in Ukraine.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva assumed the presidency of Brazil with the commitment to protect and supposedly restore democracy. He gained global sympathy and support for promising to curb deforestation in the Amazon rainforest and fight climate change. As if his original missions were not hard enough, Lula even presented himself as a guarantor of world peace with his call for negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.

But that same Lula has presided over an almost $1 billion injection into the Russian economy through energy imports. Between February and May of 2023, Brazil replaced a significant part of oil imports from the United States with those sent from the Putin regime. The change is so profound that, in just four months, Lula’s Brazil imported more Russian fuel than the sum of the imports of the same product made in the previous twelve years. More precisely, the flow of Russian diesel to Brazil, in the first five months of 2023, was 48.7 percent greater than the total of Russian diesel imported by Brazilian companies between 2010 and 2022.

After a three-year lapse, Russia returned to the Brazilian energy market during Jair Bolsonaro's government (2019–2022). The first shipments arrived at Brazilian ports in December 2021, after Bolsonaro and Vladimir Putin began their rapprochement through a series of ministerial visits on both sides, resulting in a presidential visit to Moscow in February 2022—just days before the invasion. Yet Russian diesel imports in 2021 were trifling, all things considered, and obviously did not show any signs that they would assume the size and importance they would have in the following year by the Lula government. The purchases of cheap Russian diesel by the Bolsonaro administration served to justify the Lula’s arugment that Brazil’s rapprochement with Russia was pragmatic and aimed at guaranteeing access to fertilizers and Russian fuel.

In fact, Lula has not only taken his predecessor’s course regarding the Ukraine invasion, but also accelerated it. Throughout his diplomatic trips—including visits to the United States, Argentina, and China—and meetings with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and European leaders since January, Lula has not shied away from proposals to end the war. He also instructed his diplomats to vote against or abstain from votes in the United Nations condemning Russian aggression. These formal positions give the Brazilian government a semblance of impartiality in the conflict. But when compared with the same government's actions, they reveal contradictions.

The flood of Russian diesel on the Brazilian market resulted from a combination of opportunism, ideology, and populism. Importers prefer to buy from the Russians, who offer discounts of up to $25–35 per barrel to reach new markets and avoid sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union. Brazilian importers, including the state-owned Petrobras, have benefited from the discounts offered by the Russians. Obtaining profits from the war in Ukraine is not exclusive to Brazil. Moscow’s other partners in the BRICS—China and India—are also taking advantage of the low prices. As much as he tries to maintain apparent neutrality in the conflict, Lula, who recurrently blames the United States and the European Union for prolonging the war, not only fails to isolate Russia but seems to allow it access to the Brazilian market. Moreover, the influx of cheap fuel into Brazil impacts domestic politics and helps the Lula administration to contain inflation by cutting fuel prices while raising taxes.

By allowing imports of “blood oil” into Brazil, Lula is indirectly funding Russia’s war effort. He is also reaping the political dividends from this decision. Thanks to cheap diesel from Russia, there has been a gradual reduction in the price of diesel sold to final consumers. Lula publicly attributes this phenomenon to himself and the results of his policies.

Since assuming the presidency, Lula has repeatedly reiterated his refusal to help the Ukrainians. In January, he even received a visit from the German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, who tried to convince the Brazilian president to supply ammunition for the German anti-aircraft Gepard guns bound for Ukraine. The answer was no. Lula always justifies that Brazil will not enter the war or encourage war as the United States and Europe do. But what Lula paradoxically does not know, or does not want us to know, is that his choices have already placed Brazil on one side of the war.

Leonardo Coutinho is an independent researcher, consultant, and author.

Image: Shutterstock.

Whispers of an agreement between Washington and Tehran are coalescing into something more substantial. While the fine details remain shrouded in mystery, the broad outline suggests that Tehran will receive financial incentives and a dissolution of laxly imposed U.S. sanctions on oil exports. In return, Tehran would halt uranium enrichment beyond 60 percent, which is just short of weapons-grade.

This potential arrangement constitutes a desperate bid by the United States and its allies to stymie the Islamic Republic’s nuclear progression, prompting the crucial question: can Tehran be prevented from becoming a nuclear power?

There are five potential scenarios in which the Islamic Republic would not possess a nuclear bomb—mainly either because the regime no longer exists or because it has agreed to dismantle the nuclear program.

