Defence`s Feeds

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To build a common understanding of the REACH regulatory provisions and facilitate the exchange of best practices in the field of Ammunition Classification, EDA Member States adopted on 22 September a Common Position on Ammunition Classification under REACH.

The Common Position is based on the outcome of the Agency’s work conducted in this field since 2014, with the support of Member States’ REACH and ammunition experts at technical level, and on the basis of a continuous exchange with the European Commission, the European Chemicals Agency and EU defence industry.

The adoption of the Common Position constitutes an important milestone as it will significantly contribute to:

• reducing the risk of misinterpretation of, and enhancing compliance to, the REACH Regulation´s provisions on substances/mixtures or articles;
• supporting the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) in its efforts to raise awareness on issues pertaining to ammunition classification under REACH; and
• minimising the possibility of potential incorrect classification of ammunition along the REACH Regulation´s provisions on substances/mixtures or articles, and related potential negative impact on the operational effectiveness of Member States’ Armed Forces.

The Common Position reflects EDA participating Member States’ (pMS) position/views on the classification of ammunition categories and types under REACH. It also states that ”Views reflected are for reference only and are not in any way legally binding for those obligated by REACH, the Member States, or other REACH stakeholders. Usage of the information contained in the document remains under the sole responsibility of the users, including ensuring that any conclusions drawn on the basis of the information are compliant with REACH or any other applicable national and EU legislation. The EDA and its pMS adopting this document, will not be held liable or bear any responsibility in this regard.”

 The EDA has disseminated the Common Position as widely as possible to relevant stakeholders, including the Commission, ECHA and EU defence industry, and intends to assess potential feedback/comments, as basis for future improvement of the document.

 

More information:

• EDA Member States Common Position on Ammunition Classification under REACH - full text as adopted
• EDA REACH Activities
• CapTech Ammunition Technologies (EDA project page)

One of the key elements of the Afghan government’s Road Map for pushing back the insurgency is increasing the fighting capabilities of Afghan government forces. This includes the expansion of the Afghan National Army’s (ANA) praised special operations forces. However, this expansion is spurring already existing tendencies that are turning these units into shock troops, rather than actual special forces. Moreover, such a focus on shock troops concentrates efforts on capturing territory from the insurgency, rather than addressing the more pressing problem – which is holding cleared areas. AAN guest author Franz J. Marty (*) illustrates these and other questions by taking a closer look at the ANA’s special operations forces and the plan to expand them.

When the conventional forces of the Afghan state cannot cope with insurgents on the battlefield, they usually call in units of the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) for support. These units are often referred to as ‘Commandos’. Compared to conventional troops, they are superior forces that usually manage to defeat insurgents or at least push them back. Because of this high demand for the ANASOC, the Afghan government, supported by its allies, is now doubling the number of these forces. By doing so, it hopes also to double their success. Taking a closer look reveals, though, that this will probably not be done that easily and will take the ANASOC even further away from its original mission – to conduct actual special operations.

The big picture: the ANSF Road Map

The intended expansion of the ANASOC has to be seen against the backdrop of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (1) Road Map, as laid out in a report by the US Department of Defense (US DoD) to US Congress in June 2017. The Road Map is an official Afghan policy document, although it can be assumed that the NATO-led coalition and especially the United States military provided support in developing it (see AAN’s previous analysis here). According to unclassified documents of the NATO-led coalition seen by the author, the Road Map envisions breaking what it sees as a stalemate between Afghan government forces and the insurgency; extending security, with the goal of securing control over what is seen as a critical mass of 80 per cent of the Afghan population; and “expand[ing] governance and economic development and compel[ling] or incentiviz[ing] Taliban reconciliation.” Hence, the Road Map does not hope to defeat the insurgency, but rather to tilt the war in favour of the government.

The Road Map has four key elements: (i) leadership development; (ii) countering corruption; (iii) increasing fighting capabilities by expanding the Afghan Special Security Forces (of which the ANASOC makes up the lion’s share, but there are also other units) (2) and the Afghan Air Force; and (iv) improving unity of command and effort.

With respect to the Road Map, it is imperative to keep in mind that neither the Afghan government or the coalition backing it is expecting the plan to lead to any major changes on the battlefield in the near future. On the contrary, the plan is to “realign” Afghan government forces in 2017 (3) (this phase is dubbed “build momentum”) and to “continue building offensive capability… while disrupting insurgent strongholds” in 2018 (dubbed “seize the initiative”). This is meant to set the conditions for “execut[ing] large-scale offensive operations in 2019” (dubbed “exploit the initiative”) and finally, in 2020, to consolidate the hoped for gains.

The latest quarterly report of the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) citing US Forces-Afghanistan notes, though, that “[w]hile [Afghan] President Ghani has put the execution of the strategy within a four-year time frame, its actual implementation will be conditions-based, rather than time-driven” (this mirrors the new US stance on Afghanistan – see US President Trump’s speech here and AAN analysis here). “Conditions-based” in this context apparently means that the intended “large-scale offensive operations” will be executed once the ground and the troops have been fully prepared, rather than according to a rigid timetable – ie if realigning the force, building offensive capabilities and disrupting insurgent strongholds should take longer than originally planned, this would cause a delay in executing the large-scale operations.

In any event, the ANASOC is set to play the crucial role in “disrupting insurgent strongholds” and carrying out “offensive operations.”

From division to corps

The ANASOC was reported to have been established as an independent division (called ferqa-ye amaliatha-ye khas) of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in 2011 and officially upgraded to a corps (qul-e urdu-ye amaliatha-ye khas) on 20 August 2017 (see press release here). According to Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Qayum Nuristani, ANASOC Public Affairs Officer, this upgrade will entail roughly a doubling of its strength from about 11,300 to 23,300 personnel. This expansion of personnel and units will – due to the need of recruitment, training and the establishment of completely new units, while at the same time maintaining enough troops as a fighting force in the field – take years. According to a spokesman of the Afghan Ministry of Defence (quoted here), completion of the expansion was initially planned for 2020, but a coalition source told AAN it would need more time.

This expansion will, according to the US DoD report quoted above, not augment the authorised end-strength (4) of the ANSF, as “[t]he manpower required for the ANASOC growth will come from realigning tashkil (5) positions from conventional forces.” In other words: conventional ANA forces will be reassigned to the ANASOC, and their number will decrease by the same amount as the ANASOC troops will rise.

While the ANASOC usually recruits its members directly from ANA training centres, Nuristani explained that the currently-planned, rapid expansion will mainly be facilitated by reassigning the two Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades (lewa-ye zarbati) – one based in Kabul, one in Kandahar – to the ANASOC. These two brigades consist of seven Mobile Strike Force Vehicle kandaks (battalions). According to the US DoD, they are also set to provide the ANASOC with their own armoured ground assault vehicles and make them more self-sufficient. (So far, the ANASOC did not have such mechanised assets in their own units.) (6) (The possible impact of reassigning those two Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades will be addressed in more detail later in the text.)

Nuristani also stated that the Special Mission Wing (lewa-ye 777 hawayi) will be incorporated into the expanded ANASOC corps. (Given that this concerns air assets, this will not be further addressed in this analysis which concentrates on ANASOC ground forces.)

Original mission

According to the US DoD June 2017 report, “[t]he ANASOC’s mission is to increase the Afghan Government’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency and stability operations, and, as directed, execute special operations against terrorist and insurgent networks in coordination with other [ANSF] pillars.” (7)

An elite group of Afghan National Army commandos graduated to become the first Afghan Special Forces during a ceremony at Camp Morehead May 13, 2010. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Sarah Brown/RELEASED)

The centre-piece of special operations are direct actions which are commonly referred to as ‘raids’. Their characteristics – short duration, small scale and the fact that they are conducted in “denied” areas (ie not on a clear battlefield) and often behind enemy lines – set them apart from conventional operations. Another example of special operations is reconnaissance in denied areas. (8) Yet another type of special operations are “internal defence missions” that are aimed at countering an insurgency at the level of ‘tribe’ or village; hence, such missions are at the same time counterinsurgency and stability operations. For example, in what the US military calls Village Stability Operations (VSO), special forces are assigned to support village leaders and train village defence units of the Afghan Local Police. (9)

This, at least, was the original idea behind the ANASOC. However, the ANASOC has strayed away from this original mission.

Misuse and changing mission

There are consistent reports about ANASOC forces being used outside the initially intended mission, as described above. For example, the June 2017 US DoD report previously quoted states that “the [Afghan Special Security Forces; of which the ANASOC is the main part] frequently is used as the offensive arm of the [ANSF] and tends to suffer misuse by conventional forces…,” even going as far as “employing [Afghan Special Security Forces] at checkpoints or as personal security detachments.” Nuristani partly acknowledged this, saying that ANASOC forces often support conventional ANA units to retake lost territory or fight especially resilient insurgents.

What this use of the ANASOC means is that it has, in practice, become a ‘shock’ rather than a special force – ie a force to boost the offensive capabilities of conventional forces in conventional operations, rather than one that conducts highly specialised, small-scale operations in terrain that conventional forces cannot reach (see also this media report). (10) Not only this. A SIGAR report noted that “[a]s of early 2017, the [Afghan Special Security Forces] conducted 80% of all the ANA’s offensive operations.” This means that the ANASOC, despite being just a small fraction of the conventional ANA forces, has not only become a shock force, but the primary offensive force, bearing the brunt of the fight against the insurgency – although this would clearly be the mission of the ANA’s conventional forces.

