The National Interest

A major crisis in U.S.-China relations has just been averted. Speaking on April 14 at a news conference with the visiting German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang issued an assurance: “Regarding the export of military items, China adopts a prudent and responsible attitude. China will not provide weapons to relevant parties of the [Ukraine] conflict, and [will] manage and control the exports of dual-use items in accordance with laws and regulations.”

This episode is a textbook case of deterrence theory in action. It is a successful example of the United States practicing coercive diplomacy to deter China from providing military aid to Russia. The Biden administration directly warned China on several occasions not to provide Russia with military assistance. And after careful and repeated consideration over slightly more than a year, China has weighed the costs and benefits and complied with the threat.

A Year of Warnings

This U.S. diplomatic success came close to failing. The recent alleged leaking of intercepted U.S. intelligence records by Jack Teixeira, a member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, has provided us with some insight. According to a February 23 U.S. intelligence summary of Russian “signals intelligence,” China’s Central Military Commission had “approved the incremental provision” of weapons and wanted it kept secret. Yet at some point between that date and April 14, Beijing changed its mind.

To best understand then why China opted not to arm Russia, it is necessary to highlight the critical role of a series of direct U.S. warnings to China that taken place for more than year.

The first warning occurred during National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s March 2022 meeting with Yang Jiechi, the then-Director of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission. According to Sullivan, “we are communicating directly, privately to Beijing that there will absolutely be consequences for large-scale sanctions evasion efforts or support to Russia to backfill them.”

The warning was repeated by Secretary of State Antony Blinken to then-Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi at the United Nations in September 2022. A State Department readout for that meeting stated that Blinken “reiterated the United States’ condemnation of Russia’s war against Ukraine and highlighted the implications if the PRC were to provide support to Moscow’s invasion of a sovereign state.”

A few months later, at the 2023 Munich Security Conference (taking place between February 17 and 19), Blinken repeated the message. A senior State Department official privy to the actual conversation briefed reporters that Blinken “was quite blunt in warning about the implications and consequences of China providing material support to Russia or assisting Russia with systematic sanctions evasion.”

In deterrence, threats need to be accompanied by credible assurances that, if the warning is adhered to, restraint will ensue. The readout for Sullivan’s March 2022 meeting “underscored the importance of maintaining open lines of communication between the United States and China.” Similarly, the readout of Blinken’s September 2022 meeting indicates that he conveyed to Wang that “the United States remains open to cooperating with the PRC where our interests intersect.” And at the February 18, 2023 meeting, the readout noted while “the United States will compete and will unapologetically stand up for our values and interests…we do not want conflict with the PRC and are not looking for a new Cold War. The Secretary underscored the importance of maintaining diplomatic dialogue and open lines of communication at all times.”

Observations of Chinese Behavior

Washington’s consistent warnings to Beijing seem to have worked. But will China stick with this policy? Before that can be addressed, it is worth noting two preliminary observations.

First, no embargo is watertight. A variety of factors—ranging from profit seeking by individuals employed by the Chinese state, the historically porous borders of the twenty-first century, and the role of third parties—suggest that the transfer of a non-outcome determining level of dual-use Chinese technology on the battlefield would eventually occur no matter what. Indeed, declassified information released by the Biden administration in late February 2023 demonstrates that dual-use Chinese navigation, radar, drone, and electronic communication jamming equipment has reached the Russian military. There may even be other transferred equipment, such as high-level semiconductors, which simply hasn’t been detected.

Second, China has reason to provide military aid. In Beijing’s eyes, the notion that the United States—whose own State Department figures register $35.8 billion in security aid (as of April 4, 2023) to Ukraine’s war efforts against Russia—should issue warnings to China against aiding a belligerent in a conflict that is (in Beijing’s view) of Washington’s creation is the height of hypocrisy. That said, however sympathetic Beijing may be to Moscow, Qin Gang’s statement underlines the point that China has even more compelling reasons to exercise restraint. Accordingly, as long at the Putin regime’s survival is not at stake, Beijing will not provide Moscow with the military assistance necessary to turn the tide of the war.

China Will Keep Its Guns

Overall, China’s policy is determined by a political logic. As such, China’s restraint will likely continue. There are three specific political reasons for this.

First, Beijing understands the dangers of both escalation of the war in Ukraine and the risk of Chinese entanglement. Chinese policymakers are hard-headed realists who recognize the importance of balancing the competing imperatives of aiding Russia while avoiding getting involved in a conflict that attract the ire of the West and damage the pursuit of China’s own national interests.

Russia’s poor military performance in Ukraine has generated highly critical internal commentary in China’s strategic studies community. Specifically, the January 12, 2023 issue of the People’s Liberation Army Daily, China’s leading official military periodical, contains rare direct criticism. That such appeared in a reputable and authoritative paper provides a window into internal Chinese views. The conclusion is clear: Chinese strategists understand that the provision of a politically untenable level of military support would be needed to change the military outcome in Ukraine in Moscow’s favour. They are also keenly aware that Chinese military support seriously risks drawing Beijing into a quagmire created by the U.S.-led NATO alliance. Accordingly, Beijing draws a clear distinction between diplomatic and economic support for Moscow on one hand, and a policy of military support on the other.

Second, providing outcome-determining military aid to Russia would inevitably trigger economic sanctions from Brussels and Washington, jeopardizing China’s economic growth prospects. The CCP’s domestic political legitimacy, especially in the post-coronavirus pandemic era, rests on its ability to deliver a sustained return to robust economic growth, which will itself rely on continued trade with the EU and the United States. The EU and the United States were China’s top two trade partners in 2021, representing 13.7 percent and 12.5 percent of China’s trade, respectively.

But much more than trade volume is at stake. European technology is increasingly critical to the quality of China’s economic development. Following the drastic reduction in U.S. technology transfer after Washington’s move in 2017 from a policy of “engagement” to what is being called “strategic competition” with China, Beijing is depending on Europe as a reliable alternative source of technology. Military support for Moscow would jeopardize that access.

This reality explains the accommodating comments that Wang Yi—promoted to the post of Director of the CCP’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission in January 2023—made to the substantial constituency of European attendees at the Munich Security Conference in February this year. According to Wang, “we need to think calmly, especially our friends in Europe, about what efforts should be made to stop the warfare; what framework should there be to bring lasting peace to Europe; what role Europe should play to manifest its strategic autonomy.”

Third and finally, China is intent on projecting a more positive image of itself in world politics, especially after the coronavirus pandemic. In February this year, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released two significant documents. The first was a systematic critique of U.S. hegemony, highlighting Washington’s alleged abuse of its power to maximize its political, military, economic, technological, and cultural interests. The second was more positive, outlining Beijing’s Global Security Initiative (GSI)—a Chinese alternative to the U.S. model of world politics. As things stand, a Chinese decision to provide military support to Russia would torpedo the GSI by causing many states to view Beijing as a facilitator of the very hegemonic behavior it critiques the United States of.

A Success for Washington

On the issue of China’s provision of military aid to Russia, a policy of U.S. deterrence has succeeded: Beijing will continue its diplomatic and economic support for Russia, but exercise restraint on military support. The reasons for this policy continuation reflects a combination of factors: the dangers of a Chinese military commitment to Russia; a concern that military aid to Russia will trigger economic sanctions from Brussels and Washington; and the imperative to improve China’s international image.

Short of an unlikely “fall of Putin” scenario, Beijing will not provide Moscow with the military capabilities it requires. Russia, it seems, must make do with what it has.

Nicholas Khoo is Associate Professor in the Politics program at the University of Otago in New Zealand. He specializes in Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, and great power politics.

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One could be excused for assuming all states operate as true equals in the international system and under international law. A brief observation of Lebanon quickly dispels such a conception, however, as the recent exchange of fire between it and its southern neighbor Israel depicted last week. The series of incidents mark a continuation of the small Mediterranean country’s unfortunate reality—namely one of fractured subservience or submission to various regional and international actors that are worsening its numerous ongoing crises.

Lebanon-Israeli Tensions

The escalation between Beirut and Tel Aviv began on April 6, when missiles flew over Lebanon’s southern border and into northern Israel. While unclear at first, many suspect the Palestinian organization and armed group known as Hamas for launching the rockets from positions it controls in Lebanon. This was likely in response to the brutal attacks of Muslim worshippers inside the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem during the holy month of Ramadan on April 5 which constituted major human rights violations. The worshippers wished to stay in the mosque overnight to practice Itikaf—essentially overnight stays in mosques to pray, reflect, and recite the Quran.

The Israeli military reported that thirty-four rockets had been fired into its territory from southern Lebanon, noting that it intercepted at least twenty-five while four landed inside Israel. Three people were harmed in the attack, which also caused material damage and sent Israeli citizens fleeing for bomb shelters across northern Israel.

Tel Aviv responded on April 7 with airstrikes supposedly targeting the origin sites of the attacks in Lebanon, also opting to strike Hamas positions in the Gaza Strip—the origin of additional rocket attacks on Thursday. Fortunately, no deaths were reported as a result of the strikes. Importantly, the Israeli military made a point to explicitly note that it was only targeting sites linked to Palestinian militants—likely a signal to Lebanese Hezbollah that it did not desire further escalation along its northern border with the much more formidable armed group.

Naturally, the series of events produced a flurry of diplomatic efforts to prevent a rapid escalation akin to the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, which ravaged large parts of southern Lebanon. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the peacekeeping force operating as a buffer between Lebanese and Palestinian militants in Lebanon and Israel, was in close contact with both sides to prevent further violence.

But efforts by both parties to signal disinterest in any escalation ultimately won the day. Indeed, official Israeli statements did not blame Hezbollah for the attacks. This proved to be a crucial signal to Lebanon and Hezbollah, especially as many suspected the group green-lighted the strikes since Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah met in Beirut with senior Hamas officials and Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh just hours before the strikes. Lebanese officials reciprocated, with many—including Hezbollah-ally Gebran Bassil of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) political party—condemning “non-Lebanese” rockets fired from their country.

Not in My Backyard

While cooler heads prevailed amidst a context dominated by hawks, which should be welcomed, there is an inherent irony to statements from the likes of Bassil. Not only is it unlikely that Hezbollah was aloof to any Hamas efforts to strike Israel, but the concept of any rejection of “non-Lebanese rockets” is also hysterical and hypocritical.

Ultimately, the rockets fired by Hamas from Lebanon are sourced from the same country—Iran. Bassil and his Hezbollah-aligned FPM want to present a scenario in which Hamas rockets are “non-Lebanese” while pretending that Hezbollah rockets are somehow intrinsically different. In the real world, his party and the pro-Hezbollah bloc regularly point Iranian weaponry—namely “non-Lebanese” rockets—at their southern neighbor. Thus, Bassil presenting a “not-in-my-backyard” stance is as bad faith as it gets in Lebanese politics.

The Myth of Lebanese Sovereignty Today

Yet while Bassil’s newfound altruism regarding armed groups in Lebanon should be expected given his history of disingenuous and corrupt actions, such statements speak to the Lebanese reality today. Whether it be Iranian, Israeli, or other regional and international interests, it is clear that Lebanon has shed any remaining vestiges of sovereignty, opting instead to pawn this off to the highest bidder. Bassil’s statements are the epitome of this dynamic, as the “non-Lebanese” rockets commentary proves.

Indeed, regular Israeli military flights over Lebanese skies—22,000 as of mid-2022—mark one of the staunchest examples of the former’s violation of the latter’s sovereignty. This says nothing of unilateral military operations against Lebanon in recent decades that have resulted in tens of thousands of direct and indirect deaths.

To be sure, actors in Lebanon deserve some blame for these previous military operations. Iran regularly flouts Lebanese sovereignty through its Hezbollah and Hamas partners, the former of which essentially operates a state within a state as it erodes Lebanon’s institutions. In parallel, Hezbollah regularly smuggles essential energy supplies and other goods out of the impoverished country to Syria to prop up the regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad—a country that occupied Lebanon for much of its existence in one form or another. Such actions are in support of Iran’s “resistance” efforts—not Lebanese interests. Still, they do not constitute many of the unilateral Israeli actions.

Regional states also have a long history of similar violations. Saudi Arabia is central to this reality as it has, until recently, long played a patron role in Lebanon, co-opting Sunni and Christian parties to counter Iranian influence in the country. This rarely meant support for basic human rights or anti-corruption efforts as regional states preferred Lebanon’s role as the Switzerland of the Middle East—namely for its incredibly opaque and corrupt banking system. A simple observation of the Lebanese political system shows that most politicians draw allegiances and legitimacy from ethnicity-based patronage systems that vertically span into both Lebanese communities and outside the country to various Middle Eastern states. Pro-Syria parties, such as Marada leader and presidential hopeful Suleiman Frangieh, offer perfect examples of this dynamic.

Ultimately, Lebanon’s sovereignty problem is a long-running net negative for the country, heavily contributing to the paralysis witnessed in its political and governing systems. While this does not explain the full story of despotic and nepotistic clientelism that has fueled corruption in the country for most of its existence, it is certainly a major impediment to reforms that could improve the reality of its people. 

If the region and world continue to view Lebanon as a playground for their geopolitical ambitions, the country will experience worsening economic and political degradation. As the recent Israeli strikes and political statements in Lebanon suggest, the situation is set to worsen so long as those in positions of power continue to reject the writing on the wall.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

Image: Andreas Zeitler / Shutterstock.com

The alliance between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea) is a cornerstone of the U.S. security architecture in the Indo-Pacific and, increasingly, in the world. Both the United States and South Korea must do all they can to strengthen this vital alliance.

As this year marks the seventieth anniversary of the alliance, with an upcoming state visit of President Yoon Suk-yeol to Washington later this month, it is important to appreciate the historical significance of the alliance.

For South Korea, the alliance has been the guarantor of its security and the bedrock of its economic development and prosperity since the Korean War. For centuries, Korea had been under the suzerainty of China and its fate had been tied to that of its Chinese overlords. As the Chinese empire declined in the late nineteenth century and collapsed in the early twentieth century, so did the old dynastic rule in Korea.

As Korea fell under Japanese colonial rule for thirty-six years, it was the United States that played the greatest role in liberating Korea from Tokyo’s grip at the end of World War II. And when communist forces overran South Korea in 1950 in the Korean War after Korea’s division, the United States spearheaded the United Nations forces dispatched to repel the invasion. Though the UN forces failed to reunify Korea, they preserved the territorial integrity of South Korea in large measure.

The U.S.-ROK alliance, cemented in 1953 at the end of the Korean War, marked a historic shift in Korea’s fate. For the first time in Korea’s history, a Western democratic great power came to be the principal ally and security guarantor of a Korean state. With its fate tied to the United States, South Korea came to experience miraculous economic development and an impressive transformation into a mature industrialized democracy.

For the United States, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been indispensable in preserving and defending the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific since the Korean War.

As the Indo-Pacific now contributes the largest share of the global population and the global economy, it is arguably the most important region of the world for U.S. national security and prosperity. However, the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific faces grave threats from Beijing’s expansionism and Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation.

