Ideas on Europe Blog

The 2015 European Agenda on Migration envisaged a significant role for FRONTEX, EASO, and EUROPOL, the function to operationally implement the Agenda and closely cooperate in the management of the hotspots established in Italy and Greece. Due to the extraordinary migratory pressure at the external borders of these frontline Member States, FRONTEX, EASO, and EUROPOL were called to support the competent national authorities “on the spot”.

EUROPOL is present in the hotspots and actively participates with FRONTEX and EASO. EUROPOL’s core mission in the hotspots is threefold: to reinforce the exchange of information, verify such intelligence within the relevant databases, and deploy teams of experts on the ground. The objective is to ensure a comprehensive European law enforcement approach and operationally assist the concerned frontline Member States in averting and combating migrant smuggling, human trafficking, and terrorist networks.

To achieve such an objective, EUROPOL is namely responsible for fast-tracking information, improving the national investigations, conducting operational and strategic analysis, being present at the screening of the arrived migrants, and providing forensic support in the hotspots. However, Regulation 2016/794 on EUROPOL does not mention the operational role that the agency plays in the hotspots.

The main tool employed by EUROPOL to assist the concerned Member States in the hotspots was the JOT-MARE, followed by the EMSC. Since February 2016, the EMSC has assisted the competent national enforcement authorities by providing secure-information, sharing opportunities and strategic and operational analysis, gathering evidence, and undertaking investigations against the smuggling networks facilitating the illegal entries, onward secondary movements, and residence of migrants in the EU. Not only is the EMSC active in supporting the national authorities in exchanging intelligence and investigating existing criminal networks operating in the Mediterranean, but EUROPOL’s officials, jointly with FRONTEX and the concerned Member State, also debrief on the migrants at the hotspots and assess the data gathered from the interviews and investigations.

The second activity report of the EMSC details that the Center has assisted the competent national enforcement authorities in cases related to migrant smuggling and document fraud through: forensic support in relation to questioned documents and materials used to produce suspicious documents, on-the-spot technical support to provide assistance and expertise in investigating forged documents and dismantling illegal print shops, and permanent deployments in the hotspots. The officials of EUROPOL deployed in the hotspots offer expertise, coordinate operational meetings, provide analytical support, and perform cross-checks against the databases of the agency (see here).

The key operational novelty of the EMSC, which is not established in Regulation 2016/794 on EUROPOL, consists in deploying investigative and analytical support teams (EMIST and EMAST) on the ground, as well as guest officers to undertake systematic secondary security checks and support Greece in the hotspots. The presence of EUROPOL in the hotspots is permanent and the EMIST and EMAST are responsible for delivering regional operational support and serving as a platform to ensure trustworthy relationships with national authorities.

EUROPOL’s Review 2016-2017 highlights the strong operational capacity provided by the agency in the hotspots and particularly in the secondary security checks undertaken by the deployed officials. Specifically, it is pointed out that “EUROPOL experts worked side-by-side with national authorities at the EU’s external borders to strengthen security checks on the inward flows of migrants, to disrupt migrant smuggling networks and identify suspected terrorists and criminals”.

In the hotspots, EUROPOL advises and operationally assists the competent national enforcement authorities in effectively implementing their executive measures, to both dismantle the smuggling and trafficking networks and to combat other serious criminal activities (i.e. organized crime and terrorism). Despite EUROPOL’s operational role, in the recently adopted Regulation of EUROPOL there is not a single mention of this agency’s operational powers in the hotspots, unlike in the EBCG and the future EUAA Regulations. Hence, the total secrecy surrounding the operational support of EUROPOL in the hotspots and the lack of any legal reference to the activities of the agency on the ground prevent the general public from assessing the actual implications, meaning, and extent of EUROPOL’s operational support.

This lack of transparency was brought to the European Ombudsman in 2017 as part of my PhD research. Unfortunately, on 10 May 2019, the Ombudsman agreed with Europol’s explanation that the disclosure (full and partial) of documents regarding the agency’s operational activities in the Greek and Italian hotspots “would risk prejudicing the effectiveness and the outcome of the ongoing, but also future, operations in the hotspots”.That is, while Europol is undertaking operational activities in the hotspots, citizens cannot have access to what the agency does in practice and to what extent it operationally assists the national authorities in illegal migrant smuggling investigations. This lack of transparency is clearly problematic in order to effectively hold the agency accountable.

The post The Lack of Transparency Surrounding EUROPOL and the Hotspots appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

As Poland is heading for a General Elections in the Autumn this year, both the governing and opposition political parties are treating the European Parliament election, that is only weeks away, as secondary to the General Elections.

Yes, both sides are running a campaign to mobilise their activists and supporters to increase their share of the seat in the EP.

However, as far as I can observe, the primary concern for both sides is whether the EP election results can tell them anything about how well they will do in the autumn elections and if the EP election could be used to galvanise their support bases to attract more votes.

Plus while the governing political party the Law and Justice Party (PiS) escapes from offering any concrete policy proposals to the real issues of Poland in the EU during this election campaign. The opposition political parties are not any better; generally, they miss their focus by paying unnecessary attention to PiS and its shortcomings and somewhat exaggerating their criticisms, instead of putting forward their agenda.

The PiS, which has been in power since 2015, is in constant search of bogeyman in shaping its campaign narrative. Rather than concentrating on the real issues the EU and the Polish government is clashing over.

For instance on the top of the list is the effective application of EU law, from the protection of investments to the mutual recognition of decisions in areas as diverse as child custody disputes or the execution of European Arrest Warrants. The Polish government does also clash with Brussels over environmental protection and migration.

Only in April this year, the European Commission has launched an infringement procedure against Poland regarding the new disciplinary regime for judges. While the government has two months to respond, so far the PiS turned a blind on this.

Instead, Jarosław Kaczyński gave an alarming speech about Euro. He said Poland is not going to join the Euro before its economy is as big as of Germany and demanded that the opposition political parties take a similar stance of his.

As far as his past Eurosceptic policy positions are concerned, this was not a surprise; having made this speech during the EP elections campaign period, however, was not a coincidence.

Since he is not able to campaign on the real issues concerning the future of Poland in the EU, he worked out a way out of this predicament by creating an issue that was not part of the public debate.

At the EU level, it is well known to everyone that there is not an appetite in the EU for the expansion of the Eurozone, but for someone in Poland who is not following daily EU related news might think that joining the Euro can be severe and potentially could jeopardise his or her living standards. Hence Kaczyński would win their vote.

One other issue, which the PiS has lately been vehemently campaigning on, do concern the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender communities in Poland. Kaczyński’s response to a question about a movie called Kler (The Clergy), a 2018 film, which depicts fictional clerics as drunken child abusers, sparked a debate about the PiS’s position on the LGBT in Poland and how in line it is with the EU’s expected standards.

He said:

“We are dealing with a direct attack on the family and children – the sexualisation of children, that entire LBGT movement, gender. This is imported, but they today threaten our identity, our nation, its continuation and therefore the Polish state.”

Additionally, Rafal Trzaskowski’s, Mayor of Warsaw, approval of the declaration in favour of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) rights raised the tension.

While politicians are expected to bring people of different backgrounds, sexual orientations, races and religions together, Kaczyński chose to appeal to the religious and conservative sentiments of the Polish voters. In contrast, Kaczyński not only disregarded the real issue, which is the rights of the LGBT communities in Poland but also has thrown the blame on to another agent, in this case, it is the Western countries.

Moving on to the opposition political parties; five of the most prominent opposition political parties including the Civic Platform (PO) as well as the Modern party (Nowoczesna), Polish People’s Party (PSL), Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), and Greens have joined forces in order to challenge the PiS at the EP election, which is called European Coalition.

Either the campaigning tactics used by the opposition alliance group or due to the lack of vision on the opposition’ side, the only campaign slogan that is coming through is “Polexit”, which is ironic because I live on Brexitland, which makes me and my sources of information more susceptible to any talks of having another member states living the EU.

Broadside at the PiS leadership was launched as quick as at the European Coalition’s election campaign takeoff, claiming that the PiS’s policy choices are making Poland close to exit the EU.

For instance, Grzegorz Schetyna, the leader of the PO, said: “there is a great choice ahead: either strong, rich, democratic Poland in a strong Europe or what we see today — party state, on its way to leave the EU”.

I believe that the opposition political parties do usually give a good kick to the governing political parties when they utilise their campaign time in explaining to the electorate what they are proposing to do if and when they are elected, instead of attacking the opposition political party head-on.

One reason for this is that the governing political parties are in a better place in being familiar to the electorate since they are in power and they are the decision makers.

Thus either for good or bad, the electorate knows the policy choices of the governing political parties while being vaguely informed of what the opposition political parties are standing for.

Consequently, it would have been in the interest of the Coalition Europe, had they explained to the electorate what they see as the real issues facing Poland, what they propose to do about these problems and how they plan to deliver on these proposals.

Of course, it does not make me an EU legal expert, but in the past few months, I have been researching about the evolution of the EU’s the Rule of Law framework and the new and the existing rule of law governing mechanisms, used by the EU.

So as far as I can understand that there is not a single mechanism that connects the membership of the EU to Rule of Law practice in a member state, which makes the Coalition Europe’s argument about Polexit baseless, ingenious and careless, to say least.

Politics at this level and of this seriousness should be well rehearsed and addressing the real issues, instead of creating one of their own. Only then elections can be won.

The post #EP2019—Insights from Poland: the PiS vs the Coalition Europe (IV) appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Financial Times has published an article which provides the raw truth for the Remain movement: Britain’s Remainers are too divided.

It’s something I have been complaining about for some years. My disappointment in the inability of Remainers to work effectively together has moved to frustration, to anger, and now to resigned despair. Truly, deep, despair.

By not working together, we are giving a bigger chance of a crushing victory to the direct enemy of Remain, Nigel Farage’s ‘Brexit Party’, which we should be under no illusion, has enormous and unbridled ambitions to turn our country into an isolated, nasty, right-wing state.

Three years before the referendum, I asked Dirk Hazell, leader of the strongly pro-Remain European People’s Party in the UK (UK EPP) what he thought would be the likely scenario if there was a referendum in which Brexit won. He replied:

“England would get more like Spain under the dictator Franco, but with worse weather.”

At the time, I thought this was ridiculously far-fetched. Now, I am not so sure. The threat of the far-right in the UK is serious, but I fear that it is not being taken seriously enough.

The Remain parties and groups, being splintered, ego-driven, brand-orientated and power-hungry, have hopelessly underestimated the threat of Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party.

Remainers lack a true realisation that only by working together, with a common cause, can there be the greatest chance of decisively defeating both Farage and Brexit.

Credit needs to be given to the LibDems for reaching out to the other pro-Remain parties to try and achieve some sort of collaboration, but their overtures were rebuffed.

It was Nigel Farage that caused the referendum to happen in the first place.

