Sudan Tribune

July 17, 2018 (KHARTOUM-JUBA) - Sudanese mediation team Tuesday announced that an agreement has been reached on outstanding issues of governance and the signing ceremony will take place on Thursday.

But, the South Sudanese government spokesperson Michael Makuei said the Sudanese mediators will give them the final draft agreement on Wednesday and they will determine their position accordingly.

On Monday Makuei voiced strong reservations on the text but said the final decision would be taken by President Kiir. For his part, the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) spokesperson Kwaje Lasu said they were preparing a written response rejecting this proposal.

The proposed deal reduces the cabinet members to 35 ministers but creates a vice-president position for the SSOA. Also, it keeps the number of the legislators at 550 members.

The Sudanese foreign ministry issued a statement on Tuesday evening saying an agreement on outstanding issues of the governance chapter has been reached and the agreement will be initialled on Thursday.

The statement further said the agreement will be initialled on Thursday 19 July and formally signed on 26 July in a ceremony attended by the IGAD head of states and governments.

In response to the different statements, the mediation said they didn't receive any rejection from the parties to the process when the proposal was read in a meeting held at the premises of the talks on Tuesday.

But it pointed out that they received some improvement notes.

"The appropriate notes will be included to the agreed text and the parties will receive the draft final agreement on Wednesday," further reads the statement.

According to the IGAD special envoy to South Sudan who played the role of the chief mediator, there was a disagreement on three issues in the governance chapter: the number of legislature members, the number of the states and the responsibility sharing ratio in the executive and the states.

JUBA SAYS NO DEAL YET

Information Minister Makuei said no agreement has been yet reached because none of the parties accepted to sign the draft deal extended on Monday by the mediation.

He added that the Sudanese foreign minister told the different delegations, they received concerns from several parties but nobody rejected the deal. So he said they will look on it and give the negotiating delegations the final document to be initialled on Thursday 19 July while the formal signing day will be on 26 July.

So, the final draft will be given to us tomorrow (Wednesday) and by next tomorrow, if we agree we sign it and if we do not agree we will not sign it

The minister did not give more details about their concerns but on Monday he blamed the mediation for amending what had been already agreed and coming up with new proposals that have never been discussed before.

SSOA NOTES

The opposition alliance in a four-page text to the mediation seen by Sudan Tribune detailed their notes stressing that their position had been ignored by the mediation during the revitalization process.

The position paper said they had been promised they would get the position of the deputy speaker of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly or the Speaker of the Council of States. but in fact, they got none

The same on the federalism, the opposition umbrella also wondered that a provision on the matter was agreed in the Preamble of ARCSS however they do not understand why it is being avoided.

On the leadership of the National Legislature, the alliance said they had been promised with the SPLM-IO they will get either the deputy speaker.

Further, on the presidency, they alliance said they would prefer to see it based on regional representation. For the NTLA they said they prefer to have a parliament with "only 250 members up from our original 170".

"The proposal falls short of addressing the main concerns of SSOA. Therefore, we present this response in the hope of continuing to discuss these issues so as to find a fair and just way forward," said the SSOA.

(ST)

By Roger Alfred Yoron Modi

A Revised Entebbe Proposal released yesterday in Khartoum as part of the Igad-led High Level Revitalization Forum HLRF of the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan ARCSS provides, among others, for creation of Five Vice Presidents, 550 members of a Transitional National Legislative Assembly TNLA and 45 cabinet ministers in the young nation.

First, having a big government is very expensive indeed. But the South Sudan war itself has been very unique in nature and may require a very expensive solution such as the proposed big government. Some opposition and members of the society are calling for a lean government saying the big government in the proposal is very expensive to maintain.

For me, I see their concerns as genuine. However, the latest proposal is also very clear in Article 6.2 that “the high number of members of the Executive and TNLA is agreed to be exceptional and for the purposes of the Transitional Period only. The principle of lean government and an assembly that follows the internationally recognized proportions of population to members of parliament shall be observed beyond the Transitional Period.” So that is taken care of, at least with regards to future government.

Besides, one would really encourage those opposition and civil society groups that if indeed they are serious about putting South Sudan resources into well use, they should investigate and talk more about how much South Sudan makes from the oil, gold and other revenues per a day, monthly and yearly? And loses how much from illegal gold mining? And how its income and budgets are spent? That is where huge money is lost.

So, for the sake of the Country, a lot of efforts should be made on making the government accountable and transparent. The opposition and civil society could do that now. They should also focus on achieving the reforms in the oil sector and other related areas as provided for in ARCSS. Having a big government is not a good thing but it is currently, or as the parties have made us believe, the necessary incentive for stopping the conflict. What reasonable, urgent recourse to ending South Sudanese suffering is available?

Secondly, during the transitional period, we should make sure we achieve justice, reconciliation and healing, form a competent, representative national army and organized forces, demilitarize our politics and communities, and depoliticize our military, recover our economy, achieve legal and institutional reforms to ensure democracy, and finally come up with a Permanent Constitution, which ARCSS provides that shall be Federal. The type of Federalism will be discussed and approved by the people of South Sudan during that process. ARCSS is very clear on this and I do not understand why some groups keep on saying a federal system should start off immediately during the transitional period. These are just dishonest political talks to lure support from emotional citizens who are uninformed about the HLRF process, and those parties do not really mean to implement what they say or are they unaware of the mandate of the HLRF?

Further, they should know that the current weak and poor institutions (states, even the former 10 States) are not equipped enough to implement a Federal system immediately. Even what form of Federalism? Or just the name? That is why the transitional period should be used to build competent institutions and personnel in the states so that they shall be able to implement whatever type of Federalism South Sudanese will adopt in the Permanent Constitution.

On the issue of allocating more powers to the states, what powers specifically? Among others, South Sudanese would like to elect their state governors, county commissioners but the power-sharing deal provides for appointments by the parties. So, elections and other related matters would need peace and discussions during the Permanent Constitution-making process.

On the issues of allocation of more resources to the lower level of government, I agree, the Transitional government should observe that. I also argued in my recent article that the Agreement (proposal) should include a provision for allocation of at least 40% of national revenue to the States as opposed to the current 15% or probably less given the increment of the States. The matters should not be left vogue in the Agreement without stating the exact amount of resources to be devolved.

Thereafter, when those reforms are achieved and a Permanent Constitution promulgated, the Country shall go for general elections, in fact, it's first ever!

The third issues is about the root causes of the conflict. For example, SSOA said the latest proposal “failed to address the root causes and core issues that brought the country to its knees.” This gets one wondering how would they expect a discussion on Chapter One of ARCSS which is power sharing to address those issues they keep raising? The current talk was clearly about power sharing since having reached the deal on security arrangements the other week.

I have in my articles recently made some observations and recommendations on how to use the HLRF to achieve the needed radical reforms, learning from the mistakes of ARCSS. There is still a chance to address the rest of the issues, including the root causes and how JMEC should be strengthened to ensure compliance with the Agreement, during the Nairobi Talks expected to be held soon and the finalization of the Revitalized ARCSS in Addis Ababa also we expect to happen soon after. But for now please, reach a deal on power sharing and move the discussions to other important issues.

My articles on recent relevant developments and why the parties should drop their narrow interpretation of HLRF for the sake of the Country are here on the below links:

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article65837

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article65849

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article65741

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article65816

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article65719

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article65824

Finally, the latest proposal, in my view, is very fair on the issue of number and boundaries of states.

The proposal in Article 4.12 says “The Parties agree to abide by the recommendations of the IBC, and hereby authorize the IGAD Executive Secretariat to enshrine those recommendations in the Revitalized ARCISS. The Parties accept to implement the recommendations in full at the beginning of the Transitional Period.”

Article 4.13 further adds that “In the unlikely event of the IBC failing to make its recommendations before the end of the Pre-Transitional Period, the Republic of South Sudan shall have as regions the old three provinces, as per their boundaries of January 1, 1956. This solution shall be adopted on a temporary basis until the number and boundaries of the States are agreed.”

The government and all parties should not be allowed to take an unfair advantage of South Sudanese by returning the Country to the old three provinces (regions).

It's been observed that national government retains 85% of national revenue and gives only 15% to the states. This is what should be changed by giving the states more shares of the national revenue so that the whole country gets development, instead of currently where there's hardly anything the government can show, even in the capital Juba, like clean water system, electricity or security, as their achievement for the big budget they retain.

To develop the states, and avoid a return to the old three provinces (regions), South Sudanese, the parties and all partners should work hard to make sure that the IBC does not fail to make its recommendations before the end of the Pre-Transitional Period.

Roger Alfred Yoron Modi, a South Sudanese journalist, is the former Managing Editor of Juba Monitor Newspaper and former Chief Editor of Bakhita Radio. He can be reached via his email: rogeryoron@gmail.com

July 16, 2018 (JUBA) - The South Sudanese government voiced strong reservations on the revised Entebbe Proposal on the outstanding issues of governance and blamed the mediation for making new propositions instead of developing the agreed provisions.

The revised version of Entebbe Proposal creates a new vice-president for the South Sudanese Opposition Alliance and reduced the government members to 35 ministers.

The government spokesperson and Information Minister Michael Makuei Lueth said they received the new draft on the governance and sent it to the leadership in Juba to respond to it. However, he added that document "seems not to be in place".

"The mediation has to stick to the provisions of the agreement instead of dismissing or coming up with new propositions that have never been touched before, and amending provisions which were already agreed," Lueth said.

The minister who was speaking from Khartoum to the South Sudan TV seemed as he was surprised by the content of the new draft. Also, for the first time, he criticized the mediation.

"The way the document is written appears as if there is no government in South Sudan," he said.

After what he repeated that the decision will be taken by the president "but, I really doubt it will be signed tomorrow," he stressed.

(ST)

July 16, 2018 (WAU) - South Sudan's civil society groups have added their voice to the opposition forces rejecting the Entebbe proposal which increase cabinet's ministers and members of parliament but ignore the core issues that led to the eruption of war in the country.

The High Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) at the African Union Hall, Addis Ababa (Getty)

The proposal was submitted to the parties during a meeting held in Entebbe between the leaders of South Sudanese parties to the conflict in addition to Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and his Sudanese counterpart Omer al-Bashir on Friday 7 July.

According to the initial Entebbe proposal which since Monday evening has been revised, there will be 550 members of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly and 45 cabinet ministers with their deputies respectively.

Speaking to Sudan Tribune on Monday, Biel Boutros a South Sudanese activist said such proposal did not reflect the political interest to end the conflict but focus on personal interests in the governing system.

“We said no; this is a very huge government and what the citizens want now is service delivery, but not accommodating personalities,” said Boutros.

He added they are also opposed the proposal because it would mean the establishment of a huge government that would be unable to deliver the badly needed services to the people:

“What we the civil population of South Sudan need is peace (...). We all know that Uganda has interest in the South Sudan conflict," he said.

“The citizens are really suffering. They are in a critical situation. So, the question is not how many (politicians) to be accommodated, but what services to be delivered to the people,” he repeated.

The opposition parties said the proposal reflects the government's previous positions, particularly the creation of a two vice-presidents positions for the incumbent government and maintaining the current members of parliaments.

On Monday evening the South Sudan Opposition Alliance rejected the second draft agreement on the outstanding issues of governance saying they want a lean government and the transfer of power and resources to the states and local authorities.

(ST)

July 16, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - South Kordofan State is hosting 40,000 South Sudanese refugees, said Minister of Welfare and Social Affairs Awadiya Basha

Children fetch clean water from ICRC water points in Muglad, Southern Kordofan State (ICRCJ. Guitter/file Photo)

Speaking at a workshop on refugee laws on Sunday, Basha said the government of South Kordofan is committed to granting refugees status for foreign nationals who reach its territory according to international laws.

