Diplomacy & Crisis News

Not long ago the international community was celebrating the end of the Sochi Olympics in Russia. This was before Russia’s involvement in the Middle East, before the conflict in Crimea as well as before the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight over a contested part of the Ukraine. The beginning of Russia’s added military involvement started soon after Sochi, and there has been little analysis of Russia beyond tying it to the last Presidential elections, in the United States.

International sporting events seem to have a different perspective inside Russia as opposed to that of the rest of Europe. While the FIFA World Cup is often a time to set aside differences and promote fair play on the pitch, Russian based international events also seem to focus Russians in on themselves in addition to providing the world with a positive image of the host nation as well. Sochi was a successful games, but also set a very different tone outside of Russia as opposed to inside of Russia. Negative perspectives on Russian society during the last Winter Games outside of Russia allowed nationalist movements to set Russians apart from the rest of Europe, playing on historical divisions between Russia and the West. Since then, divisions have been amplified by actions by Russian politicians as well as European policy that drove a wedge further between neighbours. What must be understood is that international events can be used as a tool of self-promotion by the government, but can also be focused on in a way that pushes moderates in Russia closer to their government if international media uses such events to criticize Russian culture.

A post Sochi approach to Russian policy during international events should have made it clear that any conflict with Russia should be addressed by an absence in international activities where Russia is hosting the event. A severe fault by Russia’s government should likely be met with a clear response to their government, even if it costs a spot for a national team in the World Cup. If all teams accept to participate in the tournament, policy is best left to when the event ends. An appreciation for the hosts during the event should reflect an appreciation of their people, not necessarily their government, until the games conclude and relations can return to one focusing on government policies. A positive games is good policy, as politics should always be left off the pitch.

The post Russia’s World Cup Foreign Policy appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

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Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2018). Samy Cohen propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Nathan Thrall, The Only Language They Understand: Forcing Compromise in Israel and Palestine (Metropolitan Books, 2017, 336 pages).

« Le seul langage qu’ils comprennent est celui de la force » : l’argument lapidaire a bien souvent tenu lieu de politique envers l’autre, Israélien ou Arabe. Les opinions publiques des deux bords s’en sont imprégnées, empêchant de voir l’adversaire autrement que comme une entité homogène, hostile et réfractaire à toute option de paix. Nathan Thrall, expert à l’International Crisis Group, renverse l’argument en montrant qu’il y a paradoxalement un fond de vérité dans cette assertion – vérité qui se retourne contre celui qui la profère. Sa démonstration est intéressante : ce sont les pressions et les arguments de force qui ont été la cause directe des concessions faites, lorsqu’elles ont été faites, par les deux parties et particulièrement de la part d’Israël, le camp le plus puissant. Chaque fois que l’armée israélienne s’est retirée d’un territoire qu’elle contrôlait, ce fut sous la force de pressions diplomatiques ou militaires.

Ce sont les menaces combinées de l’Union soviétique et du président Eisenhower qui convainquirent David Ben Gourion de retirer l’armée du Sinaï en 1957. C’est sous la pression de Jimmy Carter que Menahem Begin décida le retrait des forces israéliennes du Sud-Liban en 1977. En 1991, après la guerre du Golfe, James Baker « violait » pratiquement le Premier ministre Yitzhak Shamir, en menaçant de lever la garantie américaine à un important prêt qu’Israël réclamait s’il ne se rendait pas à la conférence de paix de Madrid. En juillet 2000, Ehoud Barak concluait à la nécessité de retirer Tsahal du Sud-Liban suite aux attaques répétées des combattants du Hezbollah. Ce sont deux insurrections palestiniennes qui ont fait bouger Israël. La première Intifada démarrée en 1987 conduisait Yitzhak Rabin, revenu au pouvoir en 1992, à conclure que le conflit ne s’apaiserait pas si Israël ne s’ouvrait pas aux revendications politiques palestiniennes.

Nathan Thrall rappelle que pendant la seconde Intifada, commencée en septembre 2000, Ariel Sharon avait affirmé en mai 2003, devant un parterre de députés du Likoud, qu’Israël ne pouvait pas continuer à « occuper » 3,5 millions de Palestiniens. La décision fut prise de désengager Israël de la bande de Gaza, et d’évacuer les 7 500 colons qu’il avait d’ailleurs lui-même contribué à installer par le passé. La force est donc bien « le seul langage qu’ils comprennent », selon l’auteur. C’est lorsque le coût de l’inaction peut se révéler trop élevé qu’on voit apparaître des concessions. Les incitations positives ne servent pas à grand-chose conclut-il, regrettant que la politique américaine des dernières décennies, bien qu’hostile à la colonisation des territoires palestiniens, ne se soit pas accompagnée de plus de fermeté envers le gouvernement israélien. Les États-Unis ont presque toujours mis leur véto au Conseil de sécurité, protégeant Israël des motions condamnant sa politique en Cisjordanie.

C’est d’un livre engagé qu’il s’agit ici. Sa thèse centrale est développée dans les 74 premières pages, la suite se composant de textes parus précédemment, sans lien direct avec le sujet. Ce mélange des genres nuit hélas à la cohérence du livre. Celui-ci pourrait toutefois apporter de l’eau au moulin du camp de la paix (mais aussi de certains diplomates occidentaux) qui, lassé de l’apathie de ses compatriotes, réclame que les États-Unis s’engagent à faire pression sur la droite au pouvoir. L’élection de Donald Trump à la présidence des États-Unis devrait cependant doucher ces espoirs.

Samy Cohen

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

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