Defence`s Feeds

The Supreme Court has ruled that President Muhammad Ashraf Ghani and his vice-presidents shall continue to serve until the election of a new president. This ruling comes in the wake of mounting pressure by a number of presidential candidates and their political backers, who have called on the government leaders to step down after 22 May, when their constitutional term ends. The ruling also comes after the Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced yet another delay in the holding of the presidential elections. These are now scheduled for 28 September 2019, more than four months after the president’s five-year constitutional term ends on 22 May, sparking political debate over whether the current president should remain in office thereafter. AAN’s researcher Ali Yawar Adili looks at the continuing constitutional crisis. He notes that while delays in elections and the extension of the presidential tenure beyond its constitutional timeframe are nothing new, there are differences this time that could lead to political deadlock.

The Supreme Court’s decision on the presidential tenure

The repeated delays to the 2019 presidential elections have sparked a debate as to who should run Afghanistan after the end of the presidential term on the first of Jawza of the fifth year (22 May 2019). The new IEC made an announcement on 20 March, the eve of Nawruz (the Afghan New Year), that the presidential elections would be delayed. The IEC said that elections could not be held as planned on 20 July 2019, which was already two months after the constitutional end of the president’s term in office. The reasons provided by the IEC were that the amended electoral law contained new obligations that could not be met in time, most notably the use of technology in all phases of the elections (see AAN’s previous reporting about the amendments here). The IEC also noted that it needed time to address some of the challenges and problems of the 2018 Wolesi Jirga elections and that reforms should be carried out before the next elections. The IEC also said that there had been general delays in the preparations for the elections that necessitated rescheduling them. The IEC announced 6 Mizan 1398 (28 September 2019) as the new date for the presidential elections, provincial elections, Wolesi Jirga elections in Ghazni.

The constitution is clear that the elections should be held 30 to 60 days before the end of the presidential term, but omits to mention what should happen if elections are not held. That is, the constitution does not mention whether the sitting president’s term should be extended until elections are held or whether transitional governance arrangements should be put in place for the interim period. While President Ghani and the National Unity Government are keen to hold onto power during the interim period, other presidential candidates have been calling on the leaders of the National Unity Government to step down after 22 May. However, they have also been struggling to come to an agreement about an alternative that could be both constitutional and acceptable to the people and supported by Afghanistan’s international partners. Therefore, if they continue to put pressure on the government to step down, a deadlock might ensue given the lack of any clear constitutional alternative.

Due to mounting pressure from presidential candidates and their backers, the deputy for policy, monitoring and review in the presidential palace’s legal department sent a letter earlier this month (1) to the Supreme Court (letter number 529 dated 28/1/1398 (17 April 2019), informing the court that the IEC had postponed the presidential elections until 28 September 2019. The letter stated that this had resulted in a gap of more than four months between the end of the president’s term on 22 May and the new elections (the gap would be even more until the completion of elections, especially if they go to a second round or results drag on). The president’s office asked the Supreme Court to review article 61 of the constitution and provide its legal opinion on governance arrangements between the end of the president’s constitutional term and the conclusion of the elections. Article 61 refers to the election of the president and his/her term. It says that the presidential term expires on the first of Jawza (22 May 2019 in the case of the current president) of the fifth year following elections and that elections for a new president should be held within 30 to 60 days prior to the end of the presidential term.

In response to the letter sent by the president’s office, the Supreme Court issued (media reports here and here) a ruling on 20 April 2019 extending the president and vice-presidents’ terms until a new president is elected. The High Council of the Supreme Court in its approval (decision) number 100 dated 31/01/1398 (20 April 2019) cited the full text of a similar ruling issued by the High Council of the Supreme Court in 2009. The 2009 ruling concerned who should govern the country after the end of the presidential term, as the elections had not been held well in advance. The Supreme Court ruled that the then-president should continue to serve until the election of a new president.

The 2009 ruling, as cited by the Supreme Court in its 20 April 2019 approval, was based on two arguments:

• Indivisibility of the different provisions in the article of the constitution that deals with the election and term of the president. The Supreme Court had argued that paragraphs two and three of article 61 of the constitution stating that “the presidential term shall expire on 1st of Jawza of the fifth year after elections” and that “elections for the new President shall be held within thirty to sixty days prior to the end of the presidential term” were complementary. Therefore, because the elections had been postponed, so the whole provision should be delayed. This, in practice, meant that the presidential term, which, according to the second paragraph, would have ended on 22 May (2009) had elections been held 30 to 60 days before that, would be extended. (2)
• Qa’ida-e fiqhi (jurisprudential rule, an Islamic Fiqh/jurisprudence term) is baqa ma kana ala ma kana (continuing the status quo ante), ie continuing previously existing affairs means that the term of the president and his vice-presidents as the status quo ante should continue until the elections.

After citing this 2009 ruling, the Supreme Court in its 20 April 2019 ruling, concluded that since the queries made by the president’s office in 2009 and in 2019 had been the same, the Supreme Court’s decision would also be the same. (3) This, in practice, means that the incumbent president and his vice-presidents should continue to rule the country until the election of a new president.

Earlier precedents of extensions to the presidential term 

This is not the first time that the presidential term in Afghanistan has been extended. As noted above, the presidential term expires on first of Jawza of the fifth year after his/her election (22 May 2019 in the case of the current president), and elections for the new president should be held within 30 to 60 days prior to that. However, to date, no elections have adhered to this rule as they have either been delayed or dragged on beyond this timeframe and consequently the presidential term has always been extended beyond the 1stof Jawza.

The 2009 presidential elections were held on 20 August 2009, almost three months after the end of the president’s constitutional term. Some candidates, including the current president, Ashraf Ghani, called for the end of Karzai’s term after 22 May 2009. Karzai’s office sought a ruling from the Supreme Court, which (as described above) said that the continuation of his term was in the interests of the country (see AAN’s previous reporting here and here).

The first round of the 2014 presidential elections was held on 5 April 2014 within the constitutional timeframe (30-60 days before the end of the presidential term, ie 22 May 2014). However, the tabulation and announcement of results took more time. Moreover, the elections went to a second round, which, however, was not held within the legal timeframe, ie within two weeks after the announcement of the results of the first round. Therefore, former President Karzai’s office of administrative affairs and the secretariat of the Council of Ministers had asked, in letter number 1186 dated 22/2/1393 (12 May 2014), that the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution (ICOIC) provide legal advice on paragraph two of article 61 of the constitution, which stipulated that his term would end on 22 May. (4) It is unclear why the former president’s office, unlike in 2009, sought a ruling from the ICOIC in 2014. There has also been some debate as to whether the Supreme Court or ICOIC should be the authority to interpret the constitution (see AAN’s previous reporting here and here).

