Defence`s Feeds

A MUSLIM scholar and leader of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), identified as Maulana Haq Nawaz Haqqani, was shot dead by two unidentified militants in in Shabqadar tehsil of Charsadda district in Pakistan's Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa early on 26 July, Dawn reported. No immediate claim of

The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has announced plans to return two of the British Royal Navy's Sea King Mk5 aircraft to service.

The US Navy and the US Air Force (USAF) has awarded a new $86.5m contract to Lockheed Martin to produce the first production lot of long range anti-ship missile (LRASM) systems.

The Boeing Company has secured a $122.8m-worth contract to supply spare parts to the US Navy.

TNI-AU SU-27SK
(click to view full)

Indonesia’s turn toward Russian fighters stemmed partly from necessity. Its 12 remaining F-16A/Bs and 16 remaining F-5E/F fighters experienced severe maintenance problems in the wake of a US embargo, triggered by the Indonesian military’s widespread human rights abuses in East Timor. Its 30+ single-seat Hawk 209 sub-sonic light combat aircraft, derived from the trainer jets the TNI-AU also operates, were the country’s only fighter alternative.

A $192 million contract began to address that in 2003, by buying 2 SU-27SK single-seat and 2 SU-30MK twin-seat multi-role fighters from Russia. Indonesia submitted a formal request to buy 24 used F-16s in 2011, but it isn’t backing away from its high-end Flanker fleet. In fact, the TNI-AU has steadily added more. Now, they’re reaching out to their neighbors for training and support.

Flankers for Indonesia’s Fighter Force

Flanker customers
(click to view full)

Indonesia’s TNI-AU has now ordered 16 SU-27 family fighters: 2 SU-27SK, 3 SU-27SKM, 2 SU-30MK, and 9 SU-30MK2.

The SU-27SKM and SU-30MK2 export variants are the result of parallel upgrade programs. They share many modifications, including the addition of digital cockpits with updated avionics, additional wing hardpoints, carrying capacity upgrades to 8,000 kg of weapons, a wider variety of weapon options, upgraded radars and ECM (Electronic CounterMeasures to jam enemy radars etc.), and in-flight refueling capability.

These modifications change the SU-27SK from a dedicated air superiority fighter to a multi-role fighter and attack aircraft. The SU-30, which has always been multi-role, is simply improved. Both of the new variants share the Sukhoi Flanker family’s combination of long range, large payloads, and air to air performance that can match any American fighter except the F-22A Raptor.

Those capabilities, and Russia’s policy of avoiding political conditions on its weapon sales, nudged Indonesia into a tilt toward Russia as a weapons supplier. A $192 million contract began to address the problems created by the US embargo in 2003, by buying 2 SU-27SK single-seat air superiority fighters and 2 SU-30MK twin-seat multi-role fighters through Rosoboronexport.

The TNI-AU’s tily toward Russia continued, despite the lifting of the US embargo in November 2005. Russia’s MAKS air show doesn’t have quite the international clout of Farnborough or Le Bourget, but the price and quality of modern Russian fighters ensures its place on the international circuit. For MAKS 2007, its top military contract came on opening day. Rosoboronexport State Corporation and the Republic of Indonesia signed a $355 million Memorandum of Understanding for 3 SU-27SKM and 3 SU-30MK2 Flanker family fighters, building on the 2003 deal, and taking the country’s ordered fleet to 10 planes.

A month later, that purchase was followed by a $1.2 billion wish list of Russian submarines, armored vehicles, and armed helicopters. That wish list didn’t fully materialize, but the end of 2011 saw another 6 SU-30MK2s bought from Russia, bringing the fighter deals’ totals to 16 fighters and about $1.02 billion.

Simulator training is currently a co-operative venture with the Chinese, but by 2014, Indonesia expects to have its own virtual training infrastructure.

It’s all part of an oil-fueled modernization drive, backed by increased military spending. For more on the strategic and procurement issues tied up in this purchase, see the Additional Readings section, below, for UPI analyst Martin Sieff’s “Jets for Jakarta: A Whole New Strategic Game For Australasia”, and Air Power Australia’s “Sukhoi Flankers: The Shifting Balance of Regional Air Power”.

Contracts & Key Events FY 2016 – 2017

 

TNI-AU F-5s
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July 28/17: After two years of talks and negotiations, Indonesia has confirmed that it will purchase 11 Su-35 fighter aircraft from Russia. The fighters will replace its F5 E/F Tiger II warplanes, which have been in service with the Indonesian Air Forces since 1980s, and deliveries could commence from as early as next year. Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu made the statement to media outlets following a recent cabinet meeting, adding that the government is also looking into purchasing Chinese UAVs that will have an attack capability as well as the ability to be customized to Jakarta’s specifications.

February 19/17: An official from the Russian state-owned Rostec said that he believes that contracts for the Su-35 with the government of Indonesia will be signed “in the coming months.” Jakarta is in the midst of an investigation into their procurement of the Leonardo AW101 helicopter, with the first delivered unit currently being stored in a hangar at the Indonesian capital’s Halim Perdanakusuma air base pending the completion of the investigation. Photos of the plane have shown the helicopter surrounded by police tape.

October 9/15: Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin is marketing the company’s F-16V to Indonesia as the country plans to replace its fleet of aging F-5E fighters. The company dispatched a cockpit demonstrator to the country this week in an effort to swoon the country’s Air Force chiefs, who appear particularly set on acquiring the Sukhoi Su-35. The Indonesian Air Force already operates 24 F-16s, with deliveries of these beginning last July.

FY 2015

 

September 8/15: Indonesia again indicated continued interest in purchasing Su-35s to replace its long-in-the-tooth F-5Es. Indonesia already has some earlier models, the Su-27, which appears to have been a positive influence over others being considered, such as the F-15 and F-16, of which the country already owns eight.

FY 2014

 

Oct 7/14: Su-35 favorite? Indonesian Military Commander General Moeldoko tells Republika Online that they’re leaning toward the Su-35 as their F-5 replacement, with the JAS-39 in 2nd place and the F-16 a distant 3rd:

“Menurut dia, jet tempur buatan negeri Paman Sam itu sudah tidak layak pakai lantaran teknologinya sudah ketinggalan zaman…. “Untuk udara, ada pengajuan penggantian F-5. Sukhoi Su-35 menjadi pilihan pertama, Saab JAS 39 Gripen pilihan kedua, dan pesawat F-16 pilihan ketiga,”…”

This isn’t the end, because negotiations, budgets and other considerations will still come into play. If that pick does stand, it would keep the Flanker family as the backbone of the TNI-AU, but the fleet would also be fragmented among 3+ types with partial commonality at best: 5 Su27SKM, 11 Su-30 (2 MKs, 9 MK2s), and 16 Su-35SK. The Su-27SKM and Su-30MK fighters will retire first, which will simplify matters, but that’s unlikely to happen before 2025 or so. Sources: ROL, “Helikopter Apache dan Sukhoi Su-35 Segera Perkuat TNI”.

Jan 7/14: Competition. Indonesia wants to replace its 11 remaining F-5E/F Tiger II light fighters with 16 modern aircraft. Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro confirmed that they “have received proposals from several jet fighter manufacturers,” and are evaluating them. Indonesian Military Commander General Moeldoko added that the TNI-AU has studied the SU-35, F-16, F-15, and JAS-39 Gripen.

Moeldoko wants the requisition plan included in Indonesia’s Strategic Plan II for the 2015 – 2020, but the air force’s choice will also depend on available funds. The F-15 is significantly more expensive than other options, and if the air force wants 16 fighters, the state of Indonesia’s economy will influence what they can buy.