Although defending the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific is crucial for U.S. national security and prosperity, there is no NATO-like collective security mechanism in the Indo-Pacific to stem forces of autocracy. In the absence of a collective security mechanism, what Washington has put together is an uneven patchwork of bilateral alliances and cooperative arrangements with individual countries. In this less-than-optimal security architecture, the linchpin is the U.S.-ROK alliance, along with the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Other than the U.S. alliances with Japan and Australia, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been the only enduring bilateral alliance for Washington in the Indo-Pacific. Other U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization did not endure, and the United States has only a few reliable allies in the Indo-Pacific, as numerous Indo-Pacific nations have been neutral or leaning toward Beijing in the standoff between Washington and Beijing.

The geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the Korean Peninsula cannot be overstated. Located within close proximity between Beijing, Tokyo, and Vladivostok and with substantial U.S. forces stationed in Japan and South Korea, it is the only place in the world where the national security and interests of China, Japan, Russia, and the United States—four of the world’s greatest powers—directly intersect in a visceral way.

South Korea’s importance as a key ally of the United States has been demonstrated over the decades since 1953. In the Vietnam War, for example, Seoul sent massive numbers of troops to fight in Vietnam alongside U.S. troops.

Today, South Korea is increasingly a key U.S. partner in defending the rules-based international order. As a leading trading nation with an export-based economy that is heavily dependent on the import of energy and raw materials from abroad, South Korea’s security and prosperity depend on the integrity of the rules-based international order, including the freedom of navigation in the high seas where its exports and imports are in transit.

Seoul’s importance to Washington has increased even more in recent years, as South Korea has become one of the largest advanced industrialized democracies in the world with a global leadership in key strategic industries such as semiconductors and electric vehicle batteries. With a military rated as the sixth most powerful in the world, South Korea today has become a major arms exporter, with its military hardware supplying nations including Poland and Australia. Seoul now has troops stationed in nations including the United Arab Emirates and is a regular contributor to international peacekeeping activities.

All this has resulted in a major upgrade of the U.S.-ROK alliance, with the partnership now expanding from the military sphere into economics and technology. Last year, South Korean firms invested billions of dollars in the United States, seeking to build factories in states ranging from Georgia to Ohio to Texas.

Given all these developments, South Korea today is undoubtedly among the most pivotal key allies of the United States, and Seoul has arguably become as important to Washington as Tokyo. Considering this seminal importance, what can be done to protect and further enhance the alliance?

For its part, Washington must refrain from taking measures that damage the national image of the United States and turn South Korean public opinion against it. The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act recently is an example of such measures, as it contains provisions favoring electric vehicles made in the United States over those made overseas. Such discriminatory measures that are seen as promoting U.S. economic interests at the expense of the interests of U.S. allies including South Korea do much more harm than good to the U.S. national interest. Such measures must be avoided if the United States were to protect its crucial alliances with key partners such as South Korea.

Washington must bear in mind that China is keen to capitalize on tensions between the United States and its key allies such as South Korea. Washington must realize that damage to its alliance with Seoul can push the latter closer to Beijing. Washington must understand that Seoul moving into Beijing’s orbit would devastate U.S. credibility and leadership in the Indo-Pacific and indeed around the world.

For its part, Seoul must recognize that its future survival and prosperity hinge on the alliance with the United States and therefore strengthen its ties with Washington. While South Korea needs to maintain good relations with China, its biggest trading partner and a key stakeholder in addressing challenges posed by North Korea, Seoul must guard against Beijing’s attempts to drive a wedge between it and Washington. Seoul must realize that, if it allows its relationship with Washington to deteriorate excessively, it could fall back under Beijing’s suzerainty as it used to be for centuries.

Clearly, the seventy-year-old U.S.-ROK alliance is critical to the national interests of both nations and is among the cornerstones of the rules-based international order. Both Washington and Seoul would be wise to refrain from taking steps that damage this alliance, and they would be wise to guard against attempts by third parties such as Beijing to undermine this alliance. Under careful stewardship, this key alliance will help guarantee continued security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and around the world for many years to come.

Jongsoo Lee is Senior Managing Director at Brock Securities and Center Associate at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. He is also Adjunct Fellow at the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum and Contributing Editor at The Diplomat. He can be followed on Twitter at @jameslee004.

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Once hailed as a model for free thinking and expression, Lebanon is becoming increasingly authoritarian toward dissenting voices and the rights of journalists to be critical of government action and political parties. Media outlets and independent writers are gradually finding themselves in a tougher environment to do their job of informing the public of the truth.

An unfortunate example of the risks journalists faces while working in Lebanon is the loss of our fellow writer and activist, Lokman Slim. Lokman was a long-time critic of Hezbollah and other parties that belonged to the sectarian ruling class. But he directed his most fiery and brisk denunciation at the heart of where he believed Lebanon’s problems lie: Hezbollah. He was found dead in the south of Lebanon, a region Hezbollah has the strongest influence in the country. His death was gruesome. Four bullets to the head and one in the back. Why did he die? Because someone thought his beliefs “crossed the line.” Lokman himself came from a Shia Muslim background but refused to allow Hezbollah to have the monopoly on the Shia community from which it claims to draw its legitimacy. Such a grim reality cannot be ignored. Organizations and individuals have taken notice of the shift in how the media is being treated on the ground in Lebanon.

Freedom House, a non-partisan human rights organization that monitors the levels of democratic freedoms across the globe, reported signs of substantial self-censorship in Lebanon by journalists and bloggers. It found in 2019 that self-censorship has increased in the blogosphere and in top media circles out of fear of offending certain sectarian voices in the government.

The study also revealed how highly partisan the official media is in Lebanon because of its connections to the political class. Thankfully, because of internet access and the rise of digital media, it is challenging the system’s power in controlling the flow of information. However, government officials are using other means to block independent voices from delivering the news.  

Journalists who are friends and acquittances have spoken up about how difficult things have become when exercising their right of freedom of expression. Tarek Hmaidan, founder and CEO of Thawra TV, a channel dedicated to supporting the principles of Lebanon’s 2019 revolution, spoke to The National Interest about the frustrations independent media faces while trying to cover events in Lebanon.

“At the Parliament, they don’t let us work freely and now won’t let us go in. Ever since independent MPs Najat Saliba and Melhem Khalaf started their sit-in in Parliament in objection to the lack of a president, some independent media have lost access.” Tarek also talked about Lokman Slim and why he believed he was marked for death. “He was Shia criticizing Shia. This put him in a dangerous situation. If he was Christian, Druze, or any other religion, maybe they would not have killed him.” The point Hmaidan was making is: some members of the sectarian class do not tolerate criticism from those of their same confession. Instead, they are deemed traitors and must pay a penalty. Regardless of the motivation behind Lokman’s killing, the current environment makes people hesitate to speak and write with confidence that no harm will come to them.

Diana Moukallah, a journalist who works with Daraj Media, commented to TNI on today’s climate regarding free speech issues. “I believe it’s the mother of all battles here in Lebanon as the intimidation is increasing. If Lebanon loses the battle, then, the whole meaning of the country is lost for good. From the case of journalists being summoned to the case of imposing prior permission on lawyers to give interviews to the rising grip on mainstream media, I believe we are battling a vicious ruling class trying to impose restrictions on free speech.” 

If journalists in Lebanon start believing their voices could be silenced through blackmail or violence, the situation will worsen. Hmaidan expressed support for the idea that independent journalists should “unify and form a type of union to protect one another.” Without solidarity, true journalism will perish. It is time to put the criteria for free media protection back on the table if Lebanon is to have any serious chance of rebuilding what it once had as a democratic way of life.

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

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In March, the new foreign minister of China, Qin Gang, waxed eloquent about the state of Sino-Russian relations. “The more unstable the world becomes the more imperative it is for China and Russia to steadily advance their relations . . . The strategic partnership will surely grow from strength to strength.”

That struck some in the West as disingenuous. After all, Russia is getting a bloody nose in Ukraine, which is not only embarrassing from a power politics point of view (who wants to be seen as backing the losing horse?) but has also served to increase the unity and size of NATO. Furthermore, the Chinese were apparently told by the Russians to expect a more limited “special military operation”—not a full-scale invasion, complete with crimes against humanity. A crippled ally may turn out to be a burden and a hindrance; an ally that potentially crosses the nuclear threshold spells disaster.

And China’s got bigger fish to fry, after all. It dreams of supplanting the Western-led order with a China-led one, and it plans its own invasion of a territory it considers part of its national heritage. Some feel that China’s recently proposed twelve-point peace plan shows its desire to see its ally Russia back down from a long, grinding proxy war with the West while saving face. Negotiations over such a ceasefire would also save China the painful choice of whether or not to bring down Western economic sanctions on its head if it were to be forced to arm the Russians lest they be defeated.

After all, it was the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu who stated, “Victory comes from finding opportunities in problems.” While there are definitely some downsides to China in its current relationship with Russia, there’s also a very bright side.

A stumbling ally becomes even more dependent on you—as China has become indispensable to Russia’s survival, and that offers China significant leverage over its neighbor. Beijing has already negotiated big price cuts on the energy resources it buys from Moscow. Russia needs the rubles, and China is quite willing to play ball, for a price. In addition to those energy price cuts, China has negotiated favorable terms for Chinese investment in key Russian infrastructure, such as roads and ports, and even farmland. Though the terms of these agreements are not public, similar Chinese investments in other countries have been conditional on greater-than-average control over the resulting assets.

Much of the Chinese investment is concentrated in the Russian Far East, which has depopulated so rapidly in recent years that it is experiencing an astounding -33 percent population “growth” rate. It is interesting, then, that noted academic Yan Yuetong, writing in Foreign Affairs last year, commented, “Soon after the conflict began, some anti-Russia Chinese netizens began rehashing the unfairness of the 1858 Treaty of Aigun, which ceded roughly 230,000 square miles of Chinese territory to Russia.” The 1860 Treaty of Peking, which saw an even greater swath of northeastern China given to the Russians, has also been brought up. A de facto Chinese colonization of the Russian Far East might be one of the opportunities Beijing sees given the weakened state of its neighbor to the north, which could play into China’s new “Polar Silk Road” initiative.

There are a few other side perks from the hobbling of Russia, such as that nation’s dramatic decrease in its international arms sales. Not only can China take over some of these accounts, but it also means that countries China doesn’t want to see armed by Russia, such as Vietnam, find their supply line cut.

At the same time though, China is also measuring how the entire situation helps or hurts its vision of retaking Taiwan in the near term. While surely the ineptness of the Russians must give China pause—its own soldiers and officers are as untested in battle as the Russians were—arming the Ukrainians is expensive and is rapidly depleting Western stocks of weapons systems and ammunition. For example, the UK government just released a report stating it will take the country ten full years to replace the weapons stocks gifted to Ukraine. There are rumblings from the DC Beltway that the United States is also running low on some systems and ammo because of what it has sent to Ukraine.

So while the Biden administration has been purposefully aiding the Taiwan government at a higher level and frequency than previous presidents have, how long can the United States figuratively burn the candle at both ends without impairing its own ability to fight? Having America entangled in the long, drawn-out slugfest that is the Ukrainian war is very much in China’s national interest.

Is Russia an albatross around China’s neck? Or, alternatively, is Russia’s weakness providing a wealth of opportunities for China to secure its own national interests? Great strategists see opportunity in problems, and the homeland of Sun Tzu is certainly no exception.

Valerie M. Hudson is professor and George H.W. Bush chair in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.

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There is a problem with deterrence; it’s not working. Not that we are about to descend into nuclear armageddon. But aside from nuclear wars, the United States’ deterrence paradigm does not seem to be deterring much recently. Our adversaries—principally Russia and China—do not seem cowed, either by the risk of failure to achieve their objectives or by the fear of retaliation. Both have been seizing the initiative with aggressive behavior ranging from information warfare, through the full range of gray zone tactics, all the way to the illegal military invasion and occupation of a sovereign neighboring state. Either the theory of deterrence is wrong, or the West is doing deterrence wrong.

The litany of Russian aggression in recent years includes the massive 2007 cyber-attack against NATO ally Estonia, the 2008 Russian seizure of the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (15 percent of Georgia’s territory), the 2014 occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea, and the 2015 intervention in Syria. Russia’s actions in Crimea sent shockwaves through the West, yet Russia’s main objectives, attained through well-planned cross-domain operations, were achieved at little real cost. In February 2022, confident in his impunity despite threats and warnings from Western powers, Russian president Vladimir Putin launched a full-fledged aggressive war against Ukraine. At the time of this writing, the war still rages in that beleaguered country as the death toll approaches half million.

Meanwhile, China—dubbed our so-called pacing threat—has been relentlessly and unapologetically stealing Western intellectual property for years at next to no cost in what was described by former National Security Agency director Keith Alexander as “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.” China has militarized the South China Sea, weaponized atolls in disputed waters, and bullied, threatened, and coerced neighbors and extra-regional countries that have dared to defy its strategic demands. The brutal repression of the Uyghurs and the brazen abrogation of the Hong Kong agreement and guarantees were met with loud protests from the West as well as limited economic sanctions, but nothing sufficient to deter China’s aggression.

Real deterrence depends on our will and our capability to inflict unacceptable costs on an adversary. If our adversaries believe that our intervention will prevent them from achieving their objectives, or that they will suffer unacceptable retaliation and consequences, they will be deterred. But deterrence requires credibility, and that is where the West in general, and the United States in particular, come up short. Who can forget President Barack Obama’s red line warning to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in August 2012 against the use of chemical weapons? Clearly, Russia and China haven’t. President Joe Biden took the military option for defending Ukraine off the table and has refused Ukraine permission to use U.S. weapons for retaliatory strikes on Russian territory. Our failure to demonstrate both the will and the capability to retaliate that undergird deterrence undermines deterrence.

Our fear of escalating the conflict in Ukraine has created an atmosphere of self-deterrence. We fear that any retaliatory action will exacerbate the situation and unleash an escalatory upward spiral, perhaps approaching or even crossing the nuclear threshold. While understandable, this mindset acts powerfully to restrain any credible demonstration of our capability and will. Meanwhile, our adversaries continue their persistent, multi-domain campaign against U.S. and Western security interests capitalizing, as they see it, on our paralysis. As the devastation of Ukraine drags on as China’s Xi Jinping, North Korea’s Kim Jung-un, and the Ayatollahs of Iran watch carefully and study. Indeed, Ukrainian cities are now routinely attacked by Iranian drones, sold to and deployed by the Russians. And soon, if not already, Ukrainian cities and troops will be bombarded by North Korean artillery shells traded to the Russians for food, by Kim. Neither of these odious regimes are deterred from actively, perhaps even enthusiastically, participating in the destruction of Ukraine and the murder of its people.

