Defence`s Feeds

The fifth and last meeting of the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (CF SEDSS) was held in Thessaloniki on 19-21 September 2017.

The conference was opened by His Excellency Panos Kammenos (Hellenic Minister of National Defence), Mr Jorge Domecq (Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency, EDA), Mr Tudor Constantinescu (Principal Adviser to the Director-General Energy of the European Commission) and Professor Athansios Konstandopoulos, the Chairman of Centre for Research and Technology Hellas (CERTH). Mr Dominique Ristori, the Director-General of the Directorate-General Energy of the European Commission, greeted the participants by video message. It was closed by Mr Denis Roger, the European Synergies and Innovation Director at the EDA.

Opening the conference, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq thanked the participants for the active involvement in the Forum over the last two years. He also used the opportunity to give direction for the future: “As we move to the next phase of the Consultation Forum, we need to focus on defence energy projects and their funding. We need to focus on results.”

As possible project areas, Mr Domecq highlighted infrastructure improvements leading for example to the refurbishment of buildings to Nearly Zero Energy Building standards. Projects relating to the assessment of renewable energy technologies could be analysed for where investments could be made to make commercial renewable energy technologies suitable for military use. Finally, there could also be scope to develop policy tools and training on raising energy awareness as well as the development of tools for optimum technology selection.

European Commission Director-General Dominique Ristori said the energy transition was a “top priority of the European Union”. “It is not only about energy and climate alone. It is about accelerating the fundamental modernisation of Europe's entire economy, making it low-carbon, energy and resource efficient, in a socially fair manner. And making it less dependent on imports. It requires the transformation of the whole energy system. All sectors need to contribute and to reap the benefits. I am therefore very pleased that we will continue with the second phase of the Consultation Forum as of October. This would allow, inter alia, a deeper analysis of the issues at stake and the identification of bottlenecks that need to be resolved to allow the defence sector to benefit fully from sustainable energy and to use the energy transition as a major economic opportunity”, he stated.

The aim of this week’s last meeting of the Consultation Forum was to reach agreement on the content of final report with recommendations for a more implementation focused second phase. The conference was attended by around 100 experts from government administrations, as well as industry, academia, NATO representatives and the European Commission. In total, there have been five conferences of this first phase of the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector.
In closing the conference, Director European Synergies and Innovation Denis Roger highlighted, that “we have built a defence energy community which did not exist before”.

Second phase

The second phase of the Consultation Forum will have an implementation focus to take the knowledge developed in the first phase and turn this into results. The focus will remain on energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, and the protection of critical energy infrastructure in relation to the implications of relevant EU legislation when applied to the defence sector’s infrastructure. This means that results will have direct benefits for the delivery of defence infrastructure capability, while contributing to the broader objectives of the Energy Union.

Background

The Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector is a European Commission initiative managed by the European Defence Agency. It brings together experts from the defence and energy sectors to share information and best practice on improving energy management, energy efficiency, and the use of renewable energy. The Consultation Forum has taken place in a series of five plenary meetings over 24 months, and its first phase will be concluded in October 2017.
The work is carried out in three parallel working groups each with a particular focus: (1) Energy Management, (2) Energy Efficiency & 3) Renewable Energy. There was also a Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructure PCEI) Experts Group which developed a conceptual paper on PCEI.

 

More information

• Consultation Forum webpage

Following the devastating 31 May 2017 bomb attack in the Afghan capital, President Ashraf Ghani commissioned his security experts to develop a new security plan for Kabul. Although apparently not officially approved or fully funded yet, the plan called the ‘Zarghun Belt’ (Green Belt) was announced in mid-August. Jelena Bjelica and Kate Clark (with input from the rest of the AAN team) have been collecting details about the new plan and mapping out what it should entail. They find it designed largely to improve the security of key government institutions and some of the diminishing ‘international community’ in Kabul, despite official claims that its aim is to protect everyone. 

The lethal truck bomb attack near Kabul’s Zanbaq Square on 31 May 2017 (see AAN’s dispatches here and here) killed at least 92 civilians and injured nearly 500. It also caused heavy damage to surrounding infrastructure, including the German Embassy which had to be closed. This and the subsequent protests that ensued (see AAN reporting here) have been game-changers for Kabul’s security planners.

A week after the attack, on 7 June 2017, President Ashraf Ghani, chairing the armed forces’ commander-in-chief’s meeting, ordered high-ranking security officials to undertake comprehensive efforts to improve Kabul’s security, including its diplomatic areas, and the wider province. (1) One of the two international security experts that AAN spoke to for this report hinted to us, however, that the plan that has emerged was driven as much by high-ranking internationals residing in Kabul; it is not clear whether they were from the various diplomatic missions or NATO’s Resolute Support or both.

The roll-out of the new Kabul security plan was announced at the Government Media Information Centre (GMIC) on 14 August 2017 (see here; see also Reuters’ reporting based on an interview with a security official from 6 August here) by the Ministry of Interior and the Kabul Municipality. (Based on AAN queries with relevant security authorities, it is not clear which authority is responsible for enacting the plan or its various parts.)

The details that follow have been somewhat tricky to collate as there are apparent contradictions within and between official statements and press reporting, not only about the what and where of the security measures, but also the when.

The plan has been presented as comprising various new or improved security measures for Kabul city, but many had actually already been discussed or had been waiting to be implemented or had already been in use for long time. It also appears that the plan, despite being announced by the government, has not actually been finalised or signed off, but is, AAN was told by an international security analyst, still sitting on Ghani’s desk. Another security expert said the plan was waiting for funding, and only a few steps had, thus far, been initiated.  The larger projects within the plan, he said, would only be executed once funding was secured. Further confusion has been caused by officials and the media using terms such as ‘diplomatic area’ and ‘green zone’ as well as ‘Green Belt’ which they then often do not define in geographical detail. So, a warning: there is some inherent confusion in how the plan has been presented. We have tried to clarify, where possible, and point up remaining contradictions, where necessary.

A three-phase plan – as presented by the Ministry of Interior

Deputy Minister for Security at the Ministry of Interior and acting chief of Kabul’s Asmai Police Zone 101, Muhammad Salem Ehsas, said at the GMIC press conference that the security plan, named the ‘Zarghun Belt’ (Green Belt, sometimes also, confusingly, translated as Green Zone) would be implemented gradually over the next six months. He said that “Wazir Akbar Khan, Shashdarak, Sherpur and some other areas [of the city] were part of the Green Belt.”

Abdul Basir Mujahed, spokesman for Kabul police, in conversation with AAN said the plan, which he referred to as the ‘New Plan for Kabul Province’, had been endorsed by the Ministry of Interior and approved by the president and would be rolled out in three phases, firstly, covering ‘the diplomatic area’, then other Kabul urban districts and finally Kabul’s rural districts. (2)

It is probably worth trying to pin down the geography of the plan, here.

The first phase of the plan appears to concentrate on what is often referred to, by officials and the media, as the ‘diplomatic area’ of Kabul, or the green zone (after the heavily fortified area of Baghdad used by successive Iraqi regimes and the US and other military and civilian authorities). The map below shows the extent of the current green zone and its proposed extensions, as discussed in security meetings. The extent also matches the neighbourhoods mentioned by deputy minister Ehsas under ‘Green Belt’.

Kabul’s green zone/diplomatic area (the green area on the map) does indeed host many embassies, including those of some of Afghanistan’s key backers – the United States, Germany, France, the UK, Saudi Arabia, India and Turkey, as well as the World Bank country office. Moreover, this area also hosts key government agencies and ministries, including the presidential palace, the Chief Executive’s palace, the ministries of interior, defence and foreign affairs, the NDS, Independent Directorate of Local Government, Sedarat and Radio Television Afghanistan. The CIA and the international military’s headquarters is also within this zone, as are some international contractors. Many commanders and politicians live there and even some ordinary people. However, many other embassies, including many northern European ones are located elsewhere in the city. The term ‘diplomatic area’, then, is a misnomer.

The red area on the map – the extension of the green zone as we know it so far – brings the northern part of Wazir Akbar Khan and Sherpur into the zone. Sherpur used to be a popular neighbourhood. “For centuries,” AAN wrote in 2010, “this plot of land was part of the finely woven agricultural fabric surrounding Kabul [comprising of] traditional mud houses, small pieces of farmland and a historical garden.” One morning in 2003 though, then Kabul Chief of Police, Bashir Salangi ordered it to be bulldozed. 100 armed police forcibly evicted the people living there, injuring some. The land was then parcelled out by the Minister of Defence, the late Marshal Qasim Fahim, to cabinet members (then Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani was one of the very few to refuse land and to criticise the land grab), politicians and commanders (with a strong bias towards Fahim’s Jamiat-e Islami comrades; read more here). Today, northern Wazir Akbar Khan and Sherpur is home to a few embassies, but also to many commanders and politicians. As will be seen below, some new security measures have already been taken in this area.

The other possible extension (in blue on the map) would bring in some stretches of the approach road to Kabul Airport. It seems, according to New York Times reporting, that this will mean US embassy employees will “no longer need to take a Chinook helicopter ride to cross the street to a military base [formerly the headquarters for American Special Operations forces in the capital] less than 100 yards.” It would, of course, mean ‘safe access’ to the airport for everyone else located within the extended green zone.

 

Green area signifies the current green zone (roughly), red is the planned extension where some new measures are already implemented, and blue is a possible additional extension. (Google Earth puts Bibi Mahru in two locations – the road named Bibi Mahru on the map is wrong, ‘BiBi Mahro’ is correct). Credit: an international security organisation.

General Ehsas has tried to insist that diplomats would be better defended, motorists little affected and the whole of Kabul protected:

In fact, we don’t have any special plan to close or open the roads. The traffic is normal, but on days that we have a VIP guest, the Wazir Akbar Khan roads will be temporary closed for an hour. Wazir Akber [sic] Khan is a diplomatic area and we are making efforts [to ensure] the diplomats’ security and this is our priority. We want to enhance our security plan on Wazir Akbar Khan area. All Kabul is our ‘green zone’ because all Kabul people need security. We have a special security plan and it’s carried out day by day and our aim is not to close the streets.

Other politicians have also sought to insist that everyone will benefit. Member of Kabul provincial council Rahimullah Mujahed claimed the plan would benefit 80 per cent of the population of Kabul, because the installation of new security posts in various squares and other locations would stop security threats to the city, as a whole. Positive claims were also heard from President Ghani and the head of the Capital Zone Development Authority, Ilham Omar Hotaki, as reported by Pahjwok:

[Hotaki] said the Kabul Green Zone plan would bring about a positive change in the living style of Kabul residents and would play a role in improving their economic and social standard. President Ghani said the government would also contribute to the execution of the green zone plan, which he called as effective in bringing about change in social living and improving security of the foreign diplomatic missions.

However, speaking to Reuters, Ehsas appeared to be more frank. “In this security plan, our priority is the diplomatic area,” he said. “The highest threat level is in this area and so we need to provide a better security here.”

Looking into the details of the plan, it appears indeed that the new security measures will largely benefit the already protected and may lead to worsening security for others.

What are the new security measures in Kabul?

The security plan, despite not having been officially published and apparently being confidential, includes at least six elements that have been spoken about by officials or written about in the media. That information provides the basis for the details below. Many are in the current green zone; others outside it.

More checkpoints

According to acting deputy interior minister General Ehsas, “26 checkpoints have been placed around diplomatic areas in Kabul so far, 10 mobile checkpoints have been considered in the routes connected to it.” Elsewhere, he mentioned the 26 checkpoints being in the Green Belt (which he defined as located in Wazir Akbar Khan, Shashdarak, Sherpur and some other areas).

