Diplomacy & Crisis News

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's reliance on aircraft carriers, despite their high costs and growing vulnerability to anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems, has raised strategic concerns. The $13 billion Gerald R. Ford-class carriers, designed for long-range power projection, face new threats from advanced missile systems that can locate and target them from over 1,000 kilometers away.

-Suggestions to use carriers as tactical distractions draw comparisons to historical naval battles but overlook the potential for significant losses and the current fragility of the U.S. defense industrial base.

-Instead of focusing on carriers, the Navy should prioritize developing hypersonic weapons, unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines, and directed-energy weapons to counter the A2/AD threat. This shift is essential to maintain naval superiority and effectively respond to modern strategic challenges.

The Navy Might Use Its Aircraft Carriers as Distractions

Outside of nuclear weapons, America’s aircraft carriers are probably the country’s biggest long-term strategic investment. The newest Gerald R. Ford-class carriers cost an astonishing $13 billion per unit, although the Navy insists that costs decrease with each new unit they build. 

Since the Second World War, when aircraft carriers proved their mettle in the Pacific Theater, Washington has made the flattop its primary platform for long-range projection of naval power.

But the world has moved on. 

Specific technologies like the anti-ship ballistic missile pair with comprehensive approaches like China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy to negate many of the advantages the aircraft carrier once bestowed. The sheer cost of these platforms means that losing even one in combat – or having one significantly damaged – could punch a hole in the United States’ strategic posture, with horrific cascading effects throughout the rest of the force.

America's Obsession with Aircraft Carriers is Dangerous

The Navy, of course, understands the changing reality it now faces. 

Yet it has done little to address the A2/AD threat. Instead, Washington continues flooding hard-earned U.S. tax dollars into building more expensive flattops whose utility is in question under present strategic conditions. If the aircraft carrier cannot get within range of a contested battlespace during a crisis, then it cannot launch its airwing. If it cannot launch its airwing, its usefulness as a power projection platform is erased. 

What’s more, these large systems are increasingly easy for rival A2/AD systems to locate, track, and target with extremely long-range weapons that are devastatingly precise.
The threat of A2/AD attacks could keep an American carrier force over the horizon of a contested battlespace. Some of these systems have a range over 1,000 kilometers. 

A Distraction Won’t Work

Trevor Phillips-Levine and Andrew Tenbusch, writing in Maritime Executive, suggest using America’s aircraft carriers as a ruse in any tactical situation. Drawing inspiration from the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the two authors argue the United States should deploy their carriers as a means of distracting a potential rival in a naval battle long enough for non-carrier units to be used more effectively in combat by the Americans. It’s an interesting suggestion.

The Japanese had correctly assumed that American intelligence analysts would detect the mass movement of Japanese warships and fixate on the presence of aircraft carriers. Japanese strategists understood that the Americans placed a high value on their own carriers, and they correctly postulated that the Americans would assume the Japanese similarly valued theirs. 

Japan got one over on the Americans. 

Of course, what the authors fail to mention is that while the Japanese diversion at the Battle of Leyte Gulf was successful in tricking the bulk of the American fleet, it ultimately ended in failure. Not only did the Americans still win the battle, they went on to win the whole war not long after that incident. 

One of the biggest issues facing Japan by the time this specific battle occurred was that the Imperial Japanese Navy, like the rest of the Japanese military, no longer had a healthy industrial base supporting their efforts. The forces deployed against the Americans were basically all that was left of the Japanese military.

Once those Japanese units were stymied, that was it for Tokyo. 

America’s Broken Defense Industrial Base

The United States today, while much larger than Japan was, is in a similar predicament. Its shipyards are in shambles. The U.S. Navy is the smallest it has ever been. The military is saddled with massive, complex, and costly systems. Losing one in combat would deal a crippling blow to American morale and to its overall strategic posture. 

The greater defense industrial base is lying prostrate, too, after years of being gutted by short-sighted financial interests, inconclusive Mideast wars, and a wasteful commitment to the lost Ukrainian cause. 

If the United States and China find themselves at war, the Americans will be at a serious disadvantage. 

Further, U.S. carriers are far too costly to risk in a ruse. Even if the maneuver were successful, the U.S. lacks requisite platforms to serve as alternative power projection units in a contested environment. A2/AD is a threat to all surface combatants, and the U.S. fleet is woefully lacking in submarines. 

Sly moves and strategic feints, while always a necessity in combat, will not save the U.S. from its overcommitment to aircraft carriers. Instead, the Americans must develop counter-A2/AD systems and strategies. Once an A2/AD network is removed as a threat, more conventional moves by the Americans, such as deploying aircraft carriers, can be attempted. 

What Must Be Done Instead

Instead of ruses, the Navy needs to focus on building hypersonic weapons, swarms of unmanned underwater vehicles, more submarines, and directed-energy weapons, for starters. Other services must back up the Navy in these endeavors. 

The overcommitment to expensive, massive flattops has created a severe vulnerability the likes of which have not been since the Royal Navy’s HMS Hood was sunk within the first five minutes of its major engagement with Hitler’s navy. 

Breaking the A2/AD web that China has created throughout the Indo-Pacific is the first, and only, priority of the U.S. Navy. Its carriers are useless until A2/AD can be overcome.

Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

James Graham Wilson. America’s Cold Warrior: Paul Nitze & National Security from Roosevelt to Reagan (Ithaca, Cornell University Press) 336 pp., $32.95.

Ten years ago, James Graham Wilson, a historian at the U.S. State Department, wrote The Triumph of Improvisation, an insightful account of Reagan, Gorbachev, and the end of the Cold War. Mr. Wilson’s America’s Cold Warrior, a biography of Paul Nitze, now reaches back to the Cold War’s origins and the long years of nuclear negotiations that followed. Wilson portrays Nitze, who died in 2004 at age ninety-seven, as the forerunner of the post-World War II generations of American national security professionals.

Nitze may be best known for guiding the preparation in 1950 of NSC-68, allegedly America’s strategic plan for prevailing in the Cold War. By the time the U.S. government declassified NSC-68 in 1975, the seventy-page document had achieved near-mythical status. As Wilson explains, later policy planners—including Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, a protege of Nitze—looked to NSC-68 as a model for rallying Americans to wage long struggles against formidable foes. No doubt today, Washington teems with aspirants who dream of drafting a new NSC-68 strategy to overcome China.

Nitze’s NSC-68 reflected the fearful era of the early Cold War, including the hot Korean conflict, threats to Berlin and Europe, and the new nuclear rivalry. Nitze had visited Hiroshima in 1945 and led surveys of strategic bombing. All his life, he worried about a nuclear showdown. His consistent solution was for the United States to secure a “preponderance of power,” both nuclear and conventional.

Nitze recognized, however, that policy plans had to be translated into actions, which he wanted to direct. Wilson recounts Nitze’s extraordinary experience on the front lines, often amid the risk of escalation to nuclear war: the Berlin and Cuban crises, the early nuclear negotiations, Vietnam, the Nixon- Kissinger treaties to limit strategic arms, and up to Reagan’s elimination of intermediate-range missiles, START negotiations, and strategic missile defense. Given all that experience, Colin Powell later reflected that working with Nitze “was like having Moses at the table.”

Moreover, Nitze was a sharp critic when out of power, so his biography targets the nuclear and arms control policies of Presidents Eisenhower, Carter, and George H.W. Bush, as well. By explaining Nitze’s views over fifty years, Wilson succinctly summarizes the nuclear debates of the Cold War.

The book also treats Nitze as a harbinger of a new technocratic cadre: the national security professional. Indeed, Nitze helped found and fund a new graduate school in Washington to train his successors, the School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS), now part of Johns Hopkins University. 

Nitze’s experience suggests some cautions for future security pros. He not only demonstrated his political independence by switching parties and working across administrations but also seemed dismissive of public attitudes, political constraints, and Congress. 

Even though Nitze began as a prodigy on Wall Street in the 1930s and later contributed to the Marshall Plan, his definition of strategic power narrowed to nuclear and conventional forces. He dismissed Eisenhower‘s balancing of economic prospects with burdens of defense spending and overlooked the USSR‘s economic weaknesses until the very end.

Nitze also failed to recognize the limits of his intellectual tenacity. According to one of his bosses, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, Nitze’s “peevishness“ and “unveiled contempt” for others doomed his appointment to the topmost rank. If Nitze did not receive deference, he could be vengeful.

Wilson’s biography acknowledges that Nitze’s service reflected his wealth, privilege, and formative early experience. After traveling in Europe as a boy in the summer of 1914, Nitze’s later outlook was always shaded by a sense that unexpected tragedy loomed. As a nuclear strategist, Nitze struggled to assure superior strength for the United States while maintaining stability and avoiding Armageddon. This conflict was one of the “tensions between opposites“ that fascinated him.

The author observes that today’s national security professionals still contend, as Nitze did, with issues of deterrence, nuclear threats, and confrontations among powers amidst newer dangers. In Nitze’s last years, he focused on the existential risks of climate change. Wilson has ably shown (in less than 300 pages) how State Department historians can extend their remit from publishing documentary records to enlivening the past—and educating those who seek to navigate the future.

Robert Zoellick served in national security and international economic posts during four U.S. administrations and is the author of America in the World.

Image: Rob Bogaerts / Anefo, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force's bomber fleet, once over 400 strong, has dwindled to just 157 airframes, many of which are outdated B-52s. This reduction poses a significant risk as tensions with China, which is developing the advanced H-20 stealth bomber, continue to rise. To maintain air superiority and deterrence, the Air Force is banking on the B-21 Raider, a next-generation stealth bomber born from the Long Range Strike Bomber program.

-However, with only 100 units planned for the next decade, concerns about insufficient production loom. The Raider, featuring a shorter wingspan for enhanced stealth and modular designs for future upgrades, is crucial for replacing the aging B-2 Spirit and ensuring the U.S. stays ahead in aerial warfare capabilities.

