The National Interest

So a young acquaintance asks what kinds of ships there are in a navy. That’s kind of a basic question. You would think it lends itself to a pithy answer intelligible to nonspecialists.

You would be wrong.

And that’s troublesome. Physicist Richard Feynman, a personal hero, maintained that if you can’t explain something to a sixth grader, you either don’t know the material well enough yourself or you have a problem communicating concepts. Ideas are not that complex. You need to deepen your knowledge, refine your teaching, or both. That’s sage counsel from a Nobel laureate. Let’s heed it.

Or try to.

The obvious way to approach queries about fleet design is by resorting to listmania. In other words, you could run through the litany of ship types found in naval inventories, from hulking aircraft carriers down to tugboats.

Do that and watch your questioner’s eyes glaze over.

There are many ship types, and distinctions between them can be obscure. For example, try explaining the difference between a U.S. Navy guided-missile cruiser and destroyer in a hurry. A cruiser is bigger than a destroyer, right? Well, not necessarily. The latest variant of the venerable Arleigh Burke-class destroyer displaces about as much as the Ticonderoga-class cruisers now leaving service. Burkes and Ticonderogas sport variants of the same combat system, known as Aegis—a combination radar, computer, and fire-control system. And they carry the same types of armaments, albeit cruisers feature substantially more vertical-launch missile siloes and thus more firepower than destroyers.

To further blur the distinction between ship types, the three Zumwalt-class stealth destroyers now being repurposed as surface strike platforms actually outweigh cruisers, and by a hefty margin. And they will pack hypersonic missiles whereas cruisers do not.

Etc. Distinguishing between surface combatants is far from straightforward. Feynman frowns.

Anyone trying to explain fleet design to nonspecialists runs afoul of such intricacies. Meeting the Feynman standard is hard. So rather than try to list all the ship types constituting a fleet, why not classify fighting ships by function? Simplifying is more promising. During the age of sail, in fact, it was downright easy. Ships of war were assigned to “rates” corresponding to the complement of guns they bore. Firepower determined their place in fleet operations. Naval historian extraordinaire Julian Corbett broke down wooden-walled fleets into three broad categories:

-Capital ships. These brawny combatants boasted the armament to mete out heavy gunfire barrages. They also had the defensive staying power—chiefly rugged hull construction—to absorb punishment while dueling rival capital ships. Capital ships constituted the navy’s battle fleet. They were big, specialized, and expensive. For that reason even the most lavishly appointed navy could only afford these apex predators in limited numbers.

-Cruisers. These were relatively inexpensive, less well-armed warships that nonetheless mounted sufficient gun power to police the sea lanes once the battle fleet had either vanquished the enemy fleet or blockaded it in port. Cruisers outgunned whatever remained of the hostile navy, letting them dominate less contested seas. Best of all, they were affordable in bulk. As a result the cruiser contingent had geographic reach that capital ships could never match given their small numbers. Cruisers could fan out, asserting control at many places on the nautical chart.

-Flotilla. This was a swarm of still smaller, more lightly armed, cheaper vessels that discharged the administrative duties all navies must discharge—chiefly in near-shore waters.

Corbett’s taxonomy of fighting ships remains a valuable point of departure for thinking through what various ship types are and do. But the neat lines separating those segments are indistinct nowadays. Even in Corbett’s day—over a century ago—he bewailed the revolution in seaborne weaponry that had overtaken naval warfare. It accompanied the changeover from wooden hulls and sail to steel hulls and steam and diesel propulsion. Even rudimentary submarines and surface patrol craft could now deploy heavy-hitting weapons such as sea mines and torpedoes. They could do heavy damage to cruisers and capital ships. No longer were small combatants an afterthought in naval warfare, as they had been for centuries when they were radically outgunned. This was now a battleworthy contingent.

A superempowered flotilla upended the Corbettian scheme of things—compelling battle fleets to take elaborate precautions to defend themselves when they ventured within reach of subs, torpedo craft, and minelayers. The new flotilla turned naval commanders’ world upside down, and Corbett’s with it. No longer was the age of sail—the chief source of historical data and insight into war at sea—a trustworthy guide to fleet design.

All of that being said, the fundamental naval functions endure. Some segment of a navy denies a foe access to important seaways if unable to defeat it outright. Sea denial is a quintessential flotilla action. Another fights for maritime command when the balance of forces favors it. There’s your battle function. A third exercises command once it’s in hand and the worst threats are at bay. Deny, win, and exploit control. There are your three basic ship types. Many types of hulls make up each contingent.

How would Corbett rate the U.S. Navy as a fighting force? I think he would find fault with it owing to imbalances in fleet design. It yaws overwhelmingly toward the battle fleet at the expense of other worthwhile endeavors such as sea denial. This is an artifact of navy culture. The U.S. Navy has grown accustomed to commanding the sea since 1945, as though command is a birthright. The service sees itself as being perpetually on offense. Thinking in terms of sea denial—by definition a strategy of the weaker pugilist—does not come easy to American naval chieftains.

Accordingly, the flotilla is a backwater in U.S. fleet design. About the only surface combatant that fits neatly into the flotilla category is the littoral combat ship, a vessel designed to operate in coastal waters under reduced threat. And the leadership has soured on the littoral combat ship, retiring youthful hulls at the same time shipyards complete the last few. If American commanders opt for sea denial, accordingly, they will be forced to harness heavier ships such as destroyers and submarines rather than purpose-built flotilla craft. This could change as technology matures. It will be reasonable to classify uncrewed surface and subsurface vessels as part of the flotilla as they join the fleet.

The result would be a hybrid, more balanced fleet. Gee-whiz technology could be salvation in the Western Pacific, where America is unlikely to be the stronger contender on day one of a conflict.

The capital-ship contingent predominates within the U.S. Navy—again, a force constructed with offense rather than defense in mind. Aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers boast that combination of offensive and defensive power needed to fight peer navies for command of the sea. Supporting the battle fleet is a combat logistics fleet made up of tankers, stores ships, and the like. Supply vessels don’t fit ideally into any of the three functions, but they are an indispensable enabler for everything the navy does. No navy prospers without regular supplies of fuel, ammunition, and stores of all kinds. That’s why no carrier or surface action group is complete unless accompanied by one or more of these workhorses.

And exploiting command? The cruiser contingent is no longer made up of cruisers in Corbett’s sense of light combatants fielded in large numbers to control the sea. Frigates and corvettes are the modern counterparts to his cruisers. The U.S. Navy is attempting to add a new frigate to the fleet, known as the Constellation class. A frigate is a lighter combatant than a cruiser or destroyer, with more modest sensors and weapons. It should be adequate for policing the sea against remnants of the hostile navy. But with only twenty Constellation-class hulls on the navy’s wish list, and with the program plagued by construction delays, it’s foreordained that capital ships will pull double duty once they have won maritime command.

Corbett was right: capital ships are too expensive to fit out in large numbers, and the U.S. Navy is top-heavy with them. It will not have enough ships in the inventory to control all vital sea lanes by itself, and to otherwise exploit the blessings of maritime command. It must fill in the force structure with low-cost craft—chiefly unmanned, one supposes—while seeking help from fellow U.S. armed services and allies.

Faster, please.

It's worth noting that Julian Corbett could have added a fourth naval function to the list. Indeed, he should have. He was a full-throated advocate of expeditionary operations, meaning operations that that navies execute to shape events on land, whether by landing troops, projecting force inland from the sea by means of fire support, or some other means. The U.S. Navy’s amphibious fleet—a fleet of transports used to deposit U.S. Marines on foreign shores—constitutes the core of the American naval expeditionary force.

Once the capital-ship fleet has wrested control of sea, sky, and coastal zones from an antagonist, it’s safe enough for amphibious groups to move in close enough to do their work. Some “amphibs” or “gators” bear a strong resemblance to aircraft carriers, featuring long, flat flight decks populated by helicopters and sometimes fixed-wing combat aircraft. Think Top Gun: Maverick. And in fact these “big-deck” amphibious warships are similar in proportion to frontline World War II flattops. Other amphibs look like humble transports. Many such vessels can ballast down, taking on seawater in order to partly submerge. Ballasting down allows landing craft to launch from bays in their sterns or return to the ship.

Corbett insisted that wars are won on land because people live on land. Controlling the sea while radiating power ashore is how the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps contribute to ultimate victory, working alongside the Army and Air Force as well as allies. Winning demands combined effort.

So there’s my rough guide to ship types. Does it meet the Richard Feynman sixth-grader standard? You be the judge.

James Holmesi s J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views voiced here are his alone.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The Israel Aerospace Industries Kfir ("Lion Cub") is a multi-role fighter developed after Israel's access to the French Mirage 5 was blocked due to an arms embargo. Israel reverse-engineered the Mirage, resulting in the Nesher and later the Kfir, powered by a General Electric J79 engine.

-The Kfir entered service with the Israeli Air Force in 1975 but was soon overshadowed by American F-15s and F-16s.

-It remains in service with several other countries despite its brief prominence in Israel's military.

The Israel Aerospace Industries Kfir (“Lion Cub”) is an all-weather multi-role fighter with a peculiar history. 

Before the development of the Kfir, the Israeli Air Force relied heavily on the Dassault Mirage IIIC, a French delta-winged fighter. In the 1960s, the Israelis and French enjoyed a harmonious relationship. The Mirage IIIC was in fact tailored to the needs of the IAF, and the Israelis found the aircraft satisfactory, at least with respect to air superiority missions. 

But the Mirage IIIC’s limited range meant the jet could not conduct many of the ground-attack missions the Israelis wanted to execute. The Israelis sought a more versatile airframe, so they pushed their French allies to begin developing the Mirage 5.

Dassault, the French aerospace manufacturer responsible for the Mirage IIIC, began working on a modified version – an aircraft that would become the Mirage 5. 

Dassault removed the avionics that were located behind the IIIC’s cockpit, allowing for increased fuel capacity and reduced maintenance costs. The result was a fair-weather, ground-attack version of the Mirage IIIC. 

By 1968, Dassault had built 50 Mirage 5s – all intended for Israel, which had paid for the airframes. But geopolitical circumstances changed swiftly. Newly inaugurated French President Charles de Gaulle made efforts to repair relations between France and the Arab world. De Gaulle retracted the French claim on Algeria, and he cut ties with Israel. 

The French government imposed an arms embargo against Israel, which would never receive the Mirage 5s they had already paid for. Israel did not sit idly by – it could not afford to lose its air superiority advantage to adversaries who were being equipped with increasingly sophisticated Soviet fighters. 

The Israelis used spies to gather the technical specifications for the Mirage 5 airframe and engine. With the stolen tech specs, Israel was able to reverse-engineer the Mirage 5, resulting in the IAI Nesher. The Nesher itself was upgraded, resulting in the Kfir.

The Kfir used a Bedek-built General Electric J79 engine, which provided 11,900 pounds of thrust dry, and 17,900 pounds of thrust with afterburners. The engine allowed for a maximum speed of 1,520 miles per hour and a combat range of 477 miles. The Kfir’s service ceiling was 58,010 feet, with a rate of climb measuring 45,900 feet per minute.