At each of those 26 checkpoints, Kabul police spokesperson Mujahed told AAN, the number of security personnel had been increased from between eight to ten policemen to 15 or 16.  He also said that two companies from a Kabul anti-riot police battalion had been sent for training before they undertook the security of the checkpoints.

Many of the new fixed checkpoints have been under discussion by the relevant authorities and their foreign counterparts for many years now. For example, the new Sherpur checkpoint at a much used road fork, just in front of Emergency Hospital, an international security analyst told AAN, had been on the agenda of many security meetings.

Meanwhile, some checkpoints outside the green zone in the Qala-ye Fatullah and Taimani areas have been dismantled. Since 2009, those were parts of another series of checkpoints, called the ‘Ring of Steel’, introduced by then minister of interior Hanif Atmar. This neighbourhood is home, not to diplomats and government ministries, but to many international and national NGOs, as well as ‘ordinary Afghans’, of course. It has been heavily targeted by kidnappers over the last couple of years, as well as by suicide bombers. The checkpoints at the Salim Karwan intersection, in Medinat Bazar, near the Attorney General’s Office and at Street 3, Taimani, have all been removed, “This seems to run counter to the Kabul police’s declared prioritization of NGO-inhabited areas,” said one analyst, “and indeed, there are empty checkpoints where there used to be manned ones.” While the police have appeared diligent looking for insurgency-related materiel and individuals at these checkpoints, there have been repeated accusations of police collusion with the kidnap gang(s), given their ability to pass through the checkpoints.

Vehicle barriers and metal gates

Kabul police spokesman Mujahed told AAN that a number, possibly up to 40, of metal ‘security gates’ (these are tubular roadblocks that prevent vehicles of a certain height from passing through streets; Reuters has a photo here) were being installed. Some would be flexible and mobile, allowing big vehicles to pass in an emergency. He said he could not disclose their exact number until all were erected. In July and August 2017, the Afghan National Security Forces installed a number of metal gates on specific roads leading to the Green Belt. These gates range in height from two to two and a half metres. A few are outside the green zone or its proposed extensions (as per the map) Those installed close to the city centre are located at: the Sherpur crossroads, close to Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum’s house; the intersection in front of the Emergency Hospital in Shahr-e Now; near to the Kabul police compound/ Sedarat intersection; Pul-e Mahmud Khan intersection; the Abdul Haq Square; in Third Macrorayon; in front of the Kabul municipality; near Azizi Plaza in Bibi Mahru from where a road leads to Fourth Macrorayon; in Pul-e Bagh-e Umumi. New gates are going up in fresh locations.

At the 14 August press conference in GMIC it was announced that large lorries delivering necessary services would be directed along specified roads within the Green Belt and would now only be allowed to enter the Green Belt via the airport road after the police had searched them (see here). Reuters reported that cars would also be generally barred on nine of the fifteen streets in the “diplomatic area” or leading into it and totally and permanently barred from the remaining six (it is not clear if or how residents will be allowed to use these roads).

Mujahed told AAN, “Kabul police have the right to check any kind of car and if anyone tries to avoid this, legal action will be taken.” In practice, police inspect cars selectively and ‘known people’ (meaning passengers who are known to the policemen on the checkpoint) are usually not inspected; at most checkpoints, female passenger are also not searched.

The security forces are also now blocking almost all the roads leading towards the presidential palace (and the Serena Hotel) from 10:00 at night until 6:00 in the morning. The roads include those passing behind Ministry of Telecommunications along Zarnigar Park, from Pul-e Mahmud Khan and from Pul-e Kheshti overnight. This measure starts from 10:00 at night until early morning.

Scanners

Four hangar-style scanners, each weighing around 30 tonnes have been installed at the four ‘gates’ to Kabul city, in Pul-e Charkhi, Company, Tank-e Logar and Sar-e Kotal at Khairkhana, ie respectively on the roads to Nangarhar, through Logar to Loya Paktia, through Maidan Wardak to Ghazni and southern Afghanistan and the Shomali to the Afghan north. The scanners, donated by China as part of an economic and security agreement with Beijing signed in 2012, had crossed into the country by rail from Uzbekistan. (See also this Reuters report from December 2016). It was reported that the scanners had been ‘gathering dust’ for over a year in a Kabul warehouse because of infighting between different Afghan interior ministry’s departments over which one should install them and a dispute over who should purchase the land on which the giant scanners would be installed. (3) After the terrorist attack at Zanbaq Square, the scanners were finally, it seems, taken out of storage. Mujahed told The Kabul Times they would stop the entry of drugs, explosives, ammunition and other illegal substances into the city.

Four hangar-style scanners, each weighing around 30 tonnes have been installed at the four ‘gates’ to Kabul city. Credit: Tolo, 2017

Several Kabul residents whom AAN spoke to said they had observed that it takes the police at least ten minutes to scan a car and at certain times of day when there is a heavy traffic congestion, the policemen do not scan any vehicles at all.

K9 units

In early August, ANSF deployed five ‘K9 units’, dog teams trained to search for explosives and other illegal materials, to several locations in Kabul City: Pul-e Mahmud Khan, Wazir Akbar Khan, Bibi Mahru Hill, Abdul Haq Square and Kabul Airport’s main entrance.

Although K9 teams have been intermittently present at Kabul Airport for almost a year, deployed there on a 24-hour basis, some vehicles have been exempt – those belonging to VIPs and ‘known people’ and those with female passengers. There is no fixed time frame for how long the K9 teams will be deployed to these five locations.

Other measures

Deputy Minister Ehsas said that police patrols, both on vehicle and motorcycle, would be increased in Kabul city. Apparently, 80 motorcycle patrols will be established, but as the motorcycles have not been purchased yet, it is a presumption that this will only happen at some point in the future.

Ehsas also said a 500-member police anti-riot battalion featured in the security plan. It appears that they have been deployed to guard the Wazir Akbar Khan and Sherpur areas. However, this 500-strong battalion was always part of the Kabul security architecture and it had, previously, been spread around Kabul City, an international security expert told AAN. According to this expert, the plan is now to re-train the battalion. The money for this may also be part of the Afghanistan-China 2012 economic and security agreement, the text of which is confidential. Known parts of the agreement suggest that a number of policemen would be sent to China for training. Either way, it seems that the green zone will benefit from a concentration of police on motorcycles, while the rest of the city will suffer a corresponding scarcity.

According to one of the international security analysts AAN consulted, there would also be increased patrolling in the Wazir Akbar Khan, Sherpur, Qala-ye Fathullah, Kart-e Chahar and Kart-e Se neighbourhoods.

T-wall removal: part of the plan or not?

The removal of anti-blast ‘T-walls’ is not part of the security plan, but worth mentioning in the context of Kabul’s security. A campaign to remove them was  started a few weeks after the Zanbaq Square attack, announced by acting Kabul mayor Abdullah Habibzai, on 23 June 2017, supposedly in response to the demands of the citizenry (see here and here).

Removing T-walls has been a demand from the public for many years now. Former president Karzai ordered their dismantlement in 2010, in order to improve traffic flow on the capital’s roads (see here). The move was short-lived, however, and it was noticeable that the former president fortified his own residence with concrete blast walls as soon as he left the presidential palace.

T-walls protect those behind them, but amplify the blast for everyone else in the vicinity. For the common people then, they are an ‘insecurity mechanism’. In some places, they seem particularly appalling, for example, on the road outside the old Ministry of Interior. They actually increase the exposure of the Lycée Malalai girls school and the Jamhuriat and Antani Hospitals on the other side of the road to danger; if there was an attack on the ministry, the school and hospitals would receive a far greater blast.

T-walls also partially block roads and hamper traffic flow, as they are rarely built within the perimeter of the protected person’s property, but jut out onto the pavement or even into the middle of the road, blatantly grabbing land from the public. Many would also argue that by increasing security for those with power sheltering behind them, they reduce their incentive to improve the security for everyone in the city. (Compare similar dynamics when those who can afford generators and bottled water are in charge of systems which fail to deliver mains electricity and drinking water to the general population.)

New roads

The new security plan’s biggest ambition is to totally close off the ‘diplomatic area’ by building by-pass roads. Head of the Capital Zone Development Authority Hotaki presented a proposal, on 3 August 2017, to build ten kilometres of new roads as part of the security plan which he called the “Kabul Green Zone.” He said short and long-term measures had been considered in the security plan and five ‘security zones’ would be established in Qala-ye Musa, Bibi Mahru, Qala-ye Khayat and Qala-ye Nazir/Qala-ye Khatir (both names were reported, here and here), all neighbourhoods adjacent to the ‘core zone’ of Wazir Akbar Khan, Shashdarak and Sherpur. On 16 September 2017, Tolo television reported an announcement by the municipality to build one such new road linking the Airport Road to Bibi Mahru and onto Qala-ye Musa (police district 10), north of Bibi Mahru hill, to avoid Wazir Akbar Khan and Sherpur (which are in its south). This would mean the destruction of homes in popular neighbourhoods. So the creation of ‘security zones’ here means security for others, not the inhabitants.

Hotaki said anyone losing their homes, would be re-housed. However, particularly given that government promises on housing and land are rarely honoured those facing the demolition of their homes could be forgiven for being sceptical (see also AAN analysis here and here).

Indeed, rather like building T-walls, this looks like another grab of resources from ordinary people to improve the security of the already privileged.

A few thoughts about the new Kabul security plan

In general, it is difficult to protect the population when Taleban and Daesh insurgents are prepared to kill civilians and do not (despite statements to the contrary) recognise the city’s population as ‘their people’ who have to be safeguarded in any attack. The insurgents’ readiness to commit suicide also makes them a tricky enemy to protect against.

Physical barriers alone will also never be able to protect a large and sprawling city like Kabul. Even in Najibullah’s time, when the population was smaller and more homogenous, his triple-ring defences could not protect the population then from mujahedin attack, in those days mainly the systematic targeting of relatively low-profile targets – police and army checkpoints, barracks and individuals (see AAN analysis here). Even if the Taleban did not have sympathisers inside the city ready to help with logistics or provide safe houses, they would still be able to force cooperation through threats, for example from people with relatives in villages under Taleban influence or control, or for money. Good intelligence is important here.

Even so, physical security measures can help. In terms of the overall safety for the Afghan capital, the new vehicle barriers at the city’s gates and the K9 teams would seem to be positive steps and will be the most visible changes in Kabul’s security architecture. Otherwise, it seems the new measures are actually aimed at the already well-protected, despite claims by officials to the contrary. One security expert told AAN that the Palace was committed to protecting its citizens and boosting Kabul’s security, but that the availability of foreign funding was affecting where the plan was being rolled out. Moreover, although some diplomats and some government ministries will become safer, others, including the majority of international NGOs and the vast proportion of the population, will see little improvement in their security and a possible deterioration. As with T-walls, closing streets and thereby exacerbating traffic congestion, demolishing homes so that by-passes can be built and emptying some existing checkpoints to concentrate efforts elsewhere, it appears that, at present at least, the many will bear the cost of better protection for the few.

