Summary and Key Points: The USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) is on its way to the Red Sea to relieve the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) as part of the U.S. Navy's ongoing carrier rotations in the Middle East.
-This comes amid increased tensions in the region following Israel's actions against Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, as well as the Houthis, who have been firing missiles.
-The carrier rotation highlights the U.S. Navy's struggle to maintain a consistent presence with its nuclear-powered supercarriers, which are stretched thin across multiple global hotspots. With the deployment of CVN-72, the Navy continues to juggle its limited carrier resources, emphasizing the challenges of sustaining long-term operations.
Aircraft Carrier Swap – USS Abraham Lincoln is on the Way to the Red SeaThe United States Navy's West Coast-based Nimitz-class nuclear-powered supercarrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) is now on her way from the Pacific to the Red Sea, where she will relieve her sister carrier, the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71). It was just weeks ago that CVN-71 arrived in the 5th Fleet area of operation, taking over for another Nimitz-class carrier, USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69).
"To maintain a carrier strike group presence in the Middle East, the Secretary has ordered the Lincoln Carrier Strike Group to replace the Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group, currently on deployment in the Central Command area of responsibility," the U.S. Department of Defense said in a statement, adding that Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, "has ordered additional ballistic missile defense-capable cruisers and destroyers to the U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command regions. The Department is also taking steps to increase our readiness to deploy additional land-based ballistic missile defense."
Exactly when the transition between the two carrier strike groups will occur, but US Naval Institute (USNI) News reported that it will likely take CVN-72 about two weeks to cross the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It also isn't fully clear how long the West Coast-based carrier will remain in the waters of the Middle East, but already, the U.S. Navy is preparing to send USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) to the region after she completes pre-deployment training.
The rotation of carriers serves to highlight how stretched thin the United States is right now. USS Dwight D. Eisenhower had seen her deployment extended twice, and the decision was made to send USS Theodore Roosevelt to the region to prevent a third extension. However, CVN-71 has also been deployed since January 11, 2024, and is due to return home soon.
Houthis and More: Regional Tinderbox in Red SeaThere has been the presence of a U.S. Navy CSG in the Middle East since last fall after the Hamas terrorist attack on southern Israel last October as well as missile attacks from the Houthis. The USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) was sent to the Eastern Mediterranean in response, and the lead vessel of the U.S. Navy's new class of supercarriers saw her deployments also extended twice.
The Pentagon is preparing a "multiple forthcoming force posture," which comes in response to Israel's assassination of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders in Tehran and Beirut respectively.
Officials from Hamas, and Hezbollah, as well as those from the Islamic Jihad and Yemeni-based Houthi rebels – also backed by Tehran – met on Thursday with top Iranian government officials. There are now fears that the Iran-back militant groups, as well as the Islamic Republic, could respond by launching additional attacks, possibly escalating the ongoing Gaza conflict into a full-blown regional war.
"The Secretary of Defense has reiterated that the United States will protect our personnel and interests in the region, including our ironclad commitment to the defense of Israel," the Pentagon added.
The Aircraft Carrier GapThe deployment of CVN-71 to the Middle East has left in the Indo-Pacific and served to highlight the U.S. Navy's "Achilles Heel" – namely that there simply aren't enough warships to go around. As noted, the U.S. Navy extended the deployment of CVN-69 multiple times and the warship and her crew were pushed hard as a result.
Exactly how stretched thin the U.S. Navy's carrier fleet has only come into focus as the sea service must deal with multiple threats at the same time. Even as CVN-69 has returned home from the Red Sea, CVN-71 will remain in the region for a few more weeks, with CVN-72 acting as a stopgap until USS Harry S. Truman finally arrives in the region.
The United States Navy is now forced to play an increasingly complex game of musical chairs with its operational carriers. It may technically operate eleven nuclear-powered supercarriers – ten Nimitz class and one Gerald R. Ford class – but rarely are more than five or six at sea at any given time.
Long deployments mean longer time undergoing maintenance, and the problem is made worse by the state of the U.S. carrier industrial base, which builds and maintains the vessels, including the lack of shipyards. Nuclear-powered carriers are also taking longer to build, are costly to maintain, and then costly and complex to retire. Worst of all, there may not be enough of them in service!
Author Experience and Expertise: Peter SuciuPeter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.
Mark Twain is often credited with saying that history does not repeat itself, but it does often rhyme. He might well have been talking about the stock market’s repeated tendency to ignore deteriorating economic and political fundamentals. When it finally wakes up to this reality, it’s too late.
Something like this occurred in 2008 in the run-up to the 2008–2009 Great Economic Recession. And now, something similar seems to be occurring in the wake of last week’s disappointing U.S. employment report and the Bank of Japan’s surprise decision to raise interest rates. That latter rise has caused a spike in the Japanese yen that has caught many hedge funds off guard. Those hedge funds had been funding their large-scale purchases of U.S. tech companies with, up until now, cheap Japanese yen loans.
During the first half of 2008, the stock market experienced only a moderate decline. This was despite the clearest signs that the largest housing bubble in the country’s history had burst, the emergence of serious problems in the subprime market, and Bear Stearns’ failure in March 2008.
It was only after the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008 that the market realized how complacent it had been about the housing and sub-prime credit market stresses that were in plain sight. When it did so, it lost around 50 percent in its value by March 2009.
Fast forward to today. This year, we have seen a stock market boom despite the fact that over the past two years, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates at the fastest pace in over a decade and despite the many signs of economic and political trouble at both home and abroad. One indication of that boom is the fact that the major stock market indices repeatedly scaled new heights, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index blowing past 40,000 and the S&P 500 Index blowing past 5,500. Another indication is the fact the stock market’s total capitalization reached the nosebleed level of almost 200 percent of GDP. That is around two standard deviations above its historical trend line.
If, in early 2008, the U.S. stock market was overly sanguine in the face of a domestic housing and sub-prime credit market problem, up until last week, it seems to have been overly optimistic about a host of economic and political problems both at home and abroad.