Abdullah Shafayi, a member of the ICOIC, told AAN on 25 April 2019 that the government would usually seek a ruling from an authority (such as the Supreme Court or the ICOIC) that was more “aligned” with the government. He claimed that the government had rarely referred constitutional issues to the ICOIC since the president (Ghani) had opposed its members’ decision to dismiss the chairman of the commission in 2017 (see AAN’s background here).

The ICOIC’s decision (made on 28/2/1393 (18 May 2014)) in response to the presidential palace’s 12 May 2014 request to interpret article 61 of the constitution was in line with the Supreme Court’s 2009 ruling in that it approved the continuation of the presidential term after 22 May 2014. The ICOIC’s decision ( available here in Dari) contained two parts:  First, the ICOIC noted that the IEC needed to provide an explanation to the ICOIC as to why the results of the first round and the whole of the second round of the elections had been delayed.  Requesting the IEC to explain the delays was most likely the ICOIC’s way of ensuring that it could check whether the delays were constitutionally justifiable. Second, the ICOIC said that if the first of Jawza (22 May 2014) fell while the final results of the runoff had not yet been announced due to justified reasons compatible with the principles of the constitution, the continuation of the president and his vice-presidents after the first Jawza until the announcement of the final results within the period specified by the IEC would not be considered as being in breach of the constitution. (5)

Delays to the 2019 presidential elections

The date for the upcoming presidential elections was announced by the IEC on 1 August 2018 as being scheduled for 20 April 2019 (see AAN’s previous reporting here and here). Since then, the elections have been delayed twice, both times being pushed back beyond the president’s constitutional term.

On 30 December 2018 the former members of the IEC, after weeks of speculation, formally delayed the presidential elections until 20 July 2019. Reasons for the delay included: the need for reform, especially after the mismanagement of the 2018 parliamentary elections; winter weather conditions; and possible pressure due to peace talks, or even a negotiated agreement before the polls (see AAN’s report here).

On 20 March, on the eve of Nawruz, the Afghan New Year, the new members of the IEC said in a statement that it would not be possible to hold the elections on the specified date of20 July 2019 and instead announced 28 September as the new date. The IEC still left a caveat – that the elections could be held on the above-mentioned date, 28 September, only if relevant stakeholders, especially the government and the international community, were able to provide the required budget to the IEC and fulfil their obligations. In its operational plan, the IEC has an estimated budget of 207 million dollars for holding three sets of elections: presidential, provincial council and Wolesi Jirga elections in Ghazni (see media report here). It has dropped the district council elections once again.

Mounting pressure for a new arrangement after 22 May

The first delay (moving the election date from 20 April to 20 July) had already provoked a debate in political circles concerning the end of the presidential term. For instance, former national security adviser and presidential candidate, Hanif Atmar, called on the leadership of the current government to step down after their legal term had expired. At the time, Nur Rahman Akhlaqi of Jamiat-e Islami told AAN that since the constitution did not specify whether the current government could continue after 22 May, it only stipulated that the government would no longer be legitimate, they would call for a grand political national consensus among political parties and civil society, supported by the international community, to decide on an alternative. According to him, this could be: 1) a continuation of the government but with a reduction in the president’s authorities; 2) an interim government; or, 3) the president stepping down and, as an example, the chief justice taking over the affairs of the state (see here).

However, following the second delay and as 22 May approached, 11 out of 18 presidential tickets (read AAN’s previous report about these 18 presidential tickets here) coalesced around a call for the government to be dissolved after 22 May. These candidates included Ahmad Wali Massud, Rahmatullah Nabil, Enayatullah Hafiz, Ghulam Faruq Najrabi, Faramarz Tamana, Muhammad Ibrahim Alekozai, Muhammad Hakim Tursan, Muhammad Hanif Atmar, Muhmmad Shahab Hakimi, Nur Rahman Liwal and Nurul Haq Olomi. They issued a statement on 26 Hamal 1398 (15 April 2019) saying “We categorically announce that the term of the government ends on 1st Jawza 1398 (22 May 2019), [and] consider use of any political trick for continuation as unjustified and in conflict with the national stability of the country.” They also said they would finalise an alternative plan for the government in light of the laws and in accordance with lawyers, politicians, civil society and other segments of society at the very earliest possibility, which, they said, would be announced in a press conference.

Perhaps in an attempt to head off the Supreme Court’s ruling in favour of the continuation of the presidential term, on 20 April 2019 they issued a second statement saying that “the leaders of the national unity government are duty bound to hand over the government after 1st Jawza (22 May).” They claimed that, based on the information and documents that they had received, the presidential palace was trying to put pressure on the Supreme Court to issue an interpretation in favour of a continuation of the presidential term until elections were held. They said this was an “obvious violation and harming the reputation and independence of the judiciary.” The Supreme Court did issue its ruling in favour of the continuation of the current president until the election of a new president, which is an unspecified timeframe, given that elections could be delayed again or might go to a second round, or the tabulation and announcement of the results might drag on.

Conclusion: reactions and scenarios

The 11 presidential candidates mentioned above (see here) issued a joint statement on 21 April in reaction to the ruling by the Supreme Court. They argued that the Supreme Court did not, following the adoption of the law on the establishment and authority of the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution (ICOIC), have the authority to interpret the constitution given that the authority tasked with interpreting the constitution had been shifted from the Supreme Court to the ICOIC. (At the time, the Supreme Court had commented that this law had introduced a conflict between its mandate and that of the ICOIC. When the ICOIC’s law was finally published in the official gazette in July 2009, it appeared together with the Supreme Court’s opinion without clarification as to what this opinion meant for the interpretation of the law – see AAN’s background here).

Neither did the 11 presidential candidates agree that the extension approved by the Supreme Court in 2009 was comparable to the one they approved in 2019. They questioned the Supreme Court’s reference that in 2009 the political elites had agreed to the extension, saying that, even if such an agreement had existed in 2009, currently both political parties and élites agreed that the presidential term should end. Whether such a consensus does exist is debatable. Some of the presidential candidates have issued separate statements damning the court’s decision. For instance, the Security and Justice team led by former NDS chief Rahmatullah Nabil said in a statement on 22 April that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of article 61 of the constitution in favour of the continuation of the government after 22 May was in conflict with this important article within the law. It said that no interpretation of the constitution could push back the end of the presidential term to an unknown time, that is to say, until presidential elections are held, the date of which is not yet clear (this is perhaps doubting that elections can even be held on 28 September, and even if they are held on schedule, it is unclear when they might be concluded). Nabil’s Security and Justice team said that it considered it its duty and responsibility to put an end to this illegal issue after 22 May by using all legal channels and civil protests. The National Accord team led by Ahmad Wali Massud called the Supreme Court’s ruling “made to order” and the extension “illegal.”