The major institutions in the green zone, both foreign and Afghan, are the obvious targets for the Taleban and Daesh, but not the only ones. Better security in those areas could lead to the insurgents seeking easier or softer targets to attack, or using different methods, outside the better protected zones. See, for example, the increase in magnetic improvised explosive devices (MIEDs) used against vehicles in the last two years, in Kabul but also elsewhere. Whoever is on the periphery of highly defended areas will also find their risk of being caught up in an attack has increased. The 31 May 2017 attack was a case in point, with foreign or Afghan government installations the intended target, but Afghan morning commuters comprising almost all the victims, after police guards at an existing barrier stopped the truck bomb entering the green zone.

It is also important to recognise that security is not limited to insurgent attacks. Citizens also suffer from criminality, and according to one of the security experts AAN spoke to, this has recently seen a “slight uptick” – here better policing could help – and racketeering and extortion when the police, themselves are often the perpetrators. (See here AAN analysis of inefficiency and corruption in the Ministry of Interior.

Concerns have also been raised by fire fighters’ and ambulance drivers interviewed by AAN as to whether their vehicles will actually be able to drive beneath the new metal gates. There will be other knock-on effects, as well, not just increased congestion for everyone, but for emergency services in particular. It can already take hours for ambulances and private cars carrying the wounded through the heavily congested Shahr-e Naw to reach the Emergency Hospital. One of the key response institutions in case of attack, can now only receive wounded people from one direction.

The Zanbaq Square atrocity rightly led to demands for greater protection, not just from diplomats, but from many others living in Kabul. However, after looking at the details of the new security plan, the question remains: whose security will it protect? At the moment, at least, this is not a Green Belt for all.

 

(1) Pajhwok news agency reported that also present at the meeting were Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, National Security Advisor Muhammad Hanif Atmar, Attorney General Farid Hamidi, Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG)’s acting director Abdul Baqi Popal and senior security officials.

(2) Then Kabul Governor Hamid Ikram (he retired in mid-September), went even further at the GMIC press conference, suggesting that the security scheme would be extended not only to Kabul city, but to other provinces, as well. If true, this raises the question of whether a security plan designed for Kabul (with its specific layout) could simply be copied and applied to other cities in Afghanistan.

(3) Different, or possibly additional locations for scanners were reported by Tolo on 6 August 2017: Arghandi, Sang-e Nabeshta and Kotal-e Khairkhana. Haq Nawaz Haqyar, deputy security chief for  Asmayi Zone 101 of Kabul said the police was also trying to install them in Dasht-e Pichari, Gul Bagh, Butkhak and Tangi-ye Tarakheil.

 

 

Chinese VN12 Infantry Fighting Vehicle

In recent days, Afghan government officials have raised the possibility of standing up a new militia force, the Afghan Territorial Army (ATA), modelled after both its Indian namesake and the Afghan Local Police (ALP). AAN understands that President Ghani is currently considering a pilot project for the ATA in the Achin and Kot districts of southern Nangrahar. This is, of course, the stronghold of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the local franchise of Daesh and the centre of the United States’ and Afghan government’s battle against it. AAN’s Kate Clark and Borhan Osman have been considering the viability of the pilot project and what might be its long term consequences. They also recall how an earlier United States arming of tribesmen in Achin paved the way for its takeover by Daesh.

Update: AAN has been told that a second government/NATO delegation will be visiting India for more research on the ATA and that no decision is expected until after that. We also received some comments and information from various readers (something which we always welcome) and did a little more digging. There is small  update, marked in the text, to do with powerbrokers behind the militias.

This dispatch is a follow-on from a previous piece  which looked at the ATA proposal in the light of the ALP experience and considered how it fitted into General Nicholson and President Ghani’s military strategy for Afghanistan.

 This dispatch is published as part of a joint three-year project by AAN, the Global Public Policy institute (GPPi), and the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani. The project explores the role and impact of militias, local or regional defence forces and other quasi-state forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, including mechanisms for foreign assistance to such actors. Funding is provided by the Netherlands Research Organisation.

 Militias and Americans in the fight against Daesh

The fight against Daesh in Afghanistan is politically important: one of Nicholson’s aims for 2017 is to “defeat” the group, something that President Trump echoed when he described America’s goal of “winning the war” and “obliterating ISIS.” The districts where it is present in Nangrahar province are also some of the few where US boots on the ground – and US planes in the air – are in evidence. The US military has been working very closely, not only with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), particularly Afghan special forces, but also local militias. The Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police (ANP) are present, but have earned a reputation for failing to hold ground.

Local fighters, by contrast, have made a name for being effective, aggressive against the enemy and, unlike other places, not particularly abusive of the population. They are under arms as members of the Afghan Local Police (ALP), the Afghan National Border Police (ANBP) and other, mostly local, ‘uprising forces’ funded by the National Directorate for Security (NDS) and raised by local powerbrokers. Here, the proposal to establish an Afghan Territorial Army (ATA) would seem to be a consolidation and regularisation of what is already happening on the ground, bringing informal ‘uprising’ militia forces into an official tashkil (personnel roster) and to place them under formal Afghan National Army (ANA) command. (1)

The current militia forces in southern Nangrahar were part of an experimental drive in 2015 by the NDS to set up ‘popular uprising forces’ (going under various local names, including Khezesh-e Mardomi and Patsunian, but in southern Nangrahar called the Hemayat-e Mardomi or People’s Support) (read more here ). They received arms from the Ministry of Defence, not just light, but also heavy weaponry, including pika (PK machine guns), dashaka (DShK heavy machine guns) and rocket-propelled grenades.

 This may sound like the state established these militias. However, local powerbrokers have been crucial or even primary in their formation. Foremost among these powerbrokers is Haji Abdul Zaher Qader, MP and former deputy speaker of the parliament and, among other senior positions in the Afghan police force, a former border police chief in Badakhsan and Takhar. He is one of the most powerful men in Nangrahar and, currently, the most powerful member of the influential Arsala clan, a prominent mujahedin family which fought with the Hezb-e Islami Khales faction (now largely defunct as a political party). Haji Zaher has forces in the uprising militias, as well as the ALP and ANBP in Achin, Nazyan and Kot districts. Earlier in the summer, he pressed for long-term support and more equipment from the government for anti-Daesh militia in the province.

Others mobilising forces for the militias are Haji Hayat Khan, another former jihadi commander, close to Provincial Governor Muhammad Gulab Mangal and active in Kot, as well as the less prominent Malek Dehqan who is active in Nazyan district. The forces of all three men have been instrumental in holding territory taken from Daesh, something ANSF units have repeatedly failed to do. Locals also described them to AAN as fearlessly chasing Daesh militants, again in contrast to conventional ANSF units.

Haji Zaher is easily the most prominent of the three powerbrokers. His current alliance with the US military and his record in mobilising forces for them has made him very important, more influential than the provincial governor or ANA Corps commander and giving him the basis even to stand against National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar (accusing him of supporting Daesh and calling for the National Security Council’s budget to be cut ). Zaher is not particularly popular locally, but he is rich – he boasted to parliament in 2013 that he was worth more than 365 million US dollars – and he can mobilise men.

Update: We may have given the impression that Haji Zaher, Hayat Khan and Malek Dehqan were rivals. However, Dehqan is a sub-commander of Haji Zaher, while the militias of Hayat Khan work closely with Zaher’s. Another question raised by a reader was whether the aim of central government in setting up the ATA would be not to regularise Zaher’s militias, but to sideline them, by setting up rival militias. If correct, the goal would be to reduce Zaher’s influence in Nangrahar. However the means would be risky, involving the creation of rival, pro-government armed groups with the risk of exacerbating intra-tribe hostility.

The ATA, modelled on the ALP?

This is all a long way from the proposed ‘village defence forces’ of the ALP, which officials said the ATA would copy (see AAN’s previous dispatch  about the ATA). In the ALP model, according to agreed (but not always implemented) procedures, forces are very local, chosen by the community and not deployed elsewhere, except with the permission of the provincial chief of police. They should only take part in defensive action. Where existing militias have simply been ‘re-badged’ as ALP, the units have tended be the most abusive and troublesome. For more detail on this, see also a recent AAN report on accountability in the ALP .

Sixteen years experience of standing up militia forces in Afghanistan, mainly with foreign, mainly US military backing, some by the Afghan government, has provided a lot of guidance about risks and benefits, particularly in the following areas: accountability whether through formal chains of command or through community control, or better both; local ‘buy-in’ for a force or lack of it; whether the new force will harm the local tribal, or sub-tribal balance of power; whether it makes potentially abusive powerbrokers richer or more powerful (with special reference to elections and the possible benefits of crime, especially in the opium industry) and whether the potential long-term negative consequences of raising a militia have trumped its short-term benefits. For more detail on this, see AAN’s first dispatch on the ATA).

Community ‘buy in’ and the local balance of power

The fight against ISKP is popular locally. It is seen as an ‘existential fight’ and ISKP as a foreign force which has behaved with unparalleled brutality towards civilians. These, then, are the grounds for a successful campaign and for Zaher, in particular, to gain popularity. Indeed, little criticism of his mobilisation of men is heard in Nangrahar. Although Zaher is not particularly popular locally, people from the districts, including tribal elders and observers, will not speak against the uprising forces or against Zaher because their hatred of Daesh is so great. Even so, the raising of militia forces is not without controversy.

If you have a one-hour conversation with locals and dig into history a little and ask about ‘the day after Daesh’, fears surface about what could happen after the hoped for victory against ISKP. One reason is that, in this area, people have hostilities even within the same tribal structure. That is one reason why, from the Shinwar tribe, for example, some are contributing men to the militias, others not. Some maleks and elders who have disputes with others have been aligning themselves with Zaher to use his authority against rivals – to settle scores, get power or money for land disputes or to bolster their position in local politics. This dynamic can have dangerous consequences.

Indeed, the emergence of ISKP can be traced back to the US arming one sub-tribe – the Sepai of the Shinwar, including in Achin district, in 2009 to face the Taleban. The ‘Shinwari Pact’, much hailed at the time, turned to catastrophe as the Sepai used their new-found power to grab land from the rival Alisherkhel sub-tribe, resulting in conflict within the larger tribe. This led the Alisherkhel to call in Pakistani militant groups for support and to the area sinking into chaotic militancy and violence. Intra-tribal solidarity was eroded – with devastating consequences. When Daesh threatened their lands, the weakened Shinwar were simply unable to stand against them. Their area was swiftly captured by the militants in early 2015. (For more detail on this, see here).

It is understandable then, why people fear that this fresh mobilisation and arming of civilians could again be brewing trouble in the long run. A hard look at local politics, demography and history in southern Nangrahar demonstrates a high risk that arming civilians in paramilitary forces is likely to throw the tribal and sub-tribal balance out of kilter.

Drugs and votes

Two serious issues have emerged in research on the ALP and other post-2001 militia forces – their relationship with the opium economy and with elections.

Militias have been repeatedly used since 2001 for strengthening patronage networks ahead of elections, getting the vote out, both in the form of actual and stuffed ballots, and keeping supporters of rival candidates from getting out to vote. (2) A natural tie-in between control of armed forces and of borders and provinces where drug smuggling and other criminal enterprises can earn money has also been seen. (This is not limited to militias, of course, as work on the Ministry of Interior has shown.) International Crisis Group has described this phenomena, for example, among “those ALP units with ties to factional militia leaders, often in places where Afghan powerbrokers want control of drug routes or other strategic territory” and said it gives the units effective impunity. It reports the comment of one Afghan senator: “‘Drug mafias are controlling ALP in many places… They can make a phone call from their village to a minister and avoid the chain of command.’” (3)

Nangarhar enjoys both a large vote bank, making it highly significant for presidential candidates, as well as those running in parliamentary elections and a significant role in Afghanistan’s opium industry. It ranked fifth in the ranks of poppy-cultivating provinces last year and has important border crossings for smuggling drugs out of Afghanistan and importing the precursors needed to make heroin. (4) On past experience, such a provincial profile would lead to concerns about how militia formation might forge or strengthen relations of patronage ahead of elections and about what militia forces might be used for after the battle with Daesh is (hopefully) won.