-Bottomline: Abandoning the B-21 program would severely compromise national security and America's ability to counter modern threats.

The Future of U.S. Bombers: The Imperative of the B-21 Raider Amid Growing Threats

The U.S. Air Force’s bomber fleet is much diminished. Fleet size has fallen to 157 bombers, and most of these aircraft are outdated B-52s. Until the early 1990s, the Air Force’s bomber fleet held more than 400 airframes. The downturn in numbers will be a problem if a full-blown war emerges in the near future. 

While the service is trying to add to its ranks by developing its latest stealth bomber program, only 100 B-21 Raiders are expected to reach the skies over the next decade. Some military experts believe such small production numbers may not match China’s own future bomber program, the Xi’an H-20 subsonic stealth bomber.

Without adequate bomber numbers, the Air Force’s air superiority over China comes under question. And in addition to their role in conventional operations, these airframes are a great deterrent to war. 

But what would make matters worse is nixing the Raider program altogether. If the Air Force does not adequately upgrade its aging bomber fleet, the service will be left unable to compete with its modernizing Chinese aerial counterparts.

What Is the Raider Program All About?

The U.S. Air Force currently flies three strategic bombers: the B-52 Stratofortress, the B-1B Lancer, and the B-2 Spirit. All three airframes remain viable, and the Spirit possesses stealth capabilities, but the service must deliver on its next-generation bomber program in order to keep up with its peers. 

The Raider was born out of the service’s Long Range Strike Bomber program in 2011.The Air Force is so committed to the Raider concept now that it seems to be purchasing the platform upfront, before the bomber has been fully vetted. This is a risk. Indeed, the “Fly Before You Buy” concept was perhaps best explained by Senator David Pryor back in the 1990s on the Senate floor: “Fly Before You Buy is not a new concept. It was first promoted in the wake of the Vietnam War after thousands of American soldiers lost their lives because of weapons that failed to perform as expected…Operational testing is of little or no use if it is conducted after the weapon system has been purchased.”

Specs and capabilities surrounding the new Raider remain highly classified, but some information and images have been shared. The upcoming platform’s wingspan is reportedly at least 15% shorter than its predecessors. This will make the Raider more challenging for enemy radar to detect – a key capability considering China’s modernizing defensive systems. Like the F-35 Lightning II fighter platform, the B-21 will also incorporate modular designs that will facilitate future upgrades as new technologies emerge.

The U.S. Cannot Afford to Nix the Raider Program

The U.S. must see the Raider program through. The B-2 Spirit is America’s sole operational stealth bomber, and its generation-old stealth technology will probably fall well short of the Chinese H-20’s eventual capabilities. Since the U.S. and its allies rely on the Air Force’s stealth bombers for deterrence, it would be a huge blow to national security if the Raider does not make it to the production line in time to properly replace the Spirit.

About the Author: Defense Expert Maya Carlin

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Summary and Key Points: The F-4 Phantom II, a third-generation American-built warplane, played a pivotal role in the Israeli Air Force (IAF) from the 1960s until its retirement in 2004. Known for its advanced avionics, versatile weaponry, and durability, the F-4 was integral in Israel's long-range and deep-penetration missions, especially during the Six Day War, the Yom Kippur War, and the Lebanon War.

-The Israeli-modified F-4s carried sophisticated radar systems, electronic warfare equipment, and a range of Israeli-made weapons, making them formidable adversaries in both air-to-air and air-to-ground combat.

-While Israel has since moved on to more advanced aircraft like the F-16I Soufa and the F-35 Lightning II, the F-4 Phantom II remains a symbol of Israel's resilience and aerial superiority during crucial conflicts in the mid-twentieth century.

The F-4 Phantom II: A Symbol of Israeli Defiance and Military Strength

The Israeli Air Force extensively used the American-built F-4 Phantom II. This aircraft was part of the third-generation warplane family, and it was an iconic warbird that defined America’s air war in Vietnam. The F-4 Phantom II was also a highly exported plane.

Today, the isolated Islamic Republic of Iran still utilizes some vintage F-4 Phantoms. But back in the 1960s, the F-4 was a gamechanger for the IAF and played a significant, productive role in several conflicts in the mid-twentieth century. 

Israel’s F-4 Phantom IIs engaged in long-range missions and delivered substantial firepower. 

Specifications 

What made Israel’s version of this plane so special was the special modifications installed to meet the specific needs of the IAF. The Israeli F-4s were equipped with advanced avionics, including a more sophisticated radar system, and they carried a variety of Israeli-made weapons. The IAF’s Phantom variants were fitted with electronic warfare systems, enhancing their survivability in hostile environments.

The Israeli F-4s could carry a multiplicity of air-to-air missiles, notably the AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-9 Sidewinder, along with a variety of air-to-ground munitions. Thus, the IAF’s Phantom was a lethal interceptor fighter capable of engaging both aerial and ground targets. 

Defensively, the F-4 Phantom was equipped with chaff and fire dispensers to confuse enemy radar and infrared-guided missiles. The Phantom’s frame could withstand a hit better than most other warplanes. 

Important Wars that Israel Used the F-4 Phantom II to Fight

The last squadron of Israel’s F-4 Phantom II fleet was retired in 2004. For nearly half a century, the F-4 was a mainstay of Israel’s fleet. This warbird served in a variety of conflicts, including the Six Day War, the Yom Kippur War, and the Lebanon War. The first two wars were widely considered to be existential fights in which Israel was nearly destroyed by its Arab neighbors.

F-4 Phantoms were one of the symbols of Israeli defiance and ultimate victory over their Arab neighbors. 

The IAF chose the Phantom due to its excellent performance, versatility, and ability to carry a substantial payload. That last point, coupled with the Phantom’s long range, made it ideal for Israel’s operational requirements, notably for deep penetration missions into enemy territory. This is a key point, considering how far-flug many of Israel’s rivals are. 

The Future of Israel’s Air Force

The F-4 Phantom was a crucial asset for the Israeli Air Force. This system helped to deliver multiple strategic victories to the Israelis in key conflicts they were involved in throughout the last half of the twentieth century. 

Inevitably, Israel purchased for themselves other, more advanced warplanes, notably the fourth-generation F-16I Soufa. More recently, Israel has acquired the F-35 Lightning II, a fifth-generation warplane built by the Americans. 

Nevertheless, the F-4 Phantom II was a critical platform for Israel when it needed advanced systems most. For that reason alone, the F-4 will always hold a special place in the hearts and minds of Israeli aviators. 

Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: Nearly 900 days into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the skies over the battlefield remain fiercely contested, prolonging the conflict. The Ukrainian Air Force, initially reliant on an antiquated fleet of Soviet-era fighter jets, is on the verge of receiving significant reinforcements from NATO countries, including around eighty-five F-16 Fighting Falcons from the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark, and an unspecified number of Dassault Mirage 2000D fighter jets from France.

-This influx of modern Western aircraft, coupled with intensified drone strikes on Russian air defenses, aims to achieve air superiority, potentially paving the way for an operational breakthrough on the ground.

-Training and logistical support from the UK and US are also bolstering Ukraine's aerial capabilities. Establishing control of the skies is seen as a crucial step towards ending the prolonged conflict.

Ukraine Prepares to Transform Air Warfare with F-16s and Dassault Mirages

Nearly 900 days after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the skies over the battlefield remain contested. This is the main reason why the war has dragged on for so long.

A lack of air superiority means that the Ukrainian Air Force and Russian Aerospace Forces haven’t been able to use aircraft consistently to take out ground targets and thus pave the way for an operational breakthrough somewhere along the contact line.

But now, Ukraine seems determined to change that and wrestle control of the skies.

F-16 Fighting Falcons, Dassault Mirages, Drones, and Deep Strikes

When the war began, the Ukrainian Air Force operated a largely antiquated fleet of Soviet- and Russian-made fighter jets. But now, Kyiv is getting close to receiving dozens of F-16 Fighting Falcon and Dassault Mirage fighter jets from several NATO countries. The addition of these Western combat aircraft will most likely change the dynamics over the skies of Ukraine and could lead to progress on the ground.

As it stands, Ukraine is set to receive approximately eighty-five F-16 fighter jets. Specifically, the Netherlands has committed up to forty-two F-16 Fighting Falcons, while Norway has committed to sending twenty-two and Denmark nineteen.

However, the type and condition of each aircraft varies. As a result, it is very likely that a smaller number of these aircraft will be operational, with the rest acting as a ready reserve of spare parts. In addition to the aircraft, several other countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States, have been providing training and logistical support to the Ukrainian Air Force.

The Ukrainian Air Force expects to receive a yet unspecified number of Dassault Mirage 2000D fighter jets from France. In June, French president Emmanuel Macron announced his decision to transfer the combat aircraft to Ukraine to help it win control of the skies.

In the meantime, the Ukrainian military has been using suicide drones to target and harass Russian air defenses with the goal of creating a gap that could be exploited later on by Kyiv’s new fighter jets.

“Ukrainian drone strikes deep within Russia continue to pressure Russia's air defense umbrella and force the Russian military command to prioritize allocating limited air defense assets to cover what it deems to be high-value targets,” the Institute for the Study of War assessed

in a recent operational estimate of the war.

F-16 Fighting Falcons and Dassault Mirage 2000D fighter jets equipped with modern Western munitions would have an easier job establishing air superiority and taking out high value targets if the Russian air defense umbrella is sufficiently weakened.

“Ukrainian forces continue targeting Russian air defense systems in occupied Ukraine and in Russia’s border areas to set conditions to field F-16 fighter jets following their anticipated Summer-Fall 2024 arrival to Ukraine,” the Institute for the Study of War added.

Taking control of the skies is an important first step in creating the conditions for an operational breakthrough on the ground that could finally end this brutal conflict.