The lack of credibility has emboldened our adversaries who will inevitably push against and probe our environment of self-restraint, seeking to measure and understand where America’s will to act matches the need to defend its vital interests. For the moment, our adversaries believe our will to act is not aligned with our interests. As such, the persistent probing continues across a wide frontage and across multiple domains, especially in the cyber domain. Using an old metaphor, our enemies are pushing in the pin—globally—and carefully measuring when, where, and how they will strike an American nerve, and then how the United States will react. Understanding and anticipating the U.S. reaction will form the basis for their challenges against the U.S. and our allies. The lower the American threshold for either symmetrical or asymmetrical reaction to these now nearly constant probes, the greater the credibility of our deterrent. Conversely, the higher the threshold of American reaction, the more emboldened our adversaries become and the more risk we must absorb.

The Russian war in Ukraine exemplifies this situation clearly. Our fear of escalation has kept the West from taking the steps necessary to end the war. Putin has shown us he will not be deterred by economic sanctions. By now we should have learned that economic sanctions—regardless of how good they may make us feel, or even despite the harm they may cause to our adversaries—do not deter a determined foe. Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, as well as Russia and China, have been resistant to, and in some cases completely undeterred by, economic sanctions. If Putin is willing to sacrifice 200,000 soldiers, he is unlikely to be deterred by lower gas and oil revenues. By contrast, consider how effectively Putin has used the specter of nuclear escalation to deter an effective counter-offensive in Ukraine by nuclear saber-rattling. The debates about providing Ukraine with tanks; long-range, precision-guided missiles, F-16s, and other weapons, have been heavily influenced, and sadly, lengthened, by a strong sense of self-deterrence.

Western fixation on preventing escalation is compounded by an anachronistic interpretation of the laws of armed conflict which require any retaliatory operation to be proportional to the provocation, militarily necessary, and limited to military targets. These principles make sense in the context of conventional warfare, but contemporary conflict has metastasized far beyond the conventional sphere and now includes never-ending sub-threshold attacks, probes, and all the ambiguity of the so-called gray zone. These aggressions frequently defy rapid and unequivocal attribution and are often perpetrated by non-military agents.

It is noteworthy that the Western binary notion of war and peace is not shared by our principal adversaries. Both Russia and China perceive international relations as a constant and permanent struggle to create “positional” advantage to achieve strategic objectives that are in direct conflict with our values and interests. Given the persistent multidimensional threats we face, to which specific act of aggression would or should we respond? How can we determine if the act was perpetrated by a military or a non-military agent? Was it government-sanctioned, or just government-tolerated? This ambiguity converts the principles of military necessity, distinction, and proportionality into competitive handcuffs.

These observations beg the question: can there be any comprehensive theory of deterrence in the twenty-first century with so many incongruities and discontinuities? What does deterrence look like when dealing with a nuclear-armed opponent? What deters Al Qaeda, ISIS, or transnational criminal networks? What about cyber deterrence, and the real likelihood that we’ll soon encounter AI-powered, lethal autonomous systems? What deters attacks on our orbital constellation and our undersea fiber optic cabling by any entity capable of disrupting or disabling them? Witness the confusion over the damage to Nordstream II. Is there a single, master, comprehensive deterrent narrative that can simultaneously and concurrently work for us across all these domains and against all these state and non-state actors?

What is clear is that the base truism of deterrence theory remains the same: for deterrence to work in any domain our adversaries must believe we have both the will and the capability to prevent them from achieving their objectives or risking unacceptable pain. The re-building of Western defense forces over the past decade has been dramatic, but regrettably has also been frequently mitigated by strategic paralysis and equivocation. Declaring we have the will or declaring red lines will not suffice, and have already shown themselves to be inadequate. Words must be matched by deeds and actions. For Russia or China to believe in our deterrent we must break the cycle of reacting to their provocations and be prepared to be resolute in our intention to inflict some real pain in retaliation. This entails risk, but without taking some risk there will be no change in our adversaries’ behavior, and the persistent probes for our weak spots and the attacks on our vulnerabilities will be never-ending. Every strategic act entails some risk but so does no action. And no action, we know, is no deterrent at all.

General John R. Allen (USMC ret.) is a former President of the Brookings Institution, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, and Commander of ISAF.

Michael Miklaucic is a Senior Fellow at National Defense University and the Editor-in-Chief of PRISM.

The views presented are those of the authors and are not statements of policy or official views of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or National Defense University.

Image: Shutterstock.

Five years ago today in Nicaragua, citizens protested against Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo for their efforts to weaken protections for seniors. It quickly evolved into a broader call for greater freedoms and respect for human rights in the country. The Ortega-Murillo regime responded with utter brutality and violence, leading to a period of bloody turmoil. According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, at least 355 people were killed between April 2018 to July 2019.

Half a decade later—shamefully—the situation remains grim.

How did we get here? Let’s start with Ortega’s war against the Catholic Church. Even though Nicaragua is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which reaffirms that religious freedom is a universal human right for all, Ortega sees religious freedom and communities of faith as threats to his authoritarian rule.

In the last year alone, Ortega has shuttered Catholic radio stations, expelled the nuns from Mother Teresa’s Missionaries of Charity, expelled the Religious Sisters of the Cross, expelled the Vatican’s papal nuncio, severed diplomatic relations with the Vatican, detained Father Enrique Martínez Gamboa, sentenced Bishop Rolando Álvarez to twenty-six years in prison for being a traitor, requested Father Uriel Antonio Vallejos to be put on Interpol’s Red Notice list, arrested at least 11 priests, and banned public Easter processions.  

In its 2022 report, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom states that the Ortega regime has “gone after Catholic-affiliated organizations, shutting down charities and expelling their workers, stripping universities of funding and legal status, shutting down news media, and eliminating non-governmental organizations.”

In December 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken designated Nicaragua as a Country of Particular Concern under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.

However, it’s not just the Catholic Church being targeted. All Nicaraguans are living under a tyrannical regime that is constantly violating their human rights and denying basic freedoms.

According to the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua at the UN Human Rights Council, crimes include “murder, imprisonment, torture, deportation, rape, and other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity…intentionally orchestrated by the highest echelons of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, against part of the population of Nicaragua, for political reasons, constituting prima facie, the crime against humanity of persecution [emphasis added].”

Ortega recently deported 222 Nicaraguan political prisoners from the country. While their freedom is a positive development for them and their families—they endured beatings, torture, and other human rights violations—it comes at the detriment of Nicaragua and its people. The main opposition to the Ortega-Murillo regime has been expelled.

All of these abuses are causing Nicaraguans to flee in record numbers. U.S. border officials reported 163,876 encounters with Nicaraguans in fiscal year 2022, adding to the migration crisis facing the United States from our hemisphere.

On the national security front, Ortega has allowed Nicaragua to be a staging ground for Russian military activity. Just this week Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov will visit Nicaragua as well as Brazil, Venezuela, and Cuba. Nicaragua has hosted a lot of Russian president Vladimir Putin’s military hardware, including T-72 tanks and even Russia’s Tu-160 Blackjack bombers. Russia has also installed a global positioning satellite system in Nicaragua, which many believe is a front to surveil the United States.

In 2020, former U.S. Southern Command admiral Craig Faller warned that “beyond Venezuela, the sanctuary of cozy relationships with authoritarian governments in Cuba and Nicaragua provide Russia with footholds close to our homeland, giving Putin strategic options.”

Those strategic options are now growing. In June 2022, Ortega went a step further and had his National Congress—which he controls—pass legislation authorizing the presence of Russian troops, warships, planes, and other military equipment in the country, bringing it all close to the U.S. homeland.

The current SOUTHCOM commander, General Laura Richardson, testified before Congress last month stating that, “Russia continued its military engagements with both Venezuela and Nicaragua … Russia uses disinformation to further its malign influence, sow instability and undermine democracy in the region, activities that promote Russian geopolitical goals and undermine U.S. national security interests.”

The question now is how the United States and the rest of the international community should respond. 

First, because Ortega prevented the newly-Senate-confirmed U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua to enter the country, the United States should reciprocate and expel the Nicaraguan ambassador to the United States immediately.

Second, Congress has passed, in a bipartisan manner, legislation that stipulated that the United States must use its voice, vote, and influence to block loans to Nicaragua unless the loans promote democracy at each international financial institution. This must be fully enforced.

Recently, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Michael McCaul (R-TX) sent letters to Central American leaders urging that they exercise their influence at the Central American Bank for Economic Integration to stop funding the Ortega regime. This is a good step forward, but the United States should go further. If the bank does not stop loaning money to this murderous regime, they are indirectly aiding and abetting a human rights abuser, and the United States should sanction the bank’s leadership.

While admonishing the Central American Bank is welcomed, the United States must also hold other international financial institutions accountable where it has leverage. According to former Western Hemisphere Subcommittee chairman Congressman Albio Sires (D-NJ), the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank have loaned at least $1.2 billion to the Ortega regime since 2018. This is appalling.

Third, the United States must prohibit imports from Nicaragua to the United States, exports from the United States to Nicaragua, and prohibit new U.S. investments into the Nicaraguan economy in accordance with authorities that the Biden administration extended by modifying Executive Order 13851 in October 2022. These authorities should be executed and utilized immediately against sectors that Ortega, his family, or his private sector collaborators control.

Whether it’s responding to Russian activity close to our homeland or attacks against the Nicaraguan people, including the church, Nicaragua must be prioritized within U.S. foreign policy. Nicaraguans today live under an illegitimate tyrannical regime that uses violence, fear, intimidation, unjust incarcerations, and state-sponsored killings to maintain its iron grip on the country.

Five years ago, many Nicaraguans sacrificed their lives for freedom. We must reaffirm our commitment to democracy for those who were massacred, and for all Nicaraguans still living under this brutal dictatorship.

Eddy Acevedo was recently deemed a “traitor” to Nicaragua by Daniel Ortega and was previously sanctioned by the Russian Federation. He is the chief of staff and senior adviser to Ambassador Mark Green, the president and CEO of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He was formerly the National Security Adviser at the U.S. Agency for International Development and senior foreign policy advisor for former Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL.). This opinion is solely that of the author and does not represent the views of the Wilson Center.

Image: Shutterstock.

Peter Baker, White House correspondent for the New York Times, published an analytic piece the other day that should be disturbing food for thought, especially for professional diplomats but also for everyone else. While marking, along with President Joe Biden, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland, Baker observed that “such diplomatic breakthroughs have become a thing of the past.” In recent years, nations—and especially the United States—have appeared more likely to break treaties and international agreements than to sign new ones. Baker concludes that although it would go too far to talk about the death of diplomacy, “certainly there is a dearth of diplomacy for now.”

Baker uses formal agreements as a measure of diplomatic accomplishment, a gauge that may overstate the problem. The output of productive diplomacy goes well beyond such agreements to include communication and informal understandings that help to stabilize volatile situations, as well as the persuasion of foreign governments to act more in line with the interests of the country the diplomat represents. Nonetheless, Baker is on to something, and it is appropriate to consider what most accounts for the dearth.

The same three levels of analysis that political scientist Kenneth Waltz once used in a classic work about the causes of war can also be used to address a decline of diplomacy. One of those levels, the international system, figures prominently in Baker’s article, with references to “the revival of great power competition on the scale of the Cold War,” and what currently appears to be little appetite in Moscow or Beijing for compromise with the West. But recalling how the original Cold War featured highly significant international agreements, especially on arms control, most explanations at this level for a decline in diplomacy are not persuasive. There is at least as much need for peacefully negotiated agreements with one’s competitors and enemies as there is for agreements with one’s friends and allies.

As for any reluctance in Moscow or Beijing to compromise, if one could strip away the internal forces affecting policies in those two capitals and look solely at the geopolitical circumstances facing Russia and China today, there is little or no reason for those two regimes to turn away from diplomacy. The relevant needs to be served by diplomacy include, for Russia, a rescuing of its great power status in the face of economic and military decline, and for China, a full exploitation of its rising strength to secure a major role in the international system.

A second level of analysis—national political systems—provides more cogent explanations for the current dearth of diplomacy. The rise of anti-globalist populism provides much of the story here, and Baker correctly mentions the ascendance of that brand of populism during the administration of President Donald Trump as a big factor as far as the United States is concerned. In the current hyper-partisan U.S. political environment, Republicans attuned to their populist party base adhere to an anti-globalism that often takes the form of opposition to any agreement with an adversary that involves compromises, as all such agreements do. For Democratic presidents, the certain prospect of being assailed by the other party for making such compromises means the path of least political risk is to forgo major new international agreements.

Many significant international agreements, including the Good Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland as well as the arms control treaties from the Cold War, are the product of months and often years of work. Such timelines include not only the negotiations that lead to the final agreement but also much earlier diplomacy that conveys shared interests, explores the boundaries of the bargaining space, and otherwise prepares the ground for signing on to a new agreement. U.S. politics that revolve around a four-year election cycle impede the sustained effort necessary for diplomatic success.

The peculiar American practice of tearing apart the upper echelons of the federal government with each change of administration has always been a problem in this regard—with domestic as well as foreign policy—but the effects have become more severe amid the intensified partisanship of the last three decades. Not only have cross-party senior appointments become much rarer than they once were, but also there is often reflexive rejection by one party of any initiative coming from leaders of the other party.

The third level of analysis—the individual leader—offers additional explanation for the absence of diplomatic agreements in situations where such agreement seems badly needed. The tragedy of the war in Ukraine, with no ceasefire agreement in sight, has much to do with the personal ambitions and now the personal political predicament of Russian president Vladimir Putin, who has staked his regime on achieving not compromise but rather victory in Ukraine. In China, the consolidation of power in one man’s hands to a greater degree than at any time since the death of Mao Zedong has meant that Chinese foreign policy, including bully-like “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, is primarily the policy of that one man, Xi Jinping.

Trump’s proclivities are a major part of why in recent years the United States has torn up or reneged on more major international agreements than it has negotiated or signed. The line between this level of analysis and the previous one is somewhat blurry insofar as much of the Republican Party remains in thrall to Trump. But Trump put a more personalized stamp on U.S. foreign relations by posing as an ace negotiator without—as demonstrated perhaps most clearly by his handling of relations with North Korea—getting substantive results commensurate with the pose.

Powers other than the United States have the potential for rising out of the diplomatic dearth and are already demonstrating their ability to do so. This is true of China with its recent brokering of rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, of Russia with its facilitation of restored relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria, and both Russia and China regarding the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and potential expansion of the BRICS group. By comparison, U.S. diplomacy in recent years has not appeared as productive, apart from Finland joining NATO and other Western actions in response to the Russian war in Ukraine.

The dead hand of Trump continues to weigh heavily on U.S. diplomacy. In several important areas where U.S. leadership in the more distant past had led to fruitful international agreements, the Biden administration, apparently out of an abundance of domestic political caution, has not undone the Trump administration’s damaging retreat from diplomacy. It has not reversed most of Trump’s moves that made an Israeli-Palestinian peace an ever more remote possibility, such as the relocation of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem. It missed an early opportunity to reverse through executive order Trump’s reneging on the multilateral agreement that had closed all possible paths to an Iranian nuclear weapon (a subject on which the Trump administration intentionally tied the political hands of its successor with the way it constructed a “sanctions wall” against Iran). And it has not undone Trump’s move away from the promotion of trade through international agreements.

