Defence`s Feeds

Unconfirmed reports say an American pilot was also aboard the Ukrainian Flanker. On Oct. 16, a Ukrainian Air Force Su-27 flying a training mission crashed near Ulaniv (between the settlements of Berdichev and Khmilnyk) in Ukraine, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine announced. According to Meduza, a Riga-based online newspaper and news […]

Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive, met today in Warsaw with the Polish Minister of Defence, Mariusz Błaszczak. He also had talks with the Head of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Michał Dworczyk, the National Armament Director, Brig Gen Karol Dymanowski, as well as with senior representatives from the Ministry’s Capability, R&T and Budget directorates, and from the Polish Defence Policy Director’s office.   

The main topics discussed during these meetings included the current state of play and way ahead in the implementation of the various EU defence initiatives (PESCO, CARD, EDF), the recently revised EU Capability Development Priorities, Poland’s current and potential future contributions to EDA projects and programmes, the implications of the Agency’s recent Long-Term Review (LTR) as well as the EU-NATO relations.

Participating in around 40 EDA projects, Poland is among the six greatest contributors to the Agency.

“We are in an important phase of the implementation process of the various EU defence initiatives. After the approval of the revised EU Capability Development Priorities (CDP) in June, we are now finalizing the report on the trial run of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) to be presented to Ministers in November when Member States are also expected to select the second batch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects. More than ever, it is important that CARD, PESCO and European Defence Fund (EDF) are implemented in a coherent and coordinated manner, based on agreed EU Capability Development Priorities, and in full transparency and complementarity with NATO”, Mr Domecq stated.

Mr Domecq also attended today the opening of the Conference on the second Phase of the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (CF SEDSS II) in Warsaw (see other EDA news here).  The Forum brings together experts from the defence and energy sectors to share information and best practices on improving energy management, energy efficiency, the use of renewable energy as well increasing the protection and resilience of defence energy-related critical infrastructures. 

 

Over 140 experts from 27 European countries and more than 30 different institutions and organisations participate in the Conference on the second Phase of the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (CF SEDSS II). The Forum brings together experts from the defence and energy sectors to share information and best practices on improving energy management, energy efficiency, the use of renewable energy as well as increasing the protection and resilience of defence energy-related critical infrastructures.

Managed by EDA, the Consultation Forum is a European Commission initiative (DG ENER) receiving funding under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 R&I programme. The   conference of today was officially opened by Mr Tomasz Zdzikot, Polish Deputy Minister of Defence. Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive highlighted in his speech the “large number of participants which send the strong message that sustainable energy matters for defence, and a greener defence energy matters for the European Union”.

Mr Hans Van Steen, Acting Director for Renewables, Research and Innovation, Energy Efficiency, DG ENER, European Commission, underlined the importance of having seen “a network develop, information being exchanged, best practices being shared, and capacity, trust and self-confidence grow”.

The Consultation Forum provides a unique platform that can assist the Ministries of Defence of the EU Member States to generate ideas for defence energy policies, strategies, action plans and defence energy-related project ideas. This process will enable them to move towards a more sustainable energy model bringing down energy bills that can be allocated to other military priorities. In this respect, the second phase is more project-oriented, and as the Chief Executive underlined, it “presents a financial and strategic opportunity to improve energy efficiency and to diversify the energy supply and enhance resilience to security challenges”. Mr Hans Van Steen drew the participants’ attention to the fact that “At a time of tight defence budgets, the Defence and Security sector cannot afford to ignore the opportunities that a state-of-the-art approach to energy efficiency and renewable energy sources offer in terms of economic advantages, security of supply and environmental impact”. He then added that, in this context, “It is very important that the Defence community has a clear understanding of how the new EU legislation on energy could affect its work. The Energy Union Framework Strategy is not only about energy and climate: it is part of a wider policy aimed at accelerating the fundamental modernisation of Europe's entire economy, making it low-carbon and energy and resource efficient, by transforming the whole energy system in a socially fair manner.“

The Warsaw Conference focusses on a range of financing and funding options, coming either from the national public sector or the European Union instruments. To support this process, the Chief Executive has launched today the European Funding Gateway for Energy in Defence, a dedicated web-page on the EDA website. Through this instrument, he encourages the participants to explore what is “an overview of the financing and funding opportunities that the defence sector, and the Ministries of Defence and Armed Forces, industry, research and technology organisations or academia, can access at the European level for energy-related projects”.

The Conference will last two days and address several topics ranging from energy data in defence, energy metering & data collection, energy performance contracts, RES projects including energy storage to critical energy infrastructure resilience and energy-related legislation.
 

Next Conference

The third Conference of the Consultation Forum will be hosted by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Cyprus and will take place in Nicosia on 26 and 27 February 2019.
 

About the CF SEDSS II

The Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (CF SEDSS) is a European Commission initiative managed by the EDA. It aims at bringing together experts from the defence and energy sectors to share information and best practices on improving energy management, energy efficiency, the use of renewable energy as well increasing the protection and resilience of defence energy-related critical infrastructures. On 20 October 2017, the second phase of the Consultation Forum (CF SEDSS II) was launched. This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, and the agreement is between the EASME executive agency and the EDA. The contract was signed on 16 October 2017 for 22 months, expiring on August 2019. 
Based on the foundations laid during the first phase of the Consultation Forum (2015-2017), the second phase has been further expanded to cover the following interrelated subjects though three main working groups (including sub-working groups): WG 1: Energy Management including Energy Efficiency (Sub-WG1: Energy Management and Sub-WG2: Energy Efficiency; WG 2: Renewable Energy Sources and Technologies; WG 3: Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructure and one cross-cutting theme: Finance.

More information:

• About CF SEDSS II at https://www.eda.europa.eu/european-defence-energy-network/cf-sedss-phase-ii
• European Funding Gateway for Energy in Defence at www.eda.europa.eu/eufunding/energy 
• Speech, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq

Myanmarese MA-S Designated Marksman Rifle

The F-35 Patuxent River Integrated Test Force (ITF) achieved a new milestone performing a Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landing (SRVL) on aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth. On Oct. 13, an F-35B STOVL (Short Take Off Vertical Landing) variant of the Joint Strike Fighter performed the first  Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landing (SRVL) on the flight deck of […]

The European Defence Agency (EDA) is actively participating in the 13th Air Navigation Conference of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), under the umbrella of the European Commission Directorate General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE). The agenda of the conference themed 'From Development to Implementation' includes a topic on civil-military cooperation. The EDA plays a key role in this domain and at EU level, to facilitate the coordination of military views and act as interface between the Military community and the EU institutions. As a result, EDA coordinated the development of the working paper proposed by the EU on this topic.

ICAO Member States and aviation stakeholders attend the conference to exchange on global strategies for safety and air navigation planning, development and implementation. As part of the European Union delegation mandated by Violeta Bulc, European Commissioner for Mobility and Transport, Mr Christophe Vivier, Head of Unit SES/SEAR, and Mr Denis Bouvier, Project Officer SES Policy, will participate on behalf of the EDA.

