From January 1, 2019, the Russian Volga will cease providing AN-124 capacity for EU and NATO states under NATO's heavy military air transport program SALIS (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution), which includes 17 European member states and Canada. The loss is sensitive: Under Salis, Antonov and Volga have each had an AN-124 permanently stationed at Leipzig-Halle Airport since March 2006, with additional uplift available at short notice.
Unfortunately, the SALIS Program Office did not succeed in overcoming the Russian withdrawal, despite the long negotiations. The move comes just over a year after the Russian freighter operator announced the end of the near-decade-long Russlan collaboration to market AN-124 capacity with Ukraine’s Antonov. A move thought to be in response to western sanctions on Russian companies. Negotiations conducted by the Salis steering board last week failed to avert the withdrawal. After Volga-Dnepr subsidiary AirBridgeCargo lost about half its 21 landing slots at Schiphol last year, Russia reportedly threatened to ban Dutch carriers from its airspace. Shortly after, KLM struck a deal with ABC over additional slots.
The ending of the Salis contract puts pressure on NATO and the EU, which need access to the world’s largest commercial cargo aircraft. This is a serious loss of capacity: the Ukrainian An-124s of Antonov's air transport industry are only flying 900 flights per year - the largest fleet with two Russian aircraft has been available to SALIS's designers for up to 2300 hours per year.
There is always the possibility that the withdrawal is part of a larger play by Volga-Dnepr president Alexey Isaikin, who is looking to set up a German cargo airline, with AN-124s registered in Germany, at Leipzig. By registering an AN-124 to a German company, the Volga-Dnepr group would no longer be caught in the crossfire of political skirmishes between Russia and elsewhere, which includes problems with Antonov maintenance. And as an EU company, it might get preferential treatment for military shipments over Ukraine’s Antonov. It also adds pressure on Germany, which is keen to develop Leipzig-Halle as a freight airport, to OK the new airline’s AOC and aircraft registration. (Although as one source told The Loadstar, Lufthansa Cargo was unlikely to welcome a new freighter airline on its doorstep, and would “go ape-shit”.)
Tag: SALISVolga-DneprOne more set of slides today, this one from a speech by Vice Admiral Igor Kostyukov, the first deputy chief of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff, on the topic of security in the Asia-Pacific region. MCIS has put on its website the text of his speech in Russian and video in Russian only.
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I wrote this up quickly on Saturday for friends, and it seemed to get a positive reaction, so I decided to expand a bit and send it out to the wider world…
The United States (and the Trump administration) came out well. The would saw a measured response that showed US willingness to follow up words with actions, while also showing that Trump’s rash tweets do not equal rash actions (at least vis-a-vis Russia). Jim Mattis in particular showed that he is the chief voice of reason and restraining figure in the administration.
At the same time, the strikes accomplished little in practical terms. Syria’s ability to make and use chemical weapons was largely unaffected, because what they are using now is chlorine gas, rather than the sarin that was made in its chemical weapons program prior to 2013. Chlorine gas is much easier to make and is almost certainly made at sites other than the ones that were targeted (and even if it was being made there, it can relatively easily be made elsewhere).
For this reason, Syria (and Assad) also came out well. For the price of a few destroyed buildings they got to take over Douma and wipe out the last rebel controlled zone near Damascus. The main question is the extent to which the strikes will deter Assad from using chemical weapons in the future. My guess is that there will be some short-term deterrent effect (because of worries that the next strike will be more damaging), but little long-term effect — because of beliefs that US memories fade and because of cost-benefit calculations that show that use of chemical weapons in certain situations is highly effective in demoralizing enemies and causing them to surrender (see Douma) while also forcing somewhat reluctant allies such as Russia to publicly support Assad.
Russia is a (minor) loser for this round — Russian officials made big loud statements early on, but then clearly got scared of being painted into a corner and started backing off a few days ago. In the end, the situation showed that Russia cannot deter the United States from hitting an ally, but it can limit the extent of the strike and the choice of targets. Also, Syria’s (older) Russian-made air defenses were completely ineffective, while potentially more effective modern air defenses under Russian control were not activated. In other words, the US strikes clearly showed both the extent and the limits of Russian influence in the region. Russian leaders clearly care about this image problem, thus the somewhat ridiculous statements about Syrian air defenses successfully intercepting US missiles supposedly aimed at airfields that the US and its allies did not target.
The military balance in the region is clearly revealed. In a few days, the US and its allies were able to gather a set of forces that are much stronger than what Russia could bring to bear in the region. This is not the early 1970s, when much of the world believed that the Soviet Union could more or less match the maximum US presence in the Eastern Med (even if present-day Russian analysts are skeptical about the actual strength of Russian military forces in the region at the time). The Russian military (in terms of conventional forces) is stronger than it was a few years ago and is more than a match for any of its other adversaries, but it’s still far weaker than the US military.
Finally, the impact of the strike on US domestic politics is pretty certainly going to be short-term and very limited. Some of Trump’s isolationist allies on the far right were appalled and highly critical, but they will come back to the fold soon enough since they have no alternative to supporting Trump. What’s more, Democratic politicians’ critiques that the attack should not have been done without Congressional authorization are not likely to last long, because actually having that debate in Congress is not in their interest politically (which way to vote — to authorize Trump to use force or to allow other countries to carry out chemical weapons attacks with impunity?). Better to just carp from the sidelines on this issue and go back to the various scandals after a couple of days.
So, to sum up, the world avoided a big international crisis through a combination of US restraint, Russian desire to avoid escalation in a situation where it did not have escalation dominance, and good use of US-Russian deconfliction channels. The strike itself was not particularly effective at achieving its stated goals vis-a-vis Syria, but was good at signaling US intent and capabilities for the future (including the limits of that intent). The major problem that remains is that given what I described above, Assad is unlikely to have been deterred from future use of chemical weapons and therefore we may well be back in the same place again a few months or a year from now.
Britain’s Royal Navy currently uses Seawolf missiles as the primary air defense system for its Type 23 frigates. They’re updated versions of a missile that was used during the 1982 Falklands War, but modern threats demand more. Britain also needs to equip its Type 26/27 Global Combat Ship frigate replacements, and could use an option that raises the number of air defense missiles carried by its Type 45 air defense destroyers.
The answer to all of these problems is being developed as one component of Britain’s GBP 4 billion, 10-year “Team Complex Weapons” partnership with MBDA. It’s a quad-packable, intermediate-range air defense missile with its own active radar guidance, which re-uses a number of features and technologies from British fighter jets’ AIM-132 ASRAAM short-range air-to-air missile. Not only will it serve on British ships, but it’s set to field as an Army air defense missile, and may even fly on future British fighters.
A quick terminology note: FLAADS, the Future Low-Altitude Air Defense System, is the British designation for the program as a whole, which is projected to involve FLAADS (M) at sea, and FLAADS (L) on land. CAMM is the missile, which MBDA uses as a general base reference, but they sometimes mention “CAMM-M” and “CAMM-L” specifically. The naval CAMM-M version and its integration with ship systems is marketed globally under the name “Sea Ceptor”.
CAMM: Performance and Positioning CAMM-M launchThe CAMM missile’s range remains vague. Reports have cited 500 square nautical mile coverage, which amounts to a 12.6 nmi circle. That’s acceptable for a point defense replacement, but MBDA refers to air defense at ranges “greater than 25 km”, as well as effectiveness against threats riding on the water. That would give it more versatility than the Seawolf missiles it will replace, and a range that compares very favorably with short-range peers like IAI/RAFAEL’s Barak-1, Denel’s Umkhonto, and MBDA’s Crotale NG that sit in the 15 km/ 8 nmi or less range.
MBDA’s response to the saturation threat was to use active homing radar guidance and a 2-way datalink for the missile, removing any strain on limited radar illuminators. It’s similar to Raytheon’s approach with the much longer-range and more sophisticated SM-6, but in a simpler, more limited, and cheaper design. The SM-6 will be able to use the ship’s more powerful radar as an option, and be cued by other vessels over the horizon, but Sea Ceptor can’t do those things. The ship’s radar sees the incoming threat, the CAMM missile is fired, the datalink updates the missile with the current location of the threat, and CAMM’s own seeker takes over once it’s close enough.
A wide variety of ships could make good use of a missile like that, especially a missile that doesn’t need ultra-sophisticated ship radars and illuminators/ trackers in order to be effective. MBDA’s use of a piston-driven “soft launch” approach removes another big obstacle to integration on small ships like corvettes or FAC (Fast Attack Craft), widening the potential market even further. On the software and hardware end, MBDA is reportedly re-using a number of elements from the high-end PAAMS system that equips advanced British, French and Italian anti-aircraft destroyers.
Within the global market, CAMM-M/ Sea Ceptor seems to fit somewhere in between short-range bolt-on naval defense systems like MBDA’s Crotale or Raytheon’s RAM; and medium-range vertical-launch missiles like MBDA’s Aster-15 or Raytheon’s RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow. That’s actually a pretty useful niche. It encompasses the main danger zone for saturation anti-ship missile attacks, which threaten to overwhelm the targeting (illuminator) capabilities of ships that rely on older radar designs and/or semi-active radar homing missiles.
There will always be a temptation for navies to choose medium-range missiles for their superior protection of other ships, and smaller ships in particular create a temptation to default to bolt-on defenses. If budgets don’t allow more expensive missiles, or navies decide that a smaller ship needs to do better than point defenses, Sea Ceptor’s main competitor will be MBDA’s own VL-MICA IIR/ARH missile family.
CAMM Platforms: Sea, Land, and Air VL SeawolfIn 2013, Britain confirmed its Type 23 Duke Class frigates, its forthcoming Type 26 frigates, and its Type 45 Daring Class air defense destroyers as the missile’s initial platforms. The Type 23 Duke Class will be the 1st in-service platform, with refits taking place from 2015 – 2021.
MBDA has confirmed to DID that the naval Sea Ceptor will be packed into Type 23 Seawolf vertical launch tubes as a 1 for 1 replacement. Reports also indicate that the missile is designed to be quad-packed into DCNS SYLVER A50/A70 launchers on ships like Britain’s Type 45 destroyers, or in American Mk.41 tactical/strike length cells in common use by navies around the world.
That capability will be an especial help to the Type 45 Daring Class air defense destroyers, whose single-packed SYLVER A50 VLS cells left them with a low number of carried anti-aircraft missiles compared to their global peers. Giving up 12 Aster-15/30 missiles to get 36 Asters and 48 CAMM-Ms is a good trade. Fortunately, heavy FLAADS (M) re-use of elements from the Type 45’s PAAMS combat & launch system should make integration relatively simple.
Compatibility with the globally popular Mk.41 Vertical Launch System under an MBDA/Lockheed Martin MoU opens an even wider market for Sea Ceptor. New Zealand’s ANZAC Class frigates are the first example, with refits beginning in 2016. Britain’s Type 26 frigates haven’t officially settled on their vertical launch system, so they’re also a potential beneficiary.
Typhoon fires ASRAAMOn land, FLAADS (L) would use the CAMM missile packed onto a truck mounted container, plus a containerized command and control cabin. Because the missile carries its own radar, FLAADS fire units aren’t sold with their own radars, just a secure MBDA-developed datalink. Fielding requires integration of the FLAADS (L) command module with existing air defense systems for cueing. This may seem like a limitation, but it actually makes the system quite dangerous. The fire units don’t have an emitting radar to give their location away and attract enemy attacks, and cueing from a variety of radar and non-radar assets makes it very difficult to silence the missile battery.
A FLAADS (L) prototype was rolled out in the summer of 2009, and is still under development. CAMM-L is cued as the future replacement for Britain’s Rapier missile batteries, but it will be a few years before it’s ready to be exported.
Future years may also see a CAMM-A successor to the AIM-132 ASRAAM, flying on British fighters. ASRAAM is currently guided by imaging infrared, but there are already air-to-air missiles, like the medium-range Russian AA-10 and French MICA, that come in both radar and IR versions. Short-range missiles haven’t used radar guidance over the last couple of decades, but giant strides in fighter radar capabilities, and the CAMM design’s long range for its class, make this a thinkable future option.