The first scenario entails a decision by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to refrain from developing a bomb for religious or moral reasons. Tehran often cites an elusive nuclear fatwa as proof of its disinterest in nuclear weapons. Consistently, U.S. intelligence agencies report that Tehran has not yet decided to build a nuclear bomb.

This scenario, however, appears extremely unlikely. Tehran’s current uranium enrichment levels have no civilian purpose, suggesting Iran seeks a bomb. Moreover, even if a nuclear fatwa exists, its validity can be revoked at any moment. Khamenei has not weathered nearly two decades of severe sanctions merely to produce nuclear electricity. He regards the nuclear umbrella as a final insurance policy for the regime’s survival.

The second scenario is predicated on coaxing Khamenei with financial and political incentives to forsake the pursuit of nuclear weapons. This approach has long been, and remains, the West’s favored strategy. Advocates of this method point to the 2015 nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as its paramount achievement. However, it should be transparent to all, including the agreement’s supporters, that the accord failed to stifle Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. At best, it merely postponed the problem. The problem with delaying tactics is they invariably reach an endpoint.

Despite offering Tehran an attractive package of political and economic incentives, the Biden administration has been unsuccessful in persuading Tehran to recommit to the nuclear deal. Biden’s failure to enforce sanctions and unite allies against Tehran has emboldened the regime and diminished Washington’s leverage. As the nuclear deal demonstrated, financial and political rewards seem unlikely to convince Tehran to surrender its nuclear aspirations and dismantle the program.

The third scenario could arise if a potent mix of political, economic, diplomatic, covert, and military pressure threatens the regime’s survival, forcing it to abandon its nuclear program to prevent collapse. The United States has intermittently adopted this strategy, often in conjunction with financial and political incentives to the regime. Yet the pressure campaign has never been comprehensive or absolute, focusing mainly on economic and diplomatic pressure and covert ops without even fully utilizing these instruments.

Over the past two-and-a-half years, the United States has squandered much of its diplomatic and economic influence over Tehran by failing to uphold sanctions and by alienating regional allies. Instead, Tehran has managed to improve its relations with countries in the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia. The regime’s mismanagement of the economy and its gamble in supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine still offer a fertile ground to pursue a pressure strategy, but critics can argue that Tehran’s nuclear progress and Washington’s loss of leverage cast a shadow of doubt on whether enough pressure can be produced in the short term to force Khamenei to retreat.

The fourth scenario entails the collapse of the Iranian regime. The regime’s various structural deficiencies have rendered it unstable. Its foreign interventionism invites the risk of war and foreign invasion, while its incompetence and authoritarianism render it vulnerable to revolution and, assuming increased internal factional competition for limited resources, coups d’état. The regime’s collapse would solve the nuclear issue, provided the succeeding political order is not anti-American.

The problem with this scenario, aside from its lack of timeliness in derailing Khamenei’s nuclear ambitions, is the significant cost and potential consequences of a regime collapse. Revolutions are unpredictable and challenging to orchestrate, coups d’état typically lack high success rates, and there is little appetite in the West for inciting regime change in Iran via military invasion, particularly after two decades of being engaged in Afghanistan and neighboring Iraq. Moreover, the collapse of Iran’s political regime could be enormously destabilizing for the region, and the succeeding government may not necessarily be aligned with U.S. or allied interests. It is for this reason that Washington and its allies have demonstrated little interest in capitalizing on Tehran’s weaknesses.

The fifth and final scenario envisages a military strike targeting Tehran’s nuclear program. If successful, such a strike could delay the program’s development for years.

Critics, however, argue that these strikes would not fully eliminate the program. They contend that, in the aftermath, Tehran would cease cooperation and resume and accelerate its efforts toward developing a nuclear bomb. At the same time, it would retaliate against adversaries with missile attacks and terrorist operations. This would mean that a single military strike would not be enough over time.

In the long run, the best strategy is to put maximum pressure on the regime and provide maximum support to the Iranian people to bring down the regime. In the short run, reviving the maximum pressure while preparing for a military strike as a last resort remains the only realistic option.

Dr. Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior Iran and financial economics advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), specializing in Iran’s economy and financial markets, sanctions, and illicit finance. Follow him on Twitter @SGhasseminejad.

Image: Shutterstock.