He promised “an earthquake” before the previous European elections in 2014, and he delivered. His UKIP party won that election with more MEP seats than any other UK party.

Consequently, the Tories, terrified that UKIP would steal their power base, responded by promising an in/out EU referendum in their manifesto for the general election in the following year, 2015 (which David Cameron never expected to win outright).

Labour and the LibDems did not offer a referendum, and if Labour had won the 2015 election, we would not now be on the road to Brexit.

Brexit was never previously a mainstream call in the years and decades leading up to the referendum. Leavers were always only in a minority, on the far extremes and side-lines of the Tory and Labour Parties.

Now, they are in charge.

Most people in Britain don’t want Brexit, they never did. Only a minority of registered voters voted for Leave (just 37%).

In most democracies across the world that hold referendums, such a minority vote could never have resulted in Leave winning, as a minimum threshold, or ‘super majority’, would have been required for a Brexit victory.

Now, all polls show that more people in Britain want us to Remain in the EU than leave.
That’s been the case in over 60 consecutive polls from different organisations since the 2017 general election: Britain doesn’t want Brexit. It’s most unlikely that all those polls could be wrong.

Yet, a low turnout in the European elections, combined with a divided, splintered front by the Remain movement, could give an unnecessary win to the Brexit Party.

Yes, the European elections are run on a form of proportional representation in the UK, but not a very good version of it.

You don’t get a second or third choice. You can only vote for one party. With several Remain parties represented on your ballot paper, it means that some Remain parties may not even reach the minimum threshold needed to get a seat.

Hugo Dixon, editor of Infacts, argues that a key test will be the total number of votes cast for all five Remain parties taken together. That will give a good indication of how strong the popular momentum is behind staying in the EU, he says.

But it will be seats that truly count, more than the number of votes, and if the five Remain parties had agreed to work together in the European elections, they could have got many more seats for the same number of votes.

It’s a truly lost opportunity.

The polling company, YouGov, has calculated that if an anti-Brexit pact had been formed between the LibDems, the Greens and Change UK for the European election, in say a notional 6-seat constituency, the pro-Remain alliance would have won two seats, the same as the Brexit party.

Instead, YouGov argues, without an anti-Brexit alliance, the Brexit party will take three seats in such a constituency, Labour two and the Conservatives one.

As the Financial Times reported:

‘The forthcoming European elections ought to be a golden opportunity for British politicians who want a second referendum and, ultimately, a reversal of the Brexit process.

‘But unfortunately for the Remain side, it’s an opportunity that is not being fully grasped.

‘With a little under two weeks to polling day, most of the campaigning momentum lies with Nigel Farage and his slick Brexit party.

‘His movement is united around his image; it is focused on an unrelenting message about a hard Brexit; and it is attracting large numbers of disillusioned Conservatives to big rallies.’

The newspaper added:

‘By contrast, there are no fewer than five parties across the UK advocating Remain and a second referendum. These are the Liberal Democrats, Change UK, the Greens, the SNP and Plaid Cymru. And thus far they are making a lot less noise.’

Of course, the pro-Remain ‘noise’ could be much louder and more effective if allies worked together.

A serious example of ‘not-working-together’ is the failure of pro-Remain parties to coalesce around a single candidate in the forthcoming Peterborough by-election on 6 June.

It was thought that pro-Remain parties would all support Femi Oluwole, a young and dynamic Remainer activist. But the accord fell through.

Remainers need to practice the ideology of the European Union: working together.

Why have Remainers learnt so little since the catastrophic loss of the referendum in 2016, that frankly, Remain should have won, if only they had been better organised, and united?

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
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The truth is out: the EU does not exist. It’s a hoax, made up by a vast conspiracy. I have evidence. You can look it up on my Facebook page.

I always believed that the story of a French foreign affairs minister proposing a coal and steel community under a yet-to-be defined supranational high authority (a what?) lacked all credibility.

What I suspected is now revealed to be true: I can finally confirm the Schuman Declaration is fake news. It never took place. Turns out Mister Schuman had well planned to read out his text, based on the draft by Jean Monnet, but he was prevented from doing so in the last minute.

It all started with a tweet by the leader of the ‘National Alliance’, the country’s main opposition party, which revealed what the government had plotted in all secrecy: ‘HOW SCHUMAN THE TRAITOR FOOLS THE PEOPLE – MINERS AND STEELWORKERS SOLD TO THE GERMANS!!!’. It went viral in no time.

Simultaneously, a video was anonymously uploaded on YouTube, a short edited clip showing Jean Monnet in government circles in London, Washington, and Bonn. The pictures were accompanied by a voice-over describing the conspiracy instigated by this ‘citizen of nowhere’ portrayed as ‘lobbyist on the payroll of the global business élites’. Shared by a multitude of Facebook feeds and WhatsApp groups, it accumulated hundreds of thousands of hits in a few days only.

On the news channels and late-night shows, the polemic went wild. Experts, politicians and the usual talking heads came together in rightful indignation about the government’s dangerous initiative. One of the country’s best-known TV pundits shook his head in disbelief: ‘A supranational coal and steel community! They really have lost all sense of reality. Tomorrow they’ll come up with a single market, then they’ll propose open borders, and why not a common currency while we’re at it?’

In the surveys, Mister Schuman’s popularity reached unprecedented lows. The pollsters provided robust evidence of the French public’s growing distrust towards their political leaders, who were about to sell out the French social model and its entire industrial culture.

The final blow was dealt by one the most influential editorialists, for whom this ‘so-called proposition by Mister Schuman’ was nothing short of ‘the ultimate triumph of the ultra-liberalist ideology promoted by unelected technocrats like Mister Monnet’.

Facing spontaneous demonstrations in several cities calling for the immediate resignation of the government, as well as an online petition launched by the ‘France souveraine’ movement and signed by tens of thousands of angry citizens, Robert Schuman finally gave in and cancelled the conference initially scheduled for 9 May 1950.

This is the naked truth, whatever the #FakeNews want us to believe.

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The post Breaking: The Truth about the EU! appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The people of the United Kingdom are lucky that they have a chance to vote in the Euopean parliamentary elections of 2019. If Theresa May and the Brexit wing of her party had had their way, then the United Kingdom would have left the EU on 29th March this year, excluding the British people from the opportunity to participate in European democracy. However the debate during the European election campaign must go beyond whether the UK leaves or stays in the EU, because the threat of climate change is even more dangerous than Brexit.

British participation in the Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCHJU) is essential if the United Kingdom wants to fight climate change and build a post carbon economic future for itself. If the UK leaves the EU, then it is difficult to see how the country could continue being involved with the FCHJU, which is a European partnership. The purpose of the FCHJU is to make clean energy a reality, improve air quality, and reduce CO2 emissions by implementing hydrogen technologies coupled to renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, tidal, and wave power, while at the same time developing a new industry which will create employment.

The key to this new industry is “green hydrogen” produced by electrolysis using electricity from renewable sorces. Today modern PEM electrolysers allow electricity to be stored as hydrogen, so the energy source can be used when the supply from renewables does not meet demand. Research projects funded by the FCHJU have allowed electrolysers to become more powerful and efficient. According to a brochure produced by the FCHJU: “The second strand relates to FCHJU projects that have demonstrated the increasing power of electrolysers. This has risen from 100 KW, with project Don Quichote in 2011, to 6MW in the 2016 H2Future project.”

We are living through a hydrogen technology revolution, which is going to make diesel and petrol burning internal combustion engines obsolete, as more and more cars are built in the form of hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs). If the United Kingdom is not a partner in the process, it will be left behind. When a Japanese car manufacturer is looking for a location to build FCEVs for the European market, it will choose a country involved in the FCHJU, because the FCHJU is a collaborative partnership of the European Commission, industry, and research, which is developing hydrogen transport and refuelling infrastructure.

The United Kingdom’s involvement with the FCHJU is essential in order for the country to meet its net-zero-emissions targets by 2050. Several important projects in the UK have already benefitted from FCHJU finding such as the BIG HIT project on Orkney. BIG HIT works in partnership with the European Marine Energy Centre Ltd (EMEC) in Orkney. The Orkney Islands are already self sufficient in electricity produced by tidal and wave power. BIG HIT follows on from the Orkney Surf n’ Turf initiative, producing hydrogen from wind and tidal energy using a 1MW capacity electrolyser on Shapinsay and a 0.5MW electrolyser on Eday. The hydrogen is then stored as a high pressure gas in tube-trailers which are transported by ferry to Kirkwell, where the gas is used to heat and power buildings and as fuel for a fleet of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles used by Orkney Islands Council.

Only political parties that are committed to the UK remaining within the EU could make a positive contribution to politicies that will help Europe fight climate change. The policy of the Eurpean Parliament should be to phase out all fossil fuels such as coal, oil and natural gas across Europe before 2050. This can only be achieved if new green industies are created in the former coal and steel industrial regions of Europe to create employment and save the environment. The first policy of the newly elected European Parliament should be to ban shale gas fracking in Europe, and allow the green hydrogen industry to grow as part of the energy transition process.

Sources

https://www.fch.europa.eu/publications/fch-ju-success-stories

http://www.emec.org.uk/research/hydrogen-projects/

https://www.bighit.eu/about“>

https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/net-zero-the-uks-contribution-to-stopping-global-warming/

https://h2revive.eu/

http://www.itm-power.com/

©Jolyon Gumbrell 2019

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Those who don’t think 16-year-olds should have a vote, should listen to the powerful and awe inspiring speech by the 16-year-old climate change activist, Greta Thunberg.

Then, you might consider, that not only are 16-year-olds capable of voting; they are more capable of leading the world than many of our current leaders.

In a rousing speech to MEPs and officials at the European Parliament in Strasbourg this week, the teenage campaigner berated EU leaders for holding three emergency summits on Brexit and none on the threat posed by climate change.

Greta, the founder of the climate change school strike movement that’s gone global, said if politicians were serious about tackling climate change, they would not spend all their time “talking about taxes or Brexit”.

She added that politicians were failing to take enough action on climate change and the threats to the natural world, which could mean our way of life being destroyed by 2030.

“Our house is falling apart and our leaders need to start acting accordingly because at the moment they are not,” the 16-year old schoolgirl from Sweden told the standing room-only meeting.

“If our house was falling apart our leaders wouldn’t go on like we do today,” she said.

“If our house was falling apart, you wouldn’t hold three emergency Brexit summits and no emergency summit regarding the breakdown of the climate and the environment.”

She said politicians told her that they could not do anything too dramatic on climate change because it would be “unpopular” with voters.

“They are right of course,” said Greta, “because most people are not even aware why those changes are required.”

She added:

“That’s why I keep telling you to unite behind the science; make the best available science at the heart of politics and democracy.”

Now, if only grown-up politicians would act like that, what a better world we’d have.