Contracts & Key Events 2015-2018Sea Ceptor hardware delivered to Royal Navy for HMS Argyll;(L).
CAMM conceptApril 16/18: Potential Sale-Finland Missile consortium MBDA is looking to sell its Sea Ceptor naval air defense system to Finland as part of efforts to help arm the latter’s fleet of Squadron 2020 corvettes. The firm’s offer is based on its Common Anti-air Modular Missile (CAMM), and is being made through the three companies—Atlas Elektronik, Lockheed Martin Canada and Saab—currently on the short list to supply the combat management system to the Finnish authorities. Speaking to Defense News, Paul Stanley, MBDA vice president for northern Europe, said that bidders for the CMS deal will propose an “air defense system as part of a package, with recommendations,” after which Finnish authorities will then “make a selection.” That indirect approach in the tender leaves the missile maker relying on the combat systems integrator, which is expected to offer Raytheon’s Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) and Barak from Israel, he said. The Sea Ceptor system has already been certified and installed on three of the British Royal Navy’s Type 23 frigates and will be installed on the service’s next generation Type 26 and Type 31 frigates. Exports have also been secured for new Zealand, Chile, and Brazil, while Spain is also looking to conduct a study for its own Sea Ceptor package. MBDA has also teamed with Lockheed Martin to develop a lightweight version of the MK41 launcher for CAMM, known as the extensible lightweight launcher (ExLS), which is intended to fit on smaller naval vessels.
April 13/18: Qualification Testing-ExLS European missile consortium MBDA and Lockheed Martin have successfully completed qualification testing of the Common Anti-air Modular Missile (CAMM) from Lockheed’s Extensible Launching System (ExLS) 3-Cell Stand Alone Launcher. MBDA’s Common Anti-air Modular Missile (CAMM) is a highly compact missile that enables multiple weapons to be fitted in limited spaces. It is the most modern air defence missile of its class on the market and has recently completed a highly successful series of firings by the British Royal Navy. The ExLS allows CAMM to come in a quad-pack arrangement which allows to store and fire 4 missiles from a single cell and is specifically designed for use on smaller naval platforms that are unable to accommodate the larger 8-cell MK 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS). A MBDA press release said the qualification tests took place in the UK towards the end of 2017.
December 22/17: Milestone-FoC Firing Trials Missile consortium MBDA announced Wednesday, the successful completion by the British Royal Navy of the final First of Class firing trials of the new Sea Ceptor air defence system. Testing was conducted onboard the HMS Argyll where the system was tested against more complex scenarios, including rapidly engaging multiple simultaneous threats. Sea Ceptor will now be rolled out on other Type 23 Frigates, and the first of a series of installation test firings have already been completed on HMS Westminster. The system will take over from the legacy Sea Wolf system, and will allow for frigates installed with the platform to protect other vessels in conjunction with itself. It utilizes the Common Anti-air Modular Missile (CAMM), which doubles the range of Sea Wolf, and its active radar-seeker allows the missile to engage targets without the need for complex and costly target illuminators.
September 21/15: MBDA has completed a final set of qualification firings of the company’s Common Anti-air Module Munition (CAMM) missile in Sweden, ahead of planned testing next year by Lockheed Martin for the 3-Cell ExLS Stand Alone Launcher designed to fire the missile. The European missile manufacturer has also begun delivering Sea Ceptor hardware to the Royal Navy for installation on HMS Argyll, with the air defense system intended to modernize the aging Type 23 frigate by replacing the Seawolf system currently fitted. The CAMM missile forms part of the Sea Ceptor system, along with advanced targeting sensors. The system is also capable of receiving targeting data from a third party, allowing it to form part of a comprehensive air defense network.
2014New Zealand, Brazil buy Sea Ceptor; Another development contract for FLAADS (L).
Nov. 28/14: Brazil. MBDA announces that the Brazilian Navy has become its 2nd export customer. The missiles will equip the next generation Tamandare (CV03) corvettes. This class is derived from the homegrown Barroso class, with 4 ships planned for delivery starting in 2019. Brazil’s Navy is also handling coast guard duties, and during peacetime one of the corvettes’ missions is to control and protect offshore oil platforms. Vard’s site in Niteroi was selected in early 2014 to work on preliminary design, even though the yard was known to face problems in recruiting qualified personnel and was working on several delayed deliveries. The contract’s value or timetable were not disclosed. Sources: MBDA; Brazilian Navy; MarineLog.
Brazil
May 29 – June 5/14: Testing. Sea Ceptor’s 1st full live fire tests are successful. The firings are conducted at Sweden’s land-based Vidsel range, using the 2-way datalink and the missile’s active seeker head to intercept both targets. Sources: MBDA, “MBDA’s First Sea Ceptor Firings Are A Double Success”.
May 21/14: New Zealand. The New Zealand Ministry of Defence signs a contract with MBDA for Sea Ceptor missiles (q.v. Oct 7/13), as part of Royal New Zealand Navy’s ANZAC Frigate Systems Upgrade (FSU) project. The missiles will replace obsolete semi-active guidance RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missiles in the frigates’ Mk.41 Vertical Launch Systems. Sources: MBDA, “New Zealand Contract Signed for MBDA’s Sea Ceptor”.
New Zealand Contract
May 1/14: Land. MBDA receives a GBP 36 million contract from the UK Ministry of Defence for FLAADS-Land’s Assessment Phase. It will demonstrate the adaptation and evolution of core command & control systems for the land environment, while integrating the missile into truck-mounted and fixed defensive options to replace Britain’s Rapiers.
FLAADS – Land Assessment Phase
2012 – 2013UK Demonstration phase & Production phase contracts; New Zealand picks CAMM to upgrade ANZAC frigates; UK to begin Type 23 frigate refits in 2015; Mk.41 VLS test-launch succeeds.
ExLS/Mk.41 launchOct 28/13: UK. UK secretary of state for defence Philip Dunne answers a Parliamentary question by saying that Sea Ceptor refits on the Type 23 frigates will be installed as part of their long-term refit program. That program will also outfit the ships with new Artisan 3D radars and other equipment, and refits are scheduled to run from 2015 – 2021. Sources: Portsmouth’s The News, “Frigates to be fitted with new missiles from 2015”.
Oct 7/13: New Zealand. The Royal New Zealand Navy will upgrade its 2 ANZAC Class frigates with MBDA’s CAMM/ Sea Ceptor for air defense, rather than following Australia’s ANZAC upgrade and replacing the ship’s RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missiles with Raytheon’s RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow.
New Zealand is the 1st Sea Ceptor export customer, and they’re also the 1st customer to benefit from MBDA and Lockheed Martin’s MoU (q.v. May 15/13) around the Mark 41 Vertical Launch System.
New Zealand’s air defense upgrade is expected to be cheaper than Australia’s, and is also expected to be cheaper per missile, while providing a different set of performance advantages in the short term. CAMM’s active guidance is currently an advantage compared to the RIM-162 ESSM missiles aboard upgraded Australian ANZACs, in exchange for shorter range. Both missile types can be quad-packed, giving their 8-cell Mk.41 vertical launchers a maximum load of 32 air defense missiles. The trade-off is that Australia’s ESSMs can use the ship’s more powerful radar for guidance, in exchange for additional work tying the missile into the frigate’s combat system. ESSM Block 2 will probably add an active guidance option, erasing CAMM’s edge and retaining longer range, but that isn’t even in the design stage yet. Sources: MBDA, Oct 7/13 release.
RNZN picks Sea Ceptor
Sept 10/13: Testing. CAMM has a successful launch test from a Lockheed Martin ExLS vertical launcher, using MBDA’s piston-driven cold launch approach. This is the first test under the May 2013 MoU between the 2 firms.
ExLS is a quad-pack insert for Mk.41 Vertical Launch System cells, but the release also describes a “3-cell stand-alone ExLS CAMM launcher” that can be used on smaller ships. MBDA’s cold launch technology is a big plus in that market. The missile’s is launched high by piston, then pitched toward horizontal by small mid-body maneuvering thrusters before the main rocket motor ignites. That allows for bolt-on naval solutions, without worrying about about launch flames damaging surrounding equipment. Sources: MBDA, Sept 12/13 release.
Sept 10/13: Production. The UK Ministry of Defence announces the 1st CAMM production contract: GBP 250 million (about $393 million) for the Sea Ceptor/ CAMM-M. Final assembly will take place at MBDA’s Lostock facility, with 9 Tier-1 subcontractors distributed across sites in England and Scotland.
Sea Ceptor is being delivered under the Team Complex Weapons Portfolio Management Agreement, which will create a common missile stockpile for a future planned land system.
The UK’s announcement of the missile’s platforms is equally significant. Sea Ceptor will be retrofitted to Type 23 Duke Class frigates beginning in 2016, serve aboard the forthcoming Type 26 frigate as its primary air defense system – and complement the Aster missiles on the Royal Navy’s Type 45 destroyers. Sources: UK MoD, Sept 10/13 release | MBDA, Sept 9/13 release.
Production contract & Platforms
Sept 10/13: IMU. MBDA is working with United Technologies’ UTC Aerospace to create a MEMS-based Inertial Measurement Unit for use in its missiles guidance, navigation & control system. Current IMU technologies use higher-cost options like fiber optics, and a Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems unit has the potential to be smaller, weigh less, and cost less. The joint project will be backward-compatible with an existing UTC Aerospace Systems MEMS IMU, which may make upgrades simpler.
A CAMM Missile picture is shown on MBDA’s release, and it would be a logical platform for the new technology. Sources: MBDA, Sept 10/13 release.
May 15/13: MBDA MoU. MBDA signs an MoU with Lockheed Martin Lockheed Martin that has the potential to shake up the naval missile industry. It sounds innocuous: both companies agree to jointly explore the market for the integration of MBDA naval missile systems into Lockheed Martin’s MK-41 Vertical Launch System, and ExLS VLS/cell insert. They’ll begin with a late 2013 demonstration involving Britain’s new CAMM-M Sea Ceptor missile.
The implications reach far beyond CAMM. Britain has already been considering adding a set of Mk-41 cells to the Type 45 destroyer, in order to hold SM-3 ballistic missile defense missiles. Adding CAMM to those cells would make the drop-in even more attractive, by giving the Type 45s two things they don’t currently have: snap-launch anti-submarine defenses (VL-ASROC), and a larger array of air defense missiles (quad-packed CAMM). Beyond Britain, MBDA has a wide array of naval missiles, and adding those missiles to the Mk-41 would give that VLS overwhelming dominance in the global naval market. Read “CAMM Opener for the Naval Missile Market: MBDA & LMCO’s MoU” for full coverage.
April 5/13: Sub-contractors. MBDA and Thales tout growing cooperation with lead firm MBDA on CAMM-related projects. Thales Belfast, which works on other missiles like the RB57 NLAW, is working on assessing and modeling heat management within the CAMM missile, structural analysis, and precision manufacturing of some missile components. It’s just GBP 1 million in business so far, but could become GBP 8 million of manufacturing work in the next phase. Meanwhile, Thales’ Basingstroke site is working on missile safety design, arming units, and intelligent fuzes.
The larger goal is a single overall enabling contract between the 2 firms, which will make it easier to place work with Thales. The 2 firms are also looking at the support opportunity created by the British Army’s decision to bring all of its current air defense assets together at Thorney Island. Thales | MBDA.
January 2012: Sub-contractors. MBDA picks Thales Basingstoke to supply the CAMM laser proximity fuze, under a GBP 11 million contract. Source.
Jan 30/12: Sea Ceptor. The UK MoD issues MBDA a GBP 483 million FLAADS (Future Local Area Air Defence System) Demonstration Phase Contract, which would develop the newly-named “Sea Ceptor” to replace the Vertical Launch Seawolf, and serve on the forthcoming Type 26 frigates. UK MoD | MBDA | British Forces News (incl. video) | Aviation Week.
Sea Ceptor demonstration phase
2006 – 2011Team Complex Weapons partnership launched, CAMM development included.