There are always extraneous considerations in Indonesia. Still, if commonality matters, the F-16 is the only fighter currently in Indonesia’s inventory. The F-15 and JAS-39 are used by its neighbors, and have Asian support networks in place. Picking the SU-35 seems odd, as it would leave Indonesia vulnerable to becoming the 1st export customer, while worsening the fragmentation within an already-split Flanker fleet. Still, the existing SU-30MK fleet is a known quantity, which means the SU-35 is the only variant would require study for a full consideration of their options. Sources: Antara News, “Defense Ministry looking to replace aging F-5 tiger fighter aircraft”.

2011 – 2013

6 more SU-30s bought, financed, delivered. US DSCA request for 24 used F-16s.

Pitch Black 2012
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Sept 5/13: Delivery. The final 2 of 6 Su-30MK2s ordered in 2011 have been delivered at Sultan Hasanuddin Air Force Base, along with 13 technicians to help with assembly. This brings the fleet to 16, once they’re re-assembled and tested. Xinhua reports that:

“Indonesia’s Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro, who witnessed the last delivery of Sukhoi Su-30 Mk2 at the air forces’ base, said that the nation has spent a total of 1.17 billion U.S. dollars to buy all of those 16 planes as well as on ammunitions, pilot training programs and logistic.”

Sources: Jakarta Post | Xinhua, “Indonesia receives last delivery of Sukhoi Flanker fighter jets, completing full squadron”.

All ordered Su-30MK2s delivered

May 17/13: Delivery. Su-30MK2 fighters #3-4 arrive at Sultan Hasanuddin Air Force Base, aboard an An-124 and in disassembled condition. They’re actually a bit early, and had been expected in June.

11th Squadron currently has 12 active fighters: 5 single-seat SU-27s, and 7 twin-seat SU-30s. Once these 2 are assembled and tested, the squadron will grow again. Jakarta Post | Flight International.

March 20/13: 12-16 more wanted. The Jakarta Globe quotes Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro, who says that Indonesia’s $15 billion, 5-year military modernization plan will add another squadron of Sukhoi fighters. Other officials placed the number of additional Sukhois at 16 planes, which would double the TNI-AU’s Flanker force.

This purchase would be undertaken in addition to planned F-16 fleet buys and upgrades.

March 1/13: KFX/IFX. Indonesian Defense Ministry official Pos Hutabarat confirms that the KF-X joint fighter project with South Korea has been delayed by 18 months, while South Korea decides whether or not to continue. A decision is expected by June 2014, but Korean studies indicate that a 1st flight is unlikely before 2020, which means fielding rather later than 2022.

Worse, UPI says that the KFX/IFX fighter’s purchase price has already risen to $50-$60 million per aircraft, and this is before a prototype even exists. That sum is already comparable to ordering SU-30MK2s, which provide similar capabilities right now. That price, and the IFX’s delays, are good news for Sukhoi. Read “KF-X Fighter: Pushing Paper, or Peer Program?” for full coverage.

Feb 22/13: Delivery. Two out of the 6 Sukhoi Su-30MK2 jet fighters ordered in December 2011 arrive at Sultan Hasanuddin Air Force Base in Makassar, on the isle of Sulawesi. Volga-Dnepr’s AN-124-100 delivered the planes in standard condition: wings, tails, nose, etc. all removed, and no engines.

A shipment of 12 engines will arrive on Feb 27/13, and the 17 KnAAPO technicians that arrived with the planes will take about 2 weeks to assemble the first 2 fighters into flyable condition and test them. Another 2 batches of 2 fighters each are expected in June and July 2013. Jakarta Post, incl. updates on other aircraft plans.

Dec 21/12: Financing. Russia’s Vnesheconombank (VEB) won a tender from the Indonesian government, and will provide $399.5 million in financing over a 7-year term. The loan will finance 6 SU-30MK fighters and related equipment (vid. Dec 31/11 entry). BSR Russia.

Oct 17/12: Support from India. During his visit to Jakarta, Indian Defence Minister A K Antony agrees to train and support the Indonesian Air Force’s Flanker fleet. India flies a large fleet of SU-30MKIs, and is conducting manufacturing and final assembly work in India at HAL. They’ve already leveraged that base to provide similar support to Malaysia’s fleet of SU-30MKM fighters, though there are some items like engines that still need to be handled by Russia.

Note that this isn’t a contract just yet. Indonesia needs to firm up its requirements, and a India high-level Indian Air Force team will be sent to finalize the training and spares support package. The move will have an importance that goes far beyond its dollar value, as it’s part of a wider set of enhanced defense cooperation agreements the 2 countries are reportedly pursuing. Indonesia isn’t looking to antagonize China, but China’s aggressive claims in the South China Sea are contrasting poorly with India’s support for freedom of navigation, and for multilateral resolution of the disputes under international law. The result is an important Indonesian tilt toward more cooperation with India, which fits very well with India’s own strategic priorities. India MoD | Indian Express | The Jakarta Globe.

Sukhoi support: a the tilt toward India?

Dec 31/11: 6 more. It seems that the F-16 pursuit hasn’t replaced Indonesia’s desire for more Flankers. The Jakarta Post reports that Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense has ordered 6 more SU-30MK2 jet fighters, and quotes Deputy Minister of Defense Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin: “We handed over the contract yesterday. We have another contract still in progress”.

Amounts were not mentioned, but by Jan 10/12, Russia’s RIA Novosti says that Russian “defense and diplomatic sources” had confirmed a $470 million contract for the new planes, for delivery beginning “after 2013.”

The purchase would give Indonesia a total of 5 SU-27SKM and 11 SU-30MK2 fighters.

6 Flankers

TNI-AU F-16A
(click to view full)

Nov 17/11: F-16 request. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces Indonesia’s official request for 24 ex-USAF F-16C/D Block 25 fighters.

This doesn’t change Indonesia’s interest in more Russian aircraft, but it will bolster TNI-AU fleet numbers if a contract is signed.

F-16 request to USA

March 23/11: Chinese competition? The Jakarta Post reports that Indonesia has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with China regarding joint military procurement, technology transfer, and joint-development and joint-marketing.

There’s a lot that isn’t set yet, including cost, proportional shares, intellectual property rights, and of course which weapons systems are covered; China does make a J-11 Flanker copy. Exact coverage and purchases usually wait until all other aspects are finalized, however, as the point of the MoU is to provide a ready-made umbrella agreement for such projects as they arise. The 1 item specifically mentioned by the Post is that Indonesia is very interested in jointly producing “C-907 missiles”, which it supposedly bought for its Flankers in 2009-2010. Unfortunately, that designation doesn’t correspond to any commonly-known Chinese missile.

2007 – 2010

6 more SU-30s bought and delivered (a bit late); Weapons buy; Interest in more Flankers; Don’t drink the moonshine, tovarisch.

SU-30MK2 Ordnance
(click to view full)

Nov 10/10: Weapons. Russia and Indonesia sign a $54 million “contract on the delivery of munitions for Sukhoi-family fighters in service with the Indonesian armed forces.” Weapon types were not specified. BNO News | RIA Novosti.

Weapons

Sept 16/10: 6 more? Indonesian Air Force Air Force chief of staff Marshal Imam Sufaat says that they plan to buy 6 more Flanker family jets, as the 10 jets bought from Russia since 2003 aren’t enough to cover its territory. He also cites Malaysia’s 18 next-generation SU-30MKMs, and Singapore’s 20 F-15SGs. At the moment, however, there is no budget or definite time frame.