The government has not officially commented on the Supreme Court’s ruling. President Ashraf Ghani, in an introductory meeting with MPs on 23 April 2019, said (here and here) :

“Our objective is stability, not the stability that comes from the bayonet of a gun, force or gold (money), [but] stability that is the result of the implementation of the constitution. Whatever puts aside the constitution is, in fact, a coup d’état, and this nation does not accept coups d’ états. We want implementation.”  He repeated this statement in his address at the inauguration of the new MPs on 26 April, saying that “those who seek to undermine the national document, namely the constitution, by spreading ambiguity, doubt and distrust are close to coup plotters, I tell them that the age of the coup d’états is over.” He said, “I am the president until completion of transparent and general elections in the country.” During the ceremony commemorating 8 Saur on 28 April 2019, Ghani’s second Vice-President Sarwar Danesh added that “the proposals such as a caretaker or interim government do not have any legal reason and basis and, therefore, the Supreme Court, as the authority for interpreting the constitution, has endorsed this view.”

Meanwhile, while the Supreme Court’s ruling makes no mention of the National Unity Government or the Chief Executive’s office, the Chief Executive’s office has welcomed the ruling, saying that the National Unity Government would continue to serve until the election of a new president (media report here). (6)

In both 2009 and 2014, the president served beyond the constitutional expiry date, either because of the postponement of the elections (2009) or the drawn-out election process (2014). The then-president’s office sought a ruling from the Supreme Court in 2009 and from the ICOIC in 2014 for a continuation, both times arguing that the continuation of the incumbent president and government was more compatible with the spirit of the constitution.

In practical terms, however, there are some differences to the current situation: 1) there is a longer delay in the elections this time around and there may even be further delays given that certain basic but important issues, such as the use of technology and the budget have not yet been resolved. 2) There has been a serious debate both among national and international circles about the sequencing of elections and a peace process (see AAN’s reports here and here). Any significant progress in the ongoing peace talks and efforts might delay the elections. 3) The current government is a national unity government based on a political deal (see this AAN’s previous report “Elections 2014 (51): Finally, a deal, but not yet democracy” here), an improvised solution after a contentious presidential election, the mandate of which has been a topic for discussion before, see AAN’s previous report “When The Political Agreement Runs Out: On the future of Afghanistan’s National Unity Government” here). Whether or not the Supreme Court’s ruling will withstand the political pressure if maintained, or which of the scenarios will prevail, remains to be seen in the weeks and months ahead.

Edited by Sari Kouvo

(1) The full text of the 17 April letter by the legal department of the presidential palace (AAN has not seen a copy of it but it is cited in the Supreme Court’s ruling, see below AAN’s working translation of it):

Earlier in 1388 (2009), based on the request of the office of the administrative affairs and the secretariat of the Council of the Ministers, the high council of the Supreme Court, through approval number (169)dated 18/1/1388, provided its legal opinion about the term of the president due to the postponement of the elections.

Now also the Independent Elections Commission has postponed the presidential elections till 6 Mizan 1398 (28 September 2019) for better implementation of the provisions of the electoral law, especially provisions of article 19 of the amendment to the electoral law, ensuring transparency and implementing voter registration and identification in a safe way, while the term of the president, according to article 61 of the constitution, ends on the 1st Jawza of the fifth year after elections and elections for a new president should be held 30 to 60 days before the end of the term of the president. But the decision of the Independent Election Commission leads to more than four months of gap between the end of the president’s term and the new elections.

Therefore, considering the political and security situation and the decision of the Election Commission and in order to prevent power vacuum, disruption in government’s duties and carrying out the affairs of the presidency of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, it requires that the Supreme Court of I.R.A once again review the implementation of article 61 of the constitution and provide its legal opinion [so it can] be shared with the president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

(2) Article 61 of the constitution reads:

The President shall be elected by receiving more than fifty percent of votes cast by voters through free, general, secret and direct voting.

The presidential term shall expire on 1st of Jawza of the fifth year after elections.

 Elections for the new President shall be held within thirty to sixty days prior to the end of the presidential term.

 If in the first round none of the candidates gets more than fifty percent of the votes, elections for the second round shall be held within two weeks from the date election results are proclaimed, and, in this round, only two candidates who have received the highest number of votes in the first round shall participate.

 In case one of the presidential candidates dies during the first or second round of voting or after elections, but prior to the declaration of results, re-election shall be held according to provisions of the law.

(3) The full text of the Supreme Court’s 20 April 2019 response to the 17 April 2019 letter by the legal department of the presidential palaces published by Ariana News (An AAN working translation):

The high council of the Supreme Court of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, after a comprehensive review of the text of the letter by the office of deputy for policy, monitoring and review of the legal department of the presidential palace, opines as follow:

The current issue has a precedent, as in the previous elections, when the Election Commission announced the date for the 2009 elections with some months of delay, due to technical reasons, the then-government requested the Supreme Court for a legal explanation for the issue whereupon the high council of the Supreme Court, at the time, about the delay in the election date, had opined as below in view of the provisions of the law:”

1. The Supreme Court of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as an independent and impartial institution, like the two other branches of the state, considers the postponement of the elections as against the provision of article 61 of the constitution
2. The Supreme Court understands the problems and challenges with all their dimensions that the Independent Election Commission faces in financial, security and logistical areas.
3. The Supreme Court is also aware of and respects the viewpoint of a group of commentators and presidential candidates who have recognised the postponement of sound, democratic, general and fair election process as justified.
4. Therefore, the Supreme Court in view of the above issues, reviewed and analysed the query as referred from the text and spirit of article 61 of the constitution and presents its opinion as bellow considering the objective situation and the supreme interests of the country and in light of legal muyyeds:

As it is clear, paragraph two of article 61 of the constitution stipulates the end of presidential term on first Jawza of the fifth year after the elections but meanwhile the constitution ties the above paragraph to the next paragraphs which says: “elections to determine a new president shall be held 30 to 60 days before the end of the presidential term.”