Whether the United States can follow other major powers in ending the dearth of diplomacy will depend heavily on the direction of domestic U.S. politics. And it will depend on getting the American electorate to understand how the compromises that are inevitable in international agreements represent not just concessions to foreign states but also sometimes an essential part of advancing U.S. interests.

Paul Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was a National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Professor Pillar also served in the National Intelligence Council as one of the original members of its Analytic Group. He is also a Contributing Editor for this publication.

Image: photojourBE / Shutterstock.com

The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s exercise surrounding Taiwan this past week, conducted in response to a visit by U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, is only the latest development in an extended competition over Taiwan. The formation of the Select Committee on Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, and the CHIPS Act have brought to the fore a bipartisan appetite for supporting Taiwan and being tough on the PRC. Last year, the Taiwan Policy Act, reviewed by the Senate, would have provided unprecedented recognition by naming the island a “major non-NATO ally.” It is increasingly important to evaluate and discuss whether, after over forty years of intentionally ambiguous policy, an overt defense commitment—“strategic clarity”—would really make Taiwan safer.

Arguably, strategic clarity opens the door to unnecessary conflict because of two faulty assumptions. First is that, in the current status quo, Taiwan is at a high risk of being invaded. Second, that a explicit defense commitment to Taiwan will deter the PRC. The omitted possibility for fait-accompli missions targeting defenses beyond the main island of Taiwan demonstrates why strategic clarity has a high risk of destabilizing the fragile cross-strait status quo, and setting a dangerous trajectory for Sino-American relations into the future.

“Strategic Clarity” Will Not Be Clarifying

Central to understanding how strategic clarity would be detrimental to Taiwan’s interests is understanding the particular circumstances of Matsu and Kinmen islands, which lie just off the coast of the Chinese mainland but are governed by Taiwan. Their geographical location makes them a preliminary target in a PRC campaign to occupy Taiwan, and a critical factor in creating a cross-straits defense policy.

At the beginning of the Cold War, the United States found itself in a position similar to the present, with chances to clarify its security guarantees to Taiwan. The resulting 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty bound the United States to defend the main island and the Penghu (Pescadores) islands but did not clarify a position on Taiwan’s other smaller islands. When the PRC responded by attacking these, Taiwanese leadership asked for public guarantees on Kinmen and Matsu. Recognizing the calculus and context for defending these islands could easily change in the future, the United States denied these requests. Instead, private assurance was given that the United States would support the defense of Kinmen and Matsu. Three years later, the PRC’s campaign progressed with an amphibious invasion of Kinmen and Matsu, which America responded to by presenting a conventional façade, heavily reliant on the threat of nuclear escalation.

In short, while the main island stayed safe, China was undeterred by the treaty from attacking other Taiwanese holdings and bringing the world close to nuclear war, illustrating issues with clarifying the Taiwan issue. The PRC’s machinations for these islands remain and their capabilities have since substantially grown.

Since agreeing to the three joint communiqués with the PRC and the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States has not taken a “clear” official position on the sovereignty of Taiwan, nor explicitly defined a policy to defend Taiwan. Switching to strategic clarity now, like in the 1950s, requires making an impossible choice over whether to include the Kinmen and Matsu islands or not. If defense commitments are clarified, but Kinmen and Matsu are not explicitly mentioned, then clarity is not achieved—this would bolster the PRC’s perception that the islands are fair game, yet an attack on the islands would still appear as a U.S. commitment failure if it did not intervene. On the other hand, including the islands in a defense commitment is even more dangerous. The Kinmen and Matsu islands remained under Taiwan in the 1950s only by the lack of PRC military capabilities—nuclear threats and deployment of the 7th fleet to the Taiwan Strait functioned as a checkmate which the PRC had no means of contesting. The balance of military power has since shifted dramatically.

Nuclear threats will not have the same effect against the PRC as then, especially with the latter having secured second-strike capabilities. The PRC has also ramped up production of both commercial dual-use means of transport and amphibious assault ships. Taiwan, meanwhile, has substantially reduced its forces on the islands. In a twenty-first-century crisis, conventional defense of the islands is impractical and increasingly unpopular. Kinmen and Matsu are now deep within the PRC’s anti-access/area denial (A2AD) umbrella. In fact, the islands are so close that numerous drones, heavy artillery, and other short-range systems not usually evaluated as A2AD capabilities can cover the islands. In order to succeed, military operations under this umbrella require stealth, division of forces, missile defense, significant suppression of opposing fires and intelligence, and raw numbers. A lack of any of these elevates the need for others. An operation to defend Kinmen or Matsu would possess none.

Overall then, while an invasion of Taiwan would certainly be a costly endeavor for the PRC, there is no doubt even an opposed occupation of the Kinmen and Matsu islands could be achieved in short order.

Strategic Clarity Takes Peaceful Reunification off the Table

Despite the PRC’s recent sound and fury, peaceful reunification still plays a large and explicit role in PRC strategy according to President Xi Jinping. Strategically, the PRC’s current pursuit of peaceful reunification is sound. If there is a way diplomacy, propaganda, and/or coercion could still allow the PRC to peacefully unify with Taiwan, Xi would prefer to exhaust all other options in that direction before taking actions that irreversibly escalate the dispute which may lead to conflict with the United States.

To achieve peaceful unification, Kinmen and Matsu play a uniquely important role. The islands’ ties to the PRC, both economically and culturally, make them unusually close to the mainland. The PRC would rather these particularly pro-unification parts of Taiwan be leveraged as advocates for peaceful reunification, rather than crushing them by force. Invading the islands would not only deracinate the PRC connection into the Taiwanese political context, but it would also irreparably alienate the remaining Taiwanese by proving fears of CCP malintent correct. The CCP would be locked out of a peaceful strategy. Unification would remain an albatross around Xi’s neck, with the only solution being a risky full-scale invasion.

The prospects of peaceful reunification are thus predicated on the possibility that U.S. interest in Taiwan may falter, and that the PRC will be able to successfully convince Taiwan through isolation and dependency that unification is in its best interest. Partially because of this, U.S. deterrence policy has historically been tailored to deter a Taiwanese declaration of independence as much as a PRC invasion. Formal guarantees cement U.S. support, devastating the case for peaceful reunification and emboldening separatist factions in Taiwan. This would provide the PRC with its crisis justifying an invasion as per its Anti-Secession Law. The PRC’s pursuit of peaceful reunification would cease, precluding the continuation of the status quo détente.

The PRC is currently deterred from invading Kinmen and Matsu for good reason: aggression would undermine the effort and wealth the PRC has sunk toward curating an air of responsible leadership. This runs counter to a growing realization the PRC needs friends, even apologizing for interference abroad. Without a substantial shock to the system, the PRC does not have a good reason to face the serious and long-term costs of invading Kinmen or Matsu now: it would lose the possibility of peacefully reunifying, and face global condemnation even if it succeeded.

The PRC May Respond to Strategic Clarity by Invading Kinmen or Matsu

In this light, strategic clarity is dangerous because it necessitates an escalatory PRC response. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership closely follows any U.S. government move perceived as supporting Taiwanese independence and responds appropriately, with the magnitude and hostility of the response calibrated by how threatened the PRC leadership feels. One might believe it is likely PRC responses will remain in the form of signals short of war. However, the PRC has issued continual warnings that the status of Taiwan is a red line. Beyond a certain point, provocative actions taken by the United States would trigger a military response.

Worth noting is that the PRC uses crises to permanently alter the regional status quo in its favor; from expanding control in the South China Sea, to continuous patrolling of vessels in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands. These actions seek to wear down and delegitimize the original threatening presence. Since the visit of a congressional delegation last August led by then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi—seen by the PRC as threatening the One China policy—the PRC has taken action to intentionally weaken Taiwan’s sovereignty, commencing unprecedented military exercises around the island and continually crossing the Taiwan Strait median line with aircraft. A true change in U.S. commitment to Taiwanese sovereignty would force the PRC to take action to delegitimize that commitment. An assault on Kinmen or Matsu would be an extreme response to an extreme threat, but nonetheless consistent with PRC strategy and historical responses.

Bombastic foreign policy rhetoric obfuscates that the CCP’s greatest worries have always been internal threats. Among these, reunification is characterized as an internal issue and remains extremely salient in the mainland. In the face of slipping economic growth and unpopular zero-covid measures, the CCP was willing to emphasize Taiwan as a priority at the 20th Party Congress, positioning the issue as a goal on which leaders will be judged. A policy challenging CCP leadership would further polarize the issue, empowering hawkish voices within the Party.

There Will Be No Unprovoked Invasion of Taiwan Any Time Soon

Proponents of strategic clarity present a narrative where any day Xi Jinping may surprise the world with a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, or engage in such as a domestic diversion. It is because of this potentiality, they argue, that strategic clarity is necessary.

This position is untenable. While there are building internal frustrations, and Xi may wish he could easily invade Taiwan, the current diplomatic environment and strategy of the CCP undercuts any justification that Xi is gambling the continued existence of his government on an unprovoked and costly invasion.

Invading Taiwan would perhaps be the most difficult military operation ever. Sea conditions in the Taiwan Strait limit the window of large-scale invasion to only two small windows in April and October, and preparations for such would be transparent in the months leading up. Routes would be predictable and could be mined or ambushed by aircraft and submarines. The island itself is also highly defensible. Suitable landing areas are few and narrow, denying a massive amphibious landing necessary to leverage the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) overwhelming numbers. Beaches are prone to becoming jammed with ships entering, exiting, and sinking. PLA’s massive arsenal of missiles would be severely limited by targets to attack. Moreover, Taiwan has significantly increased purchases of difficult-to-detect anti-armor, anti-tank, and anti-ship missiles since 2017. The island’s mountainous and foliage-covered geography ensures that many positions would remain undetected and intact to repel incoming forces. This is to say nothing of the capabilities of the United States, Japan, and Australia, which have all indicated involvement in the event the PRC attempts an invasion, bringing the possibility of success far lower. And even if a limited or full invasion were successful, the PRC would face disastrous economic and diplomatic costs.

In short, Taiwan faces a low risk of being invaded. Only 10 percent of experts in a recent survey believed that an amphibious assault with the goal of taking Taipei was likely in the next ten years. This starkly contrasts with 64 percent of those polled believed that the PRC would respond “negatively and significantly, provoking a crisis” if the United States ended strategic ambiguity. Over 70 percent agreed that the PRC believes the United States is willing to bear at least substantial costs in a conflict over Taiwan. Current U.S. policy is already explicit: the Taiwan Relations Act contains language almost as strong as in U.S. defense treaties, and in the Three Communiques—from which the One China Policy is based—the United States exclusively ties Taiwan and peaceful settlement. In a separate poll, a majority of experts expressed that they do not approve of strategic clarity on Taiwan.

America’s position is already clear enough toward the audience that matters the most: the PRC. Why kill a policy which continues to work?

The United States Should Support Taiwan… Just Not through Strategic Clarity

Strategic clarity is a rhetorical rather than a substantive change in U.S. policy—one which ultimately does not make Taiwan safer and may be dangerous enough to trigger a crisis by pushing the PRC to invade either Kinmen, Matsu, or both. The inability of the United States to respond to a Kinmen or Matsu fait accompli—the very public idea of Taiwanese territory being captured by the PRC—would severely weaken not just Taiwan’s position, but also the perception that America can support its alliance commitments across the world.

Instead of high-profile diplomatic gestures, the United States can make Taiwan safer under current strategic ambiguity without risking conflict from highly provocative actions.

First, the United States should focus on providing Taiwan with defensive assets at a rate that keeps the PLA uncertain about its capability to invade Taiwan. These assets should be capable of reaching operational capacity in the next few years, not be easily targeted by PLA missiles, and should not be tied to airstrips or ports which will be PLA priority targets. This requires clearing existing backlogs, as well as signing deals on new smart naval mine-laying craft, smart artillery, and redundant, robust intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities across the whole range of battlespaces. Dispersing assets that mitigate missile effectiveness and Chinese intelligence gathering such as more anti-air defenses as well as shore-based anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare tools are also key parts of making Taiwan’s defense equation add up. The United States can build up credibility that it will come to Taiwan’s defense by posturing more forces capable of responding quickly and affecting conflict from outside the missile range of the Chinese mainland.

Second, there is no military solution that denies an invasion of Kinmen or Matsu. However, this has been the case for years. The islands remain Taiwanese because of astute diplomacy in maintaining the cross-strait status quo. The United States should pursue a diplomatic goal of motivating allies—particularly non-regional allies who may not otherwise willingly damage relations with the PRC—on board with sanctions against non-peaceful attempts to change the status quo. Sanctions can change the calculus of a potential invasion in a way the U.S. military power cannot.

The Taiwan Strait will remain a geopolitical flashpoint, and the United States will play a deciding factor in its direction. Sober diplomacy, smart military investment, and leadership of allies can maximize the security of Taiwan.

Ike Barrash is an independent consultant working with think tanks on Indo-Pacific security and technology. He has an MA in political science from Iowa State University and has been an intern at the Department of State, CSIS’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, and the Stimson Center’s Defense Strategy & Planning project.

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While the long-term results of the People’s Republic of China’s diplomatic outreach into both the Middle East and Ukraine remain unknown, it is apparent that the foreign policy establishment in Washington DC was taken aback by the speed at which Beijing’s reputation is rising. They shouldn’t be. The long-running Saudi-Iranian rivalry has been partially fueled by the United States, meaning that Washington could never serve as a reliable mediator for all parties. China’s distance and relatively non-partisan-seeming approach to the region, however, enables more parties to be willing to at least discuss putting aside one of the more dangerous rivalries of the twenty-first century. Elsewhere, India plays an agile game of diplomacy, neither endorsing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine nor rejecting its long-standing and beneficial security relationship with Moscow that dates back to independence. Brazil, increasingly, tows no one’s line at the UN and is quick to question narratives from the great powers. France asserts that European core interests and North American core interests are rapidly diverging.

Commentary on the return of the multipolar world has rightfully arisen. The industrial and economic share of American power on the global stage has narrowed considerably since its heydays in the Cold War and even at the start of the twenty-first century. Regardless of what anyone thinks about it, the multipolar world is already here. And rather than being regarded as some great shock or oddity, a multipolar world is in fact the normal condition of the international system. What we are seeing now is the world emerging out from under an outlier period and into something more typical with the majority of history. It is apparent by the actions of countries like China, India, and Brazil that most of the world knows this and is working towards adapting to such a future.

But the United States and many of its dependent allies are not. The rhetoric from places such as Washington and London is one of appealing to the logic of a “New Cold War”, where an “Axis of Authoritarianism” is rising between China and Russia that seeks to wage an ideological battle against “The Free World” in a bid for total global supremacy. With the possible exception of a reactive and increasingly culture war-obsessed Russia, however, few outside of the North Atlantic world take this rhetoric seriously. They have already moved on to focus on their regional self-interest. This begs the question: how can so much of the foreign policy class in the Beltway continue sacrificing the outcome of results for more tired declarations of loyalty to an ideology of global conflict over universal values? What is it that holds Anglo-American elites in thrall to a way of viewing the world which was questionable even in the Cold War, but is surely beyond unhelpful now?

