Defence`s Feeds

The first F-35B aircraft are expected to land later today to join the RAF 617 Squadron “Dambusters”. Earlier today four Lightning jets of 617 Squadron took of from Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina, where the famous “Dambusters” unit was reactivated on Apr. 17, 2018, to undertake the transatlantic crossing and arrive at RAF […]

Americas

• The Navy is currently procuring support activities for its P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance plane. Under this $24.7 million contract Boeing will provide logistics and engineering data for the Advanced Airborne Sensor Peculiar Support Equipment (PSE). The Advanced Airborne Sensor is a multifunction radar installed on the P-8A. It’s a solid-state, active electronically scanned array radar with multiple functions ranging from a Synthetic Aperture Radar, Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar and Moving Target Indication modes. The externally mounted radar and a follow-on system to the currently deployed Littoral Surveillance Radar System (LSRS). LSRS currently provides a broad range of capabilities against moving and stationary targets at sea and on land. In addition, this contract acquires product support analysis, training information, technical manuals and proof-load documentation, enabling the Navy to organically support the PSE. Work will be performed Richardson, Texas and St. Louis, Missouri. The contract is expected to be completed in March 2022.

• Raytheon is being tapped for repair work on the Navy’s H-60 helicopter platform. The $14 million firm-fixed-price delivery order provides for the repair of the turret and sensor-sight in support of the helicopter. This contract follows a multi-year 2013-2017 contract worth around $11.7 billion. The 15-inch Infirno turret is integrated in the nose of the H-60. It contains high-definition, mid-wave infrared and color sensors, a multi-mode tracker, a laser designator and rangefinder and is equipped with geo-location and advanced image processing capabilities. All work will be performed in Jacksonville, Florida, and work is expected to be completed by January 2019.

• Jane’s reports that the US Navy has officially commenced operations of its MQ-4C Triton UAV. The Broad Area Maritime System platform is deployed with the Unmanned Patrol Squadron (VUP)-19, the Navy’s first unmanned patrol squadron. The “RQ-4N” system chosen by the US Navy was based on the USAF’s RQ-4B Block 20 Global Hawks, but it incorporated a wide range of changes on the way to its unveiling as the MQ-4C Triton. The Triton has been developed to provide the US Navy with a persistent maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability in support of a full range of military operations. Designed for high-altitude, long-endurance ISR tasks, the Triton has a range of about 2,000 n miles and, with an endurance of 24 hours, will be able to cover more than 2.7 million square miles in a single mission. VP-19 now has two Triton UAVs, after training and trials are successfully completed the drones will be stationed in Guam. They are set to operate in concert with the P-8A.

• The Canadian government has reaffirmed its intention to proceed with Leonardo Helicopters-led modernization of its AW101 Cormorant search and rescue rotorcraft, and to potentially increase its fleet size from 14 to 21 examples. Canada and Leonardo are currently during the final finalization stages of outlining the requirements for the CH-149 Cormorant Mid-Life Upgrade program, including fleet augmentation, simulation and training. The Cormorant is a medium-lift helicopter used in both military and civil applications. It is based on AugustaWestland’s AW-101. The potential deal provides for new avionics equipment, electro-optical and infrared sensors, as well as the integration of Leonardo’s Osprey active electronically scanned array radar. Canada has operated the AW101 as its primary rotary-wing search and rescue capability since 2002. Canada aims to extending the lifetime of its CH-149 fleet to 2040 and beyond.

Middle East & Africa

• The African nation of Rwanda has voiced its interest to acquire air-defense systems from Russia. This year, Russia and Rwanda will mark 55 years of bilateral ties. During a visit to the Rwandan capital Kigali, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “the Rwandan security forces, army, and law-enforcement agencies operate our helicopters. There are also Ural vehicles used by the army and the security service, and a whole bunch of small arms. Now the deliveries of air defense systems are being discussed.” Other bilateral cooperation exists in the mining and geological sectors. If the potential deal goes through Rwanda could buy the S-400 Triumf long range surface-to-air missile systems produced by Almaz-Antey. The system can detect stealth aircraft and other targets at all altitudes of their combat employment and at maximum ranges. This air defense missile system can simultaneously engage 36 targets.

Europe

• Austria is set receive several new Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), reconnaissance and all-terrain vehicles two years after the initial contract was signed. The $298 million deal provides for the acquisition of 106 vehicles of three types. Starting in September 2018 the Austrian Army will receive 34 new Pandur Evolution APC, which is developed and produced by the Austrian company Steyr-Daimler-Puch Spezialfahrzeuge, a subsidiary of General Dynamics European Land Systems. The baseline vehicle is armed with a 12.7 mm heavy machine gun. Its modular design allows it to be fitted with a variety of weapon systems, including a 20 mm autocannon and an armored two-man 90 mm gun turret. In addition, the army will soon add the 32 BvS10 Beowolfs to its inventory. The vehicle is designed and developed in Sweden by BAE Systems Hägglunds. The vehicle consists of two parts that are connected by a joint and has been especially developed to be driven in hard to reach places. At last the Austrian Army will receive the Dingo 2 reconnaissance vehicle. The multi-million deal is a substantial investment by the Austrian government that has a yearly defense budget of roughly $3.1 billion.

Asia-Pacific

• India has again voiced its interest in acquiring the Israeli made Spike missile as means to boost its anti-tank capability against arch rival Pakistan. The Indian Army wants to buy the Spike missile as a “stop gap” measure before its defense research agency can develop an indigenous anti-tank missile within the next three years. After a long procurement process, India had terminated its plan to buy $500-million worth of Spike missiles in January 2018. The Spike missile family is designed around 2 key principles: low life cycle cost, and simple but reliable operation. Low life cycle cost comes from keeping prices down for all components by using “good enough” solutions that offer high quality without gold plating. The Spike infantry system consists of a missile in its cannister, a tripod, a Command Launch Unit that contains the optics and firing system, and a battery. It can go from “off” to firing in less than 30 seconds, as the operator lays the cross hairs on the aim point using either the 10x day sight, or the clip-on thermal imaging night sight. Considering the bumpy track-record of Indian defense acquisition, it can currently not be guaranteed that the current acquisition proposal will actually go through.

Today’s Video

• Turkish F-35 Lightning II flying test.