She said South Sudanese refugees enjoy the state's limited services including food, health and water, pointing to strong and old relations between the refugees and the residents of the state.

For his part, the housing officer at South Kordofan refugee commission Khalifa Omer Terkawi said most of the South Sudanese refugees are being hosted in Abu Gibaiha and Al-liri localities.

He added the refugees are living in a stable and peaceful environment, pointing to coordination between various government organs and aid groups providing services and protection for refugees.

Over 2 million South Sudanese refugees have been displaced as a result of the conflict that hit the world's youngest nation in mid-December 2013.

According to the UNHCR, as of 15 January 2018, the total South Sudanese refugee population in Sudan stood at 770,110.

Other sources estimate a total of 1.3 million South Sudanese refugees in Sudan, but this data requires verification.

South Sudanese refugees in Sudan have reportedly been distributed in four states including the White Nile, South Kordofan, East Darfur and Khartoum states, amid concerns the current numbers will rise.

In August 2016, Sudan officially declared that South Sudanese fleeing war in their country will be treated as refugees, which opens the door for the UN to provide them with aid and fund aid programs.

The UNHCR said 3,000 South Sudanese refugees have arrived in Sudan in the first half of January 2018.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), an estimated 200,000 new South Sudanese refugees are anticipated to arrive in Sudan in 2018.

(ST)

July 16, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - South Sudanese parties Monday received the final draft of the Revised Entebbe Proposal on outstanding issues of governance with the hope that they would accept it and sign on Tuesday a deal on the governance chapter. However, the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) said they reject it.

Presidents Omer al-Bashir and Yoweri Museveni held a marathon meeting with President Salva Kiir and his main rival and SPLM-IO leader Riek Machar in Entebbe on 7 July.

The meeting which was also attended partly by the leaders of the other opposition groups came out with a proposal on the power-sharing and governance budded Entebbe Proposal.

However, the opposition groups said the proposed deal focuses only on the power-sharing and neglected the other vital issues particularly the number of states and establishment of an inclusive boundaries commission.

On Monday the mediators handed over to the negotiating parties an amended version of the Entebbe Proposal providing that besides President Kiir and his Frits Vice-President (FVP) Machar there would be four other vice-presidents two to be nominated by the incumbent government, one by the opposition alliance (SSOA) and a woman the FDs should nominate.

The initial version of the proposal spoke about the President Kiir and four other vice presidents including the FVP Machar.

The revised Entebbe document provides that the government would be formed from 35 ministers, instead of 55 ministers. Accordingly, the incumbent government takes 20 portfolios, the SPLM-IO nine ministers, the SSOA will get three ministers, the FDs two ministers and the OPP one minister.

There would be also 10 deputy ministers five appointed by the current government, three by the SPLM-IO, one for the SSOA and one for the OPP.

The proposed deal further kept the same numbers of the Members of Parliament, 550 MPs. The incumbent government has 332 members, the SPLM-IO 128 members, SSOA 50 members, OPP 35 members and FDs 5 members.

The Speaker of the TNLA shall be nominated by the government and the Speaker of the Council of States would be nominated by the SPLM-IO.

For the Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC), the deal provides it will consist of 15 members: five appointed by the five South Sudanese parties, two by the IGAD countries that have a border with South Sudan, three by the Troika, five by the African Union.

Finally, for the responsibility sharing at the state level and local government level, it is proposed that the government will take 55%, the SPLM-IO 25%, SSOA 10% and OPP10%.

However, the deal is obviously not accepted by the opposition groups particularly the SSOA that felt marginalized by the proposed deal.

The non-armed opposition groups believe that the transitional period should be inclusive and that all the parties should work on an equal basis for the elaboration of the permanent constitution and the different institutions.

SSOA REJECTS THE REVISED PROPOSAL

The South Sudan opposition was the first to react to the amended Entebbe proposal on outstanding issues of governance saying it "failed to address the root causes and core issues" of the conflict.

"Hence, SSOA is preparing its written response rejecting this proposal. Because the people of South Sudan had suffered enough and they deserved a genuine PEACE," said Kwaje Lasu the SSOA spokesperson.

The opposition alliance which gathers nine political groups (FDP; NAS; NDM; PDM; SPLM-FDs; SSNMC; SSPM; SSLM; SSUM) further reiterated their demand for a "lean government and a federal system of governance, beginning with a clear devolution of power and resources to the states as well as the localities".

During the revitalization forum, the alliance kept repeating that its demands had been put aside by the mediators when it comes to the proposals they draft on the different topics.

the SSOA pledged to continue to work within the framework of the peace process to reach a just and sustainable peace.

"That is the only way to alleviate the suffering of our people and stop the current downslide of the country into an abyss," stressed Lasu.

(ST)

For the full text of the revised Entebbe Proposal on governance issue, please click hereunder

TEXT: Draft Agreement on Outstanding Issues of Governance

July 16, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - Sudan's Higher Committee to Combat Human Trafficking said it would develop a national anti-trafficking strategy as well as activating existing laws to counter the phenomenon in accordance with the established international standards.

In a meeting chaired by Vice-President Hassabo Mohamed Abdel-Rahman on Sunday, the committee discussed legal frameworks to combat human trafficking besides humanitarian and social effects of the phenomenon.

During the meeting, Attorney General Omer Ahmed Mohamed reviewed the report prepared by the legal sub-committee on the relevant legislation and the distinction among illegal migration, asylum, human trafficking and smuggling.

He pointed out to victim protection measures as well as procedures for accommodation, return of victims and removal of offenders in addition to statistical methods to crimes and trials.

The Attorney General also mentioned bases and controls of international cooperation in the prosecution of offenders and the recovery of funds and assets related to crime.

For his part, Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary Abel-Ghani al-Nai'im said the meeting agreed to develop a national strategy to combat human trafficking as well as launching partnerships with regional and international anti-trafficking organizations.

Sudan is considered as a country of origin and transit for the illegal migration and human trafficking. Thousands of people from Eritrea and Ethiopia are monthly crossing the border into the Sudanese territories on their way to Europe through Libya or Egypt.

In January 2014, the Sudanese parliament approved an anti-human trafficking law which punishes those involved with human trafficking with up to 20 years imprisonment.

Also, in 2014, Khartoum hosted a conference on human trafficking in the Horn of Africa, organised by the African Union (AU), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Sudanese government.

The East African nation has also forged a strategic partnership with several European countries and the EU to combat illegal migration and human trafficking.

(ST)

Agreement on Outstanding Issues of Governance

Mindful of their commitment under the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011 to lay the foundation for a united, peaceful and prosperous society based on justice, equality, respect for human rights and the rule of law,

Deeply regretting the scale of untold human suffering that had befallen their country and people as a result of disregarding this commitment,

Determined to compensate their people by recommitting themselves to peace and constitutionalism and not to repeat mistakes of the past,

Cognizant of the prime significance of preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their country,

Confirming the commitments that they have solemnly undertaken in the Khartoum Declaration and the ARCSS,

The Transitional Government of National Unity of the Republic of South Sudan (TGoNU) the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Army-In Opposition (SPLM/ A-IO), the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), Former Detainees (FDs), Other Political Parties (OPP), referred to hereinafter collectively as the Parties, confirm their commitment to the agreed part of the Revised Bridging Proposal and hereby resolve as follows the outstanding issues on governance:

1. The Presidency:
1.1. At the beginning of the Transitional Period:
a. H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit shall continue as President of the Republic of South Sudan.
b. The Chairman of SPLM/A-1O Dr Riek Machar Teny shall assume the
position of the First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan.
1.2. During the Transitional Period there shall be four Vice Presidents of the Republic of South Sudan who shall be nominated as follows:

a. Vice President to be nominated by incumbent TGoNU.
b. Vice President to be nominated by SS0A.
c. Vice President to be nominated by Incumbent TGoNU.
d. Vice President to be nominated by FDs, who shall be a woman.
1.3. Apart from the First Vice President, there shall be no hierarchy among Vice Presidents. The ranking in 1.2 above is for protocol purposes only.
1.4. Decision making in the Presidency shall be in a spirit of collegial collaboration. However, the powers and functions of the President, First Vice President, and Vice Presidents shall be delineated along the provisions of the ARCSS 2015.
1.5. The First Vice President and Vice Presidents shall oversee respectively the Cabinet Clusters as follows:
(a) First Vice President: Governance Cluster.
(b) Vice President: Economic Cluster.
(c) Vice President: Services Delivery Cluster.
(d) Vice President Infrastructure Cluster.
(e) Vice President: Gender and Youth Cluster.

2. The Revitalized TGoNU:
2.1. The Council of Ministers shall be comprised thirty-five (35) Ministers organized in the abovementioned five (5) clusters.
2.2. The Infrastructure Cluster shall include Ministries of Energy and Dams; Transport; Roads and Bridges; and Information, Communication Technology and Postal Services.
2.3. The Gender and Youth Cluster shall include the Ministries of Gender, Child and Social Welfare; and Culture, Youth, and Sports.
2.4. The additional five Ministries and their clustering shall be agreed by the Parties before or during the Pre-Transitional Period further to a proposal to be drawn by the IGAD and shall be included in the Revitalized ARCSS.
2.5. The Ministerial positions shall be selected as follows:
a. Incumbent TGoNU: 20 Ministers.
b. SPLM/A-IO : 09Ministers.
c. SSOA: 03 Ministers.
d. FDs: 02 Ministers.
e. OPP: 0l Minister.
2.6. There shall be ten (10) Deputy Ministers in the following Ministries:
a. Cabinet Affairs.
b. Foreign Affairs.
c. Defense.
d. Interior.
e. Justice and Constitutional Affairs.
f. Finance.
g. Agricultural and Food Security.
h. General Educational and Instruction.
i. Public Services and Human Resource Development
j. Lands, Housing and Urban Development.
2.7. Deputy Ministers shall be nominated by the Parties by rotation from the above list according to the following ratio:
a. TGoNU: five (5) Deputy Ministers.
b. SPLM/ A-1O: three(3) Deputy Ministers.
c. S.SOA: one (1) Deputy Minister.
d. OPP: one (l)Deputy Minister.
2.8. No fewer than three (3) of the Deputy Ministers shall be women.
2.9. No Assistant Presidents, other Ministers or Deputy Ministers shall be appointed during the Transitional Period.
2.10. If more than two Advisers to the President are appointed, the responsibility sharing ratio shall apply to their selection.

3. The Transitional National Legislature:
3.1. The Transitional National Legislature shall consist of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) and the Council of States.

3..2 The TNLA shall be dissolved and composed of 550 members who shall
be allocated as follows:
a. Incumbent TGoNU: 332 members.
b. SPLM/ A-1O:128 members.
c. SSOA:50members.
d. OPP:35 members.
e. FDs:5 members.
3.3. The Speaker of the TNLA shall be nominated by Incumbent TGoNU. One Deputy Speaker shall be nominated by OPP and the other, who shall be a woman, shall be nominated by Incumbent TGoNU.
3.4. The Council of States shall be dissolved and composed of 50 members or the closest figure that can be shared evenly by the States as per the number that shall be recommended by the IBC. However, the minimum number for the representatives of every and each State shall be two.
3.5. The membership of the Council of States shall be reconstituted as per the responsibility sharing ratio.
3.6. The Speaker of the Council of States shall be nominated by SPLM/A-IO and the Deputy Speaker shall be nominated by Incumbent TGoNU.