FLAADS-L CAMM testSept 13/11: MBDA provides a progress report on early FLAADS-M development:
“Significant achievements are being made in all areas, notably with the development of the FLAADS Command and Control system (featuring greater than 75% re-use of Sea Viper C2 software) and the development of the FLAADS Platform Data Link, both of which are already undergoing trials in MBDA development facilities… The maturity of the CAMM missile design has been shown in a number of important trials in recent months. The novel Soft Vertical Launch concept has been conclusively proven in a number of trials, culminating in a successful ejection and turnover trial that took place on 20th May at MBDA’s Bedfordshire facility… from a truck platform, providing direct read-across to the FLAADS-L programme. Significant progress has also been made with the CAMM RF seeker development, with a series of successful air carry trials having taken place earlier this year.”
March 29/10: The UK and MBDA sign an initial GBP 330 million “Team Complex Weapons Interim Main Gate 1 Partnering Agreement.” One of its items is “Assessment Phase work on… Future Local Area Air Defence System (FLAADS) to equip the Royal Navy’s Future Surface Combatant.” MBDA.
TCW Main Gate 1
Aug 7/09: FLAADS (L). MBDA rolls out its first land-based prototype of the UK’s nascent Future Local Area Air Defence System (FLAADS) at a demonstration to its British Army customer. Janes.
FLAADS(L) prototype
June 2008: Team Complex Weapons is launched as a partnership between the UK Ministry of Defence, MBDA UK, Thales UK, QinetiQ and Roxel UK Ltd. A GBP 250 million Assessment Phase sees its first contract, as GBP 74 million first-year deal for 6 projects, including FLAAD. MBDA [PDF] | QinetiQ.
Team Complex Weapons
July 2006: The UK MoD signals a new approach to fulfilling the UK’s military requirement for Complex Weapons in response to the 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS). The DIS states that missile design is one of the technology elements that Britain must keep in-country. Raytheon makes overtures through its Raytheon UK subsidiary, but it eventually becomes clear that the UK MoD is only interested in MBDA.
Additional ReadingsCompetitors are listed alphabetically by missile name. All are radar-guided, except for Denel’s Umkhonto wich uses Imaging Infrared (IIR), and VL MICA which has the option of IIR or Active Radar Homing.
Special Operations Command’s AC-130H/U gunships can lay down withering hails of accurate fire, up to and including 105mm howitzer shells, in order to support ground troops.
The Marines also wanted heavy aircraft that could support their Leathernecks on the ground. The bad news was that the Corps could field about 45 KC-130J aerial tankers for the price of a 12-plane AC-130J squadron. Lighter options like the AC-27J “Stinger II” would probably tally similar costs, once R&D dollars were distributed among such a small fleet. Could the Marines change tack, and offer a modular weapon package that would let them arm their existing tankers as needed? Could armed KC-130Js offer limited fire support, while loitering over the battlefield and using their unique speed envelope to refuel helicopters and fast jets alike? The Harvest Hercules Airborne Weapons Kit (HAWK) program aims to do just that. It gives the USMC a far less capable convertible gunship option in Afghanistan, but the cost is about 2 orders of magnitude below a dedicated gunship fleet. Unsurprisingly, the next service to show interest in this concept was SOCOM itself.
The Marines’ initial Harvest HAWK plan is to field 3 kits, but the eventual plan is to have 3 roll-on/ roll-off kits per squadron. That would mean about 9 kits by 2011, and 12 kits when the last KC-130T aerial refueling squadron converts to KC-130Js after 2012. All USMC KC-130Js are expected to receive the wiring needed to carry the kits, which will be improved and refined over time.
Harvest HAWK Capability I involves a roll-on/roll-off set of surveillance displays and fire control electronics, plus “Blue Force Tracker” to keep tabs on friendly troops, and ROVER to communicate with them. Outside the cabin, a modular surveillance and targeting unit takes up the rear portion of the inboard left external fuel tank, or may simply be mounted below that tank as a surveillance turret. The sensor choice was said to involve 2 candidates. Lockheed Martin’s AN/AAQ-30 TSS, which is also used in the Marines’ AH-1Z attack helicopter and has been installed in some SOCOM AC-130s, won. L-3 Wescam’s popular MX-15 surveillance and targeting turret was the competitor, but competing against the Harvest Hawk’s integrator is not a promising position.
Harvest HAWK Capability II involves mounting an M299 missile rack for 4 AGM-114P Hellfires and/or up to 16 DAGR laser-guided 70mm rockets to the left wing, in place of the left-hand outboard aerial refueling pod. This leaves the left wing carrying the weapons and some fuel, while the right wing retains full aerial refueling capabilities. Capability IV (see below) was also moved up, and the 10-tube rear ramp “Gunslinger” system and precision weapons were effectively added to this increment.
After early testing for Capabilities I & II took place, initial orders and testing followed. Deployment to Afghanistan started in summer 2010.
M230 30mmHarvest HAWK Capability III involves a modular 30mm cannon linked to the fire control, which is expected to be rolled in and mounted in the troop door. Daniel Watters of The Gun Zone writes to say that the Marines’ choice of 30mm gun is interesting, and explains the tradeoffs:
“While the Mk 44 Bushmaster II [30x173mm] and M230 Chain Gun [30x113mm] are both nominally 30mm, their cartridges are very different…There is a major difference in size, power, and range. The Mk 44 Bushmaster II has already been adopted by the US Navy and USMC for other applications… The 30x173mm uses a heavier projectile with a larger explosive filling, and is fired at a higher velocity [which] should have a noticeable maximum range advantage. Perhaps it would be easier to fabricate a stable mount for the less powerful M230 than the Mk 44… M230 and its ammunition are also lighter and more compact.”
US Special Forces tried fitting 30mm cannon to their AC-130U “Spooky” gunships, but found that the gun’s accuracy level wasn’t suited to their missions. In response, they implemented a “retrograde” to their earlier 25mm and 40mm weapons. The Marines say that the 30mm cannon will suit their objectives. Time will tell, but either way, the lack of pinpoint-accurate, extreme-volume gunfire will be one of the principal differences between SOCOM’s AC-130s, and kit gunships like the KC-130Js or MC-130Ws.
Capability III has yet to even select a gun at this point, much less test and integrate one. According to US Navy NAVAIR: “…capability III [will begin] when funding becomes available.” ATK finalized a roll-on/off palletized kit for the GAU-23 cannon in mid-2012, which may help funding become available.
Viper StrikeCapability IV originally involved adding additional Standoff Precision Guided Munitions (SOPGMs) to the Harvest HAWK, but that got moved ahead to Capability II. They’re dropped out of a 10-tube “Gunslinger” launcher that fits on the rear ramp, but their future involves a new pressurized “Derringer Door”. That 10-tube launcher switches in for the regular paratroop door, allowing Harvest HAWK planes to drop weapons without depressurizing the cabin, and/or asking those inside to don oxygen masks.
Efforts were already underway to incorporate and test Northrop Grumman’s (now MBDA’s) GBU-44 Viper Strike laser/GPS-guided weapons on the KC-130Js, and they were under consideration by SOCOM for its AC-130s. Raytheon’s small “Griffin” missiles were also added. The rocket-powered Griffin B can replace Hellfires on an M299 launcher, on 3 for 1 basis. For the C-130 fleet, however, the unpowered, gravity-dropped Griffin A seems to be the mainstay. Other weapons are likely, especially from US SOCOM. One weapon they have confirmed funding for is Textron’s cylindrical 64-pound C-LAW, whose airburst devastates soft ground targets over an area the size of a football field.
Specifics regarding additional weapon plans are thin at the moment, but other options could conceivably include 81mm or larger mortars, using General Dynamics’ RCFC GPS guidance kits; tiny missiles like the NAVAIR/DRS Spike; and spinoffs from the explosion of small precision-guided bombs entering the market: Lockheed Martin’s Scorpion, MBDA’s Saber, etc. Later Harvest HAWK phases will reportedly add stations for Hellfire laser-guided missiles on both wings, instead of just the port wing. The M299 launchers would be mounted on the outside of the plane’s outboard aerial refueling pods.
US AFSOC: MC-130W Combat Spear/ Stinger II MC-130W Combat SpearA similar effort is emerging from US Special Operations Command.
US Navy NAVAIR PMA-207 has been working with US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to share information on Harvest Hawk, and a US SOCOM program is now converting its MC-130W Combat Spear aircraft along Harvest Hawk lines. Similar kits could also be fielded for SOCOM’s forthcoming HC-130J Combat King II and MC-130J Combat Shadow IIs, and they may even spread beyond that.
MC-130W. In the near term, their MC-130Ws are newly-converted C-130H aircraft, with 12 delivered as combat replacements from 2006-2011. MC-130W base roles include infiltration/ exfiltration of special operations teams, aerial refueling including combat search-and-rescue support, and psychological operations. Key additions above the based C-130H include a strengthened tail to cope with low-level drops; improved avionics and navigation that integrates GPS, AN/APN-241 radar, and AN/AAQ-38 Infrared systems; a full suite of top-of-the-line threat detection and countermeasures gear; and a communication suite that includes satellite communications with data burst, making it hard for enemies to locate the plane by tracking its transmissions. A UARRSI dorsal receptacle lets any boom-equipped aerial tanker refuel it in the air, while the MC-130W can itself act as a refueler for hose-and-drogue equipped aircraft or helicopters, using its Mk 32B-902E refueling pods.
The other difference from previous AFSOC gunships involved precision ranged weapons. MC-130Ws will have a 4-rail wing-mount for laser-guided AGM-114P Hellfire missiles or 70mm laser-guided DAGR rockets, and a 10-tube “Gunslinger” system that can launch small precision-guided weapons.
“Gunslinger”All 12 MC-130Ws will soon be converting to “Project Dragon Spear” aircraft, which add roll-on, roll-off kits featuring added sensors, communications systems, the Adaptive Carriage Environment (ACE), and weapons. Some sources refer to those as “AC-130W,” but the official USAF designation remains MC-130W.
Dragon Spear weapons will include a GAU-23 dual-feed 30mm gun with about 500 rounds, with the assembly bolted to the floor of the plane. It fires single shots or short bursts, instead of the “wall of lead” that’s associated with an AC-130H/U gunship, or the Vietnam-era C-47 “Puff the Magic Dragon” whose upgraded descendants still serve in Colombia and Indonesia.
The MC-130W represents an acquisition departure for SOCOM, who stood up its 1st Joint Acquisition Task Force in June 2009 to handle the initial MC-130W conversion and buy. The project had a minimum capability model in less than 90 days, and deployed a working aircraft within 18 months. The experience has gone well enough that SOCOM is reportedly considering using JATFs on other projects.
It has also led to a shift in mindset, wherein a government-owned “Precision Strike Package” will sit at the core of SOCOM’s new gunships.
AC-130J. Up to 32 new AC-130Js are now expected to serve alongside the 12 new AC-130W Dragon Spears, replacing existing AC-130H/Us. Initially, the AC-130Js will use roll on/off kits from the Dragon Spear project in an HC-130J airframe. Eventually, they’ll install their own “Precision Strike Package” that includes a side-firing 30mm GAU-23A chain gun, wing-mounted GBU-39 GPS-guided SDB-I bombs, and laser-guided AGM-176 Griffin missiles launched from a “Gunslinger” attachment on the read cargo door. It may eventually add a side-firing 105mm howitzer like existing AC-130H/Us, and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles like the Marines’ KC-130J Harvest Hawks, but those aren’t currently funded. These weapons will be controlled from a dual-console Mission Operator Pallet in the cargo bay, which will include multiple video, data, and communication links.
Contracts & Key EventsUnless otherwise indicated, these contracts are managed by US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD.
FY 2015 – 2018KC-130J Harvest Hawk upgrade plans.
KC-130J-HH, Kandahar
April 16/18: More money needed for lasers Speaking at a hearing of the US Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging threats, Air Force Lt. Gen. Marshall Webb told lawmakers that the service still lacks adequate funds for a program to add a laser to the AC-130J gunship. The Head of Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Webb was answering a question from Sen. Martin Heinrich on why the service is moving slowly from testing a four-kilowatt laser to a 30-kilowatt version and now directly to a 60-kilowatt laser. “We’re $58 million short of having a full program that would get us a 60-kilowatt laser flying on an AC-130 by 2022,” Webb stated. In February, Webb told a roundtable discussion with reporters at the Air Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposium in Orlando, Florida, that the “challenge on having the laser is funding.”