An attack on Farah city had long been feared. For years now, the Taleban have been taking control of the provincial capital’s outlying districts and inching their way towards the central hub. For a few days in mid-May, it looked as though the Taleban were about to take Farah city, which would have been their most significant military triumph since capturing Kunduz for two weeks in 2015. Their strategy of consolidating control over rural areas then digging in at a provincial centre’s outskirts before launching an attack appears to be an increasing trend. While they lost the battle in Farah on this occasion, the Taleban still pose a serious threat to the area. AAN co-director Thomas Ruttig together with Ali Mohammad Sabawoon, Rohullah Soroush and Obaid Ali unpack the attack and its aftermath.

This is the first of two dispatches examining the recent attack on the city of Farah. This first dispatch focuses on the attack and its aftermath. The second contextualises the attack in light of post-2001 developments in Farah.

The Farah attack

The Taleban attacked the provincial capital of Farah (1) in the early hours of 15 May. This was on day 21 of their annual military campaign announced earlier in April and just a few days before the beginning of the holy month of Ramadan. Within a few hours they had pushed through to the central chowk (junction) of the city. According to a local government military spokesman (quoted here), the Taleban set up checkpoints around the city and checked identity cards, trying to prevent people from fleeing. The Taleban had warned citizens over social media to stay indoors “and pray.” Many radio and television channels in the province stopped broadcasting, fearing for their employees’ lives, according to media watchdog Nai.

The Taleban started their attack at around two am from Regi and Chahar Bagh, areas to the immediate northeast and west of the city centre where the Taleban had concentrated their forces (media reports here and here).

During the first attack on 15 May, the Taleban moved towards Zara Ferqa, the old army division headquarters, now defunct, around three kilometres outside the city centre (media report in Dari here), and from there to the provincial headquarters of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), just south of it and located only 800 metres away from the provincial governor’s compound. The same morning, media footage from Farah showed black smoke rising above the NDS compound, although its defenders held out.

All three areas, Regi, Chahar Bagh and Zara Ferqa, are situated on the south bank of Farah River, which runs to the north of the city. It used to be the demarcation line between government and Taleban-held areas. That the Taleban took up positions there and were able to retreat to them and hold them after their attack was pushed back, demonstrates the continued threat to Farah city.

The Taleban also attacked the compounds of Farah’s police districts three and four, south of the NDS and the provincial prison, which is next to the provincial headquarters of the Afghan National Police (ANP). Afghan media reported that they used “heavy and light weapons.” They also employed suicide attackers against the police and, according to local reports, including several US-made armoured Humvee vehicles captured from Afghan forces. They had apparently been able to capture these during previous raids on police posts in Bala Boluk district in February, March and on 11 May 2018 as well as in Farah city on 11 May 2018  (more about the use of this weapon in this AAN analysis) – a clear indication that this attack had not come out of the blue.

Video clips also appeared on social media showing fighters inside the city seizing more weapons, ammunition and military vehicles from Afghan security forces. Most of this footage was filmed the first morning. Photos posted on social media also showed Taleban ‘special forces’ in gear not dissimilartothat of the Afghan army. In January 2018 the governor’s spokesman, Nasser Mehri, told Kabul-based daily Etilaat-e Roz that the local Taleban were equipped with helmet cameras and night-vision goggles.

According to Farid Bakhtawar, head of the provincial council, local government officials did manage to flee the city (see here). There were also reports that provincial governor Basir Salangi, a former mujahedin commander who was appointed in January 2018 (2), had left the city the night before fighting broke out and had relocated to a military base “a few miles from the city”, as the New York Times reported quoting “numerous local officials.” Ahmad Shah Fetrat, a local journalist in the city, told AAN “The city is empty, government offices, schools and shops are closed.” Tolo News quoted a local citizen as saying “people are running from the city.”

The Taleban, however, were unable to capture Farah airport’s runway or prevent reinforcements, particular of Afghan army commandos, arriving from Herat. Police special forces arrived from Kandahar (media report here) and Afghan and US air forces also carried out a number of airstrikes. Local journalists in the provincial capital confirmed to AAN that they had seen US and Afghan helicopters flying over the city, and NATO’s Resolute Support mission also confirmed US airstrikes in the province (read here and here).

In the afternoon of 15 May, government forces managed to push back the attackers to the Regi area (media report here). There were also reports about Taleban sheltering in residential areas within the city’s limits, from which they had driven out residents.

On 17 May, new fighting broke out “in some key parts of the city,” according to Afghan media reports (for example here and here), with attacks on the ANP headquarters, the prison and the residence of the head of the provincial council. According to Reuters, at least one more suicide bomb attack was launched near the police headquarters. The third police district reportedly fell to the Taleban. The same day, the Ministry of Education ordered that all schools in the province remain closed “till the situation has improved”. Fighting subsided after a few hours of battle; the city has been quiet since.

According to governor Salangi, about 300 Taleban, 15 soldiers, ten policemen and five civilians were killed during the first day of fighting. These figures are likely too low, though. The Taleban claimed the number of their casualties was much lower, in the single digits only. Independent sources estimated that 180 people had been killed from all sides, but without differentiating how many from each. The Interior Ministry in Kabul confirmed that provincial deputy police chief Abdul Razeq Sherzad was among the injured.

Salangi said 1,000 Taleban had been involved in the attack, with another 1,000 reinforcements brought in during the day on 15 May. The numbers cannot be confirmed, but AAN heard from several sources that the Taleban had gathered fighters from Farah, Helmand and Herat’s Shindand district (see this AAN analysis).

An attack foretold

An attack on Farah city had long been feared. The Taleban have systematically worked their way towards the city over many years (see the second dispatch), and their efforts have intensified over recent months.

Haji Khair Muhammad Nurzai, deputy head of Farah’s provincial council, told AAN in January 2018 that Mullah Muzammel, the Taleban’s shadow governor during an earlier, failed attempt to capture Farah city in late September/early October 2017, had now become the commander of the Taleban’s south-western military zone. This had given him the means to gather a larger number of fighters. AAN had already heard in January 2018 that 300 to 400 Taleban from the three provinces under the command of a Mullah Daud had started attacking government security posts and establishing makeshift checkpoints on the Herat-Farah road to try to find and sometimes kill government officials or staff working for international NGOs. One such incident was reported by Jamila Amini, a member of Farah’s provincial assembly, who told the media on 6 January 2018 that three or four out of twenty bus passengers had been abducted by the Taleban (she did not give the exact location). According to her, those abducted had been former police and government employees (read here).