4. Number and Boundaries of States:
4.1. Within thirty (30) days of the signing of this Agreement, the IGAD Executive Secretariat, taking into account the decision of 55th Extra­ Ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 30-31, 2016, shall appoint Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC) for the Republic of South Sudan.
4.2. The IBC shall consist of fifteen (15) members with the necessary skills and expertise.
4.3. Members of the IBC shall be appointed as follows:
a. Five (5) South Sudanese who shall be appointed by the Parties, one
(1) each.
b. Two (2) representatives of the IGAD states that shall come from states with no boundaries with South Sudan.
c. Three (3) representatives of the Troika states.
d. Five (5) representatives of the African Union that shall be from the C5states.

4.4. The IBC shall be chaired by one of its non-South Sudanese members who shall be of recognized standing and integrity and who had occupied a
senior judicial executive or administrative position in his home country.
4.5. The IBC may retain the services of a team of experts.
4.6. The IBC shall establish three teams, each consisting of five representatives and relevant experts, to be deployed at locations it will designate.
4.7. The function of the IBC shall be to consider the number of States of the
Republic of South Sudan and their boundaries; and to ma.ke
recommendations on the same.
4.8. The IBC shall focus on studying the alternatives currently proposed by
the Parties and any other viable alternatives in the light of guidelines that shall be drawn beforehand. The IBC shall also draw its own internal
regulations.
4.9. The IBC shall strive to arrive at its recommendations by consensus. If consensus is not achieved, the IBC shall adopt its recommendations by simple majority.
4.10. The recommendations of the IBC shall be presented to the IGAD Executive Secretariat and shall be immediately communicated to the Parties.
4.11. The IBC shall complete its work within ninety (90) days, extendable to a maximum of ninety (90) days more. ln all cases it shall ma.ke its recommendations on the number and boundaries of States during the
Pre-Transitional Period. Thereafter it shall be dissolved.
4.12. The Parties agree to abide by the recommendations of the IBC, and hereby authorize the IGAD Executive Secretariat to enshrine those recommendations in the Revitalized ARCISS. The Parties accept to implement the recommendations in full at the beginning of the Transitional Period.
4.13. In the unlikely event of the IBC failing to ma.ke its recommendations before the end of the Pre-Transitional Period, the Republic of South Sudan shall have as regions the old three provinces, as per their boundaries of January 1, 1956. This solution shall be adopted on temporary basis until the number and boundaries of the States are agreed.
4.14.

5. States and Local Government
5.1. The Responsibility sharing ratio at State level and local government level shall be as follows:
a. Incumbent TGoNU: 55%
b. SPLM/A-IO: 25%
c. SSOA: 10%
d. OPP: 10%
5.2. State and local governments shall be dissolved and reconstituted as per the responsibility sharing formula stated above.
5.3. The positions that shall be subject to responsibility sharing include:
Governors, Speakers of State Legislatures, State Councils of Ministers, State Legislatures, County Commissioners, County Councils, Mayors and City Councils.
5.4. In sharing State and local positions Parties shall take into account the
relative prominence each Party has in the respective State or Payam and effective administration of that unit.
5.5. The FDs shall have three state Ministers in States of their choice.

6. General:
6.1. This Agreement shall prevail on contradictory or incompatible provisions of ARCSS and the Revised Bridging Proposal.
6.2. The high number of members of the Executive and TNLA is agreed to be
exceptional and for the purposes of the Transitional Period only. The principle of lean government and an assembly that follows the internationally recognized proportions of population to members of parliament shall be observed beyond the Transitional Period.
6.3. Provisions of the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan and ARCSS on participation of women (35 %) in the Executive shall be observed. In particular, Incumbent TGoNU shall nominate no fewer than six (6) women to the Council of Ministers, and SPLM-10 shall nominate no fewer than three (3) women to the Council of Ministers.
6.4. Having in mind that more than 70 percent of the population in the
Republic of South Sudan is under the age of thirty and that the youth are also the most affected by the war and represent high percentage of refugees and IDPs, the Minister of Culture, Youth, and Sports shall be less than forty (40) years old. The Parties shall strive to include people of young age in their quotas at different levels.
6.5. In selecting their nominees Parties shall give due consideration to national diversity, including regional representation.
6.6. Within thirty days of signing this Agreement, the Parties shall form a
National Pre-Transitional Committee (NPTC) of ten members (5,2,1,1,1) to be tasked with oversight and coordination of the implementation of the activities of the Pre-Transitional Period. The NPTC shall be chaired by TGoNU with two Deputy Chairs from SPLM/ A-10 and S.SOA and shall adopt its decisions by consensus. The NPTC shall draw the road map for implementing the political tasks of the Pre-Transitional Period, prepare a budget for the Pre-Transitional Period, and address issues of VIP security and preparations for new Ministers, among others. The NPTC shall start in Addis Ababa and shall move to Juba sometime during the Pre-Transitional Period. The NPTC shall be dissolved when the Pre-Transitional Period ends.
6.7. The Reconstituted National Constitutional Amendments Committee NCAC shall continue to revise relevant laws and draft new legislation under this agreement within 12 (twelve) months of the beginning of the Transition Period.
6.8. There shall be established a fund for the implementation of the political
and security activities of the Pre-Transitional Period. The fund, which shall be drawn from the proceeds of oil, shall be deposited in an escrow account in a bank agreed by the NPTC. The NPTC shall manage the fund transparently and report on it monthly to the Parties.
6.9. The activities that shall be undertaken during the Pre-Transitional
Period which can take as long as 8 months shall include:

a. Dissemination of the Agreement to South Sudanese People inside the country, in different cities and towns of Sudan, in refugee camps in other neighboring countries, in diaspora, so that the people can own it.
b. To be carrying out the tasks entrusted in the IBC.
c. A process of national healing and reconciliation that shall be led by all Parties inside and outside of the Republic of South Sudan.
d. Security arrangement activities as per the Agreement on Security
Arrangement.
e. Incorporation of the Agreement of the Revitalized ARCS.S in the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011.
f. Reviewing and drafting necessary Bills as per the revitalized ARC:s.5.
g. Any other activities agreed by the Parties.
6.10. The Parties shall agree on Inter-Ministerial Mechanism for Implementation of the Revitalized ARCS.S including reporting to JMEC. The IGAD Jed mediation and the guarantors shall revitalize and restructure ail monitoring and evaluation mechanism to ensure inclusivity of ail parties and enhance their effectiveness. Such review and restructuring shall be included in the revitalized ARC:s.5.
6.11. At the beginning of the Pre-Transitional Period, the Parties shall issue a solemn commitment to their people and the international community confirming unequivocally that they will not return to war and shall work hand in hand diligently and collectively for the sake of peace and stability of the country. In particular, the Parties shall pledge to use the resources of the country wisely and transparently, for the best interest of the people of the Republic of South Sudan, and to put in place the efficient mechanisms required for achieving this paramount goal. In their solemn commitment the Parties shall also appeal to the international community for support and cooperation at this difficult time of the Republic of South Sudan.

Done in the Republican Palace

Khartoum

Sudan, this day ']hl

of July 2018.

For Incumbent TGoNU

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For SPLM/A-IO

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For SSOA

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For FDs
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For OPP

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For the Republic of Sudan (Guarantor):

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Witnesses: For GAD
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For IPF (IGAD PARTNERS FORUM)
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For the AU

For the UN

For TROIKA
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For CHINA
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By Mahmoud A. Suleiman

The attendance of the genocidal criminal, the fugitive from the International Justice Marshall Omer Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir to watch the Football Finale in Russia is Slap on the face of the Darfur survivors and a betrayal of the victims of genocide.

President Omer al-Bashir and his corrupt regime over the past 30 lean years failed to develop football team that the people of Sudan to be proud of, honour and play before the people of the world the Sudanese National Anthem and jubilantly sing by saying: "We are the soldiers of God and the soldiers of the homeland", which the Sudanese people almost have forgotten it today. Has the modesty of the president of the ruling regime in Sudan been lost, so that he is no longer ashamed? Is it conceivable that genocide criminal Omer al-Bashir receives an official invitation from a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to attend the end of the World Cup in Russia? It seems that the (ICC) has been betrayed and evaded by the Russian President Vladimir Putin if the alleged invitation of al-Bashir to attend the Finale of the International Football Tournament is true.

If the alleged news turns out true, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been betrayed by Russia the Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Omer al-Bashir Remains a Heavy Burden on the People of Sudan for three Decades and hence they must do what is possible to get rid of him and his regime.

The Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir will travel to Russia to attend the final of the World Cup between France and Croatia scheduled for Sunday 15th July 2018, according to the official Sudanese news agency SUNA.

Western leaders avoid meeting the Sudanese president, or taking part in any action, as a fugitive and a wanted criminal suspect.

It is noteworthy to report that on Tuesday the 10th July 2018, the European Union (EU) expressed regret that Djibouti and Uganda had not fulfilled their legal obligations and that they had not extradited President Bashir to the International Criminal Court (ICC) which issued two arrest warrants in 2009 and 2010. However, the arrogant Omer al-Bashir tries to prove that he is free to travel around the globe in defiance of the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment and arrest warrants for his implications in the crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocidal atrocities against the Sudanese civilian citizens in the Darfur region and he remains fugitive from the international justice, evading the (ICC), travelling widely to prove himself that no power would dare to arrest him. Below is the list of his recent travels according to the (ICC) records: https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir

• al-Bashir leaves for Mauritania on June 30, 2018
• Bashir leaves for Djibouti July 4, 2018
• Bashir leaves for Uganda July 7, 2018
• Bashir leaves for Turkey July 9, 2018
• Bashir leaves for Russia July 13, 2018

The atrocities perpetrated by the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Janjaweed militia during the third post-2003 Darfuri conflict constituted the first internationally condemned and acknowledged the genocide of the twenty-first century. Thus, President of Sudan Omer Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir remains at large since 16 October 1993 at time of arrest warrants: 4 March 2009 on 5 counts of crimes against humanity, 2 charges were for war crimes and On 12 July 2010 3 charges of genocide
The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315459641_The_Prosecutor_v_Omar_Hassan_Ahmad_Al_Bashir [accessed Jul 14 2018].

Bashir has become the present-day Ibn Battuta, entering the Guinness Book of Records which is the most important travel book around the world with the support of the money looted from the public purse of Sudanese people!

Ibn Battuta (1304 – 1368 or 1369) was a Moroccan explorer. He is known for the account of his journeys called the Rihla ("Voyage"). He travelled for nearly 30 years and covered most of the Islamic world. He also explored West Africa, Southern and Eastern Europe, South Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and China. This distance was more than Marco Polo travelled; about 75,000 kilometres (47,000 mi). Ibn Battuta was considered the greatest traveller of the medieval period. Battuta also made maps that were used by cartographers.
https://simple.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_Battuta

Social networking devices were filled with comic and other comments full of irony, disgust and anger at Omar al-Bashir's visit to Russia to attend the end of the World Cup. Some Sudanese wondered whether French President Macaron was shaking hands with Omar al-Bashir, stained with the blood of victims and lives Darfur, and therefore has been chased by the International Criminal Court and has been running away from international justice since 2009? Others also asked about the purpose for which Omar al-Bashir, his wife and his entourage of twenty-six individuals is visiting at the expense of the deprived people of Sudan while Sudan does not have a football team participating in the international tournament. Other Sudanese citizens said that at this moment, the rescue of the 12 children and their coach from the cave filled with water, which made all the peoples of the world follow the tragedy of the children of the cave and solidarity with them where the aid came from everywhere and can be said that the Government of Thailand and its people are the winners of the World Football Championship that coincided with the rescue of the Children of the cave with global football competitions! The twelve boys and their soccer coach rescued from a flooded Thai Cave will watch a recording of the World Cup final which takes place on Sunday (July 15 2018), not the live broadcast, an official at the hospital they are staying in said. Others in Sudan hoped that the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Fatu Bensouda to be in Moscow, which would frighten Omer al-Bashir because he fears the International Criminal Court (ICC) more than anything else in his lifetime and has been doing everything to avoid arrest and surrender to The Hague prisons in the Netherlands. The (ICC) Chase of him has become the real nightmare that keeps Omer al - Bashir sleepless at night and day whether he like it or not and will remain his boogeyman under his bed whether he likes it or not.