As we see, both in terms of the spirit and logic of the law and in terms of the phrasing, these two paragraphs are complimentary to each other which means that after the end of the presidential elections [to be held] within 30 to 60 days to the first Jawza of the fifth year, the president term ends and this clearly indicates that before the end of the presidential term, the presidential elections should have been conducted and completed and the person to whom the presidency should be handed as a result of the elections should have been elected, while the current [2009] situation is against it. So the only scientific and logical solution, [which is] in consonance with the supreme interests of the country and based on a jurisprudential rule (baqa ma kana ala ma kana, observing the status quo ante), is the continuation of the term of the president and his vice-presidents till elections, because with the postponement of the elections in fact the provision of article 61 of the constitution has been delayed as a whole, because the provision for an issue in one article of the law cannot be divisible, in a way [to say that] delay is allowed in one paragraph [in elections] but not in another paragraph [end of the presidential term] despite the fact that they are complimentary to each other. This analysis in addition to the fact that it is compatible with the wording of the constitution as well as with its spirit and logic and with jurisprudential rule can contribute to ensuring national unity, stability in the country. Therefore, the Supreme Court of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan expresses its views in this regard:

1. Observing the text and spirit of the constitution mentioned above
2. Realising the problems and excuses that the Election Commission faces
3. In order to further ensure stability and protect the supreme interests of the country
4. And respecting the expectations and wishes of the noble and Muslim people of Afghanistan in paving the ground for holding general, fair, sound and democratic election

Considers the continuation of the term of the president and his vice-presidents until the election of a new president in the interests of the people and the system and in accordance with the spirit and analysis of the constitution and expresses its legal and positive opinion while approving and supporting it.”

Now considering that the current president’s query is the same query made by the then-president to the Supreme Court in the 2009 presidential elections. Since the issue in question has legal and executive precedent and this ruling has been acted upon, the legal opinion of the Supreme Court in view of the provisions of the law and given the excuses that the Election Commission of Afghanistan face is the same opinion that had been provided by the high council of the then-Supreme Court as a legal principle in 2009. Therefore, the previous opinion of the high council of the Supreme Court about the issue, [and] considering the provision of paragraph six of article 104 of the electoral law published in the official gazette 1226 dated 4/7/1395 (25 September 2016), was exactly approved by the Supreme Court of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

(4) The office of the administrative affairs under former President Karzai had written that (as cited by the ICOIC in its 18 May 2014 (available here in Dari) that (AAN’s working translation):

Paragraph two of article 61 says that the presidential term ends on the first Jawza of the fifth year. As it is clear, the results of the 1393 (2014) elections have not been clarified yet and, on the other hand, a few days are left to the first Jawza of the fifth year after the elections as enshrined in article 61 of the constitution. On the other hand, if the elections go to a second round, more time will be needed to hold the runoff and until the announcement of the results and election of a new president. So in order to prevent the violation of the constitution and find a reasonable solution to the issue, the issue is referred to you so you review it and provide legal advice to the president.

(5) The OICIC provided the following reasons for its decision: First, the continuation of the then-incumbent president’s term prevents a power vacuum. Second, there is no better alternative to the continuation of the then-president’s term within the constitutional framework. Third, because continuation of the then-incumbent president’s term is the continuation of an elected power, which is more democratic than any other method (that might have been adopted to replace it); fourth, this (the delay in completing the elections within the constitutional timeframe) is the closest to a state of emergency in terms of similarity, during which elections are delayed and the presidential term is extended (this is perhaps referring to article 147, which sets forth that if the presidential or parliamentary term expires during the state of emergency, new general elections shall be postponed and  their terms will be extended for up to four months. However, the state of emergency, according to article 143 and declared by the president, should be endorsed by the National Assembly).

Article 147 of the constitution reads:

If the presidential term or the legislative term of the National Assembly expires during the state of emergency, the new general elections shall be postponed, and the presidential, as well as parliamentary terms, shall extend up to 4 months.

If the state of emergency continues for more than four months, the President shall call the Loya Jirga.

Within 2 months after the termination of the state of emergency, elections shall be held.

(6) This led to speculation on the social media that the Supreme Court might have intentionally omitted to make any mention of the office of the chief executive to allow the president to dissolve it(see for example, Abdul Ali Muhammadi, a former legal adviser to President Ghani, commenting that “with the approval of the high council of the Supreme Court, the office of the chief executive will be closed after 22 May”). A day after the Supreme Court’s ruling was published by the media, on 22 April, a fake decree (as though issued by President Ghani) as though leaked to the Pajhwok News Agency was circulated on social media indicating that the office of the chief executive had been dissolved by the president and a team had been appointed to transfer its properties to the presidential palace. The office of second Vice-President Danesh wrote: “Today the text of a presidential decree about dissolution of the office of the chief executive of the National Unity Government, citing some news agency, was published on the social media and caused a concern for the public opinion. This news is totally fake and baseless and denied.”

 

 

The four-day Consultative Peace Loya Jirga will commence on Monday, 29 April 2019. This assembly – the sixth loya jirga since 2001 – was convened by President Ghani with the aim of discussing the framework for negotiations with the Taleban. Originally scheduled to start on 17 March, it had to be delayed for organisational reasons. Like the three most recent of these loya jirgas, it has been labelled as ‘consultative’, a qualification that changes this institution’s constitutional definition as a decision-making body. In this dispatch, AAN’s Jelena Bjelica and Thomas Ruttig (with input from the AAN team) provide answers to six basic questions about the loya jirga.

1. What is a loya jirga?

The 2004 Afghan Constitution, echoing earlier constitutions, defined a loya jirga — Pashtu for grand assembly —as “the highest manifestation of the will of the people of Afghanistan.” A loya jirga is only convened during extraordinary circumstances. It has the power to amend the constitution, impeach the president and “decide on issues related to independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity as well as supreme national interests.” In that sense, it is a quasi-parliamentarian constitutional consensus-building organ representing all ethnic and social groups of the country. Its decisions are binding.

The institution of the loya jirga draws upon the Pashtun tribal codex, the Pashtunwal(a)I, which includes jirgas on an intra- and inter-community level as a non-standing instrument to regulate local conflict (AAN background here). Although there is a strong myth around loya jirgas that project the institution back into Afghan history, it is a modern political invention. (1)

German Central Asia researcher Boris Buchholz described this process as follows (see his AAN guest dispatch here):

The loya jirga, today depicted as a centuries-old institution, was ‘invented’ less than a hundred years ago by King Amanullah (1919–29) [. . .] The loya jirgas became the king’s main instrument for settling potential conflicts face-to-face with the representatives of his people.