On 28 February 2018, the Washington Post reported that the Taleban were “over running several security outposts, killing at least 43 policemen and wounding more than 50,” and crossing “the dried Farah Rud River, a natural barrier to the city, and attack[ing] a suburban outpost.” At that time in January 2018, fighting had already been going on for 20 days, and Gulbahar Mujahed, the province’s acting police chief, had been killed by a roadside bomb. Three days later Muhammad Ismail, intelligence chief of Poshtrud district, was also killed in a Taleban ambush.

A provincial council member warned Afghan media, that “every night five to ten security force members are killed and Taleban seize their equipment. But the government so far has not done anything to tackle the issue” (here and here). Approximately 7,000 families had fled the area, according to the local representative of the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriations.

In late March, Afghan commandos attacked a Taleban commanders meeting in Bala Boluk district, but this did not prevent the 15 May attack on the provincial capital.

In late April 2018, two weeks before the recent offensive, members of Farah’s provincial council expressed concern over the increase in Taleban control throughouttheir province. Deputy council head,Khair Muhammad Nurzai, was quoted by the Afghan media as saying that three districts – Bakwa, Khak-e Safid and Gulestan – were under the Taleban’s complete control, although this claim was later denied by provincial police chief Sherzad. Gul Ahmad A’azami, an MP from Farah,said six districts were largely controlled by the Taleban – Bakwa, Gulestan, Poshtrud, Bala Boluk, Anar Dara and Khak-e Safid – with government presence limited to the immediate district centres. Just before the latest attack on the city in mid-May, local sources had told the author that, in fact, this was the case in all of Farah province’s ten rural districts. In the remaining four districts, Purchaman, Qala-ye Kah, Shib Koh and Lash wa Juwayn, the government was comparatively stronger, according to senator A’azami .

The centre of Anar Dara was briefly overrun by the Taleban in March 2018, as was Shebkoh centre in October 2017. In November 2017, the Afghan army had to use helicopters in Khak-e Safid’s district centre bazaar to repulse a Taleban attack.

A quarter of all provincial centres are under threat

Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defence has indirectly confirmed the Taleban’s strategy of surrounding provincial cities. On 16 May 2018 its spokesman, Muhammad Radmanesh, said with some understatement and reacting to a media query: “Yes. (…) a few cities are under pressure.”

Apart from Farah city, he listed Maimana (Faryab), Pul-e Khumri (Baghlan), Tirinkot (Uruzgan), Kunduz and also Faizabad (Badakhshan). The media report, also added Ghazni. There, intense fighting was reported in two districts on the same day. One of these districts – Zana Khan – is just outside the provincial capital. Fighting in the province continues.

Lashkargah (Helmand) and Sar-e Pul (where incidents are underreported) could also be put into this category, although the immediate pressure on the latter has been somewhat relieved by the military successes of both Afghan and US troops, part of President Trump’s mini-surge (AAN analysis here), by taking back Nawadistrict centre just outside Lashkargah from the Taleban in July 2017 (media report here). This means that more than a quarter of the country’s 34 provincial centres face a threat from the Taleban.

Kabul could be added to this list, although the threat there is of a different nature; while the country’s capital is not close to falling to the Taleban, it is under constant threat of suicide and so-called complex attacks on strategic installations. This assessment has frequently been confirmed by UNAMA’s regular reportingon civilian casualties, which has shown for a few years now that Kabul suffers a disproportionately high number of attacks. In 2017, “16 per cent of all civilian casualties during the year occurring from such attacks in Kabul city.” Kabul province also saw the highest number of civilian casualties of the country’s provinces. Some Afghan politicians, such as Interior Minister Wais Barmak, have spoken about a city “under siege,” and Kabulis definitely feel this (see, for example, this report by Afghan journalist and former AAN colleague Ali Latifi). This has also been confirmed in Europe where some governments are talking security threats down in the context of their policy of deporting rejected Afghan asylum seekers. Recently, on 9 March 2018, the Cournationale du droit d’asile, France’s highest asylum court, has described Kabul as a “high-intensity situation of indiscriminate violence” (see here).

Reports by AAN and others have shown for a long time how the Taleban have implemented their strategy, moving slowly towards and encircling provincial centres. The most successful example was – and still is – Kunduz. Although the Taleban quickly lost control of the provincial capital in 2015 – and only came close to maintaining some control in 2016 and 2017, they haverepeatedly shownthat they have been able to penetrate the city, reaching its very centre. Symbolic snapshots taken at the city’s central chowk (junction) are of symbolic value for them. They did the same at Farah’s central chowk in the morning of 15 May 2018 after sweeping in there.

In Kunduz, the Taleban built a fundament from which they could move forward for years to come. As this AAN report showed, they started creating footholds in Pashtun pockets there as early as 2005 and increased their military activity from 2009 onwards (see how the build-up occurred in this AAN dossier). Establishing positions near important road links has also been part of their strategy, such as near the Ring Road in the districts of Baghlan-e Jadid and Dand-e Ghoriin Baghlan province, to the south of Kunduz (see this AAN analysis), with the aim of creating options to block government troop reinforcements during attacks in Kunduz (see here). This is what happened during their successful attack on Kunduz in 2015 (AAN analysis here).

The Taleban had in fact closed in on Kunduz city before this (AAN report here), as seen by their control over most rural districts, much like in Farah. Repeated government ‘clearance operations’ have been unable to permanently drive them out, even from the city’s outskirts where their positions can be seen with the naked eye (see here). Control over most districts has changed hands frequently between the insurgents and the government. The last Taleban takeover happened in Qala-ye Zal district, again, in mid-April 2018 (media report here; earlier AAN analysis here).

As in Farah, Taleban advances in Kunduz have been made possible by a combination of factors such as factional conflictswithin the provincial administration (AAN analysis here), weak leadership and a lack of cooperation among the different security forces (see here), as well asthe misrule of pro-government auxiliary armed forces (see here). Kunduz’ situation was exacerbated further by ethnic tensions and the settling of old scores along these lines (see an early Human Rights Watch report here).

Although Baghlan’s situation is less acute than that of Kunduz, the environs of its provincial centre Pul-e Khumri have seen a build-up of Taleban control and repeated low-level fighting since 2014 (AAN report here). The outskirts of the town are also where the Taleban blew up a power line pylon in March, which provides electricity to Kabul – power is still patchy as we write (media report here). That the government is still unable to repair the damage is testament to the fact that it does not have a grip on the area. The current fighting over Talawa Barfak district in Baghlan is part of the regional picture, as its centre controls an alternative route between the Kabul region and Kunduz. Talawa Barfak centre was captured by the Taleban on 8 May 2018 and recaptured by governments on 18 May 2018 (media report here), a repetition of events in March 2017 (media report here).