For armament, the Kfir carried two Rafael-built 30mm DEFA 553 cannons with 140 rounds of ammunition each; a variety of unguided air-to-ground rockets; missiles including the AIM-9 Sidewinder, Shafrir Aam, Shrike Anti-Radiation Missile, and AGM-65 Maverick; plus, plenty of bombs. In all, the Kfir could carry a payload exceeding six tons.  

The Kfir entered service with the Israeli Air Force in 1975. Two years later, the aircraft entered combat for the first time, striking a training camp in Lebanon. In 1979, the Kfir earned its only air-to-air victory when it shot down a Syrian MiG-21. Despite the lengths to which the Israelis went to obtain and develop the Kfir, the jet was not the IAF’s primary fighter for very long. By the time Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, it relied on the U.S. for air power, and the IAF imported the F-15 Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon for air superiority roles. The Kfir was relegated to secondary status, conducting unescorted strike missions. By the 1990s, the Israelis began retiring the Kfir. 

The Kfir is still in service today in air forces that rely on outdated airframes, including Colombia, Ecuador, and Sri Lanka. 

The Kfir is curious for its notable development. Its less remarkable operational history is somewhat anticlimactic. 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The B-2 Spirit bomber, crucial for deep-penetration nuclear strikes, is limited by its small fleet of about 20 aircraft, making them too valuable to risk in large numbers.

-With the rise of advanced anti-aircraft systems from adversaries like China and Russia, the need for a more capable bomber, the B-21 Raider, has become critical.

-However, budgetary constraints threaten the production of sufficient B-21s to maintain credible deterrence, repeating the same mistake made with the B-2 fleet.

-The Pentagon's push for more B-21s faces significant challenges.

The B-2 Bomber is the only bomber in the US Air Force’s inventory that is capable of penetrating deep into an enemy’s territory, delivering a nuclear payload, and surviving. Its stealth technology has made it a prized asset in the US military’s arsenal. Yet, there are only about 20 of these beauties. Having first entered service in 1997, even as enemy anti-aircraft/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities have become significant threats to America’s ability to project power globally, the United States Congress has not authorized anymore to be built. 

This means that the B-2s are far too valuable to risk in any large numbers. Despite the advantages its stealth technology gives, nations like China and Russia have steadily developed increasingly sophisticated ways to detect and threaten the safety of US stealth planes—notably older models, such as the B-2.

For the B-2 to be a reliable strategic asset in today’s highly contested world order, the Pentagon needed significantly more units than a mere 20. Today, there is a newer, more advanced, stealth plane on the rise: the B-21 “Raider.” This warplane is like the B-2, only better. Yet, there is a debate raging in defense circles as to how many the Pentagon could afford and reliably build, given its budgetary constraints and its other commitments. 

Basically, the Pentagon is doing to the B-21 what it did to the B-2 for the last 30 years: short-changing it. Therefore, Washington’s bureaucracy is undercutting America’s strategic advantages. 

Even though the US defense budget is just a couple hundred billion shy of $1 trillion, the US military is more constrained than it has ever been. At a time when the United States is more threatened by near-peer rivals than it has been in decades. Weapons systems like the B-21 “Raider” are essential for the US military, if it is to maintain its deterrence against enemies like China and rivals, like Russia. 

Part of the problem is that the costs for the weapons systems that the Pentagon needs to maintain credible deterrence are onerous on the taxpayer. Having fallen behind China and Russia in key new defense technologies, like lasers or hypersonic weapons, the ability for America to threaten its rivals falls on existing technologies, like the B-21. But the B-21, despite being easier and cheaper to build than an entirely new technology, remains an expensive system.

And that’s why the Pentagon is receiving pushback on its request for 300 B-21s. They’ll be lucky at this point if they can get 20. These are insufficient numbers to maintain credible deterrence. If either China or Russia no longer believe America’s deterrence is reliable, they will seek to exponentially expand their challenge to the United States. It will provoke the very war that America’s strategy of deterrence and denial has been designed to prevent. 

Like the B-2, the B-21 is one of America’s only surefire ways that it can threaten targets belonging to China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea, that are hardened by A2/AD defenses as never before. America allowed for the impressive B-2 bomber to languish in its arsenal for decades by only building a handful of these marvels. The B-21 is more relevant today than the B-2 will ever be. What’s more, B-21 is one of the few systems that can actually wreak havoc on enemy countries, if—and when—the next great power war erupts. 

The Pentagon must be given the funds it needs to build at least 300 B-21s—and it must be done quickly before the next great power war commences (even if it means cutting other programs that the Air Force favors to meet this increased demand for the B-21). 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force's B-21 Raider stealth bomber program is progressing as planned, with prototypes undergoing successful flight and technology testing. Developed by Northrop Grumman, the B-21 is designed with advanced stealth capabilities, long-range efficiency, and high maintainability.

-It's expected to be operational within the decade and will play a crucial role in penetrating advanced air defenses, such as those of China.

-The Air Force plans to acquire at least 100 of these strategic bombers, which will complement the existing B-52 fleet.

The program to deliver the U.S. military’s most advanced strategic bomber is on schedule, according to senior U.S. officials. The Air Force expects the B-21 Raider strategic stealth bomber to be operational within the decade. 

“The B-21 Raider program is on track and continues flight testing at Northrop Grumman’s manufacturing facility on Edwards Air Force Base, Calif,” the Air Force said in a press release. 

“The B-21 will have an open architecture to integrate new technologies and respond to future threats across the spectrum of operations, greatly enhancing mission effectiveness and joint interoperability in advanced threat environments, strengthening U.S. deterrence and strategic advantage.”

A senior Air Force official recently said much the same during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.

“We are in the flight test program, the flight test program is proceeding well,” Andrew Hunter, assistant secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, said. “It is doing what flight test programs are designed to do, which is helping us learn about the unique characteristics of this platform, but in a very, very effective way.”

The B-21 Raider is a sixth-generation strategic stealth bomber under development by Northrop Grumman. Prototypes are undergoing intense flight and technology testing. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense has cleared the aircraft for full-scale production. 

As one of the most technologically advanced aircraft in the U.S. military, the B-21 Raider carries highly sensitive tech. As such, little is known about the aircraft’s specific capabilities. The U.S. military has instead provided a broad overview of what the B-21 Raider should achieve. 

“Let's talk about the B-21's range. No other long-range bomber can match its efficiency. It won't need to be based in-theater. It won't need logistical support to hold any target at risk,” Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said during the B-21’s unveiling ceremony in December 2022. 

“Let's talk about the B-21's stealth. Fifty years of advances in low-observable technology have gone into this aircraft,” Austin added at the time. “And even the most sophisticated air-defense systems will struggle to detect a B-21 in the sky. Let's talk about the B-21's durability. You know, we really don't have a capability unless we can maintain it. And the B-21 is carefully designed to be the most maintainable bomber ever built.”  

Current estimates put the cost for a single B-21 Raider at around $750 million, although the Air Force is trying to lower that figure. But the aircraft promises to endow the U.S. military with capabilities that are absolutely necessary in future combat. For example, in a potential conflict with China, this jet could penetrate Beijing’s Anti-Access/Area Denial umbrella and deliver conventional and nuclear munitions to targets deep within Chinese air defenses. 

The Air Force has made plans to purchase at least 100 B-21 strategic stealth bombers. It wants to pair the high-tech strategic bomber with the venerable B-52 Stratofortress. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The United States Air Force's fleet includes some of the world's most advanced aircraft, essential for maintaining air superiority. The F-22 Raptor, F-35 Lightning II, B-2 Spirit, B-21 Raider, and B-52 Stratofortress are key platforms.

-Each offers unique capabilities, from the F-22's unmatched stealth and maneuverability to the B-52's long-range nuclear delivery.

-As global threats evolve, these aircraft continue to be central to U.S. defense, with future advancements in the B-21 and continued reliance on the B-52 highlighting the ongoing need for air dominance.

As a core pillar of any Western air force, gaining and maintaining air superiority has regularly been prioritized in America’s military doctrine.

The Pentagon has invested billions of dollars into developing advanced airframes across each service and the U.S. has benefitted from having air superiority over its adversaries for decades.

Although nations including China and Russia, have modernized their own aerial capabilities in recent years, certain U.S. platforms flown by the Air Force and Navy represent some of the world’s best aircraft across the globe. 

As the world’s first fifth-generation fighter to ever fly the skies, the F-22 Raptor is largely touted as the most advanced platform in service today.

The Raptor was the first operational fighter to combine stealth, supermaneuverability, supercruise, and sensor fusion in a single platform. Back in 1997, the Air Force’s infamous jet took its first flight with the service and continues to wow aviation buffs more than two decades later.

The Raptor’s smaller radar cross-section and twin thrust-vectoring F119 turbofan engines are perhaps the fighter’s greatest assets. Its thrust-vectoring capacity allows the Raptor to outperform any other jet in a dogfight since it can redirect the flow of energy that enables the airframe to do the remarkable acrobatics it is known for. 

Ordnance-wise, the F-22 can sport two AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles in its twin internal side weapon bays in addition to six AIM-120 AMRAAM radar-guided air-to-air missiles or 2 AIM-120 AMRAAM and two GBU-32 JDAM munitions in its central weapons bay.   

America’s newest fifth-generation fighter, the F-35 Lightning II, is undoubtedly the most coveted tactical jet worldwide.

Foreign militaries are hankering to get their hands on the formidable and stealthy fighter that essentially embodies the functions of three planes in a single platform.

The “Joint Strike Fighter” was initially designed to replace the U.S. Marine Corps’ F/A-18 and AV-8B Harrier, the U.S. Navy’s F/A-18, and the U.S. Air Force’s A-10 and F-16 airframes. Depending on the variant, the highly versatile fighter can do it all, including conventional takeoff and landing and aircraft carrier landings. 

The Lightning II is best known for its “beast mode” capabilities. Essentially, the fighter can load up on munitions on its external weapons pylons and turn the craft into a “bomb truck.” Beast mode does, however, compromise the stealth ability of the airframe.

While in stealth mode, the F-35 is limited to the weapons it can carry internally, protected by a radar-evading fuselage. In beast mode, however, the F-35 can sport nearly four times more ordinance by using its external mounts, which carry upwards of 22,000 pounds of weaponry. Although the Lightning II is a relatively new fighter, over 900 airframes have been exported, indicating the jet’s remarkable popularity across the globe. 

While the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit stealth bomber is over 30 years old, the strategic platform remains a powerhouse in the sky. The aging airframe will eventually be replaced by the newer and more advanced B-21 Raider, however, the aircraft represents the most lethal bomber across the globe today.

Since its introduction into service during the Cold War, the B-2 has proved itself in numerous combat operations in locales ranging from Libya and Kosovo to Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Spirit was designed to penetrate anti-aircraft defenses and remains the only acknowledged platform that can sport large air-to-surface standoff weapons in a stealth configuration.

According to the Air Force, the blending of the Spirit’s low-observable technologies with high aerodynamic efficiency and greater payload gives the airframe a significant advantage over near-peer bombers. “The B-2's low observability is derived from a combination of reduced infrared, acoustic, electromagnetic, visual, and radar signatures.