This year’s conference focuses on the implementation of operational improvements from the conceptual phase until deployment. It emphasizes the importance of concepts for global use, the development of regional implementation plans and the local implementation of performance improvements, based on specific operational requirements in a cost-effective approach. Participants will establish priorities for safety and air navigation planning for the coming years and develop a set of high-level recommendations in different key performance areas of the air navigation system, to be submitted to the ICAO Council for subsequent endorsement by the 40th Session of the ICAO Assembly in 2019.

In close collaboration with the European Commission Directorate General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE) the Agency contributes to technical discussions on civil-military cooperation and coordinates the European Union’s military inputs towards it. Civil-military cooperation is necessary to enhance Air Traffic Management (ATM) as well as communication, navigation and surveillance (CNS), and to create a safe and more interoperable airspace. Its goal is to move from coordination to collaboration and from ATM research and development to implementation.

This contribution from the EDA reflects the strong collaboration links forged with DG MOVE regarding the military side of the SES/SESAR operations. The overall objective is to ensure that a modernised aviation system will accommodate the needs of all stakeholders, including the military, for operations and training, all types of platforms (manned and unmanned) and all types of missions, roles and applications, in a balanced and proportioned way, in peace time and in crisis situations.

In preparation for this important event, the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) set up an ad-hoc ECAC/EU coordination group for safety and ATM in which the EDA was represented. This group, co-chaired by the European Commission and by ECAC, has been tasked to steer the preparation of draft ‘European Working and Information Papers’ to be presented at AN-Conf/13.

Regarding Civil-Military cooperation, the AN-Conf/13 will be invited to agree on four recommendations:

1. Urge States to agree with the strategic approach moving from civil-military coordination to collaboration.
2. Request ICAO to provide appropriate guidelines on the strategic approach.
3. Encourage ICAO to develop together with States mechanisms to collaborate with the military community at global and regional levels.
4. Request ICAO to reinforce the development of civil-military synergies thanks to an effective collaboration starting from research and development to deployment of interoperable systems.

The final report will be available in two weeks.
 

More information:

• ICAO website
• Committee A - Agenda Item 3: Enhancing the global air navigation system (video)

 

 

There is a vibrant electoral atmosphere in Herat city and nearby district centres. Rival political forces have brought supporters onto the streets to show their power and candidates have opened campaign headquarters and engaged in a range of heated campaign activities. In the midst of the bustle, there are also concerns over a series of small-scale bombings and the arrival of tens of thousands of internally displaced families – whose presence may have repercussions for the elections. Moreover, the farther you go from the city and nearby district centres, the more insecurity grows and the election campaign diminishes. AAN researcher Said Reza Kazemi writes from Herat city that deteriorating security poses serious questions about how many voters will be able to get to the polls on 20 October and therefore how representative the election can be.

AAN has put together a dossier of dispatches related to the coming elections, looking at preparations and political manoeuvring. Each dispatch in the Election Conundrum series will be added to it.

Electoral atmosphere in and around Herat city: from reluctance to liveliness

When voter registration began in Herat city on 14 April 2018 (see here), there was a reluctance to participate. The previous fraudulent presidential and provincial council polls had fostered a disillusionment with the Afghan government and with elections. For one working day, the government closed its offices and public places such as institutes of higher education to at least get public servants, university teachers and students to register for the vote. Fears about security and Taleban threats fed into the disinclination to get involved. Thousands of people decided they did not want election stickers pasted on the back of their tazkeras (national ID cards). In some areas in some districts of Herat, where the Taleban hold sway, there was no registration at all. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) was not able to access one district, Farsi, when it carried out a security assessment of registration and polling centres in late 2017 (see AAN reporting on this here).

The consequence of all this was that, out of an estimated one million voters in Herat province, only around half registered (see also a previous AAN dispatch on new voter registry here), with, it is alleged, some communities hit harder than others. A Hazara elder who has lived around Herat city for more than a decade and a half and recently met two Hazara candidates (Habibullah Ghoryani, a newcomer, and Muhammad Reza Khushak Watandost, a sitting MP) for campaign purposes put it bluntly: “Thousands of our people did not register because they were afraid that… if they needed to travel overland between Herat, Kabul and elsewhere,” the Taleban, “would cut off their heads if they caught them with sticker-pasted tazkeras.” His estimate was that the Hazara vote should be 60,000-strong in Herat, but this year registered voters had “fallen to 26,000.” Some influential Shia Hazara and Sayyed residents of Herat told AAN they believed the threats could have been a conspiracy to scare their people away from the elections in order to disenfranchise them.

Even now, so soon before the vote on 20 October, there are contradictory voter registration figures. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) in Kabul has reported 539,141 registered voters (297,391 men, 239,818 women and 1,932 kuchis or nomads) (see page 9 here). According to Ahmad Shah Qanuni, head of the IEC office in Herat, the figure is less: 500,057 (about 55 per cent men and 45 per cent women). Meanwhile, an IEC official in Herat, who asked not to be named, told AAN that 557,720 people (308,613 men, 247,434 women and 1,673 kuchis) have registered to vote in the coming parliamentary elections in the province.

Nevertheless, despite all this, as time has gone by, Heratis have become increasingly interested in the elections. The city is bustling with election activity, some of it confrontational as rival groups face off ahead of the poll. (1) Protests have been deployed in a game to show off apparent power. One of the two main players in this game are those affiliated to the Grand National Coalition, an alliance of political parties that emerged from the so-called ‘Ankara coalition’ of several senior politicians, including First Vice President and leader of Jombesh-e Milli Abdul Rashid Dostum, Second Chief Executive and leader of Hezb-e Wahdat Mardom Muhammad Mohaqeq and (now former) Balkh Governor and Chief Executive of Jamiat-e Islami Atta Muhammad Nur (see AAN analysis here, here and here). Locally, the coalition is mainly represented by former Herat governor and regional strongman Ismael Khan who among others has his son Sayyed Taha Sadeq running for parliament. The other main party in the protest game are supporters of the central government, led by Sayyed Abdul Wahid Qatali, former head of the provincial council, subsequently Herat mayor and currently President Ashraf Ghani’s chief of staff.

On 15 September 2018, dozens of Grand National Coalition supporters staged a sit-in in front of the IEC office and closed it down for public access. They were protesting alleged lack of transparency in election preparations and what they claimed was the deliberate engineering of it by President Ghani and the team in and around the presidential palace. The following morning, Herat provincial police chief General Aminullah Amarkhel ordered police forces to reopen the premises by force. The police dispersed the protestors by firing shots in the air, and rolled up their protest tent, injuring and arresting some people in the process (see here). On 26 September, the government brought a large crowd of its supporters to the city centre, those who, according to a statement issued by the Administrative Office of the President (and seen by the author), backed “the national election process, national development projects and the peace process.” There have been reports that both sides paid daily-wage labourers, who are not few in number in the city, to participate in the demonstrations to increase protestor numbers as a show of strength directed at the other side.