The Horror of Bashir for the (ICC) will remain haunting and pursuing him as long as the arrest warrants have not achieved the desired goal.

Despite the attempt of the media owned by the Bashir regime to promote that the government of al-Bashir has received a pre-invitation from Russia demanding the presence of al-Bashir to Russia for important meetings with President Putin, but a document obtained by the "Rakuba" confirmed that Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has applied to the Russian government, for attending the closing of the World football Cup matches currently held in Russian territory.

It is noteworthy that Omer al-Bashir and his entourage of 26 individuals have not received any invitation from the Russian government to attend the end of international football competitions.

Sudanese social media interactors are asking an interesting question:
As to whether President Omer al-Bashir's visit to Russia to attend the World Cup finals is based to an invitation from President Putin and if it is so what will happen if France or Croatia wins the Cup? Will President Emmanuel Macron accept congratulatory hand-shake from Al-Bashir, or how will the Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovi? react in case her turn to do so? Would the two Presidents disregard their International obligations and ignore the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of the Sudanese President Omer Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir. A Sudanese activist indicated that the expectations are that the Great Football Teams who will be playing the World Cup would refuse to play unless al-Bashir leaves the Stadium!

Earlier," the Sudanese official news agency said SUNA indicated that: "Bashir will go to Moscow on Friday for an official visit to Russia, during which he will hold talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin on bilateral relations between the two countries and ways to develop them. The agency went on saying: "The President of the Republic will see the end of the World Cup on the sidelines of the World Cup and 25 heads of state at the invitation of President Putin." Furthermore, the agency pointed out that the talks between Presidents Bashir and Putin will focus on "economic relations, building a strategic partnership for development, along with the promotion of joint cooperation in the political and economic fields, increasing investment opportunities, especially in the fields of agriculture and energy, Armed Sudanese, which is supported by Russia.” It is noteworthy to recall that In November 2017, al-Bashir made a historic visit to Russia, during which he met with his Russian counterpart and the two countries signed a package of economic and military agreements, the results of which have given no fruits so far!. However, the current alleged visit of al-Bashir to Russia is nothing but an expensive touristic journey at the expense of the Sudanese public coffers to the seat of the former Soviet Union, officially the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) where al-Bashir meant to entertain his wife and the children of his wife from her previous marriage and the individuals in his closed circle of confidants coinciding that with the international Football Tournament. On the other hand, if the spectators of the final World Football Cup have become aware of the presence of Omer al-Bashir among the audience they will shout heckling him and ask him to leave the football arena; he is a persona non grata! While the President of Thailand will be a warmly welcome from the audience watching the final Football Tournament for his caring national attitudes towards his people trapped in a cave flooded by the waters. France plays Croatia in the World Cup final in Moscow on Sunday, at 10pm in Thailand. The world soccer governing body FIFA had invited the 12 Thai boys and their coach to attend the final football tournament in Moscow but they cannot go for medical reasons. The Thai news reported that the 12-member "Wild Boars" soccer team and their coach spent more than two weeks trapped inside a flooded cave in the northern province of Chiang Rai.

They have been recovering in hospital since they were rescued over three days last week and will be discharged on Thursday. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/thailands-rescued-cave-boys-will-not-be-watching-world-cup-final-live

Bashir's marathon travels are nothing but a form of a psychological complex of inferiority feeling and accordingly, he has to resort those hapless move outs seeking some temporary relief from his ceaseless tension.

The Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow will host the finale to the 2018 World Football Cup. Russia's sporting Mecca as it is referred to, has previously hosted the 1980 Olympics, 1999 UEFA Cup Final and 2008 Champions League Final. The question that poses itself is as to whether Omer al-Bashir will be the Guest of Honour rubbing shoulders with the French President Emmanuel Macron and the President of Croatia Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovi?.

Vincent Thomas Lombardi the American football player, coach, and executive in the National Football League has been quoted as saying: “Football is like life - it requires perseverance, self-denial, hard work, sacrifice, dedication and respect for authority.
Read more at: https://www.brainyquote.com/topics/football
https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=vince+lombardi&oq=Vince+Lombardi&aqs=chrome.0.0l6.1487j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

Dr. Mahmoud A. Suleiman is an author, columnist and a blogger. His blog is http://thussudan.wordpress.com/

July 11, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - The Sudanese foreign ministry on Wednesday summoned the European Union ambassador to Khartoum, Jean-Michel Dumond, to express its dissatisfaction with a statement issued by the Council of the European Union, criticizing Uganda and Djibouti for not arresting President Omer al-Bashir.

Sudanese president Omer Hassan al-Bashir

Al-Bashir was in Djibouti on 5 July to take part in the inauguration of a regional trade zone together with the Ethiopian prime minister and Djiboutian president. After what he travelled to Entebbe on 7 July for a meeting on South Sudan peace with Presidents Yoweri Museveni and Slava Kiir and SPLM-IO leader Riek Machar.

"Khartoum rejects the pressure on African countries to respond to the International Criminal Court (ICC)'s allegations on Sudan," Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary Abdel-Ghani Al-Nai'm told Dumond, according to a statement issued by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Garib Allah Khidir.

Al-Naim said Bashir was exercising his sovereign duties, including foreign visits, according to his constitutional duties and in accordance with international law. He was referring here to his political immunity as head of state preventing his arrest.

Sudan which is not a state party "does not accept to be subject to any action or conduct based on the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court," further said the foreign ministry spokesperson.

The ICC issued two arrest warrants against Bashir in 2009 and 2010 for alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed in Darfur.

After what the statement said the Sudanese diplomat told the EU envoy that President al-Bashir is mandated by the IGAD head of states and governments to conduct "a noble mission to bring peace in South Sudan, which will positively impact the regional peace and security."

"The European Union should have issued a statement to support Sudan's efforts in this regard instead of this rejected statement," added the statement.

Also, he praised Sudan's cooperation under the leadership of Al-Bashir with the European Union and the international community in general to address international issues of mutual interest, including combating terrorism, illegal immigration, human trafficking and organized crime, as well as receiving millions of refugees.

The European Union spokesperson in his statement said the 28-country union “remains a strong supporter of the ICC and is committed to enforcing (the) international criminal law and to ending impunity”.

(ST)

July 11, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - Libya's Anti-Illegal Immigration Agency (AIIA) on Wednesday said the Sudanese embassy in Tripoli has issued temporary travel documents to repatriate dozens of illegal migrants.

According to the AIIA, Sudan's Ambassador to Libya last Thursday visited its headquarters to check on the conditions of the Sudanese illegal migrants.

It pointed out that the AIIA in coordination with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) would transfer the illegal migrants via Maitika International Airport.

Last week, the AIIA in Kufra said it has deported 56 Sudanese illegal migrants to their country via the border crossing between Kufra and Sudan.

Following the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's 40-year-rule in 2011, Libya has slid into chaos and has become the most important transit country for illegal migrants to Europe.

In May 2016, Khartoum proposed to establish a joint force to monitor the common borders between Sudan and Libya to curb the movement of Darfur rebels and fight against illegal migration and terror groups.

The UN migration agency (IOM) in April 2017 said it had received reports about the existence of slave markets in Libya where West African migrants are being bought and sold openly.

Also, the CNN which investigated the reports broadcasted footage of a live auction where black youths are sold to North African buyers. The reported filmed by the journalists of the international news channel showed that the migrants are sold for $400.

Sudan is considered as a country of origin and transit for the illegal migration and human trafficking. Thousands of people from Eritrea and Ethiopia are monthly crossing the border into the Sudanese territories on their way to Europe through Libya or Egypt.

The East African nation has also forged a strategic partnership with several European countries and the EU to combat illegal migration and human trafficking.

(ST)

July 11, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) leader Malik Agar welcomed the progress achieved in the South Sudanese peace process and the end of war between the two neighbouring Eritrea and Ethiopia.

In a statement extended to Sudan Tribune, the Sudanese rebel leader praised the signing of an agreement over the outstanding issues in the security arrangement chapter which paves the way for a lasting political settlement of the nearly five-year conflict in South Sudan.

Also, Agar hailed the agreement signed by Eritrea and Ethiopia on 9 July ending the 1998-2000 war over the border area of Badme, and restabilising diplomatic relations, trade and opened the border.

“We support any agreement to end the war in the Republic of South Sudan because it serves the South Sudanese citizens and ordinary people who were affected by the war,” said the statement.

“Our position on the regime of the National Congress Party (NCP) is clear. However, we seek strategic relations between the peoples of the two states of Sudan. The NCP regime will disappear but remain the interests of the two peoples. The state and people of South Sudan are the closest to our people and our country Sudan,” further stressed the statement.

The SPLM-N was part of the historic SPLM that struggled for a New Sudan but the independence of South Sudan in July 2011 forced the Movement to split in two separate structures.

Khartoum in the past accused Juba of backing the SPLM-N which rebelled again in June 2011 and continue to fight the government in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states.

The SPLM-N Agar further applauded for the rapprochement initiated by the new Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed which led to a visit by An Eritrean delegation to Addis Ababa and the historical visit of Ethiopian leader to Asmara on 8-9 July.

The two visits “have made a tremendous change in the region. Also, these steps serve the peoples of the two countries and the region. Peace is a strategic goal for all peoples of the region,” said the SPLM-N Agar.

(ST)

July 11, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - Sudan's Minister of Minerals Mohamed Ahmed Ali said gold production has reached 63,3 tons during the first half of this year, reported the official news agency SUNA

A Sudanese merchant weighs gold in al-Shirik, Sudan (AFP)

During a meeting with Presidential Assistant Mohamed al-Hassan al-Mirghani on Tuesday, Ali said gold production in the first half of 2018 has exceeded targeted production by 101%.

He pointed out that gold production has contributed 6% to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), saying total gold revenue in the first half of the year has reached 1,516 billion Sudanese pounds.

The Geological Research Authority of Sudan (GRAS) last year said the country produced 105 tons of gold in 2017.

Gold production is now Sudan's main source of hard currency after the secession of South Sudan where are the two third of its oil reserves before 2011.

However, restrictions on hard currency by the Central Bank represent a big challenge impeding the development of the mining industry but also encourage traditional minors to smuggle their production to neighbouring countries.

Sudan currently ranks third in gold production behind South Africa and Ghana. Officials said they hope to increase gold production to more than 140 tons and make Sudan the first gold producer in Africa in 2018.

(ST)

July 11, 2018 (JUBA) - The Sudanese mediators are still reviewing the draft agreement on the South Sudan peace revitalization forum, said the information minister Michael Makuei Lueth on Wednesday.

South Sudan's information minister Michael Makuei Lueth speaks to reporters in Bor, December 25, 2016 (ST)

Following a meeting held in Entebbe on Saturday, it was announced that the South Sudanese parties would sign in Khartoum an agreement on the outstanding issues in the power-sharing and governance and conclude the revitalization forum on Wednesdays 11 July.