March 23/18: Logistics support Sierra Nevada has been contracted by the US Air Force to provide logistics support for two USAF aircraft precision strike packages of weapons and sensors. Nearing a value just shy of $20 million, the order exercises options on a previous contract to provide additional services to AC-130J and AC-130W aircraft, bringing the total value of the contract to $72.3 million. Work will be carried out at Canon Air Force Base, in Curry County, New Mexico, and Hurlburt Air Force Base in Okaloosa County, Florida. Work is expected to wrap up by March 31, 2019. The AC-130J Ghostrider is a gunship that gained its initial operational capability (IOC) in September 2017 and will replace the AC-130H once enough crews are trained to operate them, while the AC-130W, AKA the Stinger II, has been flying since 2010 and is a highly modified C-130H.
July 4/17: Dynetics has been contracted by the USAF to deliver 70 GBU-69/B Small Glide Munitions (SGMs), with options to buy 30 more. With a value of $10.9 million, the missiles are reportedly scheduled to be installed on AC-130 aircraft operated by the service. Dynetics’ Stand-Off Precision Guided Munition (SOPGM) beat out competition from Textron’s G-CLAW, Raytheon’s Griffin and Northrop Grumman’s Viper Strike munition, as is was the only one of the competitors to satisfy the competition’s full requirements.
December 7/15: The US Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and US Navy are to collaborate on the development of a laser mounted weapon for the AC-130 aircraft. The move comes as the Navy has been developing and researching energy directed weapons with their Laser Weapon System, which saw deployment aboard the Afloat Forward Staging Base USS Ponce last year. The lasers success will be the basis for a cooperation between the two branches, and how this can aid the development of a similar system for aircraft. The AC-130 will conceivably see a miniaturized version of the one used on the USS Ponce, and possess both offensive and defensive capabilities. It is hoped the lasers will help gunships disable enemy systems and improve identification of targets on the ground. This would avoid incidents such as the bombing of the Doctors Without Borders hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan in October.
Nov 3/14: KC-130J USMC Plan. The USMC’s Aviation Plan to 2030 [PDF] has its own entry for the KC-130J Harvest Hawk, which currently uses AGM-114P2A Hellfire, AGM-176B Griffin, and GBU-44 Viper Strike precision weapons:
“MROC Decision 19-2012 reduced the total kit inventory objective from 9 kits to 6 kits with 3 kits each going to 2d MAW and 3d MAW. A total of 10 aircraft are modified to employ the Harvest Hawk kits with 5 modified aircraft in 2d MAW and 5 modified aircraft in 3d MAW. Beginning in 2015, the mission kit will receive sensor and fire control system upgrades to address system obsolescence and eliminate deficiencies, while sustaining relevancy through transition from P2A hellfire to the P4 Hellfire.”
2017 will kick off a slew of improvements, from the Software Reprogrammable Payload (SRP) radio replacement; to Hellfire missile upgrades as noted above; to a switch from the AAQ-30 TSS surveillance and targeting turret used on USMC AH-1Zs, to the MX-20 used on Navy P-8A sea control aircraft. It will also begin to replace the Fire Control Station with a Mission Operator Pallet like the AC-130J’s. Blue Force Tracker battlefield management is already on board the Harvest Hawks, and its Link-16 aerial counterpart will begin retrofits in FY 2018, along with other fleet-wide C-130J Block 7.0/8.1 upgrades like Mode 5 IFF, GPS approach capability, ADS-B (out), RNP/RNAV, and a new flight management system. FY 2019 will see the beginning of JAGM missile integration, offering a dual-mode radar/laser-guided option beside the laser-only AGM-114P4 Hellfire.
FY 2013 – 2014AC-130J flies; AC-130J details; Hellfires for AC-130W; DOT&E report re: SOCOM’s fleet highlights an armoring problem.
AC-130JMay 22/14: AC-130 Upgrades. At the annual SOFIC conference, SOCOM’s systems acquisition manager for standoff precision-guided munitions, Erich Borgstede, says that they are just beginning to fit AGM-114 Hellfire missiles on the AC-130W/Js. They’ve also developed a laser-guided small diameter bomb [SDB-I is a 250 pound GPS-only weapon] that will be fielded this summer.
“According to slides presented at the briefing, SOCOM is also looking at the potential of using helmet mounted displays, digital map upgrades, and using mobile devices to help do mission planning in the near future.”
Those changes would also apply to their HC/MC-130 fleet. Sources: Defense News, “SOCOM soon getting more capable, deadlier Ospreys and C-130s”.
March 28/14: AC-130W support. Sierra Nevada Corp. in Sparks, NV receives a sole-source $14 million firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for contractor logistics support of the AC-130W’s precision strike package. Contractor logistics support employees also deploy with aircraft in support of special operations Missions.
$10.9 million is committed immediately, using FY 2014 O&M funds. Work will be performed at Cannon Air Force Base, NM, and is expected to be complete March 31/15. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center’s Special Operation Forces Contracting Division, at Robins AFB, GA manages the contract (FA8509-14-C-0001).
Jan 31/14: AC-130J. The USAF flies a fully-converted AC-130J gunship for the 1st time, at Eglin AFB, FL. They also appear to have scaled the program back a bit:
“A total of 32 MC-130J aircraft will be modified for AFSOC as part of a $2.4 billion AC-130J program to grow the future fleet, according to Capt. Greg Sullivan, the USSOCOM AC-130J on-site program manager at Det. 1.”
The Pentagon’s recently-released DOT&E report for FY 2013 had placed the AC-130J program at 37 aircraft. Sources: USAF, “New AC-130J completes first test flight”.
AC-130J flies
Jan 28/14: DOT&E Testing Report. The Pentagon releases the FY 2013 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). Their focus is on US SOCOM’s variants: HC-130J/MC-130J Combat King II CSAR/ Commando II transports, and AC-130J “Ghostrider” gunships. The USAF intends to field 37 HC-130J Combat King IIs developed to Increment 2 capability, 57 MC-130J Commando IIs developed to Increment 3 capability, and 37 AC-130J Ghostrider gunships that will be converted from MC-103Js (TL: 94 MC-130Js produced).
The AC-130J program conducted a Preliminary Design Review in March 2013 and a Critical Design Review in August 2013, and 1st flight was expected in January 2014. The PSP weapon set is planned in 3 increments, and both development and the Live Fire Alternative Test Plan (ATP) will leverage some data from the C-130H-based AC-130W. The core problem across this fleet involves the enhanced electrical system and in 400 Amp power supply, which is required for Increment 3 upgrades and AC-130J gunship conversions. At present, the fleet is limited to a 200 Amp system. This was also concerning:
“Armor requirements and the amount of armor differ significantly between the AC-130U and AC-130J aircraft. The AC-130U armor was designed to provide protection to the aircrew stations, personnel, ammunition, and critical systems against a single 37 mm high-explosive incendiary round at a range of 10,000 feet, while the AC-130J’s primary crewmember positions and oxygen supplies should be protected against single 7.62 mm ball projectile at 100 meters [DID: just 330 feet, where bullet velocity is higher] …. The planned armor layout on the AC-130J does not include the Mission Operator Pallet, which should be considered a “primary crewmember” position and protected in accordance with the associated Force Protection Key Performance Parameter (KPP).”
The 37mm criterion isn’t random: most AC-130 kills over Vietnam involved 37mm guns. It isn’t rare for gunships to face enemies that can deploy 14.5mm – 23mm guns, to say nothing of the common .50 cal/ 12.7mm caliber. Even an unarmored C-130J would be a difficult kill for a 12.7mm machine gun. With that said, it sounds like they’ve left the crew nearly unprotected, in an aircraft that’s designed to go where the enemy is shooting. That does require an explanation.
June 4/13: AC-130J Sub-contractors. The AC-130J Ghostrider will be equipped with a configuration of QinetiQ’s enhanced LAST lightweight composite armor. Protection will depend on how much they use, and LAST’s aerial density is 37 kg/m2. Protection up to 7.62mm armor piercing is the minimum useful level, and seems to be the AC-130J’s standard. SOCOM could certainly justify higher levels, especially in critical areas, but they’d rather make the weight tradeoffs in an airplane that’s already packed with heavy gear. Jane’s adds that:
“A total of 37 AC-130J aircraft will replace AFSOC’s eight ageing AC-130H platforms, a significant increase from the 16 originally planned. It is understood that the procurement of the additional platforms will allow the 12 AC-130W Dragon Spear/Stinger II platforms currently performing gunship duties to revert back to their baseline MC-130W Combat Spear [multi-role] configuration.”
Sources: QinetiQ NA, “QinetiQ North America’s LAST Armor to Protect C-130 Aircraft” | IHS Jane’s, “New armour for AC-130J gunships”.
March 20/13: Hellfire? US SOCOM fixed-wing PEO Col. Michael Schmidt (USAF) confirms that they’re looking to add AGM-114 Hellfire II missiles to the AC-130W’s “Precision Strike Package,” using F-15 racks mounted on the AC-130W’s hard points. Money has to be found in the budget, but he’s confident that it will happen at some point.
Since the AC-130J Ghostrider will initially be fielded with the same Precision Strike Package, AC-130W integration could end up extending to the new fleet. Sources: Defense Tech, “Air Force set to arm AC-130W with Hellfire missiles”.
Dec 20/12: AC-130W Support. Sierra Nevada Corp. in Sparks, NV receives a $7.9 million contract modification for “logistics support of the Precision Strike Package on the AC-130W aircraft, Stinger II Program.”
The location of the performance is Cannon Air Force Base, NM. Work is expected to be completed by Dec 31/13. The AFLCMC/WIKAA at Robins AFB, GA manages the contract (FA8509-12-C-0001, PO 0006).
FY 2012AC-130J production begins; Griffin, G-CLAW, and GAU-23 weapons; Derringer Door introduced; MC-130W to become Dragon Spear.
“Derringer Door”Aug 27/12: G-CLAW. Textron Defense Systems announces a cooperative research and development agreement (CRADA) with U.S. Special Operations Command’s Program Executive Office – Fixed Wing, focused on Textron Defense Systems’ Guided Clean Area Weapon (G-CLAW). The GPS-guided cylinder will be integrated into SOPGM launch tube dispensers, and receive flight and weapon safety certifications. From there, Textron Defense Systems and USSOCOM will conduct inert and live-fire demonstrations from a tactical carrier aircraft such as the MC-130W Dragon Spear. Integration activities will culminate in an end-to-end, live-fire demonstration.
The 64-pound CLAW was actually designed as a safe sub-munition for cluster bombs, like the GPS-guided CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon. Instead of releasing hockey-puck shaped guided explosives to take out tanks, the entire tube is a weapon, whose air-burst is lethal to troops and unarmored vehicles over an area the size of a football field. A number of safety features ensure that it never becomes an unexploded ordnance hazard.
July 23/12: AC-130J. Production begins in Marietta, GA, but the gunship is actually built as an MC-130J Commando II. It will become an “AC-130J” (vid. Feb 19/12 contract) when it’s equipped with a “Precision Strike Package.” When queried, Lockheed Martin representatives said that:
“The initial contract is to cross-deck the current MC-130W equipment to the new AC-130Js. The PSP referenced here is a new package.”
AC-130J Initial Operating Capability is scheduled for 2015, and AFSOC expects to order 16. Lockheed Martin.
July 9/12: MC-130W. ATK announces that a rapid prototyping effort has created a modified variant of their Mk44 Bushmaster Automatic Cannon for MC-130W Combat Spear aircraft. The 30mm gun is now officially known as the GAU-23, and uses ATK’s PGU-46/B High Explosive Incendiary (HEI) ammunition for its missions.
ATK adds that in June 2011, the U.S. Air Force announced the conversion of 12 of its MC-130W Combat Spear aircraft to the Dragon Spear configuration.