Ultimately, it depends what Indonesia wants to do. If control of territory is the goal, its 30+ Hawk 209 light combat aircraft serve that role well, and so will the EMB-134 Super Tucano light attack planes it’s buying to replace its OV-10 Broncos. Over the longer term, Indonesia has signed up with South Korea to develop a “KF-X” fighter by 2022. It’s intended to be an F-16C/D equivalent, and Indonesia has made noises about buying 50 or so. The debate thus comes down to whether the country needs a high-end gap filler as a hedge against the KF-X’s schedule, and its development risks. Jakarta Post | Jakarta Globe.

Sept 16/10: Deliveries done. The last Su-27SKM arrives in Makassar for service with Squadron 11, along with 3 Sukhoi warranty technicians to replace their poisoned colleagues. Jakarta Post | Voice of Russia.

2007 order delivered

Sept 13/10: 3 KnAAPO maintenance technicians are found dead in Indonesia, and 2 more are hospitalized. Some media outlets speak of deliberate poisoning, but the deaths turn out to be from ethanol – which means they poisoned themselves with drinking alcohol.

Liquor is prohibited at Sultan Hasannudin AB, so an investigation is underway regarding the liquor’s origins. Smuggling is the theory mentioned in the media reports, though maintenance technicians for multi-million dollar aircraft would also have the skills required to set up a basic moonshine still. Jakarta Post | Jakarta Post re: investigation | RIA Novosti.

Don’t drink the moonshine

Sept 8/10: The fighter delivery to Sultan Hasannudin Airbase in Makassar is canceled when the transporting Antonov AN-124-100 air craft breaks down. Tempo Interactive.

Sept 6/10: RIA Novosti reports that Russia will deliver the last of 6 contracted fighters to Indonesia on September 7th and 16th, flying 2 SU-27SKs in via AN-124 heavy transport planes to the Makassar air base. That will make 3 SU-27SK single-seat fighters, and 3 SU-30MK2 2-seat fighters, under the current contract; the last SU-30MK2 was delivered in January 2010.

The planes are supposed to be sent to Indonesia earlier than scheduled, following a request by the Indonesian military authorities, who didn’t want to miss yet another October 5th Armed Forces Day military parade.

Dec 26/08: Deliveries. RIA Novosti reports that Russia has delivered the first 2 jets under the contract: a pair of SU-30MK2s. Another Su-30MK2 jet is reportedly due for delivery in early 2009, and 3 Su-27SKM fighter jets are due to be delivered by 2010. Russia’s RIA Novosti | Singapore’s Straits Times.

Sept 19/08: Financing. While 3 of the Sukhois were expected to arrive in Indonesia by Indonesian Defense Forces Day on Oct 5/08, the September 2007 loan agreement for their purchase has not been approved yet by Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR). Without that approval, Bank Indonesia cannot take up the loan and issue the letter of credit.

Indonesia’s DPR is not deliberately delaying the purchase, and political figures have promised to give the issue priority. Even so, resolution and delivery in time for the Oct 5/08 Armed Forces Day parades would appear to be unlikely. Philippines’ Balita Pinoy news report.

Russian SU-27SK
(click to view full)

Aug 21/07: On the opening day of the 8th International Aviation and Space Salon (MAKS 2007), Rosoboronexport State Corporation and the Republic of Indonesia have sign a $355 deal to deliver 3 Su-27 SKM and 3 Su-30MK2 fighters. This would bring Indonesia’s fleet to 5 aircraft of each type. ITAR-TASS | DefenceTalk.

6 Flankers

Additional Readings

• KNAAPO – SU-27SKM and SU-30MK2.

• DID – Indonesia Adding F-16 Falcon Fighters to Join Flankers. Via a DSCA request to buy 24 used F-16C/D block 25s.

• Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Nov 12/13) – Moving beyond ambitions? Indonesia’s military modernisation

• Jakarta Post (Oct 6/11) – Buying the right to snap up arms contracts. Shines a light on Indonesia’s deeply corrupt defense procurement environment.

• UPI (Aug 24-27/07) – Jets for Jakarta: A Whole New Strategic Game For Australasia: Part 1 | Part 2.

• Air Power Australia – Sukhoi Flankers: The Shifting Balance of Regional Air Power

Americas

• Lockheed Martin has received a $85.5 million United States Air Force contract modification for the production and delivery of Long Range Anti Ship Missiles (LRASM) to the service. The order calls for the manufacture of 23 LRASM Lot 1 missiles, with work to be performed in Orlando, Fla., with a scheduled completion date of Sept. 29, 2019. The missile is currently being integrated with the B-1B Lancer strategic bomber and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet for air launched missions, as well as the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System used on US and allied ships for surface-to-air and land attack missiles. It is expected to be mounted on submarine vertical launch systems as well.

• The US Navy has awarded Raytheon a $11.5 million contract modification for engineering and technical services for Standard Missile-2 and Standard Missile-6 surface-to-air missiles. As well as the US Navy, Japan, Denmark, South Korea, Taiwan and Germany will receive services under the award which includes engineering work for production and integration of the system into Navy and foreign missile platforms. Work will be conducted in Tucson, Ariz. and has an expected completion date of June 2018. The SM series feature as a key element of the AEGIS Weapon System mounted on Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burke-class Navy warships, while variants are also in use with 15 allied countries.

• Last month’s failed SM-3 Block IIA interceptor test conducted by the US Navy and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) was caused by human error, according to an anonymous source close to the test. The June 21 test saw the missile self-destruct after it tracked a medium-range ballistic target missile launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Kauai, Hawaii. Now, it is believed that a tactical datalink controller, in charge of maintaining encrypted data exchanges between ships and aircraft, accidentally identified the incoming ballistic missile target as a friendly in the system, causing the SM-3 missile to self-destruct in flight. So while the incident is slightly embarrassing, there doesn’t seem to be anything wrong with the interceptor.

Middle East & North Africa

• Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has announced that contracts involving the sale of Almaz-Antey S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems have been “inked.” Speaking to lawmakers from his ruling AK Party at a party meeting in parliament, Erdogan stated that “Steps have been taken and signatures signed with Russia concerning the S-400s. God willing we will see the S-400s in our country.” The announcement now confirms that both the S-400 procurement and the Turkey-Eurosam programs are parallel initiatives, with the S-400 being sought for near-term needs.

Europe

• Two unidentified governments have placed orders with Rheinmetall for air defense system hardware and services for its air forces. With a combined value in excess of $250 million, one order is to a new customer who will acquire two Skyguard 3 air defence systems, with each system including a Skyguard 3 fire control unit and two 35mm Oerlikon Twin Gun GDF009 automatic cannons. The second order, to a repeat customer, requests the delivery of one 35mm Skyguard 1 fire units, as well as 35mm ammunition, simulators, and on-location training. Rheinmetall will conduct deliveries through 2021 with expectations that follow-up orders will be made.

• The British MoD has insisted that fabrication of the AW159 Wildcat helicopter will remain within the UK. Leonardo, the helicopter’s manufacturer, had been considering moving from its facility where the Wildcat is fabricated in Yeovil, UK, however, the government announced that work will remain there for the life cycle of the Wildcat program. The helicopter is in use with the British Royal Navy and British Army, with 62 of the models currently in service.

Asia Pacific

• As a result of the ongoing investigation into corruption at Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), many in South Korea see the scandal potentially widening into a probe into other defense programs initiated under former President Park Geun-hye. Prior to being impeached, ousted from office, and imprisoned earlier this year for influence peddling, Park and her administration had overseen the approval of the purchase of 40 F-35 fighters from Lockheed Martin and kicked off the development of the indigenous KF-X fighter with KAI. Now, these programs could be rolled into a wider corruption investigation to include higher-level figures, as President Moon Jae-in seeks to eradicate corruption between big business and politicians. The prosecution personnel made available—more than 100— for the ongoing KAI Surion helicopter investigation may also indicate to a potential widening of scope.