However, the information minister who is also the spokesperson of the government negotiating team in Khartoum said the draft agreement was not ready and the Sudanese mediators are finalizing the text.

“Unfortunately at this moment the government of Sudan is still working on the document They are not yet ready. So, we are expected to continue for the next few days,” said Lueth who was speaking in Khartoum to the South Sudan TV.

The Sudanese mediators following a meeting in Entebbe including Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, Sudan's President Omer al-Bashir, South Sudan President Salva Kiir and SPLM-IO Riek Machar announced that an agreement was reached on the governance chapter.

However, the opposition groups including the SPLM-IO, South Sudan Opposition Alliance and the Other Political Parties voiced their rejection for what is called Entebbe proposal which brought important modifications to the initial document.

The most import amendment was the establishment of the fourth position of a vice-president instead of three. In return, President Kiir accepted to reinstitute Machar in his previous position as first vice president.

The proposal which dealt only with the power-sharing issues and ignored other outstanding issues like the number of states in South Sudan provides that the SPLM-IO will be given 100 seats in the parliament and the other opposition groups 50 MPs. All will join the current 400 MPs. The same for the government the SPLM-IO will get 10 portfolios, the other opposition factions 5 ministerial posts while the government keeps its 30 ministers.

Minister Lueth said his delegation will respond to the document that would be given by the Sudanese mediators once they receive it before to final signing ceremony which will be attended by the IGAD leaders.

“So let's be patient for this important day and I'm sure we will sign it in the coming few days,” he concluded.

(ST)

By Hafiz Mohamed

Sudan is facing multiple crises, mainly due to unclear political vision to tackle them, the current chronical economic problem is the manifestation of that. The Government of Sudan (GoS) decided to apply a package of measures to address the huge gap in its finances, most important components of the package is the increase of custom duties by over 200% and that will have an impact on the prices of most of goods by that they decided to liberalized the market by allowing companies to import it at the parallel market exchange rate, plus others austerity measures, 2018 budget allocated over 70% of the spending on defense and security with less than 10% in health and education. At the same time they have devalued the official exchange rate of the Sudanese pound and now US$ 1 equal SGD18, and created a parallel rate( US$1 equal SDG30), the value of Sudanese pound in the open market now is (US$1=SDG40) and that increased the prices of most essential commodities raising inflation rate to over 60% One of the most important justifications for the removal of subsidies is that the beneficiaries of the subsidies are the well-off people at the expense of the poor people and they will provide direct assistance to the low-income families so as to overcome the price increase due to the new measure introduced .

The government economic policies during the past three decades, did not reflect a bias towards poor people in the society , as the most important measures which target the rich are the income tax and business profit tax, but Sudan apply the lowest income tax in the world as the high rate is 15%, in the two decades the government has raised the indirect taxes many time by introducing Value Added Tax (VAT) and increased it to 17% at the same time customs duties has increased by over 200% in the current budget, due to the combination of tax increase and devaluation of the Sudanese currency the prices of locally produced commodities such like meat, milk and vegetables have increased with even higher rate. The tax system works in favour of the few rich as it includes many loopholes which helping them evading paying a fair tax. While targeting the least poor segments of the society directly and very sharp by increasing the value-added tax and customs duties those are the indirect taxes and do not differentiate between the rich and the poor.

The introduction of Tamkain (Empowerment) policies during the last two decades sanctioned nepotism and corruption as it becomes the norm.

Second: The new monetary policy

To address the economic crises facing the country the government opted to use some monetary policy measures instead of addressing it holistically through political reform and macroeconomic policies, the measures they introduced have complicated the situation even further they have implemented the following policies:
1- Limiting cash withdraw from banks:
To stop the rapid deterioration of the national currency ( Sudanese Pound) they decided to limit cash withdraw from the bank they aimed to target foreign currency dealers as most of their transactions are in cash , but by doing that they stop other economic activities as 80% of the commercial transactions in the retail and wholesale sectors completed by cash as most Sudanese don't have bank accounts or they don't trust dealing with cheques, The other reason Sudan lack other forms of payment methods such as point of sale in which debit and credit cards, with the shops and other commercial outlets, and there are no debit cards or credit cards.
This policy has reduced the commercial transactions and that will have an impact on the government revenue in term of tax payment (Value Added Tax) and that will increase the hole in the government finances and it will force it to resort to deficit finance by print banknote and that will fuel inflation which already too high
2- Banning Import
They have decided to ban import from own resources (non-value) and restrict it to the finance of the banking sector as the time when bank doesn't have enough foreign currencies reserve to cover the needs of importers, and that will have serious impact as the country will soon run out of many essential commodities , and that is apparent now with the shortage of fuel which the country is facing and that will hamper the preparation for the new agriculture seasons
3- In 2018 budget the government budgeted to get the amount of 5 billion US dollars from Sudanese expatriates' remittances, but actually they are not expecting to get 50% of that amount, and that will have an impact on their balance of payments.
4- At the time when the country is facing deep recession and the economy needs stimulus measure so it can start growing they are using deflationary measures just as restrict bank borrowing and reducing cash in circulation and that will deepen the recession even further.
5- All their attempt to get short-term borrowing especially from the Gulf states has failed it is clear they have no intention to bail them out as they use to do in the past even though they sent their troops to fight a proxy war in Yemen. It is clear from the recent speech of the finance minister in the National Assembly that they run out of options

Third: The Government Reshuffle
The recent government reshuffle within the National Congress Party(NCP) ministers and state governors has nothing to do with addressing the economic crisis its mainly to consolidate the power of president Bashir in preparation for his re-election in 2020, that shows the rift within the NCP and that will continue and weaken their grip on especially ally if the current economic crises continue. The reshuffle is just recycling old faces without injecting any new visions or ideas, the problem can be addressed by changing the whole system and the way the government is run.
What the country needs to move forwards a change of the system and dismantling the centre of powers, so corruption can be rooted out and establishing a system of transparency and accountability, their attempt to fight corruption will not work because its selective and use to punish political rivalries. Sudan is now ruled by one person (the president) surrounded by incircle and has the power to override any decision by ministers or within the party (NCP), many senior members within the NCP and the Islamic movement strongly believe that is hindering any genuine political reform.

Fourth: Combating Corruption
Recent the NCP government took some steps to fight corruption by arresting some businessmen most to them very close to the ruling party, they promise to take legal action against them, but they are selective and targeting certain people not all of them as that mainly driven by the power struggle within the NCP. Without radical political reform, which dismantles centres of power they will not be able to root out corruption

Fifth: Political Reform
1- To pave the way for any economic recovery Sudan, need radical political reform, first to start with a genuine and comprehensive peace process to achieve a sustainable peace in all conflict zones, and that will save a huge amount of money through cutting security and defence budget.
2- Genuine and inclusive political dialogue to set the constitutional principles and terms of an interim period which will lead to a free and fair election after creating the conducive environment for it.

Sixth: Diagnosis of the economic crisis in Sudan
The problem facing Sudan economy is in structural imbalances because of poor infrastructure of the economy and the inability to absorb any shocks due to internal or external factors.
1 -The huge budget deficit.
2 - The balance of trade/payment deficit that led to a sharp deterioration of the national currency value
3 - External debt crisis, the debt for Paris club members is over 50 billion US dollar most if its interest and fines due to default in paying debts instalments, but there are other debts which are undeclared from Arabs financial institution and Chinese Banks.
4 - Sharp rise in the rate of inflation, particularly food prices the official inflation rate now over, 63% without any rise in the average salary.
5 - High unemployment rate among the youth specifically universities graduates.
6 - Shrinking economy due to the deep recession and that led to the sharp decline in the gross domestic product (GDP) and led to decrease of the government budget from $ 10.5 billion in 2010 to 3.5 billion in 2012, the forecast of 2018 budget has increased it to around 8 billion us $ but that is unrealistic, that was mainly due to the loss of oil revenue but at the same time non-oil products have also declined.
7 – Sharp rise in the poverty level due to, many factors such as displacement and low income for families in Sudan.

Seventh: Economic Reform Needed
1- For ensuring the success of any economic policy radical review for the government accounts and financial systems to ensure all the loopholes are closed and to strengthening the monitoring and audit systems and ensure there are robust and rigorous measures to compact corruption.
2- Sudan needs to undertake the needed reforms to meet the criteria for debt relief under the UN high indebted countries initiatives, include a clear strategy for poverty eradication.
3- Reform the rule and regulation covering the banking systems and restructure Sudanese bank as most of them don't meet the international criteria (Basel Accord) for capital adequacy and liquidity ratios

The Way Out
The only way by which Sudan can address its economic crises is by taking a serious political reform by starting a holistic and comprehensive process which address the issues of governance, end the wars and agree on a roadmap for transition to democracy by establishing transitional institutions to lead that process.
First: Political Reform: -
The political reforms must start with an agreement which stop the ongoing wars as that consume more than 75% of the total budget, used for mass killing and destruction those extravagant resources can then be spent on investments in health services and education reform, infrastructure of the main economic activity which is agriculture and processing manufacturing of agricultural products and that will create jobs and boost the economy..
The political reform must include genuine democratic reforms leading to free and fair elections and establish a state based on citizenship rights, rule law recognition of Sudan multi-ethnicity multicultural, freedom of belief with the participation of all Sudanese and that begins with:
1 - negotiation with the armed movements to reach a just and lasting peace agreements which addresses the underlying causes that led to the military struggle to achieve political rights and mitigate the impact of those wars on areas of conflicts and working to return displaced persons and refugees, to their villages.
2 – To Establish transitional government which include representatives of all political parties, armed movement and all the states where everyone is treated equally so that no one has a veto by which he/she can block the implementation of the transitional programme.
3- Reforming all government institution to make them more transparent and accountable, institutions such as the army and all law enforcement and security organs. Respect for human rights according to the international norms and standards.
4 - To agree on a roadmap in a transitional period so as to lead to a final settlement by establishing a state based on citizenship, equal rights and rule of law.
5- Addressing the issue of transitional justice, reparation for victims and their families.
6 - Pave the way for free and fair elections.

Unlocking the Gate to Economic Recovery and Regeneration
The only way to unlock the gate and to pave the way for serious economic reforms to attract investment and regenerate the economy by carrying out serious political reforms. And that will pave the way for:
1 – removing Sudan from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism and according to that lifting the remaining U.S.A. sanctions against Sudan and that will open new Investment opportunities with the inflow of foreign capital and import of modern technology.
2 - Paving the way for debt relief and that will improve Sudan's creditworthiness, so it can borrow from leading international financial institutions to invest in development projects, which will lead to job creation so as to employ millions of the unemployed and it helps in the reverse migration of large numbers of Sudanese professionals, forced to leave Sudan due to the economic situation and the NCP policies.
3 - Sudan now isn't qualified for debt relief programs, grants and subsidies for poverty alleviation in the least developed countries and those programs include the following: -
A - Debt Relief under the Heavily Indebted countries.
B - This program is based on the state's plan to fight poverty through debt relief and its plan to lift the most destitute and poor within the country.
C - Clear and genuine political and democratic reform and fighting corruption.
The government's attempt to impose harsh austerity policies in the country of most of its people live below the poverty level will lead to social results difficult to treat.