The same SIGAR report, dated 30 April 2017, claims that misuse of Afghan Special Security Forces has become “mostly regionally isolated” and that “[w]hile there are still notable repeat offenders, the vast majority of [Afghan Special Security Forces] misuse has significantly decreased.”

However, the already-mentioned June 2017 US DoD report rather suggests a change of the ANASOC’s mission away from the initially envisioned special operations to a shock force than preventing such originally non-intended use. The report states, “[t]he [ANSF] Road Map contains plans to… establish the [Afghan Special Security Forces] as the primary offensive maneuver force within the [ANSF], while the conventional forces become the primary option for consolidating gains and holding key terrain and infrastructure” – with a “primary offensive maneuver force” by definition conducting conventional, and not special operations. (11)

At the same time, there are efforts to at least curb the most blatant misuse of special operations forces, such as employing them at checkpoints or as personal security detachments. According to Nuristani, ANASOC forces are already now not used anymore as personal security detachments (this could neither be verified or disproved). He acknowledged though that it would sometimes still be necessary for ANASOC forces to remain in the field to hold an area, but insisted this would not be permanent.

Given the fact that the Afghan Ministry of Defence frequently emphasises the conducting of night operations and that there will also be a need for certain other special operations, the ANASOC will not become solely a shock force, but will continue to conduct certain special operations. This was confirmed by an ANASOC officer, who, however, clarified that special operations such as night raids are rather rare and that the vast majority of ANASOC operations are aimed at retaking territory lost to the insurgency or to support conventional forces in other conventional operations. Hence, special operations are on the fringes of the ANASOC mission and not at its centre, as one would expect with what are called special operations forces.

In this regard, one could argue that – while the existence of a shock force itself is positive – the blurring of conventional and unconventional missions is not advisable, as (unconventional) special operations are (as set out above) completely different from conventional operations and require different units and capabilities.

Order of Battle

The issues raised above are further obfuscated by questions regarding the ANASOC’s order of battle (ie its organisation and command structure). To understand these problems, one has to first grasp the general ANASOC order of battle though.

According to official documents, the ANASOC so far consisted of two Special Operations Brigades (lewa-ye amaliatha-ye khas), one made up of four and the other of five Special Operations Kandaks (battalions) (SOKs) (kandak-e amaliatha-ye khas/commando) that were aligned with regional ANA Corps. The US DoD stated in its June 2017 report already quoted above that “[t]he SOKs are the primary tactical elements of the ANASOC, and they conduct elite, light-infantry operations against threat networks in support of the regional corps’ counterinsurgency operations and provide a strategic response capability against strategic targets.” SOKs are also referred to as Commando Kandaks, as they are (at least largely) made up of special soldiers that are called Commandos (more on this below). An additional, separate Special Operations Kandak, the 6th SOK based in Kabul, functioned “as the ANA’s national mission unit,” providing “the President of Afghanistan and the [Chief of ANA Staff] with a rapidly deployable special operations force able to respond to national-level crises throughout Afghanistan.” (12)

The current plan, as confirmed by Nuristani, foresees the expansion of the ANASOC with two additional Special Operations Brigades (raising the total to four such brigades) and the so-called National Mission Brigade (lewa-ye wazayef-e khas-e melli). Asked how many additional SOKs this would encompass, Nuristani refrained from giving a specific number, but said that it might amount to even more than the doubling of the current ten SOKs. (13)

The four Special Operation Brigades will be – similar to the so far nine common SOKs – “regionally oriented, [but] centrally controlled,” a coalition source explained. This suggests that ANA Corps commanders will, as so far, have to request ANASOC assistance, upon which the Chief of Army Staff or ANASOC HQ will decide and, if approved, give the regionally stationed Special Operations Brigades their respective orders.

The National Mission Brigade was inaugurated on 31 July 2017 and will take over the role of the 6th SOK. According to the June 2017 US DoD report, it has already reached initial operational capability and is scheduled to reach full operational capability in March 2018. The same report also stated that the National Mission Brigade “and associated headquarters element will consist of elements of the ANA 6th SOK and the [Qeta-ye Khas].” The Qeta-ye Khas (Special Forces in Dari; transcribed as Ktah Khas by the US Department of Defense) is (or rather was) a small special forces unit that existed in addition to the Commandos, that make up the vast majority of the ANASOC’s fighting force. While in theory and (at least initially) also in practice there was a crucial difference between Commandos and Qeta-ye Khas, this difference is far from clear anymore.

Commandos and Qeta-ye Khas – and the confusion surrounding them

The Qeta-ye Khas was, as reported here, originally a separate unit consisting of several teams modelled after the US Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha, informally called A-teams. (14) As of spring 2015, there were 72 Afghan A-teams, according to a Qeta-ye Khas member quoted by a specialised publication. (15) Assuming the US model of 15 persons per A-team, this would amount to 1,080 personnel. The June 2017 US DoD report indicates a somewhat higher number though, stating that the Qeta-ye Khas comprises 1,190 personnel out of an authorised end-strength of 1,291. (This number might include supporting personnel and not necessarily means that the number of Afghan A-teams had changed by that time.)

The original plan was that such Qeta-ye Khas A-teams conduct various special operations – particularly direct actions and special reconnaissance. This was also what set the Qeta-ye Khas apart from the other special operation forces, the Commandos, that were solely meant for direct actions (see here). In this regard, the Qeta-ye Khas would usually conduct the more special and covert direct actions (for example targeting high-value insurgents in more inaccessible terrain) than the Commandos. (16)

However, at some point that could not be determined, the Qeta-ye Khas was integrated into the ANASOC. How this was exactly done and what its current status is, is also hard to determine. But it is relevant as it directly affects the way the ANASOC is able to conduct missions – ie whether it still retains small special forces teams for special operations or whether it rather turned into a unit of Commandos that was initially intended for more overt raids, but has become a shock force.

According to Nuristani, the Qeta-ye Khas is now fully integrated into the National Mission Brigade and has been transformed into a SOK that does not differ from other SOKs, neither in mission nor training. Nuristani was very clear about this, stating that Qeta-ye Khas and the Commandos are one and the same thing. He even used the terms interchangeably or in combination (Qeta-ye Khas Commando). He asserted, though, that the Commandos (including the former Qeta-ye Khas) would be able to provide shock forces and conduct special operations at the same time.

However, an ANASOC officer who requested anonymity explained matters slightly differently. He also confirmed that the former Qeta-ye Khas has indeed been completely absorbed by the ANASOC/Commandos and does not have a separate name anymore. The officer explained though that each SOK has – besides several companies (tolay) of regular Commandos – one “special” company. These “special” companies conduct the actual special operations, usually in small teams (apparently A-teams), while the bulk of the Commandos are used as shock forces (this source, like Nuristani, described the use as shock force – contrary to a western understanding – as special operations, adding that Commando operations, at least in theory, do not exceed 72 hours). The source also insisted that these special forces would – compared to other Commandos – receive additional and separate training as had been the case for the former Qeta-ye Khas (as of now, those special companies are probably made up of the former Qeta-ye Khas). This is seemingly supported by the June 2017 US DoD report which reads that “each SOK contains eight ANA Special Forces teams.”

However, adding to the confusion, the exact same US DoD report states at another point that “[t]he [Qeta-ye Khas] is a light infantry SOK consisting of three operational companies, a training company, an engineer company, a military intelligence company, a support company, and a headquarters company,” which would suggest a separate unit. Such a separate Qeta-ye Khas unit was also displayed in official documents seen by this author in July 2017. Furthermore, in a press conference held in Kabul on 24 August 2017 – after the official inauguration of the National Mission Brigade on 31 July 2017 that allegedly definitively absorbed the Qeta-ye Khas into the ANASOC/Commandos – US Army General John W. Nicholson, commander of US Forces–Afghanistan and the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission, referred to “commandos and [Qeta-ye Khas]”, implying two separate types of forces. Even more tangibly, at the mentioned official inauguration of the National Mission Brigade, the (former) Qeta-ye Khas still wore their uniforms and sand-coloured berets that distinguished them from the Commandos who wear slightly different camouflage and burgundy red berets.

While none of the above accounts could be definitively verified, in this author’s assessment, the most likely variant is that the former Qeta-ye Khas has indeed been integrated into SOKs, but still exists as special companies that often (but probably not always) conduct independent missions.

In any event, the confusion regarding the Qeta-ye Khas adds to the blurring of the use of ANASOC forces for special operations and as a shock force. While this does not necessarily have to impair the ANASOC’s ability to conduct special operations, it certainly has the potential to do so, as we will see.

What does all this mean for the battlefield?

Given the ANASOC’s successful track record (17), it can be expected that its expansion will, as planned, indeed increase the ANSF’s fighting capabilities and bolster their offensive prowess.

Some argue though that this expansion could cause a decrease of the ANASOC’s quality. For example, a Washington Post article warned that “[r]apidly growing the elite forces could also dilute the commando units to a point where they are indistinguishable from regular units, suffering the same issues with discipline and morale while increasing the threat of insider attacks.” While the intended rapid growth and the above displayed confusion about the status of the Qeta-ye Khas indeed carries the danger of a decrease in quality, it seems unlikely that this will be as dramatic as stated in the article. This is mainly due to the fact that the ANASOC training centre (the ANASOC School of Excellence) will also be expanded and that, according to a coalition source, the expected increase of foreign advisors will specifically include special forces trainers. This means that ANASOC forces will still receive – compared to regular units – better training, ensuring that they keep their edge over conventional forces. Even so, a certain decrease in quality cannot be ruled out completely.