It’s unlikely that we would now even be on the road to Brexit, because there’s no science or evidence to support it.

Instead, we would be putting massive resources behind a serious, co-odinated, world-wide effort to tackle climate change before it really is too late.

Just as this 16-year-old has urgently demanded.

Greta continued:

“The EU elections are coming up soon, and many of us who would be affected the most by this crisis, people like me, are not allowed to vote.”

She added:

“You need to listen to us, those who cannot vote. You need to vote for us, for your children and grandchildren.”

And in her concluding comments, that inspired a 30-second standing ovation, Greta said with a trembling voice:

“It’s ok if you refuse to listen to me, I am after all just a 16-year-old school girl from Sweden.

“But you cannot ignore the scientists, or the science, or the millions of school striking children, who are striking for the right to a future.

“I beg you, please do not fail on this.”

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The post Climate changes dwarfs Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Power to gas technology could go further to save the environment from fossil fuel emmissions, by increasing the use of clean fuel from sources of wind, solar and tidal power in rural areas. Companies such as ITM Power in the United Kingdom are already manufacturing electrolyser systems used for power to gas storage and hydrogen refuelling stations, but there are still many new opportunities for how this technology could be used in agriculture.

If the hydrogen fuel station could be brought to the farm yard or the village, then it could serve both the needs of local transport as well as agricultural vehicles and equipment. At the moment few manufacturers of tractors are aware of the full potential of hydrogen fuel cell technology for their industry, but it is worth looking at how hydrogen to electric power is being used in other heavy vehicle applications.

The REVIVE (Refuse Vehicle Innovation and Validation in Europe) project has developed 15 hydrogen fuel cell refuse trucks in 8 different cities across Europe. The cities involved in the project are Breda; Helmond; Amsterdam; Groningen; Antwerp; South Tyrol (Bolzano and Merano); and Freiburg. The trucks built for this project are useful, because they carry out their tasks of waste disposal, as well as being zero emission heavy duty vehicles, which means they do not run on diesel or any other fossil fuel, so they can meet the challenges of climate change and air polution. This project is funded by the Fuel Cells and Hydrogen 2 Joint Undertaking (FCH2JU), a public private partnership supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, the New European Research Grouping on Fuel Cells and Hydrogen (N. ERGHY), and Hydrogen Europe.

According to the project’s website h2revive.eu: “Most refuse trucks operate from a single depot, allowing them to be incorporated into captive fleets. This improves the utilisation of local hydrogen refuelling infrastructure, and thus the infrastructure’s economics.”

If heavy duty vehicles can operate from a single depot, then likewise a farm yard that has a hydrogen refuelling facility on site – powered by a wind turbine, solar panels or biomass plant – could easily provide the fuel needs of the farm’s hydrogen fuel cell powered tractors. The storage of hydrogen energy from renewable energy sources is ideal for decentralized infrastructure, which could provide the electricty supply to a rural community.

Sources

https://h2revive.eu/

http://www.itm-power.com/

©Jolyon Gumbrell 2019

The post Hydrogen cells and agriculture: The future of green energy in the countryside appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Esta entrada resume el capítulo publicado por la Fundación Alternativas el 1 de abril de 2019

 

La “crisis de los refugiados” ha expuesto las divergencias existentes entre los Estados miembros en la aplicación efectiva y uniforme de las leyes y políticas de la UE adoptadas en materia de migración, asilo y gestión de fronteras. Entre las medidas presentadas por la UE para hacer frente a este déficit de implementación nacional se encuentra la transformación de la Agencia Europea para la Gestión de la Cooperación Operativa en las Fronteras Exteriores de los Estados miembros de la Unión (FRONTEX) en la Guardia Europea de Fronteras y Costas (GEFC), el refuerzo del mandato de la Oficina Europea de Policía (EUROPOL), la promoción de la cooperación interinstitucional operativa de estas agencias descentralizadas sobre el terreno a través del enfoque de los hotspots y el desarrollo de una operación militar naval (EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA) con el fin de desarticular las redes de trata y tráfico ilícito de migrantes que operan en el Mediterráneo.

La “crisis de los refugiados” a su vez revela el creciente nexo entre el Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia (ELSJ) y la Política Común de Seguridad y Defensa (PCSD), así como la necesidad de establecer una coordinación reforzada entre la dimensión interna y externa de seguridad a nivel europeo. Esto es, se precisa de una PCSD capaz de hacer frente a las amenazas externas para garantizar la efectiva seguridad interna de la UE y un sistema de seguridad interno que promueva el desarrollo de políticas externas de seguridad. Si bien la PCSD fue en sus orígenes diseñada como una herramienta centrada en gestionar aquellas crisis que aconteciesen fuera del territorio de la UE, lo que excluía cualquier cuestión de seguridad interna, la seguridad está actualmente experimentando una significativa volatilidad e hibridación tal y como el terrorismo, la inestabilidad en los territorios vecinos de la UE, el tráfico ilícito de migrantes o la “crisis de los refugiados” ejemplifican. El carácter transfronterizo de estos desafíos acentúa la actual inseparabilidad entre la seguridad interna y externa y la necesidad de promover una mayor coherencia entre el ELSJ y la PCSD.

La “crisis de los refugiados” ha revelado que la garantización de la seguridad en las fronteras de la UE exige una mayor coordinación y coherencia de actuación entre todos los actores implicados. Estamos ante desafíos híbridos o esencialmente transfronterizos que no solo exigen el desarrollo de vínculos reforzados entre la dimensión interna y externa de seguridad, sino que también suponen un cambio en la concepción clásica de soberanía nacional pues la gestión efectiva de las fronteras y de los flujos migratorios exige la promoción de la solidaridad y una respuesta coordinada a nivel europeo. Así, el papel operativo de estas agencias se ha visto reforzado, presentan un mayor peso en la asistencia operativa a los Estados miembros, así como en su capacidad de actuación fuera del territorio de la UE y colaboración con misiones militares de la UE como EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA.

EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA es la primera misión militar naval de la UE centrada en el fenómeno migratorio. Si bien la operación ha sido criticada por su falta de transparencia, por no abordar las verdaderas causas del tráfico ilícito de migrantes y la trata y por la discutible consecución de sus ambiciosos objetivos, es previsible que nuevas operaciones militares de la PCSD se diseñen y desarrollen en el ámbito de la migración, la gestión de fronteras exteriores y el desmantelamiento de las redes de tráfico y la trata. Asimismo, si bien la cooperación entre las agencias del ELSJ y las misiones de la PCSD es aún incipiente, esta se desarrollará con mayor peso en el futuro bien mediante una mayor “militarización” de estas agencias descentralizadas de la UE, o bien mediante la difuminación de los tradicionales contornos entre la seguridad interna o externa ante desafíos que ya no pueden responderse desde una concepción clásica de soberanía nacional sino desde una cooperación reforzada ante retos transnacionales.

The post La operación naval EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA: El creciente vínculo entre la dimensión interna y externa de la seguridad en la UE appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This post first appeared at the Open Migration Project

 

The so-called “refugee crisis” prompted the urge to ensure the functioning of the Schengen area and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the need to operationally assist those Member States most affected by the sudden and extraordinary arrival of mixed migratory flows, and the convenience to effectively and uniformly implement the European Union (EU) measures adopted in regards to migration, asylum and border management matters. Among the foremost measures put forward at the EU level to cope with this implementation deficit was the creation of the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) and the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), the reinforcement of EUROPOL’s mandate, and the promotion of their operational inter-agency cooperation on the ground through the “hotspot approach”.

In 2016 EUROPOL’s mandate was strengthened, FRONTEX was transformed into the EBCG, and the European Commission put forward the creation of the EUAA. Although a partial agreement on the future EUAA has already been reached between the Council and the European Parliament, the Regulation repealing EASO has not yet been adopted. The new legal frameworks shift the reasoning of these agencies’ powers and move from a reactive to a proactive approach. That is, their operational tasks shall not only center on assisting the Member States and enhancing their coordination, but also preventing potential national vulnerabilities that may subsequently lead to an untenable scenario for the competent national authorities. Regulation 2016/794 vests a nascent operational role to EUROPOL by determining that the agency may facilitate the investigation’s information exchange, provide extensive analytical support, deploy its mobile offices, and exchange in real-time and immediately cross-check against EUROPOL’s databases the information gathered. In addition, on 22 February 2016, EUROPOL launched the European Migrant Smuggling Center (EMSC). This center aims to proactively support EU Member States in dismantling criminal networks involved in organized migrant smuggling.

The recently established EBCG and the future EUAA may require the competent national border and asylum authorities to effectively implement EU law and to take immediate action under emergency situations. The EBCG and the EUAA may even intervene in the territory of the Member States to ensure that the EU border management and asylum measures are applied, and that the Schengen area and the CEAS are not ultimately jeopardized. In particular, Regulation 2016/1624 delegates the EBCG greater technical and operational competences. The EBCG may acquire its own technical equipment and have a Rapid Reaction Pool of at least 1,500 border guards to be deployed immediately in joint operations or rapid border interventions. Significantly, the EBCG is also empowered to monitor the effective functioning of the external borders of the Member States, carry out vulnerability assessments, verify whether a Member State is able to effectively enforce EU law and detect deficiencies in the management of its borders.

The future EUAA will be in charge of organizing and coordinating the appropriate operational support in cases where the national asylum and reception systems are subject to exceptional pressure. An asylum reserve pool of a minimum of 500 persons should be made available by the Member States for their immediate deployment and should assist those national authorities subject to extraordinary migratory pressure. Another significant novelty in comparison to the EASO will be the involvement of the future EUAA in the examination of international protection applications. This means that, while decisions on individual applications for asylum remain the Member States’ sole responsibility, the future EUAA, upon the request of a Member State, will be able to draft decisions on asylum applications.

Moreover, as a result of the “refugee crisis” of unprecedented dimensions, the European Commission adopted on 13 May 2015 the European Agenda on Migration. The Agenda aimed to design a common strategy in which the Member States, the EU institutions, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) agencies, international organizations, civil society, local authorities and third countries are all involved in a coordinated manner. Among all these actors, FRONTEX, EASO and EUROPOL were mandated to play a key inter-agency operational role at the hotspots.

In the hotspots, EUROPOL’s guest officers are in charge of identifying risk profiles, performing second-line security checks, and providing analytical and investigation support to dismantle smuggling and trafficking in human beings networks. EUROPOL’s officials, jointly with the EBCG and the concerned Member State, also debrief the arrived migrants at the hotspots. EASO assists the national asylum authorities by informing the arriving migrants, as well as identifying, registering and relocating applicants for international protection. The experts and technical equipment deployed by the EBCG in the hotspots facilitate national sea border surveillance and search and rescue operations. The EBCG also assists the national authorities in disembarking, screening, registering, identifying, fingerprinting, debriefing and assessing the nationality of the arriving migrants, as well as facilitating and coordinating the return operations of those migrants with no right to remain in the EU. Despite the secrecy surrounding the specific functions and the extent of the hands-on support that FRONTEX, EASO, and EUROPOL develop de facto in the hotspots, these agencies notably strain their vague legal mandates, and their operational tasks go well beyond the pure technical assistance and promotion of coordination.