These signatures make it difficult for the sophisticated defensive systems to detect, track and engage the B-2. Many aspects of the low-observability process remain classified; however, the B-2's composite materials, special coatings and flying-wing design all contribute to its stealthiness."

As the first component of the U.S. nuclear deterrent’s $1 trillion overhaul, the Raider is expected to single-handedly elevate the U.S. military’s aerial dominance. The Northrop Grumman-designed platform will carry both conventional and nuclear arms, giving it an “edge that will last for decades,” according to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

Similar to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Raider will operate like an “airborne data hub.” Many of the details surrounding the B-21 Raider remain classified.

Although the U.S. Air Force’s fleet of B-52 airframes has been in service for almost 70 years, the formidable platform continues to represent the mainstay of the service’s bomber fleet. Even with the eventual addition of the B-21 Raider into the mix, the Stratofortress will continue to serve as a significant deterrent to China and other U.S. adversaries.

The bomber has an honorable track record, operating during the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, the Second Gulf War, and Afghanistan. The current B-52 can fly nearly 9,000 miles before needing to refuel. Along with its nuclear delivery capabilities, the platform can launch stand-off cruise missiles.

This very old platform is expected to fly the skies into the 2050s. 

As tensions continue to soar between the U.S. and China, prospects for a future kinetic conflict increase. American airframes possess a range of sophisticated and unique capabilities; however, Beijing has been rapidly modernizing its Air Force over the last decade. The U.S. isn’t the only producer of fifth-generation airframes anymore, making its next generation of planes even more vital.

Maya Carlin, a Senior Editor for 19FortyFive, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The Royal Navy's Vanguard-class nuclear submarines serve as the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent, carrying Trident II D5 missiles. Introduced in 1994, the four Vanguard-class subs are the largest built in the UK and the third-largest vessels in the Royal Navy. Their only mission is to fire a vast amount of nuclear weapons at any targets - if ever called upon to do so. 

-These subs will eventually be replaced by the Dreadnought-class.

-The Vanguard-class also features advanced sonar systems and torpedoes for anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare. Despite aging, they remain crucial to the UK's defense strategy.

The Royal Navy’s four Vanguard-class nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) currently form the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent force. Each of the boats is armed with Trident II D5 nuclear missiles. They are also the largest submarines ever constructed in the UK and are the third-largest type of vessel in the Royal Navy.

The Vanguard-class was introduced in 1994 as part of the British military’s Trident nuclear program and includes just four boats: Vanguard (S28), Victorious (S29), Vigilant (S30), and Vengeance (S31). The submarines were constructed between 1986 and 1999 at Barrow-in-Furness, Cumbria by the former Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering (now BAE Systems Marine).

All four of the submarines are based at HM Naval Base Clyde, west of Glasgow, Scotland. The Vanguard-class boats were originally intended for a service life of twenty-five years, and will be replaced as the new Dreadnaught-class of ballistic missile submarines is set to enter service.

Each submarine is powered by a Rolls-Royce PWR2 nuclear reactor, with two GEC turbines; and has a single shaft and a single pump-jet propulsor and two WH Allen turbo generators.

At nearly 150 meters in length and more than 16,000 metric tons, the Vanguard-class remains the largest submarine type ever constructed in the UK, and it has remained the third-largest type of combat vessel in service with Royal Navy. The submarines have twice the displacement of the Polaris submarines of the Resolution-class. Due to the size of the boats, a special production facility had to be built to handle the construction of the Vanguard and her sister submarines.

The increased size of the subs was necessary to accommodate the Trident D5 missile, yet the complement of the class is small at just 132 officers and sailors, compared to the Polaris boats, which required a crew of 149. The 16-tube missile compartment on the new Trident submarines is based on the 24-tube system utilized on the United States Navy’s Ohio-class Trident submarines. Missile maintenance occurs in the United States, while the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston was responsible for all the design, construction and installation, as well as maintenance of the warheads.

The Trident nuclear missiles can be fired at targets up to 4,000 miles away and at their maximum speed travels at more than 13,000 miles an hour.

The Vanguard-class was also designed with several significant improvements, which included a new design of the nuclear propulsion system as well as a new tactical weapon system or self-defense purposes, both before and after a missile launch. Under “normal” conditions, the submarines are equipped with one to three warheads depending on mission, yet each Vanguard-class submarine is capable of carrying 192 warheads.

In September 2009, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown told the UN General Assembly that the UK was ready to reduce its Vanguard-class submarine force by one. Brown had said that the offer was being made to encourage other nuclear-powered countries to move towards a nuclear-weapons-free world. However, such a move never came to pass.

While designed to serve as a nuclear deterrent, the Vanguard-class boats are also equipped with four 21-inch (533mm) torpedo tubes and can carry up to 16 Spearfish heavyweight torpedoes, which can be guided by copper wire or by autonomous active or pass sonar.

At full speed, the Spearfish can attack a target up to 14 miles away, while at low speed the range is increased to more than 30 miles. The torpedoes can deliver a 660 pound explosive charge, and that provides the boats with both anti-submarine (ASW) and anti-surface warfare (ASuW) capabilities.

The boats are also fitted with what the Royal Navy calls “world-beating sonar,” which is reportedly so sensitive that it can “hear” vessels more than 50 miles away. That can help ensure that the Vanguard-class can live up to its moniker and remain the foremost part of an advancing naval force.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military hardware, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The UK’s Vanguard-class submarines, introduced in the 1990s, are the backbone of the Royal Navy's nuclear deterrent force.

-These submarines carry the UGM-133 Trident II missiles and were developed to replace the older Resolution-class vessels.

-Each Vanguard can carry up to 16 Trident II missiles, with a limited load of 48 nuclear warheads.

The submarines are powered by nuclear propulsion, allowing them to operate for extended periods.

-The Vanguard-class will be replaced by the Dreadnought-class submarines in the early 2030s.

The United Kingdom’s Vanguard-class submarines may be aging, yet these nuclear-powered vessels remain the backbone of the Royal Navy. Sometime in the next decade, the UK’s upcoming Dreadnought-class submarines are expected to replace their Vanguard predecessors. However, the Trident missile system incorporated on the Vanguards will be carried over to the new class.

During the Cold War, the UK’s leading submarines were four Resolution-class ships. Each of these vessels was fitted with the UGM-27 Polaris missile, a solid-fueled, nuclear-armed weapon designed originally for the U.S. Navy.

Since the Polaris was launched underwater from a moving platform, it was basically impossible for enemy ships to intercept and take out. As part of the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement, the UK was able to incorporate this invaluable weapon missile system. While the Resolution ships (and the Polaris missile) were considered top-of-the-line for many years, a subsequent series of submarines and accompanying missiles were conceptualized by the early 1980s.

Ultimately, then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher officially requested to purchase the American-made Trident I missiles in 1980. However, the introduction of an enhanced Trident II variant altered this request. In 1982, an agreement between the UK and the U.S. culminated in the delivery of the UGM-133 Trident II.

The Vanguard-class submarines were designed to launch this formidable weapon, developed by Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering at BAE Systems Maritime-Submarines.

In 1994, the Vanguard-class was officially introduced, including Vanguard (S28), Victorious (S29), Vigilant (S30) and Vengeance (S31). When the class was introduced, all four ships were intended to live out service lives of twenty-five years. Each ship is based at HM Naval Base Clyde, west of Glasgow, Scotland.

Their mission is to ensure nuclear deterrence and, if called upon, fire their warheads at nearly any target on Earth. 

The four Vanguard ships are powered by nuclear propulsion, which allows them to sail for periods stretching up to two months without needing to refuel. Although the Vanguard submarines were built bigger to accommodate the Trident missile, a smaller crew of just 132 sailors and officers can fit on board.

Each Vanguard can carry up to 16 Trident II missiles, which can sport up to 12 MIRVs. However, the START I treaty agreements limit this number to eight.

As detailed by Naval Technology, the Vanguard ships can technically sport 192 nuclear warheads, but the Royal Navy has limited this number to 48 missiles. “Trident II is a three-stage solid propellant missile with supersonic speed. Weight is 59,000kg.

The US Navy gives the range of the D5 as ‘greater than 7,360km’ but this could be up to 12,000km, depending on the payload mix. The accuracy of strike on the target is given by the Circle of Equal Probability (CEP) value, which is the radius of the circle within which half the strikes will impact.” The Vanguard ships additionally feature sophisticated sensors, including the Thales Underwater Systems Type 2054 composite sonar system. This upgraded system is reportedly so sensitive that it can detect other ships positioned more than 50 miles away.  

While the Vanguard ships remain a critical component of the Royal Navy, three Dreadnought successors are already under construction and will likely commission sometime in the early 2030’s.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.

Main Image: Creative Commons

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force's "elephant walks," where aircraft taxi in close formation before takeoff, have become symbolic demonstrations of military readiness.

-A notable example occurred in January 2020 at Hill Air Force Base with 52 F-35 Lightning II fighters. This exercise showcased the unit's combat readiness, with each F-35 costing $44,000 per flight hour.

-The exercise not only tested operational capabilities but also sent a powerful message about the U.S. military's air power to adversaries like China and Russia.

In recent years, the United States Air Force has conducted a number of very high-profile "elephant walks," the term for taxiing a number of aircraft before takeoff. In addition to the close formation on the ground, it can involve a minimum interval takeoff.

The first elephant walks occurred during the Second World War when large fleets of allied bombers massed for attacks – and observers on the ground noted that as the aircraft lined up, it resembled the nose-to-tail formations of elephants walking to a watering hole. Today, the U.S. Air Force employs elephant walks to show the capability of a unit as well as the teamwork that is required to conduct such an operation.

It also can help pilots prepare for the launching of fully armed aircraft in a mass event if needed.

While during World War II, dozens and even hundreds of bombers could be lined up, recent elephant walks are far smaller but no less impressive, especially considering the capabilities of modern aircraft.

Such was the case in January 2020, when the United States Air Force's Active Duty 388th and Reserve 419th Fighter Wings conducted the Combat Power Exercise at Hill Air Force Base (AFB), Utah with 52 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II 35As – the conventional takeoff and landing variant of the U.S. military's Joint Strike Fighter.

The elephant walk of the F-35 Lightning IIs was employed to demonstrate the "ability to employ a large force of F-35As" as well as to test the air wing's readiness for personnel accountability, aircraft generation, ground operations, flight operations, and combat capability, according to a Hill statement from the time.

Though the U.S. Air Force's press photos may have looked to many like little more than a number of aircraft lined up, the exercise had actually been planned for months. As TheDrive.com reported, "The amount of hardware on the runway in terms of billions of dollars is staggering."

As previously reported, the elephant walk was quite costly to pull off, as the F-35 Lightning II costs $44,000 per hour to fly.

If each of the 52 F-35 fighters in the elephant walk flew for just a single hour, it was still a $2 million-plus exercise. If the jets flew for two hours, the cost likely exceeded about $4 million.

Yet, it could be described as priceless.

The ability to launch 52 of the fifth-generation F-35 stealth fighters was as much to send a message to detractors of the program within the United States as it was to reaffirm the capabilities of the U.S. Air Force to near-peer adversaries such as China and Russia.

It highlighted the improved readiness rate of the F-35 fleet at the time, which had been lagging for years when the elephant walk was conducted in 2020.