• AeroVironment has signed contracts with the Australian MoD to deliver its Wasp AE unmanned aerial system to the Australian Defense Forces. Deliveries will take place over a three-year period commencing from July 2018 in conjunction with Australian partners XTEK, General Dynamics Mediaware and Sentient Vision. The WASP AE is a small hand-launched reconnaissance and surveillance UAS that weighs just 2.8 pounds and is capable of landing on both land and sea.

Today’s Video

• Wasp AE demonstration:

https://youtu.be/8iEIpJQ4Hhk>

Chinese Type 001A Aircraft Carrier

American M141 BDM Anti-Structure Rocket Launcher

The UK Minister for Defence (MoD) Procurement Harriett Baldwin has confirmed that work on the AW159 Wildcat helicopter will continue in the country.

US-based engineering services company Engility Holdings has secured a new $39m contract to provide the US Navy with secure, network-centric warfare capabilities.

The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) has completed testing a software fix that will ensure the US Navy's aircraft launches are conducted safely.

Jüri Luik, the Estonian Defence Minister, was welcomed today (26 July) by EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq at the Agency’s premises for a fruitful exchange of views which focused on Estonia’s participation in EDA projects and programmes, cyber defence, the conclusions of the recent Long Term Review of the Agency as well as the implementation of the security and defence aspects of the EU Global Strategy.

In that context, topics such as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), PESCO and the ongoing work on the setting up of the European Defence Fund were also discussed. Minister Luik was furthermore briefed by EDA management and staff about the state of play in EDA’s Cyber Programme as well as on the implementation of the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR).

Minister Luik and Chief Executive Domecq also discussed the preparations for CYBRID 2017, a strategic level table-top cyber exercise which Estonia, as the current holder of the EU Presidency, and the EDA will co-organize on 7 September, in the margins of the informal Defence Ministers meeting in Tallinn. The scope of the exercise will be crisis response in the context of a major cyber campaign against the EU military structures in a hybrid warfare context.

I have a new article up on War on the Rocks. Here’s a preview.

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The Russian Navy is keen on showy demonstrations of strength. Just in the last week, it has begun an exercise with the Chinese navy in the Baltic Sea and sent its largest warship, the Peter the Great nuclear cruiser, and the world’s largest submarine, the Dmitry Donskoi, from the Northern Fleet to the Baltic to participate in the Navy Day parade on July 30. In another act primarily significant for its symbolism, Vladimir Putin approved a new Russian naval doctrine last week. Taken at face value, the doctrine appears to promote a vision of a revived Russian Navy that can maintain its superiority over up and comers like China’s navy, and even pose a serious threat to the U.S. Navy in certain environments. The reality is, as with most such documents, the gap between aspiration and feasible plans remains quite large. Since no English translation of the document is currently available, it may be useful to briefly summarize some key portions of the 22-page text, put the doctrine’s aims into context, and show where the gaps between dream and reality can be found.

What Does It Say?
The doctrine highlights many of the usual threats and dangers to Russia. First on the list of dangers is the “ambition of a range of states, and foremost the United States of America and its allies, to dominate the high seas, including in the Arctic, and to press for overwhelming superiority of their naval forces.” Other threats include territorial claims on maritime and coastal zones, efforts to limit Russian access to maritime resources, and attempts to weaken Russian control over the Northern Sea Route. Only three potential specific threats to Russia are listed in the document. The first is a sudden decline in the political-military situation leading to the use of military force in maritime areas holding strategic interest for Russia. The second is the deployment of strategic non-nuclear precision weapons and ballistic missile defenses in territories and maritime zones adjacent to Russia. And the third is the use of military force by other states in ways that threaten Russian national interests. In addition to the Arctic, the doctrine highlights the importance of protecting access to energy resources in the Middle East and Caspian Sea, and expresses concern about the negative impact of regional conflicts in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa on international security. It also notes the danger posed by the growth of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The strengthening of the Black Sea Fleet and Russian forces in Crimea, as well as the maintenance of a constant naval presence in the Mediterranean, are singled out as the most critical geographic priorities for the Russian Navy’s future development.

<The rest of the article may be found here>

The US Navy's oldest commissioned warship, USS Constitution, has returned to the sea following the completion of two years of restoration work at Dry Dock 1 at Charlestown Navy Yard in Boston National Historical Park, Massachusetts.

A US Navy coastal patrol ship has fired warning shots following an ‘unsafe and unprofessional’ approach made by an Iranian vessel in international waters, US Central Command (Centcom) officials said.

The US Navy's San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS John P. Murtha (LPD 26) has successfully completed its Final Contract Trials (FCT).

Over the past two years, the National Unity Government (NUG) has been challenged by internal power struggles, protest movements and now an ‘opposition’ coalition made up of influential officials from within. It is the first time, however, that leaders of three mainstream political parties from three major ethnic groups have joined forces – at least under the NUG. The challenge posed by the coalition has now taken a more dramatic turn following the news that Vice-President Abdul Rashid Dostum was denied entry at Mazar-e Sharif airport on 17 July 2017 while attempting to return to the country. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili and Thomas Ruttig look at the coalition members’ backgrounds, their demands and the consequences of this emerging protest from within the government as the country faces another wave of intensive fighting.

Leaders of three major political parties – Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan, Jombesh-e Melli Islami and Hezb-e Wahdat-e Mardom-e Afghanistan – announced their decision to form a new coalition on 30 June 2017 called the “Etelaf baray Nejat-e Afghanistan (Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan).” The leaders of the coalition said that its aim was to “prevent the collapse of the system, avoid political chaos and restore national trust” among the political classes inside and outside the government. It is not clear, however, whether this coalition includes party leaders or how much support, in particular Jamiat, has from other party heavyweights or from its grassroots members (more about this in the text).

Three major themes emerge in the statements of the senior members of the coalition as well as in their agreements: criticism of the centralisation of power by the president’s circle; accusations of the government’s involvement in some of the high profile attacks, which they felt were targeted; and the general deterioration of security in the north. The latter is, sometimes explicitly, blamed on leading Pashtun politicians close to the president in what the coalition deems to be an attempt to destabilise the northern leaders’ local power bases.

In a declaration published on social media (see here, here, here and here (1), the coalition has demanded that Dostum’s vice-presidential authorities, which have never officially been taken from him, be restored. Earlier, Dostum’s Jombesh party held protests in a number of provinces, including in Balkh and Jawzjan, calling for the restoration of his authority, emphasising that his position was their ‘red line’ and that any disrespect to him would be regarded as disrespect to many millions of Uzbek and other Turkic speaking groups. Furthermore, the coalition has also called for the full implementation of the political agreement of the NUG, as one of its priorities. (2)

The formation of the Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan by the leaders of the three parties is the result of a culmination of complaints and accusations that Jamiat leaders and the first vice president have been levelling against the president and his entourage for some time. On 5 June 2017 for instance, two days after Jamiat leaders survived triple bomb blasts during a funeral for Salem Ezadyar (who was killed during the 2 June protests), Salahuddin Rabbani, foreign minister and acting head of Jamiat, appeared in a press conference and called for the “[r]emoval of the national security adviser [Hanif Atmar] and other heads of security institutions,” implying they had had a hand in the attacks. (3) This was echoed on 25 June 2017 by Balkh Governor Atta Muhammad Nur, another Jamiat leader, who called for “reforms at the top of the military and security agencies” in his Eid-ul Fitr prayer speech last month, with a threat to “resort to the strongest and most dangerous civil moves.” (4) Similarly, in October 2016, Vice-President General Abdul Rashid Dostum, after his convoy came under attack while he was leading a clearance operation against the Taleban in the north, accused the national security advisor and NDS chief Massum Stanakzai of plotting against him and wanting him killed. He also lashed out at the president for favouring Pashtuns in appointments, particularly from his home province, saying, “For the president, whoever speaks Pashto is a good person, but if they speak Pashto and are from Logar, it is even better.” (5)

The coalition members have, however, emphasised that they “do not want to dismantle the government.” This was stated by Mohaqeq, the leader of Wahdat-e Mardom, in response to certain MPs’ call for coalition members to resign from the government; he argued that would be impossible as the coalition represented “at least three and a half to four million clean votes” cast in the last elections. In a press appearance upon his return from Turkey, Atta also insisted that the coalition members constituted “the system’s pillar.”