The election atmosphere has become even more vibrant – and in a more positive way – since campaigning began on 28 September 2018. The face of the city and nearby district centres such as Injil, Guzara and Zendajan changed overnight. In these places, many of the 161 candidates, among them sitting MPs, (2) 28 women and several young people (see the list here), are fiercely engaged in the campaign, both in real terms and online, particularly through Facebook. In their bid to try to gain one of Herat’s 17 seats (five reserved for women) in the parliament, they have recruited and paid campaign staff, opened their campaign headquarters where they receive and feed large numbers of local people, met people from different walks of life and put up a great number of billboards, posters and banners in and around the city, courting and wooing people for their votes. So many restaurants, hotels, printing houses, marketing companies and scaffolding businesses are all extremely busy nowadays in and around the city. In Herat city, local environmentalists have voiced their concern about the sheer number of candidate posters and banners, the hammering of nails into trees and urban cleanliness in general. In response, Herat Municipality has been removing posters and banners from trees and traffic signboards.

The city: pressure building up

In the run-up to the election campaign period, from August 2018 onwards, Herat city witnessed a series of small-scale improvised electronic device (IED) attacks. On 9 August, explosives planted in a motorbike went off opposite a vehicle carrying a former Afghan Local Police (ALP) commander, Haji Amir Shindandi, in the Old Corps Road in Police District (PD) 1, killing at least four people and injuring 12 others including the ex-commander. On 5 September, there were two consecutive explosions in Chawk-e Gulha area in downtown Herat, injuring at least six people, including two traffic police officers. In late August, earlier in the same place (ie Chawk-e Gulha), an explosion killed at least two people. On 4 October, a blast targeted a parked police vehicle in Darb-e Khush area in the city centre, injuring about ten people, among them a child. In the same place, Herat police later on seized IED equipment in a hotel. On 12 October, there was an IED attack on an audio-video centre in Gawaliyan area in the south of Herat city which damaged the centre but left no casualties; the centre has been involved in the management of some high-profile events.

What could be called ‘social pressure’ has also been building up in Herat city. Quoting several sources, including the Provincial Directorate of Refugees and Repatriation, the Afghan daily newspaper Hasht-e Sobh said there are about “one million internally displaced persons from Farah, Ghor, Badghis and some southern provinces” currently living in and around Herat city. (3)  This seems to be a cumulative number reached over several years. Most recently, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and its partners have reported that in the western region as a whole, over 250,000 people have been displaced of which about 60,000 are in Herat city and twice that number in Qala-ye Naw in Badghis province (see here and here). People from the insecure and drought-affected districts of Herat province – Shindand, Adraskan, Kushk-e Kuhna, Kushk-e Rubat Sangi and Gulran – have either also been displaced to the city or have fled to Kandahar province (see also here). In Herat, most IDPs have settled in tents set up on plots of land, due to be built on, but as yet clear, in the areas of Sheydai, Dasht-e Hawz and Maslakh, respectively in the east, north and south. These neighbourhoods are regarded as the ‘gates’ to Herat city from these three directions. AAN heard from several IDPs in Sheydai about the severity of the drought and the insecurity in their areas of Badghis province that has forced them to leave their houses, orchards and lands for the sake of protecting their families.

A growing number of local government officials and residents have drawn a direct connection between the displacement and the rise in security-related incidents. They have attributed responsibility to IDPs for the recent security and crime incidents. The Killid Group, a media organisation that is also active in Herat, said in a research paper that local security and justice authorities had said the IDPs were implicated in “30 per cent of security incidents in Herat” (see here). These officials claimed that the Taleban and other insurgent and criminal groups had established links with some of the IDPs with a view to destabilising the city and the wider province. Many local Heratis and government officials, alarmed by the scale of the displacement – not seen since the drought of 2000/2001 – have increasingly called for the return of the IDPs to their original provinces (see for example here).

The IDPs – whether or not some are actually involved in crime and/or the insurgency – have become an election issue and a matter of debate in Herat. Some Heratis are also alleging they will be used to carry out fraud in the election. There have been reports that some of the IDPs have got tazkeras during recent tazkera distribution in Herat and then registered to vote in the upcoming elections by getting stickers fixed to the back of their tazkeras. It is, of course, their legal right to be registered to vote in their place of sanctuary. Still, some local Heratis worry that the sheer number of outsiders, not all from the province, could affect who will represent Herat in the next parliament.

Unfortunately, given this charged atmosphere, security-wise and politically, the suffering of a large number of people who have been displaced because of the war or the drought or both is glossed over.

Because of fears about security in Herat city, the districts and neighbouring provinces, there is a greater, visible presence of security forces at the gates to and in key intersections in the city. Government security forces have also conducted two military manoeuvres or parades, one on the streets inside the city and the other on the way from Herat city to Shindand district in a display of power and attempt to boost confidence in the security arrangements for the coming elections (see here).

The districts and neighbouring provinces: mounting insecurity

The government is right to be concerned about security. It has been deteriorating during the last couple of years in several districts of Herat province where the government and Taleban have been engaging in a violent contest for control. Roads between several districts, particularly the faraway ones, and the provincial centre are increasingly unsafe. There are frequent Taleban checkpoints on the way that control the movement of people and goods. Some of the posts are temporary, but others are more permanent. Those working for the government and foreign organisations are particularly afraid of travelling overland as they are targets for attacks. They thus go to great lengths to hide their institutional affiliation while on the road.

The Taleban provincial base, the southernmost district of Shindand, recently divided by the government into five smaller districts to improve its managementand therefore, it was hoped, its security, is the most insecure in the province. There are continual clashes between the Taleban and government forces (see for instance here and this previous AAN analysis). The two opposing Taleban factions – one loyal to the mainstream Taleban led by Mullah Haibatullah and the other to Mullah Rasul, who set up his own group after the death of Mullah Omar was announced in 2015 – also recently resumed fighting each other in Shindand (read previous AAN analysis on Taleban after Mullah Omar here). There are also reports about recent Taleban infighting in Guzara district that left at least 17 of their members dead and eight others injured. However, according to local Kohandazh news agency, the Taleban version of events is that they clashed with the Afghan Local Police (ALP) killed 16 local policemen and captured their post.

In other districts, the Taleban have attacked government checkpoints, closed roads at least temporarily and provoked the government to launch operations in response, leaving casualties on both sides. Such incidents have occurred recently in the southern district of Adraskan, the eastern districts of Pashtun Zarghun and Obe, (4) the northern districts of Kushk-e Rubat Sangi and Kushk-e Kuhna, the eastern district of Ghoryan and the north-eastern district of Kohsan. Although there have been, so far, no large-scale attacks by the Taleban to take control of district centres in Herat, some are vulnerable.

Herat province has also seen specific election-related violence. In late May 2018, the Taleban killed one IEC voter registration centre staff member and a soldier in Chesht-e Sharif district. In another similar event in the same month, the Taleban shot dead an ALP soldier who was guarding a voter registration centre in Guzara district. In early September, a rocket was fired at a campaign office in Islam Qala Township in Kohsan district. It damaged the office compound, but caused no casualties. On 13 October, unknown armed men attacked the campaign headquarters of a candidate – Sayyed Azim Kabarzani – in nearby Injil district, killing one of the guards; a child was also killed and two other children were injured in the incident.