ANASOC National Mission Brigade inauguration at 31 July 2017. Photo: Franz J. Marty.

The more significant danger is that the ANASOC might loose part of its ability to conduct special operations and further drift into becoming a mere shock force. In fact, a former Commando and current regular ANA officer told this author in August 2017 that the (former) Qeta-ye Khas mostly, if not always, supports the Commandos in missions that are even difficult for the Commandos – ie implying that the (former) Qeta-ye Khas has slid into a similar role in relation to the Commandos as the Commandos play for conventional forces. This could not be verified; however, there have been similar allegations in the past. (18)

Another, probably more crucial question is, whether the improvement of offensive capabilities will lead to the intended extension of government control throughout the country. In this context, one could argue that defeating insurgents in offensive operations – which will be the main, if not sole objective of the expanded ANASOC Corps – was never the main problem of the ANSF, as experience shows that insurgents were and still are unable to withstand concentrated government efforts, if and when mounted. The main problem is rather that the ANSF fail at holding and securing areas after they have been taken or re-taken, giving insurgents that melt away when facing a superior force like the ANASOC the opportunity to re-infiltrate such areas later.

While not clearly articulated, the intention of the Afghan government and its international backers seems to be that relieving conventional forces of bearing the brunt of the fighting by making an expanded ANASOC the “primary offensive maneuver force” will enable conventional forces to successfully hold and secure cleared terrain. This, however, might be a fallacy.

First of all, although freeing up conventional forces from fighting will give them more time to concentrate on holding territory, without specific efforts to hold terrain and train conventional forces accordingly, this might remain a significant problem. And at least to this author’s knowledge, the focus is on increasing offensive capabilities like the ANASOC; this holds true despite recent reports (here and, by AAN, here) about the intended establishment of an additional holding force, as such plans are still in an early stage and remain unclear (see also endnote 11). In any event, Nuristani was – even before reports of plans for such a holding force were published – confident that holding areas would not be a problem, although he acknowledged that in war, there was always the possibility of losing territory again.

Secondly, this could be exacerbated by what military historian Roger Beaumont called the “selection-destruction” cycle. (19) This concept is based on the fact that the best available personnel are selected for elite units, which do have a higher casualty rate due to their missions involving disproportionally intense combat (for the Afghan Commandos, the above mentioned ANASOC officer confirmed a high casualty rate). This, however, leads to “the overall effect… to select and then destroy the talent within a force under pressure,” according to counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen. (20) However, even if the selected personnel in the elite units are not killed, their mere selection “makes high quality leadership less available for conventional units” (see endnote 19). In the current case of the ANSF, this could mean that – in order to satisfy the need of the rapidly expanding ANASOC – conventional forces might be drained of their best personnel. This, in turn, may cause a decline in quality of such conventional forces. (It is also noteworthy that the source text quoting Beaumont (endnote 19) clearly states that “conventional units… must carry the bulk of the fighting load,” thereby reinforcing the above-mentioned argument that special operations forces like the ANASOC are not meant to be the “primary offensive maneuver force”.)

Such a potential degrading of conventional forces might be mitigated though. As mentioned, the growth of the ANASOC will be mainly facilitated by reassigning the existing two Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades to the ANASOC. These two brigades were, according to Nuristani, already so far independent – ie not part of any regional ANA Corps. This consequentially means that the conventional regional ANA Corps will not be significantly drained of personnel or otherwise negatively affected by the growth of the ANASOC. In this context, Nuristani also dispelled concerns that – due to the rapid expansion – the ANASOC might be forced to take on recruits that do not adhere to the same high standards as before, pointing out that the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades already consist of selected personnel that would match the high requirements of the ANASOC.

Furthermore, given that the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades have apparently not been effectively used so far, transferring them to the ANASOC will probably have less of an impact on the conventional forces than one might think at first sight. An earlier US DoD report, published in June 2016, stated that the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades “are often used in defensive operations or employed in static positions, which hinders their intended use as an offensive maneuver capability.” And given that the coalition is in any event pressuring Afghan forces to abandon static positions, the so far defensively or statically used Mobile Strike Forces Vehicle Brigades would have probably been realigned to other missions, even if there were not to transition to the ANASOC.

Whether and to what extent transitioning those forces’ armoured vehicles (see endnote 6) to the ANASOC will have a significant impact on the performance of the ANASOC, remains to be seen. Nuristani stated though that the intention is to pair every two (infantry) SOKs with one Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Kandak (kandak-e zarbati), adding that the ANASOC was in need of such mechanised assets.

Conclusion: an improvement or a dilution of tasks and quality?

The roughly doubling of the ANASOC paired with its good track record will certainly increase the fighting capability of the ANSF. However, the expansion seems to spur already existing tendencies that have turned the ANASOC more into a conventional shock force rather than an actual special operations force. While a shock force is – given that the insurgency has become more aggressive in the past years – in itself a useful and maybe even necessary asset, it could be argued that this should not be done at the expense of special operations and that a clear separation of shock and special forces would be advisable. More critically, it could even be said that making the ANASOC not only a shock, but the “primary offensive maneuver force” of the ANSF, simply circumvents the actual problem that conventional ANA forces are apparently not up to their main task, which would be bearing the brunt of the fight, in both, offensive operations to wrestle territory back from the insurgency and defensive operations to hold captured areas.

In addition, as overcoming insurgents in concentrated efforts has never been a significant issue for the ANSF, it could be contended that the expansion of the ANASOC fixes something that is not broken, while the real issue – successfully holding cleared areas – has apparently not been adequately addressed (however, see the mentioned, so far unclear plans for a new holding force ). Given that the expansion of the ANASOC will allow conventional ANA forces to mainly concentrate on holding terrain and if a separate holding force is indeed established, the hold aspect might nonetheless improve. This, however, has to be proven first and might turn out to be a mirage.

Edited by Thomas Ruttig and Kate Clark

 

(*) Franz J. Marty is a freelance journalist based in Afghanistan and focuses on security and military issues. He can be followed @franzjmarty on twitter and be contacted via franz.j.marty@icloud.com.

 

(1) AAN continues to use the original (and shorter) term Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), although other official entities, among them the US Department of Defense, have switched to using Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF).

(2) The general term “special operations forces” mentioned in the title and at the beginning of this dispatch is not clearly defined in the context described in this dispatch (ie it is not clearly defined which forces besides the ANASOC, if any, it encompasses), and it was only used to make the introduction easier. However, this analysis will only cover the ANASOC, including the Qeta-ye Khas. Apart from the introduction, it will, whenever possible, refer to strictly defined terms of units or forces in order to ensure accuracy.

In the terminology of the US Department of Defense, the Afghan Special Security Forces consist of the ANASOC, including the Qeta-ye Khas (Special Forces), the Special Mission Wing (lewa-ye 777 hawayi) and the General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU). Some accounts imply that also some forces of the National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan’s intelligence service, are part of the Afghan Special Security Forces; this could, however, not be verified.

The Special Mission Wing is a special air wing, independent of the Afghan Air Force that supports the Afghan Special Security Forces with air assets. The GCPSU is, contrary to the ANASOC, a police and not a military unit – although it does conduct paramilitary operations, most prominently responses to high-profile terrorist attacks.

The ANSF Road Map also foresees a growth of the Special Mission Wing and the GCPSU, albeit on a far smaller scale than the ANASOC growth. The Special Mission Wing personnel is planned to grow from 788 (out of a so far authorised end-strength of 902) to reportedly 1,000. The GCPSU personnel is planned to grow from 6,426 (out of a so far authorised end-strength of 7,042) to reportedly 9,000.

(3) The main aspects of realigning the ANSF are: (i) the reassignment of conventional forces to the ANASOC in order to facilitate the latter’s expansion (see in more detail later in the main text); and (ii) the transfer of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a separate police unit that performs paramilitary duties, as well as “the paramilitary portions of the Afghan Border Police (ABP),” both of which have so far been subordinated to the Ministry of Interior Affairs, to the Ministry of Defence. This is, according to the US Department of Defense, done to “consolidate the combat capabilities of the [ANSF] under the [Ministry of Defence] and allow the [Ministry of Interior Affairs] to focus its efforts on developing community policing capabilities and upholding the rule of law.”

(4) According to a SIGAR report, as of 20 May 2017, the ANA (including 8,413 personnel of the Afghan Air Force; and also all ANASOC personnel) comprised 180,031 personnel out of an approved end-strength goal of 196,534 (91.6%). (All numbers also include civilian personnel.) Given general fluctuations due to recruitment and attrition, the diminishing of conventional forces will probably differ slightly from the increase in ANASOC personnel; however, such minor differences will most likely be negligible.

(5) Tashkil means ‘shape’ or ‘structure’ in Dari and “refers to the official list of personnel and equipment requirements used by the [Afghan ministries of defence and interior affairs] to detail authorized staff positions and equipment items for each unit,” according to the June 2017 US Department of Defense (US DoD) report already quoted above.