Riding on a wave of protests

The formation of the coalition from within the government comes at a time when protestors, calling themselves the “Uprising for Change,” resumed their demonstrations on 3 July 2017 (AAN background here). The movement’s first protest, which took place on 2 June 2017, was trigged by a massive truck bomb in Kabul’s city centre on 31 May 2017 (see AAN’s previous report here). It has since taken on a new dimension, following security forces’ use of live rounds, which killed at least six protestors. One other person was killed in a clash during the removal of one of the movement’s sit-in tents the night between 19 and 20 June 2017 (see AAN’s previous report here).

Criticism from within and outside the government of the president and of those close to him has been increasing. On 13 July 2017, more than 60 members of parliament, including the first deputy speaker of the Wolesi Jirga Humayun Humayun, travelled to participate in a gathering in support of the national security forces. General Abdul Razeq, Kandahar’s powerful chief of police who addressed the gathering, said that the government had been “taken hostage by a few, like in the dark days of Mullah Omar.” Razeq is loyal to former President Hamed Karzai (see AAN reporting here) Humayun also accused the government of causing both ethnic and intra-ethnic tensions. On 9 July 2017, the Enlightening Movement that emerged from among those protesting the rerouting of a planned power line (AAN reporting here) announced that it would organise a new protest on the first anniversary of a suicide bomb attack claimed by Daesh during a demonstration it had organised at Deh Mazang Square in western Kabul on 2 Asad 1396 in the Afghan calendar (which, unlike last year and coincidentally on 23 July 2016, falls on 24 July 2017 this year).

The coalition’s members and their internal disunity

The members of the coalition – also called the ‘Ankara Triangle’ by Afghan social media activists – because it emerged out of meetings in Dostum’s Ankara residence – are political leaders from the Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek communities. Mainly:

• First Vice-President Abdul Rashid Dostum, the founder and leader of Jombesh-e Melli Islami Afghanistan (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) and until recently the unchallenged leader of the Uzbek community (AAN’s analysis here on recent developments);
• Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani, acting chairperson of Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Society of Afghanistan), one of the strongest parties and predominated by Tajiks;
• Balkh Governor Atta Muhammad Nur, head of Jamiat-e Islami’s Executive Council (shura-ye ejra’iya);
• Second Deputy Chief Executive Muhammad Mohaqeq, the leader of Wahdat-e Islami Mardom-e Afghanistan (People’s Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan) and an influential Hazara leader.

As discussed above, the new Coalition is the culmination of complaints by Dostum and the two Jamiat leaders Rabbani and Atta, and they have now been joined by Muhammad Mohaqeq, the second deputy chief executive. Mohaqeq began criticising certain circles within the government (without naming names) in an interview with Ariana TV on 24 June 2017. Like Rabbani, Atta and Dostum, Mohaqeq implied that he appeared to be the target of a terrorist attack on Al-Zahra Mosque (which killed one of his most influential backers, a prominent businessman named Haji Hussain Ramazanzada – see media report here). Mohaqeq said he had been due to appear at the mosque for a late night religious ceremony when it came under attack; he had been late due to an invitation to iftar (breaking of the fast). He said that the attack had intended to cause more casualties than it did, including himself and some other high-ranking personalities. On 24 June, in his Eid message, he complained that two or three influential ministers who were close to the top of the “power pyramid” had revoked the authorities of all the ministries and that other ministers did not have any power, even in their own ministries.” He claimed that the “circle monopolising power” was attempting to “marginalise other factions” and that this was more important than working to prevent the fall of districts or protecting security forces from increasing casualties. (6)

Wahdat deputy leader Muhammad Nateqi, who also attended the Ankara meetings, insisted when talking to AAN that the coalition was a coalition of the three parties and not of the individual leaders. He pointed out that the agreement had been signed by six people: in addition to the four leaders Dostum, Atta, Rabbani and Mohaqeq, Dostum’s son Bator, the party’s acting leader in the country, and Nateqi himself, in his capacity as deputy of Mohaqeq’s party, had also both signed the agreement. Both were probably brought in to make the pact look balanced (with two representatives per party) and to hide the fact that Jamiat is represented by two competing prominent leaders.

It is not fully clear whether the two Jamiat leaders have the full support of all the Jamiat heavyweights, as some of them, such as Ismail Khan (who does not hold any government post) and Ahmad Zia Massud (who was dismissed by the president from his position as the president’s special representative for reform and good governance in April 2017), have been calling for early elections in contrast to the coalition’s declared aim of reforming and stabilising the existing government, not toppling it. A more radical Jamiat dissenter, Sayyed Ibrahim Emad, son of Sayyed Nurullah Emad, the former deputy head of Jamiat, claimed that “95 per cent of Jamiat members” are against the coalition, which may be taken with a pinch of salt. Jamiat’s demand (also reflected in its statement issued on 5 June 2017) for the dismissal of the national security adviser was immediately rejected by the Palace. But this demand has now also been taken up by the new coalition.

While the coalition’s support for the implementation of the NUG agreement has not earned them any explicit support from the chief executive who is also a leading Jamiati, Abdullah has not opposed it publicly either. This is understandable given that it will be hard for him to divorce from Jamiat (and also to some extent from Mohaqeq), whose supporters constituted his main voter base during the 2014 elections and continue to be his political mainstay. (Without alienating Jamiat’s heavyweights, Abdullah has also successfully manoeuvred among the inner-Jamiat struggle for leadership, where, for a while, he appeared to have been side-lined – see more background here)

Moreover, Abdullah’s working relations with the president remain unstable. (7) Sources told AAN that Abdullah remained sceptical about the president. For instance, in one recent private meeting with his high-profile supporters, Abdullah complained that the Palace had tried to drive a wedge between him and his main election supporter, Balkh governor Nur, in order to weaken Abdullah and then do “whatever it wanted.” He also grumbled that the Palace continued to disempower the ministers affiliated with him. Last month, during the weekly meeting of the council of ministers that he chairs, Abdullah publicly criticised certain ministers for not attending his meetings taking particular aim at the minister of finance who, after a seven-month absence, finally showed up at the meeting on 10 July 2017. On 11 July 2017, the president appointed (by decree) four new deputy ministers to the Ministry of Finance, including a replacement for Abdullah’s nephew Mustafa Mastur, who was the financial and administrative deputy minister. Sources close to Abdullah have told AAN that he has ordered Mastur not to leave his position, revealing the thorny relations that remain between the president and the chief executive.