M. Donald Trump a annoncé le 8 mai que les États-Unis ne soutenaient plus l'accord sur le nucléaire iranien. Ce désengagement ouvre la voie à une nouvelle crise avec la République islamique, qui pourrait relancer son programme d'enrichissement de l'uranium. L'Iran cherchera aussi à renforcer son (...) / Iran, URSS, Russie, Diplomatie, Droit international, Nucléaire militaire, Stratégie, Proche-Orient, Syrie, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Histoire, Nucléaire civil, Irak - 2018/05

A joyful and tragicomic novel has been given extra weight by Russia’s invasion.

Why every day on the Mediterranean is a new scandal for Europe.

Gang leaders in the country aren’t independent warlords. They are part of how the state functions.

As authoritarian capitalism gains credibility, free societies must overcome their internal weaknesses.

What peace will mean for Ukraine’s democracy.

It’s hard to win without a plan for the future.

Israeli drones and ground forces targeted Palestinian militants in the West Bank city.

Madrid-based Prisoners Defenders, an NGO focused on Cuban human rights, reported that the Cuban and Russian governments signed an agreement in which Cuba would send soldiers to join the war in Ukraine. Such a development raises many important questions.

The Wagner Group’s dramatic failed mutiny displayed something the Kremlin knew long ago: the group, including its leader, Yevgeny Prighozin, has become a problem for Russia, particularly on the Ukrainian front.

The group had little military training and served as cannon fodder in the war. Thousands of its fighters fell in battle. Wagner was convenient to Russia, as many of its recruits were criminals recruited out of Russian prisons. In other words, they were soldiers whose lives were expendable. Moreover, using these Wagnerites in lieu of formal soldiers helped prevent a crisis of internal legitimacy in Russia.

Likewise, Wagner has played an essential role in various parts of the world, where its operations are tied to the Russian military and intelligence community. The group has provided security services, paramilitary assistance, and launched disinformation campaigns for regimes and political organizations in Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Mali, Libya, and particularly Syria.

The group’s usefulness explains Russian president Vladimir Putin’s restraint towards Prighozin, who has been a harsh critic of the Russian military establishment and, more ominously to Putin, the rationale for the war in Ukraine itself.

As Prighozin’s hostility towards the military increased, the Putin regime sought alternatives to Wagner, which became more of a threat than an asset. The Russian Ministry of Defence planned to disband Wagner by July 1.

It is again this background that we can understand Russia's recruitment of Cuban soldiers.

According to Prisoners Defenders, Russia would pay every soldier $2,000 monthly, but the Cuban government would take 75 to 95 percent of such income. The report also claims that these soldiers have no choice but to join Russian troops. Otherwise, they would be subjected to retaliation and punishment.

This is not the first time Cuban soldiers have been deployed abroad in such a manner; they have been involved in wars in Angola, Ethiopia, Congo, Algeria, Iraq, and Syria. In Africa alone, Cuba is estimated to have lost 5,000 soldiers.

It is reasonable to assume that Cuban casualties will be significantly higher in the current war, as they are likely to have the same status as Wagner’s recruited prisoners.

The Cuban government would benefit economically from such a deal, and the Russians would begin to reduce their dependence on the Wagner Group.

In addition, it would presumably strengthen the alliance between Russia and left-wing Latin American regimes, such as Nicolas Maduro’s Venezuela, Daniel Ortega’s Nicaragua, and Diaz Cannel’s Cuba, which supported Putin during the Wagner rebellion.

A strategic alliance exists between Russia and illiberal left-wing regimes in Latin America. Russia has also deployed military equipment, troops, and mercenaries to Venezuela, including members of Wagner. It has deployed S-300 air defense systems and provided hundreds of military advisors. Russia has also sent Tupolev Tu-160 nuclear bombers to Venezuela and Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, the Ortega regime authorized 180–230 Russian troops, aircraft, ships, and weapons to operate on its soil. Likewise, Russian troops have been trained in Nicaragua and Venezuela.

It only makes sense then that, as part of this alliance, Putin would try to offer similar deals to Maduro and Ortega to recruit more soldiers. 

Putin’s stubbornness is not likely to lead to an end of the conflict any time soon. Casualties will multiply, and increasingly authoritarian Latin American regimes might sacrifice their sons to a senseless war and indefinitely prolong it.

Luis Fleischman, PhD, is co-founder of the Palm Beach Center for Democracy & Policy Research, professor of Social Sciences at Palm Beach State College, and the author of the book Latin American in the Post-Chavez Era: A Threat to U.S. Security.