The US Marines may also be interested, now that the technology is mature (vid. Aug 17/11). The MC-130W Dragon Spear will bolt the GAU-23 in, but ATK has developed a Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) pallet and weapons mount for use on other aircraft, like the USMC’s KC-130Js.
May 2012: Naming. The MC-130W Dragon Spear is renamed the AC-130W Stinger II, while the AC-130J picks up the designation “Ghostrider”. Sources: USAF Fact Sheets.
May 14/12: Lockheed Martin in Marietta, GA receives an $18.4 million firm-fixed-price contract that buys 3 Harvest HAWK sets, and pays to modify 7 KC-130Js with Harvest HAWK installations.
Work will be performed in Palmdale, CA (90%), and Marietta, GA (10%), and is expected to be complete in June 2014. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12. This contract was not competitively procured, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2304c1. US Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity (N00019-12-C-0094).
April 16/12: Viper Strike. MBDA announces that its GBU-44/E Viper Strike scored “multiple direct hits”, after being launched from the KC-130J’s new “Derringer Door” during developmental testing at China Lake, CA. Viper Strike also proved out its new fast attack software load, designed to improve performance against time sensitive targets.
Feb 23/12: Derringer Door. US NAVAIR announces successful testing and fielding of a Harvest HAWK “Derringer Door” pressurized launcher, which will be used instead of the “Gunslinger” system on future aircraft. The 10-round set replaces the plane’s paratrooper door, and lets the plane launch small precision-guided munitions like Griffin, without depressurizing the cabin and forcing the crew to use oxygen gear. By freeing up the cargo ramp, it also lets KC-130J Harvest HAWKs continue to perform cargo missions, while keeping the weapon launcher on board.
Like the rest of the Harvest HAWK kit, the Derringer Door system is removable.
Nov 7/11: KC-130J-HH stats. Inside the Navy reports [subscription] on Griffin usage in Afghanistan:
“Less than a year after first introducing it to the fleet, the Marine Corps has already used the Harvest Hawk… to fire 74 Hellfire and 13 Griffin missiles… while also providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, a Marine aviation official said here recently.”
FY 2011KC-130J Harvest Hawk deployment & reports; Scorpion tested; Viper Strike precision munitions bought.
KC-130J Harvest HAWKAug 22/11: Viper Strike. Northrop Grumman announces an unspecified additional contract to deliver “multiple” GBU-44 Viper Strike GPS/laser guided mini glide bombs to the Joint Attack Munition Systems (JAMS) Project Office at Redstone Arsenal, AL. Deliveries will begin in 2011, for eventual integration onto the KC-130J Harvest Hawk. See also June 2/10 entry.
All the Viper Strike munitions on Harvest Hawk will now carry the latest software load, which greatly enhances the weapon’s effectiveness against moving targets. In recent testing at China Lake, CA, Viper Strike scored multiple hits against moving vehicles in various scenarios.
Aug 17/11: KC-130J-HH. The USMC is looking at upgrading its KC-130Js for better close-air support to address known limitations (vid. July 28/11 entry). Maj. Richard Roberts told National Defense magazine the addition of a 30mm GAU-23 cannon to Harvest Hawk is again under consideration, which if confirmed would let the program meet its Capability III milestone. The possibility of this graft was reviewed back in 2009, but the integration tech was deemed too immature back then.
According to National Defense, as of last month the 1 Harvest Hawk deployed in Afghanistan had fired 42 Hellfire and 11 Griffin missiles and identified 8 IEDs. A 2nd unit will soon be rotated in so that the 1st one can be used for training purposes.
July 28/11: KC-130J-HH. The USMC discusses Harvest Hawk operations, noting that the Harvest Hawk contingents don’t yet have close-air support experience, so the Marines are drawing fire-control officers from its F/A-18 Hornet fighter, AV-8B Harrier II fighter, and AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter units. With respect to the aircraft’s usage:
“One Harvest HAWK flew for about 10 hours and fired its entire compliment of Hellfire missiles during combat operations in Afghanistan, March 14. An F/A-18 Hornet can only fly for an hour and thirty minutes without tanker support, according to [VMGR-252 fire control officer Capt. Thane A.] Norman. “Currently, we have a Harvest HAWK temporarily assigned to our detachment with 2nd MAW (Fwd.),” said [VMGR-252 commander Lt. Col. Charles J.] Moses. “It provides coverage for eight to 10 percent of joint tactical air requests in their area of operations, which is a significant number considering it’s only a single aircraft.”
Feb 25/11: MC-130W. Sierra Nevada Corp. in Sparks, NV receives a $22.3 million contract modification for interim contract support under the Dragon Spear program, to help provide and install precision strike packages in 12 MC-130W Combat Spear aircraft. At this time, $10.4 million has been committed by the WRALC/GRUKA at Robins AFB, GA (FA8509-10-C-0013; PO0003).
Feb 8/11: MC-130W & lasers. Defense News quotes SOCOM chief Adm. Eric Olson, who says the MC-130W Dragon Spear went from concept to flying with a minimum capability in less than 90 days, and deployed in 18 months. It has already deployed to Iraq, and is now flying in Afghanistan. Defense News adds that:
“The four-star admiral also touted a system used in Afghanistan that involves an “airborne-mounted overt laser that projects a beam that illuminates a spot on the ground.” Commanders “are finding more and more uses for an illuminated spot on the ground,” he said. “It can prevent fratricide, it can cause people to muster against a target, it can have a powerful psychological effect if you are standing in the beam.” SOCOM officials are currently building tactics, techniques and procedures for the system.”
While Adm. Olson was not specific, C-130s are certainly natural platforms for that kind of system.
Feb 4/11: KC-130J-HH stats. Marines of Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352, Detachment A, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward), are preparing to return from a 6-month deployment at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan to their home at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA. VMGR-352’s KC-130J Super Hercules aircraft performed a number of transport and aerial refueling missions, while pioneering the “Harvest HAWK” kit’s use on the front lines.
Overall VMGR-352 crews completed 7,852 sorties and reached 7,897 flight hours. They also tracked 25,190 assault support requests, 65,815 additional passengers and 23,629,371 pounds of cargo. The Harvest Hawk completed 93 sorties, flew more than 565 hours and completed 191 joint tactical airstrike requests. USMC.
Nov 23/10: KC-130J-HH Action Report. Official report of a USMC KC-130J Harvest HAWK supporting 2 squads of Marines with India Company, 3rd Bn., 5th Marines. The squads ran into an attempted ambush, and the USMC explains what happened after that:
“The Marines immediately began firing at the enemy and gained superior firepower. The fight intensified as Marines were under fire from medium-machine-gun and small-arms fire. The Marines then played their trump card, calling in 60 mm and 120 mm mortars and close air support. An UH-1 Huey and an AH-1W Super Cobra fired hundreds of rounds, and a KC-130J ‘Harvest Hawk’ fired a Hell-Fire Missile. Artillery Marines played their part as well, firing multiple GPS-guided shells. The firefight lasted about two hours and killed an estimated 8-10 enemy fighters, said 1st Lt. Stephen Cooney, the executive officer with India Company, 3rd Bn., 5th Marines.”
October 2010: KC-130J-HH deploys. The lone production KC-130J Harvest Hawk deploys to Afghanistan, with the USMC’s VMGR-352.
Harvest Hawk deploys
FY 2010MC-130W operational; Contracts from SOCOM and USMC.
MC-130WSept 24/10: MC-130W. L-3 Communications TCS, Inc. in Warner Robins, GA receives a $29.4 million contract which would modify up to 4 MC-130Ws to install a precision strike package. At this time, no funds have been committed by the WR-ALC/GRUKA at Robins Air Force Base, GA (FA8509-20-C-0027).
Sept 21/10: MC-130W. L-3 Communications TCS, Inc. in Warner Robins, GA adds $15.8 million to a previous contract to install the Precision Strike package in 8 MC-130Ws. That’s on top of $45.2 million that had been committed before, raising the contract to $61 million. The WR-ALC/GRUKA at Robins Air Force Base, GA manages this contract (FA8509-09-C-0037; Action Under PZ0001).
Sept 14/10: MC-130W. Sierra Nevada Corp. in Sparks, NV receives a $12.5 million contract which will provide consoles for integration onto MC-130W aircraft. At this time, all funds have been committed by the ASC/WISS at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (FA8629-09-C-2445).
June 17/10: Scorpion drop. One of Lockheed Martin’s Scorpion precision glide-bombs is successfully flight tested in a 5,000 foot drop from a C-130. The small glide bomb uses a combination of GPS/INS and semi-active laser (SAL) guidance to hit a target 1.65 miles away, at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ. These Scorpion weapons have already been used in combat by CIA drones, but the C-130 test is new.
Scorpion was developed under the Small Smart Weapon program, which began in 2006. It’s just 21.5″ long and 4.5″ wide, with a range of up to 10 miles if it can glide from altitude. The system is modular, and the front guidance section will be switchable between a human-directed laser seeker, self-guiding imaging infrared (IIR) matched to pre-programmed target sets, or semi-autonomous millimeter wave radar. The warhead section is also a module, with multiple options. Overall weight is under 35 pounds. The weapon is carried by fitting up to 3 Scorpions on a conventional Hellfire rail, or up to 2 in a tube launcher. Lockheed Martin release | Scorpion product page | CBS News | Tactical Life | Washington Post | Comparison with Hellfire II.
June 3/10: MC-130W. Sierra Nevada Corp. in Sparks, NV receives a $20.9 million contract to provide interim contractor support of MC-130W modifications to install “a precision strike package” in support of US SOCOM’s “Project Dragon Spear.” At this time, $10 million has been committed by the 580th ACSG/GFKAA at Robins Air Force Base, GA (FA8509-10-C-0013).
June 2/10: Viper Strike. Northrop Grumman announces a contract to deliver 65 SOPGM/ GBU-44 Viper Strike munitions to the Joint Attack Munition Systems (JAMS) Project Office, within the Program Executive Office Missiles and Space at Redstone Arsenal, AL. The Viper Strikes will be delivered in 2010, for integration onto the KC-130J Harvest Hawk.
April 10/10: KC-130J-HH Phase 1 Done. Harvest Hawk completes Phase 1 testing at Pax River, MD, and leaves for required maintenance and continued testing at NAVAIR’s China Lake, CA range. The Patuxent River, MD Test Team included personnel from Air Test and Evaluation Squadrons VX-20 and VX-23, Operational Test Squadron 1 VX-1, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (VMGR-352), Lockheed Martin, the Joint Attack Munitions Systems (JAMS) project office, NAVAIR’s AIR 4.6 Human Systems department, and NAVAIR’s AIR-5.1 Integrated Systems Evaluation, Experimentation, and Test (ISEET) department.
NAVAIR says that it is working a complimentary effort to test and deploy the Standoff Precision Guided Munition (SOPGM, aka. “Viper Strike“) as a stand alone capability for Harvest HAWK, and that the first aircraft is scheduled to deploy by summer 2010 equipped with the AN/AAQ-30 TSS, AGM-114 Hellfire II missiles, and SOPGM. The 30 mm cannon, which will be mounted in the left side troop door, has been deferred to a later block upgrade. NAVAIR release.
End Harvest Hawk Phase 1
March 25/10: SOCOM Plans. Aviation Week DTI reports that U.S. Special Operations Command will base its future AC-130J gunship on the government-owned “Precision Strike Package” design used in the MC-130W. The February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review will replace 8 AC-130H Spectre gunships with 8 new “AC?130Js,” based on the C-130J, instead of the earlier model C-130H that forms the core of the MC-130W. Another 8 AC-130Js will be added on top, giving SOCOM 17 AC-130U Spookys, 12 MC-130W Combat/Dragon Spears, and 16 AC-130Js.
SOCOM officials also hope that a modular design will let them easily add new capabilities to the fleet in future, creating what US SOCOM Deputy Acquisition Director James Geurts describes as “a family of precision strike capabilities that we can port onto different [Special Operations Forces] platforms.” The difference between SOCOM’s approach and the USMC’s Harvest Hawk will involve a greater emphasis on precision strike, instead of suppression.