One of the problems to which the markets have turned a blind eye is the slow-motion train wreck that is now well underway in the U.S. commercial property market as more people work at least part of the time at home. Never mind that this problem has the potential of triggering another round of the regional bank crisis. Meanwhile, the market has chosen to ignore a substantial souring in the international economic outlook. Never mind that the Chinese economy, the world’s second-largest, is struggling with the bursting of an epic-sized housing and credit market bubble. Until very recently, Japan was battling the collapse of its currency, and a heavily indebted France now seems to be drifting towards political ungovernability, which could precipitate another round of the European sovereign debt crisis.
As if these economic problems were not reason enough for markets to have been more cautious, there are a number of political landmines in plain sight that could deal a significant blow to the U.S. and world economies. The Israel-Hamas war seems to be spreading to Iran, which could disrupt the world oil market. Meanwhile, at home, Donald Trump is threatening to introduce Smoot-Hawley-type import tariffs if he is re-elected, which could trigger a world trade war.
We have to hope that the Federal Reserve realizes that today’s stock market weakness is unlikely to be a passing fad given the poor underlying world economic and political fundamentals. Maybe then the Fed will do the right thing and start cutting interest rates aggressively to provide long-overdue support to a weakening U.S. economy.
About the Author: Desmond LachmanDesmond Lachman is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and was a deputy director in the International Monetary Fund’s Policy Development and Review Department, and the chief emerging-market economic strategist at Salomon Smith Barney.
Image: Shutterstock.
Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force faces a growing capability gap as it retires aging warplanes without sufficient replacements. With the B-21 Raider delayed and current stealth bombers in short supply, reviving the F-117A Nighthawk could be a cost-effective solution.
-Despite being officially retired in 2008, the Nighthawk has continued to serve in classified testing, highlighting its enduring value.
-Instead of pursuing costly next-generation platforms, the Air Force could modify the F-117A for modern combat, potentially filling critical roles until new aircraft are ready.
-Given current geopolitical instability, restoring the Nighthawk to full operational capability may be a strategic necessity.
It’s Time to Bring Back the F-117A NighthawkThe U.S. Air Force has a significant problem on its hands. America’s air branch has invested gobs of tax dollars on equipment and systems that are complex and expensive. Their current warplanes are being retired or rendered obsolete by new technologies at such alarming rates that the Air Force cannot replace them.
It’s Not (Quite) Over for the F-117A NighthawkOne of the Air Force’s most important advantages is that its warplanes possess stealth capabilities that many of America’s rivals still can’t match. Indeed, for decades, the Air Force has proudly operated multiple versions of stealth bombers and warplanes such as the B-2 Spirit and the F-117 Nighthawk. But their cost and age have prompted the Air Force to begin retiring these planes.
Yet the Nighthawk, which was officially retired from service way back in 2008, just won’t stay down.
Since its official retirement, the Air Force has pulled the Nighthawk back into service on various occasions. No, it wasn’t sent to fight in any of America’s ongoing wars, but it was used for classified testing purposes. One can only assume that the various systems the Air Force has been developing to enhance the stealth capabilities of its newest platforms or sensors that can detect stealth planes were being tested against the F-117.
In 2017, Congress permitted the Air Force to begin disposing of its F-117 Nighthawk fleet to the tune of four airframes per year. Per Congressional mandate, the Air Force could either send these airframes to the scrapyard or to museums.
By 2022, however, the Air Force altered its decommissioning plan for the Nighthawk fleet. They took it down from four to two, maybe three disposals per year. The War Zone reports that the “exact status of the Air Force’s current remaining F-117A inventory, including how many are still flying, is unclear. As of 2019, the service said it still has 51 jets in its possession and then said the following year that at least 12 had been specifically set aside to go to various museums.”
But for these platforms to make their way for public viewing at museums, a rigorous, time-consuming process of modification must be undertaken to remove the classified systems embedded within the aircraft.
If Nighthawks are still so advanced that they must be rigorously decommissioned, should they really be retired?
Would America’s air warfare capabilities be better served by simply modifying these birds to better withstand the evolving and complex nature of modern warfare?
The F-117 Nighthawk is Still Ready for WarGiven that the Air Force has been warning of a severe gap forming in their capabilities as planes are retired, might it be necessary to restore the Nighthawk to fighting prowess, at least until newer systems are available in sufficient numbers?
That should probably be considered, given the strategic liabilities taking shape.
For example, the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber’s replacement, the B-21 Raider, is unlikely to be available in the necessary numbers anytime soon. B-2s are already far too few in number. If retired as planned, they will leave a gaping hole in the Air Force’s capabilities. Without a long-range stealth bomber at the ready, critical functions of the Air Force’s arsenal will be degraded to the point of being combat-ineffective.
And in the current unstable geopolitical environment, that’s the last thing any country should want for its air force.
Bring the F-117A Nighthawk Back to Full Operational CapabilityThe Air Force has been very coy about why they have kept some 40 Nighthawks around, 16 years after they were officially retired.
Rather than spending gobs of money on fanciful next-generation warplanes, such as the Air Force’s egregiously expensive Next Generation Air Dominance (or NGAD), why not simply spend a fraction of that money augmenting the F-117 Nighthawk? Make it into a stealthy drone-ferrying warbird, just as the Air Force wants to do with its proposed sixth-generation warplane.
Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. WeichertBrandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.
From the Vault
Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships
Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)
Summary and Key Points: The Ukrainian Air Force has officially begun operating F-16 Fighting Falcons, marking a significant milestone in its transition to Western combat aviation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed the jets are now in use, as Kyiv is set to receive 79 aircraft from NATO allies.
-While the F-16s offer advanced capabilities, including intercepting cruise missiles and drones, analysts caution they may not be game changers in the ongoing conflict. The U.S. has approved the transfer but won't provide its own jets, focusing instead on supplying ordnance.
-The arrival of the F-16s enhances Ukraine’s air defense but may not decisively shift the war’s outcome.
The F-16 is Now in Service With the Ukrainian Air Force2024 has been a year of milestones for the F-16 Fighting Falcon, including the 50th anniversary of its first flight, and the transformation to a testbed for autonomous flight. On Sunday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also confirmed that the Ukrainian pilots have been operating the U.S.-made multirole fighter within the war-torn country.