Firstly, article 5 Regulation 2016/1624 on the EBCG states that Member States “retain primary responsibility for the management of their sections of the external borders” and that “the Agency shall support the application of Union measures relating to the management of the external borders by reinforcing, assessing and coordinating the actions of Member States in the implementation of those measures and in return”. However, FRONTEX, in practice, aids in determining the nationality of the disembarked or rescued migrants, and exerts a crucial influence over the Greek officials, who, due to the extraordinary migratory pressure they are subject to, may in practice base their final decision entirely on FRONTEX’ assessment. FRONTEX’ strong recommendatory powers may have a very significant effect on a potential incorrect registration regarding the nationality of an irregular migrant, since a nationality screening largely determines and directly impacts the subsequent procedures of relocation, asylum, and return of the irregular migrants in the hotspots.

Secondly, according to article 4(1)(c) Regulation 2016/794 on EUROPOL, the agency shall “coordinate, organize and implement investigative and operational actions to support and strengthen actions by the competent authorities of the Member States”. Whereas EUROPOL’s primary mission shall center on exchanging information and generating criminal intelligence, under the hotspot approach the agency also deploys guest officers on the ground, conducts second-line security checks, participates in debriefing the arriving migrants, and through the EMSC, operationally supports the competent national enforcement authorities in their investigations. Despite EUROPOL’s operational role, in the recently adopted Regulation of EUROPOL there is not a single mention of this agency’s operational powers in the hotspots. Hence, the total secrecy surrounding the operational support of EUROPOL in the hotspots and the lack of any legal reference to the activities of the agency on the ground prevent the general public from assessing the actual implications, meaning, and extent of EUROPOL’s operational support.

Lastly, Regulation 439/2010 of EASO indicates that the agency “should have no direct or indirect powers in relation to the taking of decisions by Member States’ asylum authorities on individual applications for international protection” (recital 14). Nonetheless, EASO primarily focuses on informing the irregular migrants of asylum and relocation procedures and facilitating the analysis of asylum applications to the national authorities in the Italian hotspots. However, since the adoption of the EU-Turkey statement and the Greek Law 4375/2016, the agency is also in charge of registering and conducting the interviews of the applicants for international protection in the Greek hotspots.

In addition, while EASO is conducting asylum interviews, it also identifies vulnerable cases and forwards them to the Greek asylum office, which ultimately confirms the existence of such vulnerability. EASO’s assessment of vulnerability is not trivial, but rather carries significant consequences for the applicant of international protection. If a deployed expert of EASO, who is undertaking an asylum interview, does not identify or wrongly classifies an applicant as non-vulnerable, the case will follow the fast-track border procedure, which provides fewer guarantees.In other words, until the future Regulation on the EUAA enters into force, the agency’s power to autonomously conduct the asylum interviews and draft an admissibility recommendation to the Greek Asylum Service will openly exceed the initial mandate of Regulation 439/2010, establishing EASO. The experts deployed by EASO in the Greek hotspots are operating in a legal limbo, in which it is unclear as to the extent of their specific operational responsibility and as to whether the procedural safeguards of the Greek legislation apply to them when examining the admissibility of asylum applications.

Therefore, while the Regulations of these AFSJ agencies continue to stress that their operational role is limited to providing the competent national authorities with the technical assistance they may require, the tasks of the EBCG, EASO, and to a more limited extent, EUROPOL, have a clear operational nature on the ground. These agencies gradually steer and shape the effective and uniform implementation of EU migration, asylum, and border management laws and policies at the national and local level. The reinforcement of the operational tasks and implementation role of the EBCG, EASO, and EUROPOL is not in itself an issue. What is problematic, however, is the broad formulation of these AFSJ agencies’ legal bases and the lack of transparency surrounding their operational activities and cooperation, rendering the task of determining the degree of discretion that they enjoy difficult. It thus remains to be seen to what extent EUROPOL, the EBCG and the future EUAA will openly interpret their supervisory and intervention capacity, and whether the EU rules and policies on border management and asylum will ultimately be more effectively and uniformly implemented.

The post Frontex, Easo and Europol: From a Secondary to a Pivotal Operational Role in the Aftermath of the “Refugee Crisis” appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On Tuesday 9 April, Brussels will host the 21st EU-China summit. This time around, the underlying tone of the meetings may be slightly different than before, following the recent “Strategic Vision” submitted by the Commission to the Council.

In its relations with the People’s Republic of China the EU is said to be unable to speak with one voice. It’s true that the recent decision of the Italian government to officially join the Belt and Road Initiative, or the eagerness with which several Central and Eastern European member-states have embraced China’s offer in an association known as the ‘16+1’, do not exactly point in the direction of a joint European position.

This makes the ‘strategic vision’ published by the Commission on 12 March all the more interesting. The document has been widely commented upon, which is no surprise, given that it clearly takes no precautions to avoid hurting Chinese sensitivities. Identifying the PRC as a ‘systemic rival’ and openly reminding the extent to which its commitment to multilateralism is very ‘selective’ comes close to a ‘Copernican Revolution’ in attitude and tone, as François Godemont put it in a recent post.

The rather dense document of eleven pages seems to spell the end of a certain European naïveté in its dealings with a major power that is simultaneously referred to as ‘cooperation partner’ and ‘economic competitor’. It lists a whole series of usual demands, for more reciprocity and fair-play, which at last should ‘demonstrate China’s commitment to a mutually beneficial economic relationship’. A sentence that certainly sounds almost aggressive to Chinese ears.

Where does this spectacular turnaround come from? Tracing back the origin of some wordings in the Commission’s paper, we are tempted to link this change of strategy to a change of awareness and, consequently, doctrine in Germany.

To put it bluntly, Germany is scared.

Scared to lose its position as major global industrial player, to be overtaken in tomorrow’s most important economic sectors, and to lose its prosperity on the way.

A policy paper published in January by the German Industrial Federation (BDI), bears the very term ‘systemic competitor’ already in its title. Asking ‘How Do We Deal with China’s State-Controlled Economy?’, the entire 23-page document is a call to Europe, punctuated by a list of 54 demands and propositions, to formulate a genuine European industrial policy in face of a ‘partner’ that is increasingly depicted as an ‘adversary’.

As early as February, this policy paper was followed by the publication of ‘Strategic guidelines for a German and European industrial policy’ for 2030 by the Federal Ministry of Economics headed by Peter Altmaier. This text, too, is very explicit about the efficiency of the PRC’s ‘Made in China 2025’ agenda and the threat it poses to ‘the industrial and technological sovereignty of our economy’. And it breaks with the traditional liberal doctrine by calling for massive public interventions in protecting German and European economic interests against China’s state capitalism. It also makes it clear that ‘German industrial policy must always be European industrial policy’, and that ‘the European Union needs a Council of Industrial Ministers’ in the near future.

All this is rather new and might be interpreted as a “Mitterrand U-turn Moment”, though in reversal, and coming from Berlin. Nonetheless, it is perfectly in line with what leading voices in Germany have been requesting for some years now, especially after the purchase of the robotics firm Kuka by the Chinese company Midea in 2016. Economic leaders like Jörg Wuttke, for instance, the former president of the European Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, have repeatedly asked for a change in attitude among German policy-makers (see here or here). The same can be said about a new generation of researchers on contemporary China, who, according to a recent article by the GPPI’s Thorsten Benner, cast an increasingly critical and disillusioned eye on Xi Jinping’s neo-Maoist China rather than apply old perspectives of exotism and exceptionalism.

It is possible that Germany has been cradled until a few years ago in the certainty of systemic superiority, like in the good old times of the Cold War when « Wandel durch Annäherung » – change through rapprochement – was based on the firm conviction that its Social Market Economy, anchored in a liberal, pluralistic democracy, would simply win in the long run.

Not any more.

There seems to be a growing awareness in Germany today that what worked with its small Eastern German neighbours, will not be successful with the huge Chinese steamroller. Quite the contrary: it seems to be dawning on German policy-makers that in this new systemic competition, China might be the winner, by its sheer force and the ruthlessness of its governance. As Peter Altmaier has it in the above-mentioned paper: “this would have dramatic consequences for our way of life”.

Visibly inspired by a change of mind in Berlin, the new ‘strategic vision’ from Brussels suggests that, more than ever, the German political class, across the ‘Grand Coalition’, sees the European Union as an indispensable multiplier of its own power resources on the global stage. In a world of increased great power competition and big data, scale is again paramount. Germany cannot make it alone, it needs the full weight of Europe behind.

It also shows that in the quest for a ‘Europe that protects’, especially against external threats to its free-market model, the Merkel government is more aligned with Emmanuel Macron’s vision than it used to be (the words ‘protect’ or ‘protection’ appear thirteen times in the French president’s recent letter to all European citizens).

In this perspective, the unprecedented staging of Xi Jinping’s recent state visit to Paris, to which Angela Merkel and Jean-Claude Juncker were invited, definitely makes sense. And so does the new Treaty of Aachen (officially ‘Treaty on Franco-German Cooperation and Integration’) signed in January, and which may well turn out to be a new joint leadership impetus rather than a ‘weak’ and ‘exclusive’ symbol as some commentators wanted to have it).

It remains more than doubtful whether Germany and France will be able to get a significant majority of other member-states on board in their new China strategy. But while the UK is absorbed in its self-mutilation and the Italian government overbids itself in provocations for reasons of internal power struggles, the Franco-German tandem at least offers a tentative road map.

Having said that, Franco-German impetus is indispensable, but certainly not sufficient. If a European industrial policy is to work, it needs to be inclusive. The centres of decision making of the future European champions and innovation hubs cannot only be concentrated in Paris, Berlin, Stuttgart and Munich. The European “G2” needs to work with other key partners in the north and the south, starting with The Netherlands and Spain, and make sure it remains open to other countries who want to join in this more strategic endeavour. If it fails to be convincing, many will be tempted to abandon the EU core and drift towards Beijing and/or Washington.

Albrecht Sonntag is Professor at ESSCA School of Management
and Miguel Otero-Iglesias is Senior Analyst at Elcano Royal Institute

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All the past British Prime Ministers since 1957 wanted Britain to be a member of the European Community. Could they all have been wrong?

In the past 62 years, there’s only one Prime Minister who wants us to turn our back on Europe – the current incumbent, Theresa May.

(However, before she became Prime Minister, she told the nation that it was in Britain’s best interests to remain in the EU.)

Britain is now throwing away the combined wisdom of ten consecutive past Prime Ministers, all of whom wanted Britain to be in the European Community.