Further south, from Ghazni, the New York Times reported on 9 May 2018 that the city was “on the brink of falling to the Taliban”as“an increasing number of insurgents live openly in the city. Their fighters regularly kill officials [and] a Taliban court claims jurisdiction over the city.” Already in December 2017, the Afghan news agency Pajhwok had quoted Hassan Raza Yousufi, a member of Ghazni’s Provincial Council, that “[b]usinessmen, Provincial Council members, governor house officials and other individuals give taxes to the Taliban.” According to the same report there are frequent attacks on police stations in the city. Deputy provincial governor Muhammad Aref Nuri was quoted as saying in November 2017 (source: BBC Monitoring) that there had been16 assassinations in the past eight months in the city.

The Taleban had raided Ghazni city before, on 14 September 2015 (an AAN’s reconstruction of events here). During that attack, the Taleban did not only storm the provincial prison but they also ransacked the local NDS office, capturing intelligence files. This attack, however, was not a means to take over the city. Given certain parallels, it might suggest that the recent attack in Farah was not designed to capture or hold Farah either, but to strike and show the vulnerability of the Afghan forces and to stay in positions nearby. The Taleban’s modus operandi of only briefly capturing district centres, where government forces have repeatedly been forced to react and recapture, might be part of this strategy. This is not to say the Taleban would be able to hold a large provincial city for a longer period.

Over the past few months, frequent fighting hasalso been reported from Deh-e Yak, Khwaja Omari and Andar district, all three situated just outside Ghazni city. For example, the Taleban laid siege on Andar district in October 2017, attacked Deh-e Yak several times in November 2017, and temporarily overran Khwaja Omari in April 2018, shooting dead the district governor and police chief. AAN heard from locals that they dug a trench across that road, ambushing approaching vehicles of the security forces.

Information AAN received from local sources indicates that the attack on Jaghatu in particular, where the district headquarters was defended by only 15 to 20 police and NDS was orchestrated by the Taleban in order to seize weapons. According to these reports, they took a ranger vehicle and a mortar and burned whatthey could not carry. They set fire to the police HQ building as well. Reinforcements arrived very late, and could only retrieve the bodies of the 11 dead and five injured.

While AAN has covered the situation in Helmand and around Lashkargah in two long dispatches (see here and here) and in Faryab as well as its centre, Maimana, which is surrounded in all but one direction, less information is available for Uruzgan and Sar-e Pul provinces.

But reports of fighting near the two provincial centres, Tirinkot and Sar-e Pul, are frequent. Local reports from Uruzgan indicate that the situation is not greatly different from that in Farah; with most districts – except their immediate centres – under Taleban control and their fighters in the vicinity of the provincial centre. The last media reports are about a – failed – Taleban attempt to take over the centre of Chinartu district in January 2018 (here), both sides suffering consider casualties during fighting near Chora district centre in March and late May. On 31 May, Major Muhammad Sadiq, spokeman for Atal Military Corps 205, a military corp operate in the southern region of the country, told VOA Pashto that they had killed 12 Taleban in their air and ground attacks. He said that they had recaptured a number of areas of Chora district from the insurgents and that there was no risk of Chora district collapsing. The Taleban’s spokesman, on the other hand, tweeted on 30 May that they had captured Chora district. There was also a report in May that most voter registration centres in the province were“closed due to insecurity.”In Sar-ePul, the Taleban have brought relative stability to Kohistanat, a district they have controlled since 2015, while frequently threatening Sayyad district, which is next to the provincial capital, as well as Sancharak district. A rare indication of the complicated situation in Sar-e Pul city was given by the Afghan election observer organisation, the Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan (TEFA) in September 2017, when a representative told AAN (see here) that the Independent Election Commission only managed to access the provincial capital for its polling centre assessment. In general, though, remote Sar-e Pul is more like an area of retreat for Taleban fighters in provinces nearby, including Jawzjan and Faryab.

Finally, it is no coincidence that the three provinces withthe highest number of districts under Taleban control – Uruzgan, Kunduz and Helmand (according to the US military – USFOR-A) – are all provinces where the provincial capital is also under threat (quoted from 30 April 2018 SIGAR quarterly, see here):

USFOR-A identified the provinces with the largest percentage of insurgent-controlled or -influenced districts as Uruzgan Province, with four of its six districts under insurgent control or influence, Kunduz Province (five of seven districts), and Helmand Province (nine of 14 districts), all unchanged since last quarter.

Conclusion: A war of attrition and a waiting game

The Taleban strategy of surrounding and putting pressure on a number of Afghan provincial centres might be a deliberate strategy or just the coincidental outcome of their efforts to ensure territorial gain. Despite some fluctuation in their territorial gains, the Taleban have managed to establish and hold positions that are threat to a number of key population centres and national highways. From there, they can almost strike at will; government troops are mostly on the defensive and constantly forced to react by sending in the few élite troops that they have – which may well lead to their attrition (see AAN analysis here).

The Taleban apply a similar modus operandi to district centres, with a strategy that could be called assault-and-retreat. The fact that the Afghan Minister of Defence recently called (media report here) 216 of the 407 districts “unsecure” reflects that this strategy is both paying off and widespread.

Given the slow pace of the Taleban’s actual territorial gains, around one per cent per quarter according to figures given in the most recent SIGAR quarterly report in April 2018, this kind of war could go on for a long time. It depends on which side can hold its breath for longest, the insurgents or the Afghan government and its allies. It could also depend on which of them may be prepared to take a bold step to break out of this vicious circle, vicious mainly for the Afghan people and the country’s infrastructure.

With regards to Farah, the fact that the Taleban were only pushed back to positions just outside the provincial capital from where they started their attack means that new attacks can be expected. Farah is only one example for a situation that prevails in at least a quarter of Afghanistan’s provinces. It remains to be seen what happens if they acquire the capacity to attack several provincial capitals at the same time.

 

 

 

(1) The capital of Farah is inhabited by between 38,000 to 108,000 people depending on different sources. The lower figure stems from the Afghan Ministry of Urban Development and Housing’s report, “State of Afghan Cities” (2015) – it also gives 5,299 “dwelling units” for the city; the higher figures is from the Afghan Central Statistics Office 2012.

The term “city” for Farah should be taken with a pinch of salt. As many other provincial and most district centres, it does not have much of an urban character, with most buildings being low and many of traditional style. They are more village-like, and – more importantly – there is not much infrastructure that holds them together.