Zaher, himself, stands accused of drug smuggling. On 15 August 2011, the Attorney General’s Office summoned him by letter to answer accusations that he was the head of a drug smuggling gang (see the letter here ). His secretary and cousin Bilal Wali Muhammad had been caught with a large amount of heroin in a border police car in Takhar. ABC News reported that a manhunt was on for Zaher himself, although he was never arrested . Zaher said it amounted to a political plot against him. In the end, Bilal was sentenced to 19 years in jail, only to be pardoned just ahead of the 2009 presidential elections in a deal by President Karzai to get Bilal and Zaher’s uncle, Din Muhammad, on board as his campaign manager. ABC News also reported Afghan officials saying Karzai had wanted to name Haji Zaher as head of the border police, but a US military intelligence assessment (which the network had obtained in 2006) had “named Zahir as a drug smuggler.” (5)

Locals have alleged that Zaher benefits from smuggling and illegal checkpoints and these ‘business interests’ have been hurt by the growth of ISKP and the Taleban, reducing the territory in Nangrahar under his influence. If this is the case, getting rid of Daesh may also have financial incentives. There may also be political ones. David Mansfield, writing for AREU, said Zaher was aggrieved, after backing Ghani in the 2014 elections, that neither he nor one of his supporters got the Nangrahar governorship. Instead, it went to ‘technocrat’ Salim Khan Kunduzi, who is also nephew to the deputy leader of National Security Advisor Atmar’s Rights and Justice Party. “[T]he appointment of Kunduzi as governor,” wrote Mansfield, “was seen by Zahir as an affront; a signal that National Security Adviser Hanif Atmar was in ascendance, and a further impetus to bypass government institutions, exemplified by his establishment of a private militia.”

Whatever Zaher’s motivation is for raising anti-Daesh militias, the close working relationship with the US military the mobilisation has given him is likely to leave him permanently more powerful.

One other curiosity to note which may influence Zaher’s future prospects is that he has carved out a position mainly as an anti-ISKP figure. He has not taken a known hostile position against the Taleban. AAN was told there are channels between both parties. Local officials in Achin and Pachir wa Agam districts, as well as NDS officials, have said that, during the past two years, there has been occasional cooperation in the common fight against ISKP between the Taleban and local uprising forces, with the endorsement of local Afghan officials. (In Achin, we were told that Taleban positions were marked with a particular flag in spring 2016, so that the US would not mistakenly bomb them. Even if incorrect, the rumour indicates something interesting about public perceptions.) US air strikes against Taleban fighters in the southern Nangarhar districts have not been absent, but they have been far less frequent than attacks against the ISKP. There have also generally been few reported Taleban attacks against American forces in these areas.

Abuses and accountability

In terms of the uprising forces’ treatment of civilians, up till now, they have generally behaved well in Nangrahar. But militias loyal to Zaher did mete out criminal violence towards locals in the early years after 2001 – see detail in this 2004 report by Human Rights Watch) which documented militias loyal to Zaher and to his rival, Hazrat Ali, seizing land and other property, kidnapping civilians for ransom and extorting money. It also found their close relationship with US forces left them untouchable, politically and in terms of the Afghan criminal justice system. (6)) Not surprisingly, there is some fear that history will repeat itself.

Concerns about a wider lack of accountability and of Zaher condoning, indeed encouraging, brutality have already surfaced, most publicly in December 2015 when uprising forces loyal to Zaher beheaded a number of alleged ISKP fighters and displayed their heads on the main road. In the best case scenario those killed had been fighters hors de combat (ie prisoners, protected persons under the Geneva Conventions, making this a war crime). Locals, however, described them as “Afridi boys” who had been settled in the area for a long time; civilians who were suspected simply because they were from the same tribe and area (Khyber Agency) as many of the Daesh fighters. Zaher was unrepentant, telling reporters it had been retaliation for the beheading of four of his militiamen, “Do you think if they behead you,” he asked, “you cook them sweets?” He has posted grisly pictures of decapitated heads and militiamen with their feet on dead bodies on his Facebook page.

Accountability mechanisms governing the uprising forces in Achin have not been in place up to now. One aim of regularising the uprising forces may be to try and get better formal command and control. This could also be the reason for creating an ATA, rather than bringing additional forces into the ALP, with the hope that accountability would be stronger through the military than the police. However, at the moment, Zaher is more powerful than the provincial corps commander and it would likely be difficult for the Ministry of Defence to discipline his forces. An obvious, basic question, then, is who would actually be in charge of the militias if they were re-badged as ATA: Zaher and the other power-brokers, or the ANA?

The use of militias and their possible regularisation as ATA units in Achin and Kot is, in part, a bid to patch over the deficits in regular ANA and ANP forces. This is a recurrent reason for standing up militias: the US military and/or the Afghan government feel they do not have the time to improve regular ANSF forces and reach for the, allegedly quicker and cheaper, ‘militia option’. It may feel a simpler solution at the time, but has been shown to risk stoking up future troubles. Armed forces, established with formal command and control mechanisms and with some insulation from powerbrokers, are easier to control. However, if the US military or Afghan government had qualms about backing the armed men of a figure with a history of running abusive militias, boasting about war crimes and with official accusations against him of drug smuggling, it has not held them back. Rather, the perceived imperative of defeating Daesh won out.

The ATA in Achin and Kot – a useful place to pilot?

The location of the possible pilot test for the ATA – two districts where local militias have been raised to fight a ‘foreign enemy’ with close US military cooperation – also reveals potential flaws in rolling out the project nationally. In southern Nangrahar, there has been genuine and widespread support from the local population to fight the ISKP, despite some disquiet about future consequences. The militias here have also had extremely close cooperation with American forces, unusual in recent times given the limited nature of the US combat mission. The local militias in southern Nangrahar feel themselves monitored, one possible reason why they have held back from abusing civilians.

All of this makes for Kot and Achin being highly abnormal among Afghanistan’s many insurgent-plagued districts where the enemy is the Afghan Taleban and Afghan forces are fighting without any international presence on the ground. Nowhere else in Afghanistan can be found the same combination of an external, existential threat, the watching eyes of foreign forces and extreme animosity towards the enemy. This raises the question of whether Achin and Kot can really serve as the site of a genuine pilot project for the ATA.

 

 

(1) This also raises questions about who is and will fund the militias/ATA and, as a follow on, whether there is any external funding. (In relation to the militias, The Wall Street Journal reports security officials saying the CIA picks up most of the bills for the NDS, but that its funding is discretionary. The US military is the largest funder of the ANA.

(2) Goodhand and Hakimi described how Aref Nurzai, ally and relative by marriage of former president Karzai, used militias (known as the Community Defense Force or CDF) as “vehicles for strengthening patronage relationships in relation to the [poll].” They also describe how then Balkh governor, Nur Muhammad Atta, pre-eminent strongman in the north, was accused, “of fanning insecurity and arming local militias to disrupt elections in Pashtun areas and undermine the incumbent’s [Karzai] electoral chances and boost his rival Abdullah, a political ally of Atta.” In neighbouring Kunduz, reported Derksen, “President Karzai, Jamiati power brokers, and others vied for influence through local appointments and by giving or withholding support to local militias.” They included the provincial governor, Engineer Omar, who asked his brother-in-law, General Muhammad Daud, the provincial NDS chief, to recruit local militias to “stem the insurgency’s rise and help secure the vote.” Earlier, Human Rights Watch wrote in its 2011 report on the ALP, “Since it came to power in 2001,” reported the Afghan government has been using and paying militias, with an increase in their deployment for elections in both 2004 and 2005.” Militias were also used, to help both Karzai and Dr Abdullah, north and south.

(3) Particularly egregious among criminally-oriented militias were the Private Security Companies (PSCs) used by the international military for transport supplies and guarding bases between 2005 and 2009 and described in a 2011 US House of Representatives investigation as “warlords, strongmen, commanders, and militia leaders masquerading as PSCs.” They were involved in drug smuggling, land grabbing and other criminal activities: the House of Representatives called the sector a “protection racket.”

(4) UNODC tracked opium production rising by 43 per cent in Nangrahar last year compared to 2015. However, production has fallen markedly in the districts controlled by ISKP which banned it. Production fell in Achin from 3,004 to 698 metric tonnes and in Kot, from 2,040 to 80 metric tonnes (between 2014 and 2016).

(5) Barnett Rubin described in 2000 how the Arsala clan had become rich:

The Arsala clan (Haji Abdul Qadir [Zaher’s father] and his brothers) was at the center of the commercial development of Jalalabad, profiting from Nangarhar province’s skyrocketing opium production and using the Jalalabad airport as a center for the import of goods from Dubai for smuggling into Pakistan in alliance with Afghan and Pakistani Pashtun truckers and the local administration of the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province].

“The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan”, World Development Vol 28, No 10, pp 1789-1803, 2000.

(6) Human Rights Watch wrote:

Hazrat Ali and Haji Zahir’s commanders throughout the Nanga[r]har area operate criminal enterprises and continue to engage in numerous human rights abuses, including the seizure of land and other property, kidnapping civilians for ransom, and extorting money—as Human Rights Watch has previously documented. As noted below, U.S. and coalition forces continue to cooperate with these forces in operations against the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In spring 2017, the European Defence Agency (EDA) launched the ‘OMBT-Leo2’ project, a new Pooling & Sharing initiative which aims at optimizing existing Main Battle Tank (MBT) capabilities in Europe with an initial focus on the Leopard 2A4.

The concept foresees the offer of surplus Leopard platforms available in certain Member States (the ‘providers’) and transfer them (lease, rent or sell) together with an upgrading package to one or several other Member States (the ‘receivers’) interested in acquiring and introducing in-service this type of capability. The Pooling & Sharing of training, exercises and maintenance between providers and receivers, using already existing facilities, is also part of the concept.

Additionally, regarding economies of scale, Member States owning and operating for national purposes the same type of MBTs, can opt-in for upgrading their in-service fleet.
Business Case

The EDA is now elaborating a business case based on the upgrading of participating Leopard 2A4 platforms to the latest configuration (2A7) and invites the European defence industry to provide its input. For this purpose, the Agency issued a Request for Information (RFI) on 22 September to the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) and National Defence Industry Associations (NDIAs) of EU countries, encouraging the European defence industry to consider creating cross-border industrial partnership.

Upgrade of legacy MBTs to the latest technical standards would have a positive impact for European defence industry in the area of land systems. It would also contribute to the maintenance of technological excellence of the European Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).

This RFI encourages the establishment of European multinational cross-border industrial partnerships as the preferred mechanism to exploit this opportunity. Additionally, EDA considers this programme as a suitable vehicle for enhanced access for Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) to the cross-border supply chain.

The business case will have to provide information on the content and cost of the Integrated Logistics Support package provided by industrial partners covering recurring/scheduled maintenance as well as estimated figures for the Life Cycle Costs of the upgraded tanks. With the support provided by EDA on updating the business case, interested Member States will further evaluate the possibility of acquiring/upgrading this up-to-date version of the tanks.

The deadline for responding to this RFI is 8 December 2017.