(6) The US DoD report already quoted in endnote 5 does not clarify, whether the two Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades consist of seven kandaks (battalions) each or altogether. AAN was unable to clarify this point.

According to the June 2016 US DoD report, the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades “consist of wheeled medium armored vehicles that provide a rapidly deployable mechanized infantry capability to undertake and reinforce operations.” More specifically, according to Jane’s World Armies (July 2015), the ANSF have been equipped with three variants of the M1117 Armoured Security Vehicle built by Textron Marine & Land Systems: “1. an armoured personnel carrier (APC) with an enclosed turret; 2. an APC with one-person turret armed with a .50-calibre machine gun and 40 mm automatic grenade launcher that also features the US Army’s Objective Gunner Protection Kit; and 3. an ambulance version. All are in the latest Enhanced Survivability Standard (ESV), which features upgraded suspension, improved seating, and a higher level of protection against mines and IEDs than offered by Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. It was reported that 50 might also be mortar-carrying, capable of transporting 82 rounds, but this remains unconfirmed.”

On 28 September 2017, the US DoD awarded a 12,692,527 US dollars firm-fixed-price foreign military sales contract to a US company, Textron Systems Marine & Land Systems, to provide the ANSF with an unspecified number of additional Mobile Strike Force Vehicles. The estimated completion date is 28 September 2018. It is unclear for which forces within the ANSF these vehicles are intended.

(7) The quoted passage of the June 2017 US DoD report describes the mission ANASOC was originally intended for. This derives from several previous reports of the US Department of Defense that, however, did not had a similarly condensed mission statement.

(8) Direct actions are, according to US military terminology, defined as “short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.” According to the same terminology (here), special reconnaissance consists of “reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces.”

(9) “Afghan National Army Special Forces: An insider’s account”, published in Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 May 2015.

(10) To set this into relations: the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom (British Army, Royal Navy, Royal Marines, Royal Air Force, including Reserves) (as of 1 July 2017, about 196,000 personnel) are – albeit there are of course many significant differences – in size roughly comparable to the Afghan National Army (including Afghan Air Force) (as of 20 May 2017, 180,031 personnel out of an approved end-strength goal of 196,534 (91.6%); see endnote 4). However, the highly regarded British special forces, specifically the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Special Boat Service (SBS), amount to only a few hundred men (no exact numbers are available), while the ANASOC expands from 11,300 personnel to 23,300. This clearly shows that the SAS and SBS are highly specialised units for actual small-scale special operations, while the ANASOC has become something far more conventional.

(11) Making the conventional ANA forces responsible for holding terrain is also meant to relieve police forces from such holding duties, so that they can “focus [their] efforts on developing community policing capabilities and upholding the rule of law” – ie actual police work (see the June 2017 US DoD report). This is also why the paramilitary forces of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) and parts of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) will be transferred from the Ministry of Interior Affairs to the Ministry of Defence, as this will make the distinction between (para)military tasks of fighting as well as defending terrain (responsibility of the Ministry of Defence) and actual police work (responsibility of the Ministry of Interior Affairs) more clear. In how far this will or can be implemented effectively is, of course, another question.
In this regard, it has to be noted that there are plans to establish a new force under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence that will mainly be tasked with holding once cleared terrain (see AAN analysis here). While this force is allegedly modelled after the Indian Territorial Army, at the time of writing (23 September 2017), details remained unclear. (Different accounts suggest different set-ups, ranging from building such a force with new recruits to incorporating or reassigning conventional ANA forces, the ANCOP and/or Afghan Local Police to this new force).

(12) The last quote regarding the 6th SOK’s mission technically refers to the new National Mission Brigade. However, given that this was taken over from the 6th SOK, it is nonetheless applicable here.

(13) The June 2017 US DoD report gives some hints at additional details of the alleged expansion; however, they do not form a coherent picture.

(14) An A-team usually consists of 15 personnel: a captain, a first lieutenant executive officer, a team sergeant, two weapons sergeants, two engineer sergeants, two communications sergeants, two intelligence sergeants, two medical sergeants, an information disseminations sergeant and a civil-military operations specialist.

(15) “Afghan National Army Special Forces: An insider’s account”, published in Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 May 2015.

(16) “Afghan National Army Special Forces: An insider’s account”, published in Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 May 2015.

(17) Gen Nicholson stated at a press conference in Kabul on 24 August 2017 that “[t]he Taliban have never won against the commandos and [Qeta-ye Khas].” While it could not be verified that the ANASOC indeed always prevailed, they certainly did so in the overwhelmingly vast majority of operations, as insurgents (employing traditional guerrilla tactics) tend to melt away when facing a superior adversary in order to fight another day.

(18) “Afghan National Army Special Forces: An insider’s account”, published in Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 May 2015.

(19) Quoted from LTC Gary L. Bounds, “Notes on Military Elite Units”, CSI Report No. 4, US Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, June 1990.

(20) Quoted from David Kilcullen, “Why Donald Trump’s ‘mini-surge’ in Afghanistan invites scepticism”, published in The Australian, 27 May 2017.

 

Freedom of expression is the right of every person to think as he wishes and to be able to express his opinions by any means he deems appropriate in the fields of politics, philosophy, religion, morals. Freedom of expression in a democratic country of the European Union is considered illegal. In a EU that never hesitates to give lessons in human rights and democracy, for example to African or Balkans countries.

According to Barcelona, the YES has won with 90% of the votes. Some 2.26 million people voted and 2.02 million voted in favor of independence. These figures represent a participation of almost 42.3%, Catalonia counting 5.34 million voters.

The referendum is quite illegal under the Spanish Constitution and the interpretation given to it by the Spanish Constitutional Court. ("It is not within the competence of the autonomies to hold consultations ... which have an impact on the fundamental issues resolved by the constitutional process.") But it is legal according to the Catalan law.

Tag: Catalunyafreedom of expression

The Afghan government is arming local civilians and strengthening the police presence across the country to try to protect Shia Muslim places of worship in the run-up to Ashura. The commemoration will take place this Sunday (1 October 2017). With these last-minute measures, the government is reacting to demands from the community and criticism that it has failed to protect Shias from sectarian attacks by the local branch of Daesh. According to leading Shia politicians, these measures will not be temporary. Thomas Ruttig and the AAN team have looked at what is happening on the ground in a number of neighbourhoods in and beyond Kabul and on the possible repercussions.

The wave of violence against Afghanistan’s Shia community has continued with two attacks on Thursday and Friday (28 and 29 September 2017) in Kabul. In the first incident, in the late afternoon on 28 September, three people, including two policemen, were killed and 16 others injured in a blast near Pamir Cinema (at the western end of the main Maiwand Street), in the Chendawol area of Kabul’s old town that has a significant Shia population, according to an Afghan media report. A spokesman for the Ministry of Interior (MoI) stated that the blast was triggered by a magnetic bomb attached to a police vehicle. AAN detected Daesh online sources hinting at its involvement in this attack and claiming it was directed against a Shia takiakhana (assembly hall) in the area.

In the second incident, a group of attackers, including two suicide bombers, reportedly caused blasts among Shia worshippers who were leaving Hussainia mosque in the Qala-ye Fathullah in centre-west Kabul in the early afternoon. The casualty figure was at five dead and 25 injured, at least, a few hours after the incident (media reports here and here). There was no claim of responsibility for this attack by the late afternoon (Kabul time) on Friday.

Historically, Ashura processions were not marked by sectarian violence in Afghanistan, but that has changed over the last few years. Since 2011, almost every Ashura has seen terrorist attacks on Shia congregations. But it is not just at Ashura that Shias fear attack: over the past two years, Daesh’s a local branch, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), has vowed – and made good on its threats – to attack Shia Muslims and it has perpetrated attacks throughout the whole year. Attacks on Shia mosques and other targets particularly proliferated countrywide after the emergence of ISKP (see here). Since summer 2016, at least seven Shia mosques have been attacked in various regions of Afghanistan; five of those attacks happened this year. (1) ISKP and ‘Daesh Central’ in Syria and Iraq have repeatedly justified its attacks on Hazaras by accusing them of helping their enemies’, ie fighting in pro-regime militias in Syria, and attacking them as ‘apostates’. (‘Daesh Central’s’ justification of the 11 October 2016 attack in Kabul is quoted here); read also our reporting of Afghans fighting in Syria here, here and here).

Not surprisingly, though, as Ashura approached, pressure mounted on the government to get serious about protecting mourners this year. (2)

Ashura is the tenth day of Muharram, the first month in the Islamic lunar calendar, when particularly Shia Muslims mourn the killing of Hussain Ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad in Karbala, in today’s Iraq, in 680 AD, in fighting over who would lead the Muslim umma. Shiite neighbourhoods are decorated with black, red and green banners and tents set up where free food and tea is distributed to the participants. The occasion is marked by marches and ceremonies where people grieve for the events of Karbala, sometimes with men beating or flagellating themselves. For nine days, the ceremonies grow, with the climax on Ashura day itself.

What the government has promised to do.