(2) His predecessor had stepped down following local protests regarding corruption and deteriorating security, citinginterference by powerful “individuals” in his work (see here).

 

 

Upgrade Your Graphic Card and Prepare for New Military Games

With the symbolic intercept of a Montenegrin Government aircraft, Italian and Greek fighters have kicked off a new NATO Air Policing mission. On Jun. 5, the day of the anniversary of Montenegro’s membership in NATO, the Italian and Hellenic Air Force have started protecting the airspace of Montenegro. The new NATO Air Policing mission kicked […]

On 4-5 June, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq travelled to Cyprus for a two-days working visit. During the visit, Mr Domecq met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nikos Christodoulides, and the Minister of Defence, Mr. Savvas Angelides, for discussions on EU defence initiatives as well as Cyprus’ current and potential future contributions to EDA projects and programmes. Minister Angelides announced during the visit that Cyprus would participate in the Agency’s Military Search Capability Building project in the domain of Countering-Improvised Explosive Devices. 

During the meeting with the Minister of Defence, discussions included the general state of play regarding the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence including the revision of the Capability Development Plan (CDP), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund, with focus of the discussions on EDA's role.

Minister Angelides and Chief Executive Domecq also exchanged views on EU-NATO cooperation as well as regional and broader priorities on security and defence. Chief Executive Domecq highlighted, “EDA supports all Member States, irrespective of their size, in order to develop the capabilities they need now and in the future. I very much welcome Cyprus’ active involvement in EDA projects; and I want to reiterate that EDA is there to support and to contribute to an enhanced security environment for Cypriot citizens.”

At a joint press point, Minister Angelides emphasised the close cooperation between Cyprus and EDA. He said, “We strongly believe that the European Defence Agency is a trusted European facilitator in the domain of the development of military capabilities and a powerful locus for cooperation between the Member States in this crucial sector. EDA has so far managed to illustrate its pivotal role in the European defence cooperation while its achievements constitute a solid proof of its outstanding efforts. Cyprus appreciates the role of the EDA and is actively engaged for supporting the Agency in accomplishing its mission.”

Chief Executive Domecq and Minister Angelides also discussed Cyprus’ involvement in ongoing EDA projects with focus on cyber defence, C-IEDs, energy and environment, protection of critical infrastructure and satellite communications as well as projects in the maritime domain where Cyrpus takes a proactive role.

During his visit, Mr Domecq also had the occasion to meet with other high-level officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence as well as representatives of Cypriot academia and research centers.

Before deploying to the Baltic region, two A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft flew over the beaches of Normandy, France, as part of the commemoration ceremonies for D-Day 74. Eight A-10C attack aircraft from the 107th FS of the 124th Fighter Wing Michigan Air National Guard, from Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan, arrived on stopover at RAF […]

The European Defence Agency’s Steering Board has given its green light to the development of a European Military Airworthiness Platform for Safety Information Exchange (EMAP SIX). This central database will enable participating Member States operating the same aircraft types to exchange airworthiness related safety information with relevant stakeholders on a need to know basis and in a secure environment. 

The database will make airworthiness related safety information in the military domain available on a single central platform at European level. As such, the database will facilitate cooperation between Member States, with relevant civil aviation safety stakeholders, and further increase trust in European Military Aviation. 

In a pilot phase, the MRTT and A400M common aircraft systems will be used for the initial development of the database. Subject to an evaluation of the results in the context of the European Military Airworthiness Authorities (MAWA) Forum, a further extension of the database to other aircraft systems is envisaged. 
 

Backgound

Operating common aircraft types in various national fleets also entails the existence of common technical safety risks. To mitigate identified 'unsafe conditions' effectively and to prevent hazardous or catastrophic events, competent airworthiness authorities coordinate the necessary measures with certificate holders and manufacturers by releasing mandatory safety information through the so-called ‘Airworthiness Directives’. 

Currently, the responsibility for processing this information is split between participating Member States' national authorities and other relevant aviation safety stakeholders. The establishment of a central database facilitating a uniform and consistent exchange of oversight information and obligations will provide for the further harmonisation of administrative processes used by participating Member States’ National Military Airworthiness Authorities, reduce the related administrative burden and contribute to maintaining a high safety level. Beyond that, it will support further cooperation among EU Member States when joining efforts in development, procurement and operation of military aircraft systems.

 

Ukrainian Antonov An-77 Medium-Range Transport Aircraft

A Ukrainian attack jet almost “buzzed” bathers on a beach at a popular resort town in southeastern Ukraine amid growing tensions with Russia in the Sea of Azov. Su-25 attack jets are particularly comfortable at very low altitudes and the Ukrainian Frogfoots often fly at low-level as part of their Close Air Support training. Indeed, […]

Russian Ural-63708 Tank Transporter

A new short book-length report, “Incremental peace in Afghanistan” looks at what is needed to end the Afghan conflict. It explores the many drivers towards the war continuing – external backing for both sides, the war economy and basic persisting disputes about power-sharing – but also details what could drive a peace process – the many concerns shared by Afghans, the view of the war as pointless and, they say, international interest in achieving peace. The new report has an interesting mix of contributors – female, male, Afghan and international, civilians, Taleban, activists, politicians, academics and military. In this review, AAN Co-Director Kate Clark finds the report is timely and full of fresh voices and ideas.

Talk of peace in Afghanistan is in the air, at least more than it was a year ago. 2018 has seen the Taleban publishing a “Letter to the American people” on 14 February which appeared to propose talks with the US (1) and on 28 February President Ashraf Ghani offered peace talks to the Taleban without pre-conditions (read AAN’s take on that here). Positive noises came from the NATO’s Foreign Ministers meeting on 27 April (2) and from Resolute Support and United States military commander in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson on 30 May. As Radio Free Europe reported, he said some Taleban are talking, with a lot of “diplomatic activity and dialogue… occurring off the stage, and… at multiple levels,” with “mid-level, senior-level Taliban leaders engaging with Afghans” (full text of his press briefing here).

This year as well, a new, non-aligned, (very) embryonic peace movement has emerged after civilians in Helmand, fed up with being killed by both sides, called for a ceasefire; groups in more than half of Afghanistan’s provinces have since come together to echo these demands (see AAN reporting here). Many Afghans are also looking admiringly at the mass demonstrations known as the ‘Pashtun Long March’ that have been held across the border in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pashtun civilians there are demanding civil rights and an end to insurgency and counter-insurgency being played out by Pakistani Taleban and Islamabad in their lands (see media reporting here and here).