Last year, the scholar Dr. Emily Finley released an important and comprehensive book that charts the history of this worldview. In The Ideology of Democratism, Finley charts how the world view of Rousseau, built upon by later additions coming from Thomas Jefferson, Woodrow Wilson, John Rawls, Leo Strauss, and up through the Bush Era neoconservatives, injected a universalist faith in liberal democracy as the guiding principle of not just specific societies and local circumstances (the preference of Washington, Hamilton, and the early Federalists in U.S. history), but of the entire world. Democratic systems are no longer outgrowths of particular historical and geographic circumstances but are taken to be the inevitable destiny of all of mankind. For a democracy to be threatened anywhere is to be threatened everywhere. Thus, democracy becomes a kind of civic religion known as “Democratism.”

One of the paradoxes of Democratism, as described by Finley, is that the democratist claims to speak “for the people” while also being highly dismissive of local concerns or popular opinion should these contradict the missionary mentality of expansion of democracy abroad or deviate from the plans of democracy experts. The “national will” is not something left up to individual elections but is rather a long-term project that can only be entrusted to the technocrats of democratic governance. In other words, only the democratists themselves can govern policy because only the mission of democratization is a legitimate purpose for a government whose goals transcend day-to-day concerns about security and infrastructure. Finley contends that this is now the default ideology of the governing and media classes in the North Atlantic, and especially in the foreign policy establishment of Washington. In a world where the U.S. expects Europe to hold solidarity with it on Taiwan (or Japan to not breaks ranks sanctioning Russia over Ukraine), it becomes apparent that, whether cynically or genuinely used, democratism is the rhetoric if not the purpose of present-day global over-extension.

While not the entirety of the reason why the Beltway struggles to shed its imperial hubris and adapt to the new multipolar world, (much of that is simply complacency) understanding democratism’s hold over the governing elite is vital for explaining the unique hostility found in so much of foreign policy commentary towards a soberer and more realistic appraisal of the world. From the bafflement expressed at countries failing to rally behind support for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia, to the clueless exhortations for a “values-based” diplomacy that prioritizes a nation’s domestic politics over its strategic opportunities, democratists will not concede that perhaps their worldview is unsuited for the proper practice of diplomacy under conditions of multipolarity. Particularly in a world where non-liberal powers have a variety of localized interests and abilities to assert themselves to greater degrees than were previously possible.

Perhaps the most damaging manifestation of the democratist worldview is the assignment of a type of karma point system to how nations are ranked. “Good” countries have policies that reflect Anglo-American norms and thus are worthy of some sovereignty, while “bad” countries can have their sovereignty violated on a economic or humanitarian pretext for failing to play their assigned role in the view of North Atlantic policymakers. The backlash this inevitably causes is taken as further proof that this contest for political power is a Manichean struggle of good versus evil which is existential, rather than a clash of interests that could be solved by diplomacy. Such tendencies serve only to drive nonaligned powers further away from partnership with countries enthralled by the democratist worldview.

Geopolitics is the contest for resources and power among territorial units jealous of their security and suspicious of their rivals. The rising and more assertive middle powers cannot coast on the received wisdom of ahistorical ideological projects, they must develop and survive. Having no comforting mythological narrative to blind them, they embrace the world as it is, rather than as they wish it to be. It is this that gives them a key advantage over a self-indoctrinated global power whose commitment to democratist and exceptionalist rhetoric prevents it from adapting to the very real world in which its power is embedded. Nations that understand this dynamic will outperform expectations and those that do not will comparatively underperform. You can have effective situational crisis management, or you can wage a global jihad for abstract universal values. You cannot have both.

Christopher Mott (@chrisdmott) is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and the author of the book The Formless Empire: A Short History of Diplomacy and Warfare in Central Asia.

Image: Shutterstock.

In the realm of foreign policy discourse, few memes have been more prevalent or misleading than the oft-cited comparison of Russia’s economy to that of Italy’s. The phrase, first coined by Senator Lindsey Graham in 2014, has been wielded like a blunt instrument by Western policymakers and commentators, the implication being that Russia’s economy is feeble and inconsequential when contrasted with the collective might of the West. This soundbite, depressingly, has informed and shaped our approach to Russia, and it is high time we abandon it.

For if Russia’s economy were as small and unimpressive as the statistics suggest, how could it withstand the sanctions imposed upon it? Why has President Joe Biden’s declaration that “the Russian economy will be cut in half” failed to materialize? Did not French finance minister Bruno Le Maire tell a French radio station that the West’s goal was to “cause the collapse of the Russian economy” and bring Moscow to heel? How does a nation with an economy purportedly the size of Italy manage to exert such global influence, to the point where U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen recently stated that Western sanctions are themselves putting U.S. dollar hegemony at risk?

On paper, Sen. Graham’s observation seems accurate; both Russia and Italy are close to each other in terms of nominal gross domestic product, or GDP, which has been the preferred method of measuring a country’s economic size and power since World War II. The figure is produced by determining the total cost of all goods and services either produced or sold in a country within a given time frame. According to World Bank data, in 2013, Russia’s nominal GDP was around $2.29 trillion while Italy’s was around $2.14 trillion. As recently as 2021, Russia’s nominal GDP was around $1.78 trillion while Italy’s stood at $2.11 trillion.

Yet error in this comparison lies in the reliance on measuring nominal GDP itself, as it fails to account for exchange rates and purchasing power parity (PPP), which accounts for the standard of living and productivity (and from there, per capita welfare and, importantly, resource use). Renowned French economist Jacques Sapir has pointed out the inadequacy of this metric, arguing that Russia’s GDP, when measured in PPP ($3.74 trillion in 2013, $4.81 trillion in 2021), is closer to Germany’s ($3.63 trillion in 2013, $4.85 trillion in 2021) than Italy’s ($2.19 trillion in 2013, $2.74 trillion in 2021). This is a crucial distinction, and it is both puzzling and troubling that so many continue to parrot the Russia-Italy comparison.

But even the PPP figures do not fully capture the significance of Russia’s economic power. Sapir further expanded his analysis in an essay for American Affairs, a policy journal, and noted that the PPP measurement “may not yet reflect the real importance of the Russian [economy] when strategic, geopolitical issues are at stake.”

Sapir notes that, over the past fifty years, Western economies have become increasingly dominated by service sectors, which, while contributing to GDP calculations, lose their importance during times of conflict. In such situations, it is the production of physical goods that matters, and by this measure, Russia’s economy is not only stronger than Germany’s but also more than twice as robust as France’s. Furthermore, Russia’s dominant position in the global energy and commodities trade—as it is a key producer of oil, gas, platinum, cobalt, gold, nickel, phosphates, iron, wheat, barley, buckwheat, oats, and more—provides it with substantial leverage over markets and economies, making it less susceptible to sanctions and less easily cowed by Western pressure. This reality has not been lost on many nations in the Global South, who have been reticent to support Ukraine in its struggle against Russian aggression.

Though Senator Graham made a significant mistake in deploying the Russia/Italy economic comparison, he can perhaps be forgiven on the grounds that he is a politician. The same, however, cannot be said for a number of economists and foreign policy experts who have repeated the line over the years up to and including the present.

Yet the persistence of the Russia-Italy myth among these professionals is perhaps not surprising given the allure of the service sectors in the West. The spectacular growth of these capital-intensive sectors, along with their nominal wealth and productivity, has led many in Washington and various Western capitals to not just embrace them, but also to politically, culturally, and ideologically prefer them. We Americans take particular pride, for example, in the success of our tech giants as drivers of innovation, growth, and national prestige. The Internet, and the various applications that flourished on smartphones, are considered by many to be inherently democratizing, effectively serving as a conduit for American values and an enabler of U.S. national interests.

This love for service sectors results in a tendency to view the labor-intensive industries of the past—energy, agriculture, resource extraction, manufacturing—as antiquated relics. But this skewed perspective has left us unprepared for a world in which tangible goods are once again of vital importance, as evidenced by our struggles in the face of the war in Ukraine. The conflict has “exposed a worrisome lack of production capacity in the United States.” In Europe, the United Kingdom has noted that “it will take 10 years to replace weapon stocks gifted to Ukraine and rebuild British weapon numbers to an acceptable level.” The EU, for its part, now cut off from cheap Russian energy, faces the terrifying possible prospect of rapid deindustrialization.

It is high time that we admit how much we severely underestimate the relative size and power of rival economies, including and especially Russia’s. It would also behoove policymakers to reevaluate their current policy approach to economic statecraft—sanctions are not a one-size-fits-all solution, particularly when dealing with a nation that wields significant economic power.

But above all, let us resolve to never again utter the words “Russia has an economy the size of Italy.”

Carlos Roa is the Executive Editor of The National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.

A Chinese moon base sounds like the punchline of a bad conspiracy theory. But Yang Mengfei—a member of the China Aerospace and Technology Corporation (CASC)—sees it as an ambitious goal within reach of the People’s Republic of China. Despite this posturing, China is lightyears away from a moon base.

Late last month, Mengfei called on China to seize the opportunity to build critical space infrastructure on the moon that would lay the groundwork for the economy of the future. Yet the latest announcement about a Chinese-Russian lunar base is just another piece of propaganda; U.S. policymakers should not have serious concerns about a Chinese lunar base.

Certainly, China’s advancements in space exploration in the twenty-first century are not to be ignored. China’s Chang’e 4 lunar explorer became the first space probe to land on the far side of the moon in 2013. Furthermore, in recent years China has conducted high-resolution imaging of the Earth’s surface and constructed the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), which provides China with economic and security data that informs its industrial development. The Chinese government has also proposed its own Lunar Research Station (LRS) in partnership with Russia to counter the United State’s Artemis Program, which seeks to return U.S. astronauts to the moon.

Mengfei and the Chinese Communist Party obviously want to tout these accomplishments to increase China’s prestige on the international stage. However, China’s space technology is still lightyears behind the United States in terms of reusability and cost efficiency. China’s main rocket used for heavy payloads, the Long March 9, is having to be completely redesigned in order to make it a reusable rocket on par with SpaceX’s Falcon 9 and other privately-owned reusable rockets in the United States. This redesign could delay the Long March 9’s utilization for a decade or more. Previous launch failures, like that of the Long March 5 in 2018, have also delayed Chinese space missions by a number of years. China’s ability to calibrate its own rockets will take time, but it is in the diplomatic sphere that the CCP’s moon base ambitions may face their biggest challenge.

The war in Ukraine has exposed Russia’s space programs to the budgetary chopping block, making any potential assistance from Russia to China’s space program negligible at best. Currently, these cuts stand at $557 million, with funding for scientific research and development cut completely. This comes on the heels of Russia announcing it would quit the International Space Station in 2024, thereby sacrificing a key source of revenue and forsaking the massive amount of leverage it possessed over the United States and other Western space programs. Russia previously used the Baikonur Cosmodrome to launch other nations’ satellites and payloads into space in exchange for payments by the United States and several other Western nations but has refused to do so over the war in Ukraine, depriving the government of millions more in revenue. Those countries are now turning to the United States or the private sector to launch their products into orbit. Russia has spurned countries that have sanctioned the Kremlin in favor of countries on friendlier terms with Moscow, but this has also resulted in a substantial loss of revenue that has severely hampered the Kremlin’s space program.

China’s decision to partner with a diplomatically isolated ally that now lacks any major cutting-edge space technology or financial investment in spacefaring can only hobble China’s own ambitions. While both China and Russia recognize the massive potential for moon resources, like minerals and solar power generation, Russia can only tepidly support Chinese alternatives to U.S.-led space policy. This renders China and Russia’s LRS partnership a mere theoretical alternative to the U.S. Artemis Accords being presented to other nations. What’s more, partnerships with other countries have failed due to U.S. export laws that prohibit the transfer of sensitive technologies. With already-limited funding, Russia’s ability to dodge U.S. sanctions will be restricted, meaning its contributions to China’s moon base ambitions will be minimal at best.

China’s successful strides to join the ranks of space-faring nations is something that the Communist Party rightly touts in the diplomatic sphere. Yet the notion that China is serious about putting together an Earth-Moon system that will generate billions of dollars and solidify Chinese control of the Moon is pure fantasy. While Yang Mengfei’s recent success as chief designer and chief commander of China’s 2020 Chang’e-5 lunar sampling mission allows him to promote China’s breakneck pace in matching U.S. capabilities in space, mega-projects such as the Chinese moon settlements exist only in Beijing’s imagination.

Roy Mathews is an Innovation Fellow at Young Voices. He is a graduate of Bates College and a former Fulbright Fellow. His work has appeared in The Wall Street Journal, National Review, and the Boston Herald.

Image: Marcos Silva/Shutterstock.

Bilateral cooperation remains the coin of the Western world. But cooperation cannot be achieved by berating countries to fall into line. Nations seeking to grow and prosper must find ways to work together. U.S.-Hungarian relations, for example, are no exception.

Surely America wants a Europe that is free, prosperous, and at peace. As a global power with global interests and responsibilities, the United States needs friends at its back.

And surely every European nation would like to be unshackled from the threat of being terrorized and squeezed between competing great powers and empires.

That said, a European superstate is not the answer. While there is undeniable value in the European Union, it is an institution with limits and not immune from political influence where some try to dominate and dictate to others.

Nations participate in the EU primarily because they recognize that it can advance their national interests. But, in the end, each member state bears the real risks and responsibilities of delivering peace, prosperity, and freedom to its own people.

The transatlantic community is another grouping of like-minded countries bound by common interests and geography, reflecting the history, tradition, religions, and culture of Western civilization. It, too, has the capacity to serve the mission of governments to serve their people.

Within Europe and among the transatlantic community, bilateral relations are as important as ever. Indeed, strong honest relations between members—built on trust and confidence—as well as mutual interests and understanding of differences, will strengthen institutions like NATO and the European Union. That, in turn, empowers these organizations to deliver better outcomes for their members.

Obstacles to Bilateral Cooperation

But all is not well in transatlantic relations. Today there are pathologies that, if left untreated, will make it harder to meet the challenges of the modern world through joint action.

Mirror-Imaging Politics. The old truism “politics stops at the water’s edge,” no longer holds true. Domestic political battles are widely reported throughout the world, often through the filter of reporters’ political biases. Audiences reflexively absorb partisan content from foreign pundits, politicians, and media, just as they do domestic news. Too often, people assume that the political Right and Left in other countries are pretty much the same as in theirs. It is not. In Europe, for instance, center-right governments and political parties have a wide diversity of views on domestic and foreign issues. Yet, the impulse to pigeonhole can lead to labeling Giorgia Meloni’s election in Italy a victory for right-wing extremism, when the reality is it is anything but.

Political Infighting. Political fights will exist. That is foundational to a community of free nations. We disagree on things. That is why we have elections. But democracy is for the people and by the people: We should let them decide. And, even if they do not vote the way we wish, we must work together with the elected governments as friends and allies should do.