A similar security trend is seen in Herat’s immediate provincial neighbourhood (see also here). In neighbouring Badghis to the north, the Taleban have encircled Qala-ye Naw, the provincial centre. It seems unlikely it will fall, at least in the foreseeable future, because of a concentration of government forces stationed there as well as the dispatch of commando forces. The fall of Qala-ye Naw would be disastrous for the Afghan government in the entire western region. Recently, there have been severe clashes between the Taleban and government forces in Muqur, Qades and Abkamari districts of Badghis province. In most cases, the government has launched operations in response to Taleban attacks on its checkpoints. The neighbouring province of Ghor to the east is also unsafe, but to a much lesser extent. In a recent security incident, an attempt by government security forces to arrest an uprising commander, Alipur, who is from Behsud district in Maidan Wardak province but was visiting a parliamentary candidate in Lal wa Sar Jangal district, resulted in a firefight which left around 10 people, including one woman and four policemen, dead. To the south, Farah province remains troubled with the Taleban still near its gates since they attacked the provincial centre in May 2018 (read AAN’s recent dispatch here). Backed by NATO-led troops, government security forces have increased airstrikes on insurgent positions to keep the road access between the provincial centres of Farah and Herat open. It seems in Herat, at least, the current strategy on the part of the NATO-backed Afghan security forces is to keep attacking insurgent positions so as to make them busy defending areas under their control instead of giving them time and space to interfere in and disrupt the electoral process.

This complicated security environment has prompted senior government officials to be more outspoken to at least attract attention to what they see as happening on the ground. They consider the Taleban to be intent on extending their military influence to areas of Herat where government security forces are not concentrated and then expanding to encircle and vie for control of district centres. Muhammad Asef Rahimi, Herat provincial governor, and General Nurullah Qaderi, the top military official for the western region, have given the narrative of the government repeatedly: backed by Iran and Pakistan, the Taleban are aiming to devastate the country’s infrastructure projects, implying for example that the Salma hydropower dam in Chesht-e Sharif district in Herat province is at risk. Putting the blame on neighbouring countries obviously ignores the government’s own failings in many different areas from security to development and to governance in general.

Conclusion: elections amid growing insecurity

The vibrancy of election campaigning in Herat city and nearby district centres coupled with the rising insecurity in the rest of the province raises serious questions about the nature of the coming elections. Hundreds of thousands of Heratis did not register to vote or will not be able to vote in their areas in several districts. This is both in the provincial centre (in the case of Shia Hazara and Sayyed residents) and particularly in districts contested or controlled by the Taleban. In some areas of some districts, especially the far-flung ones under Taleban control and in one whole district, Farsi, no voter registration took place and there will be no election at all. According to the IEC official quoted above, of all 462 polling centres in Herat province (see their list here), 162 will be closed on polling day. Most of the province will be affected to some degree. In two newly created districts in Shindand, ie Zerkoh and Pushtkoh, no polling centres will be opened. Only in Herat city and the immediate district of Injil will all designated polling centres be opened.

Campaign activity has thus focused on Herat city and district centres, while voters residing in villages situated far from them are potentially disenfranchised. Some residents told AAN that powerful candidates and their local community supporters might be able to influence at least some local Taleban forces to let elections take place in particular areas, or if that did not work, would bring their supporters to safer areas where they could vote. At the same time, there are fears that insecurity in areas far away from the district centres might provide an environment conducive for widespread fraud because few candidate agents and observers can go there to monitor the vote. This has been a pattern in previous elections.

The provincial electoral landscape is thus marked by a strange co-existence of hope and fear, of participation and its lack. The parliamentary elections of 2018 in Herat are not taking place in a normal or conducive environment and there are concerns as to how inclusive they will be and whether the widespread insecurity will aid fraud. Yet, it seems the Afghan government and its international backers have decided that an election, whatever it is and however it is held, is better than no election at all.

Edited by Sari Kouvo, Thomas Ruttig and Kate Clark

 

 

(1)There has also been a protest for Herati parliamentarian Abdul Hadi Jamshidi who was initially disqualified by the IEC (read a recent AAN dispatch here), but was recertified by the Election Complaint Commission (ECC). Jamshidi had been initially disqualified for allegedly failing to hand over to the government some weapons and ammunitions his men had seized in an armed clash with the Taleban in Kushk-e Rubat Sangi district. He was then reinstated.

(2) All sitting MPs in Herat are again running for parliament, apart from Ahmad Behzad who is running from Kabul province (for the list of and some information about sitting Herat MPs, see here). A female MP from Herat – Shahnaz Hemati – died in a car accident in Iran in 2013.

(3) To the IDPs, one should add thousands of recent returnees and deportees from Iran and Turkey, some of whom stay in Herat at least for some time, according to AAN’s interviews with some Afghan returnees and deportees from Iran and Turkey in Herat city in September 2018.

(4) The information is from AAN interviews with government officials, activists and residents who are from/in Obe, September 2018, Herat city.

Bizarre F-16’s “ground-to-ground” kill injures two. It’s the second accidental aerial weapon discharge in Europe this year. A Belgian Air Force F-16 has been destroyed and another aircraft damaged when the M61A1 Vulcan 20mm cannon on board a third F-16 was accidentally fired on the ground by maintenance personnel at Florennes Air Base in the […]

Myanmarese MA-1 Mk.3 Assault Rifle

The 48th Fighter Wing hosts a big exercise, integrating joint service as well as 4th and 5th Generation capabilities. One of the biggest military exercises the 48th Fighter Wing has ever hosted, began on Tuesday Oct. 9, 2018, at RAF Lakenheath, UK. U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptors assigned to the 1st Fighter Wing out of […]

We met Major Paul “Loco” Lopez on home soil. Naval Air Station Oceana (NAS Oceana) is celebrating its 75th anniversary this year. This longevity shows just how important this Naval Master Jet Base is to the local community and the nation as a whole. NAS Oceana celebrates this continuing achievement each year by hosting an […]

Almost two-thirds of voters in Faryab will not be able to vote in the 20 October parliamentary elections after insecurity prevented them from registering. Since voter registration ended in early July, the government has seen an even further loss of control and more than a dozen additional polling centres have since closed. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili recently visited Faryab and (with input from Kate Clark) wonders how inclusive an election is possible in a province now largely controlled or threatened by the Taleban. He also reports concerns that because of insecurity in this Uzbek-majority province, they will have a much smaller ‘vote bank’ and less clout in next year’s presidential elections. (A breakdown showing Faryab’s polling centres and registered voters can be read in an annex.)

AAN has put together a dossier of dispatches related to the coming elections, looking at preparations and political manoeuvring. Each dispatch in the Election Conundrum series will be added to it.