• PRIME MINISTER HAROLD MACMILLAN – CONSERVATIVE, 1957 to 1963

In 1961, Harold Macmillan applied for Britain to join the European Economic Community, just four years after it was formed with the signing of the Treaty of Rome by six other European countries.

Mr Macmillan explained to the nation:

“By negotiating for British membership of the European Economic Community and its Common Market, the present Conservative Government has taken what is perhaps the most fateful and forward looking policy decision in our peacetime history.

“We did not do so lightly. It was only after a searching study of all the facts that we came to accept this as the right and proper course.”

He added:

“By joining this vigorous and expanding community and becoming one of its leading members, as I am convinced we would, this country would not only gain a new stature in Europe, but also increase its standing and influence in the councils of the world.”

• PRIME MINISTER SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME – CONSERVATIVE, 1963 to 1964

Mr Macmillan’s successor, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was briefly prime minister for one year from 1964. He supported Britain’s application to join the European Community. Sir Alec said:

“I have never made it a secret that I cannot see an alternative which would offer as good a prospect for this country as joining the EEC [European Community].”

As Foreign Secretary in Edward Heath’s government, Sir Alec said:

“I, too, have concluded through the years that membership of the Community would be advantageous to Britain.

“I almost add ‘necessary for Britain’, because I am acutely conscious that there are two questions which have to be asked : not only whether we should go in, but what is the prospect for Britain if we stay out.

“Those two questions have to be asked because, whether we are in or out, the Community goes on.”

• PRIME MINISTER EDWARD HEATH – CONSERVATIVE, 1970 to 1974

It was Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, who joined Britain to the European Community following the backing of Parliament after 300 hours of debate.

On the evening of 28 October 1971, Mr Heath addressed the House of Commons during the momentous debate on Britain joining the European Community. He said:

“Surely we must consider the consequences of staying out. We cannot delude ourselves that an early chance would be given us to take the decision again.

“We should be denying ourselves and succeeding generations the opportunities which are available to us in so many spheres; opportunities which we ourselves in this country have to seize”

Mr Heath added:

“..tonight when this House endorses this Motion many millions of people right across the world will rejoice that we have taken our rightful place in a truly United Europe.”

Parliament did endorse the Motion, and Britain subsequently joined the European Economic Community on 1 January 1973.

Mr Heath explained to the nation just before we joined:

“The community which we are joining is far more than a common market. It is a community in the true sense of that term.

“It is concerned not only with the establishment of free trade, economic and monetary union and other major economic issues, important though these are — but also as the Paris Summit Meeting has demonstrated, with social issues which affect us all — environmental questions, working conditions in industry, consumer protection, aid to development areas and vocational training.”

• PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON – LABOUR, 1964 to 1970 and 1974 to 1976

In 1975, just two years after Britain joined the European Community (also then called ‘the Common Market’), Prime Minister Harold Wilson offered the nation a referendum on whether to remain a member.

In that referendum, Mr Wilson endorsed the ‘Yes’ vote which won by a landslide – by 67% to 33%.

Before the referendum, Mr Wilson told the House of Commons on 7 April 1975:

“My judgment, on an assessment of all that has been achieved and all that has changed, is that to remain in the Community is best for Britain, for Europe, for the Commonwealth, for the Third World and the wider world.”

During the referendum campaign, he said that he was recommending continued membership in “strong terms”.

He said that it would be “easier and more helpful” to solve Britain’s economic problems “if we are in the Market than if we were to be out of the Market.”

In recommending continued membership, Mr Wilson’s government sent a pamphlet to every household explaining the primary aims of the Common Market:

• To bring together the peoples of Europe.

• To raise living standards and improve working conditions.

• To promote growth and boost world trade.

• To help the poorest regions of Europe and the rest of the world.

• To help maintain peace and freedom.

• PRIME MINISTER JAMES CALLAGHAN – LABOUR, 1976 to 1979

As Foreign Secretary during the first referendum on Europe in 1975, James Callaghan supported the ‘Yes’ vote for Britain’s continued membership of the European Community, having led the negotiations for Britain’s new terms of membership.

He said, “Britain is in, we should stay in” and he also said, “The Government asks you to vote ‘Yes’, clearly and unmistakeably.”

Although critical of the European Community’s “nonsense” agricultural policy, Mr Callaghan as Prime Minister supported continued membership. For his party’s 1979 manifesto he wrote:

“We are ready and willing to work with our European partners in closer unity.”

The manifesto called for Greece, Portugal, and Spain to “receive an early welcome into the Community” and for reforms to the European Community’s Common Agricultural Policy.

• PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER – CONSERVATIVE, 1979 to 1990

During the referendum campaign of 1975, the Conservative leader, Margaret Thatcher, strongly campaigned for Britain to remain a member of the European Community.

In a keynote speech at the time she said:

“It is not surprising that I, as Leader of the Conservative Party, should wish to give my wholehearted support to this campaign, for the Conservative Party has been pursuing the European vision almost as long as we have existed as a Party.”

During her tenure as Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher is credited with pushing for, and making possible, the Single Market of Europe.

In September 1988 Mrs Thatcher gave a major speech about the future of Europe. She said:

“Britain does not dream of some cosy, isolated existence on the fringes of the European Community. Our destiny is in Europe, as part of the Community.”

She added:

“Let Europe be a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating each other more, doing more together but relishing our national identity no less than our common European endeavour.”

Crucially she said in support of the Single Market:

“By getting rid of barriers, by making it possible for companies to operate on a European scale, we can best compete with the United States, Japan and other new economic powers emerging in Asia and elsewhere.”

• PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR – CONSERVATIVE, 1990 to 1997

It was Conservative Prime Minister, John Major, who negotiated and won Parliament’s backing to sign the Maastricht Treaty, that among other benefits gave us EU Citizenship rights allowing us to reside, work, study or retire across a huge expanse of our continent.

At the Tory Party Conference of 1992, just six months after John Major won a surprise victory in the General Election, he said to the party faithful:

“I speak as one who believes Britain’s future lies with Europe.”

And Mr Major warned about Britain walking away from Europe:

“We would be breaking Britain’s future influence in Europe. We would be ending for ever our hopes of building the kind of Europe that we want.

“And we would be doing that, just when across Europe the argument is coming our way. We would be leaving European policy to the French and the Germans.

“That is not a policy for Great Britain. It would be an historic mistake. And not one your Government is going to make.”

He added,

“Let us not forget why we joined the Community. It has given us jobs. New markets. New horizons. Nearly 60 per cent of our trade is now with our partners. It is the single most important factor in attracting a tide of Japanese and American investment to our shores, providing jobs for our people..

“But the most far-reaching, the most profound reason for working together in Europe I leave till last. It is peace. The peace and stability of a continent, ravaged by total war twice in this century.”

• PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR – LABOUR, 1997 to 2007

Tony Blair, Labour’s longest-serving Prime Minister and, so far, the longest-serving Prime Minister of this century, was and still is a natural pro-European.

Mr Blair was recently described by Andrew Adonis, his former policy chief, as:

“The most instinctively pro-European prime minister since Edward Heath.”

In his memoirs, Mr Blair wrote:

“I regarded anti-European feeling as hopelessly, absurdly out of date and unrealistic.”

Mr Blair’s first manifesto, just before coming to power in 1997, promised that:

‘We will give Britain the leadership in Europe which Britain and Europe need.’

In a keynote speech to the European Parliament in 2005, Mr Blair said:

“I am a passionate pro-European. I always have been. My first vote was in 1975 in the British referendum on membership and I voted yes.”

He added that the European Union is:

“a union of values, of solidarity between nations and people, of not just a common market in which we trade but a common political space in which we live as citizens. It always will be.”

He continued:

“I believe in Europe as a political project. I believe in Europe with a strong and caring social dimension. I would never accept a Europe that was simply an economic market.”

Mr Blair concluded:

“The broad sweep of history is on the side of the EU. Countries round the world are coming together because in collective cooperation they increase individual strength.”

• PRIME MINISTER GORDON BROWN – LABOUR, 2007 to 2010

Gordon Brown was the first Prime Minister from a Scottish constituency since the Conservative’s Sir Alec Douglas-Home in 1964. He came into power just as the world was going into economic meltdown.

But he saw the European Union as being uniquely placed to “lead the world through global crisis.”

In a speech to the European Parliament in 2009, Mr Brown said:

“Today we enjoy a Europe of peace and unity which will truly rank among the finest of human achievements and which is today a beacon of hope for the whole world.”

He was proud to say that Britain today was a country “not in Europe’s slipstream but firmly in its mainstream”.

Europe was uniquely placed to lead the world in meeting the challenges of globalisation precisely because it had achieved:

• “the greatest and biggest single market in the world”,

• “the most comprehensive framework of environmental protection”,

• “the world’s biggest programme of aid” and

• “the most comprehensive social protection anywhere in the world”.

• PRIME MINISTER DAVID CAMERON – CONSERVATIVE, 2010 TO 2016

David Cameron was the only leader of a main political party to call for a second referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Community.

During the subsequent 2016 referendum campaign, he urged the country to vote to ‘Remain’ in the EU, which was his government’s official position.

In a keynote speech just days before the vote, Mr Cameron told the country:

“I feel so strongly that Britain should remain in Europe. Above all, it’s about our economy. It will be stronger if we stay. It will be weaker if we leave.”

He added:

“Britain is better off inside the EU than out on our own. At the heart of that is the Single Market – 500 million customers on our doorstep…a source of so many jobs, so much trade, and such a wealth of opportunity for our young people.

“Leaving the EU would put all of that at risk.

“Expert after expert – independent advisers, people whose job it is to warn Prime Ministers – have said it would shrink our economy.”

He concluded:

“I believe, very deeply, from my years of experience, that we’ll be stronger, we’ll be safer, we’ll be better off inside Europe. To put it as clearly as I can: our economic security is paramount.

“It is stronger if we stay. If we leave, we put it at risk.”

 ALL OF THESE 10 PRIME MINISTERS had good points and bad points, and policies that not everyone agreed with.

But during their premierships, they all without exception unanimously supported our membership of the European Community as being in Britain’s best interests.

Could they all have been wrong? Please think about it.

Just one Prime Minister (Theresa May), out of Britain’s eleven Prime Ministers of the past 62 years, wants us out of Europe, when all the other Prime Ministers wanted us in. * Before Harold Macmillan, Sir Anthony Eden was Conservative Prime Minister from 1955 until he resigned on 9 January 1957. He was a Eurosceptic who made the momentous decision for the UK not to be a founder member of the European Economic Community, when six other European countries signed the Treaty of Rome, just two months after Sir Anthony left office. * Before Sir Anthony Eden, Sir Winston Churchill was the Conservative Prime Minister from 1951 to 1955. In the immediate post-war years, he strongly promoted ‘a union of Europe as a whole’ and a ‘United States of Europe’ but he did not envisage at that time Britain joining such a union. There is compelling evidence, however, that Churchill – who is recognised as one of the 11 founders of the European Union – changed his mind in the late 1950s. Please see my separate report ‘Winston Churchill: A founder of the European Union’

• My campaign, Reasons2Remain, is three years old. 2-minute video:

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

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xitIn a moment when so much is changing so fast, it’s hard to know where to begin in trying to make sense of it all. From the upheaval of Parliamentary procedure to the sudden reaching-across-the-aisle by Theresa May, even that which was unthinkable seems to be both thinkable and actually happening.