All the responses will be evaluated by experts from EDA and interested Member States at the beginning of 2018.

Chinese VP22 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The Afghan government and its United States military backers are considering standing up a new militia force, an army version of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and modelled on the Indian Territorial Army. Officials claim this is their only option if isolated communities are to be protected from insurgents. Human rights groups have reacted with shock. AAN’s Kate Clark looks at the multiple, unhappy precedents for this force, but also at where militias have, occasionally, worked to defend communities, rather than abuse them. She considers the serious questions that would need to be answered before the government went ahead with this plan and also asks what it means for the third of a million-strong ANSF that a new militia is felt to be needed.

AAN has been told that President Ghani is currently considering a pilot project for the ATA in the Achin and Kot districts of Nangrahar, heartland of the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) and the US/Afghan government fight against it. In a second dispatch, we will assess the viability of this pilot project using lessons learned from previous experiments with militias.

This dispatch is published as part of a joint three-year project by AAN, the Global Public Policy institute (GPPi), and the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani. The project explores the role and impact of militias, local or regional defence forces and other quasi-state forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, including mechanisms for foreign assistance to such actors. Funding is provided by the Netherlands Research Organisation.

Many, including this author, could not believe their eyes when they read a New York Times piece on 15 September 2017 quoting un-named officials about a proposal to establish a new militia force for Afghanistan modelled after a combination of the ALP and the Indian Territorial Army. For many years now, there have been scathing critiques of both (1) and of other Afghan militias including allegations that they engage in widespread abuses, undermine accountability, or simply do not work to protect the population. It seemed astonishing then that the Afghan government and US military would be planning to create another of these forces. 

Yet, the proposal appears to be serious. It was followed up with other articles quoting named Afghan Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials; according to The New York Times, Tolo TV and AFP, the proposal is to establish ‘village defence forces’ in other words civilians who would be recruited locally and given arms to protect their areas. This new ‘Afghan Territorial Army’ (ATA) may include some 20,000 forces – that would be more than two-thirds the size of the ALP (now at 29,000 forces). One Afghan MoD official told AFF it will “operate under an army corps and will be used to fill the gaps.” Spokesman for the ministry, Dawlat Waziri told Tolo:

“People will be recruited from their areas, because they know their region and realize how to keep it … The forces will not go from one place to another. It is almost the same as the Local Police, but there is a big difference.” [This difference not explained in the report.] 

The New York Times reported that the move would regularise the use of “local militias” which it says the government has often turned to when “districts have come under Taliban attack and the regular forces [are] stretched.” Pro-government militias have been increasingly used by Kabul since the completion of handover of security from international to national forces in 2014, both in Nangrahar and in the north (they were also raised before that – see AAN reporting here, here and here). Some militias have been badged as ‘uprising forces’; others not. None have any status in Afghan law and their chains of command tend to be opaque, both factors which tend to foster abusive behaviour. (2)

One aim of the ATA, it seems, would be to bring such militias under formal state control.

The role of these re-badged militias, according to The New York Times, would be “holding areas cleared by the regular army, whose units would take on a primarily offensive role.” The new force would be cheaper than the national army, it said “and more sustainable and accountable than the existing militias.”

AAN understands the ATA proposal has the backing of the US military, Afghan ministry of defence and NATO Resolute Support and is now on President Ghani’s table waiting his final decision. However, reports say it was met with scepticism and disquiet by many of Afghanistan’s major donors, particularly the European countries. They have maintained their refusal to support the Afghan Local Police because of concerns over funding militias, so it seems unlikely they would back the ‘Afghan Territorial Army’. Human rights groups also immediately raised detailed concerns, founded on experience of uncovering abuses by previous militia forces. Human Rights Watch warned that “the expansion of irregular forces could have enormously dangerous consequences for civilians.”

The ATA within Afghanistan’s new military strategy

The reason for setting up the ATA – a force that is presented as replicating the ALP, but under MoD control (more on which, later) – has not been made clear. Officials have yet to reveal any difference in their role or make-up, except that they would be “better trained.” Like the ALP, the ATA would be recruited locally and, we are told, not deployed elsewhere.

It is also not clear why the Afghan government and its US military backers want to stand up a new force at all, when there are so very many Afghans under arms already. As of May 2017, (see here) there were a third of a million men and women (3) – 336,000 – in the ANSF, of whom 180,000 are ANA and 156,000 ANP.

The ATA proposal needs to be seen within the new military strategy of President Ghani and General John Nicholson, commander of US and international forces in Afghanistan; this was backed by President Trump in a speech on 21 August 2017 (read about it in detail here). Its aim is to ‘tilt’ the war in Kabul’s favour, with the aim of capturing back territory so that 80 per cent of the population is in Afghan government control. They want to eliminate Daesh and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, but have expressed no hope in defeating the Taleban (few predict that either side can achieve victory on the battlefield).

The key failure since the transition from international to national responsibility for security, which was completed at the end of 2014, has been the inability of the conventional elements of the ANA and ANP to hold territory against the Taleban and the ANA’s inability to take offensive action to gain or re-gain territory. Because of that, Kabul has continued to lose territory to the Taleban and, to recapture it, Afghanistan’s special forces been relied on, flown round the country and heavily overused. Despite their efforts, the land may be lost again as other army and police forces fail, yet again, to hold it. (AAN will be publishing a special despatch on the Afghan Special Forces, soon.) The scale of this failure can also be seen in monetary terms. SIGAR’s latest running total of US aid (alone) to the ANSF since 2001 is more than 73.5 billion dollars (see here).

One possible response to these failings would be to improve the effectiveness and morale of the conventional parts of the ANA and ANP, but doing so would take time – time that Nicholson and Ghani do not think they have. The fundamental problems of weak leadership, low morale, nepotism (and in the Ministry of Interior, at least, the buying of positions) and other forms of corruption would need time and determination and, in the case of the highly powerful and highly corrupt MoI, courage and political capital, to sort out. (The difference, one senior international officer told AAN, between the two ministries was that the problem with corruption in the MoD was dodgy contracts; in the Ministry of Interior, he said, “It is everything.” Read in detail about the MoI here). Reforms have started, particularly in the less problematic Ministry of Defence, but they will not result in a well functioning (at least to the degree necessary) ANA and ANP any time soon. However, the US wants to defeat Daesh this year, a time-table which may make short-term ‘solutions’ look more attractive.

The ALP, a trouble history and a somewhat better present

Because the declared model for the ANA is the ALP, it is worth looking in some detail at how that has worked and what lessons can be learned from it. The ALP was certainly not the first militia that central government or its backers set up to try to compensate for weaknesses in state forces; the practice goes back to PDPA president Babrak Karmal and his Soviet advisors, although they were more associated with his successor, Dr Najibullah. Since 2001, the US military (and to a very limited extent, the UK and German armies, see here), as well as different Afghan stakeholders have repeatedly toyed with different models of standing up local militia forces, sometimes with a level of connection to Afghan national forces, sometimes not. On occasion, the Kabul government was not informed of these efforts, while at other times, it was centrally involved. For details of the post-2001 forces, see the appendix: A Brief History of Afghan Militias.

The immediate precursors to the ALP were established from 2009 onwards, as (mostly) US Special Operations Forces (SOF) experimented with creating local militias which they termed ‘village defence forces’. There was usually, but not always, some element of Afghan government buy-in. The US military hoped to stand up dependable, local forces in the face of a strong insurgency and a weak ANSF. In July 2010, Karzai who was against the militia forces reluctantly passed a law creating the ALP, which would ultimately absorb the majority of these local forces, both those stood up by international forces and a number of local militias answering to Afghan powerbrokers. The ALP was regularised to fall under MoI command in 2012, with local units answering to district and provincial police chiefs. The ALP is now present in almost all Afghanistan’s provinces.

AAN and others have, over the years, uncovered multiple instances of ALP units abusing the local population and being co-opted by strongmen and factions. Units portrayed as shining examples of locals taking security into their own hands and fighting the Taleban were revealed, with a little digging, to be violent towards civilians or cooperating with the Taleban or fighting their neighbours. (See examples here, here, here and here).

As a result of such investigations, the ALP gained a lasting reputation as an abusive militia force, at least among many researchers and human rights groups. However, the ALP has actually improved in recent years (see AAN reporting here) and always had a more mixed record than its reputation suggested. The unit within the MoI overseeing the ALP has undertaken reforms to improve its accountability – ensuring local policemen are paid, armed, exist and trained and holding individuals to account when they have committed crimes. There has also been a tightening up on their misuse, as private guards or being deployed away from their villages (abuses are more likely to occur away from home, particularly in ethnically mixed areas, against ‘other’ group). UNAMA’s tracking of abuses and violations suggest that the ALP is no worse than other Afghan forces, and in fact, in many cases appears to be causing fewer civilian casualties and engaging in less abuse. In its mid-year 2016 report, UNAMA only noted three incidents in which the 29,000-strong ALP had engaged in threats or harassment of the civilian population. There are grisly exceptions, however, with continuing accusations against some units of abuse, including murder, rape and extortion. Where the ALP is bad, it is very bad.

There is some evidence, as well, that the ALP may be more effective than many have assumed. UNAMA said, for example, in its 2014 annual report on the protection of civilians in the conflict that, “Most communities reported improved security following ALP deployment.” Also, as a forthcoming AAN dispatch will show, the Taleban have, from very early on, recognised the ALP as a major threat, especially in the south and east of Afghanistan, which have long served as the Taleban’s bedrock. This is precisely because where the ALP works, it draws on the same community support as the Taleban. (4) (See also this rather more mixed picture of the force from the International Crisis Group from 2015 here), this assessment of Helmand’s security where ALP have played a mixed role and this example of an abusive ALP unit eventually being turned around by community pressure (see here).

Successful ALP units, ones which usefully protect the local population against the insurgency and do not abuse them, tend to be where the community has wanted the force and has control over it. (5) They are often in places where the community is homogenous. Often it is in Pashtun areas where it fits best, within the known framework of arbaki or other traditions of setting up temporary, local, tribal defence forces (a study of ALP working in non-Pashtun areas can be read here).

Where the ALP fails, sometimes catastrophically, is where it exacerbates existing factional, ethnic or tribal rivalries. This most often happens in the north with its long and complex history of militias and militia abuses, but has been seen in the south and east as well, including in Pashtun areas. A key sign of danger is when the ALP has been drawn from one of several competing local groups or where it has been co-opted by a powerful politician, commander or faction with clout locally and in Kabul (so giving ALP units effective impunity).

The ALP is now seven years old. Training, command and control and pay have all become fairly standardised over the years as institutional control has grown. Despite continuing abuses by some units, the ALP may be the best that can be hoped for from an Afghan militia. Certainly, all the many other militia forces raised in the post-2001 period, often re-badged and rarely stood down have behaved more badly. One of the issues which is unclear in the ATA proposal is whether this will be an ALP-style set up, as it now exists, with a careful selection of locations and members of ATA units, and reasonable command and control, or actually just a re-badging of militias already in existence which claim to be protecting villagers, but have very different agendas. For a recent example of just such a ‘village defence force’ which engages in crime and oppression locally, see this piece containing serious allegations against Commander Piran Qul’s NDS-funded ‘uprising force’ in Takhar (see here).

Will the ATA work: questions that need to be asked about setting up a new ‘village defence force’?

As Ghani weighs the decision to stand up the ATA, critical questions should be whether the initiative is likely to work to help protect and stabilise contested areas, and what the potential other consequences of creating such a force might be.