If the NCP government is serious in addressing the consequences of its policies in the last two decades, it must address the underline causes of those crises, the problem in Sudan is not lack of resources, but mismanagement of those resources, taking short-term measures do not resolve them. They must introduce policies which target those who benefited from its policies in the last three decades, at the expense of millions who have been impoverished such measures include the followings : -
A – Increase Income tax band for high- income earners by as much as 40% at the same time Increase business profits tax rate to 40%.
B - Reform rates and property taxes.
C - Re-evaluate the public institutions that have been sold less than half their real values and the impose windfall taxes on the owners of those institutions for a period of up to 5 years. The windfall-Tax then can be invested in retraining graduates who have spent years without a job, so they can find their way in the job market.

Other Possible Scenarios
There are many changes in the regional and international politics, the recent development in Ethiopia is a clear sign of the maturity of it political leaders by putting the interest of the country and its people over their narrow personal interest, the recent Khartoum agreement by South Sudan political leaders also goes on that direction and their seriousness will be tested in the coming few months. But the ruling elites in Khartoum still haven't learned the lessons insisting on putting their narrow personal interest over the interest of the country and its people the current status quo is not an option as no one can predict what will happen within one week as the GoS adopting hand to mouth and buying time tactics, waiting for miracle to bail them out.

The author is a former banker and civil society activist. He can be reached at hafiz2502@hotmail.com

By Roger Alfred Yoron Modi

Over the weekend, the media widely reported that South Sudan's warring parties agreed to a power-sharing deal reinstating the leader of the armed opposition (SPLM/A-IO) Dr Riek Machar as First Vice President, quoting Sudan's foreign minister Al-Dierdiry Ahmed.

"It has been agreed that there will be four vice presidents: the current two vice presidents, plus Riek Machar (who) will assume the position of first vice president, and then the fourth position will be allocated to a woman from the opposition," AFP quoted Ahmed as saying after last Saturday's meeting between South Sudan's government delegation headed by President Kiir and the SPLM/A-IO led by Machar, among others. The Talks which is a continuation of IGAD process aimed at ending the civil war in South Sudan was hosted in Entebbe by Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni and attended by Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.

The Sudanese foreign minister "said the new proposal was "accepted by the government" and that Machar's opposition had accepted the deal "in principle" but would "consider it and come up with the final position" following further negotiations, to begin in Sudan's capital, Khartoum, on Sunday."

Other salient features of the Entebbe proposal include the addition of 15 ministers to the South Sudan central cabinet which currently has 30 ministers. It is reported that the SPLM-IO led by Machar will be allocated 10 ministerial positions while the other five will go to the other opposition groups. According to the Proposal, 150 members will be added to the current 400-member parliament to represent the opposition groups with Machar's SPLM/IO to take 100 seats while the rest 50 seats.

Opposition Reject Entebbe Proposal

So far, the SPLM/SPLA-IO and the South Sudan Opposition Alliance SSOA, a coalition comprising nine parties, movements and entities have issued statements rejecting the Entebbe Proposal.

The SPLM/SPLA-IO said the Proposal "only focuses on accommodation of politicians and ignores the radical reforms needed in order to effect fundamental" in South Sudan.

"We are following the IGAD peace process and the Movement shall not accept any shortcuts to peace by vested interests, whether locally, within the region, or beyond…The Movement is confident in the peace process and is confident that the only way to end the conflict in our country is through a negotiated settlement. We are also fully committed to the IGAD peace process and we shall continue negotiating in good faith to achieve a just and honourable peace for our people," partly read the statement bearing the name of the SPLM/SPLA-IO Chairman for Information and Public Relations Committee, Mabior Garang de Mabior.

"However, in light of the regime's malicious propaganda, intransigence throughout the peace process, their constant violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreements (CoH) and constant aggressive posturing the SPLM/SPLA (IO) reserves our natural right of self-defence," added the statement.

On their part, SSOA decried lack of their inclusion in most part of the Entebbe meeting, calling the event "a bilateral agreement between two of the warring parties, namely; the Juba regime and SPLM/A-IO."

"It is to be noted that the leadership of SSOA and Other Political Parties (OPP) were officially invited to Entebbe for the July 7th meeting but kept out of the 8-hour proceedings between the government and the SPLM/A-IO; only to be invited into the meeting to be briefed about what had been agreed upon by the two parties," SSOA statement bearing the name of Kwaje Lasu partly read.

"It is crystal clear that the Entebbe meeting was focusing on power-sharing instead of addressing the fundamental issues of governance. For that reason, we absolutely reject these proposals as they do not serve the interests of the suffering people of South Sudan."

SSOA argued, amongst others, that the Proposal "does not address the root causes of the crisis in South Sudan," and "says nothing about the adoption of federalism which all Parties have recognized to be the will of the people of South Sudan."

A group of women participating in the ongoing Talks calling themselves "non-partisan South Sudanese Women representatives" have also issued a statement saying they will not accept "a peace agreement without the full consent of all parties to this process."

"We recognize the tireless efforts of mediators to attain peace for South Sudan. However, we urge the mediators to refrain from subjecting the parties to sign an agreement under duress. We want to categorically state that the people of South Sudan do not deserve an agreement that cannot be implemented," the Women said in their joint statement, adding that they are hopeful and have confidence that the process could yield peace "if interests of ordinary South Sudanese are placed above those of individuals and parties."

On their part, The African Union Peace and Security Council during its 783rd meeting just concluded in Nouakchott, Mauritania, welcomed the commitment by the South Sudanese parties to make progress on the IGAD-released Revised Bridging Proposal, and urged them to “conclude this process very urgently to address issues of power sharing and security arrangements.”

Also, The UN Secretary-General António Guterres welcomed the signing of the Khartoum Declaration and urged all parties to demonstrate “political leadership at a critical juncture of the peace process.”

The UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Bintou Keita later, in an address to the UN Security Council, praised the IGAD efforts but stressed that peace would not be achieved or sustained “merely on the basis of a bilateral deal between President Kiir and Mr. Machar.”

“While the outcome of regional and international efforts to deliver a political settlement is yet unclear, I must reiterate that peace will only be sustained if the revitalized agreement is inclusive, fair, that addresses the root causes of the conflict and engages all stakeholders, including women and youth,” Keita said.

“While that declaration dealt broadly with all the contentious issues, further discussions would be needed to ensure that the agreement would be implemented through an effective mechanism.”

The South Sudanese parties to the conflict, the Civil Society and other stakeholders are currently in Khartoum, reportedly expecting to receive a final draft proposal on governance "soon."

Real Challenges facing the Peace Process

It first starts with the nature of the Talks. The ongoing South Sudan peace Talks is not a new peace process per se. It is called High-Level Revitalization Forum HLRF of the 2015 IGAD-mediated Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan ARCSS which remains largely unimplemented mainly due to the resumption of armed conflict in July 2016 and repeated attempts to frustrate the implementation of reforms provided for in the ARCSS.

It was therefore in its response to the new armed conflict and circumstances that emerged in South Sudan that the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government in a Communiqué on 12, June 2017 mandated the IGAD Council of Ministers "to urgently convene a High Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) of the parties to the ARCSS including estranged groups to discuss concrete measures, to restore permanent ceasefire, to full implementation of the Peace Agreement and to develop a revised and realistic timeline and implementation schedule towards democratic election at the end of the Transition Period."

However, several of the parties and stakeholders have on many accounts interpreted that mandate for the HLRF differently. This factor has been among the major striking challenges facing the progress of the peace being pursued through HLRF.

This has been well observed in several forums and discussion regarding the process. For instance, citing Dr Jacob D Chol of the University of Juba, in a December 2017 Policy Brief, Meressa K. Dessu of the Institute for Security Studies ISS wrote: "… [Chol] told the ISS that] the different parties involved in the conflict conceptualise the IGAD initiative differently. He notes that the SPLM/A-IG [President Kiir's side] says the revitalisation is the same as what the government is trying to implement; SPLM/A-IO's Taban Deng in the TGoNU argues that the revitalisation is pushing for the implementation of the ARCSS; and the SPLM/A-IO – led by Machar – disputes the process as rebooting and renegotiating a new peace deal that incorporates all the newly emerged rebel outfits."

"From IGAD's perspective, the revitalisation is about restarting the ARCSS – with some amendments to accommodate the interests of estranged groups, and a revision of the schedule for a realistic implementation process," Dessu continued.

On the other hand, in addition to the different interpretations and possible attempts to manipulate the HLRF process by some parties, it is evident that circumstances have changed a lot. We are currently in July 2018; the IGAD communique mandating that the HLRF be “urgently convene[d]” was issued in June 2017 which is over a year ago but so far the process which was meant to be urgent in the first place is still no concluded.

Moreover, the term of transitional government established is soon expiring together with the ARCSS, regrettably, without conducting most of the legal and institutional reforms envisaged in the ARCSS. There is no peace also. Elections are out of question due to the nationwide insecurity created by armed conflict and other factors. The economy is in dire straits. Already the US has warned against the extension of the term through the legislature, as opposed to a peace agreement. It is expected that the HLRF succeeds in revitalizing the ARCSS so as to give legitimacy to the next transitional government to be formed thereunder.

But it is has been acknowledged that so far the process has made a breakthrough between the parties such as the signing of the agreements on outstanding issues of security arrangements last week and the permanent ceasefire about two weeks ago, though there is a growing caution over the texts of the former.

Those are fruits of the "Khartoum Declaration of Agreement between Parties of the Conflict of South Sudan" which was signed as part of the HLRF and the last month resolution of IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government which mandated the ongoing process.

In the Khartoum Declaration also, the South Sudanese parties have agreed to reach a deal on the IGAD-peace "Revised Bridging Proposal" "as soon as possible and before closing the current Khartoum Round of Talks." This limitation could be positive or negative, depending largely on the manner of the Talks and the progress thereof.

Also, as announced by Sudan's foreign minister, the Khartoum round of talks between the South Sudanese shall continue until 12 July (tomorrow.)

But the gap between the proposals and the talks by those calling for a comprehensive peace agreement through the HLRF that addresses the root causes of the conflict remain too big as of recent it is mostly about power-sharing in the next transitional period.

Parties must drop narrow interpretation of HLRF mandate

It is indeed very important to have a fair power-sharing agreement between the South Sudan parties to the conflict and stakeholders/entities participating in the HLRF. This will greatly assist in creating a balance in decision-making and genuine implementation of peace and the institutional and legal reforms enshrined in the revitalized ARCSS.

But a mere distribution of power (percentages) are not enough. The revitalized ARCSS must contain substantive provisions on the fundamental issues facing South Sudan and as well as incorporate corrections to the lessons from its past failures. That is how the HLRF could lead to ARCSS full implementation and end to the conflict.

As I have argued in my recent articles making substantive observations and recommendations on the nature of the peace process and power-sharing proposals, despite the (limited?) mandate of the HLRF, the South Sudanese parties, could still discuss and agree on a comprehensive peace agreement that is implementable, that addresses the root causes of the conflict and incorporates the needed radical reforms for fundamental change in the Country.

They, all the South Sudanese parties, very well know the problems and solutions to the issues of governance failure and the cycle of violent conflicts in the young country. All required from them now is honesty and constructive engagements to come up with a final agreement that will bring a lasting peace. They also have a chance to rectify the (unintended) mistakes made in the ARCSS that directly or indirectly led to its failure.

Moreover, a narrow interpretation of the wordings of the IGAD 2017 communique that mandated the HLRF, whether by the government or the opposition, is not only unhelpful by unreliable as well.