Maimana city is in the full flow of election campaigning, with 62 candidates competing for nine seats (with three reserved for women) in Faryab province. The city is papered with campaign posters and it is easy to come across candidates talking to voters. There is a concentration of activity in Maimana because it is one of the few places where candidates are able to campaign. One indication of how much the city is surrounded was the advice given to the author when he wanted to drive to the suburb of Imam Sahib, just twenty minutes from the centre: “Don’t go. It is too risky.” Two candidates described to us the difficulty of reaching voters. Incumbent MP and commander, Fatahullah Qaisari, said he was hoping to reach his home district on a government (ANSF) helicopter; the road was not safe for him to travel. Another, the veteran journalist Muhammad Hassan Serdash, is one of the candidates who have managed – in a limited way – to operate across frontlines:

I was the first candidate who posted his posters in Qaisar district. I sent my posters through Tamir Keprak (Iron Bridge in Uzbek) where the Taleban have checkposts. I had contacted the Taleban asking them to allow my campaign posters to be transported [to Qaisar] and they asked for the number of the vehicle. I provided the number and they allowed the vehicle to go to Qaisar. Mullah Qamar, brother of Qari Salahuddin [Ayubi, the former Taleban shadow governor in the province], an Uzbek from Tir Shadi Almar holds sway there.

However the future may, potentially, not be so easy for him.

The Taleban told me that they would not harm me in their areas because I was a journalist,” Serdash said,” but once I become an MP, I would become their enemy. I told them that I would be a fair MP and speak against the Taleban if their land-mines killed the people.

Faryab is one of the most contested provinces in the north-west. As we wrote earlier this year, it is “strategically important as it connects the western parts of the country with the north – it was through Faryab that the Taleban moved to capture Mazar-e Sharif in 1997 and 1998 and from where anti-Taleban forces came to re-capture the city in 2001.” The Taleban have fought hard to capture territory, so much so that earlier this year, both the government and its international supporters were alarmed that the Taleban were threatening to capture the provincial capital (see AAN’s previous analysis here) That means a majority of the population will not be able to vote in the upcoming elections.

Security-related election statistics – a tale of disenfranchisement

In 2014, Faryab province had one of the highest audited turnouts in the country (and one of the highest proportions of women voters) (see details here). It gave a clear majority to Ashraf Ghani (65.6 per cent): Jombesh-e Melli’s leader General Abdul Rashid Dostum featured as number two on Ghani’s ticket and his party was able to get the vote out in a province where Uzbeks are the largest ethnic group (more on which later). This election will be very different and the reason for that is the steady loss of territory to the Taleban in the last four years.

1) Most polling centres inaccessible because of the insurgency

Faryab has 14 districts including its provincial capital, Maimana. (1) The Independent Elections Commission (IEC) has allocated a total of 238 polling centres spread across the province. However, when the IEC closed voter registration on 6 July, only 108 centres, fewer than half had managed to register voters. 130 others had reported no registration. In one whole district, Kohestan, which has a total of 14 polling centres, there are no registered voters. It has long been inaccessible due to the insurgency and was one of 32 districts which IEC employees carrying out an assessment of polling centres across the country in the second half of 2017 could not get to. (The national average for polling centres that were inaccessible to the IEC because of insecurity is 24 per cent – 1,744 out of 7,180. See AAN’s previous reporting about the exercise here)and for a list of the completely inaccessible districts, see footnote 2).

2) Less than half of the estimated voting population registered

The preliminary list of registered voters (the author got a copy from the IEC provincial office in Faryab) showed a total of 197,976 people (110,869 male and 88,849 female) had registered to vote. This preliminary list had to go through a verification process at the IEC’s headquarters for detecting underage, duplicate and multiple registrations, and the final list is slightly lower (by about four per cent). (The IEC’s final list shows the number of voters per polling centre, as well as the total numbers of the voters in each district and at the provincial level and can be read here). (3) That figure is lower than estimates given earlier to AAN by a provincial IEC official, who thought about 10 per cent might be fraudulent, and candidate Serdash who thought “that 70,000 [out of the preliminary list of voters] were based on fake tazkeras, mainly in Qaisar, Maimana, Andkhoy, Juma Bazar and Dawlatabad.” Such gaps raise some questions about the robustness of the final voting list.

The main problem though is the absolute very low number of registered voters in the province. It is low relative to both the estimated voting population and the number of voters in the 2014 presidential elections. The IEC has given the following figures for Faryab:

• 189,566 total registered voters
• 104,454 male
• 84,974 female
• 138 Kuchis

Assuming that at least half of the population in the province is over 18 – the minimum voting age – it appears that just 36.7 per cent of those eligible to vote have registered. (4) Guest author Scott Worden placed Faryab among six provinces in which less than 40 per cent of eligible voters had registered. (The others are Farah (26% or eligible voters registered), Badghis (31%), Kunar (33%), Uruzgan (33%) and Kunduz (34%).)

The sharp fall in registered voters compared to the last election four years ago is also clear. The preliminary results of the 2014 runoff presidential election showed a total of 331,123 votes cast: 217,895 (66%) for Dr Ashraf Ghani and 113,228 (34%) for Dr Abdullah. The final runoff results reported 296,202 (197,118  or 67%) for Ghani and 99,084 or 33%) for Abdullah.. (This means that 34,921 votes (10.54%) were discarded as a result of the post-second round audit.) (5) Taking the final results as a baseline, that would mean a drop between voters in 2014 and 2018 registered voters of 36 per cent. This is despite strong population growth, estimated by the Central Statistics Office at 3.5 per cent.

3) More polling centres closed since registration

Since voter registration was completed in early July, the Taleban have gained yet more territory, meaning more polling centres have closed and more voters will not be able to exercise their franchise. Earlier this month, IEC provincial officials told that a total of 15 to 17 out of the 106 centres that had registered voters were now closed because of Taleban gains. The breakdown was as follows:

• Almar, two out of five centres that had registered voters closed
• Belcharagh district, four out of 11 polling centres that had registered voters are now closed
• Gurziwan, one out of three centres closed
• Pashtun Kot district, four out of nine centres that had registered voters (in Gaday-e Qala and Sar-e Howz) closed
• Qaisar, five out of 19 centres that had registered voters closed (in Khwaja Tipchaq, Chichaktu, Chaharshanba Uzbekiya, Hazara Qala and Yaka Pesta-ye Afghaniya)
• Qaramqul district, between five to seven out of eight centres that had registered voters closed

4) Displacement of the population

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), from 1 January to 23 September 2018, a total of 30,282 Faryabis were forced to leave their places of origin. (This is 12 per cent of almost a quarter of a million Afghans displaced by conflict across the country in the same period.) The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in Faryab told AAN on 11 October that 13,809 families had fled their homes in the period between April and July this year and that the displacement “continues as the fighting is continuing.” NRC also said that some of the displacements had been caused by drought or a combination of drought and conflict. It is possible that some of those who were displaced earlier on in the year may have been able to register in the place where they have found sanctuary, but many of the IDPs will not have been. This displacement will likely further reduce the turnout on election day.

The reason for the sharp drop in the number of Faryabis able to get out, first to register, and then to vote is “clear-cut,” candidate Serdash told AAN. In the 2014 presidential elections, he said, “no district had fallen [to the Taleban]. Now, elections are not possible at all in two districts – Kohestan and Belcharagh. And nine districts – Pashtun Kot, Qaisar, Almar, Khwaja Sabz Posh, Shirin Tagab, Dawlatabad, Qaramqul, Kohestan and Gurziwan – are no longer secure.”