Less than two weeks before this year’s Ashura, on 19 September 2017, extra protection measures were announced by Second Vice President Sarwar Danesh after he had presided over a meeting of high-ranking government, security officials and a “joint people’s security commission” that includes Shia clergymen, MPs and other representatives. In a meeting with a number of Shia and Sunni ulema on 25 September 2017, President Ashraf Ghani also assured both communities that measures had been taken to commemorate Ashura “in a secure environment” and that “the enemies of Islam… cannot damage the unity of our people and prevent our religious activities.” (see here)

Police usually only guard mosques (of all sects) on certain occasions, during Friday prayers and on other religious holidays, when particular ceremonies are held or VIPs are attending, often on the initiative of the conveners of such ceremonies. This year, additional police have been deployed around places of worship of the Shiite community, coordinated by the Ministry of Interior. Danesh, himself a Shia, called “especially” on the youth to secure places of worship in their respective areas during the days of Muharram.

A second and far more controversial measure is the arming of civilians to guard Shia mosques and takiakhanas. Acting Interior Minister Wais Barmak who participated in the meeting presided over by vice president Danesh said on 20 September that “hundreds of people” had been recruited for training by his ministry. He also confirmed that “measures… to distribute weapons, salaries and other necessary means to the newly recruited people” have been taken. AFP, without a concrete source, gave a figure of “over 400” recruits. The selection of guards was reported to have been made by local elders and communities and in cooperation with mosque committees. (The model here of ‘community defence forces’ would be the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and planned Afghan Territorial Army – see recent AAN analysis here).

Deputy Chief Executive Muhammad Mohaqqeq told ulema in a meeting on 22 September 2017 that, based on a plan approved by the National Security Council, 600 mosques were supposed to get guards. If this figure is correct, the numbers of recruits given are far too low to cover the amount of sites to be protected. Similar doubts were raised by participants of the meeting.

In Kabul, a smaller number of Sunni mosques are also reportedly included in this programme. This might be a step to alleviate concerns among the Sunni majority vis-à-vis the arming of Shia civilians, in a general atmosphere where inter-and intra-communal mistrust and between communities and the government and its security forces has been on the rise.

Danesh has emphasised that these measures would not be limited to this year’s Muharram. He spoke of a “medium-term policy… for across the country… [and for] one to two years,” depending on how security conditions develop.

The second vice president also appealed to those participating in the Ashura commemorations to behave in a way that prevents provoking “unwarranted emotions.” He did not explain further. However, the mourning rituals of Muharram have become very public and far more visible each year since 2001 and not everyone is happy with this assertive display. (For a detailed look Ashura before 2001, during the Taleban era, see here, and for a longer view of sectarian relations, see here.)

The rituals of Muharram have become an identity marker for Afghanistan’s Hazara and other Shia communities who were long and systematically oppressed, but who have become more self-assured in recent years, after their successful resistance to the Soviet occupation (the Hazarajat was the first largest liberated area in the 1980s). There has been immense progress in education and political representation during these years, albeit with many caveats (see a good, detailed examination of this, here.) In previous years, some groups of Sunni Muslims have objected to what they perceive ‘too assertive’ displays of Muharram rituals, leading, for example, to clashes between fringe groups at Kabul University (see here). In 2016, the Shiite community was asked by the authorities to keep commemorations low-key, “to ensure better security in Kabul city and the safety of mourners.”

What is happening on the ground

The security measures began to materialise in the very last days before Ashura and seem to be concentrated in those big cities – Kabul, Herat and possibly Mazar-e Sharif – which have been targets of sectarian attacks in previous years. This has been confirmed for Herat where the measures were reportedly discussed between Vice President Danesh and the province’s governor, Muhammad Asef Rahim. A locally based observer confirmed to AAN that the government has armed some local people who are visible in and around mostly Shia mosques in Herat city and outside of it. The weapons have been given to them via local structures such as Community Development Councils. Additionally, he reported, some local people, “mostly Shias outside Herat city,” have armed themselves, with “simple shotguns” already in their possession or bought for the occasion and are patrolling their areas in shifts, mostly throughout the night. He adds that “day-to-day life is going on amid the increasing securitisation.”

However, the same measures seem not to apply in the cities of Ghazni and Kandahar, both of which have a sizeable Shia population. According to local sources contacted by AAN, including local residents and journalists, security is “very tight” around mosques in the Shia parts of Ghazni, but with all the security personnel in ANP uniform. No additional plain-clothed personnel are visible there so far, according to neighbours of such mosques. The same goes for the Shia neighbourhood of Top Khana in Kandahar.

In Kabul, AAN observed police contacting elders in different police districts of the city to identify volunteers who could carry out body searches on Ashura. The police also appealed to the elders for their neighbourhoods to corporate with the force. People have been asked to keep their eyes open and identify strangers not belonging to the communities. Access roads to mosques and takiakhanas will be blocked and body searches implemented by a mixture of police and civilian guards, both for and by men and women, on the day of Ashura, itself.

From one Shia area in west Kabul, AAN heard that five people had been chosen for each mosque by the Shia Ulema Council and the MoI. The recruits have to be from the mosque’s precinct and the mosque’s board of trustees (hay’at-e umana) have to agree to them; the MoI will issue them with a special ID card with their photos of the guard and, as an additional back-up, a photo of a relative on it. According to local residents, they will be paid 6,000 Afghani monthly. In one neighbourhood mosque in the Telegraph area of Police District Six, for example, the MoI gave five AK 47 assault rifles and 75 bullets to each of its five recruits on 26 September.

In some mosques, the board of trustees or those in charge have also taken extra measures on their own initiative. At Rasul Akram Mosque in Shahrak-e Omid Sabz (better known as the Haji Nabi township) where President Ghani has attended Ashura commemorations over the last few years, they have put up a barrier of cement blocks in a radius of approximately a hundred metres around the mosque, with only small entrances left towards the mosque. This was not the case in previous years. In some areas of Kabul, armed people in plain clothes protecting Shia mosques and takiakhanas have already been already observed. It was not clear, though, whether they were part of the government plan or locally mobilised guards. (More voices from Kabul, including from those involved in the programme, here on al-Jazeera.)

In one mosque in Khairkhana, women were asked by elders after a previous terrorist attack in the area not to attend the commemoration. Security guards also told participants in already on-going commemorations to stay in one venue and not, as is normal practice, go from one mosque to another, in an effort to prevent strangers from infiltrating the crowd.

Members of the AAN team have also observed cases where plain-clothed armed personnel were standing guarding stands distributing tea, milk and other foodstuff specific installed for Muharram.

Perhaps not unexpectedly, the first criticisms of the mosque guard programme has also emerged. The website of Salam Watandar, a popular radio programme developed and formally sponsored by the BBC, in a report from Kabul’s 13th police district, in the southwest of city, quotes local neighbourhood representatives (wakilan-e guzar) and residents that some wakils are keeping their neighbours in the dark about the programme. There are allegations that some wakils are mainly putting forward their relatives and sympathisers as guards. Shia member of the Kabul provincial council Abdul Ahmad Ali Yazdanparast, however, denied reports of wrongdoing and the head of the police district claimed the lists had been compiled in cooperation with the mosques’ religious affairs commissions and in cooperation with the Ministry of Hajj.

This account, however, does not rule out manipulation. As understandable as the anger of various communities about the wave of ISKP terrorist attacks and the inability of the government to protect them is, the mosque protection programme does open the door to abuse. The pattern of ‘village guards’, also armed civilians, being co-opted by interest groups, commanders and powerful politicians is familiar, as is skimming off resources. This becomes particularly problematic if local civilian guard forces become longer-term and adequate oversight measures are lacking. In such circumstances the new guard forces can just look like new militias.

Conclusion: Last-minute, long impact?

The government seems to have reacted only at the last minute to the legitimate security concerns of the Shia community, despite having months to plan for this year’s Ashura. There are also doubts about the effectiveness of arming civilians. It is doubtful, for example, that they would be able stop a complex attack in a crowded place when masses of worshippers are marching or trying to enter a certain mosque or congregation site. In 2016, even regular ANSF units, trained to search and monitor, failed to detect the ISKP bombers in Kabul’s Sakhi shrine. Moreover, even if the searchers succeed in their task, an atrocity could then simply occur at their check-post, which could be as crowded as the site it is supposed to protect, and likely with little downward impact on casualty figures.

All in all, the plan looks much more like a symbolic act of reassuring the Shia communities that the government is ‘doing something’, rather than achieving a real improvement security. Crowds of civilians are among the most vulnerable of targets and the most difficult to protect, so what is being implemented may be the best that could be expected. However, the warning signs are also there, from previous experiences of arming civilians and giving them little training and indifferent oversight. The longer groups of armed civilians exist, the more opportunities of misuse will arise, as the different stages of militia programmes have sufficiently shown (AAN analysis here). There are particular risks when, as currently, inter-and intra-communal mistrust (see AAN analysis here and here) and mistrust between communities and the government and its security forces are on the rise from all sides.

Edited by Borhan Osman and Kate Clark

 

(1) On the eve of last year’s Ashura, on 11 October 2016, at least 14 people were killed (including the local police chief) and 26 more injured by a gunman, dressed in a police uniform, who had sneaked into the Sakhi Shrine, near Kabul university. The shrine is one of the most important Shia places of gathering in the country. (See AAN reporting here.) In a simultaneous attack next to a Shia mosque in Balkh district, 15 people were killed and more than 30 wounded by an IED (see here).

On 21 November 2016, a suicide bomber killed 32 and injured more than 50 people (UNAMA figures) in Baqir al-Olumi mosque in Kabul during a service to commemorate the death of Imam Hussein, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson and a Shia martyr (see here).