According to the current constitutional definition, it consists of all elected representatives of the country, ie the members of both houses of parliament (Wolesi and De Meshrano Jirgas, although the latter, also known as the Senate, includes members appointed by the president) and the chairpersons of the provincial as well as the district assemblies. The constitution stipulates that ministers, the chief justice and members of the Supreme Court as well as the attorney general “shall participate in the Loya Jirga sessions without voting rights.” Under this definition, a loya jirga is always convened by the president, except in the case of a president’s impeachment when it is convened by the Wolesi Jirga (Article 64, 7).

There is also confusion about the sub-category ‘constitutional loya jirga.’ There are two types of such. The 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) was called so because it had to decide about a new constitution. Currently, however, the term is used for a loya jirga convened according to the stipulations of the constitution, ie with all elected representatives – which was not the case in the 2003 CLJ, simply because there was only a provisional constitution at that point of time, namely the 1964 constitution as re-instated by the 2001 Bonn Agreement, but minus the monarchy and the post of a prime minister.

The discussion is now whether there currently can be a loya jirga according to the requirements of the constitution as districts councils have still not been elected. District council elections have been scheduled and postponed various times. This has required what AAN has described in earlier dispatches as “innovative Jirga-ism,” ie a re-defining of the ‘historical’ term to meet political requirements of the day with the aim of legitimising the decisions of a body convened, but not in conformity with assumed ‘historical’ or constitutionally prescribed ways (see here and here). This led to a number of loya jirgas that were described with an additional adjective, such as ‘traditional’ or ‘consultative’ or without the term ‘loya’ at all (more about this below).

Since 2001, five Loya Jirgas have been held (2):

1.  The Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ) in April 2002, with around 1,600 delegates. Based on the 2001 Bonn Agreement, it elected a transitional administration that replaced the interim administration established in Bonn (both were headed by Hamed Karzai, who later became president) and was tasked with drafting a new constitution and preparing a constitutional loya jirga to pass the constitution. Delegates were elected by province, after a pre-selection process in each district (based on a previous survey) ensured that all relevant ethnic and social groups were represented. The ELJ delegates included 140 women (see AAN reports here and here).

2. The Constitutional Loya Jirga convened in late December 2003 and early January 2004 that passed the new constitution. It had 102 female (of which only eight were directly elected) and 400 male delegates. The remaining women were either appointed by President Hamed Karzai or elected on separate lists.

3. The Peace Loya Jirga in June 2010 with 1,600 delegates, of which many had been hand-picked by then-President Karzai (see detailed AAN reporting here and here for the communique). Some delegates then pointed out to AAN “the ambiguity of the gathering and the terminology used: traditionally a jirga would have binding decision-making power, but this one has been termed a ‘consultative’ one (mashwarati, which comes from the word shura).” A shura only gives advice to a leader – who having heard the advice has the authority to act as he sees fit.

4. The Traditional Loya Jirga in November 2011 with 2,000 delegates in attendance who spent two days discussing the draft Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) with the US and the peace process in 40 working groups (see AAN reporting by Kate Clark here, here and here). Like the 2010 peace jirga, the delegates for this loya jirga were hand-picked by Karzai, and like its predecessor jirga this one was also of a ‘consultative’ nature.

5. The Consultative Loya Jirga, convened to scrutinise the Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States, in November 2013, with 2,500 delegates divided into 28 working groups to give recommendations. As AAN reported then (here):

Jirga organisers told AAN that the jirga is a consultative body: “People are not supposed to vote for or against the BSA,” said one. “They are just supposed to give input.”

As AAN reported in 2013, “despite their [jirga representatives] almost unanimously expressed the desire for a speedy signing [of the BSA], [Karzai] left saying he would carry on negotiations with the US.” He did, in fact, overrule the jirga’s recommendation and did not sign the agreement.

A female delegate who tweeted about the proceedings in real time (she allowed her Twitter feed to be published by AAN, see here) reported, for example, that the delegates produced 200 recommendations but that dissenting voices were simply ignored. For example, there were demands not to negotiate with ‘terrorists’ – a definition still often used by the government for the Taleban – but this was not allowed to stand in the way of the dominating demand to hold negotiations. She also reported that the summaries given of the discussions in the working groups (only one was chaired by a woman) were often “speeches” that did not reflect the discussions but the personal opinion of the presenter.

2. What is the aim of the 2019 jirga, and why did President Ghani want to convene it?

The aim of this loya jirga is to produce another ‘peace road-map’, AAN was told by a source close to the organisation of the event. It will likely update an earlier version presented at the February 2018 Kabul Process meeting and updated once already for the international Geneva Conference on Afghanistan on 28 November 2018 (AAN background here). Essentially, the new road-map is supposed to include three phases: pre-negotiations, negotiations and a post-agreement phase of five years. It sets the elected Afghan government and the Taleban as the future key negotiators, supported by the US, the European Union and regional countries. Ghani’s February 2018 seven-point proposal had offered a “political framework” that included a “ceasefire,” the recognition of the Taleban as a political party (siasi gund), confidence-building measures and what he called free and fair elections (see this AAN analysis).

The new road-map (an organiser told AAN) would again reject much-discussed plans to establish a transitional or caretaker government that would negotiate with the Taleban. President Ghani (with support from sectors of the public) had reacted harshly to such an idea, saying they would never be implemented “not today, not tomorrow, not in a hundred years.” The idea had come up as the US-Taleban talks in Doha started to achieve results (read this AAN analysis) and was designed to avoid new elections – ostensibly to not preclude any decisions reached in talks with the Taleban.

In official language, as in Presidential Decree number 162, dated 26 February 2019, the aims of the coming Peace Loya Jirga are as follows: The Loya Jirga is organised with the purpose of [the following is an AAN working translation]:

. . . listening, effectively using and paying ultimate [sic] tribute to the advice, views and analysis of people’s representatives from all layers and strata of society on problems to seek solutions and accelerate the negotiation process . . .

The decree added that the Loya Jirga will be “a big, national opportunity for people’s representatives from across the country and refugees to discuss substantial issues in a free and friendly atmosphere.” It said that the two key issues to be discussed are:

1. the definition of and modalities of achieving peace
2. limits and a framework for negotiations with the Taleban movement

The decree then says:

In light of the views of the people’s representatives, the leadership of the Afghan Government will draft and complete the peace and negotiation strategy and will strive to utilise all national and state resources for its implementation.