About the Author: 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The United States Air Force and the newly elected UK Labour government are both showing hesitation towards their respective sixth-generation fighter jet programs due to rising costs. The US Air Force's Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program and the UK's Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) face scrutiny, with concerns paralleling past budget overruns seen in the B-2 Spirit and F-22 Raptor programs.

-UK Armed Forces Minister Luke Pollard emphasized the importance of the GCAP but noted the need for cost-effective procurement. The Labour government is currently reviewing its defense strategy, potentially impacting the £12 billion commitment to GCAP.

-Both programs involve multinational collaborations, including Japan and Italy for GCAP, highlighting the global implications of these cost concerns.

Labour Government Hesitates on GCAP Amid US Air Force's NGAD Apprehensions

The United States Air Force is apparently getting cold feet regarding the development of a sixth-generation fighter, which is being developed as part of the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program that calls for a system of systems, including an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that could act as a loyal wingman. The cost of the manned fighter component of the NGAD is a major concern, and the U.S. Air Force can ill afford an expensive mistake – possibly noting how both the B-2 Spirit and F-22 Raptor programs were significantly scaled back.

It would seem that the apprehension over the cost of the future fighter isn't one limited to the U.S. Air Force, as it was reported last week that the new UK Labour government, which took power earlier this month, now views the UK-led Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) as "important," yet isn't ready to go all in.

"It is a really important program for us. It's important for our partners in Japan and Italy … and we're meeting both those partners next week to underline that. But it's not right for me to prejudge what might happen in the [Strategic] Defence Review." explained Armed Force Minister Luke Pollard at the Global Air and Space Chiefs Conference in London on Thursday, according to a report from Breaking Defense.

"We need cutting-edge capabilities," added Pollard. "We need to make sure that when we're procuring systems, high-end systems, future systems that we need to keep our people safe, we do it in the most cost effective way and that is by working with our partners."

As Breaking Defense further reported, the Tory government had committed spending upwards of £2 billion ($2.6 billion) on GCAP until 2025 and an additional £12 billion ($15.5 billion) on the program overall, yet, it is unclear if  Labour will stick to that level of funding.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who took office on July 5, had launched a strategic defense review. Labour is expected to continue the efforts of the Conservative Party that called for greater investment in military defense, and to maintain the UK's prominent role in the NATO alliance.

Will Lack of Confidence in the NGAD Shoot Down the GCAP?

However, there is also speculation that the UK could follow the lead of the U.S., and that could be the breaks on the GCAP.

"It's notable that the US Air Force is saying it can't potentially afford NGAD, and given that NGAD already has prototypes flying around is their third or fourth attempt to build a combat stealth aircraft, they're very good at it and it's US funding, if the US thinks it is maybe unaffordable … then I think we probably need to look very carefully at how we're going to do this in Europe," Justin Bronk, senior research fellow for airpower and technology at the Royal United Services Institute, also said at the Global Air and Space Chiefs Conference. "But for the immediate term, you’ve got to stop the Russians from trying to test NATO militarily in this decade, otherwise, everything else is kind of irrelevant."

Where the UK may have an advantage is that it has lined up foreign partners. The UK and Italy's Tempest program merged with the Japanese F-X project. In December 2022, the UK, Japan, and Italy signed an international treaty to collaborate on the development of an advanced front-line fighter.

Tempest was initiated to develop a replacement for the Eurofighter Typhoon, which is operated by both the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Italian Air Force, while the F-X program was jumpstarted to produce an aircraft to replace the aging Japanese F-2 fighters. It is worth noting that all three nations have adopted the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II multirole fifth-generation stealth fighter – but appeared to be looking towards a sixth-generation combat aircraft.

The multi-national industry team includes BAE System, Rolls-Royce, Leonardo, MBDA UK, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, IHI, and Mitsubishi Electric.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched an aerial strike on Houthi-controlled targets near Hodeidah, Yemen, in response to recent drone attacks on Israel that resulted in casualties.

-Utilizing at least a dozen aircraft, including the advanced F-35I Adir, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) executed a mission reminiscent of the 1985 "Operation Wooden Leg."

-This marked a significant demonstration of the F-35I’s long-range strike capabilities. Israel, the sole operator of the F-35 in the Middle East, has enhanced its fleet with unique electronic warfare systems and other upgrades, solidifying the F-35I Adir’s role in its defense strategy.

F-35I Adir Leads IDF Strike on Iran-Backed Houthi Rebels in Yemen

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it carried out strikes on targets controlled by the Iran-back Houthi rebels in Yemen on Saturday, hitting positions close to the port city of Hodeidah. It came following a months-long series of Houthi attacks on Israel, including a drone assault on Friday that killed one Israeli citizen and injured 10 others.

The militant group may not have anticipated that there would be such a response as Israel has not struck back previously, but it was clearly wrong if that was its thinking.

The aerial raid carried out by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has been compared to that of "Operation Wooden Leg," the IAF's attack on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Tunis. In that operation – the IAF's longest aerial strike to date – nearly 30 years ago, the IAF employed eight F-15 Eagle fighters assisted by two aerial refueling tankers.

During Saturday's raid on the Houthi rebels, the IAF utilized at least a dozen aircraft, including the F-35I Adir – the Israeli-specific variant of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation multirole fighter. Videos of the stealth fighters being refueled over the Red Sea have been shared on social media.

"A short time ago, warplanes attacked military targets of the Houthi terrorist regime in the Hodeida port area in Yemen, in response to the hundreds of attacks against the State of Israel in recent months.

There is no change in the directives of the Home Front Command. If there are changes we will update.

More details to come," the IAF announced in a post on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter.

The first F-35I Adir landed in Israel eight years ago, and the fifth-generation multirole fighter has been employed in numerous combat operations. On May 22, 2018, Israeli Air Force commander, Major General Amikam Norkin, reported that the F-35 was used to strike Iranian missile launch sites in Syria, while in April 2022, an Israeli F-35 was credited with shooting down a pair of Iranian drones for the first time.

The F-35's ability to target the Houthi militants in Yemen further confirms that it is well-suited to long-range strike missions.

The F-35I Adir in the Spotlight

Israel remains the sole operator of the F-35 Lightning II in the Middle East. Currently, 36 of the original 50 ordered by the Jewish state have been delivered, but the total force could grow to as many as 75 within the next decade, as Israel signed a deal last month for an additional 25 of the fifth-generation fighters – to be delivered at a rate of three to five annually beginning in 2028.

Though an "early adopter" of the F-35, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) expressed concerns that the aircraft's stealth capabilities could be partly overcome within a decade despite the 30 to 40-year service life. To address that very serious issue, Israel sought to utilize its own electronic warfare system (EWS). Initially, the U.S. refused to allow such changes over security concerns.

However, it eventually agreed to allow Israel to integrate its own EWS, including sensors and countermeasures, on top of the U.S. systems. Additional changes included a special, IAF-tailored helmet-mounted display, and bespoke datalink functionality that is specific to the IDF, while other enhancements further improved the F-35's already-potent data gathering and processing capabilities.

Those enhancements to the stealth aircraft were also significant enough to warrant an 'I' designation, making the F-35I one of just a handful of formally acknowledged F-35 variants. The Israeli Air Force gave the F-35I the name Adir, meaning "Mighty One" in Hebrew.

It was now used in a mighty strike against the Houthis.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine has drained its resources, leading to potential cuts in its naval fleet. The Kirov-class battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy, one of Russia's two nuclear-powered surface warships, may soon be decommissioned due to high maintenance costs.

-These formidable vessels, designed during the Cold War to counter U.S. carriers, are the largest surface combatants after aircraft carriers.

-While the Admiral Nakhimov, the other surviving Kirov-class cruiser, is expected to return to service soon, Moscow’s financial constraints and the war’s demands raise questions about the future of these naval giants.

Each day Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine continues, the Kremlin is funneling scores of resources into fueling its offensive efforts.

Experts estimate that Moscow has lost more than half of its main battle tank arsenal, in addition to loads of munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles and other military systems.

Crippled by hefty international sanctions amidst its ongoing war, the Kremlin is looking to make cuts where it can. In April, the Russian state-run news outlet TASS reported that the country’s Pyotr Velikiy battlecruiser may soon be decommissioned due in part to excessive maintenance and repair costs.

As one of two nuclear-powered surface warship in Russia’s Navy, the Pyotr Velikiy plays a significant role in the service. Strapped for cash, however, Moscow will likely retire this colossal sized vessel.

That is a shame, at least for Moscow, as these warships are pretty powerful. 

Introducing the Kirov-class

Second in size only to large aircraft carriers, the Kirov-class nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers are the largest ships in Russia’s arsenal.

During the Cold War, the Kirov-class vessels were designed to counter American aircraft carriers. The Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad launched its warship in 1977. Four more vessels we laid down up until the collapse of the USSR. Initially, the boats were named to honor Bolshevik revolution heroes, but these names were changed to coincide with the end of the communist state.

Only two battlecruisers survived the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the financial woes of the Russian Navy- the Pyotr Velikiy and the Admiral Nakhimov. 

Both ships are massive in size and can pack a punch. When designed during the Cold War, the ships were intended to function primarily as missile cruisers. However, over the next decade, the Soviets shifted gears and wanted the vessels to prioritize anti-submarine warfare instead.

In terms of air-to-air armament, these Kirov-class ships can sport 96 S-300F, 40 4K33, and 192 3K95 short-range surface-to-air missiles in addition to six Ak-630 close-up defense systems.

These battlecruisers were also fitted with various fire control radar, air/surface search radar, and hull-mounted sonar. 

As detailed by one defense expert, “The propulsion system was a combination of nuclear power and steam turbine, with two nuclear reactors coupled to two oil-fitted boilers, which superheated the steam produced in the reactor plant to increase the power output available during high-speed running, while it also provided an essentially unlimited range.”