In February 2017, policemen (possibly members of the Afghan Local Police) and relatives were reportedly attacked when leaving a mosque after prayer in Jawzjan province. Eleven people, including one woman, were killed.

On late 15 June 2017, during the last days of Ramadan, suicide bombers attacked the al-Zahra mosque in west Kabul (see here and here), killing, according to different sources, between four and seven people and injuring as many as 18 others.

On 1 August 2017, armed men stormed the fully occupied Jawadia mosque in Herat’s Bakrabad neighbourhood during evening prayer, shooting at the worshippers and subsequently blowing themselves up. With 29 dead and 65 injured, this became the worst attack of its kind in Herat so far. Afterwards, local protests broke out, with immediately after, angry people pelting a nearby police station with stones and accusing the policemen of not adequately protecting them. A later protest demonstration was attended by thousands – notably, it was a mixed crowd of Shias and Sunnis.

On 25 August 2017 a suicide bomber and gunmen stormed the Shia Imam Zaman mosque in Kabul’s Khairkhana neighbourhood during Friday prayers, killing about 40 people and wounding nearly 100 (see here), making this the worst attack on a Shia mosque in the country. Calls to allow people to arm themselves and protect their own mosques increased markedly after this attack.

In two other incidents in Herat, a Shia imam was killed in a drive-by shooting in December 2016 and a bomb exploded in May 2017 outside a bakery, killing seven people and injuring 17 more. In the case of bakery bombing it seems likely that the device exploded prematurely; the actual target is believed to have been a religious gathering of Shiites in a mosque nearby.

ISKP did not claim all but most of those attacks, the 11 October bombing in Kabul and the 12 October bombing in Balkh, the attacks in Kabul on 21 November 2016 and 15 June and 25 August 2017, and the February 2017 attack in Jawzjan. In Herat, it claimed the bakery and the Jawadia mosque bombings, but not the other incidents.)

ISKP had already claimed its first massive anti-Shia attack, a suicide attack on a public demonstration on social issues, organised by Hazara activists, in Kabul on 23 July 2016 (see here). At least 80 people were killed and more than 200 wounded. (Footnote this: Even before the emergence of ISKP, in 2011, Shia congregations were attacked in Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif. More than fifty people were killed in an attack on an Ashura procession in Kabul’s Muradkhani, while four more people died in Mazar (see AAN analysis here and here).

The ISKP attacks on Shia targets echo the approach of ‘Daesh Central’, and that of violent sectarian groups in Pakistan, some of which now associated with Daesh. In those countries, they have been part of a widespread, violent, sectarian, Sunni-versus-Shia conflict (see AAN analysis here) and it appeared that ISKP, as well as being consumed by sectarian hatred, also sought to provoke the same tit-for-tat violence in Afghanistan. This has not succeeded so far. Indeed, attacks have been followed by calls on all sides for national unity and Muslim brotherhood. That includes the Taleban, who have condemned attacks against Shia worshippers and mosques (see for example here, after the August 2017 attack in Herat). Many Afghan Shias and Hazaras, however, have complained about the government’s failure to protect them, some alleging indifference or collusion.

(2) The various communities of Shia Afghans are not alone in feeling under threat. Other communities and political forces in Afghanistan have alleged, too, that the government is either incapable or unwilling of protecting them, particularly after the ‘Black Week’ in Kabul in June this year (see AAN reporting here and here). There were even allegations that the security forces, or other parts of the government, had colluded with the terrorists. (See also AAN’s analysis of the latest government security plan for Kabul, the “Green Belt”, here.)

 

The European Defence Agency’s ‘Mission Abort System for Guided Ammunition’ (MAS) project, launched late 2013, has successfully demonstrated a generic system to cancel the flight of gun launched precision ammunition, when the projectile exits the pre-defined safety corridor.

The project, sponsored by both the German and Italian MoDs in the frame of EDA’s Capability Technology (CapTech) Ammunition Technologies group, addresses the challenge that affects most European shooting ranges: they are too narrow and too short to adhere to the necessary safety areas for shooting tests with guided ammunition.

So as to enable European shooting ranges to perform this test firing, a generic mission abort system was designed and demonstrated. In the event of a deviation from the predefined flight path, the system will break down the projectile into two parts and these parts will not leave the surface danger area. The project progressed through several phases from concept through to overall design, more detailed designs, construction, integration, and design verification tests.

The aerodynamic analysis, safety area calculations, and reliability analysis were also undertaken. The final test consisted of firing of two MAS demonstrators with the Howitzer PzH2000 and was conducted at Meppen Proving Ground (WTD91) in Germany in the third quarter of 2016.

The feasibility of mission abort systems for guided ammunition was successfully proven. This represents an important step towards the utilisation of European test ranges in the performance of guided ammunition tests. Possible miniaturisation of electronic components could facilitate the integration of MAS into rounds with calibres smaller than 70 mm. Another possibility might be the implementation of MAS into operational ammunition.

The demonstrator was developed by Diehl BGT Defence and Finmeccanica and the test projectile used was the Vulcano 155mm (subcaliber 92 mm).

Picture copyright: Diehl/Leonardo

 
More information:

• CapTech Ammunition Technologies - EDA project page

The 12th edition of the Joint Personnel Recovery Staff Course (JPRSC), a project initiated and supported by the European Defence Agency (EDA), was co-organised and hosted for the first time by the Italian Joint Air Operation School from 12th to 22nd of September 2017 in Guidonia, Italy.

A total of 19 students, from 6 contributing countries (Cyprus, Ireland, The Netherlands, Germany, Spain and Italy) benefitted from the knowledge and experience of a cadre of instructors from Germany, Hungary and Italy. The European Personnel Recovery Centre (EPRC), a close partner of EDA, contributed to the event by organizing a specific instructor course aimed at ‘training the trainers’.

The main focus of the course was to train staff officers to support their commanders in personnel recovery related matters. The course was designed for personnel in Tactical Operational Centres (TOCs), Personnel Recovery Coordination Cells (PRCCs) or Joint Personnel Recovery Cells (JPRC’s). The overall objective of the JPRSC is to ensure that trained personnel are available to support any future personnel recovery activities in an operational context.

Personnel recovery is a vital element of modern operational planning as it provides a security net for deployed personnel. Most importantly, it boosts morale and acknowledges the responsibility of Member States and the European Union to develop and provide relevant capabilities to recover and reintegrate isolated personnel deployed in the context of crisis management operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

The next EDA JPRSC will take place from 15th to 24th November 2017 in Italy (Poggio, Renatico) and will be organised by the European Personnel Recovery Centre (EPRC).
Background

The EDA PRCPC project was established on 30 May 2013 as an EDA Category B project under the lead of Sweden. As of today, it includes eight contributing EU Member States (cMS): Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands and Sweden. The course has been extended three times and will be finalised on 30 May 2019. The JPRSC is part of the EDA’s Personnel Recovery Controller and Planner Course (PRCPC).

In the first eight months of 2017, Afghan government revenues grew by nearly 13 per cent compared to the same period of 2016. This follows on from strong revenue performances in 2015 and 2016 and is one of the few positive trends in the Afghan economy, in contrast to its continuing weak overall showing in terms of economic growth and employment. Guest authors Bill Byrd and M Khalid Payenda* look at how the government has achieved this revenue growth and how it could maintain it. They also look at how modest economic growth could be encouraged and warn of the need to minimise any economic disruption and revenue losses during the next election cycle, given that both parliamentary and presidential elections are now looming over the horizon.

Strong revenue performance: what and how?

The Afghan government is performing well in terms of increasing revenues, with the double-digit growth in 2015 and 2016 continuing into 2017 (see earlier reporting here. After increasing by 11.4 per cent in the first half of the year, revenue has grown robustly in the seventh and eighth months as well and in the first eight months as a whole is up by 12.9 per cent compared to the same period of 2016. (1)

Importantly, and in contrast to 2015 and 2016, the revenue increase in the first half of 2017 was not due to rises in tax rates. On the contrary, Afghanistan was forced under the conditions of its entry into the World Trade Organisation to reduce some import tariff rates, costing the government budget roughly Afs 3-5 billion (on the order of $45-70 million) in annual revenue. (2)

Nor has depreciation of the Afghan currency – which would artificially raise revenues denominated or collected in foreign currency – accounted for any of the revenue growth. The exchange rate of the Afghani against the US dollar actually appreciated slightly in the first half of 2017 as compared to the first half of 2016. (3) Though part of the increase in revenues may be attributable to a slight uptick in inflation, the bulk of the solid revenue performance so far this year reflects the fact that the government has made stronger and more successful efforts to collect the revenues that are due.

Specifically, in the first half of 2017, revenues denominated or collected in foreign exchange accounted for around 40-45 per cent of total revenue and increased by 13-14 per cent compared to the same period last year. As noted, none of this increase can be attributed to depreciation. (4) The remaining roughly 55-60 per cent of total revenue was denominated and collected in Afghanis. It increased by around 10 per cent, but here inflation needs to be taken into account. There was a six per cent increase in the consumer price index, so this figure can be deflated by six per cent to remove the impact of inflation. (5) Thus, a little over half of the increase in Afghani revenues, or no more than about one-third of the total increase in revenue, can be attributed to inflation. This means that, after subtracting the effect of inflation and taking into account that the exchange rate did not depreciate, revenue growth on the order of eight per cent in the first half of 2017 can be attributed to stronger and more successful government revenue collection efforts.