The implications of Faryab’s shrinking constituency

Afghanistan’s constitution, as UNAMA has pointed out, states that citizens have a fundamental right to “elect and be elected.” Many people in Faryab will not be able to exercise that right this year. Nationally, the security situation is grave enough for the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, Tadamichi Yamamoto to brief the Security Council (on17 September) on his concerns. “Almost one thirdof Afghanistan’s over seven thousand polling centres could not open due to insecurity. Thisis raising concerns about inclusivity. The main question, therefore, is not whether the elections will be imperfect but how Afghanistan’s electoral institutions will manage these limitations.”

The concern is not just about individual disenfranchisement in Faryab, but, as expressed by some, ‘ethnic disenfranchisement’. Although the Central Statistical Office does not provide an ethnic breakdown of the population, a 2017 UN profile of the province (of which AAN has a copy) said the majority is Uzbek, followed by Tajiks and Aimaq, Pashtun and Kuchi, Turkmen, Arab and Hazara. Earlier UN provincial reporting, from 2007, put the ethnic composition as follows: Uzbek (51 per cent), Tajik and Aimaq (22.3 per cent) and Pashtun (8.6 per cent) (see also previous AAN’s reporting here). The fact that two-thirds of polling centres in this province will be closed is potentially a much more serious issue in the April 2019 presidential election. Given that voting in this poll has tended to go on ethnic lines, having a coherent ‘ethnic’ vote block gives the chance to get a ‘representative’ on the presidential ticket and in power. (A tentative electoral calendar – AAN has a copy – leading up to the presidential vote on 20 April 2019 does not include any new or top-up voter registration. This means that, even if government control of territory improves, those who were unable to register will continue to remain disenfranchised.)

The Uzbeks have been the most coherent electoral block of any of the ethnic groups and this has given them some influence and political status nationally. As the fourth largest ethnic group in the country, this coherence is crucial because the constitution only gives three people power at the highest level – the president and the two vice-presidents. The tendency has been for those three to be a Pashtun, a Tajik and a Hazara. In previous elections, the head of the largely Uzbek party, Jombesh-e Melli General Dostum was able to deliver this ‘Uzbek vote’ to former President Karzai in 2009 and to President Ghani in 2014. Karzai gave Uzbeks few favours in return and even when Dostum was on Ghani’s winning presidential ticket and became First Vice President in 2014 partly because of the very solid block of votes delivered by Uzbeks there have been fewer Uzbeks at the heart of government than might have been expected. This time, the Uzbek vote bank will be greatly diminished and their influence potentially far less. (6)

Some have alleged the insecurity and therefore the drop in the ability of Uzbeks to get their vote out has been engineered deliberately for political and electoral reasons. As the UN Secretary General’s report described it:

Discontent over electoral preparations was largely focused in the North, where security conditions continued to deteriorate, and some opposition figures accused the Government of a deliberate plot to disenfranchise northern communities. That perception was exacerbated following the arrest by Government forces on 2 July of Nezamuddin Qaysari, a district chief of police and close associate of Mr. Dostum in Faryab Province. The arrest triggered protests in the Uzbek-majority Faryab Province that quickly spread to other northern provinces, including Balkh, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sari Pul and Takhar.

The arrest of Qaisari was a significant political event in his home province of Faryab. Presidential deputy spokesman Shah Hussian Murtazavi told the media Qaisari was arrested based on the complaints by the people and his behavior with government departments, while Qaisari supporters insist he was an active and brave commander, a pillar against the Taleban, and that his arrest was political. They also say it was made without a warrant, with torture (see his testimony released by Vice-President Dostum’s chief of staff Enayat Babur Frahmand who visited him on 9 August) and with his bodyguards abused by the commandos (see a video here and here). Without getting into the rights or wrongs of Qaisari’s arrest, it is clear that the government has lost at least some territory to the Taleban since. Local journalist, Qutbuddin Kohi,said that, especially after the video of the commandos kicking Qaisari’s prone, handcuffed bodyguards aired on social media, many local people felt betrayed:

Now people in Faryab see their security forces, especially the commandos as the enemy because they did not come here to carry out operations against the enemy but to suppress Jombesh and arrest Qasiari and after his arrest, the forces in Shirin Tagab and Khwaja Sabz Poshand the commandos stationed here in Maimana left the province.

A less than perfect election, but who will be fighting it?

Seven out of the nine incumbent MPs from Faryab are standing again (see footnote for the sitting MPs) (7). Dr Naqibullah Faeq’s seat remained empty after he was appointed as the head of the Afghanistan National Standard Authority (ANSA) in February 2016 (see media report here). According to article 50 of the electoral law, if a member of the Wolesi Jirga dies or resigns or loses their seats, their seat shall be assigned to the next candidate of the same sex (male or female) with the highest votes based on the IEC’s list of the final results. (8) However, this did not happen, because when Faeq joined the government, the Wolesi Jirga was already serving extra-constitutionally. Faeq is now the governor of Faryab, and is not running again. Another sitting Faryab MP, Gul Muhammad Pahlawan, former commander of Jombesh-e Islami and brother of General Abdul Malek, also a former commander of Jombesh, now the head of his own Hezb-e Azadi-ye Afghanistan (Liberty Party of Afghanistan) and an adviser to Chief Executive Abdullah, is running from Balkh province, due to insecurity in his home village of Faizabad in Shirin Tagab.

Apart from the seven sitting MPs seeking re-election, 55 new people are standing, with a total of 62 candidates in all (43 male and 19 female) (see the list of candidates in footnote 9). One hopeful, Sakhi Nawid, was disqualified by the IEC for links to an illegal armed group. (See AAN’s previous report on the disqualified candidates here).

15 candidates have registered their affiliations with the three major political parties operating in the province – 13 from Jombesh and one apiece from Jamiat-e Islami and Hezb-e Islami. (10) However, one candidate told AAN that a large number of other candidates were supported by one or another political party. This shows the usual practice of political party affiliates running independently whenever they feel it could garner more votes for them.

In the 2010 parliamentary elections, three out of the nine elected MPs identified themselves with Jombesh, as recorded by this NDI’s Wolesi Jirga directory here. Bashir Ahmad Tahyanj from Andakhoy district, Dr Naqibullah Faeq from Almar district and Fathullah Qaisari from Jegdalak village of Qaisar district. (Of these, Faeq and Fathullah Qaisari no longer identify as Jombesh.) Six others were independent.

Conclusion: growing insecurity, a shrinking constituency and disenfranchisement

This year’s parliamentary elections were never going to be easy. Nationwide, disenchantment with elections themselves, after the disastrous 2014 poll, has been coupled with a resurgent Taleban, who by controlling more districts than four years ago have been able to prevent millions of Afghans from even registering to vote. The Taleban, together with the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) in some places, have also directly threatened election workers and security services trying to guard the poll and some Afghans have felt (see here) it is a risk too far to participate. Nevertheless, once actual campaigning started, a measure of enthusiasm has been generated.

In Faryab, the effect of insecurity is being felt more than in most other provinces. Campaigning there is concentrated in a small part of the province and participation will be limited to a third or so of voters. For many among Afghanistan’s Uzbek community, as well as tens of thousands of individual Faryabis who have been disenfranchised by insecurity, this is a huge concern.