On 11 March 2019, President Ghani appointed the head of the High Peace Council’s secretariat and Ghani’s special representative on “regional affairs for consensus on peace,” former interior minister Omar Daudzai, as the head of the secretariat of the loya jirga commission. (3) Daudzai had published two discussion papers on peace and reconciliation and a future political settlement in Afghanistan on his webpage in May 2018. Ghani’s decision to appoint Daudzai was probably informed by the latter’s vision of a future political settlement in Afghanistan that is very close to his own. Although both papers were very critical of Ghani’s personality, (4) Daudzai supported Ghani’s idea of having confidence-building measures with the Taleban and elections first, before negotiations.

In his first paper, entitled “A Way out of Quagmire,” in a section titled “Election-first [sic], must be the way forward,” he wrote:

they [the Taleban] know that they can disrupt elections and ultimately defeat constitutional democracy. [. . .] Afghan government with the help of the international community must make sure all elections are held within the constitutional timeframe.

(This, since 2001, has only happened once and will not happen again in 2019, as the presidential election has already been postponed twice. See AAN background about the first delay here and a media report about the second one here.)

Daudzai also proposed that a High State Council for Peace, with a much wider range of powers and responsibilities, replace the High Peace Council in the peace process and negotiations. Even more significantly, he suggested creating a powerful new religious council (5) to accommodate the Taleban in some future political set-up.

So when Ghani announced the jirga in February 2019, just after the end of another round of US-Taleban talks in Doha, he wanted wide support and backing for his vision of the peace process (which naturally included a place for the government  at the Doha negotiating table) before even more progress was made while his government was still not at the table. The US and the Taleban then announced that they already had reached a ‘framework’ for an agreement that would facilitate the withdrawal of the US and other foreign troops from Afghanistan, adding impetus for the Afghan government to influence the sequencing of the elements of the peace process.

The jirga and the – now cancelled (or at least delayed) – ‘intra-Afghan dialogue’ meeting in Doha originally scheduled for 19–21 April were expected to build momentum for the necessary dialogue among Afghan actors about how the peace process should continue and about a possible post-negotiations political system. The jirga would build an ‘in-country’ consensus, ie among the non-insurgent actors. (6) The Doha meeting is now in question. The Taleban also declined Daudzai’s invitation to attend the peace jirga, calling it a “fake jirga.”

3. Who will attend the jirga – and who won’t, and why?

According to the Afghan Constitution, the Loya Jirga consists of the elected representatives of the people, ie parliamentarians as well as the elected heads of the 34 provincial and 387 district councils. This specific provision seems to be the ‘catch-22’ for this jirga. First of all, the results for parliamentary elections held on 20 and 21 October 2018 have not been officially announced yet. It has been announced now, however, that the new parliament will be inaugurated on Saturday 27 April, conveniently just a couple of days before the Jirga. This will happen, however, without the new representatives for Ghazni province (where elections were not held; see this AAN analysis) and Kabul province (for which the results were disputed and declared void by the Electoral Complaint Commission; see this AAN analysis).

Second, district council elections have never been held (see this AAN analysis), so there are no elected heads of those councils. For previous post-2001 loya jirgas, district representatives were chosen from among the provincial council members (which include district representatives).

To compensate for this lack, this time a solution has been found in using a revamped version of the 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ) district representatives’ election guidelines. The guidelines were approved by the Jirga Commission just two days after the commission was appointed, and its implementation was entrusted to the provincial councils. This included their responsibility to hold elections in both district and provincial centres.

According to the guidelines, each province was given a number of loya jirga delegates that is seven times the number of their MPs in the Wolesi Jirga. This was later interpreted as including their Wolesi Jirga MPs plus six times their number of new delegates. For example, Panjshir province, which has two Wolesi Jirga seats, will send those two to the loya jirga, plus twelve more elected delegates. Kabul province, on the other extreme with its 33 seats in the WJ, will elect 198 district representatives for this loya jirga. This may seem an irrelevant technical point, but it shows that even during the preparation phase of this loya jirga, the government has been interpreting and bending its own rules to polish the hasty preparations.

The guidelines also state:

• Members of the peace consultative Loya Jirga in district and provincial centres are elected based on elites’ consensus including Ulema, influential persons [mutanafezin, an often-used term in the Afghan context], university professors, merchants/entrepreneurs, local development councils, district/area representative, youth, women and representatives of civil society.
• Election of at least one representative per district is mandatory.

It also stipulated a gender quota:

• Taking in view the progress made in last 17 years, [the] women’s quota is at least 30 per cent of all the members of the Loya Jirga.

In total, Daudzai announced, around 3,000 people will attend this jirga: 1,500  individuals from provinces (including representatives of Kuchis, Sikhs and Hindus), 250 members of parliament, 750 people from different ethnicities and 423 from the provincial councils.

As important as who will attend the Jirga is who will not, and why. The list of boycotters includes seven competitors to President Ghani in the next election, scheduled for October 2019: Chief Executive Abdullah, Hanif Atmar, Rahmatullah Nabil, Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, Ahmad Wali Massud and Faramarz Tamanna. Abdullah stated that the members of his election team were not consulted about the meeting, there were no convincing reasons for holding the jirga and it would not help resolve existing problems in Afghanistan. Additionally, eleven political parties decided to boycott the loya jirga. The boycotters are almost entirely part of the anti-Ghani opposition, so that the loya jirga has become entangled with what already amounts to the election campaign.

4. How were the delegates elected?

The election guidelines for the Consultative Peace Loya Jirga also detail the method for holding the elections (entekhabat) of the delegates and foresee various roles for different ministries and parts of Afghan society in collaboration with the provincial councils. For example, the department of Hajj and Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Information and Culture, the municipalities, civil society and local media were tasked with conducting public awareness programmes on the importance of the loya jirga. Citizen Charter Councils, civil society organisations, youth and other existing councils at the district and provincial levels were to invite influential representatives of people from different walks of life to assigned locations on election day for the selection of district representatives. Given the diversity, for example, of civil society, it is unclear whether and how full inclusion has been ensured.

The guidelines also set the prerequisites for voters and candidates. To be a voter, a person must have Afghan nationality, should be a minimum of 18 years old and should be present at the election site on election day. A person who wants to nominate himself or herself as a candidate should be an Afghan national of the minimum age of 23 years and should be present at the election site on election day (ie, no one can be elected in absentia).

A jirga secretariat member told AAN that the elections had already been held in all 34 provinces between 10 and 12 April (as per the guidelines they should have been held between 6 and 9 April). In some provinces, the deadline was extended for three days. No election results have been published so far. The jirga’s Facebook page only contains short news from different provinces that delegates had been elected, but not who was elected.