"F-16s are in Ukraine. We did it. I am proud of our guys who are mastering these jets and have already started using them for our country," Zelensky said from an undisclosed location while being flanked by a pair of Fighting Falcons as two more soared overhead.
"This is the new stage of development of the air force of Ukraine's armed forces," Zelensky added. "We did a lot for Ukrainian forces to transition to a new aviation standard, the Western combat aviation."
The official announcement that the F-16s are now in Ukraine comes days after images of the fighters in the skies near Kharkiv appeared on social media. Kyiv is on track to receive a total of 79 of the jets – donated by Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands. Though an older variant, the F-16s are seen as being more capable than the vintage Soviet-era aircraft operated by the Ukrainian Air Force.
Though Washington gave the green light for the transfer of the aircraft, the United States hasn't committed to supplying any Fighting Falcons. The U.S. has pledged to provide some ordnance that could be employed from the aircraft – notably the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), AIM-9X missile, AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles, and JDAM Extended-Range and Small-Diameter Bombs.
F-16: Capable Warbird and High-Value Target for RussiaAccording to a report from Reuters, Ukrainian officials had worked "24/7" to ensure that the fighters would be properly secured, as the Kremlin has vowed to destroy the Fighting Falcons and has already been targeting potential bases that could house the fighters.
For those reasons, the F-16s provided to Ukraine by NATO members should be considered among the most valuable targets in the country, perhaps after Zelensky.
Won't be a Game ChangerThough more advanced than the current fleet of Ukrainian combat aircraft, the F-16 likely won't be a serious game changer. It may help protect Ukraine's cities, but it won't be enough to turn the tide of war.
Analysts have suggested that the effectiveness of the F-16 is being constrained as Washington and other Western allies won't allow Ukraine to use the fighters to strike inside Russian territory. Likewise, 79 aircraft – not all of which have arrived or likely will be operational by the end of the year – will be significant enough in number to make a huge difference. Kyiv's pilots also haven't been put through the years of training that Fighting Falcon jockeys normally go through.
Yet, the F-16s will have the ability to intercept cruise missiles and drones in flight. In other words, for the rest of 2024 and perhaps into 2025 should the war continue, the Fighting Falcon will be employed as a much-needed defensive platform.
Perhaps that is what Kyiv needs most right now, and that could allow Ukraine to carry on the fight.
Author Experience and Expertise: Peter SuciuPeter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
Summary and Key Points: The T-14 Armata, Russia's advanced main battle tank, boasts impressive specs like a 125 mm smoothbore gun, modular armor, and a 55 mph top speed. Despite its power, Russia has only produced about 20 units due to the tank's complexity and high cost.
-In contrast, Russia is focusing on simpler, more cost-effective tanks like the T-72 and T-90, which are easier to produce and maintain.
-While the T-14 was field-tested in Syria and briefly deployed in Ukraine, it was quickly pulled back, highlighting the challenges of using complex systems in modern warfare, where function often trumps form.
The T-14 Armata: A Powerful Tank That Russia Won’t Mass ProduceOne of the strangest phenomena in modern warfare is the gap between the expensive, complex systems the world’s advanced militaries procure versus the actual needs of those militaries once in combat.
The Americans experienced this painful reality in the Middle East during wars defined by the improvised explosive device and the unmanned aerial vehicle.
The Russians are experiencing the same with their tanks in Ukraine.
The Specifications on the T-14 ArmataThe T-14 Armata is one of the most powerful, fearsome tanks in the world – at least on paper. This latest-generation main battle tank has an unmanned turret sporting a 125 mm 2A82-1M smoothbore gun fed by an autoloader.
According to Army Technology, that turret “carries a total of 45 rounds of ammunition, including ready-to-use ammunition. The main gun can also fire laser-guided missiles.” A more sophisticated 2A83 152 mm gun can also be equipped. So can secondary weapons such as a Kord 12.7 mm machine gun and a PKTM 7.62 mm machine gun.
The hull of the T-14 Armata looks otherworldly. It has a modular armor system composed of ceramics, steel, and composite material. This tank sports a low silhouette, thereby reducing the vulnerability of the machinery to enemy fire and favoring the survivability of the tank crew. The crew is also protected from unwanted explosions of the tank’s autoloader and ammunition stores. This was a problem for many previous Soviet-era tanks.
The T-14 has reactive armor in the front and bar armor out back, which enhances protection against anti-tank weapons. Russia’s T-14 is powered by an A-85-3A turbocharged diesel engine, producing up to 1,200 horsepower. It has a 12-speed automatic transmission, too. An Armata has a standard range of 310 miles and a top cruising speed of about 55 miles per hour.
Russia wanted a whopping 2,300 units of these tanks.
Needless to say, that lofty goal was scaled back both because of the complexity of the systems involved and the obscenely high cost. Russia has about 20 of these systems, and it has no intention, or even capability at this point, to mass-produce more of them.
The T-14’s Service Record (So Far)The T-14 was field tested in the killing fields of Syria. It performed adequately, although there was little evidence the T-14s did anything more than a T-90M would have done. Meanwhile, in the Ukraine War, Russia’s greatest conflict since the Soviet-Afghan War, the T-14s have been pulled back from the fighting.
While they were initially deployed and are believed to have been involved in a smattering of engagements, they were used mostly in support functions. They were quickly and quietly pulled back from the fighting and returned to Russia. It is not believed they will ever be deployed to Ukraine again.
Russia’s industrial base has not only survived the Western sanctions lobbed against it at the outset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but it is likely stronger today than it has been in decades.
Yet the Russians are not prioritizing the mass production of these advanced, costly systems. Instead, Russia is fixated on purchasing more variants of the T-90 MBT. Come to think of it, Russia is even more interested in mass-producing the Soviet-era T-72 MBT than they are in the Armata.
The Cult of the ComplexFunction beats form every time in modern warfare. It is a timeless lesson. Cost is always a significant factor, and simplicity should always be preferred over complexity. The Russians are doing just fine with their old T-72s and the slightly more sophisticated T-90s.
These systems are far cheaper, easier to produce, better to maintain, and less complex to operate than the T-14s. Russia is smart not to waste its money on building more T-14 Armatas.
Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. WeichertBrandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.
From the Vault
Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships
Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)
Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy’s Virginia-class submarines are advanced and versatile, but they may not match the speed of the legendary Seawolf-class.