First, it is important to establish the criteria and set out some benchmarks, based on lessons learned. AAN, in partnership with German foreign affairs think tank GPPi, is currently in the middle of a research project scrutinising foreign-backed ‘militia forces’, looking at where they work, where they do not and why. Certain key issues keep recurring to do with effectiveness and accountability, assessed in terms of protecting the community from insurgent attacks and not abusing the local population. Based on past experience with the ALP, before the government or its American backers stand up another village defence force in Afghanistan, the following questions, at least, should be asked.­

Who actually chooses the members of the force?

Claims that defence forces have been chosen by ‘the community’ have often turned out to be duplicitous. Where locals actually want a defence force and are involved in choosing members, there is a higher likelihood of success.

Are they chosen from one tribe, sub-tribe, ethnic group or faction in a mixed area?

If so, expect disaster. ALP has worked best where the local community is homogenous or has a history of cooperation on local defence.

Is there a history of militia abuse in the area and/or powerful commanders with strong links to the state/US military and/or a history of war crimes?

If so, expect fresh abuses of civilians, in-fighting with other armed groups, involvement in the drug trade and other criminal enterprise and commanders wanting to re-badge illegal militias as men officially under arms.

Will anyone make money or gain politically out of the force?

Look for benefits going to local commanders or politicians who often agitate for local forces, regardless of whether they will be of any actual use in protecting people drawn to the money. If the militia is being set up in an area with the potential for it to be used for drugs or other smuggling, expect them to get involved, if only in ‘taxing’ shipments.

Are there elections coming up?

Be wary of forces being set up purportedly to guard local populations which are actually aimed at getting someone’s vote out, whether actual or ballot-stuffed votes. Village defence forces may also actually be aimed at stabilising an area, so that people can vote, but history has taught scepticism on this front.

What command and control and accountability mechanisms are in place?

One tricky issue here is that ‘village defence forces’ are supposed to belong to the community and, if set up by the state, to the state, through formal mechanisms, as well. This raises questions about command and control. In general, though, it can be said that we have seen problems arising with both the ALP and uprising forces where communities did not want them in the first place or were not involved in setting them up and where they are not loyal to the local community.

In terms of the state’s command and control, ie through the ANP hierarchy, we have seen impunity for units which have stronger, informal links to the factional leaders or politicians who mobilised them and who may be more influential than those supposedly in charge, the ANP district and provincial police chiefs. Control by either community of the MoI can be near impossible in such cases. Accountability for the ALP has improved as a result of eventual determined pressure from the US military and those in charge within the MoI, but it was many years before the political will was there to ensure this.

Why is it felt the militia force is needed?

Is the militia force being set up because this looks easier than fixing other, more fundamental, problems? That might be weaknesses in the ANSF or unpopularity, ineffectiveness, unresponsiveness or corruption in government – local, provincial or national. Creating militias as a short-cut solution to deeper problems has become a familiar pattern since 2001.

What happens if things go wrong?

This question seems rarely to be asked. The government and/or its US military ally have generally established militias apparently with the hope that all will go well, while ignoring the possibility for failure or disaster. It is worth taking a cool look at the outset at local politics and demography, land and water disputes and the possibility that arming some people may send the local factional, tribal or ethnic balance out of kilter. The potential long-term costs need to be considered, not just the possible short-term benefits.

Is there a date for standing down the force?

Militias are easier to stand up than they are to stand down.

The bar for raising a new militia force should be very high indeed in Afghanistan, given their troubled history. In a second dispatch, AAN will use these ‘lessons learned’ to help analyse the proposed pilot project for the Afghan Territorial Army which, we understand from several sources, would be in the southern Nangrahar districts of Achin and Kot. Might it be viable or lead to further complication and trouble? Achin and Kot are Daesh heartland and centre of the US/Afghan battle against the group. It is also where the US military created an earlier militia which went so badly wrong, it helped pave the way for Daesh to secure a base in Afghanistan.

A post-script

Also mentioned in press reporting on the ATA was a plan to set up a new 15,000-strong tribal militia, under the Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs, modelled, a source in the ministry told AAN, on the tribal border protection force of the Najibullah era. It also existed earlier under the monarchy. The same source said the government was also planning to create a new deputy ministerial post and department within the ministry with the name of Conflict Resolution, Peace and Reconciliation. The process for creating both department and tribal force would start after parliament approves the acting minister, the former governor of Kandahar (and Nangrahar), Gul Agha Sherzai.

Alarm bells over this proposal should be ringing loudly: in the immediate post-2001 period Sherzai’s militia and state forces under his control, in close cooperation with US forces, abused and predated on former Taleban commanders and tribal and factional rivals of Shirzai’s in Kandahar. Influential men who were trying to live in peace, found themselves targeted for arrest, torture and extortion. Some found themselves handed over to US forces as ‘terrorists’ and sent to Bagram and Guantanamo Bay. Such actions earned Sherzai considerable money in US bounties, as Anand Gopal’s masterly work “The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar” (see here) has detailed. Shirzai’s rule in Kandahar turned out to be one of the most important factors sparking rebellion and eventually insurgency in the province.

Edited by Thomas Ruttig, Borhan Osman and Erica Gaston

 

(1) As Human Rights Watch commented in its press release on the Afghan proposal:

The Indian Territorial Army, the model for this proposed defense force, has been deployed to support Indian counter-insurgency forces in Jammu and Kashmir. Territorial army personnel have been implicated in serious abuses, and its irregular status has contributed to a lack of accountability.

(2) UNAMA pointed out in its 2016 report into the Protection of Civilians in the conflict:

The increased practice of using untrained and unregulated pro-Government armed groups in such operations [against ‘anti-government elements’], sometimes to compensate for a lack of Afghan security force personnel, raised serious protection concerns for civilians both during such operations and during the post-operation phase. Pro-Government armed groups lack the training provided to Afghan national security forces and the discipline and accountability imposed through a formal command structure…

UNAMA continued to receive reports of Government authorities‘ unwillingness or inability to control the illegal activities of pro-Government armed groups due to their reliance on such groups to fight against Anti-Government Elements and the protection provided to some groups by powerful political figures. The use of irregular government militias operating outside a well-defined chain of command increases the risk that such groups exploit a fragile security environment, further compounding the protection risks faces by civilians and the possibility of human rights abuses. UNAMA urges the Government once again to disband pro-Government armed groups and dismantle the political patronage of such groups.

(3) [added 1 October 2017: Women accounted for 1.3 per cent of the ANSF,  according to the most recent SIGAR quarterly report.]

(4) One US expert group with top-level access to the ALP and the US military in 2013 said that ALP units ranged from “highly effective” – enhancing local security, undermining insurgent influence, and facilitating governance and development – to those “causing more harm than good to the counterinsurgency” – ineffective, predatory, or engaged in collusion with the enemy. It reported the US SOF’s own assessment, as one third of ALP units being effective, one third counter-productive and one third somewhere in between. (Mark Moyar, Ronald E Neumann, Vanda Felbab-Brown, William Knarr, Jack Guy, Terry Corner and Carter Malkasian, “The Afghan Local Police Community Self-Defense in Transition,” Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, August 2013, unpublished, but seen by AAN).

(5) Often, better ALP were marked out also by good training by US Special Operations Forces (SOF) who, in the early days, ‘embedded in the community’. This was not always the case, however.

 

Annex: A brief history of militia forces in Afghanistan

This is an edited version taken from a literature review by AAN and GPPi which looked at local, community or sub-state forces in Afghanistan. Full details and sourcing is available here.

It is not the first time that central government or its backers have sought to fill in gaps in state forces by setting up militias. Soviet-backed Presidents Karmal and Najibullah took this route in the 1980s: this was, for example, the origin of (now Vice-President) General Abdul Rashid Dostum’s Jombesh movement; also forces under current Kandahar police chief Abdul Razeq were formerly a 1980s militia in that province, under the lead of Ismatullah Muslim. (Muslim’s militia was a mujahedin group that ‘joined the government’.) The militias then were set up to keep the mujahedin at bay, but the litany of their abuses was long (read more about it in the Afghanistan Justice Project’s project). Many would also argue that many of the mujahedin forces, by the 1990s, had turned into little more than militia forces, with some having better command and control than others, but all accused of gross human rights abuses, war crimes and infighting (again, see the Afghanistan Justice Project report for detail on this).

Since 2001, irregular forces have regularly been established or backed by international military forces or set up by the Afghan government. They have included:

2001-2005

In 2001, the US military and CIA armed and funded the factions of the Northern Alliance and various Pashtun commanders to fight the Taleban. Some had been fighting the Taleban previously and were involved in fierce battles in the autumn of 2001; others were re-mobilised immediately after the start of the US-led intervention and simply drove into areas vacated by the fleeing Taleban and seized power locally. Under the new administration led by Hamed Karzai, those forces were re-named as the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) and put under Ministry of Defence (then under the control of the Shura-ye Nazar network within Jamiat-e Islami which presented their forces, at least, as a continuation of the old pre-Taleban Islamic State of Afghanistan army); it imposed a notional, formal structure of eight corps with divisions, garrisons, and other divisions: the tashkil was for about 200,000 men, although in practice many were ghost soldiers (with salaries paid into other pockets).

In practice, the AMF were often little more than re-hatted militias still loyal to their pre-2001 commanders and with little central command and control (see Human Rights Watch reporting of their many abuses here. From 2003, a nationwide programme of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) thinned out some of the AMF ranks while a new military force, the Afghan National Army (ANA), was created from scratch with a deliberate mixing of ethnic groups. However, DDR largely failed to demobilise the militias of the AMF, and many of its elements were incorporated into the Afghan National Police (ANP). Others, never integrated into the AMF or other state forces, continued fighting alongside the US Special Operations Forces and CIA and were often referred to collectively as ‘campaign forces’, for example, the Kandahar Strike Force, the Afghan Security Guards in Paktika and the Khost Protection Force, which still operates, (at least according to the latest reports) under CIA control. The campaign forces were notoriously abusive, with their relationship to US forces making them ‘beyond the law’ (see details here and here).

Both ISAF and the US military’s counter-terrorism mission used local militias to guard bases or as partners in operations, despite local people’s dismay; they had hoped ISAF would protect them from local militias, not partner them; the various local ad hoc arrangements were formalised in 2003 and they became know as the Afghan Security Force (ASF). The ASF was largely demobilised in 2006 when reporting suggests it numbered about 2,500 fighters, 90 per cent of whom joined the ANA or the Afghan National Police (ANP).

2005-2009

From about 2005 onwards, with the outbreak of the insurgency, ISAF expansion and later ‘the surge’ (the increase in US troops to almost one hundred thousand in 2009-2012) and the absence of a strong ANSF, the international military needed Afghan forces to guard bases and convoys and gave out contracts worth millions of dollars for this purpose. Many of the old militias were ‘re-hatted’ as guards in Private Security Companies (PSCs) which were licensed from 2006 onwards by the notoriously corrupt Ministry of Interior, and owned by relatives or close allies of the most powerful figures in government. These militias were extremely powerful and well-connected and were described as running a “protection racket” in a US House of Representatives report; money was syphoned off into private pockets, including the Taleban’s.

Increasingly unhappy with the power and money being channelled into non-state militias, President Karzai demanded the guard forces be regularised and brought under state control. From 2009, onwards, PSCs began to be replaced by guards from a state-owned enterprise within the Ministry of Interior, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF); there was pressure from commanders and strongmen to get ‘their men’ into this force.