The performance of customs duties and fees has been notable, increasing by nearly 15 per cent during the first half of 2017. This turnaround from the poor performance of customs collections in past years is impressive. The major factors here appear to have been customs units managing to reduce the incidence of mis-declaration of goods (falsely labelled in order to pay a lower tariff rate) and under-valuation of goods (declared at below the actual import price so as to lower duties). The average value of customs declarations in the first seven months of the current year rose by six per cent compared to the same period of last year, most likely reflecting less under-valuation of imports. Another indicator of improvement is the 13 per cent increase in the number of trucks reported by the Customs Department in the first seven months of 2017 compared to the same period in 2016. This increase may, in part, reflect growth in the volume of imports, but also, in part, less revenue leakage, perhaps due to some trucks that previously had crossed the border without submitting a customs declaration now providing declarations.

Other areas of progress

As well as the strong growth in revenues, it is worth noting a few other bright spots in the macroeconomic and economic reform spheres. These include gaining the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) ‘seal of approval’, accessing more on-budget aid, getting off the money-laundering ‘watch list’ and some progress in anti-corruption efforts.

Following the promulgation of the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF) at the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan (BCA) on 5 October, 2016, when $15.2 billion was pledged by donors over four years, Afghanistan has made further progress on economic reforms while maintaining macroeconomic stability. The latter is evidenced inter alia by continuing low (single-digit) inflation, a stable foreign exchange rate for the Afghani and maintaining foreign exchange reserves in excess of $7 billion (sufficient to cover more than 10 months’ worth of imports). The Afghan government’s macroeconomic program has been endorsed by international financial institutions, resulting in confirmation of additional financial support.

On 24 May 2017, the IMF Board approved the completion of the first review under Afghanistan’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF). Though the ECF includes only a small amount of financial assistance – $6.2 million was disbursed upon completion of the first review — the fact that Afghanistan has remained on-track with the IMF program constitutes an important seal of approval for the country’s macroeconomic management. The IMF seal of approval is also significant because it is required for other international agencies to provide aid directly to the Afghan budget, as well as for bilateral donors who provide some of their aid in this way (either directly or through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, the ARTF).

Related, on 12 July, a $482.3 million package of new assistance from the World Bank and the donor-financed ARTF was signed. This package supports various development projects, (6) and it also includes a $100 million development policy grant, which consists of direct, un-earmarked budget support to the Afghan government (ie not tied to any specific project). This is in addition to the ARTF ‘recurrent window’, which disburses around $400 million per year to cover part of the operating budget.

Another recent achievement is that on 23 June, Afghanistan was removed from the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ‘grey list’ of countries being monitored for Anti Money Laundering/Combatting the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) risks and compliance. This milestone is an important signal of international confidence in the country’s banking practices from a money laundering/terrorism financing perspective.

Finally, some progress has been made in fighting corruption. The recently formed Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) has received 95 cases, of which 15 have been referred for prosecution. Thirty-one individuals have already been sentenced to prison for a combined total of 209 years, close to seven years each on average. These include three officials from the Ministry of Urban Development convicted of corruption and six from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) for taking bribes. To date, US$ 9 million has been recovered from offenders.

Looking ahead: how to navigate the economic and election-related ‘headwinds’

These successes aside, the fundamental problems of Afghanistan’s weak economy and high joblessness remain unchanged and there appears little prospect for improvements in the short run. The economic headwinds stem in part from the earlier shock to aggregate demand as a result of the sharp reduction in international military expenditures associated with the withdrawal of the vast bulk of international forces between 2012 and 2014, combined with the Afghan economy’s limited ability to adjust its structure in response to the shock and shift to other drivers of growth. However, deteriorating security and political uncertainty in recent years have contributed to the ongoing economic malaise. These problems are likely to constitute a continuing drag on economic growth in the coming several years.

So modest expectations definitely are called for, but what can be done to improve the economy at least somewhat in the face of these ‘headwinds’? A critical priority is to prevent the fiscal and economic situation from getting worse in the run-up to and during the upcoming election cycle (with parliamentary elections scheduled for 2018 and the next presidential election for 2019). The fiscal crisis that occurred around the 2014 presidential election – characterised by a haemorrhage of government revenue, cash management problems, imposition of extraordinary controls stopping some budgeted and committed expenditures, building significant government arrears, an urgent request for ‘emergency’ short-run aid and inability to complete review of the IMF program – was very damaging. It took considerable time and effort for the government and Ministry of Finance to turn the situation around and get back on track. Afghanistan cannot afford a repeat of anything like such a crisis in the coming two years and some measures could help to prevent that.

First, a stable, cohesive, effective management team at the MoF, and also at Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB – the country’s central bank), will be crucial. The recent management changes at the MoF, resulting in all deputy ministers now being confirmed in their positions (as opposed to some of these positions being vacant and filled in an acting capacity hitherto), provides grounds for hope that this will be possible. It will be essential for political interference in the ministry’s work of budgeting, macroeconomic management and especially revenue collection to be avoided during the election season and the minister and his team need to be empowered to prevent such problems from arising.

Second, the catalyst of the 2014 fiscal crisis was extremely weak revenue mobilization performance, which reached its nadir during and immediately after the election. While it is neither necessary nor desirable for revenue to keep growing as rapidly as it did during the impressive turnaround of 2015-16, continuing robust revenue increases and at least maintaining the revenue-to-GDP ratio, will be important in preventing the kind of revenue erosion seen in 2014.

Third, a contributing factor exacerbating the 2014 fiscal crisis was the MoF’s lack of access to funds, which severely hindered and greatly complicated short-run cash flow management as its deposit balance with DAB was drawn down and virtually exhausted in the latter half of 2014. (7) To avoid such problems in the future, the MoF’s deposit balance at DAB should not become the binding constraint on short-run cash management. Options for greater flexibility can be pursued, whereby if necessary for short-run cash management, the MoF could temporarily run a modest negative deposit balance, incur an overdraft, or engage in some form of limited short-term borrowing from DAB as necessary and appropriate.

Making macroeconomic policy more growth-friendly

Although expectations of higher economic growth should be kept modest, the government could encourage this through macroeconomic policy, public expenditure management and improving the business environment.

With regard to the overall macroeconomic stance, although any attempt at major fiscal stimulus through deficit financing via government borrowing would be risky and must be avoided, fiscal policy should not be contractionary (ie shrinking aggregate demand), either. For example, in 2014 the government incurred a modest domestically-financed fiscal deficit (after – ie not including – donor grants) of about 1.7 per cent of GDP, by running down MoF deposits at DAB, with no adverse macroeconomic consequences in a recessionary economic environment. On the other hand, in 2016, domestic fiscal policy turned slightly contractionary, with the government running (after donor grants) a small fiscal surplus of 0.9 per cent of GDP, manifested in an increase in MoF deposits at DAB.

Public expenditure – how it is spent and on what – can modestly support a more buoyant economy. One priority is to improve and expedite budget execution – this is important in a country where budgeted expenditures are equivalent to around one-third of GDP. If budgeted funds are not actually spent and/or if there are long delays in budget execution, the stimulating effect of public spending on the economy gets lost. Afghanistan suffers from chronic shortfalls in its execution of the development budget (money for public investments and other development projects), whereas the recurrent budget (money for running costs, including salaries) tends to get fully spent. On average, only around half of the development budget actually gets spent each year. Increasing the development budget execution rate would help create jobs, build infrastructure, stimulate economic growth and over time generate more revenues for the government.

Although a common perception is that poor budget execution is due to low capacity in implementation of projects, in reality, budget execution issues in Afghanistan are more complex. One of the main reasons for low budget execution is the quality of project preparation. Currently, many projects get pushed into the budget that are poorly prepared, or in some cases are not prepared at all and in reality are little more than vague concepts. Also, no matter how well-designed and prepared, a project cannot achieve spending targets if the plan is not realistic. Hence improving the front end of the budget process is important, including ensuring that the projects in the budget are fully costed, with a realistic spending timetable.

Shifting the composition of expenditures toward quick-disbursing activities that have a high ‘domestic content’ and relatively low spillover into imports, such as labour-intensive public works and cash-for-work programs and other transfers to the poor, can increase the macroeconomic impact of a given level of public spending. Expenditures that have a higher ‘multiplier’ effect on aggregate demand can be prioritised, also including those with a high salary and other recurrent spending component, such as education, health and direct cash transfers, as well as the security sector. (8)

On the revenue front, the relatively high level of taxation of Afghanistan’s small tax base of formal-sector companies and especially the cumbersome tax administration processes, constitute another obstacle to business activity (beyond the broader security, political and economic headwinds) (see earlier AAN reporting here). For example, overly high tax assessments, combined with the requirement that 50 per cent of the assessed amount be paid in advance to avoid very high penalties during the appeal process, squeeze those companies that try to comply with the law. On the other hand, non-compliant taxpayers can avoid such problems by paying bribes – a phenomenon which also breeds resistance within the system against reforms that would bring in greater revenue. Simplification and streamlining of tax administration, E-filing (recently launched for large taxpayers, planned to be rolled out for medium taxpayers next year) and reducing the pre-payment requirement during appeal and the penalties for delayed payment (both currently under consideration) would begin to improve the situation. More generally, the way forward is to minimise the multiplicity of stages in obtaining tax clearances and reduce the opportunities for discretionary contacts between companies and tax officials. This could be accomplished by combining E-filing with an automatic acceptance of tax return, followed by randomised and risk-based auditing of returns.