The service had only just reached a mission-capable rate of 75 percent the prior October, up from just 66 percent a year earlier.

No doubt an adversary would have loved to have the chance to take out the Lightning IIs on the ground – which is about the time that the aircraft can be described as truly vulnerable.

 Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The USS Pierre (LCS-38), the final Independence-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), has been launched, marking the end of this controversial program.

-Despite being touted for their speed and versatility in near-shore waters, the LCS fleet has faced criticism due to frequent breakdowns and the cancellation of planned mission modules.

-The U.S. Navy has already started retiring some of these ships ahead of schedule, and there are discussions about transferring them to allies for roles like drug interdiction or regional defense.

The United States Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has been seen as one of the sea service's biggest missteps since the end of the Cold War – perhaps only second to the Zumwalt-class destroyers. Both the LCS and the stealth destroyers were seen as failures for being the wrong ships at the wrong time, and while the U.S. Navy cut the Zumwalt-class program to just three ships – which made it a very costly mistake – the service has continued to accept delivery of brand new LCS vessels even as the oldest were retired years ahead of schedule.

This week, Mobile, Alabama-based Austal USA announced that it launched the future USS Pierre (LCS-38), the final vessel of the Independence-variant of the LCS program. Christened in May, LCS-38 is the nineteenth vessel of the class to be built by Austal and is on track to begin sea trials later this year.

"Meeting this ship milestone in such a safe and timely manner demonstrates how well our Austal USA launch team, transporter operators, and tug pilots have learned to work together over the last thirteen years, seamlessly executing this technical launch process," said Austal USA Vice President of New Construction, Dave Growden. "Our industry teams work methodically alongside our Navy partners to improve this innovative process with each launch evolution, guaranteeing the Navy a quality product delivered on time and budget."

After the future USS Pierre enters service, she will be homeported in San Diego.

LCS 38 is only the second U.S. Navy warship to be named for the South Dakota capital, while the first USS Pierre was a PC-class submarine chaser that was commissioned in 1943 during the Second World War, and decommissioned in 1958.

The launch of the future USS Pierre comes just days after Lockheed Martin subsidiary Fincantieri Marinette Marine delivered the Freedom-variant USS Nantucket (LCS-27) to the United States Navy at its shipyard in Marinette, Wisconsin.

Two additional Freedom-class LCSs are now under construction – the future USS Beloit (LCS-29) and future USS Cleveland (LCS-31) – the final warships of the program. Both are expected to be handed over to the U.S. Navy by the end of the year. With their delivery, it will mark the end of the construction phase for the troubled LCS program – although it is unclear how long the fleet of LCSs will remain in service.

It was three years ago that the U.S. Navy began to retire the oldest of vessels of the respective variants – even as some of the ships have served in the fleet for less than half the expected twenty-five-year service life. To date, five have been decommissioned, while two more Independence-class variants are expected to be retired from service this year. In addition, the United States Navy has considered offering some of its LCS to allies and partners via the Pentagon's foreign military sales.

Though the warships were touted to emphasize speed and could operate in littoral or near-shore waters, such as those of the South China Sea, the LCS suffered from breakdowns while Congressional lawmakers cut the funding for the planned mission modules that were meant to provide flexible capabilities for the warships.

That has left the U.S. Navy with a lightly armed vessel that isn't ideally suited to a confrontation with a near-peer adversary such as China. As a result, there have been calls to transfer them to partner nations in South America, where the warships could be employed in a drug interdiction role, or to the Middle East where they could bolster the navies of regional allies.

It was only in April, that testing began on a Mine Countermeasure Mission Package (MCM MP) aboard the Independence-variant USS Canberra (LCS-30), which could finally give the LCS program purpose. The MCM package, made up of an integrated suite of unmanned maritime systems sensors, was developed to locate, identify, and destroy mines in littoral waters.

However, it would seem that module is too little and it comes too late for the warships that have earned the scorn of sailors and senior naval officials alike.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Summary and Key Points: The F-16XL was an advanced variant of the F-16 designed for supercruise capabilities and increased payload, initially considered as a potential replacement for the F-111 Aardvark.

-Despite its enhanced features, including greater range, payload capacity, and reduced radar signature, it lost out to the F-15E Strike Eagle.

-The F-16XL's technology contributed to later advancements in fighter jets, including the F-22 Raptor.

Two prototypes were used in various NASA experiments before being retired to museums.

America’s formidable fourth-generation F-16 fighter platform made headlines last year when the White House gave Ukraine the green light to fly them in war.

Since February 2022, Kyiv has asserted that without more advanced aerial capabilities, it would be unable to thwart Russia’s advances.

Initially, the Biden administration was adamant that it would not provide F-16 Fighting Falcon airframes to aid Ukraine’s defensive efforts. However, the training of Ukrainian pilots on these airframes was ultimately okayed.

American Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said that the U.S. would actually head up the coalition of nations that will train Ukraine’s pilots and crews to properly operate the Fighting Falcons last month. 

The General Dynamics F-16 was designed nearly five decades ago to fulfill the U.S. Air Force’s need for an air superiority fighter.

Following the Vietnam War, military officials understood the need for airframes better equipped to maneuver with minimum possible energy loss

By the 1970’s, the Fighting Falcon was born out of the Lightweight Fighter program.

The compact, multi-role jet is highly maneuverable and can operate in both air-to-surface and air-to-air combat.

Over the years, the F-16 platform has achieved an honorable combat record and continues to fly for the USAF as well as a litany of foreign militaries. 

While the F-16 has an honorable legacy, not all of its subsequent variants have made it to the service phase.

Shortly after winning the Lightweight Fighter program contract, General Dynamics worked on several prototypes, including two variants it later delivered to NASA’s Langely Research Center.

Referred to by their serial numbers #849 and #848, these jets were both used in a litany of experiments that only concluded in the late 1990s.

Notably, F-16XL #849 participated in a 1995 sonic boom study where it flew 200 feet behind a NASA SR-71 to ascertain the boundary of a SR-71’s supersonic shockwave.

As Peter Suciu explained on additional F-16XL studies conducted by NASA: “The two-seat F-16XL was extensively modified by NASA Dryden for the Supersonic Boundary Layer Control research project in the mid-1990s. A turbine-driven suction system was installed in the aircraft’s fuselage while a modified, thickened left-wing pulled in boundary layer air flowing over the wing to enable laminar, or smooth, airflow over the wing. The aircraft last flew in 1996 and is reportedly no longer airworthy.”

While these variants are now sitting in storage at the Air Force Flight Center Museum at Edwards and on display at the Museum Air Park, they are highly respected by aviation buffs and industry experts alike. 

The resulting F-16XL design was conceptualized to potentially replace the F-111 Aardvark. Ultimately, however, McDonnell Douglas’ F-15E jet was awarded the contract. The two constructed F-16XL fighters were then relegated to Edwards Air Force Base.

The main concept driving the F-16XL was supercruise (sustained supersonic cruising without afterburner) capability. The culminating prototype did indeed have a longer range while still saving on fuel.

Despite the F-16XL’s trajectory, the fighter is widely recognized by aviation experts as a powerhouse.

According to Military.com, this variant would carry twice the payload of the original Fighting Falcon variant and fly as much as 44% further.

Furthermore, the F-16XL could accomplish this without external fuel tanks and while sporting a full suite of air-to-air weapons including four AMRAAMs and two AIM-9 Sidewinders. 

Additional capabilities have been outlined by Air and Space Forces: “As for penetration and survivability, the F-16XL can dash supersonically with a load of bombs at either high or low altitude. It can climb at high rates with the bombs aboard. And it has a speed advantage of up to eighty-three knots over the F-16A at sea level at military power setting and 311 knots on afterburner at altitude while carrying a bomb load.

Two additional capabilities of the F-16XL contribute to survivability. First is improved instantaneous maneuver ability coupled with greatly expanded flight operating limits (with bombs), and second is reduced radar signature resulting from the configuration shaping.” 

While the Strike Eagle platform that did eventually enter service with the USAF proved to be highly capable, the F-16XL would have undoubtedly enhanced the service’s prowess if accepted alongside the F-15 back in the day.

Nonetheless, the F-16 has contributed to modern aerial concepts. In fact, the variant would even aid in the development of the supercruise capability of the first-ever fifth generation airframe to take to the skies- the F-22 Raptor. 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The F-16XL was an experimental variant of the F-16 Fighting Falcon, designed with cranked-arrow delta wings to enhance lift, range, and payload.

-Developed under the U.S. Air Force's Enhanced Tactical Fighter program, the F-16XL competed against the F-15E Strike Eagle to replace the F-111 Aardvark.

-Despite its innovative design, the F-16XL lost to the F-15E due to cost and survivability considerations.

-Though not adopted, the F-16XL's design influenced future F-16 variants.

The F-16XL is an experimental variant of the F-16 Fighting Falcon, a single-engine multirole fighter aircraft originally developed by General Dynamics (now Lockheed Martin) for the United States Air Force. America’s F-16XL was designed to explore the benefits of a cranked-arrow delta wing, which was intended to improve the aircraft’s lift, range, and payload capabilities. 

Designers of this unique bird developed it with an additional two fuselage sections near the front and back of the aircraft, thereby extending its length to around 56 inches.

Not only were the cranked-arrow wings a new and innovative turn by the designers of the XL, but they also added a new wing skin of carbon fiber that reduced the bird’s weight by 600 pounds. Here, by the way, you can see the mosaic that is military aerospace engineering. Because obviously the designers were borrowing cutting-edge concepts from other projects, such as stealth planes, with the carbon fiber skin, and toying with them in the context of a souped-up F-16. 

Between the new wings and the lighter overall weight, the XL could outfly a conventional F-16 by leaps-and-bounds. Not only that, though, the new design allowed for so much spare room that the F-16XL could carry 27 hardpoints for armaments!

Engineering is so cool, isn’t it?

In fact, the F-16XL was based on earlier, even more radical F-16 prototype design, the F-16 SCAMP (Supersonic Cruise and Maneuver Prototype) from 1977. The SCAMP was a truly brilliant concept. 

On first glance, bean counters might be upset that, as Alex Hollings wrote for Military.com, “The effort wasn’t about fielding another production fighter—General Dynamics had no intention of trying to sell SCAMP once it was complete.” But it was actually a rare example of deft stewardship of the taxpayer’s money by the Pentagon.

Rather than SCAMP being the next warplane for the Air Force in the late 1970s, instead, as Hollings assessed, “the entire premise behind the program was to quickly (and cheaply) field a platform [the USAF] could use to test the concept behind supersonic cruising, or as we’ve come to call it today, ‘supercruising.’”

From there, the F-16 SCAMP became the basis of the F-16XL. 

The F-16XL was designed to explore the benefits of a cranked-arrow delta wing, which was intended to improve the aircraft’s lift, range, and payload capabilities. This bird was considered to be part of the Air Force’s Enhanced Tactical Fighter (ETF) program.

America’s EFT program was an initiative for the Air Force in the early 1980s. It was aimed at developing a replacement for what was then the aging F-111 Aardvark. The program sought to procure an aircraft that could perform both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions effectively.