An Overview of Russia’s Two Remaining Battlecruisers

Both Pyotr Velikiy and the Admiral Nakhimov were expected to undergo repairs to enhance their capabilities.

However, reports now indicate that only the latter will actually make it past this phase.

As the latest move in a series of reductions to Russia’s sea-based fleet, this decision was likely influenced by the ongoing Ukraine war.

These hefty ships are pricey and Moscow could allocate resources planned for the Pyotr Velikiy to its offensive efforts in Kyiv.

The Admiral Nakhimov was supposed to return to service just two years after initially being laid up for refit back in 1997. Since the early 2000’s, a series of delays have pushed back this timeframe.

Within the last five years alone, Russian officials purported that the Admiral Nakhimov would re-enter service by 2018, 2018 and 2021. 

The Altered Fate of Admiral Nakhimov

Latest estimates indicate that the Admiral Nakhimov is expected to re-enter service with the Russian Navy over the next two years. Analysts predict that country’s sole remaining Kirov-class cruiser will serve under the Northern Fleet.

As explained by Bulgarian Military, this move will reflect “the Russian Navy’s Arctic region prioritization due to its emerging importance as a key trade route and geopolitical battleground. The Northern Fleet’s positioning also allows the warship to contribute significantly to Russia’s strategic missile defenses.”

While exact details concerning Admiral Nakhimov’s refitting remain unclear, industry experts predict the ship will feature Russia’s new Tsirkon missiles which are currently under development. Earlier this year, Putin sent a frigate to the Atlantic Ocean with this new generation hypersonic cruise missile in tow. According to Russia’s defense minister, the Tsirkon (or Zicron), is capable of overcoming all missile defense systems and can fly at speeds reaching Mach 9.0 with a range of over 1,000 km. 

While the Admiral Nakhimov’s claimed firepower would make it one of the most potent surface combatant ships globally, the Kremlin does have a history of exaggerating the true capabilities of its military systems.

This spring, Moscow deployed its top-of-the-line T-14 Armata to Ukraine. Widely touted to be the most formidable tank to ever trek across the battlefield by the Kremlin, the tank’s service in the war was short-lived.

By summertime, Moscow withdrew its Armata tanks from the conflict, despite its already dwindling available tank arsenal. Obviously, the T-14 did not perform up to standard. Once the Admiral Nakhimov re-enters service with the Russian Navy, only time will tell if the ship’s claimed capabilities are realistic. 

About the Author: Maya Carlin

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The Kirov-class battlecruisers, once the centerpiece of the Russian Navy's offensive strategy, have not lived up to their initial hype. Launched in 1977, these nuclear-powered warships were designed to counter U.S. submarines and carrier groups with a formidable array of missiles and heavy armament.

-However, only four were built, and today just one remains in service while another languishes in drydock. In the era of advanced anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, the utility of large surface warships like the Kirov-class and American aircraft carriers is increasingly questioned.

-Both nations may need to rethink their naval strategies to focus on more relevant and resilient capabilities.

Kirov-Class Battlecruisers: A Costly Boondoggle in Modern Naval Warfare

If the centerpiece of the United States Navy’s offensive strategy was the aircraft carrier, since the Cold War era, the Russian Navy’s main offensive system was their battlecruiser. Heavily armed, nuclear-powered, and seriously armored, the Kirov-class battlecruiser was to be the most important strategic asset in the Russian fleet. 

Yet, as my colleague, Peter Suciu, outlined in an article in these pages last year, the Kirov-class “never lived up to the hype.” 

Of course, one could say the same about America’s vaunted aircraft carriers in the age of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) defensive systems of the kind that both China and Russia possess (as well as their partners in Iran and North Korea).

The fact of the matter is that the era of surface warships might be at an end because of how sophisticated A2/AD has become (and how ubiquitous these systems have become). As for the Kirov-class, they struggled in ways that America’s flat tops never did. The Soviets and, later the Russians, envisaged these beasts raging across the world’s oceans in ways that sent shivers down the spines of even the Americans. 

The Kirov-Class Never Lived Up to Its Hype

Launched in 1977, the Kirov-class’s eponymously named warship was the second largest warship to traverse the oceans (next to America’s aircraft carriers). Four of these behemoths were built since then. They inspired so much fear-and-loathing among the US Navy’s brass that the Iowa-class battleships were refurbished and brought back into service in the 1980s as a counterweight to the Soviet battlecruiser threat. The Kirovs were loaded with potent long-range missiles rather than the traditional “big guns” that usually armed the decks of similar sized warships.

These warships carried an assortment of other missiles as well as torpedoes. They also housed three helicopters. 

Despite these beastly armaments, the Kirov-class lacks the staying power those other systems, such as those belonging to the US Navy, enjoy. Four warships were built between 1977-1988. 

Of those four, only two remained until 2023. The Admiral Nakhimov has been languishing in drydock since 1999! The other battlecruiser, the Pyotr Veliky, was slated to be modernized but the Russian Navy ultimately announced it was being retired last year. 

As for the Admiral Nakhimov, it has been undergoing “modernization” in port for years. There is real concern among Russia’s military planners that the warship will never leave port; that it will simply be constantly upgraded. Nevertheless, the Russians appear committed to refurbishing this weapon of war—giving it all new and deadlier weapons, to boot!

The Russian Battlecruiser and American Aircraft Carrier Aren't Useful Today

Although, this gets back to a point raised earlier: are large surface warships even relevant in today’s era of A2/AD and hypersonic weapons? 

The Americans have overcommitted to their aircraft carrier capability to the detriment of other, more relevant capabilities, such as their submarines. Meanwhile, the Russians appeared to have done something similar with their Kirov-class battlecruisers. 

In fact, the Russians should have gotten the wake-up call when their warship, the Moskva, which belonged to the smaller and cheaper Russian battlecruiser Slava-class, was sunk by the Ukrainians at the outset of the Russo-Ukraine War.  

Investing heavily into modernizing the remaining Kirov-class battlecruisers is a waste. 

Circumventing A2/AD with Distance

A similar fate which befell the Moskva could easily befall the Kirov-class, modernization notwithstanding. A better use of resource for any navy today would be to spend its money on developing effective countermeasures against drone swarms, hypersonic weapons, and massive numbers of antiship missiles. 

At the same time, being able to deploy offensive systems far beyond the range of A2/AD systems would ensure that a navy remained relevant in this age of contested environments. 

The Russians are making the same mistake that the Americans are in investing so heavily into their surface prestige weapons. These systems will not prove decisive. They are boondoggles. 

About the Author 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Summary and Key Points You Need to Know: The Kirov-class battlecruiser, known to the Soviets as Project 1144 Orlan, has been a significant presence in the Soviet/Russian Navy since 1980. These nuclear-powered, guided-missile warships are the largest surface combatants in the world, second only to aircraft carriers.

-Developed during the Cold War to counter U.S. Navy submarines and carrier strike groups, the Kirov-class boasts an impressive array of weaponry, including anti-submarine and anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and advanced defense systems.

Russia's Naval Titan: The Enduring Legacy of the Kirov-Class Battlecruiser

The Kirov-class is a nuclear-powered guided-missile battlecruiser that has been in service with the Soviet/Russian Navy since 1980. The Kirov, known to the Soviets as Project 1144 Orlan (sea eagle), holds special distinction: she is the largest and heavier surface combatant warship, in service, anywhere in the world.

The only modern warships larger than the Kirov are aircraft carriers. The Kirov is the size of a World War I-era battleship – and is typically referred to as a battlecruiser because of its size and shape.

Making Waves

The debut of the Kirov, predictably, caught the attention of Western war planners. When the Kirov debuted, the Cold War was climaxing, and both global superpowers were monitoring one another’s weapon development with paranoid vigilance.

The appearance of the Kirov, the world’s largest and heaviest surface combatant warship, concerned the Americans, who felt they might be falling behind their rivals. To balance the perceived deficiency in surface warships, the US recommissioned the Iowa-class battleships – World War II-era battleships that had long since been outdated but were still massive and heavily armed and capable of delivering significant amounts of ordnance on target.

The Kirov, in turn, was developed to counter the US Navy submarines. Accordingly, the Kirov carried a large payload of SS-N-14 anti-submarine missiles – and later, the Kirov was modified to carry twenty P-700 Granit anti-ship missiles (aka SS-N-19 Shipwreck) for countering the US carrier strike groups.

In addition to the SS-N-14 and SS-N-19 missiles, the Kirov was outfitted with twelve octuple S-300F surface-to-air launchers with 96 missiles and a pair of Osa-MA batteries with 20 missiles each. One of the Kirovs, the Pyotr Velikiy, carries the S-300FM, which makes her the only ship in the Russian Navy capable of ballistic missile defense. Other weapons included on various Kirov ships include the Metel anti-submarine warfare missiles; the 3K95 Kinzhal surface-to-air missile systems; a bow-mounted RBU ASW rocket launcher; eight 30mm (1.18in) AK-630 close-in weapon systems; the Kortik air-defense system; automatic 130mm (5in) AK-130 gun system; ten 21-inch (533mm) torpedo/missile tubes (9capable of firing RPK-2 Vyuga ASW missiles on later ships) and Udav-1 with 40 anti-submarine rockets and two sextuple RBU-1000 launchers.

Russia is developing a new hypersonic anti-ship missile, the 3M22 Tsirkon, which will be deployable from the Kirov.

A Kirov-Class Comeback?  The massive Kirov measures 827 feet long with a 94-foot beam and a 30-foot draft. When fully loaded, the Kirov displaces 28,000 tons. The battlecruiser relies upon a 2-shaft CONAS and 2 KN-3 nuclear marine propulsion with two GT3A-688 steam turbines – all of which can generate 140,000 horsepower. The Kirov’s top speed is 32 knots (37 miles per hour). The Kirov’s range is 1.000 nautical miles at 30 knots, or unlimited when operating at 20 knots on nuclear power. To use the Kirov, she requires a complement of 710 sailors.