With that in mind, perhaps the more useful approach is to consider some of the underlying dynamics at work here.

In particular, the moves towards finding a decision in the UK represents a partial confronting of the ambiguities that have existed in and around Brexit from the very beginning.

During the referendum, both sides built up very broad coalitions of activists and supporters. Because of the nature of such a vote, where every single vote counts equally and where there is necessarily going to be one winner, there was a very strong incentive to say whatever it took to secure those votes.

To be more precise, the incentive was to communicate different messages to different voter groups, to secure their support. You’re concerned about immigration? Then voting for us will address that. You’re losing sleep over what they’re doing to our Great British bananas? Sign up here.

There is no judgement about the validity of the different concerns, because what matters at that stage is the vote itself.

And the reason for that is that it is the result of the referendum that matters to political operators: they take it and use it to further their assorted projects and programmes. You’ll recall that the second half of 2016 was a time of many different people telling you “what the referendum really meant was…”.

That sets up the present blockage.

Everyone was able to feel that the referendum was fought on the terms they were interested in, because at the time they could find activists who would be willing to talk in such terms, but now most people discover that the terms are now being set by others.

To take the most obvious example, few people (especially outside Northern Ireland) made their choice in 2016 on the basis of the potential disruption to the Good Friday Agreement and the implications it might have for the territorial integrity of the UK. But now the backstop is front-and-centre in the debate. Likewise, hardly anyone bothered themselves with how customs unions work and what implications they might have, but apparently this is now a resigning matter.

One of the most crucial insights that we can have into politics is that what we talk about matters at least as much as how we talk about it. If you control the agenda, then you have already won half the argument, because you have chosen the points of reference and the language we use.

All of which is to say that this current phase of the British debate was always going to occur. At some point, someone’s conceptualisation of “what Brexit means” had to come to dominate, at which point the disillusion would set in much harder among those whose conceptualisations didn’t succeed.

The problem has been that the collapse of the ambiguity has come very late and with great difficulty.

Parliament still contains many different visions of Brexit, with their proponents all convinced that they can win the day: when everyone around you looks weak and damaged, where is the incentive to compromise or to give ground?

All of this is reflected in the numerous votes of the past weeks: even the process for reaching a decision is confused and uncertain, long before actually winning out in those processes.

I won’t even try to guess what might be the outcome of it all, but I would be happy to suggest already now that whatever decision is reached, the further collapse of the multiplicity of interpretations and framings of Brexit will drive more discontent in the short-term. Whether those who succeed in securing their vision are able to build longer-term buy-in to that, and so create an increased likelihood that it will endure, remains very much to be seen.

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La creación de una Guardia Europea de Fronteras y Costas (GEFC) y la propuesta de transformar la Oficina Europea de Apoyo al Asilo (Easo) en una Agencia Europea de Asilo (AEA) en 2016 responde a la necesidad de garantizar la implementación de las medidas adoptadas por la Unión Europea (UE) en el Espacio de Libertad Seguridad y Justicia (ELSJ). Tras la “crisis de los refugiados” tanto la GEFC como la AEA están llamadas a asistir sobre el terreno a aquellas autoridades nacionales sujetas a presiones extraordinarias en sus sistemas de registro, recepción y asilo, así como a garantizar respectivamente el espacio Schengen y el Sistema Europeo Común de Asilo. Si bien los nuevos nombres con los que se ha bautizado a las anteriormente conocidas como Frontex y Easo parece sugerir que la UE cuenta ya con un verdadero Cuerpo Europeo de Guardias de Fronteras y Asilo, debe señalarse que los nuevos reglamentos de estas agencias se limitan a reforzar las tareas operativas que les fueron inicialmente delegadas.

Ahora bien, la constante expansión de los poderes operativos de la GEFC y la AEA pone de manifiesto una tendencia en el ELSJ por la que la ejecución de las medidas adoptadas por la UE deja de ser una competencia exclusiva de los Estados miembros para gradualmente devenir en una competencia compartida. El desarrollo de funciones de implementación por parte de la GEFC y la AEA plantea un importante desafío: el impacto directo de las tareas operativas de estas agencias europeas en los derechos fundamentales de los nacionales de terceros países a los que asisten. Así, los reglamentos de la GEFC y la AEA incluyen un mecanismo administrativo de denuncia que faculta a los individuos a plantear una queja ante la propia agencia si consideran que alguna de sus actividades ha conculcado sus derechos fundamentales. Este mecanismo está llamado a fomentar una responsabilidad más integral de la GEFC y la AEA pues cualquier persona afectada por las acciones del personal que participa en una operación y que considere que debido a estas actividades se han vulnerado sus derechos fundamentales, así como cualquier parte que represente a dicha persona puede presentar una queja contra las agencias.

El novedoso mecanismo de quejas de la GEFC y la AEA se basa en los arts. 41 y 47 de la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la UE. El art. 41.3 declara que todo particular ha de ver reparados los daños que la UE, instituciones o agentes le hayan ocasionado en el ejercicio de sus funciones. El art. 47 establece que toda persona tiene derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva. Asimismo, los arts. 263 y 340 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la UE habilitan a los particulares a presentar un recurso ante el Tribunal de Justicia de la UE (TJUE) solicitando la anulación de un concreto acto de una agencia europea destinado a producir efectos jurídicos frente a terceros, así como que la UE repare cualquier daño que les haya sido infligido. Sin embargo, la creciente cooperación entre la GEFC y la AEA en los recientemente establecidos hotspots, la falta de transparencia de las operaciones que desarrollan, el complicado entramado multinivel de responsabilidad derivado de los numerosos actores implicados en las fronteras exteriores o la obligación de los nacionales de terceros países de probar ante el TJUE que las actividades de la GEFC y la AEA les afectan directamente dificulta, cuando no impide, su derecho fundamental a una buena administración y a un recurso judicial efectivo.

En concreto, la principal limitación del mecanismo de denuncia de la GEFC y la AEA es su falta de independencia e imparcialidad, así como su carácter puramente administrativo. Toda queja admitida a trámite por el oficial de derechos fundamentales de la GEFC y la AEA ha de dirimirse internamente, bien por el director de la agencia o bien por el Estado miembro implicado, en función de si la denuncia se refiere a un miembro del personal de la agencia o a uno de los oficiales nacionales desplegados. No obstante, ni el director de estas agencias (nombrado por el Consejo de Administración de la agencia y compuesto mayoritariamente por representantes nacionales), ni por supuesto los Estados miembros que se encargan de garantizar un seguimiento adecuado de la denuncia y adoptar las medidas disciplinarias o acciones que consideren pertinentes para resarcir a la víctima son independientes a las agencias.

Asimismo, si la queja presentada es considerada inadmisible, si las medidas adoptadas por la GEFC y la AEA para resarcir la violación alegada se estiman por el denunciante como insuficientes o si las medidas no se ponen efectivamente en práctica porla agencia, el mecanismo de denuncia no prevé ningún recurso administrativo o judicial adicional. La inadmisión de una queja por el agente de derechos fundamentales, la disconformidad del denunciante con el examen de su queja y/o las medidas adoptadas al respecto por la GEFC y la AEA deberían calificarse, a nuestro parecer, como actos que producen efectos jurídicos frente a terceros y así poder ser objeto de control por el TJUE.

En definitiva, las reforzadas tareas operativas conferidas a laGEFC y a la AEA comportan una creciente responsabilidad de las agencias y un mayor impacto de estas en los derechos fundamentales de los nacionales de terceros países. Si bien las tareas delegadas a los agentes de derechos fundamentales deberían haberse expandido al menos en igual medida que las tareas operativas conferidas a la GEFC y la AEA, sus agentes no están facultados para indemnizar y compensar directamente a los denunciantes por daños, ni pueden terminar, suspender o retirar el apoyo financiero a una operación de las agencias en la que haya quedado probado que los derechos fundamentales de los nacionales de terceros países han sido vulnerados. El agente de derechos fundamentales no está facultado para emitir decisiones vinculantes o investigar de manera independiente e imparcial quejas relativas a violaciones de derechos fundamentales.

Por ello, estimamos que la eficacia e imparcialidad del mecanismo de denuncia diseñado por los reglamentos de la GEFC y la AEA se vería claramente reforzado si sus agentes de derechos fundamentales fueran las autoridades competentes para llevar a cabo la investigación de las quejas y para hacer cumplir las medidas adoptadas en su totalidad. Esto es, el actual mandato de los agentes debería ser reformado con el fin de permitirles aplicar mejoras operativas internas, ejecutar las medidas adoptadas por la GEFC y la AEA o los Estados Miembros respecto a una denuncia admitida a trámite e imponer, si fuera preciso, sanciones contra las propias agencias.

 

Este post apareció en primer lugar en el Blog del Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos en el marco del proyecto: “Mi Propuesta para una Europa mejor”

 

The post Mi Propuesta: “Un mecanismo de quejas efectivo para Frontex y Easo” appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Climate politics are increasingly looking at decarbonizing the transport sector. Part of the debate focuses on increased pollution from civil aviation, where Ryanair is in the top 10 of EU emitters. Part of the debate focuses on flying less, i.e. twitter #flyingless, and staying on the ground, i.e. rail travel. More recently, the Danish Socialist People’s Party has proposed to increase cross-border rail travel thereby taking the debate into mainstream climate politics. Thus, there is an increased focus on the railways to deliver cross-border services.

Why is cross-border train travel so difficult? The short answer, railways are inherently national whereas aviation and maritime are international in nature. The European Commission has promoted the European railways, for almost 30 years, through market opening and Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T). Simultaneously, the EU has liberalized air travel and road haulage. Whilst air travel have become cheaper and more competitive, the railways continue to be mainly state-owned railway companies financed by national governments.

The EU railway governance structure and market opening attempt to create transparent administrative procedures at national level that enable cross-border rail travel and  domestic market opening. However, some member states and incumbent railways have not supported market opening, which are reflected in EU decision-making (for detailed discussion see my book).