In many provinces, the election for the loya jirga had to be held in the provincial centres, because the security situation (read the control of the district) did not allow for elections in district centres. For example, the elections for Andar district, which is fully controlled by the Taleban, were held in Ghazni city, and the two elected representatives but do not live in the district any longer. The Taleban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahed, said that the Taleban will not participate “in such fake Jirgas,” the Afghanistan Times reported. This statement came despite Daudzai’s repeated public invitations via media to the Taleban to take part in the jirga and here).

From Herat, Hasht-e Sobh daily newspaper reported that 3,000 to 3,500 people came to determine the 26 representatives of the city for the jirga. “The provincial council was tasked by Kabul to administer the election process without clarifying a procedure on how to do it in advance,” the newspaper reported, adding:

The election process was chaotic. No candidates stood up to speak on why they were running. People rushed to cast their votes, and this turned into a kind of stampede and the anti-riot police intervened to calm down the situation. The women who had come to vote were particularly worried about this disorderly organisation and many left and went back to their houses to stay safe.

In Kabul province, re-elections had to be held for the capital city after, as a member of the secretariat told AAN, “they did not do so well” number-wise in the first attempt.

About the election in Shakardara district of Kabul province, a resident told AAN:

The local people got together and they introduced five people: Commander Matan, Sayed Anis, Malim Yunes, a person from the People’s Council (shura-ye mardomi) and a person from the Citizens’ Charter, but they did not reach an agreement and there were lots of disagreements and they left the decision to be taken another time. There are always people getting together but there are powerful people who manipulate and influence and introduce their own people.

Proceedings were even worse in Takhar province, where an angry mob destroyed ballot boxes for the district representatives’ election, Tolo reported). Elsewhere, a youth representative and elected member of the jirga from eastern Laghman province was killed by unknown assailants on 13 April 2019, Pajhwok reported.

A person who was invited to facilitate and moderate one of the sessions during the loya jirga told AAN that when he went to register at the loya jirga tent, he found that his name was misspelt. He did not receive an agenda and only very little information and prep-talk on what was expected from him at the session he was to moderate.

The mentioned cases of shortcoming might easily represent only the tip of the iceberg. They signal that the elections had been held in a hasty and ill-prepared manner. It remains to be seen whether the loya jirga organisers will handle the jirga with less confusion and problems.

5. What will the delegates do and how?

Apart from the two general questions mentioned above (about definitions, modalities, red lines and the general framework for peace and negotiations), it seems the loya jirga delegates will be expected to answer 25 detailed questions prepared by the organisers. But this questionnaire has not been published yet.

The jirga delegates will discuss these two issues in 50 working groups and they will put forward recommendations to the government. Each group will have a rapporteur and a secretary who will report back on behalf of the group, similar to the 2013 jirga. The recommendations, in the form of a communiqué, will be shared with the public on 2 May, on the last day of the jirga. This means there will not be much time to compile and reconcile possibly contradictory input from the working groups on issues that are not only essential for the country’s future but possibly controversial. It is obvious that, for example, not everyone agrees that there should be peace talks with the Taleban. Some of the public reject such an idea, as a recent Afghan think tank paper showed. Various politicians, such as Ghani’s running mate in the September elections, Amrullah Saleh, have made it clear that he does not favour talking to ‘terrorists’ – at least before he joined the president’s election ticket (see his statement during a podium discussion in Kabul in this video, starting at 30:20 minutes). In addition, opposition politicians question whether the current government possesses the legitimacy to represent the country in such negotiations (see above about the intra-Afghan dialogue which includes actors who question the legitimacy of the government, some having announced their boycott of the Jirga).

The jirga will not have an official website. Already, all communication is social media-based, with a Facebook page and Twitter account. This limits accessibility to those with internet access, which is more widespread – but still far from all-encompassing – in the cities than in the countryside (see a critique of the similar approach used during the preparatory women’s ‘consensus gathering’ (ejma) here).

6. Can the jirga achieve its goals?

Judging from previous loya jirgas, and also from the preparatory women’s ejma, achieving the jirga’s goals is possible. Historically, loya jirgas have usually come up with what the respective government wanted, as the government – as is currently the case – had control over who was invited and the proceedings of the gathering. This was also the case in the women’s ejma earlier in 2019, a preparatory event for this jirga.

When delegates deviated from the government’s wish, as in 2013 when the bilateral security agreement with the US was the subject, the president (then Karzai) simply ignored the jirga’s decision. He was formally able to, as the jirga had been declared ‘consultative’ only (terminology does matter) and politically, as those who opposed him had no legal or institutional means (and possibly not sufficient willingness) to stop him. They also knew he would be out after the 2014 presidential election in which he was constitutionally unable to run.

It can also be expected that the government – or better, the president’s apparatus, as the other part of the National Unity Government, the chief executive, has pulled out of the event – has prepared documents that will reflect its main demands on the ‘modalities’ of and the ‘framework’ for peace talks: namely that the elected government be included in the on-going peace negotiations that, so far, are between the US and the Taleban only. The red lines for such negotiations (or the “limits” as they are called in the context of this jirga) are less controversial and might represent the only real existing consensus among all non-Taleban players, at least rhetorically. These are that no rights and freedoms enshrined in the current constitution will be sacrificed and the Islamic republican character of the state be preserved.

The more important question, however, is whether the jirga can bring the peace process forward and even strengthen the position of the government in it. Questions persist, linked – as during the women’s ejma– with the lack of transparency again shrouding the jirga’s preparations. Terminology about how delegates were determined is blurred. The guidelines called the process an ‘election’ but actually what happened amounted to a selection. (The 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga, which served as an example for the current jirga, had a second election by secret ballot at the provincial level.) There are still no lists of s/elected delegates (although the government says the elections have already been held); only a few days before the jirga is to start, there is no agenda or instructions for facilitators and only social media-based communication. This could indicate that recommendations are already prepared and the delegates’ discussions might change little.

The loya jirga also convenes in a time of shifting political context and has become part of the pre-election campaigning. This subordinated the long-term goal (to end the war and build a post-war Afghanistan) to elections-related short-term goals, in effect, limiting the space for genuine debate. In contrast to earlier loya jirgas, an organised opposition exists that is not ready to play along and that even includes people (such as Hekmatyar) who are usually seen as allies of the president. It boycotts the jirga as such and puts into question whether any outcome really represents a national consensus. It is too strong to be marginalised and ignored (as was the opposition to some chapters of the constitution during the 2003/04 CLJ), not least because there are presidential elections this year in which the incumbent is running while his victory is far from assured; he will be facing an at least three-horse race, with his erstwhile (but uneasy) partner, NUG Chief Executive Dr Abdullah, as one of his challengers and his former National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar another. (There are other candidates such as Nabil, Hekmatyar and Rasul who will nibble at his constituency in the first round of the election if they cannot be brought back on board.)