As the Afghan conflict enters its fortieth year, there is actually quite a lot of agreement about it – virtually everyone agrees neither side can win and that the conflict is causing atrocious damage to Afghanistan and its people (ten thousand civilians killed and injured last year, to mention just one of the nasty statistics of this war – see more here). Yet even those who want to prioritise peace-making are often left stumped with many unanswered questions: what to do, who should speak to whom, what would peace ‘mean’ and how can we help (the author has heard the last question raised in many military and civilian international circles in recent weeks).

A timely publication

The publication by Conciliation Resources of “Incremental Peace in Afghanistan” is therefore very timely. (3) It is also very good, providing context, information and quite a lot of fresh thinking. This is how the editors lay out what they feel they have done with this publication:

[We] identify the need for a radical change in approach to move beyond peace rhetoric in Afghanistan through a progressive, step-by-step process towards political settlement, which builds stability, confidence and legitimacy over time. This would pursue two phased objectives: first, short-term – to reduce violence which inevitably involves a central role for the conflict parties, principally the Taliban and the Afghan government; and second, long-term – to achieve a more broadly inclusive social contract representative of all Afghans which is only achievable with involvement and ultimately endorsement across Afghan society.

There is a good range of contributors, including local perspectives from civilians in four provinces and from senior Taleban commanders and leaders in four areas of the country and from Quetta, analyses from academics like Barnett Rubin, Muhammad Nazif Shahrani and Thomas Barfield, the thoughts of senior politicians/military leaders including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Yunus Qanuni, Habiba Sarabi and retired US general Douglas Lute and statements from High Peace Council chair Abdul Karim Khalili and spokesman for the Taleban’s political office in Qatar Muhammad Suhail Shahin.

The report is split into three parts: historical lessons from the conflict and from earlier attempts at peace-making, priorities for peace initiatives, and options for institutional change. The lessons-learned section aims at understanding “how departures from established, violent political paths might be possible” and includes historical analyses of the Afghan state, critiques of the Bonn agreement and of Dr Najib’s late PDPA era attempts at ‘national reconciliation’ and a setting out of how the Taleban view the post-2001 era.

The final section of the report looks at the possibilities for institutional changes and features the thoughts of Hekmatyar and Qanuni and the views of Afghans living in rural Balkh, Nangrahar, Herat and Ghazni on elections, peace and reconciliation. It was thesecond section, ‘peace initiatives’, however, which contained some particularly interesting insights.

Fleshing out some detail when looking at initiatives for peace

Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam manages to get away from focusing on women’s representation as mainly a tick in the box exercise to actually asking what would women’s participation mean for the peace process and how a range of Afghan women could be represented. For example, she writes:

There is also often an assertion that gains from a peace process absent of women would not be sustainable. But it is not clear how women’s participation would guarantee sustainability if women participants are in any case disempowered and must be granted space and permission to engage in the first place. This comes across as fearful and anxious rather than a proactive approach to entering the peace marketplace and seeing what is on offer. On the other hand, proactive approaches to peacebuilding on a small scale and at a local level have been fruitful, as a woman activist working with local shuras to reduce civilian casualties recently told me.

Perhaps the most surprising chapter is when of the publication’s editors, Anna Larson, hears from senior Taleban commanders and leaders from five ‘caucuses’ in the north, west/north-west, south-east, south and Quetta. “All groups currently self-identify as Taliban and belong to the central Taliban movement,” she writes, “but some have expressed the desire to become autonomous from it.” The conversations took place “in person over the course of several days in spring 2018 at an undisclosed location outside of Afghanistan, to which the five caucuses concerned had travelled in order to begin talks with
a group of high-level actors representing several countries, including Afghanistan and the United States, about the de-escalation of violence and potential for reconciliation with the Afghan government.” One of the positions common to all five caucuses, says Larson, is that, “Above all, it is critical to end the needless killing of Afghans. We want to work towards the establishment of peace in our country.”

There is a lot that is interesting and unexpected in what these particular Taleban say. Among other things, those in the north complain about their marginalisation by  “Kandaharis and Zadranis,” (4) a reference to the predominance of Kandaharis in the leadership and the clout of the Haqqanis. And, one of the west/north-westerners complains about the lack of local Pashtun political representation on the Provincial Council and in parliament – he also compares government help to his area, unfavourably, with the previous efforts of NATO’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams. A “senior member of an opposition group that has links to the Taliban” in the south-east insists they started fighting the ‘US invasion’ only in self-defence:

We are not the followers of fighting. We want to continue towards peace – we are not against democracy, it is not against Islam. We have three clinics and we have female doctors too. No one can control local security as well as we can. There is a dam being built in one of our districts and we have 60 people providing security for that project. No engineer has died or been kidnapped. We are supporting them. Police are in their jobs, we are supporting them also.

…No one will find anything in
our history that connects us to suicide bombers. In our mountain areas there are foreign fighters – Chechen, Punjabi, etc – and we try to stop them as far as possible but we cannot do this all the time. We do not allow them to come to the villages or the mosques. Foreign fighters have a lot of money and weapons but still we try to stop them. We have no funds from opium. The Peshawar Shura is supporting the Haqqanis but it is not supporting us.
This is our story.

This chapter shows that there are different voices within the Taleban. Those featured in the report may be critical of their own leadership, but, it should be noted, they are even more scathing about the Kabul government, complaining about corruption, the “criminals in power” and government forces who they allege sell their weapons to the insurgents and do not come to the aid of their comrades. These Taleban are not interested in surrender or coming over to Kabul, but they are interested in ending the conflict. It is also interesting that they talk about jobs, representation, power in Kabul and the districts, and the influence of Pakistan – all very normal concerns for Afghans generally.

Even though the Taleban controls or influences much of Afghanistan (how much is argued over, see here) for the discussion), the voices of individual fighters and commanders are rarely heard. Not all of this chapter is easy reading, but it is a welcome contribution, adding nuance, detail, complexity and some internal contradictions into what some Taleban within the movement think.

Also in the section on peace initiatives, Julius Cavendish writes about three local peace ‘accords’ that were made between Taleban and communities in Helmand province in 2006 and 2010 and which were successful but which ultimately failed. Although they had the support of some international players, they also suffered from a lacklustre response from provincial and central government and hostility by senior US commanders (described in this 2014 dispatch for AAN).