In all, four Kirovs were built, while one was canceled. Two have since retired, and one is undergoing a refitting. Admiral Nakhimov has been mothballed since 1999 but is expected to return to service at somepoint. 

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on global affairs issues. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points You Need To Know: The Russian Navy's sole nuclear-powered guided-missile battlecruiser, the Pyotr Velikiy, might be decommissioned due to high maintenance costs and its deteriorating condition.

-The Kirov-class ship, part of the Soviet Project 1144 Orlan, is one of the largest and heaviest surface combatants. Initially designed during the Cold War to counter the U.S. Navy's submarine capabilities, the Kirov-class was equipped with SS-N-19 Shipwreck anti-ship missiles and an array of advanced defense systems.

-Despite its formidable armament, the extensive repairs and modernization needed to keep Pyotr Velikiy operational may lead to its retirement, marking the end of an era for Russia’s naval fleet.

Russia's Kirov-Class Battlecruiser Faces Possible Decommissioning

The Russian Navy might decommission its sole nuclear-powered guided-missile battlecruiser, the Pyotr Velikiy. According to Tass, this Kirov-class ship costs too much to maintain. The vessel’s poor condition, coupled with the repairs and modernization needed to keep it relevant, mean its demise may be approaching. 

The Kirov class was designated by the Soviets as Project 1144 Orlan (Sea Eagle). It includes the largest and heaviest surface combatant warships to sail the seas. Second in size only to larger aircraft carriers, these ships have remained an important component of Russia’s naval fleet.

Kirov ships were conceptualized during the Cold War to counter the capabilities of the U.S. Navy’s submarine fleet. Specifically, the USSR desired a battleship class capable of carrying a large payload of SS-N-14 anti-submarine missiles and later P-700 Granit anti-ship missiles. The Granit long-range anti-ship missile system (designated by NATO as SS-N-19 Shipwreck) was the primary armament of the Kirov class. 

With their multi-variant target engagement program, Granit missiles could share information while in flight. However, these weapons could not be controlled after being launched. The lead missile would always assume a high-level flight trajectory, followed by subsequent missiles at a lower level.

Kirov-Class Battlecruisers Packed a Punch

The Shipwreck missile was designed in the 1970s to replace the Soviets’ shorter-range P-70 Ametist and P-120 Malakhit missiles. Soviet officials strongly desired the missile, seeing it as a better counter to the U.S. Navy’s rapidly advancing carrier battle groups. The Shipwreck was constructed by Chelomei/NPO Mashinostroyenia. By the early 1980s, the weapon was deployed aboard the Kirov cruiser. Granit launchers were also incorporated onto the Soviet’s aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, giving it added primary attack capability.

The -300F air-defense missile complex is also equipped on Russia’s lone remaining Kirov-class ship. As detailed by Naval Technology, “The Osa-MA air defense missile system is supplied by the Znamya Truda Plant based at Saratov. The ship has two double launchers and 40 missiles. The system can operate autonomously or it can be integrated into the ship’s combat systems and download target data from the ship’s sensors. Osa-MA has a range of 1.2 to 10km at an altitude between 25m and 5,000m.”

The addition of the Kashtan air-defense missile/gun system gives the Kirov-class ship an added edge, defending against an array of precision weapons including aircraft, anti-radar missiles and air bombs, and even small naval ships. This system is able to engage up to six targets at the same time, with a gun range of 1.5 km for altitudes up to 4,000 meters. 

Russia’s Ametist Design Bureau, Izumrud JSC, and Tula Engineering Plant supply the Kirov ships’ 130mm AK-130 multipurpose twin-barrel gun. Notably, the gun can be operated remotely under autonomous control, or manually. 

Sputnik provides more detail surrounding the S-300 on the Kirov-class ship, claiming its radar can track multiple aerial targets at altitudes of 30km and ranges out to 300 km. 

“Pyotr Veliky is armed with 48 S-300F Fort and 46 S-300FM Fort-M (SA-N-20 Gargoyle) medium-range surface-to-air missiles (with effective range of up to 200 kilometers), 128 3K95 Kinzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) short-range SAMs, and six CADS-N-1 Kashtan gun/missile systems,” Sputnik reports.

Initially, the Kirov was also equipped with the RPK-3 Metel (designated by NATO as SSN-N-14 Silex) and the RPK-2 Vyuga (designated by NATO as SSN-N-15 Starfish). 

The majority of these weapons systems are positioned forward, while the ship’s stern is designed to house a below-deck helicopter hangar and other machinery.

About the Author: Maya Carlin

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points You Need to Know: The U.S. Air Force faces significant challenges as it grapples with developing the B-21 Raider, a new long-range stealth bomber, amidst looming financial crises and budget constraints. The Air Force needs at least 300 B-21s to maintain effective deep strike capabilities, but is slated to receive only 100 over the next decade.

-The B-21 features advanced stealth technology, capable of penetrating contested airspace, but budget limitations and the rise of drone warfare complicate its viability.

-Augmenting the B-21 fleet with next-generation drones could enhance mission success and survival, crucial as tensions with China and Russia escalate.

B-21 Raider: Essential Investment or Costly Gamble?

The United States Air Force is in a real pickle. It’s not the only part of the US government that is facing significant problems. In fact, the whole country is about to be riven by a catastrophic debt crisis, now that America’s enemies (and friends, such as Saudi Arabia) have killed the petrodollar and begun the movement to remove the US dollar as the primary reserve currency in the world. 

It’s probable that the Pentagon doesn’t even realize how cooked its budgets are. 

Even without the pending debt crisis and subsequent financial reordering heading our way, though, the military has been struggling to deliver systems as promised—despite paying top dollar for these systems. 

One of the biggest problems facing the Air Force (and the other branches in their own way) is how to develop a platform that can reliably penetrate contested airspace belonging to a near-peer rival, such as China or Russia, without being shot down outright? 

Enter the Air Force’s newest long-range stealth bomber, the B-21 Raider. This bird has it all. It incorporates the most advanced version of stealth. Unlike previous stealth planes, this has an entirely upgraded composite skin, making it even harder to identify on radar. 

These planes move fast for a bomber. What’s more, they can deliver an assortment of lethal payloads over distant, otherwise well-defended targets. 

The B-21 Raider Has a Math Problem 

There’s just a tiny problem: the Air Force needs at least 300 of these birds in the next couple of years for it to be worth the massive investment. At best, the Pentagon will receive 100 of these warbirds over the next decade. And even then, many are understandably inquiring about whether investing this system is the most efficient use of America’s limited (and soon to be dwindling) resources.

After all, as I have argued repeatedly, we are now in the age of rampant drone warfare that undermines most concepts of warfare that so many of our leaders hold dear. 

Still, the Air Force needs a deep strike bomber capacity. It has already made the investment into these platforms. But if it is not going to get the required 300 units for this to be an effective investment, the Air Force should spend considerably smaller sums of money building next-generation drones to operate in tandem with the B-21. 

What’s more, the Air Force (along with the Army and the rest of the force) must pool their limited resources to both build offensive hypersonic weapons systems as well as viable defenses against enemy hypersonic weapons.

The idea, though, that the B-21 is a waste of time or money is ridiculous. It is without a doubt the most advanced bomber in the world. If the Americans committed to building at least 300 of these units as quickly as possible, the rest of the world would be put on notice. 

Failing that, augmenting the handful of B-21s that are being built with advanced drones will allow for the B-21 to not only penetrate the sophisticated air defenses of enemy airspace but it would also ensure mission success. 

As well as mission survival. 

Time is running out for all of these issues, though. Soon, a shooting war either with China or Russia will be upon us. Their advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) and other air defense systems will deny most of the Air Force’s fleet reliable access to contested regions. 

It will, therefore, fall upon stealth systems (which even then will find it difficult to operate). But the most advanced stealth technology as found in the B-21 will be instrumental in overcoming the threats posed to US power projection platforms. 

The B-21 is a worthy investment. Now pair it with next-generation drones and listen to our enemies cry.

Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force is currently testing the B-21 Raider, a new stealth bomber designed to deliver nuclear and conventional ordnance. The Air Force is phasing out the B-2 Spirit and B-1 Lancer to make way for the B-21, raising concerns due to the untested nature of the new aircraft.

-Canceling the B-21 would jeopardize the Air Force's stealth bombing capabilities, leaving the U.S. dependent on outdated B-52 bombers.

-This would compromise the nuclear triad and reduce the strategic edge over adversaries. The success of the B-21 Raider is crucial for maintaining U.S. military strength and deterrence capabilities.

B-21 Raider: Why the U.S. Air Force Can't Afford to Cancel Its New Stealth Bomber

The US Air Force is currently flight testing their newest aircraft, the B-21 Raider, a stealth bomber capable of delivering nuclear and conventional ordnance.

The Air Force appears to be “all-in” on the B-21, opting to phase out the B-2 Spirit and the B-1 Lancer as it comes online.

The heavy commitment to a new airframe, which remains mostly untested, has raised some eyebrows and places significant pressure on the B-21 to deliver, as canceling the program doesn’t appear to be an option.

What if the B-21 were Cancelled

The Air Force is fully committed to the B-21. Actually, the Air Force seems to be skirting the “Fly Before You Buy” concept of aircraft procurement, in purchasing the B-21 upfront before the aircraft has been properly vetted.

“Fly Before You Buy is not a new concept,” Senator David Pryor said on the Senate floor in 1994. “It was first promoted in the wake of the Vietnam War after thousands of American soldiers lost their lives because of weapons that failed to perform as expected…operational testing is of little or no use if it conducted after the weapon system has been purchased.”