Specific AC-130J requirements are still in flux, but FY 2011’s budget asks for $9.9 million in initial funding. The first serious funding is reportedly slated for FY 2012.
March 17/10: KC-130J-HH. A Harvest HAWK equipped KC-130J from USMC VMGR-352 squadron “The Raiders” arrives at NAVAIR’s Patuxent River, MD facilities from Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA for testing. Source.
Jan 29/10: MC-130W. Sierra Nevada Corp. in Sparks, NV receives a $32.7 million contract to provide consoles for integration onto the MC-130W “Combat Spear” aircraft. At this time, the entire amount has been committed by the 667th AESS/SYKA at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH (FA8629-09-C-2445).
Jan 13/10: MC-130W. The 27th Special Operations Wing deploys 2 MC-130W Combat Spear aircraft from the 73rd Special Operations Squadron in support of humanitarian operations in Haiti. The deployment is a reminder that these multi-role aircraft can be deployed in unarmed roles, with or without their advanced sensors and weapons.
The release does not mention specifics, but advanced thermal sensors can be used for tasks like to seeing heat sources in disaster situations, as well as pinpointing armed enemies on a battlefield. Canon AFB release | Canon AFB picture | Clovis News Journal
MC-130W deployed
Nov 17/09: MC-130W Gun. ATK announces a $20 million contract to:
“…provide 30mm PGU-46/B High Explosive Incendiary (HEI) ammunition for the ATK-produced Mk44 30mm cannon on the multi-role, MC-130W Combat Spear gunship, which will support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Contracting Office at Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio awarded the contract.”
It would seem that AFSOCOM has made its 30mm gun choice. ATK will produce the ammunition at the company’s facilities in Radford, VA and Rocket Center, WVA. Deliveries will be complete in December 2010.
FY 2009Concept definitions; Initial contracts; Testing begins.
M299 on KC-130JSept 30/09: KC-130J-HH. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Marietta, GA receives a $21.3 million modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract (N00019-09-C-0053) for 2 Harvest HAWK capability I and II kits for the Marine Corps KC-130J aircraft. Work will be performed in Palmdale, CA, and is expected to be complete in December 2010. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, which is technically this very day.
Aug 29/09: KC-130J-HH. Harvest HAWK testing begins, to verify that changes to the KC-130J’s flight characteristics are either entirely absent, or known and compensated.
The retrofitted KC-130J used an AN/AAQ-30 Targeting Sight System, and a 4-weapon Hellfire II weapons rack in place of the left-hand aerial refueling pod. The right wing can still carry fuel for aerial refueling, while the left wing carries the kit. There is no discussion of a direct fire gun, but the release does add that Lockheed Martin plans to retrofit the Marine Corps’ fleet of KC-130J aircraft with the necessary wiring to carry Harvest Hawk, so that any aircraft could be quickly converted for use. USMC release.
Harvest Hawk testing begins
June 4/09: Gunslinger. An AFSOCOM pre-solicitation notice [FedBizOpps MS Word format | WIRED Danger Zone] discusses one option for mounting precision guided weapons on the MC-130Ws:
“The goal for Gunslinger is to have 10 or more Standoff Precision Guided Munitions (SOPGMs) loaded and ready to fire in rapid succession, reload in flight, and not modify the SOPGMs or their Common Launch Tube (CLT). The Gunslinger system must be interoperable with the Government’s SOPGM Battle Management System (BMS)… If only one qualified source responds the Government reserves the right to issue a sole source contract to that qualified source.
The Air Armament Center Capabilities Integration Directorate (AAC/XR) proposes to procure Gunslinger System Engineering which will include; design and ground demonstration of the Gunslinger system using a surrogate aircraft provided by the Government or a contractor provided mock up representative of the MC-130W. The design is allowed to include both permanent and removable portions. The installation as designed shall not prevent the aircraft from performing the cargo/transport mission when the removable portion is not in place. The permanent portion shall maintain cabin pressure when the removable portion is installed as well as when it is not installed. The time to install and uninstall the removable portions shall be minimized. The goal is less than five (5) minutes. The contractor shall develop an aircraft modification package with drawings and supporting data for installing the Gunslinger system and submit it to the aircraft OSS&E authority for approval to proceed with the aircraft modification.”
May 15/09: AFSOCOM’s analogues. Gannett’s Air Force times reports that Air Force Special Operations Command’s plan to buy 16 C-27Js under the Joint Cargo Aircraft program, for conversion to AC-27J Stinger II gunships, has fallen apart with the removal of Army C-27J funding in the FY 2010 budget.
In response, they’re investigating a “Plan B” that would add roll-on, roll-off kits to its MC-130W Combat Spear fleet. The MC-130W program began in 2006 to replace combat losses of the MC-130E/H Combat Talon, but it’s based on converted C-130H models, rather than new “J” version of the Hercules.
May 8/09: HH R&D. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Marietta, GA received a $22.8 million firm-fixed-price contract to develop a roll-on, roll-off armed targeting capability for the Marine Corps’ KC-130J.
Work will be performed in Palmdale, CA and is expected to be complete in December 2009. Contract funds in the amount of $15.5 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured (N00019-09-C-0053).
May 4/09: SOCOM PSP 360. The USAF is also interested in this concept, and issues a PIXS solicitation for a “Precision Strike Pkg 360 Degree Situational Awareness Camera System.” The solicitation adds that:
“This system would operate at altitudes at or above 10,000 feet and act as a hostile fire indicator system to provide aircrew with the ability to virtually scan the outside of the aircraft for hostile ground threats that would possibly target them. This system is part of a broader Persistence Strike Package (PSP). The purpose of the PSP program is to add a modular PSP to a medium lift cargo aircraft, to include a medium caliber gun and Stand-Off Precision Guided Munitions (SOPGM).”
Additional Readings and Sources Background: Projects & AircraftA fundamental question ahead of any Afghan election is where polling centres are located. In the past, they have been located in ways that deliberately disenfranchised some voters. New regulations designed to prevent this are aimed at making sure locations are ‘balanced’, ie there are now strict criteria which should ensure centres are near voters, their number is proportional to the local population and they are not sited in insecure areas. Given how vulnerable this aspect of Afghan elections is to manipulation, the Independent Electoral Commission’s (IEC) assessment of polling centres is crucial to the credibility of the forthcoming provincial and district elections (now scheduled for 20 October 2018). Here, AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili takes a close look at the IEC’s assessment and examines the doubts which have surrounded its findings.
This is part sevenof a series of dispatches about preparations for the parliamentaryelections. Part one dealt with political challenges; part two with an initial set of technical problems, including the date, the budget and the use of biometric technology; part three with electoral constituencies; part four with controversies around the appointment of one new IEC member, after its former chief was sacked by President Ashraf Ghani; part five with a demand by political parties to change the electoral system and; part six with the date of the polls and with voter registration.
Why do polling centres matter?
Polling centres are the actual places where voters cast their ballots. They are often located in schools, mosques, government offices, large private homes or even in tents when no sufficiently large building is available. For example, many polling stations for Kuchis have been in tents during previous elections (see here).
Each polling centre contains at least two polling stations, one for men and one for women. (1) Identifying how many polling centres are needed and where they should be located is fundamental to preparing for any election in Afghanistan, a country marred by conflict and with insufficient – and by now, largely unfavourable – experience with elections.
Prior to the 2014 elections, AAN released its own analysis of what to watch out for in elections and their preparation. Polling centres featured prominently in this analysis. On the one hand, AAN argued, polling centres need to be known and accessible, so that voters keen to vote are not disenfranchised. On the other hand, the number of polling centres needs to be manageable, as each additional centre increases the likelihood of fraud, whether this is petty, spontaneous and localised, or large scale and well-prepared. This is especially the case in insecure areas where monitoring is limited. The more ballots sent to areas that are out of reach of observers, the greater the likelihood of receiving back large numbers of fraudulent votes.
The establishment of the polling centre list is, in itself, an important process. In advance of previous elections, the number of polling centres was altered several times. This led to complaints that the changes were intended either to disenfranchise or favour voters in certain constituencies (see this AAN paper) (2).
What does the new legal framework say?
The 2016 Electoral Law (see AAN’s previous reports here and here) goes further than its predecessors. It does not merely define what polling centres and polling stations are, but also stipulates that polling centres should be established in a balanced manner. In this context, ‘balanced’ means taking into consideration the number and geographical location of voters, so that the proportion of centres to voters and the proximity of centres to voters is the same across the country. This extended provision was included, based on recommendations by the Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC), which was established by the government in 2015 to come up with proposals for electoral reform. The SERC specifically proposed that polling centres be revised in order to ensure “easy access” by voters to the centres. Article seven of the Electoral Law states that:
Based on the Electoral Law, the IEC developed and approved a regulation for a polling centre assessment. This was reported by the IEC on 9 May 2017 in a press release, which said that it had also approved the procedure and operational plan and that the budget for the assessment had been submitted to the government for it to provide funds. The regulation (available in Dari here) specified ten criteria for the allocation of polling centres, as follows:
The regulation also said that, in cases where these criteria do not exist when selecting a polling centre, the head of the IEC provincial office, in consultation with local authorities could recommend another suitable alternative location, which should be approved by the IEC central office. (3) Officials from the United Nations who are dealing with the Afghan elections, in conversation with AAN, said it was the first time the IEC has had such a clear regulation and called it “a big achievement.”
The IEC’s 2017 ‘countrywide’ polling centre assessment marred by doubts
As mentioned in the regulation, the point of departure for the polling centre assessment was the list of existing polling centres from the 2014 election. The assessment was, in practice, aimed at analysing whether the existing centres fulfilled the new criteria, or if adjustments had to be made. According to the IEC, it had a master list of 7,180 polling centres from 2014. However, not all of those centres were activated during the 2014 election due to security reasons. At that time, a list published on the IEC website contained 6,775 polling centres with 21,663 polling stations, 12,705 for men, and 8,958 for women (see AAN’s previous report on how the list changed constantly here). It went through even further revisions as per security reviews, and the number of polling centres that actually opened in the first round of 2014 presidential elections was 5,928. (4)
The IEC’s current assessment began on 7 August 2017and was conducted by 1,000 temporary staff (who, according to the IEC, had been hired and trained for this purpose), first in the provincial capitals and then in the districts. According to an IEC update, from 30 August 2017, the staff used tablet computers with the capability to obtain GPS and other information. The tablets, it said, had been designed to work “online and offline,” so that they could automatically transmit data from an area without internet coverage to headquarters when they came into an area with internet connection.
The IEC’s 30 August 2017 update also provided a breakdown of territorial coverage of the assessment (press release in Dari here). It said it had been able to access 385 (92 per cent) of the country’s 418 administrative units, but did not specify how many polling centres it had been able to visit in those units. (5) The IEC’s press release added that, in the remaining “33 administrative units (8 per cent) with high security threats, the polling centre assessment has not been done, but [the IEC continues to] work to pave the way for [their] assessment.” Again, it did not specify how many polling centres were located in those areas. On 28 October 2017, Wasima Badghisi, the IEC deputy chair for operations, told the local website Khabarnama that, if the IEC could not assess these areas before election day, it would approve sites used in previous elections.
The IEC, in its first open session to decide the polling centres, on 7 November 2017, indeed made the decision that polling centres that had not been assessed due to security threats would be retained in their previous location, so that eligible voters were not disenfranchised should the security of those areas on election day be ensured. This indicates that the IEC had already come to terms with fears that it would not be able to assess these areas in advance of election day. In early January 2018, AAN received a list from the IEC that showed that 32 districts in 14 provinces had not been assessed. (6) Afghan media outlets also published a slightly shorter list. The lists largely overlap and include well-known areas of intense Taleban activity. On 18 February 2018, the head of the IEC field operation department, Zmaria Qalamyar, told AAN that the list of 32 districts was correct and that a 33rd district, named in an IEC press release was either a mistake, or that one ‘administrative unit’ had been added later to the list of those units that had been assessed.