Two main contenders emerged: the General Dynamics F-16XL and the McDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagle. As you’ve read the F-16XL was a derivative of the F-16 Fighting Falcon while the F-15E was a derivative of the F-15 Eagle that was merely designed to carry a larger payload and have extended range compared to its predecessors. 

Ultimately, by 1984, the Air Force selected the F-15E Strike Eagle over the F-16XL. 

Key factors in the Air Force’s decision included the F-15E’s lower development costs, perceived future growth potential, and advantage of having two engines for increased survivability and payload capacity. When the F-16XL lost out to the F-15E Strike Eagle, the two F-16XL prototype aircraft were transferred to NASA for greater aeronautical research. 

As for why the Air Force was originally interested in the F-16XL as a replacement for the aging F-111 Aardvark, that comes down strategic and tactical needs. The F-111’s mission sets involved attack, strategic bombing, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare (EW). The F-111 was also known for its innovative variable-sweep wing design, which allowed it to adjust its wing configuration for optimal performance at different speeds and altitudes. 

So, the designers of the F-16XL knew that they needed to create a bird that was as versatile as had been the F-111 Aardvark. It would seem as though the designers of the XL focused on the Aardvark’s unique wing design. Hence, why General Dynamics built the F-16XL had its own unique wing configuration—the aforementioned cranked-arrow delta wing.

The F-16XL made its inaugural flight on July 14, 1982. After that, the innovative bird went through a wide range of testing and evaluation by the USAF. Although the Air Force ultimately chose to go with the F-15E Strike Eagle as the replacement for the ailing Aardvark, the development of the F-16XL was not an entirely useless exercise. 

After all, the Air Force would incorporate the warbird’s innovative design and other features into later versions of the F-16, such as the F-16C/D the F-16 E/F Desert Falcon variants which continue proving their worth today (only now being slowly supplanted by America’s fleet of fifth-generation warplanes). 

It’s too bad that the F-16XL was not embraced by the Air Force, as it was undeniably a better plane than the F-15E and would have been more innovative than the F-15E. Ultimately, the Air Force chose to go with the F-15E because of how its production line was established and maintained. 

Still, it’s fun to imagine what might have been. A light, supercruising, F-16 with 27 different kinds of armaments on it would have been one lethal warbird.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

The Russian military and pro-Russian separatist forces continue to lose thousands of men to the fighting in Ukraine every day.

However, the Russian political and military leadership is willing to take big losses to achieve its goals in Ukraine.

In July, the Russian forces suffered approximately 36,000 men killed, wounded, and captured. These casualties are in line with those of June (around 35,000) and slightly lower than those of May (around 40,000).

“The average daily Russian casualties (killed and wounded) in Ukraine has fallen over the past two months from a conflict high of over 1,262 per day in May to 1,140 in July 2024,” the British Military Intelligence assessed in one of its latest estimates of the war.

“Despite this reduction, the last three months have been the costliest for the Russian forces since February 2022, according to Ukrainian General Staff reporting,” the British Military Intelligence added.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has been one of the main sources of Russian casualty data. Despite the obvious bias, Kyiv has largely provided accurate reporting since it has been largely corroborated by Western military and intelligence sources. However, the casualty data coming out of Kyiv seem to be more accurate when it concerns manpower losses than materiel losses. For example, the Ukrainian military estimates that the Russian military has lost over 8,000 main battle tanks, whereas Western assessments put that number closer to 3,000 tanks—still a significant blow to Moscow’s combat power as it represents the Russian military’s entire prewar arsenal.

A good portion of the losses of the prior two months were the result of a large-scale offensive against Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest urban center in the east. The operation failed, and the Ukrainian military regained much of the lost territory.

“The reduction in daily average is likely indicative of Russian forces consolidating positions on the Kharkiv axis. Although this new approach has increased the pressure on the frontline, an effective Ukrainian defense and a lack of Russian training reduces Russia’s ability to exploit any tactical successes into wider operational gains,” the British Military Intelligence stated.

In the absence of the requisite combat power and ability to leverage tactical successes, Moscow is forced to pursue a strategy of attrition. Russian president Vladimir Putin seems to be content with sacrificing over 1,000 of his men on a daily basis in order to exhaust the Ukrainians. The dictatorial nature of Russian politics and the lack of any meaningful opposition to Putin means that this strategy of attrition will continue.

“Russia’s casualty rate will likely continue to average above 1,000 a day throughout August 2024 as Russia continues offensive operations on a wide front from Kharkiv in the north to Robotyne in the south of Ukraine,” the British Military Intelligence concluded.

With the current rate of casualties and a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive during the fall, it is likely that the Russian forces are going to reach 700,000 casualties by the end of the year.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summer is the main fighting season in Ukraine, and as it slowly wanes, it is worth doing a tour of the battlefield to assess the situation.

Overall, the situation remains relatively the same. The Russian forces continue to be on the offensive, but they lack the requisite combat power to breach the Ukrainian defenses and achieve an operational breakthrough. On the other end, the Ukrainians are holding fast across the contact line, building their combat capability for a future large-scale counteroffensive.

In the east, the situation remains largely stagnant, with small-scale action on both sides.

“Positional engagements continued in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 5, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline,” the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed in its latest operational estimate.

There is active fighting north and northeast of Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city in eastern Ukraine. The Russian forces maintain two pockets in the area, but they don’t present a serious threat to Kharkiv.

In May, the Russian forces tried to capture the city, launching a large-scale offensive. However, the Ukrainian defenses held, and the Russian forces lost much of their tactical gains to subsequent Ukrainian counterattacks. Moreover, the Russian military lost over 40,000 men in the operation.

The Donbas remains the center of fighting.

“Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian military blogger claimed that Russian forces seized several Ukrainian strongholds along the Berestove-Pishchane line (southeast of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim,” the Institute for the Study of War stated.

The Russian forces continued with their small-scale offensive operations in the direction of Siversk and Chasiv Yar but without any significant success or confirmed advances.

However, in the direction of Toretsk in the southern part of the Donbas, the Russian forces have had more success, making significant tactical advances.

“Russian forces reportedly continue to advance east of Pokrovsk on August 5, and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are closer to completing a tactical encirclement of Ukrainian forces near the T-0511 (O-054) road southeast of Pokrovsk,” the Institute for the Study of War estimated.

The Ukrainian forces usually won’t retreat until they have to, falling back to better-defended positions.

In the southern part of Ukraine, the Russian forces have made some small gains around Robotyne, in the western part of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Last year, the Ukrainian military launched its promising large-scale counteroffensive in the area. However, the Russian forces were well-entrenched and managed to absorb most of the Ukrainian offensive push.

Meanwhile, the Russian forces continue to take serious losses on a daily basis. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, over the past twenty-four hours, the Kremlin lost approximately 1,050 men killed, wounded, or captured, as well as fifty-four tactical vehicles and fuel trucks, thirty-nine artillery pieces and multiple launch rocket systems, thirty-six unmanned aerial systems, eight infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, six cruise missiles, four main battle tanks, and one piece of special equipment.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The arrival of American-made F-16 fighter jets in Ukraine is seen as a significant boost to the country's air defense and support capabilities. However, while these jets offer advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground weaponry, including the AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles, their impact on the war is likely to be limited by their numbers and lack of stealth capabilities.

-Ukraine's F-16s, while a valuable addition, face significant risks from Russian air defenses and will not single-handedly change the course of the conflict.

More than two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, F-16 Fighting Falcons have officially begun arriving in the country, marking what many hope will be a shift in the embattled nation’s air defense and air support capabilities. These Western fighters represent what promises to be a significant increase in combat capability for the Ukrainian Air Force, but despite the potential these aircraft have to tip the balance toward Ukraine’s favor, it’s also important to keep in mind that the war for Ukraine’s future is far too large to be decided by any single platform or weapon system.

“F-16s in Ukraine. We ensured this. I am proud of all our guys who are skillfully mastering these aircraft and have already started using them for our country. I thank our team for this result. I thank all the partners who are truly helping with the F-16s, and the first countries that accepted our request for aircraft – Denmark, the Netherlands, the United States, – and all our partners, – we value your support,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said during a ceremony at an undisclosed location. “I wish our Air Force and all our warriors to feel the pride of Ukrainians in our combat aviation and to bring Ukraine the combat results that will bring our victory closer – our just peace for Ukraine.

But while we need to keep our expectations for these aircraft grounded in reality, these images of Ukraine’s first operational F-16s do offer us a promising glimpse at how these aircraft will be employed (at least early on) and, in turn, how they might affect the fight moving forward.

In images and video released by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, these F-16s were armed with air-to-air focused load-outs comprised of AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air missiles (AMRAAMs) and AIM-9M Sidewinder infrared-guided air-to-air missiles.

The AIM-120, which serves as America’s primary beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air weapon, comes in multiple forms, including the AIM-120C, which is optimized for internal carriage in stealth fighters like the F-35, and the AIM-120D — which is among the most capable iterations of the missile ever to reach service. The AIM-120D boasts GPS guidance, anti-jam capabilities, and a maximum engagement range that extends out beyond 110 miles. It isn’t entirely clear which version of the AMRAAM these aircraft are carrying, but previous statements from Ukrainian officials suggest it likely is the AIM-120D.

The AIM-120D is capable of hitting targets further out than the radar on Ukraine’s F-16s could likely identify them, and the weapon itself is network capable, meaning it could get target data from other assets in the battlespace, but it remains unclear as to whether Ukrainian forces will be able to leverage that capability at this point. This also points to the possibility that Ukrainian officials being quoted about the range of the weapons they were receiving could simply have been mistaken, and Ukraine may actually be receiving a less advanced (and long-ranged) iteration of the AMRAAM.

Regardless of which AMRAAM Ukraine’s F-16s fly with, it will represent a significant improvement over the R-27 semi-active radar-guided air-to-air missiles employed by Ukrainian fighter jets today. The R-27 has a maximum range of better than 60 miles, but is much more difficult to employ against enemy fighters due to its lack of onboard radar guidance. Unlike the AMRAAM, which can transition to its own onboard radar seeker as it approaches its target to close the remaining distance unassisted, Ukraine’s R-27s require continued guidance from the fighter’s onboard radar. This means Ukrainian pilots attempting long-range engagements need to chase the missiles they launch, maintaining a lock on their targets until the missiles make impact.

“After all, these aircraft have powerful airborne radars, technological equipment and, most importantly, missiles with active homing heads,” Col. Yuri Bulavka, a Ukrainian Su-27 pilot, said in April when asked why Ukraine needs Western fighters to say viable in the air war.

Russian forces have been attempting extremely long-range engagements against Ukrainian fighters using R-37M radar-guided missiles launched at high altitude by MiG-31BMs, which have a claimed maximum range of around 250 miles — though in practice, Russian aircraft have primarily been employing these missiles from inside of 80 miles — outside the reach of Ukraine’s R-27s, but well within the reach of AIM-120Ds if Ukraine’s F-16s are indeed carrying them.