The accords show, Cavendish writes, that “even in the midst of very violent conflict, peace is possible in Afghanistan – and that local populations are prepared to take calculated risks to make it happen.” He believes the way the accords worked – and ultimately failed – also point to “several simple yet critical lessons.” They are: recognise that good brokers can play essential roles
in peace mediation but have ambiguous identities; empower local communities; honour commitments punctually; be realistic about central government support; recognise that local deals can nonetheless pave
the way for a national settlement and; coordinate military and political activities. On that last point, Cavendish writes:

This fundamental disconnect between Afghan and British officials pursuing a political deal on the one hand, and
US warfighters on the other, was also evident in the contrasting narratives with which each described the second Sangin accord. Senior US commanders framed the deal as a surrender by Taliban-aligned fighters to the coalition rather than a compromise with honour – a depiction that many [Upper Sangin Valley] found both insulting and inaccurate. At the same time, US commanders insisted on ‘testing the deal’, sometimes by contravening its terms….

Where political and military action was coordinated, however, as it had been in the build-up to the first Sangin accord, the results were effective. Most notably, the exercise of ‘heroic restraint’ by British forces through
the first half of 2010 was viewed positively by local communities, and contrasted sharply with abusive behaviour by out-of-area Taliban personnel, whose actions bred resentment and eventually led them to be perceived as occupiers – precisely as the district governor and his advisors intended.

Michael Semple, now a professor at Queen’s University, Belfast, but previously with both the United Nations and European Union mission in Afghanistan looks at what will be needed to foster a peaceful Afghanistan that is stable in the long-run. “A single, comprehensive peace agreement to agree a new social contract is unlikely to be achievable,” he warns. “A more viable alternative model would involve an incremental, phased approach that builds confidence over time.” He posits ten (rather daunting) priorities that need to be discussed and dealt with to create the sort of new ‘social contract’ which would foster peace and stability. They include “the preservation of national unity and Afghan identity; international military forces; security, respect and basic needs for combatants and people affected by conflict; state-citizen relations and the role and privileges of elites.” (5)

Dialogue and reform is needed, but cannot begin, he insists, without first an end to the violence:

The best way to shape the conditions conducive to
such a sustained process of dialogue and reform would be to agree a pause in the fighting early on. Conflict parties wishing to participate in such a sustained peace process would need first to sign up to the suspension of violence.

Conclusion: drivers towards peace… and war

This new publication makes plain the very real factors driving the horrible persistence of war in Afghanistan:

… a well-established war economy, which fuels and funds violence. Both main parties to the war – the Taliban and the Afghan government – remain determined to fight on and have secured sufficient external backing to do so. Underlying the violence are persistent political disputes over how power is shared and how future reforms are configured.

Yet it also highlights how much Afghans of all stripes have in common, with concerns shared and even some of their narratives overlapping. There is a communal weariness with the war and a collective view that the conflict is pointless – what actuallyis it over? Also positive in the drive for an end to the war, say the authors, is that there is international interest in achieving peace.

The editors recognise both the many real difficulties and dangers and the many positive pro-peace forces. For them, after eighteen months of research on the topic, unless there is to be anindefinite continuation of violent conflict, an incremental progress towards sustainable peace is needed:

The cessation of violence would represent the single most important
action to build confidence and help launch dialogue on core substantive issues. Such an approach recognises the importance of rebuilding relationships between the parties in expanding the possibility of agreement. Rather than involving a single text such as the 2001 Bonn Accords, an incremental peace in Afghanistan might consist of a series of agreements sequenced from easy to hard, with agreed reforms and confidence-building connecting the parallel short- and long-term tracks over a period of years.

As Afghanistan enters its fortieth year of conflict, this reviewer, at least, was happy to be reading something fresh and practical about how to achieve peace.

 

(1) Part of the Taleban’s letter read as follows:

The Islamic Emirate had asked America from the very beginning to solve her issues with the Islamic Emirate through talk and dialogue. The use of force has adverse consequences, and you might have now discerned the bitter consequences of American aggression against Afghanistan. If the policy of using force is exercised for a hundred more years and a hundred new strategies are adopted, the outcome of all of these will be the same as you have observed over the last six months following the initiation of Trump’s new strategy.

According we still believe that it is not too late for the American people to understand that the Islamic Emirate – as representative of its people – can solve its problems with every side through healthy politics and dialogue. Needless use of force only complicates the issues by creating new dimensions which gradually move out of the realm of control. The Islamic Emirate is a regional power with deep roots which cannot be subdued by sheer force. The chances of dialogue however are not exhausted. The American people must understand that the Islamic Emirate understands its responsibility and can play a constructive role in finding a peaceful solution for issues but this can never mean that we are exhausted or our will has been sapped. It is our policy that logic should be given a chance before the use of force. Whatever can be achieved by logic, should not be relinquished due to the use of force. It is the moral obligation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to inform you, the American masses, about these realities.

(2) The Foreign Ministers’ statement included the following (emphasis added of a phrase which seems to point to the role of NATO forces in the country):

NATO Allies are united in their support for this proposal of an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process. We will respect and support a negotiated political settlement led by the Afghan Government which ends violence, cuts ties to terrorism and protects the human rights of all Afghan citizens. We also support the Afghan Government’s intention to address all contested issues between the parties, including those relating to the future role of the international community in Afghanistan.

(3) Conciliation Resources (www.c-r.org.) describes itself as “an independent international organisation working with people in conflict to prevent violence, resolve conflicts and promote peaceful societies.” It publishes reports, roughly one a year, in a series titled “Accord”.  These are aimed at informing and strengthening “peace processes by documenting and analysing the practical lessons and innovations of peacebuilding.”

(4) This should be ‘Zadran’, used for both single and plural members of the tribe

(5) Semple’s other priority areas are: inclusive security reform; property, economic rights and the illicit economy; structure of government and consolidation
of electoral democracy; promoting Islam and religious freedom; judiciary and legal system; and ethnicity, social inclusion and equality of opportunity.