Some of the obstacles to more cross-border rail travel mentioned in the flying less debate are; lack of one-stop shop ticketing, expensive fares, lack of night trains and lack of investment in high-speed trains

The Commission has talked about a one-stop shop, including ticketing, since I was a PhD student doing interviews a decade ago. Some rail operators have started to work together to provide online ticketing e.g. https://www.raileurope-world.com/, just as you can book international journey on individual operators’ websites, e.g. bahn.de. The man in seat 61 website tells you how to get around Europe by rail and how to get the best deals. However, these tentative steps cannot compete with the traditional travel websites. Instead, there is a need for collaboration between rail operators and traditional travel website to make international rail travel more accessible.

Rail fares are expensive and the idea of breaking up journeys to save money is new to many who are used to booking flights. Governments can use taxes and charges to faciliate modal shift from air to rail, e.g. many climate movements have suggested a carbon tax on flying. Another option is to create an EU fund or use regional funds or TEN-T funds to facilitate start-up operations of cross-border rail traffic, such rail service promotes mobility and cultural exchange, which are central to the EU principles, crucially the programme would have to comply with state aid rules. Nevertheless, member states would have to agree on funding in the new multi-annual budget.

The lack of night trains in some parts of Europe is problematic. The geographical periphery like the Baltic countries and the Nordic countries would benefit from cross-border night trains to the geographical centre. By comparison, ÖBB, the Austrian railway company, is successful in operating cross-border night trains to neighbouring countries. Moreover, night trains can be expensive, and more demand for night trains necessitate change in consumer behaviour, so consumers see night trains as part of the holiday and an extra hotel stay.

The TEN-T investment in cross-border high-speed rail infrastructure is behind schedule because large-scale cross-border infrastructure projects are difficult, e.g. the Eurotunnel and more recently the Fehmarn bridge. It takes time for big national infrastructure projects to find the right window of opportunities, and international projects require different national agendas to merge into one window of opportunity. Thus, there is no real prospect that all the planned priority TEN-T rail projects will be built in the near future.

Overall, successful cross-border rail traffic requires strong bottom-up mobilisation to push for change at national level and EU level. More importantly, it requires grass-root pressure on the railway industry and traditional travel agencies to deliver competitive rail travel solutions. Until then, “EU railway market … is not a high-speed train, which is quickly reaching its destination – A Single European Railway Area – instead it is a slow regional train, stopping at all stations” (Dyrhauge 2013: 160).

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Over a million people marched in London yesterday demanding a new People’s Vote on Brexit. The tide has turned. There is now no doubt that Britain doesn’t want Brexit.

Today Remainers outnumber Leavers. There are no longer 17.4 million Leave supporters.

According to analysis of recent polling, there are now only around 14.8 million Leave supporters compared to around 16.5 million Remain supporters.

Remain has been in the lead in over 60 consecutive national opinion polls since the 2017 general election.

YouGov’s latest polling this month shows that if there is now a new referendum with a choice between remaining in the EU or leaving on the government’s Brexit terms, Remain would win by 61% to 39%.

[Excluding Don’t know, Would Not Vote and Refused AND weighted by likelihood to vote. See page 5]

If those who didn’t vote in the 2016 referendum decide to vote in a new referendum, Remain could gain an extra 4.7 million voters net, according to new research by YouGov.

A petition to revoke Article 50 and remain in the EU has now reached a record 4,899,767 signatures (as of writing – it’s going up at a rate of 545 signatures per minute).

Remember, the majority for Leave in the referendum was just 1.3 million. The margin for Remain in a new referendum could greatly exceed that.

If the government now goes ahead with Brexit, they will be going against the will of the people. Britain doesn’t want Brexit.

• Watch this 2-minute video explaining why there are no longer 17.4 million Leave supporters:

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Nine weeks away from the European Parliament elections, Brexit and the suspension of Fidesz from the European People’ Party has been worthwhile developments to pay attention to in the context of the EP elections campaigns.

The evening of the 20th of March and the following day have been critical moments for both the British and the Hungarian politics, but more so for the EU.

The British Prime Minister Theresa May waited until the very last minute of the 20th of March to send her letter of Brexit extension request to Donald Tusk, the European Council President.

Once the letter was sent, she made an appearance outside the Number 10. Luckily she had her voice back, viewers did not have to check their TV frequencies or radio signals to make sure what they were hearing was what May was saying.

While May heavily criticised the UK Members of the Parliament for the delay in the Brexit date, disregarding how the democratic process works in the House of Commons, she did not look like a leader in control, but she was more like a toddler having a tantrum because things did not go the way she envisaged.

May’s speech is very damaging for her authority in her own party, as well as in the British political establishment. Reverberations of the position May have adopted on that very night will be something to watch out in the coming days, but some MPs have already reported on the Twitter how the Brexit supporters have harassed them and blamed them for the delay.

In the light of these developments and their possible ramifications, the future of the Brexit is ever more ambiguous.

There is still a possibility that the UK participates in the EP elections, depending on how the Meaningful Vote (III) results next week, considering May’s treatment of the MPs and lack of change in her deal, it is very likely to be voted against.

Under these circumstances, then the UK will need to leave the EU on the 12th of April with no deal or have decided to a new plan by then. However by this date the UK will need to tell the EU what it plans to do next. Tusk said that the UK could ask another extension, if the UK agreed to stand in the EP elections in May.

Talking of the EP elections, suspension of Fidesz, the Hungarian Civic Alliance Party, from the European People’s Party has also been remarkable. Not least because we all thought the question was more about whether the EPP will decide to expel Fidesz.

I do not know what happened during that meeting and what conversations the EPP members had between them, but there is a huge difference between expulsion and suspension.

Fidesz will not have  a say on the business of the EPP, will not be allowed to nominate candidates for jobs in the grouping or attend party meetings—however it will be loosely connected to the EPP.

This means that the Fidesz will continue to run its election campaign as a suspended member of the EPP, having denied all their wrongdoings and blamed the media for producing fake news about their election material.

In a way Fidesz survived for another day and the EPP has given the impression to the outside world that the EPP does take actions against those who do breach it’s values—effectiveness of these actions is not for discussion, at least for now.

Drawing on the debate about the extension of the Brexit date and the suspension of Fidesz, I like to make two points about the current state of the EU and why these were critical moments for the EU.

The fact that the EU 27 stands united concerning the Brexit and can act together in the common interest of the EU shows that regardless of the speculations about how divided the EU is, there are more unifying the EU then dividing it. 

The second point is that the way the EPP is dealing Fidesz is exactly how the EU is handling the Member States which are in breach of the the Article 2 of the TEU. By which response I think not just the values of the EPP and of the EU, but the future of the EU have been put at a greater risk. 

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The first duty of all MPs is to put the safety of the country first.

Contrary to popular belief, MPs are not beholden to follow the opinions of their constituents.

• That means that MPs in constituencies that voted for Leave are not under any legal or constitutional duty to support Leave if they believe that is not in the best interests of Britain.
• Conversely, that also applies to MPs in constituencies that voted for Remain. That in itself does not mean those MPs must also support Remain, if they don’t believe it’s in Britain’s interests.

Also contrary to popular belief, MPs are not beholden to follow the result of the 2016 EU referendum.

That referendum was advisory only, not legally binding, and Parliamentarians were (and are) under no legal or constitutional obligation to ‘obey’ that referendum.

MPs are not the delegates of their constituents. They are representatives. MPs are free to act in whatever way they believe to be in the interests of the country.

Indeed, they have a solemn duty to do so. The country comes first. Their constituents and their party come second and third.

Before the referendum, Parliamentarians by a huge majority – around 70% – would have voted for the UK to remain in the EU, because they believed that was in the best interests of our country.

None of the facts have changed since then, except that a highly divisive referendum offered a different point of view, by the slimmest of margins, and by a minority of the electorate.

For complicated reasons, MPs felt bound to ‘respect’ the result of the advisory referendum, even though in the heads and hearts of most of them, they didn’t believe that Brexit was in Britain’s interests.

It’s now crunch time.

Britain is facing the worst constitutional crisis in generations. We are due to leave the EU within a few weeks, either with a deal that most MPs don’t support, or without any deal, that most MPs don’t want.

And the decision must be made next week.

Or MPs could push to give ‘the people’ a new democratic opportunity to reconsider Brexit, now we know so much more than we did in 2016. Or they could vote to revoke Article 50 and to bring an end to Brexit.

It’s time for all Parliamentarians to examine closely the onerous responsibility they must now confront.

Should they act in the narrow interests of their parties; in the fear of losing their seats if they upset their constituents, or in the overwhelming interests and safety of the UK?

There is no doubt about the first and foremost duty of MPs, overwhelmingly agreed by Parliamentary precedent and practice.

As published by our Parliament the role and duty of MPs is clearly stated by two leading authorities on the subject, the 18th Century Parliamentarian Edmund Burke, and Britain’s greatest 19th Century war leader, Winston Churchill.

In Edmund Burke’s Speech to the Electors of Bristol on 3 November 1774 he said:

“Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion …

“Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.

“You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament.”

And on 26 March 1955, a few days before he tendered to Her Majesty his resignation from the office of Prime Minster, Sir Winston Churchill spoke about the duties of a Member of Parliament:

He said:

“The first duty of a member of Parliament is to do what he thinks in his faithful and disinterested judgement is right and necessary for the honour and safety of Great Britain.

“His second duty is to his constituents, of whom he is the representative but not the delegate.

“Burke’s famous declaration on this subject is well known.

“It is only in the third place that his duty to party organization or programme takes rank.

“All these three loyalties should be observed, but there in no doubt of the order in which they stand under any healthy manifestation of democracy.”

We have heard that a number of MPs have received death threats by people who disagree with the way they are speaking and voting. That is reprehensible, and entirely unacceptable.

As the Speaker of the House of Commons, John Bercow made clear  yesterday:

“The sole duty of every Member of Parliament is to do what he or she thinks is right.”

Please support your MP to do what they believe is right for the country. That’s their first and foremost duty, regardless of your opinion, or mine.

• Watch these short (less than a minute) related videos:

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For younger readers, Millwall FC garnered much public interest in the 1980s for their forthright style of football and their supporters, whose chant of “nobody likes us, but we don’t care” resounded around stadiums (and punch-ups). Yes, things have moved on, but still the label has hung around.

Theresa May hasn’t yet got into any fist-fights, but she does seem to have adopted the F-Troop motto in these dying days of Article 50.

And they are dying days. With scarcely a week left, there is much talk of an extension, but the EU27 have been clear that re-negotiation of the Withdrawal Agreement remains off the table, so this is essentially about whether the UK signs up or shoves off.

May’s strategy of “my deal or no-deal” has led her inexorably to the current place and as last night’s televised statement showed, she has now reached a point of not even trying to sell the Agreement on its merits, but rather as the only way out of the impasse she has had a large part in creating.

Impressively, she appears to have turned some MPs that might have come round to supporting her in a Meaningful Vote 3 into much more vociferous opponents than before. The entire structure of her statement was that it was the Commons’ fault that delays had occurred and were to blame for it all: an odd strategy ahead of a vote early next week that would unlock the short Art.50 extension she had asked for just earlier that day.