The AIM-9M Sidewinder seen in these pictures is not quite as advanced and capable as the latest variants of the AIM-9X in use for the U.S. but is nonetheless seen as an extremely potent short-range weapon. The AIM-9M uses a traditional infrared seeker and control surfaces and is limited to engaging targets within the pilot’s forward field of view (as opposed to the AIM-9X’s high off-boresight targeting capability). Like much of the technology found within the F-16AMs being employed by Ukraine, the AIM-9M was cutting-edge in the early 1990s — being credited with at least 10 air-to-air kills in Operation Desert Storm alone.

However, according to reports from the Wall Street Journal, Ukraine will indeed be receiving AIM-9X variants of the Sidewinder missile, which will further increase the close-quarters combat capabilities of these F-16s. The AIM-9X not only boasts a significantly improved guidance system to better see through the tricks of common missile countermeasures like flares, but it also offers a massive increase in aerobatic maneuverability. The AIM-9X is famously so maneuverable, thanks to its thrust-vectoring rocket nozzle, that it can even engage enemy aircraft flying behind the launching aircraft — targetable through the helmet-cued targeting system Ukrainian pilots have already been seen training on.

Both the AMRAAM and the Sidewinder (in various iterations for each) will prove valuable not just for air-to-air combat, however — they’ll also be essential for expanding Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. Both AMRAAMs and Sidewinders are capable of downing long-range subsonic cruise missiles like Russia’s air-launched Kh-101, and the Sidewinder is a relatively low-cost option for engaging larger enemy drones than Patriot interceptors.

One of the most important air-to-ground munitions these F-16s will leverage is America’s AGM-88 HARM, or High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile.

Ukrainian forces have already been using the HARM since August of 2022 or earlier, but because these weapons were being launched by dated Soviet jets that were never intended to use them, their utility has been dramatically limited.

Anti-radiation missiles like the HARM work by honing on the electromagnetic radiation broadcast by radar arrays – in other words, radar waves – making them uniquely suited for the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) role. American Wild Weasel pilots often fly their aircraft into contested airspace, waiting for enemy air defense systems to power up in an attempt to target them or their wingmen. Once the air defense systems are broadcasting radar waves, Wild Weasel pilots launch their HARM missiles to hone in on those radar waves and destroy the air defense equipment.

Ukraine’s Soviet-era fighters are only able to leverage the HARM missile in what many call the “pre-briefed” mode. In effect, the missile is pre-programmed with a target area and then launched by an aircraft, often at a fairly long distance. The missile flies toward its intended target area, using its seeker to look for any air defense systems powering up and broadcasting radar waves for it to then close with and destroy.

This method can be very effective, especially when launching these missiles in volume, as even if they don’t ultimately destroy enemy radar sites, their presence alone will often prompt air defense crews to power down their arrays. This effectively amounts to suppression of air defenses, as those powered-down arrays allow aircraft to operate inside the contested area for a short time, but of course, once the HARM threat has passed, these arrays can power back up and begin hunting for Ukrainian jets all over again.

However, if operated by an aircraft carrying NATO-standard busses, like Ukraine’s new F-16s, pilots can leverage the HARM’s full capability set, including two more operational modes that can be very handy in a fight: “Self-protect” mode and “target of opportunity” mode.

In self-protect mode, the aircraft’s onboard radar warning receiver identifies an enemy radar array that’s broadcasting. It then passes that target data over to the HARM, which can hone in on either the broadcasting radar or the specific location that waves were coming from in the event the enemy powers the system down. The target of opportunity mode is similar but allows the AGM-88’s onboard seeker to spot enemy radar arrays powering up, which then alerts the pilot to launch the weapon.

Another very important weapon system we can expect to see these F-16s leverage is the extender range iteration of America’s long-serving Joint Direct Attack Munition, or JDAM. JDAM kits are, effectively, guidance systems that can be installed on conventional “dumb bombs” to turn them into GPS-guided precision munitions, usually capable of engaging targets from ranges of 15 miles or so. In February 2023, however, the U.S. announced its plans to equip Ukraine with the JDAM-ER, which adds a deployable set of wings to the system to triple its engagement range out to 45 miles or better. Russian forces have seen a great deal of success in recent months using a very similar glide-bomb system, meaning Ukraine should soon be able to give them a taste of their own medicine in that regard.

Ukraine’s new (old) fighters are being transferred from the inventories of Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway — and while these aircraft do share the same design as America’s in-service F-16s, the hardware and software found onboard is often quite a bit more dated. These F-16AMs were built and delivered in the 1970s, before undergoing what’s called a “Mid Life Update” (MLU) in the early 2000s to bring them more-or-less on par with the Block 50/52 F-16Cs and Ds operated by the United States during Operation Desert Storm in the early 1990s.

One of the most important elements of this update was the inclusion of the Texas Instruments Modular Mission Computer (MMC), which in conjunction with a cockpit refresh helped to bring these 1970s hotrods into the digital age, making it possible to leverage a breadth of new weapons and auxiliary systems through an improved pilot interface.

While Ukraine’s F-16s do lack the Active Electronically Scanned Array radar found in many American F-16s, they do carry the updated AN/APG-66(V2) Fire Control Radar, which is a medium-range pulse-doppler planar array said to offer a 25% improvement in detection range over the aircraft’s original array. This system is capable of tracking up to ten targets simultaneously while scanning the area and offers what’s commonly called a “six on six” AMRAAM capability — which means the radar can support long-range engagements of up to six targets at once using an onboard complement of AIM-120 radar-guided air-to-air missiles.

The original AN/APG-66 was said to have a target detection range out beyond 90 miles (150 km) and the ability to track fighter-sized targets at ranges of roughly 35+ miles (60 km), but the APG-66v2 found in Ukraine’s new F-16s is said to boast a roughly 25% improvement in detection and tracking performance. That pushes those ranges out to roughly 110+ miles for detection and a bit north of 43 miles for targeting fighters, though it should be noted that these are unclassified figures and should be taken with a hearty helping of salt.

As first reported by The Warzone, Ukraine’s F-16s shown in recent images and videos seem to be equipped with Denmark’s Pylon Integrated Dispensing System Plus (PIDS+) and possibly with the Electronic Combat Integrated Pylon System Plus (ECIPS+). These systems, which you can see in the images look sort of like weapon pylons with optical sensors, include integrated radar-warning receivers to notify the pilot of nearby threats and missile approach warning sensors (MAWS) to let them know when trouble’s coming. This will be of particular value in attack and air defense suppression missions, as the Su-25s employed by Ukraine to date don’t even have radar-warning receivers onboard to speak of.

“Our jets don’t have a system to warn about [Russian rocket] launches,” said a Ukranian Su-25 pilot with the call sign Pumba. “It’s all visual-based. If you see them, then you just try to escape by firing off heat traps and maneuvering.”

Depending on the system in use, these integrated systems can either provide additional flares and chaff to confuse inbound missiles or more advanced Northrop Grumman-sourced electronic warfare capabilities.

Put simply, these are fairly modern F-16s with all the bells and whistles you might expect to find in such a fighter operated by nations without top-tier funding for the latest and greatest gadgets, making them a significant threat to Russian aviators, but not necessarily the technological overmatch one might expect in an engagement between American F-16s and Russian fighters. In practical terms, Ukraine will soon be operating between 60 and 80 total F-16s, which is certainly a significant development but is far from enough to offset the numerical advantage represented by Russia’s fighter fleets.

The F-16 is a highly survivable fighter, as demonstrated by its performance in conflicts like Operation Desert Storm, where one F-16 managed to dodge six incoming surface-to-air missiles in rapid succession without the use of countermeasures at one point — but it’s important to remember that Russia’s S-300 and S-400 air defense systems are the most advanced these fighters have ever squared off against in modern warfare. The F-16 is not a stealth fighter, and as such, is still very vulnerable to being detected and targeted by Russian air defenses, just as the rest of Ukraine’s fighters have been throughout this conflict. But more than that, Russia will be making it their business to engage and destroy as many F-16s as they can as quickly as they can to limit the positive effect these fighters can have on Ukrainian morale and Western support.

Russia’s emphasis on managing the perceptions of the world at large through concerted disinformation campaigns tightly interwoven with real and manufactured news out of the battlefield is sure to be working overtime to find ways to portray these F-16s as ineffectual or highly vulnerable, and that will almost certainly will come with a heavy allocation of resources meant to down these jets for the sake of that narrative (and of course, to minimize their actual strategic impact). These fighters are most vulnerable on the ground, meaning Russian airstrikes will be placing a large emphasis on not just destroying the jets, but runways and support facilities required to operate them.

To put it simply, these aircraft will be operating with a big target on their back, and the nature of warfare all but assures that some of them will go down fighting or likely, be destroyed on their runways. These losses will be framed in the media as a significant development — for the sake of driving clicks in the West, and for the sake of driving narrative out of Russia — but losing aircraft is just what happens in the war-fighting business.

F-16s will not win this war for Ukraine, but they could play a vital part in a broader strategy aimed at doing so — and to use them effectively to that end, risk will be an inherent part of the job. So, as these jets slowly start getting into the fight, it’s important to maintain a realistic perspective about what they are and what they can do… But just as importantly, what they can’t. F-16s are incredible jets that can do some positively mind-bending things, but at the end of the day, they’re not invulnerable, especially when sitting on the tarmac.

Of course, there will be some pro-Russian commenters who will pretend this sort of pragmatic realism is a new development, as Western analysts try to hide their fear that NATO’s super fighters might not be as invincible as we once claimed… But let’s not fall for that tired old narrative either, folks. There’s no such thing as an invincible fighter, tank, or anything else for that matter. There are only tools, strategies, and incredibly brave men and women tasked with employing the first for the sake of the second.

Warfare is a dirty business, and while the F-16 won’t end that for Ukraine, it will equip them to fight just a little bit dirtier than ever before.

And that’s really what transferring these jets has always been about.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's investment in Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) like the HELIOS laser system reflects its urgent need for advanced defense against evolving threats such as hypersonic missiles and drone swarms.

-Despite decades of research and significant funding, these systems are still under development, with the Navy facing challenges in integrating DEWs into existing platforms like the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

-Waiting for the DDG(X) warships to be built for DEW deployment could be a strategic error, and the Navy should focus on integrating these technologies into current systems and unmanned platforms.

For almost 20 years, the U.S. Navy (as well as the Air Force) has worked on various concepts for directed energy weapons (DEW), or lasers. 

Gobs of U.S. tax dollars have been spent on the technology, and many promises have been made by the military. And, as U.S. Navy Adm. Fred Pyle told reporters earlier this summer, “Sometimes [the Navy has] a tendency to over promise and under deliver.”

That is an understatement. 

To be clear: The U.S. military needs to possess a reliable and robust DEW capability. The reason it has lacked this capacity is not because the technology is not there yet. It surely is. But there has been a lack of direction, funding, and initiative over the course of many decades on this technology. 

As Adm. Pyle had to admit, the Navy needs these weapons more now than ever. 

China is ascendant. Russia is resurgent. Iran appears poised to upend the U.S.-led Mideast order. Latin America is aflame as Venezuela implodes. And North Korea is, well, who really knows these days? 

Pyle wants the Navy to concentrate on developing DEW for surface warfare purposes. He’s right to fixate on that like a laser. That’s because America’s enemies are overcoming the strategic advantages that ballistic missile defense (BMD) and other missile defense systems have conferred upon the countries employing these capabilities. Israel’s Iron Dome, for example, has allowed for that country to mitigate what could be catastrophic damage from Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthi rockets fired at the country. 