Following sustained Chinese presence in Vietnamese-claimed territory in the South China Sea, the United States sent the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier to Vietnam for a port call visit this week at Vietnamese invitation—only the third such visit since the Vietnam War. This visit not only sent a powerful message of deterrence but also symbolized the incredible growth in relations between the two countries over the decades.

Just fifty years ago, the United States withdrew from Vietnam after over a decade of brutal conflict. Since then, the relationship has blossomed into a vital partnership, especially in recent years. Given the upward trend of relations and China’s increasingly coercive action in the South China Sea, some experts have either called for or predicted a formal upgrade of ties from a comprehensive partnership to a strategic partnership—something both countries have signaled a desire to do. However, given the apprehensions held by Vietnam regarding potential Chinese repercussions, the prospects of an upgrade in relations remain unlikely.

How We Got Here

Beginning in 1954, the United States and Vietnam fought a decades-long war that culminated in the U.S. withdrawal and a unified country under the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1975. The conflict resulted in the death of millions of people and a complete severance of relations between the two countries, with little optimism for reconciliation.

However, evolving geopolitical and economic circumstances resulted in a re-engagement between the two former enemies. Shortly after the war, Vietnam began experiencing severe economic difficulties partly due to a dysfunctional centralized economy, its evolving reliance on the fledgling Soviet Union, and its economic isolation from the United States following Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia to remove the Khmer Rouge in 1979. Yet, in 1986 Vietnam transformed its economy through economic reforms (Doi Moi), and in 1989 it withdrew its military from Cambodia. 

These two occurrences presented an opportunity for reconciliation with the United States, ultimately leading to the normalization of relations in 1995. One of the most immediate impacts of this normalization was observed in trade relations, further solidified by the signing of a bilateral trade agreement in 2001. Consequently, between 1995 and 2022, bilateral trade between the two countries increased from $451 million to $113 billion.

The culmination of these efforts occurred in 2013 when the two countries upgraded their relations to a comprehensive partnership. This upgrade established an overarching framework for the two Pacific powers to cooperate on trade, security, climate change, and people-to-people engagement.

Building on this momentum, in 2015, Vietnamese general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong made the first visit of a Vietnamese Communist Party leader to the White House. Less than a year later, President Barack Obama became the first president since Bill Clinton to travel to Vietnam for a bilateral visit and only the second since the war. These visits led to the Obama administration’s decision to remove the embargo on lethal weapon sales to Vietnam.

Lifting the embargo created space for both countries to elevate security relations. Since 2016 Vietnam and U.S. security cooperation has included the docking of U.S. aircraft carriers on several occasions, participation in a RIMPAC military exercise, the transfer of millions of dollars of defense equipment—particularly equipment related to maritime security like U.S. Coast Guard Cutters, a T-6 trainer aircraft, and metal shark patrol boats—and multiple high-level visits.

Upgrade as the Next Logical Step

Given this trend in relations, many expect both countries to upgrade relations to a strategic partnership, something both countries have transparently supported. In March of this year, Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to Vietnam, where both countries expressed a desire to grow their relations. Blinken said, “This is … one of the most important relationships we’ve had … It’s had a remarkable trajectory over the last couple of decades. Our conviction is that it can and will grow even stronger (emphasis added).” Similarly, as reported by Reuters, Prime Minster Pham Minh Chinh said the two countries “were looking to elevate ties ‘to a new height.’” Blinken even suggested a tentative “weeks and months” timeline for an announcement.

At face value, this upgrade in relations makes sense. As the United States attempts to disentangle its economy from China (“de-risking”), Vietnam has become a prime benefactor as a partial replacement in the supply chain. Major manufacturers, such as Microsoft, Foxconn, Apple, and Samsung, have moved some of their operations to Vietnam to mitigate the costs of future economic clashes between China and America or U.S. sanctions and restrictions placed on companies operating in China. This move has deepened their economic engagement even further.

More importantly, from a security perspective, both have aligned interests in the Pacific on maintaining a rules-based order with skepticism about China’s intentions. The initial catalyst for improved cooperation was China’s increasing aggression in the South China Sea, where it has overlapping claims with Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Consequently, China has infiltrated Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (including this month), occupying vast Vietnamese-claimed territory in both island chains. This incursion threatens Vietnamese resources, trade, strategic autonomy, and territory.