-Powered by a Westinghouse S6W nuclear reactor, the Seawolf-class can achieve top speeds of 35 miles per hour (25 knots), making it the fastest attack submarine in the world.
-While the Virginia-class submarines, powered by a GE S9G reactor, are newer and more adaptable with increased firepower and interoperability, they likely fall short in terms of speed and depth. The Seawolf-class’s superior speed and stealth, despite its limited numbers, still give it an edge in submarine performance.
The Virginia-class Submarines are Fast, But the Seawolf-class is FasterThe United States Navy’s Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarine has been described by many experts as the most advanced attack sub in the world. Despite this, little details are known about key aspects of this newer submarine. One question pervades many discussions about this submarine’s capabilities, how fast can this boat travel?
Compared to another highly advanced attack submarine in the Navy’s fleet, the legendary Seawolf-class, we know that that class is widely considered to be the fastest attack submarine in the world.
As I have written in these pages, the Seawolf-class can achieve top cruising speeds of thirty-five miles per hour (twenty-five knots). However, the Virginia-class is newer and was chosen by the Navy to be the replacement for the long-serving Los Angeles-class attack submarine over the Seawolf-class submarine because, according to the Navy’s leadership, the Virginia class was even more advanced than the Seawolf class.
Understanding the MechanicsWell, whenever one talks about speed on any kind of craft, it’s always important to look at the engine powering the machine. For example, when speaking about the M1 Abrams tank, it’s important to note the fact that they are powered by a literal jet engine, which explains their power and speed.
Similarly, the Seawolf-class submarine retains the record of the fastest submarine in the world and is powered by a single Westinghouse S6W nuclear reactor, “driving two steam turbines, to a total of 52,000 shaft horsepower,” according to Kyle Mizokami.
The Virginia-class attack submarines, meanwhile, are the General Electric (GE)-provided pressure water reactor S9G which is “designed to last as long as the submarine, two turbine engines with one shaft and a United Defense pump jet propulsor.” Surprisingly, despite its capabilities, there is some debate as to whether even the newer Virginia-class attack submarines are better than the Seawolf-class subs when it comes to speed.
An Argument Between SubmarinersThere was a fiery debate on one defense forum among former US Navy submariners about which platform was truly better. The consensus was that, despite being more numerous and newer than the Seawolf-class, the Virginia-class was not superior to the older Seawolf-class submarine. In my own reporting, I have proven that the only reason the Seawolf-class was not scaled beyond only three boats was due to their high cost as well as the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
According to many submariners, the Seawolf-class subs can dive deeper and run faster than the Virginia-class submarines.
Let’s take a look at the believed flank speed of the Virginia-class. It is believed that the Virginia-class has a flank speed—or top cruising speed—of around twenty-five knots, the same as the Seawolf-class. So why are so many former submariners online arguing that the Seawolf-class is better and faster?
That’s because in terms of diving and flank speed, or at least sustaining flank speed, the Seawolf-class is better than the Virginia-class. Where the Seawolf-class likely loses to the Virginia-class is in firepower and interoperability.
The Virginia-class is More VersatileFor instance, in 2021, H.I. Sutton at Naval News reported that the Virginia-class subs were slated to get “seventy-six percent more firepower” than what they already had. The Virginia-class in general terms is easier to modify and can be used in a variety of offensive ways that the Seawolf might not be able to be used.
Again, the Seawolf has some incredible covert capabilities.
Speed and maneuverability as well as stealth are primary components to making a good modern submarine. Both the Seawolf-class and Virginia-class possess these features but in different admixtures.
And, it is likely that the Seawolf-class is simply faster than the Virginia-class but that the Virginia-class may be a more well-rounded (certainly cheaper) submarine than the Seawolf-class submarines.
Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. WeichertBrandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.
From the Vault
Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships
Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)
Summary and Key Points: During World War II, the entertainment industry played a significant role in supporting the war effort, including Walt Disney's collaboration with the Canadian military to produce the film Stop That Tank!
-This 22-minute instructional film, blending animation with live-action footage, was designed to teach soldiers how to use the Boys anti-tank rifle, a bolt-action weapon that fired .55 caliber bullets capable of disabling light tanks and armored vehicles.
-Stop That Tank! stands out as a creative and effective piece of wartime "edutainment," combining humor with practical military training. The film's approach was particularly effective because it resonated with the young soldiers who grew up watching cartoons, making the serious task of learning to use a weapon more engaging and memorable.
Disney's Stop That Tank!: The WWII Film That Taught Soldiers to Fight with CartoonsDuring World War II, most segments of American society contributed to the war effort and this includes the entertainment world as evidenced by the film Stop That Tank! that Walt Disney produced for the Canadian military.
The film, which was a collaboration between Walt Disney and the Canadian Department of National Defence, aimed to teach soldiers how to use the Boys anti-tank rifle. The film is 22 minutes long and is a mix of animation and live footage.
The Boys anti-tank rifle was a massive bolt-action rifle designed to fire .55 caliber bullets that could pierce through certain areas of contemporary tanks.
While it wasn’t a tank-killing machine, the rifle could kill the crew, deliver mobility kills, or even freeze the turret. Additionally, it was portable at 36 pounds and allowed the user to remain camouflaged while firing it. However, anti-tank rifles were largely out of fashion during World War II in favor of Bazookas and similar weapons.
Stop That Tank! – Edutainment at its finestThe film is divided into two sections. The first three minutes are a cartoon featuring Hitler and five Nazis in their tanks. They are approaching an Allied village and plan to attack while the villagers are sleeping! Here we see Hitler portrayed as a buffoon who talks bombastically and spits while doing so. He’s yelling nonsense and gibberish with the occasional stereotypical German word, like schnitzel, thrown in. At one point, he just burps.
Then the Germans go on the attack. The film cuts to several Canadian soldiers in camouflage with Boys anti-tank rifles. Their camouflage is divided from a hay bale to a soldier disguised as a buzzard, another disguised as a horse, and a third firing from his outhouse. The Boys anti-tank rifles make the German tanks jump and separate into several pieces. Stop That Tank is all very Disney-like in its animation.