Turning to customs duties (currently the most important single source of revenue), further improving the customs administration and containing corruption will be a priority and continuing robust increases in customs collections, as seen in the first half of 2017, would support overall revenue growth. In addition to the role of import tariffs in raising revenue, they can also be an instrument, if used judiciously and in moderation, for protecting and nurturing the development of domestic production. While high tariffs would be inappropriate, ineffective and most likely would further encourage smuggling, it does not make sense to cut tariffs and provide no protection at all for goods which Afghanistan is producing domestically, where it has some, at least, potential comparative advantage and where the economy has a capacity for a supply response (ie the right incentives would stimulate greater production). Many agricultural products fit this bill and, moreover, Afghanistan does currently import very large amounts of agricultural goods (some of them implicitly or explicitly subsidised by the exporting country).

Other obstacles to private sector development are legion. A simpler, more business-friendly regulatory environment would be highly desirable and while eliminating corruption altogether is an unrealistic objective, it needs to be contained and rendered less debilitating to businesses. Improvements in both of these dimensions are especially important for smaller businesses and start-ups. However, those benefiting from bribes associated with the current regulatory complexity will try to block reforms. It must also be recognised that a better investment climate, even if it can be achieved, is unlikely to translate any time soon into higher private investment and expansion of business activity, as long as the major security and political headwinds as well as uncertainty and short-termism remain prevalent.

What should international actors do?

Afghanistan’s international partners can and should provide meaningful support to Afghanistan’s macroeconomic stability and growth agenda, while recognising the need for modest expectations:

• In the face of security challenges and political uncertainty during the next election cycle, stability in international strategy and support for Afghanistan will be critical. Medium-term support was agreed at the 2016 Warsaw (for the security sector) and Brussels (for civilian assistance) meetings, generating international commitments covering 2017-20; these need to be reaffirmed.
• Shifting the composition of aid in favour of giving more assistance directly to the Afghan government budget (on-budget) and toward quick-disbursing, high domestic content activities, would help provide a modest boost to the economy.
• Endorsing a modest degree of fiscal flexibility and supporting a non-contractionary fiscal policy stance (after donor grants) would help enable the macroeconomic framework to be modestly growth-friendly in the current recessionary economic environment.
• International actors can also support efforts to improve the investment climate and help contain corruption, while recognising that these will yield benefits only over the medium-term and, in particular, if the protracted conflict ends or at least there is a major reduction in violence.

Conclusion

The government has done well to maintain robust growth in revenues over the first eight months of this year and has continued to demonstrate sound macroeconomic management. However, the next few years will test whether these achievements can be sustained in the face not just of insecurity and insurgent violence, but also political uncertainty during the approaching election cycle. Sustaining steady revenue increases (even if at a slower pace than during 2015-16), effective macroeconomic management and stable international support will be crucial for navigating the next several years. As we have said, there are bright spots – which should not be overlooked – but the Afghan economy is still weak and unemployment high. Government and donors can take some pro-active measures which would modestly improve the prospects for economic growth, but expectations here have to remain realistic.

* Bill Byrd is a senior expert at the US Institute of Peace and M Khalid Payenda is Deputy Finance Minister in the government of Afghanistan. Both co-authors have closely followed fiscal and macroeconomic developments in Afghanistan for many years and published extensively on these subjects, including earlier updates on revenue performance. Research support by Hassen Ullah Ahmadzai, Sub Director Fiscal Policy in the Ministry of Finance, is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in this paper are the authors’ personal views and should not be attributed to the Ministry of Finance, the Afghan government or to the US Institute of Peace (which does not take policy positions).

Edited by Kate Clark

(1) Revenue and fiscal data presented in this paper are from the Ministry of Finance (Afghanistan Financial Management Information System); the calendar years mentioned refer to the corresponding Afghan fiscal year, which covers the period from approximately 21 December to 20 December (ie 2015 refers to 1394, 2016 to 1395, 2017 to 1396). The raw revenue figures show a decline of 4.4 per cent between the first half of 2016 and the first half of 2017 (from Afs 80,027 million to Afs 76,520 million). However, the former figure needs to be adjusted downward for the large one-time transfer of Afs 10,260 million from the Afghanistan’s central bank (DAB) to the budget (which is not a revenue and certainly does not reflect revenue mobilization efforts), as well as a one-time transfer of Afs 1,090 million from the Ministry of Urban Development. The resulting adjusted total revenue figure in the first half of 2016 that is appropriate for comparisons is Afs 68,677 million, yielding the 11.4 per cent revenue increase in the first half of 2017. The preliminary adjusted revenue figure for the first eight months of 2017 is Afs 104,435 million, a 12.9 per cent increase over Afs 92,514 million in the first eight months of 2016

(2) Based on estimates by MoF staff.

(3) The average of the monthly rates reported by DAB (midpoint of their buying and selling rates) actually appreciated slightly, from Afs 68.67 for US$ 1 in the first half of 2016 to Afs 67.53 for US $1 in the first half of 2017. (See here.)

(4) On the contrary, foreign exchange-denominated and/or collected revenues actually should be slightly inflated to account for the small exchange rate appreciation. However, this approach has not been adopted in the interest of taking a conservative approach in ascertaining the portion of revenue growth attributable to stronger revenue mobilization efforts..

(5) The best deflator to use would be the GDP deflator, but that is not available for six-monthly data and only with a lag for annual data. Generally the GDP deflator tends to be somewhat lower than CPI inflation; thus, using the latter results in a more conservative estimate of revenue effort and/or can be considered to incorporate at least to some extent the real growth of the economy, which was slightly over two per cent in 2016.

(6) Specifically, the package includes development projects supporting communities with internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees from Pakistan, urban development, electrification in Herat, establishment of a strategic grain reserve, rural all-seasons access roads and the women’s economic empowerment national priority program.

(7) The inability to spend budgeted amounts in 2014 resulted in the loss of aid that, otherwise, would have been available on a reimbursement basis, for example from the ARTF’s enhanced matching grant program for operations and maintenance spending.

(8) The May 2017 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update discusses the fiscal multiplier and estimates of the multiplier for different categories of expenditure, as well as options for increasing the multiplier and thereby raising the stimulus impact of a given level of public expenditure. These latter options — including increasing absorptive capacity and greater market competition/contestability in key sectors such as construction and banking — would have a positive impact only over time, whereas shifting the composition of expenditures in favour of quicker-disbursing and higher domestic content activities would have a short-run positive impact. (See here, pp 16-23.)

 

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Chinese Dongfeng EQ2101 Light Utility Vehicle

Germany and Norway to join the MMF

In a signing ceremony on 25 September, 2017, the current Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet (MMF) contract was amended to include both Germany and Norway as participants to the MMF project along with the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Mr. Arturo Alfonso-Meiriño, OCCAR Director, Mr. Bernhard Brenner, Airbus Defence & Space Executive Vice President Marketing and Sales, and Mr. Didier Plantecoste, Airbus Defence & Space Head of Tanker Programmes and Derivatives officially signed the amendment at OCCAR-EA offices in Bonn, Germany.

This amendment exercises a contract option to significantly increase the scope of the project from the two A330 MRTT aircraft initially ordered to seven aircraft in total, including also options for up to four additional aircraft (potential increase to 11 aircraft in total). The contract amendment signifies an important evolution of the MMF Programme as a key capability for NATO and European Air Forces, demonstrates the increasing confidence of European nations in the cooperative solution achieved by the European Union and NATO and recognizes the A330 MRTT product. Further nations are expected to join the MMF in the future and to exercise the available contract options.

Also in attendance at this important signing ceremony were Mr. Peter Dohmen, General Manager, NSPA, Mr. Jan der Kinderen, the Netherlands, Mr. Tom Schons, Luxembourg, Mr. Stefan Neumann, Germany, and Mr. Dion Polman, EDA.

The MMF project was initiated by the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2012 and the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement (OCCAR) manages the acquisition as the NATO Support and Procurement Agency’s Contract Executing Agent. The acquisition phase was launched in July 2016 with the signing of the original contract and includes the first two years of support. Following the acquisition phase, NSPA will be responsible for the complete life-cycle management of the fleet.

The Programme is funded by the four participants to the MMF project who will have the exclusive right to use these NATO-owned aircraft which will operate in a pooling arrangement. The aircraft will be configured for inflight refuelling, the transport of passengers (including VIPs) and cargo as well as for medical evacuation flights. The aircraft will be operated by a multinational unit from the Main Operating Base (MOB) in Eindhoven (NLD) and Forward Operating Base (FOB) in Cologne (GER).

The delivery of the seven A330 MRTT aircraft currently on contract from Airbus Defence and Space’s tanker conversion line at Getafe near Madrid is expected between 2020 and 2022.

 

More information:

• Germany and Norway formally join Netherlands and Luxembourg to operate pooled fleet of NATO-owned Airbus A330 MRTT tankers (EDA news, June 2017)
• Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet (MMF) takes shape (EDA news July 2016)
• Air-to-Air Refuelling - EDA Project Page