Some election observers doubted the IEC’s claim of having assessed 92 per cent of the country’s districts. Sughra Sa’adat of the Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan (TEFA) told AAN on12 September 2017 that TEFA’s observations showed that “three districts in Balkh province (Chemtal, plus two others) haven’t been assessed at all. Out of Ghor’s ten districts, only three and in the provinces of Sar-e Pul, Faryab and Jawzjan, only the provincial capitals’ districts have been assessed.” She told AAN that TEFA’s assessment was based on observations collected from all 34 of the country’s provinces collected by 43 partner organisations which work with TEFA, either under a project contract, or as volunteers.
Sa’adat also raised concerns about the assessment in general. She said that “in the last elections, we had a lot of ghost polling centres, others inaccessible to women and [or] located in the houses of powerful men.” (This is confirmed by AAN research; see here and here.) She indicated that this might be the same this time.
Similarly, on 18 February 2018, Muhammad Yusuf Rashid, the executive director of the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA), another major observer group, wondered how the IEC – which had announced that the aim of the polling centre assessment was to balance polling centres – could do that, if it did not know the exact number of voters. A UN election specialist in conversation with AAN said that it was a ‘chicken and egg’ problem. This meant that it would also be hard to tie voters to specific polling centres if the IEC does not have a list of polling centres (according to article six of the Electoral Law, a voter should be tied to a specific polling centre, ie they should vote at the same poling centre where they registered to vote). Rashid also said that FEFA’s follow-up research showed the IEC employees had not visited many polling centres. Instead, they had either met elders or talked to people on the phone, asking if they were happy with the polling centres used in 2014.
The UN also seems to have its doubts. On 25 September 2017, the UN Special Representative to Afghanistan, Tadamichi Yamamoto,reported to the UN Security Council that the IEChad “completed its assessment of polling stations, reportedly[our emphasis] reaching more than 90% of districts.” Together with voter registration as the next step, he said this “would lay the foundation for what will be the most important electoral reforms since 2001: the establishment of polling station-specific voter lists and the completion of a viable voter registry.” (see here.)
Shahla Haque, the acting head of the IEC secretariat, (7) in response to the allegations, told AAN on 20 March 2018 that the IEC, in addition to the fact that it could not access 32 districts at all, also could not assess some polling centres in the districts that it accessed. She said that 32 districts included only around 360 polling centres, while the IEC could not assess an aggregate number of 1,744 polling centres and that this was what the IEC had reported publicly.
Shahla, in response to Rashid, told AAN that it was important for the IEC that employees brought the coordinates and other physical specifications of the polling centres they had assessed. This, she said, would not be possible unless they had visited those centres in person.
The outcome of the assessment
On 6 December 2017, during a consultation forum with political parties and civil society organisations (also attended by the author), the IEC gave these detailed statistics:
Out of 7,180 former polling centres (the IEC’s master list of polling centres from 2014), 5,436 (76%) were assessed and 1,744 (24per cent) were not assessed due to insecurity.
1,015 polling centres (14.2 per cent) were moved from their 2014 sites to an alternative location, 617 (61 per cent) to schools and 398 (39 per cent) to mosques.
1,341 new centres were proposed. This would have increased the total number of centres to 8,521, an increase of 18 per cent. However, out of these, 1,176 (14 per cent) were found to be contrary to IEC criteria, while 586 others were merged.
In the end, 7,355 centres were approved. This number includes the 1,744 centres (23.7 per cent) which could not be assessed because of insecurity. Crucially, it is not known whether fulfil the new criteria or not.
A provincial breakdown of the centres can be seen in footnote 8.
Criticism from within the IEC
Apart from doubts about the actual territorial scope of the assessment, there were also questions – even within the IEC itself – as to whether or not the assessment achieved its objectives. For instance, the media received a copy of a letter (see here in which IEC Field Operations Chief Qalamyar wrote critically to the head of the IEC secretariat on 24 November 2017 that, despite the fact that the assessment was considered a huge achievement, the GIS (Geographical Information System) information showed that it had not met one important goal, to balance the polling centre assessment. He also called into question the budget and the efforts invested in the project.In a conversation with AAN on 7 January 2018, Qalamyar gave more detail:
I will not tell you the names of the provinces, but in some provinces, for each three villages within a radius of ten kilometres and with 1000 voters, one polling centre has been allocated, while in some other provinces, for each nine villages within a radius of six kilometres and with four thousand voters, one polling centre has been allocated. [This] will lead to an imbalanced distribution of polling centres.
If this is correct, it will affect the accessibility of polling centres to voters in certain areas. This, in turn, might lead to their disenfranchisement, as well as violating the Electoral Law’s provision that calls for balanced allocation of the polling centres.
Pajhwok News Agency reported on 10 December 2017 that, as a result of the new polling centre assessment, the number of polling centres had decreased in Nangrahar, despite its having seen a high rate of returnees and so has more voters. The number of polling centres for Nangrahar approved by the IEC (on 29 November 2017) is 457, a decrease of 41 polling centres from 498 in 2014. (see here.)
On 27 December 2017, the IEC’s Shahla Haque rejected Qalamyar’s criticism that polling centres had not been balanced. She told AAN that his criticism wasbased on additional criteria that he had wanted to introduce (such as the territorial size of each province). She further pointed to the on-going complaints procedure that could lead to adjustments to the polling centre list.
Allegations of corruption
In the process of carrying out the polling centre assessment, the IEC also found itself dealing with two major allegations of corruption. These allegations were associated with the procurement or the assessment itself. First, on 14 September 2017, the IEC announced that it had suspended the head of its field operations, Zmarai Qalamyar. This came after the IEC obtained an audio tape in which, as the (former) head of the IEC secretariat, Imam Muhammad Warimach told Tolonews, Qalamyar allegedly asked the head of a provincial IEC for 500,000 Afghanis. Warimach said Qalamyar couldbe heard demanding, “just cash three hundred thousand of it and keep the other two hundred thousand and pay the salaries.” (see here). It is unclear how this audio was obtained.
An IEC member who has listened to the tape and preferred not to be named told AAN that actually a larger sum was at stake in this case and that Qalamyar had spoken to the head of the provincial election office in Kandahar, asking him to return 1.5 million Afghanis allocated for the polling centre assessment in that province. The IEC has not published any report about budget allocation and expenditures or the corruption allegations. It was not clear, therefore, whether the 1.5 million afghanis was part of, or the full amount of the money spent on the assessment in Kandahar. The IEC member told AAN, “Ghost people were sent to carry out the polling centre assessment.”
This IEC member claimed to have told IEC officials to send the clip to the judicial agencies for prosecution and that, as a result of this pressure, Qalamyar had resigned on 6 September 2017. IEC spokesman (now chair) Gula Jan Abdul Badi Sayyad (9) told AAN on 23 October 2017 that Qalamyar’s resignation had been approved and that the case was now with the Attorney General’s Office. Later, on 6 December 2017, Sayyad backtracked and claimed that the Attorney General’s Office had sent a letter to the IEC saying Qalamyar could continue to work with the IEC and that he was already back at work.
On 7 January 2018, Qalamyar himself provided a diametrically conflicting story about the corruption allegation against him in a conversation with AAN. He alleged that the Kandahar provincial election officer holds two tazkeras (ID cards), one from Kandahar and one from Zabul, but had concealed his Kandahar tazkera and showed only his Zabul tazkera when he was hired as the provincial election officer in Kandahar. Qalamyar said that, after he received the provincial election officer’s Kandahar tazkera in 2017, he notified the Human Resources Department that the Kandahar provincial election officer had two tazkeras and asked whether they should continue to work with him or not. Qalamyar said that, according to the law, provincial election officers could not work in their own province. Qalamyar also alleged that, since then, the Kandahar provincial election officer has held a grudge against him and had forged the audiotape. He said he had resigned after the allegation came to light, but withdrew it after the Attorney General’s Office cleared him.
In the second corruption allegation against the IEC, an IEC member told AAN on 7 September 2017 that there had also been a misuse of resources during the purchase of the tablets used for the assessment. This allegation was about over-pricing and violation of procurement requirements. The IEC purchased them for 46,000 afghanis (around 700 USD) each, while, both according to IEC sources and AAN enquiries, the market price for such tablets is between 200 and 500 USD. The tablets were also purchased using a single-source procurement procedure. Another IEC employee confirmed both these facts to AAN. According to rule 22 of the general procurement rules of procedure, such a single-source procurement may only be used where: 1) a particular potential bidder has exclusive rights in respect of the provision of goods, works and services or the procurement can only be conducted from single source; 2) there is an emergency need for the goods, works or services, involving an imminent threat to public health, welfare or safety or an imminent threat of damage to property, and engaging in open tendering proceedings or other procurement methods would be impracticable or; 3) where the estimated value of the procurement does not exceed 5000 afghanis. (See the Dari version here).
Again, Qalamyar was involved in this issue. A source from the UN, which is privy to the IEC’s internal discussions, told AAN that Qalamyar very particularly pushed for single-source procurement. Qalamyar rejected this in a conversation with AAN. He even asserted that he was against this method. He said the IEC had not faced an emergency and there was more than one dealer readily available in the market.
However, then IEC spokesman (now chair), Sayyad, played down this allegation of corruption in two conversations with AAN, on 23 October 2017 and again on 6 December 2017. He claimed there had been insufficient time available for open-source or limited tendering methods, but the IEC would still deal with the issue seriously.
AAN is not in a position to judge who is right in either of these two cases. However, the allegations have left a stain on the IEC’s credibility. Some Afghan election observer organisations have expressed similar concerns. For example, Jandad Spinghar, the director of Election & Transparency Watch Organization of Afghanistan (ETWA), was quoted as saying that, although corruption existed everywhere, within the IEC it could “create distrust among the people about elections.” (see here.)
On-going assessments
There are two other assessments of polling centres.
One: Security assessment
After its approval, the IEC submitted the list of the 7,355 polling centres to the security agencies for a security review. Coordinating and approving the final list of polling centres that will open on election day with the security institutions responsible for the security of each of the centres has been the procedure ahead of every previous election.
On 18 February 2018, the head of the IEC field operation department, Zmaria Qalamyar, told AAN that, according to their procedure, the security agencies should provide their list to the IEC four months before election day. This would be 20 June 2018 for the new election date set on 20 October 2018 (it was scheduled after it became clear that the previously planned date, 7 July 2018, was not feasible). (10) After 20 June, the security agencies will no longer be able to clear any additional polling centre on the 7,355 list, but could still cancel centres which are under threat. According to Qalamyar, the IEC does not have any say in the security assessment of polling centres. If security agencies, for example, say they cannot ensure the security of a certain polling centre, then the IEC cannot open it.
On 25 March 2018, Senior Deputy Minister of the Interior Murad Ali Murad provided the security agencies’ assessment to the IEC. He said that out of the total 7,355 centres, 1,122 remain under “medium threat,” 1,120 face “high-level” threats and another 948 are not under the control of government forces. This would mean that out of the 7,355 polling centres proposed by the IEC, 3,190 or 43 per cent are either under a medium or high threat, or are in areas not under government control.
On 5 April 2018, Qalamyar told AAN that this meant the security agencies needed to take extra measures for those facing threats (both medium and high) and to regain the control of areas in which the 948 centres were located. This would be necessary for the delivery of election material, voter registration – another key step that the IEC plans to carry out between 14 April and 12 June 2018 (see also AAN analysis and on election day itself.)
Two: the ongoing complaints process
Simultaneously with the security assessment, a complaints process has been underway with regard to the IEC assessment’s results. According to the Electoral Law (article 28.1), the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) is responsible for addressing challenges and complaints arising from negligence, violation and identification of crimes related to elections. Pursuant to this provision, the ECC said, on 29 November 2017, it was ready to receive complaints regarding the balancing of polling centres, either at ECC headquarters in Kabul, or the IEC provincial offices. It said it had dispatched working teams to the zones between 2 and 11 December 2017.