The Germans flee under fire, and Hitler’s tank is done for and finished with an artillery blast. Hitler rolls down to face the Devil, who begins to translate his gibberish for us. He’s throwing a tantrum like a child and throwing his clothes off.
My youngest son came to watch with me and found the whole first three minutes hilarious. I got a huge laugh from the soldier hiding in the horse.
This portion worked as an excellent attention-getter and likely got the soldiers ready to learn all about their Boys anti-tank rifles.
The educational aspectThe film then goes into instruction mode. It teaches soldiers all about their rifles. This includes how the rifle works, its maximum effective range, and where and how to shoot tanks with it.
Live-action footage of soldiers firing the rifle is mixed in as well. I bet their ears hurt after all that shooting with this massive anti-material rifle. Troops are taught angles to fire, where to target, and how to lead tanks through animated sequences that illustrate how to use the weapon in an easy-to-understand manner.
Animation is an effective means to illustrate the rifle, its features, and its method of operation clearly and consistently. You could do the same with live video, but at the time, an animation provided a clearer picture of the rifle and its features. It’s an interesting concept and one that seemingly lacks the appreciation it deserves.
Stop That Tank! features animated X-ray footage to show how the weapon works internally, as well as what happens when it hits a tank. Stop That Tank! continues to mix in a bit of comedy here and there as the film progresses, including the narrator subtly insulting an Elmer Fudd-looking soldier and a very mad cow.Â
I’ve never handled a Boys anti-tank rifle, but after watching Stop That Tank!, I feel as if I could. Or I could at least pull the film up on YouTube and figure it out.
Why the film worksThere is a bit of a dark undertone to the entire film. Why would Walt Disney need to animate a film on how to kill Germans? Why do we need silly tanks, mad cows, and soldiers who can’t lift the rifle?
Well, it’s for the same reason the film is effective. The men watching the film were likely still young and were being trained to go to war by the same cartoons they likely enjoyed a few years earlier.
Stop That Tank! was effective because these brave young men were still young and easily entertained by cartoons. This is sad to think about now, but it ensures I remember that these men are owed a debt of gratitude that could never be fully repaid. They gave their youth and their bodies, and many gave their lives to protect democracy and create a more free world.
About the Author: Travis PikeTravis Pike is a former Marine Machine gunner who served with 2nd Bn 2nd Marines for 5 years. He deployed in 2009 to Afghanistan and again in 2011 with the 22nd MEU(SOC) during a record-setting 11 months at sea. He’s trained with the Romanian Army, the Spanish Marines, the Emirate Marines, and the Afghan National Army. He serves as an NRA certified pistol instructor and teaches concealed carry classes.
This article first appeared at Sandboxx News.
All images are Creative Commons.
Summary and Key Points: In the twilight of the Cold War, the U.S. Air Force explored replacing the A-10 Thunderbolt II, known for its 30mm GAU-8 Avenger cannon, with a variant of the F-16, dubbed the A-16 and later the F/A-16.
-This concept involved fitting the nimble F-16 with a pod-based version of the A-10's cannon, aiming to create a more survivable close air support (CAS) platform.
-The A-16 underwent limited combat testing during Operation Desert Storm, but the idea was quickly abandoned after the cannon proved ineffective due to mounting issues and the F-16's high-speed flight profile, which hindered precise targeting.
-Despite efforts to replace the A-10, the Warthog proved irreplaceable in its CAS role, and it remains a legendary combat aircraft, beloved by troops and aviation enthusiasts alike.
The A-16: Why the F-16 Failed to Replace the Legendary A-10 WarthogThe A-10 Thunderbolt II, better known as the Warthog, is renowned for its massive 30mm GAU-8 Avenger rotary cannon. But for a short time in the twilight of the Cold War, the Air Force wanted to know if it could replace the low-and-slow Warthog by strapping a variant of the same massive gun to the light-and-nimble F-16.
This concept, known initially as the A-16 and later as the F/A-16, would see the broadly capable fighter absorb the A-10’s close air support (CAS) role by delivering a variety of air-to-ground munitions. Most prominent among its weapon systems would be gun pods carried beneath each wing and the aircraft’s center pod. These pods would house a pair of matching 7.62mm miniguns underwing, which were meant to support the primary gun system bolted to the F-16’s belly: a 30mm rotary cannon that fired Red Bull-can-sized depleted uranium projectiles at ground targets at 40 rounds per second.
This combination of the F-16’s speed and agility and the A-10’s incredible firepower, the Air Force hoped, would result in a more survivable close air support platform – one that would be capable of offering the Warthog’s ground-pounding presence without its vulnerability to enemy air defenses.
The idea seemed so promising that a small batch of F-16s were even modified and equipped with a new pod-based variant of the A-10’s mighty cannon and deployed to Iraq for Operation Desert Storm, where a group of pilots from the New York Air National Guard were tasked with determining once and for all whether or not this new F/A-16 concept had wings.
However, within just about 48 hours worth of combat operations, the Air Force came to realize that despite their concerns about how survivable the Warthog may be in contested airspace, not even mounting a 30mm cannon on the F-16 would be enough to bring the A-10 down.
The A-10 has always been living on borrowed timeThe Warthog’s path to duty arguably began during the Vietnam War, when the United States came to recognize that high-speed, low-loiter time platforms like the F-4 Phantom were ill-suited to fly close air support missions for troops on the ground. As a result, the Air Force turned to its Korean War-era A-1 Skyraider for the job, but with a standard cruising speed of under 200 miles per hour and four 20mm cannons onboard with just 200 rounds per weapon, the aircraft not only lacked the necessary firepower but was also seriously vulnerable to small arms fire.
Yet, while the need for the A-10 may have been first recognized in the Far East, the aircraft’s focus throughout development was decidedly further West – namely, in a lowland corridor on the border between East and West Germany known as the Fulda Gap.
This area, some 60 miles northeast of Frankfurt, included several narrow open passes tucked away between rolling German hills making it uniquely suited to allow columns of Soviet armor to pour into Europe if the Cold War suddenly turned hot. With only around 250,000 American troops pre-positioned in Western Germany at the time, and roughly 1.2 million Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops staring them down from the opposing side of the Fulda Gap, NATO planners had no illusions about their chances at successfully stopping such an assault.