Edited by Kate Clark and Thomas Ruttig

 

(1) There has been, as we reported,an administrative “tussle” over another district, Ghormach, as to whether it is part of Faryab or Badghis. The IEC’s list apportioning seats to district councils in preparation for holding district council elections (which have now been dropped) says that Ghormach is part of Faryab based on the IDLG list, but the CSO counts it as part of Badghis. The IEC’s final list of voters per polling centre has put it under Badghis (see here).

(2) Following is the list of the districts that the IEC was not able to access for polling centre assessment.  AAN received it from the IEC:

1) Maidan Wardak: Jaghatu; 2) Nangarhar: Hisarak; 3) Baghlan: Dahana-ye Ghori; 4) Ghazni: Zanakhan (under Taleban control), 5) Giro (only district centre with the government) 6) Ajristan (only district centre with the government) 7) Nawa;; 8) Paktika: Neka, 9) Gyan and 10) Dela; 11) Badakhshan: Warduj and 12) Yamgan (both are completely under the Taleban (see this AAN’s report); 13) Kunduz: Qulbad and 14) Gul Tapa of (both under the Taleban control); 15) Urozgan: Chora, 16) Shahid-e Hassas and 17) Chinarto; 18) Kandahar: Miyaneshin, 19) Shorabak and 20) Reg; 21) Faryab: Kohistan; 22) Helmand: Nawzad, 23) Sangin, 24) Musa Qala, 25) Reg (Khanneshin), 26) Baghran and 27) Disho; 28) Badghis: Ghormach; 29) Herat: Farsi, 30) Zer Koh and31) Pusht Koh; 32) Farah: Bakwa.

(See also AAN’s previous report on the polling centre assessment here.)

(3) On1 October, the IEC reported it had confirmed 8.8 million voter registration stickers as valid nationwide (this excludes Ghazni where the poll has been postponed). The IEC said more than 600,000 others had been invalidated. The IEC has not provided a more accurate figure yet, nor has it given a breakdown of the reasons for invalidation. However, an election expert privy to the criteria listed six: duplicate registration, voter was underage, missing date of birth, missing tazkera details (such as grandfather’s name); lost voter registration books and; voters reported as having registered at polling centres that were officially closed

(4) The IEC has been using population estimates 2016-17 for election planning. This is because when the IEC started planning, the new population estimates for Faryab had not yet been released. The 2016-17 population estimates were:

• 1,032,765 total
• 528,223 male
• 504,542 female.

According to the latest, 2018-19 population estimates its population has grown by 36,775 (3.5 per cent) and now stands at:

• 1,069,540 total
• 544,865 male
• 524,675 female

Assuming that half of the population is over 18 and therefore eligible to vote, Faryab’s voting population should be 516,382. However, only 189,566 people (104,454 male and 84,974 female and 138 Kuchis) registered to vote.

(5) The final results of the 2010 parliamentary elections per province showed a total of 194,889 votes cast: 187,561 valid votes and 7,328 invalidated votes (cast for candidates whose names were on the ballots but had actually withdrawn or been disqualified by the Electoral Complaints Commission before the election day). 103,184 of those votes were for the elected candidates. The votes cast in 499 polling stations were included into the results. However, the summary results shows 195,314 (187,986 valid and 7328 invalidated). The summary report of polling stations shows 605 polling stations: 501 valid and 104 disqualified.

(6) As well as the number of registered voters being low in Faryab, it was also low in several other provinces with large Uzbek populations. Badghis (31%) was also in the top six of lowest registering provinces, while in Jawzjan and Sar-e Pul reported less than half of the eligible voters registered. The other low registers are Farah, Kunar Uruzgan, Kunduz, Ghor, Wardak, Zabul and Logar.

(7) The seven incumbent MPs running again are: Engineer Muhammad Hashim Awartaq, Haji Muhammad Hashim, Al Hajj Fathullah Qaisari, Bashir Ahmad Tahyanj, Rangina Kargar, Fowzia Raufi and Asefa Shadab.

Two other MPs: Dr Naqibullah Faeq (who resigned in February 2016 to work with the government and is currently the governor of the province, Gul Muhammad Pahlawan (who is running from Balkh this time). (See their short profiles in this NDI’s Wolesi Jirga directory.)

(8) Article 50 of the electoral law concerns how the seats are awarded in a particular electoral constituency and who should replace if a Wolesi Jirga member dies, resigns or loses their seats:

• In each electoral constituency, the seats are awarded to the candidates who have garnered the highest number of valid votes.
• In case of equality of votes between two candidates for assuming the last seat, the winner shall be selected based on the highest criteria, which are as follows in the given order:

  Level of education; work experience with governmental or non- governmental organizations.

• If an elected member of the Wolesi Jirga cannot take up his/her seat or leaves his/her seat due to any reasons or dies or resigns or is appointed to another office in accordance with the law during the term of the Wolesi Jirga; or if he/she loses his/her membership by the provision of the law; or becomes handicapped or disabled in a way that permanently prevents him/her from performing his/her job, his/her seat shall be assigned to the next candidate of the same sex (male or female) with the highest votes recorded on list prepared by the IEC, if more than one year remains until the end of the term of office of the Wolesi Jirga.

(9) There are 19 female candidatesstanding in 20 October elections (: 1) Shahr Banu Sadat Karezi, 2) Al Hajj Dr Fowzia Salimi, 3) Dr Manizha Bustani, 4) Bibi Nuria Turan, 5) Karima Zaki, 6) Gita Sa’ed (Jombesh), 7) Tahmina Shuja (not mention of affiliation/independent), 8) Aziza Sadat, 9) Ustad Maria Nuri, 10) Saranwal Amena Mokhleszada, 11) Suhaila Asa Kohi, 12) Banu Mukarrama Sadat, 13) Banu Farzana Bahman, 14) Sayyeda Asefa Shadab, 15) Al Hajj Fowzia Raufi, 16) Nasima Yuzbashi, 17) Shafiqa Sakha Yulchi (Jombesh), 18) Hajera Enayat Kamran, 19) Rangina Kargar.