The challenge posed by the coalition has now taken on an even more dramatic dimension following the news that Dostum’s plane was denied permission to land in Mazar-e Sharif on 17 July 2017, where he was due to participate in the official inauguration of the coalition and where Balkh’s Governor Atta (who was Dostum’s main rival for much of the post-2001 period) had reportedly gone to the airport with hundreds of supporters to welcome him (see this media report). Although both Dostum’s and Atta’s offices have denied the news, William Salvin, a spokesman for the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission forces, confirmed that their commander for the northern region had received a call seeking permission from the central government for the vice-president’s landing. The government has not provided any official explanation, but some sources from within it also confirmed the incident, warning that the vice-president could return to the country on the condition that he accepts being put under house arrest at his home in Kabul and appear in court to answer the accusations of torture and physical abuse levelled against him by his political rival, Ahmad Eshchi. Earlier, on 23 June 2017, General Dostum in his Eid-ul Fitr message had reminded the people that he was in Turkey for his son Batur Dostum’s engagement party and would return to the country after the holidays. Before Dostum’s failed attempt to return, Nateqi had confirmed to AAN that the member parties of the coalition would declare its existence and would present its programmes in Kabul.

Reactions from inside and outside the government

President Ghani reacted swiftly, albeit indirectly, to the formation of the new coalition when addressing several groups of supporters invited to the presidential palace. He resumed this practice recently, in the face of mounting pressure from the protest movements and from inside his own government. (He also held a string of meetings immediately after he took power in September 2014.) For instance, talking to elders, young people and civil society and political activists from the three south eastern provinces of ‘Loya Paktia’ and eastern Kabul on 30 June 2017, he welcomed “reform plans,” but rejected “ideas of sharing (power).” He said that “the presidential seat is not a shared seat” insisting on the president’s dominance in the political system. (8)

This rising polarisation within the government quickly extended to the parliament and beyond. On 3 July 2017, the first deputy speaker of the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House of Parliament), Humayun Humayun, previously a strong supporter of the president, called the formation of the new coalition a result of “the president’s poor leadership.” He criticised Ghani for failing “to reach an agreement with his deputy, with his governor or with the CEO’s second deputy.” Other MPs such as Allah Gul Mujahed accused the coalition’s members of wanting “to plunge the country into a crisis.” Hezb-e Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, also joined the chorus criticising the coalition, continuing to emphasise his loyalty and the indispensability of his party to the government since his return to Kabul following the September 2016 peace deal.

In the face of growing criticism, the president continues to promote his own narrative, which is – as evident in his reactions mentioned above – that these leaders are preventing him from delivering services to the people and changing the culture of governance. He also expressed concerns about the consequences of reviving ethnic polarisation, recalling what happened in the 2014 pre-election period. In his speech at the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Board on 10 July 2017, he admitted that the discontent was increasingly taking on an ethnic hue, bringing about ethnic polarisation, a cause of “invisible annihilation”. Indirectly referring to the new coalition’s leaders, Ghani warned that “unscrupulous leaders and individuals who sacrifice the national interests for their personal gains could manipulate a polarized society”. However, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, Tadamichi Yamamoto, pointed to related deficits on the government side when briefing the UN Security Council on 21 June 2017. Here he urged “enhanced efforts by the National Unity Government to increase political inclusiveness, strengthen accountability, and improve the government’s credibility, particularly in the security sector”, otherwise “we are likely to face more crises in an increasingly fragile environment.”

In the meantime, another political group consisting of high-profile politicians called Mehwar-e Mardom Afghanistan (People’s Axis of Afghanistan) announced its formation on 16 July 2017 as a “political opposition current”, denouncing the NUG’s “failed and divisive policies”. (Members of its leadership council include former President Hamed Karzai’s affiliates, especially Former National Security Adviser Rangin Dadfar Spanta, former NDS chief Rahmatullah Nabil, former chief electoral officer Daud Ali Najafi and Shakiba Hashemi, an MP from Kandahar.)

Conclusion: Resurgence of ethnic polarisation

The announcement of the ‘Ankara coalition’ by Dostum, Mohaqeq, Rabbani and Atta, who all hold government positions, brought the paralysing power struggle within the NUG to the fore again (AAN analysis about previous power struggles, here). The member-parties of the coalition constitute vote banks for both the president and the chief executive in the disputed 2014 presidential elections and continue to hold a strong sway in their (mainly ethnic and regional) constituencies.

The ‘Ankara coalition’, which Nateqi termed “a protest from within” could potentially mount a more daunting challenge to the embattled government than the more civil society-based protest movements (ie, the Enlightening Movement and Uprising for Change). Their difference lies in that they are multi-ethnic, cross-factional (in the sense of election campaign camps) and all their members hold government positions. Unlike the grassroots protest movements that have brought up issues of social and security sector reforms, the new coalition – although utilising some of the same slogans – focuses on the on-going power struggle between the political classes within the NUG, and reflects its personal, factional and ethnic dimensions.

The rhetoric used by coalition members and the reactions from the government have already further deepened the polarisation within the government. But parliamentary elections have been announced for July 2018, and 2019 will see the next presidential poll. And as the ever-fluctuating combination of election camps and coalitions show, the ethnic factor is only one in a more diverse mixture of factors determining who will end up on certain election tickets – as the break-up of a similar pre-2014 election coalition, then-called the National Front (background by AAN here), showed.

The rather dramatic issue of whether and under what circumstances the first Vice-President will or will not be able to return to Afghanistan, will only be the next act in a play that will end in 2019. In any case, Dostum has the ability to mobilise his followers from afar – as both a challenge to the government and as a bargaining chip in future elections.

 

 

(1) On 23 July 2017, Muhammad Nateqi, the deputy head of Hezb-e Wahdat-e Mardom Afghanistan, confirmed to AAN that it was their declaration and that it had been signed. However, he also said that it had been decided that only the text without the signatures should be published.

(2) In addition to a call for reforms, which might only be aimed at strengthening the position of the coalition members within the NUG, it also seems to be focusing on the next elections. This kind of coalition has appeared before almost every election. For instance, Nur told the BBC that the Palace was trying to pull apart the coalition but has “emphasised that the coalition leaders are committed to continuing until their demands are met.” While the coalition has been formed apparently in response to what they call the president’s centralisation of power, Nur has already described “long-term goals” for the coalition, which is that it will field its own candidate or support someone who “will probably not be Mr Ghani.”

(3) Rabbani continues to serve as the (acting-) minister of foreign affairs, despite the fact that he was given a vote of no confidence in November 2016 (see AAN’s previous report here) after the MPs set off an interpellation motion against those ministers who had not been able to spend more than 70 per cent of their ministries’ development budget for the financial year of 1394 (2015). On 6 June 2017, Rabbani boycotted the Kabul Process conference reportedly based on a decision by the Jamiat leaders, despite the fact that President Ghani held the conference up as a highly important process and did not want it to be weakened by internal disputes.

(4) Earlier, Nur was in negotiations over the implementation of the NUG deal with the president and to possibly join Ghani’s camp in Kabul. His negotiation with the president became controversial among Jamiat members, which only led to his reappointment as the governor of Balkh on 20 February 2017; before then he had been serving as acting-governor.

But these talks have now fallen apart. Tahir Qadiry, a senior adviser to Nur, has said this is because Ghani’s advisers “began spoiling the discussions.” He further accused the president of starting to crack down on “these personalities [Nur, Dostum, Mohaqeq and Rabbani],” saying that “[t]he clique wanted to get rid of these people.”

(5) The first vice-president was already in Turkey. He flew to Turkey on 19 May 2017 (see media report here for ‘medical treatment’ (see here), which came months after Ahmad Ishchi, a former governor of Jawzjan province just before the Taleban took over the province, accused Dostum in late 2016 of torturing and abusing him. The Attorney General’s Office (AGO) said that it had appointed a team to investigate the allegation. However, no clear results were made public and only at one point in February 2017, security forces supposedly besieged his house, which ended without any clash with his bodyguards (the coalition also called for an “impartial investigation of the illegal siege of the first vice-president’s residence in Kabul” (see here) On his part, Dostum accused Ishchi of financing ‘the opposition’ and of being involved in “security problems” (see here).