The ECC has five members. Three are appointed for five years and two for three years. In addition to the central ECC, Provincial Electoral Complaints Commissions, comprising three members, have to be established one month before the candidates’ registration starts. Two members of the provincial bodies are appointed by the central ECC and take into consideration gender (there should be one woman and one man), while the third member is appointed by the Independent Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan upon the recommendation of the central ECC and approval of the president. According to article 29.6 of the Electoral Law, the government may also appoint two international election experts as non-voting members of the ECC in consultation with the United Nations for the purpose of ensuring further transparency in addressing challenges and complaints arising from the electoral negligence and violation. On 30 March 2018, ECC spokesman Ali Reza Ruhani told AAN that the provision of the appointment of non-voting international members was intended to boost the confidence of the people, as well as the international community if there are disputes, but it was not binding. He said the need for such an appointment has not come about yet. UN sources told AAN that some political party officials had flagged this; without being more specific, they wished the UN to play a greater role in elections.
On 16 December 2017, the ECC extended the complaints period for ten days until 21 December 2017, but without mentioning the reason (see here) (11). On 1 February 2018, it announced it had received 373 complaints from the provinces regarding the IEC’s performance in carrying out the polling centre assessment. It said it had sent the list of complaints to “the relevant authorities” to obtain the required information and would make decisions thereafter. The EEC indicated that the IEC had asked for one week in which to respond. After a preliminary review and analysis of the complaints, it published a list of them. According to Ruhani, this included an analysis of who complained and what was the complaint about (see it in Dari here).It showed various types of complaints. Some demanded more polling centres be allocated or reallocated to a certain area in various provinces (due to a number of reasons, including long distances from the polling centre, concentration of population, removal of polling centres and lack of polling centres).
The ECC held an open meeting on 28 March 2018 with representatives of the election observer groups to address the 373 complaints. (Ruhani had confirmed already to AAN on 20 March 2018 that the ECC had received the IEC’s response in three categories: invalid complaints; valid complaints which should be acted upon and; those that required the IEC to send its teams to the areas to reassess polling centres.) The ECC made the following decisions for these 373 complaints:
On 5 April 2018, the IEC’s Qalamyar told AAN that it had added 11 centres based on the complaints procedure. This increased the total number of centres to 7,366. As the complaint process is ongoing, there could be further changes to the initial 7,355 polling centre list approved by the IEC.
Conclusion: the ‘balance’ of polling centres still in doubt
The IEC worked on the existing master list of 7,180 polling centres from the 2014 elections (not all actually used) to assess whether or not they met the new criteria established for the coming elections. The IEC claimed it could not assess 32 districts and 1,744 of the centres –almost one quarter of the total – due to security reasons.Although it stated it would work to ensure those districts and polling centres would be assessed before the election, the practical follow-up so far shows it has put no urgency into this task. Indeed, these districts and polling centres may not be assessed at all. If the IEC is not able to open polling centres for voter registration and voting in areas that were open during the 2014 election, this would be a serious matter, the effective disenfranchisement of the population there.
As a result of this exercise, the IEC has, so far, approved 7,366 polling centres for the next elections. Thishas been one of the key steps that the commission has taken in preparation for the next parliamentary and district council elections. As a complaints procedure and a separate security assessment of the centres are both ongoing, the final numbers may still change.
The IEC’s polling centres assessment was designed to find out also whether the centres’ distribution across the country’s population was balanced, or needed adjusting, and whether or not the centres were accessible to the voters. Although the IEC has, for the first time, put in place a clear regulation that specified the criteria for measuring this, doubts remain as to whether they were used in practice, as claimed by the commission. Some election observer groups, in particular, have cast doubts on the number of polling centres that the IEC claimed to have assessed, saying the number of districts and polling centres that remain un-assessed must be larger than those admitted to by the IEC. They have also accused the IEC of not carrying out part of the assessment on the ground, but by using indirect, remote methods. Doubts about the validity of the assessment have been compounded by allegations of corruption, which have not been refuted convincingly by the IEC.
As yet, the IEC’s polling centre assessment exercise remains deficient. If matters are not clarified, this means the integrity of the forthcoming elections is already in doubt.
Edited by Sari Kouvo, Thomas Ruttig and Kate Clark
(1) The size of a polling centre can vary greatly. Large polling centres can have up to 12 polling stations. Every polling centre has a code indicating the province, district and centre. Within the centre, each polling station is also numbered. (see AAN analysis here) A polling station is provided with one ballot box per election and a maximum of 600 ballot papers (see also this AAN’s paper here).
(2) For instance, as AAN wrote previously, “in June 2009, a leaked letter from the Ministry of Interior suggesting to decrease the number of planned polling stations in the North by 1000, due to shortage of security staff, met with protests in the media and led to allegations that certain actors were seeking to disenfranchise the non-Pashtun constituencies. In the south of Afghanistan, several interlocutors commented in the run-up to the elections on the potential willingness of local government officials to sacrifice security in certain districts where opposition candidates may make a strong showing. Due to insecurity, mainly in the Pashtun areas, several hundred planned polling stations may need to be relocated to more secure areas (in many cases next to existing polling stations or into the houses of tribal elders), while others may not open at all”
(3) The IEC in its polling centre assessment regulation also said it would determine the number of necessary mobile polling stations prior to each election. These are the polling stations to which voters are not specifically linked. It further said that these mobile polling stations would be set up in; 1) hospitals, prisons and military bases, one polling station for each 100 or more eligible voters; 2) impassable areas and villages that do not meet the abovementioned criteria. These would be identified during the polling centre assessment and reported to the IEC. The IEC may then decide to allocate mobile polling stations to those areas, based on their circumstances.
(4) Both Shahla Haque, the acting head of the IEC secretariat, and Zmarai Qalamyar, the head of the IEC field operations, told AAN that the 2014 polling centre list was based, in turn, on an earlier IEC polling centre assessment conducted in 2011 which, according to a concept note developed by IEC field operations, dated 24 June 2011 (which AAN received from Qalamyar) aimed to establish a “robust polling centre database (with polling centre risk factors, staffing needs and logistical support requirement).” According to this concept note, the assessment included two months of data collection and data compilation each with later updates.
It provided the following sample from the then-current list of a polling centre, which the concept note said, was not sufficient and that “many other facts about a given polling location must be managed.”
Province District Polling Center Name and Location PC Code Est. Voters Total PS/Male Female Kuchi Herat PROVINCIAL CENTER Sultan High school, PD 1 2401001 4500 8 5 3 0
Both IEC sources provided the following list of the data that it proposed be collected for the assessment of polling centres. It pointed out this was still not exhaustive.
(5)According to a list of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) that AAN received from its spokeswoman Munera Yusufzada on 18 December 2017, there are currently 364 official districts and 21 ‘temporary’ (unofficial) districts in Afghanistan. On 27 December 2017, Shahla Haque, the acting head of the IEC secretariat, told AAN that the IEC also used these figures (364 plus 21) and added the 34 provincial capitals, but not the urban districts, called nahias or nawahi (which, however, would give a total figure of 419, not 418 ‘administrative units’). (More on the relevance of this in a future dispatch about the district council elections.)
The IDLG in an 11 June 2017 official letter to the IEC (AAN has obtained a copy of it), introduced 21 temporary districts to the IEC to include in the electoral processes. According to the letter, ‘temporary districts’ refer to those districts that have been approved, after entry into force of the 2004 Constitution by the president of the country due to some security considerations.
However, they have yet to be approved by the parliament. However, according to another list that AAN was given by Obaid Ekhlas, executive manager to the deputy head of IDLG in mid-February 2018, there are 384 official and 23 temporary districts.
(6) This is the district list that AAN has received:
1) Maidan Wardak: Jaghatu; 2) Nangarhar: Hisarak; 3) Baghlan: Dahana-ye Ghori; 4) Ghazni: Zanakhan (under Taleban control), 5) Giro (only district centre with the government) 6) Ajristan (only district centre with the government) 7) Nawa;; 8) Paktika: Neka, 9) Gyan and 10) Dela; 11) Badakhshan: Warduj and 12) Yamgan (both are completely under the Taleban (see this AAN’s report); 13) Kunduz: Qulbad and 14) Gul Tapa of (both under the Taleban control); 15) Urozgan: Chora, 16) Shahid-e Hassas and 17) Chinarto; 18) Kandahar: Miyaneshin, 19) Shorabak and 20) Reg; 21) Faryab: Kohistan; 22) Helmand: Nawzad, 23) Sangin, 24) Musa Qala, 25) Reg (Khanneshin), 26) Baghran and 27) Disho; 28) Badghis: Ghormach; 29) Herat: Farsi, 30) Zer Koh and31) Pusht Koh; 32) Farah: Bakwa.
(7) Shahla Haque was appointed as the acting head of the IEC secretariat (also known as CEO) on 16 January 2018. This came after the former head, Imam Muhammad Warimach, was dismissed by President Ashraf Ghani on 21 October 2017 (see AAN’s previous reports here and here). Before this, Shahla was the head of the IEC training department. According to the electoral law, the IEC should introduce three candidates to the president who appoints one as the CEO. The IEC advertised the position with a six-day (20-26 February 2018) deadline for application. According to an IEC press release, 40 potential candidates had collected application forms, but only 29 people actually applied. The IEC started shortlisting on 12 March 2018. Shahla Haque herself toldAAN that she did not apply for the position as she lacked some legal requirements – the applicant should have degrees in certain fields that did not include her medical field. A UN election specialist expressed concern that, if Shahla were replaced, things could unravel, especially if a new CEO with no experience was appointed because, according to this source, things had been moving well with the election preparations since she became the CEO.
(8) The IEC approved the following polling centres in four sessions:
On 7 November 2017, for the following seven provinces: Samangan (115, increased from 101), Jawzjan (129, increased from 126), Kunduz (220, increased from 219), Nimruz (67, increased from 62), Sar-e Pul (149, increased from 143), Logar (82, decreased from 84) and Farah (224, decreased from 227). (see here.)
On 13 November 2017, for the following nine provinces: Baghlan (284, increased from 281), Badakhshan (322, increased from 315 in 2014), Ghor (289, increased from 240), Faryab (238, increased from 216), Kunar (137, increased from 119), Uruzgan (65, increased from 60), Zabul (99, increased from 81), Helmand (246, increased from 219) and Parwan (170, increased from 164). (see here.)
On 22 November 2018, for the following seven provinces: Paktia (197, decreased from 212), Panjshir (97, decreased from 108), Khost (192, increased from 186), Badghis (210, increased from 197), Kapisa (93, decreased from 107), Herat (462, decreased from 480) and Maidan Wardak (157, decreased from 160). (see here.)
On 29 November 2017, for the following 11 provinces: Kabul (553, decreased from 557), Balkh (314, decreased from 319), Bamyan (220, increased from 188), Paktika (237, decreased from 266), Daikundi (256, increased from 184), Kandahar (225, decreased from 245), Ghazni (406, increased from 397), Laghman (123, increased from 136), Nangarhar (457, decreased from 498), Takhar (241, increased from 215) and Nuristan (79, increased from 77). (see here) All the above links above include tables for each province.
(9) These allegations of corruption (as well as divisions within the IEC) also provided an opportunity for political groups to question the credibility of the IEC and demand the replacement of all of the IEC – and ECC – members with new ones. (See AAN’s previous report here) As a result, President Ghani sacked the IEC chairman on 15 November 2017 and a new IEC member was appointed on 13 January 2018. (See AAN’s previous reports here and here).
On 31 January 2018, the IEC elected its former spokesman Sayyad as its chairman for two and half years and Wasima Badghisi as deputy for operation and Mazallah Dawlati as deputy for finance and administration both for a period of one year. However, it has yet to elect a spokesman who, according to the Electoral Law, also serves as its secretary. According to paragraph two of article 11 of the Electoral Law, the chairperson is elected for a period of two years and six months, and the deputies and secretary (spokesperson) for a period of one year.
(10)For instance, before the 2010 parliamentary elections, the security institutions decided that 938 of the 6,835 originally planned polling centres (ie 13.7 per cent) could not be secured. The IEC accepted this in its final list of polling centres, which then consisted of 5,897 polling centres, representing a total of 18,731 planned polling stations. (See this AAN’s paper).
(11)According to the IEC regulation for complaints arising from the polling centre assessment, the IEC has to issue its final decision about the complaints received and send it to the IEC within 30 days for implementation (a Dari version of this regulation is available here).