Ossifying Orthodoxies. One way to stifle political competition is to declare the debate settled. Yet many issues that are fundamental to the freedoms and prosperity of our citizens—climate, energy, family, education, migration, gender, and economic freedom to name a few—remain unsettled.  We can’t build a strong base for common action by declaring a willing partner who challenges political orthodoxies to be a radical extremist and a danger to democracy.

Threats to Free Markets. No orthodoxy must be challenged more than that our economies should be wholly centrally managed by transnational bureaucrats. Doing business should mean doing business. Investors will have to make profits, but they also provide jobs and tax revenues for the host country. We should acknowledge that and not shy away from admitting it. Healthy market competition between countries that respect free market competition creates space for win-win situations.

Uneven Development Initiatives. There are problems the EU has been habitually and consistently unable or unwilling to solve. Topping the list is developing North-South infrastructure in Central Europe. The Three Seas Initiative can be a great solution, addressing needs that have gone unanswered for thirty-plus years, but the entire leadership of the transatlantic community needs to get behind the initiative.

Energy Insecurity. The community needs to get more serious about energy security. That means establishing stable and alternative supply sources (including gas, oil, and nuclear) and routes to deliver fuels and electricity. There must be more cooperation—and a commitment to proceed on a businesslike basis not tainted by favoritism or politics—to develop real plans to open up new markets, where profits can be made, and new enterprises established, with partners like the Abraham Accord countries and the nations of the Middle Corridor (Caucuses and Central Asia).    

The West has failed to overcome these obstacles to cooperation by wasting its energy beating what are often portrayed as recalcitrant allies into submission.

Solutions, Not Slander

When you can’t beat down an obstacle, it is time to try something else: building bridges through better bilateral cooperation. How do we know cooperation can work in these troubled times? We see evidence of it every day.

Many governments in Europe have proven extremely stable despite high energy prices, inflation, migration issues, and the uncertainty of the war over Ukraine. Why? In part because they have made taking care of their citizens their top priority and then worked with other countries to make it happen. One example is the quick action to build the gas corridor from Azerbaijan. Another is the NATO consensus to let Finland join the alliance. How can we build on these examples?

Honest assessments on empirical data. When different countries tackle challenges differently, the outcomes can be measured, debated, and compared, yielding lessons that can inform public policies. Rather than impose orthodoxies, let’s encourage objective, collaborative research on family policy, education, monetary policy (like the Eurozone), and energy and the environment.

Building free and open spaces. We spend too much time arguing over who are and aren’t our competitors and enemies, and too little time working to build partnerships and create new opportunities that will allow nations to work together and make their own choices rather than just have to submit to one sphere of influence or other.

New Forms and Platforms of Dialogue. Decades after the end of the Cold War, the discourse and debate within NATO and the EU is dominated by the same platforms and players as they were decades ago. They are not diverse. They do not make more space for debate on the “orthodoxies.” They include many of the same people who always say and advocate for the same things. We need new instruments of connectivity. Not just more forums that parrot views, but real exchange. Civil society in the West needs to get back in the game. It should become the font of innovation and creativity, not the twenty-first-century version of the Spanish Inquisition.

Defense Cooperation. Nations often most berated by the EU are also among those most committed to NATO, deterrence, and building up their own self-defense capabilities. Defense cooperation, industrial partnerships, and joint efforts focused on advancing collective security in the transatlantic community are a pathway for greater collaborative efforts.

James Jay Carafano is a Heritage Foundation Vice President, responsible for the think tank’s research on matters of national security and foreign relations.

Marton Ugrosdy is the Head of the Office of the Prime Minister’s Political Director in Hungary and former Director of the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade in Budapest.

Image: Shutterstock.

Despite Vladimir Putin’s move to “suspend” Russia’s participation in the New START treaty and the recent decision by the United States to stop sharing nuclear stockpile data, Washington should not abandon all hope of this treaty or future arms control/risk mitigation endeavors.

It is possible Russia and the United States can come to terms on another extension or update of this treaty, although unlikely given the current state of relations. However, America should continue to adhere to the tenets of the treaty even after its likely expiration. This would show continued U.S. resolve and commitment to arms control not only to Russia but the entire global community.

Some will argue the demise of New START will spark another arms race, and that the United States will have no choice but to keep pace with Russia should the latter decide to deploy more nuclear warheads above the treaty limit. Yet this line of thinking causes more problems than it solves. The New START limits of 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads, along with the warheads currently in storage, is enough for the United States to maintain a capable and credible force that can counter any adversary. There is no reason to discard treaty limits to pursue greater numbers of deployed nuclear weapons unless absolutely necessary. A recent State Department annual report on arms control concluded that despite Russia’s suspension and noncompliance with New START, there is no “strategic imbalance”, at least for now, with regard to nuclear capabilities between Russia and the United States

It’s important to note that Moscow’s use of the word “suspension” of the treaty does not mean “cancellation.” While Moscow has eschewed all data exchanges and on-site verification, the Russian Foreign Ministry has publicly stated they will continue to abide by the treaty limits as well as the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement. Separate from New START, this 1988 Agreement requires U.S. and Russian notification of impending unarmed test launches of any Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Sea Launch Ballistic Missile (SLBM). The agreement stipulates the notification must occur at least twenty-four hours prior to the launch and provide the planned date, launch location, and planned impact area of the relevant unarmed reentry vehicle(s). This prudent agreement provides transparency to the ICBM and SLBM test launch process and reduces the risk of misinterpretation. As someone who participated in numerous ICBM test launches as a member of an ICBM test launch squadron, this is a welcome relief.

Additionally, if the treaty does expire, a lapse in arms control is not without precedent. During the transition to New START from the original START treaty there was a gap of well over a year from expiration to ratification. During this time, there was no interim treaty in place and both countries successfully navigated through that process. This fact, plus recent statements from Moscow, at least provide a glimmer of hope.

In concert with pursuing future arms control and risk mitigation, the United States should continue the current path toward modernizing the nuclear force to include deployment of the Sentinel ICBM, the Columbia class nuclear submarine, and the B-21 bomber. It would seem paradoxical to relate upgrading our nuclear force with arms control. However, history suggests that past U.S. nuclear modernization efforts provided negotiators with leverage and options that actually helped negotiators find common ground during treaty deliberations. Moreover, America still requires a capable nuclear force to provide security for the homeland and allies while bringing the United States closer to nuclear modernization “parity” with Russia, if indeed their nuclear force is nearly 90 percent modernized.

To be clear, modernization does not mean an increase in deployed warheads over the New START limit nor is that needed. Modernization means increased reliability and capability; not more.

If New START can’t be saved, it is essential to retain agreements such as the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement and any other type of communication that could facilitate crisis management with Russia. The road ahead for nuclear arms control will look much different and likely not just between Russia and the United States. China will certainly figure into the equation due to its rapid nuclear force buildup. Reducing the risk of a nuclear conflict should be a primary concern not only to Washington and Moscow, but also Beijing. Current tensions notwithstanding, the United States and Russia have well-established communication, protocols, and data sharing which provide confidence and transparency (at least it did, and still can) that is vital to avoid stumbling into a nuclear conflict. Despite the fact there is no similar relationship with China, leveraging protocols such as those in New START and the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement could provide an opportunity, at the very least, to begin a dialogue with Beijing toward the goal of strategic stability. Moreover, future agreements between all three, while difficult, should not be considered an impossibility.

While any type of formal nuclear arms treaty or risk reduction agreement between Russia and/or China will be incredibly difficult to achieve, efforts toward strategic stability must endure. The rules and the players of the game may be changing, but the goal remains, that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

Dana Struckman is a retired Air Force Colonel and a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College. He was a missile launch officer on active duty and commanded an intercontinental ballistic missile squadron at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota.

The views expressed here are solely those of the author and not of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the United States government.

Image: U.S. Department of Defense.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has made clear that there are gaps in the U.S. defense industrial base, which will prove costly in Ukraine and other geopolitical hotspots if not addressed. The most important one is undoubtedly Taiwan, the democratically self-ruled island that Beijing asserts as its own, which is reliant on U.S. military aid to keep a credible defense. But Taiwan isn’t getting the help it needs, and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission identified “diversion of existing stocks of weapons and munitions” to Ukraine as a key reason for delays and backlogs in delivery of promised defense articles to Taiwan. The Biden administration must invoke the Defense Production Act (DPA) to ensure Taiwan has the capabilities to defend itself.

Invoking the DPA is the best and only immediate solution to surging production capacity. Under the act, the president is authorized to “allocate materials, services, and facilities” for national defense and emergency preparedness purposes and instruct private companies to prioritize contracts from the federal government. The DPA has been increasingly used for defense and non-defense purposes alike:, former President Donald Trump instructed 3M to produce N95 respirator masks, and General Motors to produce ventilators during the Covid-19 pandemic, and President Joe Biden ordered defense contractors to boost production of Virginia-class attack submarines in 2021.

Although some lawmakers have recently criticized the Biden administration’s use of the DPA, such scrutiny has primarily focused on non-defense purposes such as solar panels and biofuels. Nevertheless, lawmakers from both sides of the aisle, such as Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-CN., and Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-WI, have already called for invoking the DPA for Stingers and Javelins. “The cupboard is empty, or it will be very, very shortly unless the president invokes the Defense Production Act to provide that demand signal on an expedited basis,” Blumenthal said in an April 2022 hearing.

Taiwan has been unable to receive billions of dollars in military equipment to defend itself amid China’s increasingly coercive activities in the Taiwan Strait. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States is obligated to provide Taiwan with the necessary equipment for self-defense. But more than $19 billion of weapons and equipment has not been delivered to Taiwan. This includes a 2019 $8 billion purchase of sixty-six F-16 fighter jets and a 2015 agreement to supply more than 200 Stingers and Javelin shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles to Taiwan. Without adequate weapons to defend itself, Taiwan will be unable to create the strategic environment that would deter Beijing from pursuing “reunification”—an objective that Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping has promised to fulfill in his lifetime.

Amid the United States’ struggles with its defense industrial base, China continues to pursue an ambitious military modernization program consistent with Xi’s desire to transform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a “world-class” military by 2050. Such modernization includes a large-scale reorganization of the PLA that “encourages synergy between and within military, defense industrial and academic communities.” China’s state-owned and state-controlled enterprises allow for state-led industrial policies that can divert all resources into the military. No more than 4 percent of China’s military equipment was modern in the 1990s. At present, most of its equipment is. As Oriana Skylar Mastro and Derek Scissors point out in Foreign Affairs, China will have more than 450 naval ships within ten years—a number the United States will not reach until 2045.

Dwindling stockpiles of arms and armaments are making it increasingly more difficult to give Taiwan the weapons it needs. Take, for example, artillery, a crucial and decisive tool on the battlefield. The Russian military describes artillery as “The God of War,” and used it to puncture German defenses during World War II. Similarly, the United States outfired the Chinese three-to-one during the Korean War’s Chinese spring offensive, facilitating a successful defense. And at present, Ukraine is doing the same thing with HIMARS and 155mm howitzers against the Russians, demonstrating a fierce and formidable resistance. Of course, artillery shells are an essential tool in the war theater. But a U.S. defense official characterized the stockpile of 155mm shells as “uncomfortably low” due to the United States giving more than 1 million artillery rounds to Ukraine.

A low stockpile of artillery shells is incredibly concerning because, in an invasion scenario, Taiwan’s military would certainly need artillery to stop an amphibious assault. It would take four to five years to rebuild the 155mm ammunition stockpile at the current non-surge production rates. And it’s not just artillery shells. Since the start of the war, Ukraine has received one-third of the United States’ Javelin missiles and one-quarter of its Stinger missiles to repel the Russian invasion. The dwindling U.S. arsenal, according to Mark Cancian, senior advisor at the Center for International and Strategic Studies, is likely reaching a point where defense strategists are beginning to question whether war plans can be executed. At the very least, depleted stockpiles exacerbate already prolonged delays in weapons deliveries to U.S. allies and partners.

To replenish stockpiles and, in turn, ensure that Taiwan is armed to the teeth to deter forceful unification, the United States needs first to address production capacity and the delivery of defense systems and platforms to Taiwan. To do so, the current administration must invoke the Defense Production Act.

By all means the act is crucial to bolstering depleted stockpiles, but it does not address underlying issues of decreased, in some cases closed, production lines. To illustrate, the United States currently buys roughly 1,000 Javelins a year. Even if the United States decided to build as many Javelins as possible—6,480 a year—it would take thirty-two months before delivery, and anywhere from three to four years to replenish the number of Javelins already sent to Ukraine. Moreover, the Department of Defense has not purchased Stingers for more than eighteen years and closed its production lines in 2020. Greg Hayes, Raytheon’s chief executive, pointed out in April 2022 that there is “a very limited stock of material for Stinger production.” In other words, even if defense contractors were compelled by the federal government to prioritize producing weapons such as Javelins and Stingers, they may still be unable to boost production capacity.

Nonetheless, preparing for war costs much less than fighting a war. That is why addressing our dwindling U.S. stockpiles is essential. Task and Purpose’s Jeff Schogol said it best: “it’s time for the military to stock up on things that go boom.” The thought of a weak defense industrial base and depleted stockpiles should haunt policymakers. At the very worst, it could lead adversaries to conclude that the U.S. military is not as strong as it portrays itself to be. Hal Brands of the American Enterprise Institute warned that unless U.S. stockpiles are replenished, the United States might as well “get ready for ‘missile famine’ if there is a great-power war.” U.S. allies and partners are signaling they are ready to take on looming threats; they will need a defense-industrial base that they can rely on.

Pieter van Wingerden is a fellow at the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College.

Image: DVIDS.

The United States and Europe have a vested interest in ensuring a free and fair electoral outcome in Turkey. On May 14, 2023, Turkish citizens will vote to decide if President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has run the country for twenty years, will continue to do so for another five. Under present circumstances, if free and fair elections were held, it is a safe bet that Erdogan would lose decisively against Kemal Kilicdaroglu. (Several recent polls show Kilicdaroglu with a significant lead.) It is far from certain, however, that the elections will be free or fair.

The viability of a democratic Turkey is in the United States’ interest. Regional adversaries such as Russia and Iran would be further emboldened if Turkey continues to drift from the West. Rebuilding Turkey’s democratic governance and institutions will ultimately be up to the people and the country’s future leaders. Unfettered free and fair elections, however, will ultimately help them reach that goal. 

Turkey is already drifting away from NATO’s orbit and moving ever closer to Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Erdogan also threatens the stability and security of the eastern Mediterranean by recklessly pursuing broad claims to undersea gas exploration and antagonizing NATO allies. He threatens Syria’s stability by threatening to launch new military incursions against the Syrian Kurds. If Turkey is to once again become a trusted and integral part of the Western alliance system, a democratic change must occur that will oversee Erdogan’s departure.