This fear is not theoretical but rather rooted in a history of Chinese invasion and colonization spanning thousands of years—something China has also reaffirmed more recently. In 1979, Vietnam fought a short but bloody war that killed millions after China invaded its northern territory to pressure Vietnam to evacuate Cambodia. In the 2014 China-Vietnam oil rig crisis, which occurred when China moved an oil rig and three oil and gas service ships into Vietnamese-claimed territory, there was a months-long standoff and Vietnamese riots, which were targeted at ethnic Chinese, resulted in the destruction of various Chinese businesses and the death of six Chinese citizens.

This concern is still palpable among Vietnamese. The Singaporean-based think tank ISEAS, which conducts an annual survey of business and policy leaders in Southeast Asia, found that just 1.5 percent of respondents have confidence in China to provide leadership to maintain the rules-based order and uphold international law.

The United States shares this concern about Chinese intentions and has a vested interest in ensuring China doesn’t control the South China Sea. America’s prevailing interest in the disputes revolves around international law—if China can throw out UNCLOS, it can dispense with other international laws and norms. Additionally, as U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin said, “[The] Indo-Pacific is at the heart of American grand strategy.” China threatens this grand strategy if it can bully its way into control of the South China Sea and threaten the United States' ability to ensure the free movement of goods and station forces throughout the region.

With an Eye Toward China

Despite the momentum of relations and aligned interest, an upgrade has yet to manifest, despite having an auspicious opportunity. Earlier this year, Blinken visited Vietnam to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War and the tenth anniversary since the last time the two countries upgraded ties. Still, the visit came and went with nothing but lip service to their desires to upgrade relations.

This lack of progress is primarily because Hanoi is careful not to pivot too close to Washington to avoid ire from Beijing, which has a history of choosing punitive measures when states pursue policies China finds unacceptable. The most recent example occurred in 2020 when China applied tariffs on various Australian agricultural products following Australia’s call for an investigation into the origins of the coronavirus pandemic. 

Given Vietnam’s geographic proximity to and economic interdependence on China, its prudence is well-founded. China's track record of encroaching upon Vietnamese territory and Vietnam's reliance on Chinese exports partnership further compound the risk faced by Vietnam. This reality leaves Vietnam vulnerable, especially when factoring in its skepticism of American commitment to the region.

Similarly, although China would likely respond with punitive measures, it isn’t clear what tangibles would result from upgrading relations with the United States. As Bich T. Tran notes, U.S.-Vietnamese officials have argued that the relationship is already strategic in practice. Put another way, Vietnam values the United States as a security partner to deter Chinese aggression, but growing that security partnership doesn’t require an upgrade in relations. Therefore, by not upgrading relations, Vietnam avoids a high-risk, low-reward scenario and can continue to grow its security partnership with the United States while preserving relatively healthy relations with China. 

Vietnamese anxiety about Chinese reactions contributes to how each envisions the upgrade in relations and how it would serve overlapping yet distinct objectives. As the Diplomat’s Southeast Asia editor, Sebastian Strangio, wrote in the lead-up to Blinken’s visit to Vietnam earlier this year, “What Vietnam wants out of its relations with the U.S. (strategic autonomy, economic growth, and the preservation of CPV rule) differs from what the United States wants … (a partner in the containment of Chinese power and influence).”

Other impediments do exist. For example, Vietnam has existential concerns with getting too close to the United States and the repercussions that will have on democratic progression in its own country—something Vietnam expert Bill Hayton argues the Vietnamese leadership considers the “single biggest threat they face.” Likewise, the United States is troubled by Vietnam’s authoritarian government and close relationship with other autocratic powers, such as Russia. There are also lingering grievances from the war, such as the accounting and returning POW remains on the American side and Agent Orange clean up in Vietnam.

Nevertheless, the primary obstacle hindering any progress in advancing relations lies in Vietnam's apprehension of provoking China without a clear and tangible benefit. Unless the United States actively pressures the situation, it would require China's aggressive behavior in the region to escalate to a level where Vietnam deems it imperative to enhance its relations to deter Chinese actions. Nonetheless, we are currently distant from such a scenario, and it would be imprudent to anticipate any immediate official upgrade in relations.

Vincenzo Caporale has a BA from UC Berkeley in Comparative Politics and an M.Phil from the University of Cambridge in International Relations. He is currently an Editor at Large at the Realist Review and a Contributor at Modern Diplomacy. His work focuses on development and geopolitics in Southeast Asia. You can reach Vincenzo or follow his work on Twitter @VincenzoCIV.

Image: Shutterstock.

South Korean LGBTQ+ groups fight for their rights as far-right politicians and religious groups attempt to block Pride parades.