43 male candidates: 1) Dr Eshanullah Wahedi, 2) Ehsanullah Qowanch, 3) Sayyed Shah Wali Parsa, 4) Sayyed Farukh Shah Jenab, 5) Hashmatullah Arman, 6) Fathullah Qaisari, 7) Haji Zahiruddin Safari, 8) Kharullah Anosh, 9) Muhammad Hashem Khan, 1) Abdul Rahim Uzbek Oghli, 11) Sanjar Kargar, 12) Muhammad Ismail Ayubi, 13) Jawid Khan Qaisari, 14) Muhammad Hassan Serdash, 15) Engineer Aman Amin, 16) Muhammad Hashem Ortaq, 17) Faqir Muhammad Sa’idi, 18) Ezatullah Kaigham, 19) Sayyed Esmatullah, 20) Sebghatullah Naderi, 21) Muhammad Anwar Bashliq, 22) Sayyed Daud Sadat, 23) Muhammad Ashraf Sherzad, 24) Bashir Ahmad Tahyanj, 25) Sayyed Farid Hashemi, 26) Ahmad Zia Ahmad, 27) Muhammad Ayub Ghafari, 28) Jamal Naser Farahmand, 29) Shah Mahmud Najwa, 30) Khairuddin Muradi, 31) Sayyed Ehsanullah Hashemi, 32) Sayyed Mamun Gahrik, 33) Muhammad Nasim Rahmani, 34) Farhad Esar, 35) Sayyed Babur Jamal, 36) Hashmatullah Rahmani, 37) Muhammad Rasul Faryabi, 38) Dr Ahmad Jawid Qazizada, 39) Muhammad Saleh Tudehpur, 40) Sayyed Jawid Sadat, 41) Muhammad Shaker Karimi, 42) Edris Barna, 43) Abdul Wakil Faryabi

(see here)

(10) They are:

• 13 Jombesh-e Melli Islami-e Afghanistan candidates: 1) Ustad Ehsanullah Qowanch, 2) Ustad Sayyed Shah Wali Parsa, 3) Sayyed Farukh Shah Jenab, 4) Abdul Rahim Uzbek Oghli, 5) Muhammad Ismail Ayubi, 6) Jawid Khan Qaisari, 7) Gita Sa’id, 8) Bashir Ahmad Tahyanj, 9) Jamal Naser Frahmand, 10) Engineer Muhammad Nasim Rahmani, 11) Engineer Hashmatullah Rahmani, 12) Shafiqa Sakha Yulchi, 13) Ustad Edris Barna.
• One Hezb-e Islami candidate (Ustad Abdul Wakil Faryabi);
• One Jamiat-e Islami candidate (Haji Sayyed Daud Sadat);

 

Appendix

No. District No of polling centres No of polling centres reported registration No of registered voters Estimated eligible voters Estimated Population 2018-2019 Estimated Population 2016-2018 1  Maimana 24 24 37,398 44,022 91,490 88,044 2 Pashtun Kot 42 9 19,400 99,542 206,072 199,084 3 Khawja Sabz Posh 11 2 1,743 26,776 55,432 53,552 4 Almar 18 5 10,678 37,064.5 76,733 74,129 5 Belcharagh 11 4 15,335 27,519.5 56,972 55,039 6 Shirin Tagab 15 3 3,594 42,953 88,922 85,906 7 Qaisar 38 19 39,606 75,121.5 155,517 150,243 8 Gurziwan 14 3 14,906 39,978 82,762 79,956 9 Dawlatabad 14 3 4,083 25,700 53,226 51,400 10 Kohistan 14 0 0 28,759 59,538 57,518 11 Qaramqul 9 8 7,306 10,354.5 21,428 20,709 12 Qurghan 11 11 11,177 24,854.5 51,455 49,709 13 Andkhoy 10 10 23,486 21,531.5 44,715 43,063 14 Khanchar Bagh 7 7 9,264 12,210 25,278 24,420

 

Kohestan is not on the IEC’s final list of voters in Faryab

Number District Total polling centres Total voters registered Difference between preliminary and final lists 1 Almar 5 10,514 164 2 Andkhoy 10 22,545 939 3 Belcharagh 4 14,407 928 4 Pashtun Kut 8 16,504 2,896 5 Khan Charbagh 7 8,963 301 6 Khawja Sabz Posh 2 1,675 68 7 Dawlatabad 3 5,296 1,213 increase 8 Shirin Tagab 3 3,622 28 increase 9 Qurghan 11 11,392 215 increase 10 Qaramqul 8 7,342 36 increase 11 Qaisar 19 39,254 352 12 Gurziwan 2 10,907 3,999 13 Maimana 24 37,208 190

 

 

 

Suspected Fuel Problem Results in Grounding of Joint Strike Fighter. Not all of them actually… All Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters were ordered grounded on Thursday, October 12, 2018 for safety inspections of their fuel flow systems following the September 28, 2018 crash of a U.S. Marine F-35B Lightning II in Beaufort, […]

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Images May Show Special Operations Unit Training with DEVGRU or Army Delta. Frequent contributor to The Aviationist, Lance Riegle, of Dearborn Heights, Michigan, noticed unusual aviation activity during his recent trip to Virginia Beach, Virginia. He grabbed his Canon EOS 70D with a Tamron 70-300mm f/4-5.6 lens and started shooting photos. What he got is […]

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Myanmarese MA-1 Assault Rifle

Each year, waves of paratroopers commemorate Operation Market Garden fought in the Netherlands in September 1944. Operation “Market Garden” is the name of an unsuccessful Allied military operation launched during World War II and fought between Sept. 17-25, 1944, in the Netherlands. The objective of the operation was planned to be achieved through two subsidiary […]

The European Union’s ERASMUS+ programme, funded by the European Commission to support education and training, has awarded €3 million for a transnational advanced Master course relevant to defence called EMIMEO: 'Erasmus Mundus on Innovative Microwave Electronics and Optics'.
 
EDA contributed with data analysis to the application which was put forward by a consortium led by the Université de Limoges in France to access ERASMUS+ funding. 

EDA’s support to EMIMEO is justified by the fact that it addresses analog RF Photonics and Microwaves which are in the critical defence technologies list and also part of the Capability Development Plan (CDP) where they are considered as enablers for advanced radars and electronic warfare systems. The European defence industry and research institutes are looking for engineers and researchers with skills and competences in this complex field.

Under its activities related to Key Strategic Activities (KSA) in defence meant to identify key domains for European strategic autonomy, EDA has selected the area of RF Photonics as a relevant sample case. The EMIMEO Master course will contribute to support European skills and competencies in this domain, as well as the competitiveness and non-dependence of the European high-tech industry (including defence and space) in the development of Photonics and Microwave applications.
 
The international partnership (encompassing industry, universities and associations in 6 Member States) includes the following participants:

• Università di Brescia (Italy), Universidad Del Pais Vasco/ Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea (Spain), Aston University (United Kingdom), Universitatea Tehnica Cluj-Napoca (Romania);
• Altran Italia SpA and Hitachi Rail Italy SpA in Italy;
• GMV Aerospace and Defence SA, and TTI Norte SL in Spain;
• Oclaro Technology Ltd in United Kingdom;
• European Microwave Association in Belgium;
• Alcatel-Lucent International Sas, Amcad Engineering, Competitiveness cluster Alpha-RLH, Callisto France, III-V Lab, Inoveos, NOKIA, CNES, Thales Alenia Space France, Thales SA and United Monolithic Semiconductors SAS, Zodiac Aerospace  in France.

This successful case is another example of the importance of ensuring consistency and coherence between European defence priorities and EU funding opportunities. Against this backdrop, EDA will continue to serve its Member States' Ministries of Defence, research centres, universities and industries in an integrated manner on all relevant dimensions: R&T, key skills and competencies, industrial supply-chain.
 

For more information:

• Capability Development Plan (CDP)
• Key Strategic Activities in Defence (KSA)
• CapTech Technologies for Components and Modules
• European Funding Gateway for Defence
• Erasmus+ for Defence.

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