(6) Over the past two years, during the Zabul Seven, the Jombesh-e Roshnayi protest movements largely organised by Hazaras, Mohaqeq has defended the government. In November 2015, for instance, when the slaughter of seven Hazara travellers who had been taken hostage by Daesh sympathisers in Zabul province triggered one of the largest demonstrations (Zabul Seven protest) ever held in Kabul (See AAN’s previous report here), he lashed out at the organisers of the protest for what he called “setting the Hazara people against the Palace.” After the 16 May 2016 and 23 July 2017 demonstrations organised by the Enlightening Movement against the cabinet’s decision to reroute a 500 KV power transmission line from Bamyan to Salang (see AAN’s previous reports here and here, Mohaqeq, after an initial complaint against the cabinet’s decision in which he claimed his and Second Vice-President Sarwar Danesh’s voices had not been heard, again defended the government after the president agreed to appoint a review commission, which came up with a suggestion to extend a substation power line of 220 KV from Dushi in Baghlan province to Bamyan. Mohaqeq argued that this 220KV was adequate for Bamyan. This gave rise to outrage against him among his Hazara supporters, as they had expected him to act as one of their representatives in the NUG (in addition to Vice-President Danesh) in support of their demands; this cost him a large degree of popularity.

(7) Abdullah himself publicly criticised the president’s ‘unilateralism’ less than a year ago, on 11 August 2016 (see AAN’s previous analysis here and here). Since then he has patched up his differences with the president, although only on the surface. Their underlying problems remain.

(8) Besides his indirect response to the coalition through his meetings with people, the president also sent NDS chief Masum Stanekzai to Turkey for talks with General Dostum. Dostum’s chief of staff, Enayatullah Babur Farahmand, told the BBC that Stanekzai met Dostum in Ankara on 4 July 2017 and invited General Dostum to participate in “an imminent meeting of political leaders of Afghanistan” in Kabul. Earlier, another unconfirmed report indicated that Stanekzai had made a deal to offer to the first vice-president, in which the government would facilitate Dostum’s return to the country and restore his vice-presidential authorities in return for his withdrawal from the coalition. Muhammad Nateqi also confirmed to AAN that the NDS chief not only met General Dostum but also Mohaqeq and Rabbani. However, the Palace said it was not aware of the meeting. On the contrary, the Palace has asked the judicial agencies and the attorney general office to conclude Dostum’s dossier as soon as possible and that if Dostum is proved to be innocent as result of the investigations, he will continue his work; if not, he will be tried.

 

Israeli Merkava Mk.4 Meil Ruach Main Battle Tank

The US military has announced that it has killed Abu Saeed, the amir of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), in an air strike in Kunar province earlier this month. Abu Saeed was a veteran fighter with a long militant career. His death – if confirmed – deals a considerable blow to the group, which is under growing pressure from the different enemies lined up against it. Nonetheless, it has continued to be able to put up stiff resistance and has clung to most of the territory it has taken from the Taleban in Nangarhar. AAN’s Borhan Osman looks at the state of the ISKP after the reported death of its new leader.

ISKP had not yet recovered from the death in May 2017 of its second leader, Sheikh Abdul Hasib, when his replacement, Abu Saeed, was killed on 11 July 2017, according to the US Department of Defence. The Pentagon statement, issued on 14 July, said Abu Saeed was killed three days earlier in Kunar in a drone strike. Independent sources from the province told AAN the air strike took place in the Katar area of Watapur district, which borders Nuristan province. Two other ISKP militants were also killed in the attack. However, according to a local journalist, relatives of one of the victims told him no senior ISKP members were among those killed. While the group has not commented publicly on the reports of Abu Saeed’s death, ISKP sources have also rejected it; AAN knows from three ISKP sources that they denied these reports categorically.

 Abu Saeed: A brief profile

Abu Saeed, nom de guerre for Mawlawi Abdul Rahman Ghaleb, is (or was) in his (early?) 40s, from Bajaur agency, one of Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) that borders Kunar. Unlike most other ISKP commanders, Abu Saeed is (or was) a veteran with a career of more than half of a decade in militancy. He steadily rose through the ranks of at least three militant groups, constantly evolving his affiliation to the latest ‘version’ of the most violent extremist strands. In his late teens, he left his local madrasa, studies unfinished, to join one of the earliest armed Islamist groups operating in the tribal areas, Tahrik-e Nefaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi (TNSM), which was created in the early 1990s, struggled for the implementation of Islamic law in Swat, Malakand and Bajaur and even took over parts of Pakistan’s Malakand Division for several days in 1994. After the US started its military campaign in Afghanistan in late 2001, TNSM contributed fighters to support the Afghan Taleban. Abdul Rahman aka Abu Saeed was reportedly among them. After the fall of the Taleban regime, he returned to Bajaur to complete his studies and became a mawlawi (someone certified as a religious scholar upon graduating from a madrasa).

Abu Saeed remained close with Faqir Muhammad, one of the TNSM leaders, and was promoted to serve as a judge (qazi) for the group. When Faqir joined the Tahrik-e Taleban-e Pakistan (TTP) upon its emergence in 2007, Abdul Rahman followed suit. He rose through its ranks to become the deputy to the movement’s commander for Bajaur around 2011. In 2012, he was reportedly killed in an air strike by the US military in Marawara district of Kunar, which killed the Bajaur commander, Dadullah. He remained close to Dadullah’s successor Abu Bakr. When the latter joined ISKP in February 2015 along with his key commanders as well as about 200 fighters, Abu Saeed also followed. Abu Saeed studied in a Hanafi madrasa and had remained Hanafi, but when joining ISKP he, like most others who do so, converted to Salafism.

After the death of ISKP’s first amir, Saeed Khan, in late August 2016, Abu Saeed served as the group’s amir for Nangarhar, according to one account based on ISKP sources. According to another account, he was appointed as a deputy to Abdul Hasib.

Abu Saeed and ISKP’s Bajauri commanders, in general, have mostly used the upper Kunar valley as their base, both when they were part of TTP and later. Specifically, many of the commanders kept a constant presence in Sholtan valley which borders Bajaur. The population of the valley, like the population of the districts under ISKP’s influence in Nangarhar, almost entirely belong to the Pashtun tribe of the Shinwari. When Abu Saeed took over the leadership of ISKP, he reportedly wanted to increase the group’s operations and visibility in Kunar; the area was mostly familiar to him and it was also important for him in order to connect to his home base of Bajaur. Among the tribal (FATA) agencies, Bajaur has seen the most ISKP activity, thanks to the Bajauri commanders’ commitment to extend operations to their home areas. Given Abu Saeed’s traditional base in Kunar, it is not surprising that the air strike on 11 July 2017 targeted him in that area.

Being a veteran militant and mawlawi as well as having served as a militant judge plus being experienced as a deputy chief commander for one of the most important TTP strongholds supplied him with both ideological clout and strategic know-how. As a sign of respect for his scholarly credentials, he was referred to as “Sheikh” Abu Saeed among ISKP members. In one of the interviews aired by ISKP’s Khilafat Ghag Radio in early April, he seemed to be posing as an ideologue, vowing that ISKP’s jihad will continue “until conquering the United States and converting its citizens to tawhid (oneness of God as perceived by Islam, but narrowed to a sectarian concept by the Salafis).” All that made him a good fit for the job of ISKP amir – and possibly a more effective leader than his predecessor, Abdul Hasib.

How was he appointed?