Between 1950 and 2015, Turkey held relatively free and fair elections (although incumbent governments always enjoyed an advantage in the mass media given their dependence on government subventions), helping to represent citizens’ choices at the ballot box and electing its leaders. This is important not least because Turkey is a major NATO ally but also because it is arguably the only Muslim democracy in the region. Indeed, Turkey’s neighbors have found it difficult to match Turkey’s democratic credentials.

In his twenty years of ruling Turkey, Erdogan has unfortunately overseen the country’s dramatic transition into authoritarian rule. This has been carefully documented in the Department of State’s annual reports on human rights and Freedom House’s assessments of democracy. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe found that Turkey’s elections since 2017 have witnessed interference from the governing party. Since the coup attempt of July 2016, Freedom House identified Turkey as a country that is no longer “free.”

Unfortunately, Turkish voters lack important resources to choose their next president. Turks lack unfiltered information about all political parties and candidates. They don’t have a media environment free of government interference. And they desperately need bureaucratic institutions that can ensure the sanctity of citizens’ choices. Just recently, Turkey’s media watchdog refused to extend the license of the German broadcaster, Deutsche Welle—signaling that independent foreign media may be kept from reporting on the elections.

Meanwhile, Erdogan has been using the power of his incumbency to purchase the affection of voters by increasing the minimum wage and pensions and offering cheap credit to businesses—all short-term measures designed to win the election but destabilizing to the health of the overall economy. Such measures were already underway prior to the devastating earthquakes that struck Turkey in early February 2023 but now continue under the guise of relief and reconstruction.

In short, the outcome of Turkey’s presidential elections is heavily tilted in Erdogan’s favor. This is the case because Erdogan himself is in a race for political survival. Staying in power is not a simple matter of wielding power for Erdogan; it is existential. If he is no longer the president, it is likely he will have to answer for his numerous abuses of power in a court of law.

A unique opportunity exists for the United States to stand behind the Turkish people in their time of need. Washington must make a strong call to champion the cause of democratic elections in Turkey. The United States can continue to offer Turkey its support by promoting the cause of free and fair elections.

Sinan Ciddi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he contributes to FDD’s Turkey Program and Center on Military and Political Power. Follow Sinan on Twitter @SinanCiddi.

Eric Edelman is a senior advisor at FDD. FDD is a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Image: Shutterstock.

Bolivia’s economy is running aground, squeezed by higher global interest rates and policy missteps. Its foreign exchange reserves, which stood at $15.4 billion in 2014, are now estimated to be under $400 million (not counting $2.6 billion in gold reserves)—able to provide less than two weeks of import coverage. The country’s overvalued exchange rate is showing signs of strain. Bank runs are ongoing as people try to get their dollars ahead of what increasingly looks like a collapse. While the Andean country’s slide into a major balance of payments crisis is by itself bad news, it also has wider geopolitical implications, affecting the global energy transition and filtering into the new Cold War between China and the United States.

Bolivia’s Energy and Money Problems

The country’s economic plight originates in its longstanding heavily statist economic model, largely implemented following Evo Morales’ election to the presidency in 2006. While the model allowed the country to reduce poverty, improve per capita income, and kept inflation down, other problems mounted. The current government is under pressure from ongoing expansionary policies—primary subsidies for agriculture, industry, and fuel, which were all strained by the coronavirus pandemic and the Russo-Ukrainian War. Additionally, oil and gas production is declining; revenues from the energy sector have long financed state largesse.

Once called the “beating heart” of South American natural gas production, Bolivia had no major discoveries for many years and production has fallen since 2015. According to energy research firm Wood Mackenzie, based on current trends Bolivian gas production is expected to decline from 1.4 billion cubic feet per day in 2022 to almost nothing by 2030.

The nation’s natural gas sector has numerous problems. The Morales government nationalized the industry in 2006 but then failed to reinvest in exploration. Meanwhile, Bolivia’s foreign investment record is poor; other countries offer better terms for exploration and production and lower political risk. Bolivia’s energy standing is further complicated by changes in its key customers, Argentina and Brazil, which have developed their own energy resources. To avoid a painful adjustment (which means reducing subsidies), the government over the past decade has routinely tapped its foreign exchange reserves to cover any gaps in spending. Falling gas revenues are now a major headache for President Luis Arce’s government.

A Lack of Potential Solutions

Bolivia’s options are limited. Further tapping foreign exchange reserves will be difficult, given that the vast majority of what is left is in gold. Selling gold on international markets could take time—as the government requires Congressional approval to do so—and would at most serve only as a temporary measure. Moreover, it would further sap confidence in the country’s financial situation.

Alternatively, the central bank could tap the foreign exchange reserves held by the country’s commercial banks, as it did in 2018. But such action would only deepen the public’s nervousness over the country’s financial institutions. Government policies are already under intense scrutiny, including demands that the government provide an explanation as to why $918 million of retirement funds were invested in Bolivian sovereign bonds, which have suffered a severe devaluation.

Turning to the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and/or the Inter-American Development Bank would be politically difficult. Any such assistance would surely entail conditionality measures: cutting subsidies (to improve the country’s fiscal position), changing the central bank’s monetary regime (to help boost exports and reduce the central bank’s exposure to currency swaps), introducing policies that promote a more welcoming environment for foreign investment (to help natural gas exploration and develop the nascent lithium industry), and pension reforms. Considering the populist-leaning nature of the Arce government, these measures would be painful, especially with elections in 2025. Furthermore, Bolivia, with its single B credit ratings, would be a hard sell to international bond investors—a situation not helped by rising international interest rates, which have caused some ructions in global bond markets and banks.

Complicating the situation even further Arce’s MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) government wants to keep the country’s subsidies and overvalued foreign exchange rate in place because of Bolivia’s own personal history with inflation. There is a deep concern that the reduction or removal of subsidies on fuel would result in higher inflation, which Bolivia has suffered through before in the 1980s. At that time, inflation peaked at an astounding 23,464 percent in 1985. Any gains that have been made in the country’s standard of living could be washed away with another such bout of high inflation, and would certainly open the door to social turmoil.

Then there is the country’s internal political dynamics, which only further frustrate the policymaking environment. There are tensions inside MAS between supporters of former President Evo Morales (2006–2019), who is thought to seek reelection, and the incumbent Arce. There is also animosity between the Arce administration and the country’s strongest economic region, Santa Cruz province. This more conservative province has often clashed with both the leftist Morales and then Arce governments on economic policy. Tensions escalated in December 2022, when the province’s conservative governor (and a leader of the opposition), Luis Fernando Camacho, was arrested for his alleged role in the 2019 turmoil that led to the forced removal of then-President Morales.

The Lithium Issue

Bolivia’s troubles begin to take on an international dimension when one adds the country’s lithium to the equation. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, Bolivia has the largest amount of lithium resources in the world at 21 million tons. Achieving the Biden administration’s ambitious plans to make half of all cars sold in the United States electric vehicles (EVs) by 2030 means lithium batteries for each—something that is beyond the small amount extracted in the United States itself. America currently imports most of its lithium from the Lithium Triangle countries of Argentina (51 percent of lithium imports) and Chile (40 percent). Bolivia is the third country in the triangle.

Yet at the same time, China has made important inroads into Bolivia. While the United States has lacked an ambassador to the country since 2008 and relations have generally been poor over the past few years (partly due to the Morales administration’s anti-U.S. stance), China has developed a formidable diplomatic representation. Chinese diplomats are an integral part of Beijing’s economic statecraft, which is geared toward securing access to critical metals like lithium. Bolivia joined the Bridge and Road Initiative in 2018 and China has lent it $3.2 billion, mainly for infrastructure construction. It was no surprise that in January of this year Bolivia selected a Chinese consortium led by CATL, the world’s largest battery maker, to mine lithium and help the Andean country develop a battery plant. The deal came with an announcement that the Chinese consortium would invest over $1 billion in the project’s first phase, boosting infrastructure, roads, and conditions needed to create plants to produce lithium cathodes and batteries.

Questions for Washington

Bolivia’s economic troubles raise some important geopolitical questions. Is China willing to provide bridge financing or stretch out its repayments? Does the United States have an interest in helping Bolivia by facilitating a path through the IMF, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank? China has demonstrated a reluctance to help troubled debtors find an easy exit ramp by adding new capital resources, though it did eventually help Ecuador with a debt restructuring. But it has had a difficult path with two countries Pakistan ($24.7 billion of external debt to China) and Venezuela ($60 billion). Does Bolivia have the option to play the China card? Most likely China will probably seek to sidestep another troubled debtor situation, but China does want Bolivia’s lithium.

In any case, Bolivia is certainly facing a major economic crisis. It is time for the Bolivian government to overhaul its economic model and move toward policies that are less reliant on the state, which is running out of money in the face of declining natural gas production. In neighboring Argentina, a more liberal investment regime helped increase the country’s lithium exports by 234 percent in 2022, pushing up the country’s total mining exports (a fifth of which were lithium) to $3.86 billion. Argentina expects to see mining revenues of around $6 billion in 2023, pushed along by a rush of foreign company investment from the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

As more countries shift to EVs and use batteries to store more power in national electricity grids, Bolivia risks restricting foreign investment flows and developing a dependency on one market, China. Bolivia should consider a more open foreign investment policy. However, that may be attained only after an economic crisis, which might have been averted. It has been said that no crisis should go to waste, maybe that is the lesson to be learned in La Paz and something that is going to be closely watched in Beijing and Washington.

Dr. Scott B. MacDonald is the Chief Economist for Smith’s Research & Gradings, a Fellow with the Caribbean Policy Consortium, and a Research fellow with Global Americans. Prior to those positions, he worked for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Credit Suisse, Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette, KWR International, and Mitsubishi Corporation. His most recent book is The New Cold War, China and the Caribbean (Palgrave Macmillan 2022).

Image: Hyotographics/Shutterstock.

The military signaling by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in August 2022, following the visit to Taiwan by U.S. speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, set a benchmark by which to assess the latest Taiwan Strait crisis touched off by the meeting between Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen and new House Speaker Kevin McCarthy. Some observers interpreted Beijing’s reaction to the Tsai-McCarthy meeting as “dialed down” or “nothing compared with the belligerent reaction to Pelosi’s visit.”

This might support a hopeful conclusion that the deterioration of U.S.-China relations is bottoming out. Washington and Taipei reportedly coordinated to lower the profile of the Tsai-McCarthy meeting. McCarthy altered his original plan to travel to Taiwan as Pelosi had done. Instead, he and Tsai had an “unofficial” meeting in California, far from Washington, DC, as part of what has become a routine transit, one of twenty-nine by Republic of China (ROC) presidents (seven by Tsai).

A strongly negative reaction from Beijing was inevitable. Nevertheless, if it was clear that Xi Jinping’s government intentionally limited its response as a signal that it was reciprocating efforts by the U.S.-Taiwan side to be less provocative, this might be the beginning of a virtuous cycle that could gradually reduce cross-strait tensions.

Alas, this interpretation of China’s behavior in the aftermath of the Tsai-McCarthy meeting is probably unjustified.

Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan on Aug. 2, 2022, was one of a series of U.S. gestures of support for the Taipei government that began during the Trump administration and continued into Joe Biden’s presidency. Even before Pelosi’s visit, official PRC commentators were criticizing what they called a U.S. “salami slicing” campaign to gradually move Taiwan toward permanent independence from China. Although Pelosi’s visit was not unprecedented, since a different speaker of the U.S. House had traveled to Taiwan twenty-five years earlier, the PRC government had characterized Pelosi’s planned visit as an unusually egregious political offense—a “gross violation of the one-China principle” that would “deal a severe blow to Sino-US ties.” Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned that “China will surely make a firm response.” The Chinese Communist Party-owned tabloid Global Times warned that PRC military forces might intercept Pelosi’s aircraft en route to Taiwan.

Pelosi didn’t get shot down, but Beijing’s reaction was unprecedented in two ways. First, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) carried out its largest military exercises ever near Taiwan. Live-fire drills took place in six areas that surrounded Taiwan and that were particularly close to major shipping and air-travel routes. The exercises included an aircraft carrier and a nuclear-powered submarine.

Second, while the PRC had employed practice missile launches in attempts to intimidate Taiwan during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996, the post-Pelosi retaliation of August 2022 was the first time that Chinese missiles overflew the island of Taiwan and landed in the waters of Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

China’s behavior in the April 2023 Taiwan Strait Crisis might have been slightly less bellicose, but even that proposition is debatable. The most positive possible spin is to emphasize the lack of PLA missile launches, which were the most spectacular feature of the August 2022 demonstration. 

But like the post-Pelosi retaliation, the post-McCarthy retaliation involved partial rehearsals of specific aspects of the likely PLA cross-strait war plan, even if this time there was less of a role for missile tests.

A PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson said the exercises were “a stern warning to the provocative activities of ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces and their collusion with external forces.” The latter phrase was an obvious reference to the United States and Japan. The positioning of some of the exercises suggested Beijing wanted to demonstrate its ability to block an intervention from the north or east.

Chinese forces carried out multiple live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC aircraft carrier Shandong sailed through the Bashi Channel (between Taiwan and the Philippines) into the seas to the east of Taiwan and, for the first time, launched J-15 fighter jets into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone,.

Near-record numbers of PLA aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, long understood by both sides as a provocation. The aircraft menacing Taiwan included H-6K bombers “with live ammunition” supported by fighter, early warning, and electronic jamming aircraft.

For the first time, PRC media described the military exercises as practice strikes against important targets on Taiwan’s territory. Commentators mentioned that the drills were training for specific wartime missions, including “electronic suppression of the radar and anti-missile bases on the island.”

While the August 2022 exercises implied a threat to impose a wartime blockade, the April 2023 version made the threat explicit. The Chinese government announced that the Fujian Maritime Safety Administration would carry out “inspections” of commercial vessels in the Taiwan Strait for three days. Although there were no reports of PRC vessels attempting to forcibly board Taiwanese vessels, Beijing seemingly moved closer to implementing an actual blockade.

Of course, China’s reaction to the McCarthy-Tsai meeting could have been stronger and more violent. But even if something did indeed moderate the PRC’s behavior, the most likely cause of that moderation was not anything the United States did. 

On the same day that Tsai met with McCarthy, French president Emmanuel Macron, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, and former ROC president Ma Ying-jeou were in China. Beijing is courting Western European elites, trying to weaken their strategic partnership with Washington and deepen their economic engagement with China. An excessively belligerent PRC demonstration toward Taiwan so soon after the departure of von der Leyen and Macron would have played poorly in Europe. The meeting with Macron went especially well for Xi. Macron distanced France from Taiwan’s predicament and from the United States. It was not in Xi’s interest to squander his gains by making Macron look even more like a stooge.

Similarly, Ma’s visit helped promote the Chinese Communist Party’s agenda. “People on both sides of the Strait belong to the same Chinese nation,” he proclaimed. Taiwan’s next presidential election is in January 2024. Beijing desperately hopes for a victory by Ma’s Kuomintang party, which shares the PRC view that Taiwan is part of China. The PRC wants to use the prospect of war to frighten Taiwan’s voters away from supporting Tsai’s independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party, but not so overdo it as to repulse potential Kuomintang voters.