“This is the frontier where it would happen,” Col. Thomas E. White, commander of the 4,500 troops in the 11th U.S. Armored Cavalry stationed at the mouth of the Fulda Gap, told the LA Times in 1987.
The pressing need to find a way to curtail an armored Soviet advance in this region certainly informed the selection of the A-10’s primary weapon system – a massive hydraulically driven seven-barrel rotary cannon capable of slinging 30mm armor-piercing rounds with selectable speeds of 2,100 rounds per minute or a mind-blowing 4,200 rounds per minute. At full tilt, this 20-foot monster of a weapon could deposit 70 rounds on target per second, meaning the Warthog could empty its entire standard loadout in just over 16 seconds of sustained fire.
While that might not seem like much, there aren’t many targets on the planet that could withstand a full second of sustained fire from this powerful weapon, making the 1,150-round standard loadout (and 1,174-round maximum loadout) more than enough to have the necessary impact.
With a maximum effective range of 4,000 feet, this weapon came to dictate the A-10’s flight profile. That massive gun, dubbed the GAU-8 Avenger, was mounted along the aircraft’s center line and angled down only slightly, which meant Warthog pilots would need to fly just about directly at their targets on the ground in a shallow 30-degree dive and close to within 4,000 feet to engage them. With what was sure to be a symphony of Soviet air defense weapons firing from below, the A-10 would not be able to avoid being hit, so it was designed specifically to stay flying even after absorbing an immense amount of punishment.
For this reason, the A-10 boasted double-redundant hydraulic flight control systems, as well as a mechanical backup in case both of those systems failed. The cockpit was encased in 1,200 pounds of titanium armor ranging in thickness from 0.5 inches to 1.5 inches – enough to withstand a direct hit from 23mm gunfire and indirect hits from weapons as large as 57mm. Its engines were positioned high atop the aircraft, limiting the chances of debris being sucked into them while operating from austere forward airstrips. Self-sealing fuel tanks with check valve-equipped fuel lines helped ensure any puncture of the fuel system wouldn’t result in the jet going down.
The A-10 was over-engineered to be able to make it home while down an engine, or after losing half the tail or half of one of its wings. The Warthog was meant to be a flying tank, but even with all its baked-in survivability, the Air Force still recognized that the aircraft itself… just wasn’t all that survivable.
According to a report published by Combat Aircraft magazine, the Air Force still predicted that a war in Europe would result in substantial A-10 losses, as the aircraft were tasked with engaging columns of Soviet armor amid an inverted hail storm of anti-aircraft fire. Estimates projected that in every 100 sorties, the branch could expect to lose roughly seven percent of its deployed A-10s, which was a big problem, seeing as the plan to stifle a Soviet advance through the Fulda Gap called for each pilot to fly roughly four sorties per day for a combined minimum of 250.
As War Is Boring would later point out, a seven percent loss rate flying at that operational tempo would have meant that each of the six A-10 forward operating locations in Europe would lose at least 10 airframes per day. At that rate, America would lose every A-10 in its fleet – roughly 700 jets – in under two weeks.
That is to say that the A-10 Thunderbolt II wasn’t designed to survive in contested airspace but was rather built to last just long enough to inflict heavy losses on invading Soviet forces before being all but inevitably shot down. This concept of operations might sound cynical to our modern ears, but it’s important to understand the stakes of such a conflict between nuclear powers. After all, Warthog pilots wouldn’t be the only ones going out in a blaze of glory if NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries started trading nuclear blows.
Yet, while strapping highly-trained pilots into what could arguably be called heavily armed Kamikaze tank killers may have been seen as an operational necessity at the time, it was very clearly not an optimal solution, and the Air Force started looking for ways to retire its new flying tank almost as soon as it entered service.
Cramming the A-10’s 30mm gun into a podSeveral efforts at fielding more survivable close-air-support aircraft soon emerged, including a heavily modified iteration of the A-7 Corsair II that would have boasted the same F100 afterburning turbofan as the F-15 Eagle, but none managed to demonstrate the necessary combination of value versus survivability needed to step in and replace the still-new A-10.
So, the Air Force opted for a different approach – looking to aircraft that were already in service and demonstrating the sort of high-speed survivability it was looking for, and then simply trying to strap the A-10’s massive 30mm cannon to them instead.
To accomplish this, the Air Force kicked off a new program dubbed “Pave Claw,” which sought to reduce the size and weight of the Avenger rotary cannon and then stuff it into a gun pod that could be carried by other, more survivable, jets.
The original GAU-8 was so massive that the A-10 had to be designed around it to accommodate all seven of its 7-foot-long barrels, a hearty firing mechanism and feed system, and the ammunition drum that, alone, was nearly six feet long and 34.5 inches in diameter. The gun system itself weighed only around 620 pounds, but when fully loaded with 1,350 rounds of 30×173 mm ammunition, its weight skyrocketed to a hefty 4,029 pounds.
The first order of business, then, was to bring the weight down, so the Air Force started by reducing the number of barrels in its new pod-based 30mm cannon from seven to four. While the A-10’s GAU-8 was powered by a pair of hydraulic motors, each with independent redundant hydraulic systems, the pod-based cannon would use a single pneumatic drive system powered by a 3200psi composite bottle of compressed air.
The biggest source of weight for the GAU-8 was its Coke-bottle-sized 30mm depleted uranian armor-piercing rounds, and there was no way a pod-based variant would be able to carry as much of this ammunition as the A-10.
Nonetheless, a cleverly designed helical magazine that saw the rounds spiral around the gun inside the pod made it possible to carry 353 rounds onboard. With fewer barrels and a different drive system, this new 30mm gun pod could only manage a comparatively measly 2,400 rounds per minute – just over half of the GAU-8’s maximum – but could nonetheless put 40 rounds on target per second. When you account for the half-second it took for the barrels to get to speed, that meant a pilot could burn through every round onboard in under 10 seconds of sustained fire, but in those 10 seconds, this new gun pod could unleash some serious destruction.