The Air Force Needs the B-21 Raider...Badly

The B-21 has not been thoroughly vetted yet must work as planned because the entire structure of the Air Force is dependent upon the B-21 working.

Were the B-21 cancelled for some reason, the US could potentially lose their stealth bombing capabilities. The B-2, America’s current stealth bomber, is being replaced for a reason; that reason is because the B-2’s stealth technology is already a generation-old and not as effective as when it first debuted. Soon, if not already, the B-2’s stealth may not be sufficient at all, rendering the aircraft, functionally, a non-stealth aircraft.

Without a stealth bomber in the inventory, the US would lose a major advantage over its adversaries, who fear the capabilities of the stealth bomber fleet. The mere existence of a stealth bomber offers a diplomatic and strategic edge; the capabilities are unmatched.

And were the B-21 to be cancelled, were the US left without a stealth bomber option, their nuclear triad would be compromised. True, the US has non-stealth aircraft capable of delivering nuclear ordnance, most notably the B-52 – but the non-stealth aircraft would be incapable of entering contested airspaces, where nuclear payloads are most likely to need to be delivered. The ultimate effect would likely be that the nuclear triad were reduced to a nuclear duad, consisting of just land- and sea- based nuclear options.

If the B-21 were cancelled, the Air Force would surely want to do the cancelling before the B-2 and the B-1 were taken off-line, otherwise, the US would be stuck solely with the aged B-52 fleet as the only bomber in the entire inventory.

The B-52 debuted in the 1950s, and many of the airframes are in questionable condition; B-52 flights are often grounded for mechanical reasons, and its unlikely the fleet could handle the increased burden of being the sole bomber at the US military’s disposal.

Indeed, canceling the B-21 would cause problems for the US military. Hopefully, the new stealth bomber will perform as advertised during its initial flight testing.

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The B-21 Raider is the most advanced long-range stealth bomber globally, crucial for restoring U.S. deterrence against China and Russia.

-However, America’s current industrial capabilities and reliance on materials from China pose significant challenges.

-The U.S. Air Force needs 300 B-21 units but is slated to receive only 150 over the next decade, costing $600 million each. Given potential economic constraints, prioritizing the B-21 is critical, yet alternative solutions like stealth drone swarms might be more feasible.

-These drones could support fifth-generation fighters like the F-22 and F-35, offering a cost-effective way to maintain air superiority and meet future combat demands.

Stealth Drones vs. B-21 Raider: Exploring Affordable Alternatives for U.S. Air Dominance

The B-21 Raider is the Air Force’s newest long-range stealth bomber. It’s undoubtedly the most advanced bomber in the world. If it could be produced to the level that the Air Force (quickly) needs them to be produced at, the United States would have likely restored a key element of its failing deterrence against China and Russia. 

But America’s industrial strength today is a fraction of what it was in the Second World War. In fact, our defense industrial supply chain sources many of its materials from China. 

Between that and the broken nature of the US defense industrial base, these planes won’t be available in any meaningful number anytime soon.

Anyway, the Air Force needs at least 300 units of the B-21. 

They’re slated to receive only 150 units over the next decade. At $600 million per unit, it seems unlikely that the Air Force will ever get its desired number of 300 units—let alone 150. They’ll probably get a few to a dozen aircraft in this model over 15 years (and with serious cost overruns and additional delays). 

Will it be worth the cost? 

The B-21 is Being Given the Short Shrift 

These are the questions that military planners must now ask themselves as we stare down the face of a massive debt crisis and likely recession. Unlike 2008, there will be no bailouts to be had, meaning that when the crisis hits the wider economy it will be felt for the duration of the crisis. The military will be impacted along with the rest of the country.

Personally, I think the Air Force should prioritize this plane over almost all of its other considerations. Having 300 of these birds soon would truly deter America’s rivals. But if the Air Force cannot—and Congress won’t allow for them to—build requisite numbers of these birds, the Air Force might want to consider canceling the project now and working its lessons learned into something more affordable. 

Drone swarms are a critical feature of any future combat planning. Yet, the United States is still working on this in the concept phase. If the Air Force cannot get the number of B-21s it wants and needs to achieve a deterrent effect, then it is necessary to look at other, cheaper modalities. 

Again, the B-21 is the best vehicle for restoring deterrence but if it’s too expensive and if the Air Force won’t prioritize it, then we need something else.

The Air Force is already working on advanced drones, such as the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) concept that Kratos is building (the XQ-58 Valkyrie). These drones will support the mission sets of America’s fifth-generation warplanes, the F-22A Raptor and the F-35 Lightning. The XQ-58 costs anywhere between $20.5 and $27.5 million per unit (significantly cheaper than the B-21). 

Creating stealth drones that are capable of swarming would be more expensive, though still less than the B-21 Raider costs.

A More Economical Solution

Building off the Air Force’s CCA concept, stealth drones could be deployed from F-22 or F-35 “motherships.” From there, these drones, armed with advanced propulsion and, eventually, artificial intelligence (AI), will augment existing air capabilities. The stealth drone swarms, at least in theory, would deliver the same kind of firepower over distant targets that the B-21 Raiders can—but at lower costs and with no direct danger to American pilots. 

Plus, building an entirely new generation of drones that are stealth capable, longer-range, and can swarm will help keep the amazing F-22A Raptor relevant (the Air Force idiotically wants to retire this great plane to make way for its ghastly sixth-generation warplane boondoggle). 

Time is of the essence. 

The world is speeding towards even greater geopolitical problems in which every technological asset that America can bring to bear will be required. Right now, the United States is going to lose that war. It needs to significantly—fundamentally—change things up. Before it’s too late. 

Stealthy drone swarms married to America’s fifth-generation warplane fleet is the surefire answer. 

Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The B-21 Raider, unveiled in late 2022, represents the future of the U.S. Air Force bomber fleet. This sixth-generation stealth bomber is progressing on schedule, a rarity in military procurements.

-With costs between $600 million and $750 million per unit, it is significantly cheaper than its predecessor, the B-2 Spirit. Currently undergoing testing at Edwards Air Force Base, the B-21 will offer unmatched range, stealth capabilities, and durability.

-Designed to deliver both nuclear and conventional munitions, the Raider will serve as the Air Force’s premier deep-penetration bomber, ensuring strategic reach and effectiveness.

-The B-21 Raider stealth aircraft is the future of the U.S. Air Force bomber fleet. The sixth-generation strategic bomber was unveiled in late 2022 and conducted its first flight late last year. 

B-21 Raider: Advanced Capabilities and On-Schedule Progress for the U.S. Bomber Fleet

The B-21 Raider is the latest-technology project, yet it is surprisingly moving along as planned. 

B-21 Raider Moving Along 

That Northrop Grumman’s B-21 Raider is progressing according to plan might sound unremarkable to someone without knowledge of military procurements, but it is in fact a surprising development. 

New military projects tend to go over budget and over the agreed timeline. Sometimes by a few years and a few billion dollars, while other times a project may lag for many years and cost hundreds of billions of dollars more than expected. 

The estimated cost of the new strategic bomber hovers between $600 million and $750 million per aircraft. That is a lot, but it is still cheaper than the B-2 Spirit, the aircraft it will be replacing, which has a price tag of $2 billion per unit. 

In total, the B-21 has been in development for close to a decade and will be the first strategic bomber to join the fleet since the B-2. 

The first B-21 Raider prototype aircraft are currently undergoing intense flight and technology testing at Edwards Air Force Base in California.

The Capabilities of the B-21 Raider 

As a sixth-generation strategic bomber in development, not a lot is known about the specific capabilities of the Raider. We know that it is going to have stealth capabilities, that it will be able to carry nuclear and conventional munitions, and that it will be the go-to deep-penetration bomber for the U.S. Air Force. 

During the unveiling ceremony of the strategic bomber, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin provided some information about the capabilities of the aircraft. 

“Let's talk about the B-21's range. No other long-range bomber can match its efficiency. It won't need to be based in-theater. It won't need logistical support to hold any target at risk,” Austin stated. 

This means that the B-21 Raider, like its predecessors, will be beyond the reach of enemy munitions. That makes it a truly strategic asset. 

“Let's talk about the B-21's stealth. Fifty years of advances in low-observable technology have gone into this aircraft. And even the most sophisticated air-defense systems will struggle to detect a B-21 in the sky,” Austin added.

Stealth doesn’t make an aircraft invisible. But an aircraft with good stealth capabilities can remain undetectable to enemy air defenses, giving it precious time to deliver munitions. 

“Let's talk about the B-21's durability. You know, we really don't have a capability unless we can maintain it. And the B-21 is carefully designed to be the most maintainable bomber ever built,” the Pentagon’s top official added. 

Good operational availability is an important aspect of a capable aircraft. What is the point of having a Ferrari in your garage if you can’t drive it because it constantly breaks down? 

About the Author 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: Russia's sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, has faced numerous challenges since its commissioning, reflecting the broader issues within the Russian Navy. Unlike the U.S., which mastered aircraft carrier operations during and after World War II, Russia’s land-focused military delayed serious carrier development until the 1980s.

-The Kuznetsov, built in the Soviet Union’s final days, suffers from technical limitations, including the use of mazut fuel, outdated launch systems, and poor construction quality. Maintenance issues have plagued the vessel, often requiring tugboat escorts.

-Despite its shortcomings, Russia persists with the Kuznetsov to maintain a semblance of naval capability.

From Dreams to Disasters: The Saga of Russia’s Admiral Kuznetsov

Aircraft carriers are the ultimate symbols of national power projection. The United States has led the world in aircraft carrier operations ever since the Second World War. Back then, there were multiple powers with flat tops, not just the United States. In fact, the US Navy didn’t know what to do with the aircraft carriers it had built before the tragic events of December 7, 1941—Pearl Harbor. 