 

 

This cool footage shows what it looks like to fly an A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft. Filmed on May 26, the following footage shows Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Mike Schriever, a pilot in the 303rd Fighter Squadron, flying an A-10 Thunderbolt II alongside his wingman, Air Force 1st Lieutenant Tanner Rindels, over Miami Beach, Florida […]

Russian Ural-63704-0010 Heavy Utility Truck

Americas

• The Navy is tapping Orbital ATK Inc. to upgrade its inventory of guided missiles. The awarded contract modification is valued at $171 million and provides for the procurement of full-rate production for the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) in support of the Navy and the government of Australia. Under the contract Orbital ATK will convert 271 provided AGM-88B High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles into 253 Navy AGM-88E AARGM all-up-rounds (AURs). The AGM-88E AARGM is a medium range, supersonic, air-launched tactical missile compatible with U.S. and allied strike aircraft, including all variants of the F/A-18, Tornado, EA-18G, F-16, EA-6B, and F-35. Its primary job is to attack and kill enemy radars. AARGM’s production phase may total up to $1.4 billion for 2,121 missiles, to equip the US Navy, US Marine Corps and partnering nations. The contract also includes an option to exercise related services necessary for AARGM manufacture and deployment. Work will be performed in Northridge and Ridgecrest, California and is expected to be completed in March 2020.

• Lockheed Martin is being awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order. Valued at $46.6 million the delivery order provides for non-recurring engineering, the development of design documentation, and the creation of modification instructions. These efforts will support service life extension and enable the developmental test F-35 aircraft to maintain currency with delivered technology. The F-35 Joint Strike fighter can be considered as the largest single global defense program in history. Testing and re-testing is an incremental part of this project. Due to the jets high procurement cost, Lockheed Martin is trying to develop systems that extend the F-35s life while keeping the associated costs to a minimum. This delivery order combines purchases for the Navy $12.37 million; Marine Corps $12,37 million; and non-US DoD participants $7,89 million. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, Texas and is expected to be completed in June 2019.

• The Air Force is procuring new parts for its fleet of C-130J aircraft. The $29.5 million contract provides for the R391 propellers and spares currently used on the transport plane. GE Aviation, doing business as Dowty Propellers Inc. will work in conjunction with the commercial Rolls Royce AE 2100D3 engine managed by the Warner Robins, Air Logistics Center. The C-130 Hercules remains one of the longest-running aerospace manufacturing programs of all time. The C-130J looks a lot like its predecessors but has seen some major changes. Its improvements are mostly clustered around 2 key characteristics: performance, and operational costs. It uses lighter Rolls-Royce AE2100D3 engines, coupled with a 6-blade Dowty R-391 propeller system made of composite materials. The overall system generates 29% more thrust, while increasing fuel efficiency by 15% and offering improved reliability and maintenance. Work will be performed in Sterling, Virginia, and is expected to be completed by May 2023.

Middle East & Africa

• Jane’s reports that, Epsilor, an Israeli battery and charger manufacturer is set to provide the Canadian Armed Forces with a battery charging solution. The $3 million contract sees for the development and delivery of 400 multi-channel chargers, spares, and services in support of Canada’s Integrated Soldier System (ISS) program. The Canadian ISS program is essentially a suite of military equipment that soldiers wear as part of their combat load. It includes weapon accessories and electronics that allow soldiers to stay connected with their teams after exiting vehicles on the battlefield. It also features a radio, a smartphone-like computer to run battle management software, a GPS, and a communications headset. The ISS combines those devices into an ensemble of system that greatly improves the situational awareness of the individual soldier. All of those systems require battery supplies for lengthy field operations.

Europe

• Sweden is set to close a deal with Raytheon in the next few weeks that sees for the procurement of the Patriot air defense missile system. The deal is initially worth around $1.13 billion and is the biggest military purchase since 2013 when Sweden started to upgrade 60 Saab Gripen fighters. The decision comes at time of heightened tensions between Western Europe and Russia. Moscow’s brief war with Georgia in 2008 and its annexation of the Crimea Peninsula six years later has pushed Sweden, not a NATO member but with close ties to the alliance, to rebuild its armed forces after decades of neglect. Sweden’s current air defense system, which is over a decade old, cannot shoot down ballistic missiles. The current US standard for new-build Patriot Missiles is the Patriot Advanced Capability 3. Its enhanced capabilities also allow it to be used for point defense against ballistic missiles, and its Config-3 ground systems also feature a range of improvements to the battery’s radar, communications, electronics, and software. The contract also includes an option to expand the purchase to up to 300 missiles. If the option is used, the final bill will be around $3 billion, Lewin said. If the government makes its final decision by August 10th, delivery of the first units could start in 2021.

• The German Army has taken delivery of its first Leopard 2A6MA2 main battle tank. The tank has been delivered to Armor Battalion 414, which is a joint German-Dutch tank company stationed in Lohnheide, Germany. The Leopard 2A6 is a German-made main battle tank designed and manufactured by the Company Krauss-Maffei Wegmann. It’s the successor of the main battle tank Leopard 1. The upgraded tank is a major step in the integration of the unit, with the tank’s Dutch Essential Land based Information Application & Services battlefield management system providing technical interoperability between the two forces. The tanks now also have the Blue Force Tracking System with which they can distinguish their own troops. This considerably reduces the risk of fire on their own troops. The Leopard’s will immediately participate in the German-Dutch contribution to the NATO flash force in 2019, a response to threats to NATO territory. The company will receive 16 tanks in total. Delivery is scheduled by the end of June.

Asia-Pacific

• Kazakhstan is acquiring four more combat helicopters to boost its strike capabilities. After all of its Mi-24s have been withdrawn from service, Kazakhstan Air Defense Forces are quickly moving to address the gap in rotary-wing combat capability. To fill this gap the country has signed a deal with Russia that provides for the delivery of four Mil Mi-35M helicopters. The multirole Mi-35M attack helicopter is a comprehensive modernization of the Mi-24V and was developed by the Mil Moscow Helicopter plant and has been series produced at Rostvertol since 2005. The main role of this helicopter is destruction of armored vehicles, enemy troops, UAVs and other helicopters. Its secondary role is delivery of troops and special cargo, evacuation of wounded. It can operate at night and in adverse weather conditions. This attack helicopter can carry different weapons, including podded guns, 8 Ataka-V or Shturm-V ant-tank missiles and Igla-V air-to-air missiles, unguided rockets or bombs. The country already took delivery of the first four Mi-35s late 2016, with another four scheduled for arrival by the end of 2018 as part of a contract signed with Russian Helicopters in 2017.

Today’s Video

• Four F-22s touch down in Okinawa

The Dutch Defence Materiel Organisation has handed over the Kodiak armoured engineer vehicle (AEV) to the Royal Netherlands Army, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced on 31 May. The Netherlands is co-operating with Sweden on the procurement of 10 Dutch and six Swedish Kodiaks. The AEV was