This new four-barrel 30mm cannon was dubbed the GAU-13/A. Once complete, it weighed in at just 333 pounds and stretched just over nine feet long, making it roughly half the weight of the GAU-8 at less than half the length. The pod that housed the weapon was entirely self-contained and designed to be mounted on just about any tactical aircraft with standard 30-inch lugs, including the F-15 Eagle (the Strike Eagle wouldn’t emerge until years later). However, the Air Force already had one very specific fighter in mind… the broadly capable and extremely agile F-16 Fighting Falcon.
Turning the F-16 into the A-16The General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon entered service just one year after the A-10, but from a technological standpoint, it was practically from another era. Meant to serve as a low-cost supplement to the immensely expensive F-15 Eagle, the small and nimble F-16 was the first production fighter ever to incorporate fly-by-wire control, which brought with it a revolution in fighter design that coincided with the advent of John Boyd and Thomas Christie’s Energy–maneuverability theory model of aircraft performance.
The F-16 was the first fighter designed for combat in the truly modern sense, embracing quantitative data over the pervasive belief at the time that air-to-air combat was more artform than science.
Aircraft up until that point had been designed to have what’s commonly known as “positive static stability,” which means the aircraft is shaped in such a way that air flowing over its wings and control surfaces will make it stable by default, forcing the pilot to trade either kinetic energy (speed) or potential energy (altitude) to overcome that inherent stability and perform aerobatic maneuvers. The F-16, on the other hand, was inherently unstable, but used an onboard flight control system to make constant small adjustments to the positioning of its control surfaces to make it seem stable in level flight.
As a result, this new fighter didn’t need to trade nearly as much energy to snap into aggressive aerobatic maneuvers, allowing it to retain as much speed and altitude (energy) as possible. The more energy the aircraft maintains, the more it has to trade for further maneuvers, and the bigger the advantage it has in a dogfight.
Yet, while the F-16 was envisioned as an all-business dogfighter by Boyd and his controversial group of colleagues known as the Fighter Mafia, it wasn’t long before the Air Force came to realize that this nimble new fighter could do a whole lot more than air-to-air combat. The F-16 entered service in 1978 but proved so well suited for ground-attack operations that by 1981, every F-16 to roll off the assembly line came standard with the built-in structural and wiring provisions required to leverage air-to-ground bombs and missiles.
The very next year, production began on the GAU-13/A and its GBU-5 gun pod, which the Air Force believed could turn the air-to-air focused multi-role F-16 into an attack-specific 30mm CAS machine. Before long, the branch began setting F-16 airframes aside for this new role, which came to be known as the A-16, swapping out that F-for-fighter prefix in favor of a new A-for-attack designation.
This new Block 60 A-16 would boast a great deal of onboard firepower, delivered primarily by its massive GAU-13 30mm cannon, but boosted by twin 7.62mm miniguns mounted in their own pods under each wing. Targeting for all this firepower would be bolstered by a new conformally mounted FLIR targeting system dubbed “Falcon Eye;” this was then integrated with the “Cat’s Eye” helmet-mounted targeting sight that was similar, in some respects, to the monocle sighting systems employed by Apache helicopter pilots. These changes, and a slew of others, however, saw the A-16 concept quickly balloon in both price and weight, effectively eliminating two of the F-16’s primary strengths in the Air Force’s eyes.
Two existing Block 15 F-16s were modified and converted into the A-16 trim at Shaw Air Force Base for testing, but the effort was curtailed by a lively debate about what kind of aircraft was truly suitable for the CAS mission. Some argued that the A-16, while certainly quick and agile, lacked the rugged toughness required to survive the hornet’s nest of small arms fire such an aircraft would have to contend with, while others made the now familiar claims that the A-10 was simply too slow to survive in modern battlespaces.
Ultimately, however, the argument was made moot in 1990 when the U.S. Air Force was ordered to maintain two wings of A-10s for the CAS mission, effectively killing off the A-16 concept the branch had hoped could serve as a suitable replacement.
Congress forced the Air Force to keep its Warthogs, but the branch wasn’t happy with that and kicked off a sizable retrofit of some 400 F-16s with a slew of new CAS-focused systems, even if the GBU-5 gun pod was not among them.
Then as the Desert Storm air campaign kicked off in the early days of 1991, the Air Force saw its opportunity to demonstrate that the F-16 really could fly and fight using its podded 30mm rotary cannon. A group of 24 F-16As and F-16Bs out of the 174th Tactical Fighter Wing of the New York Air National Guard were equipped with the GBU-5 30mm gun pod and re-designated F/A-16s, combining both fighter and attack prefixes.
These aircraft flew into the fight with the Air Force’s CAS hopes resting on their shoulders, but despite the best efforts of the pilots, the 30mm gun pods just didn’t live up to expectations.
First and foremost, the centerline pylon mount for the nearly 2,000-pound (when fully loaded) gun pod quickly proved insufficient for the job, with the weapons knocking themselves off-center after just a second or two of sustained fire, eliminating the weapon’s zero and making it all but impossible to accurately lay down fire. While that could likely be addressed with just a bit more R&D, the other issues were inherent to the differences between how the F-16 and A-10 were designed to operate.
Although the A-10 flies at a standard cruising speed of around 335 miles per hour while engaging ground targets, the F-16’s cruising speed is usually almost twice that, at just shy of 600 miles per hour. In theory, this added speed would make the F/A-16 a harder target for ground troops, but in practice, it meant the A-16’s pilot had significantly less time to line up a target during their shallow dive toward the earth on a gun run. And of course, when the weapon was firing, it created such immense vibrations within the aircraft that there were palpable concerns about potential damage to onboard electronics.
Within only a day or so of combat operations, F/A-16 crews transitioned to using the 30mm gun pod as an area-effect weapon, effectively giving up on the idea of precise targeting in favor of using its massive rounds more like cluster munitions over a broader area. Within just two days of combat operations, the entire idea was scrapped, the gun pods were removed, and America’s only-ever F/A-16s transitioned back to their conventional bomb-dropping roles.
And just like that, the A-10 was given its second of many stays of execution, proving once again that no other platform in the American arsenal could effectively employ the mighty GAU-8 Avenger rotary cannon, and as such absorb the CAS role as the Air Force knew it at the time.