It was the Imperial Japanese Navy that had pioneered the use of aircraft carriers as an offensive weapons platform. After all, the symbol of power projection back then was the battleship. But Japan did not attack Pearl Harbor with battleships. They used aircraft carriers. Similarly, the naval campaign of the Pacific Theater during the Second World War was not won by the battleship. It was won by the US Navy’s carrier force.

After World War II, the carrier remained as the pinnacle of naval power. Throughout the Cold War, American flat tops were the envy of the world. Whereas the Americans had mastered the art of aircraft carrier operations and had made the flat tops the basis of their surface fleet, the Soviet Red Navy lagged far behind the Americans. It was not until the 1980s that the Soviets even seriously contemplated building their own aircraft carrier. For decades, the Soviet Navy had made the heavy battlecruiser and submarines the basis of their navy’s power projection capabilities. 

Geography’s Influence on the Russian Navy and Aircraft Carriers

The Soviet Union and, today, the Russian Federation is a predominantly land power. Occupying a large swathe of northern Eurasia, Russia has conducted its military operations usually across the continent as opposed to across the oceans, as so many other Western powers had done. This geographical reality has informed every aspect of Russian society. It explains why Russia is has trended toward autocracy. And why it took so long for Moscow to even contemplate building aircraft carriers. 

By the time that Moscow opted to build an aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, was intended to be one of three carriers. Unfortunately for the Russians, the Cold War ended, and the Soviet Union died with it. What followed was chaos and poverty. Moscow retained control over its carrier but Russian experience maintaining a carrier—an inherently costly endeavor under the best of circumstances—was limited. 

What’s more, the carrier was an incomplete mess heap that should have probably been scrapped or sold to the highest bidder (as was what happened to the Admiral Kuznetsov’s sister ship which became China’s first carrier, the Liaoning).

The Aircraft Carrier Admiral Kuznetsov’s Technical Limitations

Run on “a goopy, tar-like substance,” called Mazut, which is a petrochemical derivative, the Russian carrier was never as advanced as its American counterparts, which ran on more efficient and powerful nuclear energy. Mazut creates an amazing amount of pollution, so much, in fact, that it poses a health risk to sailors and to the equipment on the ship employing Mazut as a fuel source. Yet, it is relatively cheap and Russia being a petro-producing superpower, never has to worry about the supply chain for this low-grade fossil fuel being disrupted.

Burning this energy, though, creates security risks as well as health risks for the ship employing it. Namely, a large smoke trail, which can be seen for many miles, billows from the warship’s smokestack, and leaves a trail that would be easy for an enemy to track. 

The carrier is an antique, too. 

It uses neither a steam powered catapult nor an electromagnetic catapult, such as does the US Navy’s new Ford-class carriers do, to launch aircraft into the wild blue yonder. Instead, a ski jump ramp is used to help deploy fighter jets from the carrier. What this means, for all practical purposes, is that aircraft deploying from the Admiral Kuznetsov must be lighter than what they normally would be—meaning those aircraft must carry less armaments than they would, if they launched from another carrier that possessed a powered catapult system.

The infrastructure within the warship itself is shotty. Built during the terminal days of the Soviet Union, engineers at the Ukrainian shipyard where this jalopy was built cut significant corners. Cheap, ineffective pipesdegrade the efficiency to transfer pressurized Mazut to the engines. This has caused all kinds of knock-on problems for the carrier. 

Then, of course, there’s the fact that the funding to maintain the aircraft carrier has been inconsistent and pretty much lacking. Thus, the carrier has been chock full of problems because of shabby maintenance schedules and inadequate parts. 

Oh, and don’t forget all the engine woes the carrier has been made to endure. It’s gotten so bad for the carrier that, for many years, the warship was forced to travel with a tugboat. There has been long period when the carrier could not leave port because of all the maintenance issues. 

A Hodgepodge of Broken Dreams & Lost Hopes

The Admiral Kuznetsov is a hodgepodge patchwork of broken dreams and lost hopes. 

The only reason Moscow keeps dumping money into the warship is because the Kremlin fears the creation of a capabilities gap in its navy. Sure, Russia’s navy has nowhere near the level of experience managing carriers that the Americans do. But they don’t have to be on par with Washington in that domain. They just need to have some degree of knowledge—especially if, inevitably, China and Russia fuse their carrier programs on some level to counter the Americans, as I fear they will eventually do. 

Those (limited) Russian carrier capabilities will be essential for helping China as much as China’s mass production capabilities will be critical for helping to establish a Russian carrier presence. 

There is no doubt, though, the Admiral Kuznetsov is truly the worst aircraft carrier ever made. Certainly, it is the most dilapidated on the high seas (or not on the seas) today. 

About the Author

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The Russian Navy's sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, has been undergoing a troubled refit since 2018, with uncertain prospects for returning to service.

-Initially intended as a symbol of Russian naval pride, the carrier has faced numerous setbacks, including mechanical issues, fires, and corruption.

-Historically, Russia has prioritized land-based power over naval dominance, focusing on submarines and missile cruisers.

-Despite considering new aircraft carriers like the "Shtorm," financial and strategic challenges, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, make it unlikely that Russia will soon develop a new carrier. The ongoing issues with Admiral Kuznetsov underscore the broader struggles of the Russian Navy.

The Russian Navy's Aircraft Carrier Woes: A Deep Dive into Admiral Kuznetsov"

The Russian Navy's sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov, has been undergoing a refit since July 2018. The Kremlin has announced that the warship could finally conduct sea trials sometime in the future – but whether that actually happens has yet to be seen.

The problem-plagued warship was meant to be a symbol of pride for Moscow, but it has often been the butt of numerous jokes – often with good reason. At one point, the Kremlin did consider a replacement, yet likely, the warship will never sail.

And also for many good reasons.

Russia Has Been a Land Power

It is true that throughout the Cold War, the United States Navy's aircraft carriers were used for force projection throughout the world. Nearly a dozen and half aircraft carriers played a role during the Korean War, and naval aircraft provided much-needed air support – especially in the early stages of the conflict. The carrier air wings were instrumental in destroying enemy supply depots, bridges, roads, and railways. When the tide turned in November 1950, as Chinese forces pushed Allied units south, U.S. Navy aviators covered the retreat.

More than 250,000 sorties were flown by the U.S. Navy, contributing one-third of the total air effort in the war. The case for Cold War carriers was made, especially as the U.S. Navy began the war with 15 active carriers and ended it with 38 in service.

After the war, even as the United States developed strategic aircraft, concealed intercontinental missiles throughout the Midwest, and launched a fleet of ballistic missile submarines, aircraft carriers played a crucial role in providing a defensive parameter around the United States.

"Control of the seas means security; control of the seas means peace; control of the seas can mean victory," stated President John F. Kennedy.

In the years that followed, U.S. Navy carrier strike groups have been deployed dozens of times to launch sorties around the globe. Today, the warships continue to allow the U.S. military to maintain force projection that is simply unrivaled.

The question then can be asked why didn't the Soviet Union – with its goal of spreading communism across the world – build true aircraft carriers? The short answer is that the Soviet Union, like Imperial Russia before it, was always a land-based power.

The Soviet's Failed Aircraft Carrier Ambitions

Despite it being a land-based power, there were numerous efforts to develop aircraft cruisers. Yet, the Soviet Union instead underwent a rapid modernization in the 1960s and 1970s that focused on submarines, as well as guided-missile cruisers and destroyers. Moscow saw the threat that the carriers presented, but Soviet military planners had to face the reality of its limited resources and the high cost to build and maintain carriers.

One factor was that, unlike the United States, the Soviets lacked the overseas bases to support the warships. Without foreign port facilities or the ability to resupply a carrier strike group at sea, Moscow could have truly employed the warships as effectively as the United States Navy.

It was only after Leonid Brezhnev came to power that the Soviet Union finally began to consider aircraft carriers once more. It eventually launched a total of two Moskva -class helicopter carriers, one in 1965 followed by another in 1968. The first Soviet aircraft carrier to support fighter jets, the Kiev-class, was only launched in 1975. It was a race that was already long lost, as the United States Navy's carrier efforts dated back to 1910.

The one serious attempt to build a carrier comparable to the American standards began as "Project Orel" in the 1970s, but it was scuttled over costs and disagreements within the Kremlin over the Soviet military's strategic priorities. Only in the 1980s did Moscow finally move forward with a new class of "aircraft cruisers."

In the end, just a single flattop was completed. Launched as the Leonid Brezhnev, and later as the Tbilsi, she was renamed Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As of July 2022 that aircraft cruiser is currently undergoing a refit, during which time she has suffered a number of misfortunes. Her sister vessel Varyag was sold to China by cash-strapped Ukraine and refurbished as the Type 001 Liaoning.

The Modern Russian Carrier

In 2018, it was announced that the Russian Navy had begun to explore options for a new aircraft carrier. According to GlobalSecurity.org, one option was focused on a conventionally powered vessel with a displacement of around 70,000 tons – slightly larger than the 58,600-67,500 tons full load Project 1143.5 Admiral Kuznetsov. Another option called for a nuclear-powered carrier, with a larger displacement. That would be bigger than the 42,000-ton French Navy flagship Charles de Gaulle – the only non-U.S. Navy nuclear-powered carrier – yet not likely as large as the 100,000-ton American supercarriers.

The new "Shtorm" aircraft carrier – a.k.a. Project 23000E – was to be included in Russia's armament program for the 2019 to 2025 period.

As the trade magazine SP's Naval Force also reported in 2018, "Project Shtorm was shrouded in mystery for several years until an initial concept was unveiled by the Krylovsky State Research Center (KRSC) back in 2015. The new super-carrier would displace close to 100,000 tonnes, 330 m long, 40 m wide and could launch 80-90 aircraft with an EMALS system."

Russian officials had suggested the carrier could be laid down between 2025 and 2030 – while a model was presented at a past Army Technical Forum. Yet, as of 2020, the project hadn't been approved and given its financial costs would likely impact other Russian naval modernization efforts.