From 2005, onwards, there was also increasing experimentation with irregular fighting forces. In response to Karzai’s request to create ‘tribal militias’, the NATO funded and the US trained the Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) in 2006, as a temporary counter-Taleban force in southern Afghanistan; it was highly corrupt. Like the PSCs, it also ended up legalising illegal militias, bringing groups loyal to local governors into the official sphere. Following extensive international criticism and reports of Taleban infiltration, it was quietly shut down in 2008.

2009 to date

From 2009, onwards, the US military, especially the SOF, began to pioneer ‘village defence forces’. The first was the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) in 2009, initially funded and implemented by US SOF in coordination with the Ministry of Interior (MoI) under Hanif Atmar (now National Security Advisor) in four districts of Wardak province. Overlapping with AP3, US Special Operations Forces set up various different community defence forces in southern Afghanistan, which were originally called the Local Defense Initiative (LDI), aka Community Defense Initiative (LDI/CDI). These Village Stability Operations (VSOs) would eventually morph into the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which was officially authorized in August 2010 under the MoI. Still US-funded, it is a 28,000 strong force and present in most provinces.

Other international forces also supported local defense organizations or militias in their areas of operation. The Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (CIPP) which operated in four, possibly five northern provinces, was set up in August 2011 as a joint German-US military initiative, using money from an American discretionary fund. There was also the Intermediate Security for Critical Infrastructure (ISCI) in Marja, Helmand (set up by US marines), and Community-Based Security Solutions (CBSS) set up in three eastern provinces. All were disbanded or absorbed into the ALP in 2012 after Karzai heard about their existence and banned them.

There have also been initiatives to establish militias by the government which did not get international funding, such as the Community Defense Force (CDF) established by President Karzai and funded by the Ministry of Interior ahead of the 2009 presidential elections, on paper to provide security to polling stations, but actually to help get the Karzai vote out.

The government has been establishing what it calls National Uprising Groups (patsunian or Khezesh-e Mardomi), to fill the (supposedly temporarily) security gap in places too remote for the ANSF or even the ALP to operate. They fall under no Afghan legal framework, but various parts of the government are reported to hire and arm them, particularly the NDS.

In addition to the ALP program and the national uprising forces, there remain a large number of ‘pro-government militias’, as they are termed by UNAMA. These are militias which are mobilised and on occasion fight for the government, and often refer to themselves as ‘ALP’ but have no formal position.

 

 

 

Please find below a link to the plenary debate on the draft report by Bodil Valero (Greens-EFA, Sweden) on "Arms export: the implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP" held on 12 September 2017 and a link to a video message by the Rapporteur calling for stricter controls.
Further information
Arms export: extracts from the plenary debate
Arms export: video message by the Rapporteur calling for stricter controls
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

On 25 September, the SEDE committee will hold an exchange of views on the implementation of the Preparatory Action on Defence Research with Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency and Alain Alexis, Head of Unit for Defence, Aeronautic and Maritime Industries, DG GROW, European Commission.
Further information
Draft agenda and meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Chinese Dongfeng CSK131 Light Protected Vehicle

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

For the first time ever, COSME (the EU Programme for the COmpetitiveness of enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) offers grants for European defence clusters cooperating in international partnerships.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) has been exploring and highlighting COSME opportunities for  defence-related SMEs and clusters since 2016. An EDA exploratory study addressed defence-related clusters and informed about their potential eligibility for COSME grants, including through a dynamic EDA’s COSME web-platform.  Last March,  EDA hosted a workshop dedicated to EU opportunities for defence-related clusters. Among other topics, the meeting envisaged a future defence-oriented call from the European Commission (EC) allocating COSME grants to EU clusters and, in this respect, EDA started facilitating transnational cluster partnerships during a dedicated cluster-to-cluster (C2C) session.

For the first time ever, and building on the continuous and productive coordination EDA-EC, defence-related clusters now have the opportunity to apply for earmarked grants under the call for proposals - just issued by the Commission’s EASME – “Clusters Go International in the Defence & Security sector”.

The deadline for applications is 13 December 2017 (17:00 Brussels time).

Eligible consortia will have to be composed of at least three different clusters/business network organisations established in three different EU Member States.

At least one of them must be a defence-related entity, meaning :

• either a member of a National Defence Industry Association (see, as non-exhaustive examples, the dedicated EDA’s directory)
• or devoting part of its sales to defence markets
• or taking part in national or European defence-related projects (for example as part of a project managed by the EDA).

EDA stands ready to facilitate the building of cross-border cluster partnerships applying to the just published EASME’s call for proposals.
 

More information 

• E-mail EDA
• EDA’s summary table on EU funding opportunities for defence-related stakeholders
• EDA’s “COSME web-platform”
• EDA’s work supporting access to EU funding
• EDA’s work in support of industry
• EDA’s work in support of Small-and-Medium-Sized Enterprises 

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The industry workshop on Standard Architecture for Soldier Systems focusing on data management and infrastructure (STASS II) was successfully completed on 6 September 2017. Twenty participants from seven countries and 14 organisations (industry and research) attended the workshop and discussed a suitable approach towards the realisation of an open architecture for soldier systems. 

Industry and research representatives acknowledged and welcomed the progress made in the development of standard architecture to date. Some of the most relevant topics discussed were:

• The lack of standard connectors suitable for dismounted soldier systems (DSS) impedes the standardisation process as standardisation is only possible in cases where at least two sources are available. 
• Lack of data interfaces between weapon devices and soldier systems in the “NATO Powered Accessory Rail” document. Instead it focuses only on the mechanical and electrical interfaces. It was stressed that recommendations be included for such data interfaces in the STASS II architecture. The lack of data interface standardisation means that each manufacturer has to define a data interface which significantly reduces the opportunities for future interoperability.
• Cognitive burden to soldiers imposed by large amounts of available information. The participants recommended the study team to focus not only on technical aspects of soldier systems architecture but also the possible effects on soldiers of such large amounts of data. This aspect is critical of the way tactical information is presented. If a soldier is overwhelmed with information his/her attention can be easily diverted from the battlefield situation and as a result put him/her in danger. 
• The storage of collected information. Nowadays, the sensors that provide Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities generate large volumes of data. A soldier is considered an important asset to collect and thus to support ISTAR capabilities. However this creates the need for equipping him/her with additional equipment. Taking into account the current trend to reduce the cognitive, thermal or weight burden for soldier systems this aspect requires further assessment. 
• As stressed during the workshop, a business model and cost-benefit assessment are important prerequisites prior to investments in  soldier systems. While the majority of benefits are for the user, a STASS II compliant system facilitates a flexible and powerful arrangement that otherwise would be extremely costly.

The STASS II study will be completed by the end of 2017 and together with the STASS I results will propose a comprehensive open reference architecture for soldier systems. The approach initiated under the STASS studies will be further developed under the EU Preparatory Action for Defence Research 2017 (PADR 2017) call for Force Protection and Soldier Systems by defining and technically validating a generic open soldier systems architecture which should be ready for standardisation.

All presentations given during the workshop are available here: 2017-09-06 - STASS II Industrial Workshop - Presentations
 

More information

• CapTech Ground Systems page

The Taleban have put in place administrative and military institutions in northern Jawzjan province that function relatively well. The shadow administrative posts are held by local non-Pashtuns. The recruitment of Uzbeks, in particular, has proved effective for the Taleban. However, Daesh’s appearance in this Uzbek-dominated province has created concerns, not only for the local government, but also for the Taleban. The Taleban, so far, have failed to fully block Daesh’s infiltration among the Turkic community in Jawzjan, but have contained it. AAN’s Obaid Ali explores the presence and capacity of Daesh to stand against the Taleban, the reasons for their infiltration, and the challenges the Taleban face in opposing it.

This dispatch is part of a series on the non-Pashtun Taleban in the north (for Tajik Taleban in Badakhshan, read our previous reporting here, for Uzbeks in Takhar, Faryab and Sar-e Pul here, here and here).

On 21 August 2017,the Taleban assaulted the Khamab district centre and quickly overran the government compounds in the town (see media report here). The militants seized governmental buildings, such as the district governor’s office, and the main bazaar of the district, for almost half a day. When reinforcements from the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) arrived and airstrikes were carried out, the Taleban withdrew from the districtcentreand the Afghan security forces returned to their positions.

Speaking to AAN, a local elder said that the government forces retreated with little resistance. However, local officials claimed that, after a few hours, the ANSF mounted a counter-attack and pushed the Taleban back from the district centre. According to the provincial police chief, now the district is undersecurity forces control again (read short report here). Engineer Ahmad, the district governor, when speaking to AAN, said the Taleban were still located in villages near the district centre and it was feared they might target itagain.

The repeated fall and recapture of Khamab district centre raised serious questions for locals as it was not the first time that the centre had fallen into Taleban hands. In December 2014, for instance, Khamab district fell entirely into Taleban hands. The Taleban seized the district centre again for ten days in October 2015, until the first vice president Abdulrashid Dostum led counteroffensives against them.

Khamab is just one example of how security in Jawzjan has deteriorated to such an extent that other district centres have also regularly changed hands between government forces and militants. In June 2017, the militants overran the Darzab district centre, seizing governmental offices for a few days. According to provincial security officials, the ANSF conducted a large-scale clearance operation, pushing the militants back (read short report here). However, as Muhammad Dawar, the district governor, said that 98 per cent of Darzab district continues to be controlled by militants. He told AAN that the security forces only control the Afghan National Police headquarters and the district governor’s compound; the remaining areas are all under the militants’ control. As a result, he said, “the governmental offices are removed to the provincial centre, Sheberghan.”

When considering the current security dynamic, the militants have made significant inroads in Jawzjan, which borders Turkmenistan in the north. As in Darzab, the government presence in Qushtepa is also limited to the government offices in the district centre,while militants rule the remaining parts. Rahmatullah Turkestani, the provincial police chief of Jawzjan, admitted to AAN that militants largely controlled bothdistricts in the southwest of the province, He said that, as in Khamab, the government and Taleban both hold half the territory in Qarqin district. According to the police chief, five other districts are also heavily contested by the Taleban: Aqcha, Faizabad, Mangijik, Muradian and Khaniqa. Aqcha, the second largest city in the province, has been “under siege” by the Taleban since mid-August, according to an Afghan media report. On 18 September, the security forces started a large scale counteroffensive to push the Taleban back from villages around Aqcha district centre. They claim that so far 15 villages have been cleared from Taleban presence. The operations continue (media report here). Furthermore, the provincial police chief said, security forces have been engaged simultaneously on several battlegrounds in the northeast and southwest of Jawzjan province. Meanwhile, Khwaja Duko and the district around Sheberghan city, he said, are relatively calm and under government control.

Militancy in Jawzjan

The Talebaninroads into this Uzbek dominated province are, in fact, part of the movement’s strategy to localise the warfare by offering positions to local non-Pashtuns, as AAN has already described for other provinces in the Afghan north (read our previous analysis here, here and here). It has been a priority for the insurgents to recruit from the Turkic communities and to appoint local commanders from them to help run their war-machine.

The Taleban promoted Mawlawi Abdulrahmanin 2016, to a position as a member of their leadership council. This increased the number of Turkic speakers with the council to two; the first one being Sheikh Qasem – a Turkmen from Jawzjan. Mawlawi Sunnatullah, an Uzbek, who served as group commander during the Taleban regime in the 1990s, was announced as shadow provincial governor for Jawzjan in 2017. When theTaleban re-established their presence in the province in 2009, Mawlawi Sunnatullah had returned to Darzab, where hegathered a group of 20 to 25 fighters who were mainly operating here and in neighbouring Qushtepa.