Abu Saeed became the amir of ISKP less than three weeks before his reported death. His appointment took more than one month, after the death of Abdul Hasib in late April 2017 (see AAN analysis here), as members differed over several candidates for Hasib’s replacement proposed by senior ISKP members. The Central Asian fighters, generally suspicious of many former TTP fighters for their possible secret ties with the Pakistani government, objected to the nomination of candidates with that background. At the heart of the dispute was Abdullah Orakzai, aka Aslam Faruqi, a former mid-level TTP commander from Orakzai agency, who has been close to the first ISKP leader, Saeed Khan. The Central Asian contingent, which possibly constitutes less than a third of ISKP’s fighting force, presented its own candidate, Muawiya Khorasani, a nom de guerre not heard before; he is thought to be from Uzbekistan.

Since the Central Asians objected to all the candidates with TTP background, and in effect wanted leadership for themselves, ISKP reached a deadlock over appointing a new amir. According to one source close to ISKP, the issue was referred to IS Centre (In Syria or Iraq), with a request to guide ISKP with a mechanism for the appointment. From there then an order came to elect a 40-member shura to make such appointments who, then, would be finally confirmed from IS Centre. This is a single source, and AAN could not corroborate it through other reliable accounts. The shura agreed over Abu Saeed as a compromise candidate, and he was then quickly endorsed by IS Centre, according to the source.

The state of ISKP’s influence in Nangarhar

For the past one and a half months, ISKP has been engaged in intense battles, some of which have been on and off, in three districts of Nangarhar: Achin, Deh Bala and Pachir wa Agam. The fiercest fighting has happened in Achin district, the centre of a concentrated ground operation by Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) accompanied by intensified air strikes and supported by the US military. The operation has focused on Pekha and Mamand valleys, in both of which the joint forces have faced heavy resistance from ISKP. The offensive has not forced the group to yield much territory. The progress of the joint forces has been described by local officials and residents as happening at a snail’s pace. ISKP has also put up similar resistance in Deh Bala district, which previously had been largely spared from ground offensives (also from air strikes). Most of the territory in this district under the control of ISKP has remained so for the past two years. The joint forces in June penetrated deep into that territory for the first time and even managed to briefly hold parts of Oghuz and Gurgury, the two areas that have served as the centre for the group in the district. But later, the combined forces retreated from these areas apparently due to tough resistance from the group. The US military suffered two casualties in the operation in the district on 7 July.

Pachir wa Agam district, with the Tora Bora mountains and its cave complexes, was the focus first of an ISKP offensive and later of a counter-offensive by the joint forces. ISKP had extended its presence to Tora Bora in mid-June after defeating the Taleban along the way from Deh Bala. Given the symbolic importance of Tora Bora, which has remained the strategic hideout (and launch pad for attacks) for the anti-Soviet mujahedin and later for Arabs from al Qaeda, including its leader Osama bin Laden, the ANSF moved quickly to contain ISKP’s advance. Within days of ISKP’s move into Tora Bora, the ministry of defence announced that the ANSF had cleared the strategic area of ISKP. However, the operation only took back the parts of Tora Bora that are closer to populated areas; the bulk of the most important valley, the uninhabitable Milawa valley, still remains under ISKP control.

Government officials and media reports portrayed Tora Bora as one re-enforced stronghold, similar to the network of caves that the “mother of all bombs” (see AAN analysis here) airstrike (mostly) destroyed in Achin. However, Tora Bora is a much larger area, a series of valleys surrounded by mountain ranges, and the place where bin Laden’s fortress was built is not the most important part of it. The joint forces have been trying hard in recent weeks to lay siege to the ISKP fighters inside those valleys, but have faced tough resistance. ISKP seems to be tucked away in a remote and naturally uninhabitable point in Tora Bora that is a several-hour foot journey from its last supply point in Deh Bala. Therefore, ISKP will also be unable to retain it for any length of time. For the time being, the group might keep a mere presence there to use it as a hideout and to show off that it controls a place of such huge symbolism.

In Chaparhar district, where ISKP fighters have only intermittent control over parts of the district close to Deh Bala, the group has been engaged in fierce fighting with the Taleban. The Taleban have never been able to fully clear the district of ISKP. Major parts of it to the south have changed hands between the two groups numerous times, with huge suffering inflicted on locals. Every time following a takeover, the victorious group will conduct a witch hunt against suspected or actual supporters of the rival group.

Nazian, the district in Nangarhar where ISKP’s close ally Lashkar-e Islam led by Mangal Bagh is present, has largely been spared from military operations and fighting for a long time.

Pakistani operations against ISKP: Eliminating militants? Or pushing them into Afghanistan?

ISKP is also facing the threat of losing its most important retreat and supply centre on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. Its Khyber 4 Operation launched on 16 July 2017, the Pakistani army says (see here and here), aims at preventing ISKP from spreading its influence into Pakistani territory. In fact the operation is about clearing those parts of Khyber agency still out of the government’s full control of militants. The operation is said to be specifically targeting the Rajgal valley in the Khyber agency. Rajgal, which borders Achin and Nazian districts on the Afghan side, has remained a constant hideout of various militant groups for over a decade. Through the valley, ISKP militants have been freely crossing the line with supplies of weapons and fighters, effectively eliminating the border between the two countries. Numerous sources told AAN that ISKP transported ammunition into Nangarhar from Khyber agency on backs of mules. It also gives access to vast areas in other valleys in Khyber.

Previous operations by the Pakistani military, namely the Khyber 3 Operation, that targeted militants in the agency, failed to displace them from Rajgal valley. Capturing the valley would deny ISKP a key strategic retreat and supply route.

On the other hand, if successful, the operation in Rajgal would most likely sweep the militants currently based there into Afghanistan. They would then swell the ranks of the militant groups operating here, particularly ISKP and its ally Lashkar-e Islam. The Pakistani army’s previous operations in the Khyber agency had a similar effect: Rather than being killed and captured, militants were mostly dislocated from their old bases and pushed into Afghanistan. They could easily cross the unmanned porous border in the districts of Nazian and Achin. Additionally, if the Pakistani military manages to clear Rajgal valley, the militants will still have access to Khyber agency through the adjacent Tirah valley, which borders the ISKP-controlled Deh Bala district; although that is a much longer route with harder terrain. Rajgal is not the only valley still out of the Pakistani government’s control; parts of Tirah continue to serve as hideouts for militant groups.

Decapitated, but not demoralised

The death of veteran ISKP leader Abu Saeed, if confirmed, would deal a significant blow to the embattled group. The ‘decapitation’ of ISKP has been well underway over the past two years as the US military has stepped up its military campaign, mainly through air strikes, against the group in Nangarhar. It has lost about 20 of its founding and some of its ‘second-generation’ leaders, the overwhelming majority by air strikes. ISKP is also too overstretched to fight front-line battles in three districts simultaneously for long. The Pakistani operation further adds to the group’s woes, as losing one of its key retreats and supply hubs would tighten the siege around the group in Afghanistan. The group is also facing emerging internal differences, mainly between the more radical Central Asian fighters and the locally better entrenched and therefore more powerful Pakistani leaders.

In the face of all these threats, ISKP has shown it is resilient. Recruits continue to pour in to Nangarhar from various provinces of Afghanistan as well as from Pakistan. No signs are visible yet that its appeal to some radicalised sectors is fading. Additionally, local residents describe the group’s fighting vigour as exceeding that of any militant group they have seen previously. The group can be expected to put all its efforts into holding out against ANSF and US forces to retain its most important stronghold in Nangarhar. ISKP might be less smart than the Taleban in protecting its leaders, but it has proved to be a much tougher fighting force than many could anticipate.

 

 

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