"Considering the estimated program cost of $9 billion, it seems quite unlikely that economically weakened Russia will move beyond the design stage," SP's Naval Force added.

That assessment was made before Russia's Ukrainian folly, and notably before vast sums of money were thrown into modernizing the Admiral Kuznetsov. Given the current situation – not to mention the advancements in anti-ship weapons – it would seem unlikely the Shtorm will ever be more than a concept that failed to sail off the drawing board.

Author Experience and Expertise

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, plagued with endless mechanical and operational problems, has not participated in the ongoing Ukraine conflict due to prolonged maintenance since 2017.

-This Cold War-era vessel, using outdated Mazut fuel and an ineffective bow ramp for aircraft launches, highlights significant deficiencies in Russia's military capabilities. The carrier's persistent issues, including boiler failures, poor piping, and structural damage, have raised questions about the future of Russia’s naval power.

-With resources stretched thin due to the war in Ukraine, the likelihood of Russia investing in a new aircraft carrier appears low.

-In fact, this aircraft carrier has just one enemy: no willingness by Russia as of yet to scrap the carrier. 

Admiral Kuznetsov: A Symbol of Russia's Naval and Military Challenges

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has offered revealing insights into the health of the Russian military.

While Russia is often billed as a near-peer power of the United States, with a capable fighting force, the Russo-Ukraine War has laid bare the rampant deficiencies of a Russian military that has struggled to establish a foothold in the territory of a weaker neighbor.

Russia has underperformed in air, land, and sea – deploying weapons systems that have fared poorly against the Ukrainian’s low-tech defense mechanisms.

The Russian invasion has renewed focus on Russian military specifics, raising criticism about outdated tanks, undertrained troops, and a shoddy naval fleet.

One vessel is especially notable: the Russian’s lone aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov. To date, the Kuznetsov has failed to take part in ongoing hostilities – because the ship has been under maintenance since 2017, without a return date set.

The Admiral Kuznetsov has been so problematic that some observers have suggested Russia abstain from making aircraft carriers in the future.

Admiral Kuznetsov: Shifting priorities

Russia has become embroiled in a war of attrition, in what is generally considered the most viscous fighting on the European continent since the end of World War II.

The conflict, which has placed emphasis on land-based systems, caused Russia to hemorrhage tanks and soldiers – which, of course, taxes Russia’s finite resources. Paying for something like a new aircraft carrier is not a priority.

An aircraft carrier exists to project airpower flexibly without needing a fixed, land-based airfield. Sure, parking an aircraft carrier in the Black Sea could help supplement Russia’s ability to launch ground strikes on Ukraine or perhaps compete to control the air space above Ukraine. But Russia has more pressing concerns and the likelihood of investing in a new aircraft carrier right now seems low.

Besides, Russia’s current aircraft carrier has proven to be a massive headache.

Problems at Sea for Russia's Only Aircraft Carrier 

The Admiral Kuznetsov has a few problems - and that is putting it nicely for sure.

One, the Kuznetsov runs on Mazut, an outdated petrochemical that leaves a thick and hazardous exhaust fume. Whereas modern aircraft carriers are using nuclear power, and can operate indefinitely, the Kuznetsov burns fuel as if it were an automobile – imposing limits on the carrier’s range and endurance.

Relatedly, the burning of Mazut requires the fuel to be preheated and pressurized, which requires an extensive system of piping. Yet, the Russians installed low-quality pipes on the Kuznetsov. Piping failures have constantly plagued the Kuznetsov. The boat’s boilers tend to fail, too, forcing operators to alternate between working boilers, and occasionally, use just one boiler. The result has been a boat that sometimes travels as slow as four knots per hour.

The Russians recognizing that the Kuznetsov is prone to breaking down outright, always assign tugboat escorts to stick with the aircraft carrier, just in case she must be towed back to port.

Mazut, and the faults of the related infrastructure, are not the only problems hindering the Kuznetsov’s performance. The Kuznetsov employs a bow ramp to launch aircraft, which has proven outdated and limiting.

Modern aircraft carriers rely on catapults to launch aircraft. The Nimitz-class, for example, uses a steam catapult; The Ford-class uses a magnetic catapult (the EMALS). Both catapult systems can launch relatively heavy aircraft because the catapult is able to reach high speeds in a short distance. The Kuznetsov, meanwhile, does not use a catapult. Instead, Russia’s lone carrier uses a simple bow ramp. With a bow ramp, aircraft simply take off, self-powered, off an upward lilting ramp.

The bow ramp launches aircraft at a relatively slow speed – just fast enough to sustain flight. But the low speed doesn’t leave much room for error – and heavier planes, are unable to reach the speeds necessary to sustain flight from a bow ramp. The result is that the bow ramp can only launch relatively light aircraft.

And to meet the weight requirements of the bow ramp, Russian aircraft must cut down their ordnance and fuel loads. In effect, the Kuznetsov is only capable of launching aircraft that have had their range, and their ability to strike enemy positions, reduced. Since the aircraft carrier exists to project airpower, the Kuznetsov’s bow ramp detracts from the boat’s fundamental mission.

An Uncertain Future for Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia's Only Aircraft Carrier

If the Russians are ever going to make another aircraft carrier, they will need to consider what has gone wrong with – and potentially fix – the Admiral Kuznetsov, which has been docked for maintenance since 2017.

But the maintenance is way behind schedule. Fires, and in one dramatic instance, a 70-ton crane punching through the ship's deck, have added years to the Kuznetsov’s repair schedule.

Given the Kuznetsov’s checkered performance and past and given the resource commitments of the Russo-Ukraine War, the prospects of Russia building a new aircraft carrier in the near future seem dim.

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a seasoned defense writer with over 1,000 articles posted. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: Russia's sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, has become a symbol of persistent naval woes. The carrier, infamous for its black smoke and mechanical failures, has faced numerous setbacks, including fires, accidents, and corruption.

-In 2011, U.S. Navy officials even feared it might sink during a Mediterranean deployment. Despite plans to retire the vessel by the decade's end, its ongoing refit, started in 2018, has been plagued by delays and accidents.

-With the latest reports suggesting service resumption no earlier than 2024, Admiral Kuznetsov continues to drain resources, raising questions about its future viability.

The Costly Nightmare of Russia's Only Aircraft Carrier Admiral Kuznetsov

So many jokes could be made about the Russian Navy's flagship aircraft cruiser Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov - or Admiral Kuznetsov, for short - that most comedians would run out of time before they ever ran out of material.

The cursed carrier has been plagued with endless problems, and it is unclear when – or even if – the Cold War-era warship will ever return to service.

The Navy Feared Russia's Only Aircraft Carrier Could Sink

What wasn't a laughing matter is that in late 2011, some United States Navy officials feared Russia's only carrier would sink in the Mediterranean Sea as she struggled during her only fourth deployment from her northern base to reach the Russian naval facilities in Syria.

The concern was reportedly so great that the United States Navy's Sixth Fleet was even tasked with maintaining contact in case the carrier floundered.

The fears were actually well-founded, as just two years earlier Admiral Kuznetsov suffered a fire at sea while deployed to the Mediterranean, resulting in the death of a sailor onboard. In addition, the flattop – which had notoriously and routinely belched black smoke – spilled hundreds of tons of fuel into the sea while refueling.

Unlike western vessels that use gas turbines or nuclear power, the Russian flattop uses mazut as fuel, which often results in a trail of heavy black smoke that can be seen from great distances. Such a smoke signal is hardly ideal as it practically announces the location of the carrier.

Moreover, at best, the flattop's endurance is a mere 45 days, while Russia has few ports where the aircraft cruiser could operate year-round. During deployments, the carrier was often escorted with tugs in case she were to break down. Worst of all, the carrier relies on a bow ski ramp to launch fighters, and the Russian designs are ill-suited to the task.

She Made It Home to Russia (Barely)

It is hard to say for sure if the U.S. Navy's concerns were overstated – and perhaps they were meant to make the Russian warship look bad (not that much effort was required) – but in fairness, Admiral Kuznetsov did manage to make it to Syria and back to her home port at Severomorsk near Murmansk.

Yet, the problem hasn't gotten better, and after breaking down in a storm in late 2015, the carrier had to be towed back to port.

While the original plan from the Kremlin had been to retire the warship by the end of this decade, it isn't clear if she'd return to service in time to be retired.

The vessel has been undergoing a refit since 2018, and just recently, it was reported that the warship had suffered another repair delay and won't likely reenter service until 2024… at the very earliest.

A source in the Russian defense sector told state media that there have been defects in the work, and as a result, Admiral Kuznetsov will remain in dry dock for refit longer than initially planned.

The time already spent in the repair facilities hasn't really improved matters, and in some ways, those efforts have been to blame for the delays.

In November 2018, Admiral Kuznetsov was damaged when a 70-ton floating crane fell on the warship's flight deck, which tragically killed one worker and injured four more.

It was just over a year later that a fire broke out in the engine room during a welding accident; and it resulted in the death of two, while 14 more suffered injuries from fire and smoke inhalation. In addition, the actual drydock, which was vital to the repairs, was also damaged during a power outage, further delaying the refit.

Corruption has also contributed to the lack of progress on the carrier's refit. In March 2021, Yevgeny Zudin, general director of Shipyard No. 10 in Polyarny, was arrested under suspicion of the theft of 45 million rubles (approximately $600,000) that had been allocated to the repair of the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet flagship.

Given these factors, the best option would be for the Kremlin to cut its losses and deep-six this sad excuse of a warship.

For now, it is just a hole in the water that Russia keeps pouring money into with no end in sight – while the carrier is truly the biggest joke floating (or barely floating as the case may be).

About the Author: Peter Suciu 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

All images are Creative Commons. 

The choice of the Olympics as a target follows the logic of terrorism itself.