Currently, Mawlawi Sunatullah leads more than 800 fighters in the province. Local, young, Uzbek, educated religious figures, lead the Taleban shadow administrative and military committees. Qari Ghani, an Uzbek from Qushtepa district, for example, leads the shadow financial committee, while the military committee is led by Mawlawi Ahmad Shah, an Uzbek from Faizabad district, and the judicial committee by Qari Hafiz, an Uzbek from Aqcha district.

These two districts, as well as Aqcha district, to the south and northeast of Sheberghan respectively, were the first areas of activity for the post-2001 insurgency in the province. More active pockets of insurgency were seen in 2010, just a few kilometres from the provincial capital; both near the highways connecting Mazar-e Sharif and Sheberghan (to the east), and Sheberghan and Faryab (to the west). This made the routes unsafe for travel (for more background read this AAN’s 2011 report on the insurgency in the north, p53). (1)

The Taleban leadership council’s recruitment efforts among the Turkic communities have produced effective results. This has ensured, not just the Taleban’s presence, but it has also generated fighters loyal to the movement. This is part of the long-term strategy by the leadership council to ensure adequate manpower and financial resources at a local level. The Taleban tasked influential Uzbek and Turkmen figures, who had rejoined the movement in 2004, to implement this strategy and to help revive the militancy among the Turkic community in the northwest.

The recruitment was pursued through two main avenues. First, it started with young Uzbek madrasa students in Pakistan. This was carried out through Uzbek religious scholars, who taught at madrasas in Pakistan. One of them was Sheikh Abdulbari, an Uzbek from Darzab district. During the Taleban’s Emirate, in the 1990s, Abdulbari served as a mid-level military commander in the north and later led a religious school, Madrasa-ye Faruqia, in Kabul where it was not only Uzbeks that used to study there. After the fall of the Taleban regime, he fled to Pakistan where he continued serving as a madrasa teacher. According to sources in Pakistani madrasas, Sheikh Abdulbari mainly targeted Uzbek students, providing them with accommodation and food.

The first group of young, Pakistani, madrasa-educated Uzbeks were deployed to the north in 2009. They all became mosque preachers in Aqcha, Muradian, Khanaqa and Khamab districts. From there, they started a campaign against the government.

First, they criticised the activities of the government; later calling it a ‘puppet of foreigners’. The government watched this for four months and then put most members of the group in jail.

Second, secret Taleban delegations often visited former mid-level Taleban commanders from the northwest to muster them to take up arms again and fight against the government. According to sources close to the Taleban, Mawlawi Abdulrahman (an Uzbek from Faryab), Hafiz Nurullah (a Turkmen from Jawzjan), Mawlawi Abdulsalam Hanafi (another Jawzjani Uzbek), who was the Taleban deputy minister for education and, therefore, one of the highest-ranking Uzbeks in the regime, all frequently visited the northwest to mobilise fighters, as well as to instruct local commanders on the ground.

They were able to utilise the already existing small pockets of opportunistic Uzbek commanders, who were loyal to no particular group, until and as long as sustainable financial resources were channelled to their pockets. Some of those commanders served as Taleban group commanders and fighters in the 1990s, while others were locals with criminal backgrounds. The restarting of the Taleban movement in the area prepared the ground for these actors to label themselves as fighters of the insurgency in order to access to financial resources. These resources were obtained, either at the local level (through taxation and other revenue), or the payments came from the leadership council budget.

However, this did not happen without problems. For example, there were small-scale internal struggles over taxation and revenue collection among the Taleban commanders in the province from 2009 and until 2013 when the Taleban leadership council insisted their field commanders document revenues collected from locals and report this to the financial committee of the movement. The Taleban assigned influential and loyal commanders to oversee the income flows. Mawlawi Abdulrahman, for instance, was authorised to lead the insurgency in the northwest, as well as making the field commanders accountable. This was a Taleban attempt to reach two objectives: to oversee the income of resources and to prevent opportunistic groups from taking advantage to prevent local commanders from establishing private fiefdoms outside of their control.

Mawlawi Abdulrahman managed to implement successfully the Taleban leadership council’s strategy of recruiting large numbers of fighters and commanders from the Turkic communities. He also prevented irregularities among the insurgents and made sure there was more accountability in their operations. However, when it came to financial resources, he struggled. Some local commanders refused to document their revenue collection in order to keep a larger share of it for themselves. In 2014, for instance, a number of field commanders did not transfer the collected revenue to the provincial shadow financial committee. This elicited a tough response from the Taleban who, according to sources in the movement, for example, disarmed or even expelled disobedient commanders.

Daesh branding as an opportunity

The Taleban’s efforts to prevent irregularities, as well as getting a better hold on income resources, has created an environment of mistrust among field commanders. The Taleban provincial leadership’s obvious failure to fully control those income flows opened up a competition, which, sometimes, has turned into open disputes and quarrels among local Taleban commanders as to who should keep control over certain territories to raise income through taxation and revenue. The appearance of Daesh in this situation – both in the international, as well as in the Afghan arena – provided the commanders with an outlet they could turn to when they did not want to adhere to Taleban discipline.

Their Taleban superiors repeatedly accused Qari Hekmat and Mufti Nemat, field commanders in Jawzjan and in Darzab and Qushtepa, respectively, of irregularities, harassment of locals over taxation and misuse of their authority. Qari Hekmat had served as the shadow district governor in Darzad, and Mufti Nemat as the head of the Taleban military committee for Darzab and Qushtepa districts.

In 2014, according to locals, Qari Hekmat developed a conflict over collecting revenue with another local field commander, Qari Aman, known as Shamsullah, an ex-deputy Taleban shadow governor for Jawzjan. Both are Uzbeks from the Darzab-Qushtepa area. Locals told AAN that, eventually, both commanders disappeared for a short while as they went to Pakistan to discuss the issue with the leadership council. Both returned after a few months, but Qari Hekmat was removed from the Taleban’s ranks in the province. According to local journalists, the Taleban spokesman told them that Qari Hekmat was no longer a Taleb commander in the province. They say he told them “the Taleban are not responsible for his activities in Jawzjan.”

At the same time, the appearance of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) fighters in Qushtepa district opened a new chapter for Qari Hekmat. IMU is an organisation that was a former Taleban ally, but one that had shifted allegiance to Daesh in 2015 (read our previous analysis here). This provided the opportunity to shift allegiance and the Qariimmediately pledged allegiance to Daesh. In 2015, he started to target, not only the Afghan security forces, but also those commanders within the Taleban movement in Darzab district who had now become his enemies. Over the past two years, he has successfully managed to shape his unit as a Daesh-associated group and has received several delegations from the core Daesh base in Jalalabad province.

In 2014, the Taleban leadership council also expelled Mufti Nemat from the Taleban ranks. When he visited Pakistan in 2013, he was accused of corruption and misusing his authority and kept in custody there.

After his release that same year, he initially went a different way to cope with his ejection from the Taleban. To present himself as a convert to Daesh provided Qari Hekmat with an easy cover to settle his score with hisex-comrades in the Taleban movement and to remain in power in the area under his control. In contrast, Mufti Nemat joined the peace-process hoping to gain access to government resources (see short video here). When he returned to Jawzjan, he decided to surrender to Dostum with some 200 fighters (read media report here). Mufti Nemat stayed in Sheberghan for almost two years hoping to join the ALP or pro-government militia forces in the province. As a follower of Salafism, he intended to expand the Salafi ideology in the province at the same time. In November 2016, he established a Salafi madrasa called E’ya-ye Sunnat (Rehabilitation of the Sunnah) in the city and where male and female students attended classes. This created concerns among the dominant Hanafi Sunni scholars. Both sides engaged in a serious public debate about the interpretation of certain religious subjects. Eventually, the provincial department of the Ministry of Hajj issued an order to shut down Nemat’s madrasa. In November 2016, the madrasa was closed and Mufti Nemat banned from teaching in the province. He then reached out to Qari Hekmat and also joined the Daesh-affiliated group in Darzab.

In the case of Jawzjan, when compared with power-saving opportunism, it was ideological motivation that seemed to play a lesser role among commanders and their fighters to link up with Daesh. According to local sources, the Salafi ideology is a core motivation among Daesh fightersin eastern Afghanistan (see AAN analysis here) but has limited followers here. According to Muhammad Rasul Mujahaz, head of the Ulama Council in Jawzjan, Salafism only appeared recently in the province. “There was no Salafi mosque or madrasa, only in Darzab district a small group of Salafis attempt to promote the ideology.”

The appearance of Daesh has created a serious challenge for how the local Taleban handle disgruntled commanders. According to Taleban sources, a number of delegations from the Taleban side were sent to meet Qari Hekmat and to assure him a position and authority in the province; an offer he rejected. Simultaneously, Daesh also courted him. Hekmat received several delegations from their side, too. In 2016, for instance, the Taleban detained a five-member Daesh delegation that tried to reach Qari Hekmat and were killed by local Taleban. In revenge, Qari Hekmat fighters captured and killed ten Taleban members. In August that year, another high-level delegation from the Taleban side, including Mawlawi Abdulrahman, Sheikh Abdulbari, Hafiz Nurullah and Abdulkhaleq reached Qari Hekmat to encourage him to rejoin the Taleban. According to Taleban sources “the discussions left no impact.”

Conclusion: A three-way struggle

The emergence of Daesh as a second insurgent group in the northwest and its attempts to establish a footprint among the Turkic communities has created serious concerns for the local government, as well as for the Taleban. The local conflict constellation is now a triangle with Daesh as its weakest side. Governments in neighbouring Central Asia are watching this development with concern as a potential threat to their countries.

Daesh’s emergence presents an unprecedented outlet for Taleban commanders who either do not want to subordinate themselves to the stricter discipline of the Taleban movement or want to keep their local fiefdoms free of too much outside interference. On the other hand, this is a rather dangerous option for them, as such shifts of allegiance often is followed by a strong Taleban reaction. According to locals from the north, in a number of cases, local Taleban even eliminated suspected commanders for fear of them shifting their allegiance to the new group.

Nevertheless, Daesh constitutes a challenge to the Taleban recruitment strategy among the non-Pashtuns. They see the danger of losing followers to the new group, particularly those who have a strong local base. But, so far, they have tried to keep the conflict at a low profile. Ethnic sympathy among the Uzbeks, to which both sides belong, might contribute to this kind of approach.

This is reflected by Qari Hekmat’s case, where the Taleban used a soft, political approach to win him back by negotiations. So far, the Taleban have not taken serious action against Qari Hekmat. This is largely because the Taleban want to avoid invoking infighting among the local Uzbeks; not least because it would make media headlines, which would be against their desire to tackle the issue at the local level. They also fear this could drive more of their commanders to Daesh.

The overwhelming presence of the Taleban in most districts of Jawzjan, as well as in the wider north, so far prevents potential Daesh sympathisers to openly join the ranks of the “Islamic State Khorasan Province.”

Also, the government has failed so far to take advantage of the three-way conflict by winning over disgruntled Taleban commanders. Already earlier, a number of Taleban field commanders, who had ‘joined the peace-process’, went back to the Taleban given its failure to ensure security and job opportunities for those who change to its side (read media reports here, here and here).

Edited by Thomas Ruttig

 

(1) A German journalist who just travelled on the Mazar-Sheberghan road told AAN of clearly visible Taleban presence in the few villages along this route.

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