In the years since, the F-16, F-15E Strike Eagle, and even much larger platforms like the B-1B Lancer, have all proven to be CAS experts in their own right, thanks to the widespread adoption of precision-guided munitions that allow these aircraft to engage enemy troops effectively without having to adopt the Warthog’s daredevil flight profile.
The A-10, which was a specialty aircraft built to fly and die in a world-ending conflict over Europe, would go on to become a troop (and fan) favorite throughout the two decades of the Global War on Terror, where American forces fought an asymmetric conflict against adversaries with no air defense capabilities to speak of. This proved once and for all, that if you build an aircraft tough enough, a viable use case will present itself – and on a few rare occasions, it might even be tough enough to secure its place in the pantheon of legendary combat aircraft – a pantheon the A-10 has already been circling at low altitude for years now.
Today, the A-10 is once again staring down the seven-foot barrels of retirement, but thanks to the A-16 and F/A-16 efforts, the branch has no illusions about the need to strap its legendary gun to another jet when it does.
But the GBU-5 gun pod is still around, and you never know what the future might bring.
About the Author: Alex HollingsAlex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.
This article first appeared at Sandboxx News.
Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force’s decision to pause the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, which aims to develop a sixth-generation stealth fighter, has raised concerns about the future of American air superiority.
-Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall announced the pause to reassess the program's cost, operational concept, and next steps, even as the Air Force had planned a significant $2.5 billion investment for next year.
-Critics argue that halting the NGAD would be a mistake, as it is crucial for maintaining air dominance, especially against technological peers like China. Manned platforms, despite the rise of unmanned drones, are still essential for complex missions that require real-time decision-making and advanced capabilities. The pause also risks falling behind international competitors and weakening the U.S. military aircraft industrial base.
The NGAD Must Be Allowed to Fly for the U.S. Air ForceOnce upon a time – meaning just a few months ago – the U.S. Air Force was all-in on acquiring a sixth-generation stealth fighter. Now, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall has announced he will “take a pause” on the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program to re-evaluate the cost, operational concept and next steps in the process.
Kendall said the service is still “going to do a crewed, sixth-generation platform” but this is a major moment considering the Air Force has been working on this program for years and planned to invest $2.5 billion next year in this new fighter. Suddenly, the Air Force appears to be backtracking on its commitment to NGAD and to the central role for advanced, manned fighters in general.
There is a meme running through defense circles that recent conflicts demonstrate that modern air defenses are too lethal for manned platforms and that drones can pursue the same missions alone. While NGAD is still in its formative stage, and there are trades to be made between different capabilities, it would be a mistake of colossal proportions for the Air Force to halt the program. Here are five reasons why the Air Force must continue to develop a sixth-generation, manned tactical platform.
First, the U.S. Air Force needs a new, specialized air superiority platform.
NGAD is intended to be a next-generation air superiority platform, replacing the F-22, and allowing the U.S. Air Force to dominate the air domain for decades. It is a system of systems with many pieces, including a key role for unmanned capabilities, particularly the highly capable, largely autonomously operating drones called Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA).
However, the centerpiece of NGAD is a manned platform. This new fighter would be equipped with highly advanced avionics, multiple sensor systems, unparalleled electronic warfare capabilities, and a host of weapons. It is expected to have a new power plant supporting both long-range, fuel-efficient cruising and a high-speed dash. Finally, the NGAD platform would have the computing and communications capabilities to act as the quarterback for a team of unmanned systems and other air-launched effects. NGAD is being designed, in particular, for the expected intense and lethal air environment in the Pacific theater and a future conflict with a technological and industrial peer, specifically China.
Second, there remain unique roles for manned aerial platforms. The more complex the mission, the greater the need for a manned platform. Modern air warfare requires a mix of capabilities and the ability to shift from one type of engagement and one capability or weapon rapidly to another. Drones and CCAs are conceived of as single-mission platforms. Moreover, they must either be pre-programmed before launch or have secure communications with an operator. Only a manned platform will have access to the range of capabilities needed to respond to rapidly changing circumstances and the presence of a pilot who can make the necessary decisions in the moment despite an intense electronic warfare environment.
Third, drones may not be as effective as proponents assert. While a great deal of attention has been devoted to the potential of drones and other unmanned aerial systems to change or even dominate the future of warfare, the reality so far is less impressive. The great change has been the proliferation of relatively simple and, hence, cheap tactical drones. Yet the Iranian air assault on Israel saw more than three hundred drones, cruise, and ballistic missiles shot down. With most nations investing heavily in counter-unmanned aerial systems (CUAS) capabilities, it is unclear whether the future favors drones for every mission. Beyond this, the more capable the drone, the more sophisticated the CCA, the greater their cost and the smaller the number that can be procured. The Air Force is looking at a mix of expendable, attritable, and exquisite drones, with most being in the first two less expensive categories. The question is, where should the most sophisticated, high-end capabilities be deployed: in the drone or in the manned aircraft quarterback? Experience suggests that the most exquisite capabilities should reside in a manned platform.
Fourth, the U.S. is not the only nation working on sixth-generation tactical aircraft and unmanned adjuncts. The Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), a program involving the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy, and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), are being developed by France, Germany, and Spain. China is moving forward quickly on a sixth-generation platform; Russia claims to have flown such a platform, as well. Without NGAD and its Navy counterpart, the U.S. will be left behind in the race to deploy a sixth-generation fighter.
Fifth, pursuing NGAD is vital to maintaining a robust U.S. military aircraft industrial base. The range of technologies that will go into the NGAD is truly breathtaking. So, too, are the technical accomplishments required to build such an aircraft and its systems, including power plants, avionics, sensors, computers, and hardware. Some of these innovations will be migrated to the commercial aircraft world. Most of all, investing in NGAD will help ensure a robust U.S. aircraft design and production base for the future.
About the Author: Dr. Dan GoureDan Goure is a non-resident fellow with the Lexington Institute, a nonprofit public-policy research organization in Arlington, Virginia. He has held senior positions in both the private sector and the U.S. government, including as a member of the 2001 Department of Defense transition team. Follow him on Twitter at @dgoure and the Lexington Institute @LexNextDC. Read his full bio here.
This article was first published by RealClearDefense.
All images are Creative Commons.