Similarly, U.S. Navy warships employ a coterie of systems meant to defend against incoming missiles. This allows for those Navy warships to operate with relative impunity near enemy shores while knocking those enemies around with their offensive systems. 

But these times, they are a-changin’, as Dylan warned us so long ago. 

Ultimately, conventional ballistic missile defenses run out of ammunition with which to fire at incoming rockets and missiles. These systems can be overwhelmed by swarming tactics that fast-moving drones and modern anti-ship ballistic missiles employ. 

What’s more, hypersonic weapons completely circumvent the ability of conventional missile defenses to protect the ship or territory they are charged with defending. 

So a U.S. aircraft carrier and its attendant battle group could soon be in the unenviable position of its defensive systems either being totally overwhelmed in the early phase of a conflict – or they will be rendered obsolete with a small batch of hypersonic weapons systems. Sure, the Americans are always building better systems. The Pentagon is supposedly prioritizing the creation of hypersonic weapons of their own, as well as defenses against them. 

Sadly, for now, China and Russia have the Americans beat in this domain.

That leaves the U.S. military with a limited set of options in the near term. That’s where DEW comes. If the American military can make DEW work reliably – and scale it up – it’s an additional layer of defense for U.S. surface warships or bases that could overwhelm the swarming tactics that America’s enemies are preparing to deploy against U.S. assets in war. 

There are two DEW systems the Navy is investing in. The first is the High-Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-Dazzler and Surveillance system (HELIOS). Navy leaders claim that the system can “blast more than 60 kilowatts of directed energy at targets up to five miles away,” and these systems were being tested on Flight IIA Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

As if trying to justify the cost of such systems, the Navy is trying to marry these new innovations to a platform that has yet to materialize: the replacement for the Navy’s Ticonderoga-class destroyers, the mythical DDG(X) warship. Whatever the Navy says about the timelines for the DDG(X), it is all up in the air, as the US economy struggles, politicians are distracted, and America’s industrial base is all but broken. 

Hoping and waiting for the DDG(X) to be delivered in any meaningful numbers so that they can utilize the Navy’s lasers is strategic malpractice on the part of American war planners. 

Of course, the Navy needs DEW to ensure its surface fleet is not a total wasting asset in the age of A2/AD. Thus far, however, the Navy has failed to accomplish even its baseline goals for achieving real DEW capabilities and then having a platform that can deploy them in combat. The Navy should rededicate its resources toward building its lasers. But it must merge these systems with existing platforms. 

As for platforms that are still being built, it would be wiser to place such weapons on large unmanned undersea vehicles.

Wasting time and money trying to do everything at once, as the Navy is currently doing, will ensure nothing is done on time or properly. Without the DEW capability, Navy warships risk being destroyed, or at least forced to stay out of any fight with an A2/AD-wielding enemy.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

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Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

The first presidential debate between Joe Biden and Donald Trump resulted in a media blitzkrieg of hysteria about Biden’s performance, which continued through the Republican convention and led to Biden’s eventual withdrawal from the race. The New York Times editorial board and other prestige media sites, supported by some leading Democratic fundraisers and politicians, including from the Democratic Senate and House leaders, called for Biden to withdraw from the race for the White House. It’s understandable to some extent that the media, whose professional obsession is with communication, and the many Democratic members of the House and Senate, who are concerned about their own elections, would declare Biden’s performance a disaster. On the other hand, with respect to the substance of policy, as opposed to the optics of stage performance, the debate was one blip in a journey that will require more months of campaigning and electioneering between former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris to sort out.

Of particular importance in this regard are the candidates’ and parties’ respective positions on foreign policy and U.S. military strategy. The world is transforming an immediate post-Cold War euphoria of American triumphalism and liberal democratic hubris to a more complicated picture. The return of wars and other conflicts among major powers, especially with respect to the rising capabilities and aspirations of China and Russia, creates uncertainty about the United States’ political objectives and military readiness in Europe and Asia. In addition, unprecedented challenges in climate change and pandemics; efforts to dethrone the dollar as the benchmark currency for international transactions; mass migration in unprecedented numbers; and new technologies for cyberwar, artificial intelligence, and the military uses of space all contribute to a possible bow wave of political regime destabilization and military planning vexation. Today’s certainties for politicians and their military advisors are tomorrow’s guesswork. 

Therefore, in choosing among competing presidential candidates, we need to understand their perspectives on this international environment of political complexity and military uncertainty. No country has unlimited resources, and even the United States, facing a cumulative deficit of more than $35 trillion, cannot continue unrestrained binge spending on domestic and foreign policy priorities. What, going forward, is America’s preferred geopolitical orientation or grand strategy? What military commitments and obligations derive from that grand strategy? And third, what assumptions should drive military preparedness for deterring wars and, if necessary, for fighting them?

Broadly speaking, the options for U.S. grand strategy include: (1) Godzilla Rex, or what has sometimes been termed “liberal hegemony”; (2) offshore balancing; (3) globalization unlimited; and (4) selective engagement and enlargement. Isolationism is eliminated as an option because, in today’s world of complex interdependence and media saturation, it would not be possible, even if deemed desirable by some.

Godzilla Rex was the U.S. position in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. An end to history and the perpetual triumph of liberal democracy was assumed by optimists about the post-Soviet world. The United States was a singular global superpower with no serious military rival. However, President Clinton reduced national focus on security and defense, including intelligence, which came back to haunt us after the attacks on 9/11. Nonetheless, the United States invaded Afghanistan to depose the Taliban in 2001 and struck down the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003. A Global War on Terror was declared, and both conflicts became “forever wars” that lasted well into the second decade of the present century. 

Offshore balancing was an alternative grand strategy favored by some academics and prominent policy analysts. From this perspective, the United States should limit large-scale military intervention to threats by a hostile power to dominate an essential region in ways inimical to U.S. and allied vital interests. Regional rivals would include a resurgent Russia in Europe, a rising China in Asia, and lesser but still dangerous disruptors in Asia (North Korea) or the Middle East (Iran). Under this approach, the United States would first seek to rely on regional allies to take the lead if they were prepared to do so, although the United States would otherwise act if our vital interests were threatened.

A third grand strategy, favored by many postmodern politicians and a worldwide community of activists, would emphasize transnational challenges over national rivalries and argue for moving issues such as climate change, poverty, migration, urbanization, pandemics, and disarmament to the front end of national policy agendas. From this perspective, great power rivalries and wars for hegemony are outdated relics of hyper-nationalism and excessive military influence over policy. Resources spent on defense and war-fighting should be diverted to international scientific collaboration and peacekeeping overseen by the United Nations or other international bodies. 

A fourth grand strategy is selective engagement and enlargement. This approach was supported by some in the Bill Clinton administration and emphasized economic growth through international cooperation and investment. Although there was broad agreement among Democrats and Republicans in the 1990s that liberalized free trade would be a rising tide that lifted all boats, it eventually became clear that some states would benefit much more directly than others. Military interventions were undertaken in the wake of a famine in Somalia in order to curb the power of warlords, resulting in the “Blackhawk Down” episode that led to a U.S. military withdrawal from that failed state. Elsewhere, the United States and NATO intervened to restore order in Bosnia in 1995 and waged war against Serbia in 1999 in order to prevent ethnic cleansing and sectarian strife in Europe. NATO’s attacks on Serbia in 1999 enraged the Russian government and its otherwise U.S.-friendly President Boris Yeltsin, a precursor of later objections to NATO enlargement by his successor, Vladimir Putin.

Among these competing grand strategies, the foreign and defense policies of the Biden administration have included some elements from each of the first three options. A Harris administration would most likely expand them. Growing defense budgets and robust U.S. and NATO military support for Ukraine against Russian invasion show that Godzilla Rex remains aspirational among both Democrats and many Republicans in Washington. U.S. support for Israel in the Middle East is close to offshore balancing against dangerous regional rivals (Iran and its proxies). Also, it reflects the historical American commitment to defending Israeli sovereignty against regional enemies. 

But so-called progressives in the Biden administration, including globalists as described above, have objected to Israel’s military tactics in the war against Hamas in Gaza. With regard to China, the Biden policy has been divided between options one and two: emphasizing a U.S. defense buildup and greater preparedness for an attempted Chinese military takeover of Taiwan or seeing China as more of an economic and informational competitor than an immediate military threat—although China’s growing capabilities for cyberwar and in space are admittedly of major concern. Still, others see China’s rise as a science and technology challenge that does not have to evolve into an arms race or war, which is more like option three. 

Where would a second Trump administration place itself in selecting among these grand strategies (or others)? It’s unknowable at the moment because Trump relies on his personal ability to engage with other heads of state in order to resolve international disputes. Some of his comments seem to endorse option one, Godzilla Rex. Still, he also prizes his ability to woo hostile leaders into more favorable alignments by grand summitry and selective engagement. Trump promises to crack down on illegal migration and on trade deals that disadvantage U.S. producers and manufacturers. 

In this respect, he combines old-style nationalism with an aggressive globalism turned upside down. He claimed credit for keeping the United States out of major wars during his administration, although he did authorize selective strikes against terrorists and rogue regimes. In public events during this year, he asserted that he would end the war in Ukraine between the time of his election in November 2024 and his inauguration in January 2025. Whether Ukrainian president Zelensky and Russian president Putin are on board with this timetable remains to be seen. In addition, during his term in the White House, some members of Congress and other commentators worried about Trump’s finger on the nuclear button should a Cold War-style nuclear crisis present itself. However, others noted that the U.S. decision-making process has safeguards against any presidential impetuosity.

Stephen Cimbala is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous books and articles on international security issues. 

Lawrence Korb, a retired Navy Captain, has held national security positions at several think tanks and served in the Pentagon in the Reagan administration.

Image: GreenOak / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: The railgun, an advanced artillery system using electromagnetic force to launch projectiles at high velocities, has faced significant challenges, leading to the U.S. Navy canceling its program in 2021.

-The main issues included durability, integration with ship power systems, and underperformance in tests. Despite this, China claims to be advancing its railgun technology, potentially incorporating it into their naval forces.

-While some analysts believe China may be bluffing to provoke U.S. spending, others worry about China's genuine progress in this field.

When the catapult was introduced into warfare, it changed history forever. Empires were built or destroyed by this ingenious weapon. They seem antiquated today, but the concept of taking an object and hurling it at enemy formation or fortification keeps its appeal. 

We are obviously well beyond the era of catapults. But the U.S. military and others have toyed with a more high-tech version of this artillery piece: the railgun.

Basically, a railgun uses electromagnetic force to propel an object toward a target at an extremely high velocity. The innovation is that the railgun uses electricity rather than chemicals to give the projectiles their speed.

The speed we are talking about leaves little time to react. There is in theory little defense against this type of attack. 

But while this technology was the great dream of many U.S. military engineers, it never came to fruition. 

According to ExecutiveGov, the Navy canceled the program because “the rails could easily experience wear and tear from firing multiple projectiles, resulting in a very high surface temperature, which can magnify durability issues even more.” 