And it’s not only the Commons that May doesn’t appear to be trying to charm. The EU too has been deeply unimpressed by her management of the extension request itself.

It has been clear for several weeks that an extension was necessary, and it’s always been clear that European Councils can’t make decisions there and then – especially if, as here, there’s been no prior discussion of positions – so to leave a request until 24 hours ahead of the meeting was always a recipe for further delay. Further complicate that by, a) not clearly asking for one particular length of extension, and b) more importantly, offering no justification for the extension other than a vague hope that “this time it’ll be different” on the Meaningful Vote, and it’s no surprise that the Commission and EU27 are spitting feathers.

This is all the odder for May’s approach hitherto of asking the EU to do her a favour in Art.50: this is such a slap in the face to them and makes granting an extension all the more difficult that one has to wonder what’s going on in Number 10.

As ever, I resist the “she’s stupid” explanation, because that neither helps us very much nor does it actually fit the evidence.

Instead, this all speaks to two general ideas.

The first is that May hasn’t got a Plan B. In keeping with the rest of her political career, she has set on a course and she will stick to that come hell or high water, unless and until she absolutely is forced to abandon it. And remember, that was an approach that didn’t always work, but did work enough to get her into Number 10, so the chances of her changing that model now are minimal.

The second is that nobody else has a viable plan. As much as it’s bad politics for May to tell everyone that they have no choice to do do as she wishes, it’s also apparent that everyone else is struggling to build up an alternative path through all this that might command broad support.

Yes, the choices still remain the same: revocation, deal or no-deal, with a side order of extension to delay having to choose among these. But none those combinations is the clear challenger to May’s approach.

The EU can’t do much more than set out conditions for an extension and hope the UK complies; Parliament can’t decide if it wants to take control of the process and, even if it does, where it might go; Tories talk a lot about removing May, but don’t do it; Cabinet is unhappy, but passive.

All of which brings us back to Millwall’s latest signing.

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Over the weekend, I had a twitter conversation about who is a climate researcher. Twitter is obviously not the place for deeper and complex conversations. Thus, this blog post explains my argument that it is not helpful to debate who is or is not a climate researcher, instead climate research requires interdisciplinary dialogue and cooperation in order to solve the multiple crises we are facing.

Let me start by outlining the argument I met this weekend. A climate researcher is someone who research the physical and chemical processes in the atmosphere!

I do not disagree that such a person is a climate researcher. My point is that climate research and climate change is much broader because it affects all elements of life on Earth. The changes in the atmosphere affect our ecological systems and socio-economic structures. Thus, everything is connected and to be able to understand these connections we need to talk across disciplines to find ways of breaking the current structures that are causing climate change.

It is not helpful that natural sciences, social sciences, humanities, engineering etc. are standing in our own corner looking at the big climate elephant in the middle of the room whilst trying to understand it from our own perspective. By focusing on disciplinary research alone, we only understand parts of the climate elephant. What we need is for natural scientists and social scientists to talk together. For example, natural scientists show how climate change affects our ecological systems, whilst social scientists identify how socio-economic structures contribute to climate change. Similar, engineering develops technological solutions to mitigate climate change. In short, we need each other to develop successful climate mitigations at all levels and across all areas.

Importantly, many of us are already work with colleagues in other fields on shared climate change problems, which we only can solve through shared research.  Similarly, research grants increasingly require us to develop interdisciplinary research proposals, which often end up with different fields of social sciences, e.g. politics, sociology and geography, working together. Indeed, we need to think wider in terms of our research partners and we have to start talking with colleagues in other fields, who are looking at similar climate change issues. It is only through interdisciplinary research that we can change the projections in the IPCC reports and achieve a low carbon society in 2050.

Does it matter how we define ourselves? Of course, but limiting the definition of a climate researcher to someone studying the atmosphere is not useful when all research from all fields show that climate change is affecting us all in many different ways. Thus, let us move on from this debate over definitions, and instead talk about how we together can solve the climate crises. After all, that is what all the students striking last Friday 15th March, were asking us grownups to do.

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At the end of 2018, the UACES  Gendering EU Studies Research Network and the Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) brought together a group of academics, civil society, policy makers, practitioners and military officials who work on gender to consider the integration of gender into peace and security from a European perspective. The resulting discussions shed light on some of the current challenges and future opportunities to realising an inclusive vision of peace and security and the transformative potential of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Despite the different backgrounds and perspectives of participants, some key issues emerged which we consider further here. They related to ownership, advocacy, insider-outside coalitions and ensuring the change we pursue is the ‘right’ change.

The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda is encapsulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the seven follow-up resolutions (UNSCR 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122 and 2242). It calls for women’s inclusion in peace and security, but also highlights their particular needs in conflict and post-conflict situations. It calls on the UN and member states to integrate gender into their peace and security apparatus. As the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) highlight, the WPS agenda has transformative potential or ‘the potential to escape cycles of conflict, to create inclusive and more democratic peacemaking and to turn from gender inequality to gender justice’.

Who can claim ownership of the Women, Peace and Security agenda? The UN, many member states and regional organisations including the EU, NATO, African Union (AU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) all claim the relevance of WPS to their own work through their respective policies on the issue. This is in many respects a positive development, yet, it also requires reflection. WPS did not originate out of thin air with the adoption of UNSCR 1325 by the UN Security Council in 2000. Indeed, the Resolution built on decades of feminist organising inside and outside of the UN. From The International Women’s Congress in The Hague in 1915 to the UN Conference on Women in 1995. This knowledge building created the space to consider a reconceptualisation of what ‘peace’ and ‘security’ mean for those whose needs are often marginalised or excluded from such policy considerations. It is crucial that academia, civil society and those working within institutions on WPS acknowledge this, as well as the global nature of the WPS agenda.

At a European level, much scholarship has emerged to examine regional engagement with WPS by actors such as the EU and NATO. While this is welcome, it also bears reflection that Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (which has been the focus of much of this research) is not the only EU policy area for which gender is relevant. If, as we claim, the EU and EU Studies are co-constitutive – meaning that the way we study the EU ‘shapes the way we understand it and determines which elements take center stage’ – then feminist scholars need to be cognisant not to reify a narrow militaristic definition of security, and relatedly the relevance of WPS, in their own work. They need to heed the warning of their civil society counterparts.

As we approach the 20th Anniversary of UNSCR 1325 we can see that there has been much progress. Yet, in many countries, including within Europe, we see pushback and regression on gender equality. Gender and gender studies are under attack and often branded as ‘gender ideology’. We are then at a critical juncture for the WPS agenda, will it go forward or will it go backwards? And will we know what distinguishes these two trajectories? In order to ensure we are pursuing the ‘right’ change gender advocates need to be reflective. This means considering whose security are we talking about? How do we make sure it is as inclusive as possible? And, who do we involve in addressing these security concerns?

Within our own fields (be it the military, policymaking, civil society or academia) we also face push back. Be it day-to-day microaggressions because of our work as gender advocates or the still all too common assumption that ‘gender’ = ‘women’. Something only reinforced by the title of the Women, Peace and Security agenda (even if it does encompass gender mainstreaming and provisions for men and boys). This speaks to one of the compromises made to ensure the UN Security Council would adopt the WPS agenda, ‘gender’ was felt to be too ‘political’ for some members of the Security Council to palate. Naming the agenda Women, Peace and Security also centered women and moved them away from the margins of peace and security. Yet this decision has contributed to reinforcing perceptions that gender is only applicable to women.

Building on this, our discussions also drew attention to the fact that men’s experiences of ‘doing’ gender are often very different to women. Often their expertise is not questioned in the same way as women’s often is. Men can also face an assumption that it is somehow more noteworthy that they are engaging with gender issues than their women colleagues (again often built on a false premise that gender = women). Practically, men as gender advocates can use their positions to draw attention to the work of women colleagues in this area (who may not be getting credit which is due), they can also refuse to participate in all-male panels which we found to be an issue across all our areas of work.

The symbolic exclusion of women remains pervasive across civil society, policymaking, academia and military circles. Yet women’s inclusion across peace and security issues is a key underlying principle of the WPS agenda. Women’s absence is noticeable in the all-male panels which are still evident in some panels at conferences such as the 2018 Paris Peace Forum and the International Studies Association (UACES has now banned all-male panels). Some of the responses often received by those who call out an all-male panel are nicely summarised in these bingo cards produced by Sam Cook (and free to download). One token women on a panel is just as damaging as an all-male panel, with that women effectively speaking for all women as a homogenous group. Having no women is a visible representation of a silence in the field. How do we ensure the message of representation and inclusion is heard?

For feminist academics within the discipline of Politics and International Relations there are signs of progress, with many Universities now actively appointing gender scholars. And while this is welcome, there is a real danger that these scholars then come to embody the institution’s commitment to gender equality at the expense of real structural change. The same could be said for the appointment of Gender Advisors in militaries or at the EU or NATO, and gender positions within civil society organisations. We need to be careful that this does not let others of the hook for their own responsibilities for ‘knowing’ gender.

The feedback we received from the workshop highlighted the value of conversations across silos. Bringing together academia, civil society, policy makers and military demonstrated some of the commonalities in the challenges we face. It provided a space to share lessons and strategies from our own experiences. So how can ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ better support each other? Part of the answer certainly lies in recognising the value of situated and experiential knowledge of gender as well as that gleamed from scholarship endeavour (see also Aiko Holvikiki’s discussion of this). There are significant experiences in our shared experiences as gender advocates, learning from each other has to be part of pushing for transformative change to the current flawed peace and security architecture.

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The workshop was held on the 26- 27th November 2018 at Quaker House in Brussels under Chatham House rule. It was co-convened by the Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) and the Academic Association for European Studies (UACES) Gendering EU Studies Research Network. It also received funding from Newcastle University. We would like to thank all the participants for their contributions.

About QCEA: The Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) works to bring a vision based on the Quaker commitment to peace, justice and equality to Europe and its institutions. It does so through a peace and a human rights programme through its publications, a quiet diplomacy approach and through its networks such as the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office and Human Rights and Democracy Network.   It recently published Building Peace Together, which makes the case for peacebuilding, including through gender inclusiveness.

About the UACES Gendering EU Studies (GES) Research Network: is funded by UACES and brings together a rich and growing body of work in the area of gender and EU politics and policies. The Research Network seeks to explore and challenge the obstacles which curtail feminist influence in EU Studies and leave gender analysis on the periphery.

The authors and conveners of the workshop:

Olivia Caeymaex (QCEA), Katharine A. M. Wright, Newcastle University (GES)
Hanna Muehlenhoff, University of Amsterdam (GES), Toni Haastrup, University of Kent (GES, Roberta Guerrina, University of Surrey (GES), Annick Masselot, University of Canterbury, New Zealand (GES)

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