The United States moderated, but China did not reciprocate. The PRC government does not see the Tsai-McCarthy meeting in California as an act of goodwill toward China, but rather as another American provocation requiring another Chinese demonstration of determination to fight to prevent Taiwan’s independence. McCarthy’s meeting with Tsai, and similar pro-Taipei gestures by Washington, are not cowing China into backing down. As occurred in August 2022, China has permanently increased its level of military activity near Taiwan this month even after the conclusion of the main show of force, an unwelcome adjustment of the status quo. U.S.-China relations have deteriorated further, and Taiwan is less secure.

U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken complained that “Beijing should not use the transits [by Tsai] as an excuse to take any actions, to ratchet up tensions, to further push at changing the status quo.” If Beijing needed an “excuse” to gain valuable warfighting practice, better to have not provided it.

Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.

Image: Shutterstock.

France has long been celebrated as America’s oldest ally, going back to 1778 when the French monarchy recognized the independence of the United States. It provided military and economic assistance during the American American Revolutionary War which was crucial to the American victory. Symbolizing this long and supposedly strong Franco-American friendship was the Marquis de Lafayette, the French aristocrat who fought in the war. He commanded American troops in several battles, including in the siege of Yorktown, and is considered an American national hero who was granted honorary citizenship by Congress in 2002.

Yet both as a colony and an independent nation, America would end up fighting five wars with France, including the French and Indian War. France itself attempted to conquer Mexico in the 1860s, motivating Washington to intervene to prevent such from happening.

In a way, and contrary to the myths perpetrated by Lafayette’s American admirers, the main motivation for the French assistance during the Revolutionary had nothing to do with common ideals—France was, after all, then ruled by a reactionary monarchy—and more by French interest in recouping some of its losses in the French and Indian War.

Indeed, it was French national interests, rather than President Woodrow Wilson’s desire to “make the world safe for democracy” that drove Paris to draw the United States into the Great War. It ended with French prime minister Georges Clemenceau encouraging the imposition of Germany’s humiliating surrender agreement, which helped sow the seeds of the next world war.

As the historian Michael Neiberg suggests, America’s post-World War I European strategy was based on faith in the French military. Its strength was supposed to prevent Germany from dominating the continent, reflecting the assumption in Washington that France would serve as a “protective barrier for the United States from the conflicts in the Old World.”

Instead, France’s abrupt military armistice with Nazi Germany in 1940, leaving its British ally isolated, forced the United States to re-establish the balance of power in Europe after being drawn once again into another war there.

It was not a secret that the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, which continued to work with the Vichy government despite its pro-Nazi tendencies, had very little trust in French resistance figure Charles de Gaulle. The Americans rightly suspected that de Gaulle would attempt to rebuild the decaying French Empire and challenge American global interests after the war. In fact, during much of the Cold War, French interests collided with those of America which, de Gaulle believed, was intent on forming a European condominium with the Soviets while marginalizing France and the Western Europeans.

After the 1956 Suez Crisis, during which the Americans forced the French and their then-British allies to withdraw their military troops from Egypt and the return of General de Gaulle to power, tensions between Paris and Washington grew. French foreign policy, aka Gaullism, led to the decision to remove all French armed forces from the integrated military command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1966.

But Gaullism, as a coherent foreign policy, proved to be nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of the old general. He fantasized about drawing the Soviets into a European confederation and of Europe serving as an intermediary between Washington and Moscow. He rejected Britain, which he regarded as America’s lackey, as a member of the European community and tried to win Arab support by distancing the French from Israel.

But the Americans didn’t need French help in managing their relationship with the Soviets, while the 1973 Middle Eastern oil embargo demonstrated Paris’ continuing dependency on America’s military presence in France’s strategic backyard. That reality was the product of France’s post-Gaullism foreign policy: asserting its “independence” from the United States while recognizing that its national security interests required sustaining the alliance with Washington.

Hence the need to count on the massive U.S. military machine that made the difference in Desert Storm as well as in the military campaigns against Serbia during the wars in the Balkans. The French could have their croissant while biting into the American hamburger.

One major example of this French approach has been its post-Cold War strategy in the Levant and North Africa, where France needed to secure core geostrategic and geoeconomic interests. That included French access to the energy resources in the region, the threat of terrorism, the challenge of a nuclearized Iran—whose would-be weapons of mass destruction would pose a direct threat to southern Europe. And all this is without mentioning the need to deal with the flow of Muslim immigrants from that part of the world.

The French economy, unlike the American one, is dependent on oil imports from the Middle East, and what happens in that region directly affects its interests and those of its southern European neighbors in the same way that developments in Mexico and Central America affect U.S. interests.

Yet the French government, with the exception of the occasional attention to Lebanon and its former colonies in the Maghreb, has refrained from embracing a strategy that would employ French military and economic power and that of the European Union (EU) to advance its interests in the region.

Instead, it has expressed criticism of U.S. policy in the region, including its policy towards Israel, and by opposing President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq. These steps helped the French win diplomatic brownie points with Middle Eastern players while continuing to depend on the United States to secure the oil resources in the Persian Gulf and to contain potential aggressors.

This Machiavellian French approach of relying on U.S. military power was underscored in 2011 when the Obama administration agreed to back a French-British plan to oust Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi without any guarantee that the Europeans would send troops to establish order in Libya after regime change. The result has been chaos across Libya. In that case, the notion that France, Italy, and the other southern European governments should have taken the lead in dealing with the upheaval in Libya made sense. It explained why President Barack Obama was initially reluctant to get the U.S. military involved in Libya. Instead, Obama decided that Washington would take the lead role in launching military action in Libya while hoping that France and other governments would end up “taking over” leadership of the operation.

They didn’t. Obama ended up playing directly into the hands of then-French president Nicolas Sarkozy, who succeeded in drawing the United States into a military campaign aimed at protecting French and European interests.

Current French president Emmanuel Macron, who likes to compare himself to the legendary de Gaulle, entered office stressing French efforts to win “strategic independence” for the EU and enable the Europeans to compete with the Americans on the global stage; he has insisted that Paris and Brussels shouldn’t follow the more assertive U.S. position towards these two powers.

But the Russian invasion of Ukraine disrupted those grand designs. Macron tried, but failed, to reverse President Vladimir Putin’s decision to go to war and to reach a deal between Moscow and the United States.

If anything, the war only highlighted the European dependency on American military and economic power in containing aggression and maintaining stability in Europe. That has strengthened America’s leadership role in NATO. And with the United States replacing Russia as Europe’s largest natural gas supplier, the French and the Europeans have found it difficult to challenge the Biden administration’s decision to provide subsidies to electric vehicles and other kinds of U.S.-based manufacturing.

Likewise, another example of the way the changing geostrategic and geoeconomic balance has weakened France’s hand has been the American decision to pursue a technological cooperation agreement with Britain and Australia—a move that wrecked a French submarine contract with the Australians. Paris complained and recalled its ambassador from Washington, but there wasn’t much that the French could actually do to reverse that decision.

Yet Macron continues to pursue his Gaullist dreams. He insists that France and the EU need to distance themselves from the Americans in their dealings with the Chinese, telling reporters recently that “the paradox would be that overcome with panic, we believe we are just America’s followers;” he believes that contrary to the U.S. position, it isn’t in Europe’s interest to “accelerate” a crisis with Taiwan, that it need embrace neither “the US agenda” nor “a Chinese overreaction.”

But instead of working together with Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, to project European unity and “balancing power” vis-à-vis Beijing, Macron’s recent visit to China, where he was joined by a contingency of French business executives, only underscored that his policies are driven mainly by French interests. As they should be, and were under the original Gaullism, with its similar pretensions to remake France into a great power like it was during the age of Lafayette. But France wasn’t such under de Gaulle, and it isn’t today.

Dr. Leon Hadar, a contributing editor at The National Interest, has taught international relations at American University and was a research fellow with the Cato Institute. A former UN correspondent for the Jerusalem Post, he currently covers Washington for the Business Times of Singapore and is a columnist/blogger with Israel’s Haaretz.

Image: Shutterstock.

In the early morning of Monday, March 27, 2023, former Israeli minister of diaspora affairs Nachman Shai was interviewed on the country’s public Hebrew-language news channel. The interview was part of live coverage of events unfolding since the country’s minister of defense had been fired the night before. The latter decision, by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, spurred an upsurge in the street protests and public upheaval that had taken hold of the country since the government had proposed a judicial reform package about three months earlier.

Shai, who is just a little older than the State of Israel itself and has therefore consciously lived through most of its history, claimed that he had never experienced anything similar to what was going on. Indeed, not only had tens of thousands spontaneously taken to the streets and blocked a main artery in Tel Aviv for several hours, the country’s largest trade union Histadrut was about to announce a national strike, with academia, healthcare services, air traffic, and the diplomatic corps joining the movement to different extents. All this was just the culmination of a massive protest movement that had taken root after a far-right government had been sworn in following four years of inconclusive elections and political instability.

The immediate steam was let off on Monday night, after Netanyahu temporarily shelved the contentious bills and when clashes between demonstrating supporters and opponents ended without major injuries. Still, the temporary truce does not mean that the country is on an easy track to deal with the questions it faces. First of all, the composition of the current government is not one that seems conducive to compromise, either internally or with the opposition, as the judicial reform saga has made clear. Also, while Netanyahu is known for the tricks he usually has up his sleeve, his coalition partners’ ideologies and motivations for joining the government may well require particular skills if the coalition is to hold. More fundamentally, however, both the government and the opposition, and Israeli society in its entirety, still need to come to grips with some basic questions that have accompanied the country since it was founded almost seventy-five years ago.

First, the relations between the very diverse groups within Israeli society, as well as their rights and duties, have not been the object of a fundamental legislative process as in many other countries with a “Western” tradition. Although the Israeli Declaration of Independence of May 15, 1948, stipulated that a constitution would be adopted no later than October 1 of the same year, such a foundational document never saw the light. As a result, many fundamental institutional changes—which elsewhere would require specific procedures or special majorities—can be carried out by a simple parliamentary vote. And such changes are increasingly being proposed and discussed because of demographic and societal developments that reshuffle the ways in which the different components of society interact. Indeed, several internal divisions exist within Israel’s Jewish population, of which the distinctions between Ashkenazi and Sephardic/Mizrachi, and between secular and religious are the most obvious. During the country’s first decades of existence, its institutions (government, judiciary, media, academia, etc.) were mainly shaped by Ashkenazi, secular left-wingers. The Sephardic and Mizrachi communities, however, started claiming more visibility and influence, especially since Menachem Begin’s electoral victory in 1977, while the (strictly) religious population has grown slowly yet steadily. These evolutions have raised fundamental issues about the place of tradition and religion in public life: does “religious conscience” trump anti-discrimination rules? Is gender segregation in civic spaces allowed? What is the role of strictly religious Torah scholars, who often do not work and usually do not serve in the army? Despite the blurring of old distinctions after decades of interaction as well as the arrival of Ethiopian and former Soviet Jews, questions like these revive the feeling of a real or perceived overlap between intra-Jewish faultlines, in which the left-wing, Ashkenazi, and secular oppose the right-wing, Sephardic/Mizrachi, and religious. Importantly, all these oppositions seem to have gained prominence in the Israeli debate of late, especially during Netanyahu’s time in power. In such a context, it was not surprising to recently hear several of the judicial reform’s proponents fume against the “elites,” in a reference to the circles that were in power following the state’s foundation. As long as this kind of history is part of the national (sub)consciousness, mutual understanding and conciliation tend to be fragile, certainly in the context of deeply divisive legislative proposals. 

Another issue intrinsically linked to Israel’s founding is the standing of its Arab citizens, who make up about a fifth of its population. While they enjoy full civil and political rights like all other Israelis, relations between them and Jewish Israelis can take many different forms in practice, from collegiality and close friendships to mistrust and—in rare cases—outright violence. Arab Israelis, internally probably as diverse as their Jewish counterparts, collectively face a number of serious issues, such as internal violence and limited political representation. These matters are of an intricate nature and neither the Arab-Israeli communities themselves nor the Jewish-majority institutions can be held entirely accountable for them. 

A second important observation is that large numbers of Arab Israelis take advantage of the opportunities the state offers to all citizens, yet many do not feel represented by the same state, a situation that probably originates in a shared responsibility as well. Tellingly, the waves of blue-and-white flags at the recent mass protests engulfed very few Arab citizens. Last week on Monday, while the Hebrew-language public broadcaster covered developments in a more than twenty-four-hour livestream, nothing similar was available at its Arabic-language counterpart. However, much more is needed—in education, media, and political debate—to bridge the gaps between Jewish and Arab experiences as well as narratives. While language, religion, and traditions are clearly distinct, a minimal extent of shared belonging and mutual awareness is necessary to prevent that divergences in interests or viewpoints escalate into violence, as painfully recalled by the May 2021 Jewish-Arab riots.

Violence has also been a regrettable characteristic of Israeli-Palestinian relations during most of Israel’s existence. While political negotiations between both parties have often been impossible, controversial, or difficult, the legal status of the territories in question—the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and (except in most Israeli views) East Jerusalem—remains unclear. Whereas Israelis regularly consider “Judea and Samaria” as a “part” of Israel (without specifying what that entails), the area in question was never annexed and Israel finds itself in a situation in which its borders are neither fixed nor internationally recognized. For the Palestinians, this state of affairs has produced, because of Israeli rule and control, huge consequences, that many Jewish Israelis are—willingly or not—unaware of. Still, for military, legal, and budgetary reasons, the Palestinian question also continues to influence life and politics within the Green Line. Therefore, beyond the obvious fact that improved Israeli-Palestinian relations are likely to lead to more security and better lives for all involved, progress regarding the Palestinian issue is also crucial for appeasement within Israeli society.

Nearly seventy-five years after the country’s founding, it seems that Israel is in dire need of true dialogue between the population groups within and outside its official borders. Such a dialogue, however, is not straightforward when schools, media, and religious institutions are operated in siloed ways, as is often the case in Israel and the Palestinian territories. Also, realities in the Middle East reinforce a political and societal culture that invests more in immediate reaction and stopgap measures than in in-depth debate and long-term planning. Nevertheless, the latter may be the only way to get to grips with some of the country’s fundamental choices. Interestingly, following the uproar last week on Monday, both a government and an opposition Knesset member claimed that the people are superior to specific points of contention. Moshe Solomon from the National Religious Party did so in a television interview from the Knesset, while opposition leader Yair Lapid used similar language in his address at a rally in Jerusalem. Following the latest developments, however, it remains to be seen whether people are indeed drawing lessons and whether citizens and their leaders are capable of opening up breaches in the ideological walls that have been separating them.

Dr. Alexander Loengarov is a Senior Affiliated Fellow at the Institute for International Law at the University of Leuven (KU Leuven, Belgium), as well as a former official of the European Economic and Social Committee of the European Union.

His writings reflect solely his own views, and not those of the European Economic and Social Committee or the European Union, which cannot be held responsible for any use made of it.

Image: Shutterstock.