Further, these weapons are power hogs, and their inability to integrate into the warship’s electrical grid made them useless as weapons. 

Finally, when railguns were tested at the U.S. Army’s Dugway Proving Ground in the Utah desert, they didn’t hit the range their designers had promised. 

All of this left the Navy with nothing to show for over a decade of work and hundreds of millions of dollars invested. In 2021, the Navy canceled the program and redirected its resources to more conventional defenses as well as its hypersonic weapons program.

The Navy couldn’t make it work, and we were told that it wasn’t that big of a deal. If the Navy couldn’t do it, certainly no one else, especially a foreign power, could ever attain this radical technology.

But China claims it is proving these Western leaders wrong. 

With China becoming a wealthy and modernizing nation-state, it is inevitable that they would enhance their military capabilities. As part of the effort, China is working on some radical, advanced new military technologies. One such new capability, they claim, is the railgun. 

Beijing announced the existence of their program just two years after the Pentagon abandoned theirs. 

Some in Washington, such as the analysts at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), don’t think that the Chinese have the railgun. They believe China is bluffing on the topic. They see a sort of reverse-Reagan approach to handling the U.S. threat to China. U.S. President Ronald Reagan got the USSR to spend itself into oblivion partly by lying about what new systems the Americans were building, and China is doing that to the U.S. today.

But after every Chinese advance, the Western press enters the scene to downplay the threat and disparage anyone who would believe such sophistry. Beijing is undoubtedly turning some variation of the Reagan plan against the U.S. Yet China is also truly developing some advanced – and fearsome – technologies to combat the Americans.

Enter the Chinese railgun. They purportedly have a rudimentary version of the one the Americans had been developing. Chinese strategists also claim that the new railguns are being easily incorporated into their warships to give their naval force added protection and power-projection capabilities. 

The United States military, meanwhile, is struggling with all these problems. If China can build a railgun when the U.S. cannot, that is good reason to worry. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

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Summary and Key Points: China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is reportedly developing a "jam-resistant" Yu-10 torpedo, designed to effectively strike moving targets with high accuracy. This torpedo, launched from a Type-039B submarine, was demonstrated in a test that reportedly sunk a retired landing vessel.

-The Yu-10's capabilities are seen as a significant threat to large naval targets, including aircraft carriers.

-The ongoing development of such advanced torpedoes highlights China's efforts to enhance its submarine warfare capabilities, posing a growing challenge to U.S. naval forces.

China Developed Jam-Resistant Torpedo

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has repeatedly touted the capabilities of its DF-21D and DF-26B "carrier killer" missiles that can be fired by land-based mobile launchers. Beijing's deployment of such weapons could deny access to a potential adversary in the East and South China Seas, but now it seems that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) could have in its arsenal a weapon that could be employed anywhere its submarines can travel.

China state media broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) highlighted the capabilities of what was believed to be the PLAN's Yu-10 torpedo. In a video presented on the media outlet last month to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the PLAN's submarine, a Type-039B diesel-electric submarine (NATO reporting name Yuan class) fired the torpedo at a Type 074 amphibious landing vessel.

"Its stern was lifted out of the water by the explosion shock wave, accompanied by a column of water nearly 100 meters (328 feet) high," reported The South China Morning Post, adding that the Yu-10 is believed to have entered service around 2015, quoting an article in the Ordnance Industry Science Technology, a Chinese military magazine.

"From the CCTV video, the power of this torpedo means even an aircraft carrier could hardly escape the fate of sinking, let alone destroyers or landing docks. Even if not sunk, they would be essentially out of operation," the Chinese military publication had stated. "This technology uses the wake generated by the target vessel to correct the torpedo’s orientation to better track and effectively strike moving targets, which greatly improves the responsiveness and accuracy of the torpedo, making it more resistant to jamming."

Though the report from The China Morning Post claimed the Yu-10 has an estimated range of fifty km (thirty miles), which is comparable to the U.S. Navy's MK-48 Mod 7, the exact specifications of the Yu-10 torpedo have not been published, nor has its use in sinking the amphibious landing vessel been independently verified.

The apparent sinking of a retired Type 074 amphibious landing vessel was likely conducted in response to a pair of Sinking Excercise (SINKEX) drills carried out during the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2024 multinational exercises, and follows a similar event in June in which the amphibious transport dock ex-USS Cleveland (LPD-7) was sunk during the Valiant Shield (VS) 2024.

The Austin-class amphibious transport dock – the third ship of the U.S. Navy to be named for the Ohio city – had been maintained at the Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Facility at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, since November 2017. The retired vessel was sunk as a target on June 17, during a naval-fire exercise.

During RIMPAC 2024, a U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit bomber successfully sank the ex-USS Dubuque (LPD-8) – another Austin-class amphibious transport dock – with a GPS-guided bomb. Even more impressively, the decommissioned U.S. Navy amphibious assault ship USS Tarawa (LHA-1) was sunk after being hit by a Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) from a U.S. Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet.

These recent U.S. and Chinese exercises highlight that sinking a warship may be the easy part, at least with the right ordnance. The trick would be getting through the vast screen of guided-missile destroyers and other defenses.

The danger for the U.S. Navy is that submarines like the PLAN's Type 039B are noted for employing an air-independent power (AIP) system that can allow them to remain submerged for long periods, operating quietly and stealthily.

As previously reported, several U.S. carriers have been notionally "sunk" in exercises by similar submarines, raising concerns about the safety of the floating air bases against such threats. Coupled with a "jam-resistant" submarine could make for a dangerous threat indeed.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

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Summary and Key Points - F/A-18 Fighters for Ukraine?: While Ukraine's receipt of F-16 fighter jets is seen as a significant boost, the limited number of these non-stealth aircraft may restrict their impact in the ongoing conflict.

-The F/A-18 Super Hornet, though versatile and capable, would face similar challenges, such as detectability by advanced Russian air defenses.

-Both aircraft would likely be used defensively, offering improvements but not dramatically altering the conflict's course. The war is expected to continue as it has for nearly three years.

Would the Ukrainians benefit from the gifting of Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet?

The Ukrainians are celebrating the arrival of the F-16 fighter jet – a gift from the Americans that has been billed as a potential game changer in the two-and-a-half-year-old conflict. But does the F-16 provide the Ukrainians with game-changing capabilities? And was the F-16 the best airframe for the Ukrainians?

Despite making its first flight fifty years ago in 1974, the F-16 is still a reliable and capable fighter. This single-engine fighter is equipped to operate in all weather conditions and a variety of different roles, making the F-16 well-suited for the volatile conditions of conflict. The F-16 is distinct for its frameless bubble canopy, which permits the pilot an exceptional, unobstructed field of vision. In production (almost) continuously since 1973, the F-16 is numerous, with 4,604 airframes built.

Yet only a handful of the F-16s have been sent to Ukraine, where officials believe at least 130 F-16s will be needed to neutralize Russian air power. The Ukrainians have not disclosed exactly how many F-16s they received, but it has been estimated that the number does not come close to approaching 130, meaning the effectiveness of the F-16 will be limited – in large part because the jet will be used conservatively in account of how finite the resource is.

Also limiting the effectiveness of the F-16 is the lack of stealth capabilities. Whereas modern fighters have minuscule radar cross sections, which permit operations in contested air space, the F-16 was designed before such stealth technology had been developed, and thus is easily detectable with modern air defense systems. The result is a jet that would have limited use in the conflict’s front lines. Instead, the F-16 would likely be used primarily in defensive situations.

As the F/A designation suggests, the F/A-18 is a versatile aircraft, offering impressive capabilities in both offensive and defensive situations. And while the F/A-18 is commonly associated with carrier operations, the jet is of course capable of operating from land, as well.

The F/A-18 has been built in far fewer quantities (1.480) than the F-16 and has been distributed far less (just three countries operate the F/A-18, whereas about twenty-five operate the F-16), meaning the Ukrainians are not going to receive the F/A-18 in quantities exceeding that of the F-16.

The F/A-18, also designed in the 1970s, is equally lacking in stealth technology. The result would be similar: the F/A-18 would struggle to survive against Russia’s advanced air defense systems and would likely be confined to a purely defensive role.

To be clear, the Ukrainian’s circumstances will be improved with the addition of the F-16 – and would be improved with the addition of the F/A-18; both airframes offer a quantity and quality increase over the existing Ukrainian inventory. But the improvements yielded won’t be sufficient to expel the Russian invaders, or to force Putin into some sort of peace agreement, or capitulation. The war will likely persist in much the same way it has persisted for nearly three years.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.  

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Summary and Key Points: The delivery of American-made F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine is a significant development, but their impact on the war might be limited. Ukraine needs around 130 F-16s to neutralize Russian air power, but the number received is much lower. The F-16, like the JAS 39 Gripen, is non-stealth, making it vulnerable to Russian air defenses.

-While both aircraft could be valuable in defensive roles, neither is likely to change the conflict's dynamics significantly without more substantial numbers and capabilities.

The big news out of Ukraine is the delivery of American-made F-16 fighter jets to Kyiv’s forces. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy spent months lobbying for the fourth-generation fighters. Now the jets are finally ready for deployment against Russian aggressors.

“F-16s are in Ukraine. We did it. I am proud of our guys who are mastering these jets and have already started using them for our country,” Zelenskyy said. “These jets are in our sky and today you see them. It’s good that they are here and that we can put them to use.”

But the F-16 is unlikely to impact the war as much as Zelenskyy has advertised. Ukrainian officials have said Ukraine would need 130 F-16s just to neutralize Russia’s existing air assets. While the precise number of F-16s delivered to Ukraine has not been disclosed, we can be fairly certain that number is not 130. The result will be an F-16 force that is vulnerable to Russia’s air defense systems. 

Would another jet be more effective? Could Ukraine add something else in the NATO inventory, like the JAS 39 Gripen?

The F-16 has two shortcomings in Ukraine. First, the jet has not been supplied in numbers sufficient to tip the balance. Second, the F-16 is not a stealth aircraft. 

Let’s consider the supply issue first. To date, 4,604 F-16s have been built. They are in service with the United States and 25 other operating entities. The jet is prolific. The JAS 39, meanwhile, has been produced less than 300 times and is in service with just four air forces, two of them from NATO member-states. Ukraine could not turn to the JAS 39 to find the 130 airframes needed to neutralize Russian air power. That number would constitute nearly 50% of the type ever made and would need to come exclusively from Hungary and Sweden. That won’t happen. 

The F-16 is numerous and has long since proliferated throughout the NATO air force network, and Ukraine is still nowhere close to procuring the amount of F-16s needed to really make a difference against Russian air power. If Ukraine were to inherit the JAS 39, the limited numbers procured would make it a precious commodity, inspiring the kind of cautious use that would limit the jet’s impact on the outcome of the conflict.  

The second problem is that the JAS 39, like the F-16, is a non-stealth fighter. The Russian military has many deficiencies, but air defense does not seem to be one of them. Non-stealth fighters would not be survivable against Russian air defenses, meaning the JAS 39 would need to avoid frontline and behind-frontline operations. 

The JAS 39, like the F-16, would be limited to a more defensive role. This is valuable, of course, but unlikely to lead Russian forces to abandon Ukrainian territory.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.  

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