It is worth recalling that 32nd Extra-Ordinary Summit of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government that mandated President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir of Sudan to facilitate the Khartoum Talks to: “a. discuss and resolve the outstanding issues on governance and security arrangements including measures proposed in the revised Bridging Proposal of the IGAD Council of Ministers; and b. discuss measures to be taken to rehabilitate the South Sudanese economy through bilateral cooperation between the Republic of South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan” also decided that President Al-Bashir shall inform President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya of the outcome of the discussion between the parties.

The Summit further decided that President Kenyatta will facilitate the third round of face-to-face discussion between President Kiir and Dr Machar in Nairobi “to facilitate the revitalization process and report the outcome and way forward to the upcoming Ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government.”

The Summit also instructed the IGAD Council of Ministers “to give guidance to Special Envoy for South Sudan on the remaining tasks to finalize the IGAD bridging proposal at the sideline of the 33rd African Union Summit….in Nouakchott, Mauritania” which just was ended early July, apparently without finalizing the IGAD bridging proposal due to the recent unforeseen changes, one of which is Article 3 of the Khartoum Declaration between the South Sudanese Parties which says “An Agreement on the ‘Revised Bridging Proposal' shall be concluded as soon as possible and before closing the current Khartoum Round of Talks.”

Indeed, the different South Sudanese parties have different interests and different allies in the region and beyond, but if they are serious about peace and ending the suffering of the people, they should be particularly concerned about making a comprehensive peace through the HLRF, not capitalizing on issues of whether or not the recent agreements prevail over past communique of the regional body on related matters. They should as well be concerned about their direct and indirect actions that could possibly lead to lack of support required from the region and beyond for smooth implementation (success) of the very Agreement they say should bring reforms in the Country.

Recommendations for fundamental reforms

Therefore, given the justifications above, in addition to my earlier suggestions to the success of the peace process, I hereby recommend the following:

1- On excessive powers of the National Security Service

The South Sudanese Parties should reach an agreement and set a timeframe and parameters for reforming the existing National Security Act. Provisions of the National Security Act giving the National Security service broad powers of arrest, search and seize property without a judicial warrant, and expansive surveillance powers with no independent oversight or due process should be repealed.

In fact, those powers given to the National Security Service NSS contradict Article 159 of South Sudan Constitution TCRSS which limits the NSS to information gathering, analysis and advice to the relevant authorities (e.g. the Police).

Actually, many of our current leaders were the ones who struggled for the professionalization of National Security Service during the times of the liberation war and peace negotiations.

Renowned academician and Former Minister in the Office of President Kiir Dr. Luka Biong Deng captured that history very well in his 2014 article after he was reportedly arrested, detained, deported from Yei with his properties sought and seized by the Military Intelligence of the SPLA.

“The genesis of this constitutional provision of the mandate of the National Security Service goes back to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) insisted to discuss and to clearly define the mandate of National Security Service in the CPA. Specifically, the Power Sharing Protocol that was signed on 26th May 2004 stated in section 2.7.2.4 that National Security Service shall be “professional and its mandate shall be advisory and focused on information gathering and analysis”. The same provision about the mandate of National Security Service was included with the same wording in the Sudan Interim National Constitution, 2005. It is clear that the National Security Service is not constitutionally mandated to arrest, detain, search and seize,” wrote Dr Biong.

In fact, the Constitutionality of the provisions of the Act would have been contested before the Courts in South Sudan but since they lack independence, pursuing such avenue in the hope of getting justice may be, simply, a wishful thinking.

Also, this could not have been an issue for the HLRF if ARCSS provisions were explicit on the parameters and nature of reforms to be carried out on the National Security Act. But ARCSS is not explicit on the matter.

So, the best option is to agree on and stipulate a comprehensive approach for the reforms of the National Security Service (Act) in the final Agreement (revitalized ARCSS) currently being negotiated through the HLRF.

2- On Media Laws

The South Sudanese Parties should reach an agreement and set a timeframe and parameters for reforming The Media Authority Act, the Right of Access to Information Act and The Broadcasting Corporation Act.

For instance, though has not been implemented, Chapter 1 Article 14 of ARCSS provides for reforms and reconstitution of The Broadcasting Corporation SSBC “…paying particular attention to the mandate and appointments, to ensure their [the Corporation's] independence and accountability.”

Well, this may be well intended however, there are two problems with that provision namely: A) Instead of providing for those reforms and reconstitution to be done by parliament by amending the SSBC Act, the ARCSS stipulates that they be shall be done the executive.

B) Whether intentionally or not, major media laws like the Right of Access to Information Act and The Media Authority Act have not been included in ARCSS as among the institutions and legislation requiring reforms to ensure their independence and accountability.

The presidential appointees heading those bodies have no security of tenure as the president, instead of the legislature, holds the powers to remove them. The provisions of those Three Media Acts requiring reforms include, but not limited to, repealing the provision criminalizing defamation (see section 5 of The Media Authority Act); the procedure for appointments and removal of officials under the Acts, to ensure adherence with democratic principles, human rights law and international best practices as at the moment the bodies established by those laws are not living up to expectations.

Some of the negative actions of the Media Authority include coming up with “registration” of media houses and warning “the public and donors not to engage with media houses, it says are unregistered and operating illegally.”

The Media Authority, as of April 24 2018, publicized media houses and entities that are “legally” registered. The Media Authority “authorized” nine newspapers and magazines to operate. This is a violation of Section 13 (i) of the Media Authority Act which provides that “…there shall be no licensing or registration of newspapers, news agencies, magazines and periodicals or other printed media, or of websites or sources of content on the Internet, other than that required by law for any business seeking to engage in a commercial or non-profit activity…”

The Media Authority has no powers to register newspapers, news agencies, magazines. The registration required “by law for any business seeking to engage in a commercial or non-profit activity” is not the competence of the Media Authority as that falls under the Ministry of Justice at the moment and such registrations are purely for those mentioned purposes and nothing to do with professionalism/media ethics per se.

Last year, The Media Authority “banned” about twenty foreign journalists from entering or operating within South Sudan for reporting what it termed “unsubstantiated and unrealistic stories.” The Media Authority cited no law and no transparent, verifiable, justified procedure in reaching those decisions.

As for the SSBC which controls the Public Broadcasters (TVs, Radios, etc) the opposition, especially the SPLM-IO, The Democratic Change DC, the other political parties and the civil society know very well the bureaucracy in there as many a times they complained about their events not being covered or broadcasted by the SSBC (former SSTV/SS Radio). The Act SSBC Act provides for transformation of the State-owned media (SSBC) into public broadcasters, independent from the political or economic control of the government. But that is far from the reality on the ground as the SSBC suffers lack of independence from the executive, apparently due to undue influence over budget and the fact that Section 32 of SSBC Act provides that the Media Authority shall monitor the SSBC while the Media Authority itself lacks the independence it ought to have from the executive.

Member of Parliament and then Leader of Minority Onyoti Adigo Nyikwec once told me in an interview published in September 2016 on The Nation Mirror newspaper that his party was not being accorded fair opportunity by the SSBC.

“If you see me there… it is something which has been organized by other people, not by us [opposition].

“The TV is still being controlled by the government, even the radio and especially by the minister of information. So it has become the property of some people, not the South Sudanese people,” Adigo said at the time. So far the situation may have only changed for those currently to the government.

This February, the Human Rights Division (HRD) of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in a joint report on The Right To Freedom of Opinion and Expression in South Sudan since the July 2016 crisis, wrote:

“As the present report shows, the restrictive domestic legal framework, which criminalizes defamation and does not clearly define the clauses limiting the exercise of freedom of expression, leaves a wide margin of interpretation which might lead to arbitrary implementation. As media outlets and civil society play a key role in promoting good governance and accountability, journalists and outspoken civil society actors have been especially targeted with censorship, harassment, threats and violence. As a result, citizens fear criminal prosecution for expressing their views or are concerned about their safety, and tend to practise self-censorship,” the UNMISS-OHCHR report continued.

“Despite positive developments, such as the establishment of the Media Authority, the key regulatory institution aimed at promoting freedom of the media, effective civic participation remains a challenge. Main concerns include a restrictive legal framework and the imposition of undue restrictions by State institutions, at the national and local levels, including by security forces, to the legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression of media workers and other individuals. Restrictions, such as censorship of newspaper articles that are critical, have been misused to muzzle individuals and media critical of the Government or perceived as such – in some cases with the pretext of prohibiting hate speech.”

Last year, the deputy chair of the ARCSS Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, Amb Gen. Augostino Njoroge called for the protection of fundamental principles of press freedom and an end of the crackdown on journalists in South Sudan.

“The media, in South Sudan, like it is globally can offer a platform for various voices that seek to promote tolerance, dialogue, cohesion and compromise. This will ensure an all-inclusive national healing and dialogue and also shape the development agenda of the country,” Gen. Njoroge said.

He is right. Also, as correctly observed by the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity, “A silenced journalist mutes the voices of the people and curbs their right to know. The result is a society where fearful citizens resort to self-censorship and where it is not possible to make informed decisions.”

Therefore, taking into account the abovementioned facts and arguments, the author hereby submits that providing for reforms in the South Sudan media laws and environment are extremely necessary for peace and ensuring full implementation of the revitalized ARCSS.

Given the failure to implement the reforms provided for under ARCSS, the revitalized ARCSS, the next TGoNU and all should ensure freedom of expression and the media in South Sudan so that the same mistakes do not occur. Make explicit provisions for reforms of the media laws in the final Agreement now!

3- On the Peace Monitors and their Mandate

Chapter Seven, Article 3 of ARCSS provides that JMEC “shall be responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the Agreement and the mandate and tasks of the TGoNU, including the adherence of the Parties to the agreed timelines and implementation schedule. In case of non-implementation of the mandate and tasks of the TGoNU, or other serious deficiencies, the JMEC shall recommend appropriate corrective action to the TGoNU.”

This provision implies that JMEC has powers to, for example, recommend appropriate corrective actions to the TGoNU regarding the validity or lack thereof in the appointment to a post or removal of a position holder under the Agreement (when there is a dispute.) Otherwise, why have a monitoring body when it shall not follow such significant processes to ensure that they occur in line with the letter and spirit of the very Agreement establishing them for the purposes of overseeing the Agreement's implementation and recommending appropriate corrective action in case of non-implementation or other serious deficiencies?

This was the test JMEC faced when in July 2016 debates arose on the question of Machar's replacement by members of the SPLM-IO in Juba following the resumption of violence.

On 24, July 2016, JMEC issued a statement saying: "The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission [JMEC] would like to clarify its stance on the SPLM/iO leadership debate. As stated yesterday, a change to the leadership depends on the Opposition itself and we are not here to speculate on such changes. We do not see any value in speculating when the people and friends of South Sudan are working hard to ensure a return to the implementation of the Peace Agreement."

This was unnecessary, since according to ARCSS, in my view, JMEC role is never to "speculate" on leadership changes anywhere, be it in the opposition or any other party to the agreement. Thus, legally, in relation to Dr. Machar's replacement, in my view, JMEC was supposed to ensure that, it was in line with the recommendations of the “Top Leadership” of the SPLM-IO as required by Chapter One, Article 6(4) and Chapter 1 Article 5 (2) (4) of the ARCSS. That ought to be a democratic exercise and ARCSS seeks to transform South Sudan into a Democracy.

So, it was a simple matter that only would require JMEC to monitor and verify that there was the quorum required for the meeting or voting of “the Top Leadership” of the SPLM-IO and that the replacement was in line with ARCSS. This is what they should be doing with all other related provisions of the ARCSS and then recommend appropriate corrective action in case of non-implementation or other serious deficiencies.

On this, in relation to the HLRF, I have recommended in one of my recent articles that let each party or entity develop, adopt and deposit their internal Constitution or rules and regulations with JMEC and IGAD. Such internal Constitution or rules and regulations should define the mode of decision making within each party on matters related to the revitalized ARCSS, including their procedure for membership and lose thereof, the procedure for nomination of their representatives to the next TGoNU, TNLA, etc. The internal Constitutions or rules and regulations should be separate documents that IGAD or JMEC or HLRF should, on the technical aspect, assist the parties to develop as soon as possible for the purposes of protecting the revitalized ARCSS from violations. The documents should be valid for the purposes of the revitalized ARCSS, regardless of possible change such as the expected reunification of the SPLM. This is very significant as it will ensure accountability, adherence to the revitalized ARCSS. It would also avoid a return to armed conflict or any controversy and possible pulling out by some parties/entities from the revitalized ARCSS over related issues, thereby negatively affecting its implementations.

Back on the stand JMEC took since July 2016 crisis, it is somehow understandable, given the nature of the violence that erupted and required politics and diplomacy as JMEC leadership itself was notably lacking enough backing from the region and apparently the wider international community.

However, to avoid the occurrence of similar crises during the period of the revitalized (next) TGoNU (ARCSS), strengthening of JMEC mandate and gathering support for their role is absolutely necessary if the revitalized ARCSS currently under negotiations through the HLRF is intended to be implemented.

This was also called for by Aly Verjee, the JMEC former deputy and subsequently acting chief of staff Testimony in his last year's testimony before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy.

“In the event the Forum produces a meaningful result, reform to the peace agreement's supreme oversight body, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), where I served as deputy and subsequently acting chief of staff until my expulsion by the Government of South Sudan in April 2016, must be contemplated,” Verjee told Senates Subcommittee.

“While the principal responsibility for continued conflict and systematic misgovernance rests on the South Sudanese political elites, JMEC has failed to live up to expectations. It has not moved quickly enough to take corrective action at moments of acute crisis, and not held the parties to account when they dishonoured their obligations. There has been insufficient backing for JMEC from the IGAD member states and the African Union when the South Sudanese failed to comply with the terms of the agreement. When JMEC itself came under attack, with its key personnel expelled from the country, JMEC's regional and international backers did not protest.”

Another issue is, Chapter 7, Article 2 (6) of ARCSS provides that the terms of reference of JMEC shall be endorsed by the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

There is no such terms of reference available in the public arena to the best of my knowledge. This further makes it difficult for the public to hold JMEC to account. JMEC may also be reluctant to live up to expectations as a result of that.

The JMEC Chairman has no security of tenure. ARCSS in Chapter Seven, Article 2 (5) only provides that “JMEC shall be chaired by a prominent African personality appointed by the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government in consultation with IGAD-PLUS Partners, and form Committees to facilitate its activities as deemed necessary. JMEC may select deputy Chairs in accordance with the number of the said Committees.”

Lack of provisions in the Agreement guaranteeing the security of tenure and a clear procedure for their removal could be a big source of undue influence and underperformance. This should be rectified in the current process and JMEC needs to involve more members of the academia in decision-making positions than politicians. Involving respected, competent South Sudanese academics in top positions in JMEC would also strengthen the influence of the body within the Country and counter the arguments that South Sudan's sovereignty under threat because of the powers given to the peace monitors.

Conclusions

In case the South Sudanese Parties and Stakeholders continue to differ over their interpretations of the IGAD communique establishing the HLRF to the extent that they fail to discuss and agree on a comprehensive peace agreement that is implementable and equally important, addresses the root causes of the conflict and the major issues for fundamental change in the Country, IGAD should issue urgent resolutions with explicit provisions detailing/expanding the mandate to the HLRF.

The resolutions should set clear parameters for the peace talks through the HLRF to include, inter alia, the fundamental issues facing the Country as raised herein and the articles attached. The IGAD resolutions should as well incorporate rectifications to the lessons learned from ARCSS failures, without altering the relevant provisions of ARCSS, the “Revised Bridging Proposal” and positive achievements made by the HLRF. Then IGAD should speed up the HLRF with clear areas for discussions and agreements needed from the parties and stakeholders including the civil society.

On their part, parties who were signatories to the ARCSS such as the SPLM/AIO led by Machar, the Former Detainees, and others, should not view an expansion of the HLRF mandate or even a new peace process as being against their interests. It may be wrong for them to assume that under an expanded mandate of the HLRF, they would lose their current level of influence in that process and its outcome.

In fact, they should know better, that, reaching any final agreement that fails to address the fundamental issues facing South Sudan will be too costly for the Country and most of them the opposition in particular. Anyway, they know more about this, including the fact that the government has not withdrawn labelling them as plotters of a failed coup attempt. The opposition leaders know very well the costs for surrendering themselves without a genuine agreement providing for fundamental reforms in the Country.

On the other hand, the various leaders in the government (delegation) to the HLRF should work for a comprehensive peace agreement as well. They should remember that several leaders who were part of the government when the conflict erupted, like the Former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Paul Malong, have now become victims of the same system they worked to maintain. They, like others, have apparently learnt their lessons and they will probably be different and become pro-reforms if they find themselves again in power.

The various government leaders should as well convince President Kiir to accept radical reforms to the problems facing South Sudan. It is well-known that the governance crisis facing South Sudan today is not the making of President Kiir alone. Many of the current opposition leaders were directly involved in establishing the weak and corrupt system in the Country.

But Kiir being the President, together with all the parties, including Dr Machar, now have a chance to correct the mistakes and move the Country forward based on the ideals which inspired our decades of struggle for freedom, independence, democracy and good governance.

Our people have suffered for far too long. Do not squander this opportunity. Make a comprehensive peace agreement now and make our people pick up their lives once again.

Finally, if IGAD is too reluctant to come up with a new peace process or help expand the mandate of the HLRF given the justifications above, and in case the South Sudanese Parties and Stakeholders continue to differ over their interpretations of the IGAD communique establishing the HLRF to the extent that they fail to discuss and agree on a comprehensive peace agreement that is implementable and equally important, addresses the root causes of the conflict and the major issues for fundamental change in the Country, then it means the African Union and the United Nations should step in more actively than before and roll-out a new peace initiative to rescue the people of South Sudan and help transform the young nation into a democracy. This will as well need cooperation from South Sudan neighbours and IGAD, albeit to a different degree.

Roger Alfred Yoron Modi, a South Sudanese journalist, is the former Managing Editor of Juba Monitor Newspaper and former Chief Editor of Bakhita Radio. He can be reached via his email: rogeryoron@gmail.com

July 10, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - The European Union condemned two east African countries, Djibouti and Uganda, for refusing to arrest Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir, the only sitting head of state wanted by the International criminal court.

President al-Bashir was in Djibouti on 5 July to attend the inauguration of a regional trade zone. Also, he was in Entebbe on Saturday for meeting on peace in South Sudan with Presidents Yoweri Museveni and Salva Kiir and SPLM-IO leader Riek Machar.

“The European Union and its Member States regret that Djibouti and Uganda, both States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), did not comply with their obligations under international law and as State Parties to the ICC and did not surrender President Al-Bashir to the Court,” said the statement.

The statement, which is issued by the EEAS Spokesperson, further called on all Member States of the United Nations to abide by and implement the UN Security Council resolutions related to the referral of Darfur crimes to the war crimes court.

“The European Union remains a strong supporter of the ICC and is committed to enforcing international criminal law and to ending impunity”.

Sudanese foreign ministry didn't react to the statement but the Sudanese embassy in Cairo distributed a statement by the Arab Parliament Speaker Mishaal bin Fahm Al-Salami denouncing the provocative EU statement against an Arab leader.

(ST)

July 10, 2018 (JUBA) - As discussions over the governance chapter are stalled in Khartoum, the main armed opposition SPLM-IO Tuesday accused the South Sudanese government army of attacking its positions in Yei River State.

“This morning the 10/07/2018, over 200 regime's soldiers went out of Morobo Town and attacked the SPLA IO base at Isebi in Lujulo Payam of Morobo County, Yei River State,” said SPLM-IO military spokesperson Lam Paul Gabriel.

In a second statement, Gabriel further said Yei River Governor Emmanuel Adil is preparing to launch an attack SPLA IO bases in Kajo Keji county.

The warring parties committed themselves in an agreement signed on 27 June to implement a permanent ceasefire in the country starting from the 1 July.

However, they had accused each other of breaching the deal twice in the Northern Upper Nile and Yei River State.

The SPLA IO spokesperson called on the ceasefire monitoring mechanism, CTSAMM, and UNMISS peacekeepers to investigate into these attacks and to hold Governor Adil responsible for the alleged violations.

Gabriel further went to say that the South Sudanese army Chief of staff Gen. Jok Riek, recently travelled to China to acquiring new weapons to continue with their military campaign despite the ongoing peace process.

“This is a blatant violation of the signed permanent ceasefire,” he added.

(ST)

July 10, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - An Indian company on Tuesday has won a tender to build electricity interconnection project between Sudan and Egypt, said Egypt's Minister of Electricity and Renewable Energy Mohamed Shaker

The Egyptian minister didn't disclose the name of the Indian company saying the concerned parties are making preparations to sign the final contract soon.

He pointed out that the first phase of the project would be executed within four months at a cost of $60 million.

According to the minister, the first phase of the project, which covers 95 kilometres within the Egyptian territory, would enable Egypt to supply Sudan with 300 megawatts.

He expected the supply to rise to 3000 megawatts at the end of the project.

Shaker added the linking of Sudan and Egypt power grids would allow for the optimal use of both grids and supports development projects.

He stressed the two countries are ready to work jointly to implement this project, saying there are no natural obstacles that hinder the implementation of the project as scheduled.

In a meeting held in Khartoum last April, Shaker and his Sudanese counterpart Muataz Musa agreed to establish an electricity linkage between the two countries.

The tumultuous relations between Sudan and Egypt experienced last December a new crisis over media attacks against al-Bashir after a visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Sudan. Also, Sudan accused Egypt and Eritrea of supporting rebel groups to attack Kassala State on the eastern border.

However, the two countries recently developed joint security cooperation against the opposition groups from both sides.

The main differences between the two neighbours remain the dispute over the border triangle area of Halayeb and the construction of Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam that Sudan backs.

(ST)

July 10, 2018 (KHARTOUM) - Sudan's State Foreign Minister Osama Faisal has met China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bejing on the sidelines of the eighth ministerial meeting of China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF).

Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) shakes hands with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir during a signing ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, September 1, 2015. (Photo Reuters/Parker Song)

The CASCF, initiated in 2004, is a high-level platform for dialogue and cooperation between China and the Arab World.

The two ministers discussed ways to promote bilateral relations and develop economic cooperation within the framework of the Belt and Road initiative.

The Chinese minister expressed pleasure that President Omer al-Bashir has confirmed his participation in the meeting of the Africa-China Cooperation Forum which would be held in September in Beijing.

For his part, Faisal thanked China for its continued support to Sudan's stances at the various international forums.

China has been Sudan's largest foreign investor, particularly in oil and telecommunications after western firms shunned the East African nation due to conflicts and sanctions.

It has invested more than $20 billion in Sudan mostly in the oil sector during the past two decades. Beijing provides low-interest loans and weapons transfers in return for oil.

Sudan hopes to attract new Chinese investments after Beijing had refrained from implementing a number of projects agreed upon with Khartoum following the latter's failure to settle its debts.

Sudan's total debt to China is estimated at $ 10 billion, accounting for about one-fifth of Sudan's estimated $53 billion foreign debt.

(ST)