Another problem in the 2019 jirga is that even if the delegates and the president concur about the main goals and if there were no opposition, any outcome remains worthless as long as the Taleban do not give up their opposition to a government’s role at the real negotiating table and the US proves unable to persuade them that this would be beneficial. The planned but postponed intra-Afghan dialogue, even if it gets on the agenda again, is no substitute for negotiations. And there is even doubt over when this dialogue will have a chance to be reset. The failure to agree on a delegation from Kabul for the meeting (or such a large one that it was easy for the host, Qatar, and/or the Taleban to reject it as unpractical), has highlighted the lack of consensus among the elites that constitute the current Afghan political system.

Under such circumstances, the jirga will hardly enhance the legitimacy of the Afghan government, and the Taleban will find it easy to continue dismissing both as irrelevant. (This does not mean, of course, that their current position is beneficial for peace in Afghanistan.) A possible silver lining is on the horizon: if the next president – whoever this will be – is elected in a more acceptable and accepted fashion than in 2014, he and his government might legitimately draw on whatever the jirga delegates agree upon. However, given the many open questions related to the 2019 election (see an AAN dossier here), even this must remain doubtful.

 

Edited by Christian Bleuer and Thomas Ruttig

 

(1) Afghan mythology says that “the historical roots of Jirga can be traced from the times of the ancient Arians and Kanishka the Great” (as quoted from the 2011 Traditional Loya Jirga website, which is not active anymore, but an excerpt is available in this AAN report). The jirgas that made Mir Wais Hotak (1709) and Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747) Afghan kings in Kandahar are described by some Afghan historians and in the public discourse as loya jirgas, but they looked different from what has been enshrined in Afghan constitutions since 1923. They were much smaller bodies of tribal leaders (see an AAN historical outline here).

(2) Additionally, the first (and so far only) joint Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace Jirga was held in Kabul in August 2007 after relations between the neighbours became strained. This was not a loya jirga, because as per constitutional definition loya jirgas cannot have non-Afghan participation. As AAN’s Martine van Bijlert reported:

The Joint Peace Jirga in 2007 had a difficult run-up, as relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were tense and cooperation was reluctant, but in the end, neither side wanted to be blamed for sabotaging the effort and the meeting did take place. The four-day gathering was attended by the top leadership of both sides, the discussions energized the participants – many of whom had been skeptical about the whole affair – controversy was largely avoided and the meeting ended on a high note with agreements for a follow-up jirga process. But although committees were appointed and some meetings took place, the initiative ultimately petered out.

(3) Other appointments were

* Najib Amin, head of the board of the appointments of the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission and who has also been involved in policy coordination of all jirgas in the past ten years, as administrative and financial deputy of the secretariat of the Loya Jirga commission;

* Naheed Sarabi, deputy minister of finance, as deputy for policy affairs of the secretariat of the Loya Jirga commission and

* Shoaib Rahim, acting mayor of Kabul city, as coordinating deputy of this commission.

The secretariat does all of the work related to the organisation of the Loya Jirga. However, it has been a tradition in all previous loya jirgas since 2001 that a commission is established to oversee not just the preparations but the entire process. The commission also acts as an advisory board to the secretariat. Members of the Commission for the Consultative Peace Loya Jirga were appointed on 4 April 2019 at a meeting chaired by Omar Daudzai.

The 19-member commission includes Fazel Karim Fazel, owner of Shamshad TV and President Ghani’s advisor on peace; Abdul Wahab Erfan, a former senator from Takhar province; former MP Abbas Noyan; Abdul Haq Shafaq, former governor of Faryab and Samangan provinces; Mohammad Ayoub Rafiqi, presidential advisor and former executive secretary of HPC; Abdul Rashid Ayoubi, senior advisor to President Ghani; Daud Kalakani, former MP from Kabul; Mohammad Seddiq Patman, member of the New National Front led by Anwarul Haq Ahadi; Khan Jan Alakozay, deputy head of Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Jamahir Anwary, ex-minister of refugees and repatriation; Fawzia Aral, advisor to the minister of finance, Humayun Qayoumi, former journalist with Radio Azadi; Malalai Shinwari, advisor to President Ghani on youth affairs; Sayed Ali Kazimi , former MP from Kabul; Aminuddin Muzafari, former senator from Kapisa province; Nasrin Oryakhail, former minister of labour and social affairs; Ziaulhaq Amarkhail, senior advisor to the president and former IEC CEO; Nilofar Ibrahimi, former MP from Badakhshan; Sarir Ahmad Barmak, senior advisor to President Ghani on electoral affairs and former IEC commissioner; and Rohullah Niazi, deputyhead of Administration Department at IDLG.

The commissioners all seem to be from the Ghani camp. It is also interesting that the former minister of refugees and repatriation, Jamahir Anwary, is among the commissioners. His ministerial tenure (from June 2010 to December 2014) will mainly be remembered for the accusations of corruption, nepotism and embezzlement of government and international aid agencies’ funds. Anwary was called in by both houses of parliament (Wolesi Jirga and Meshrano Jirga) for questioning. Among other things, the Afghan media reported that Anwary was summoned over allegations of graft, including embezzlement of funds, failure to clear the ministry’s power bills, anomalies in recruitment and the ministry’s overall failure to address the plight of refugees (see this AAN report).

(4) In “A Way out of Quagmire,” Daudzai wrote:

President Ghani often gets it wrong. He doesn’t consult, and when he consults, he does it with the wrong people in the wrong manner. For him consultation is a one-way traffic. He explains and people must listen and understand it. I often give the example that: “he is trying to open the door with a screw driver while he has the key in his pocket.”

(5) On this, Daudzai wrote:

At present, we have an informal organization called the Council of Clerics. It is ethnically and geographically inclusive but they are seen as a tool at the president’s hand. Their status is not reflected in the constitution. If this council is more formalized and reflected in the constitution and is led by the title of Mufti Azam (highest official of religious law), the Taliban and their followers would have achieved what they wanted since they would be able to see a place for themselves within the Council of Clerics. The authority and the limits to the scope of the council’s work shall be reflected in the constitution and the relevant laws of the country.

(6)There were disagreements between the Afghan government, the Taleban and the Qatari hosts over who should participate from the Afghan side. The Afghan government had announced a ‘final’ list of 250 delegates on 16 April that included politicians and civil society representatives from across Afghanistan, both from the government and the opposition, but the Taleban objected to it and said that the peace talks are “not an invitation to some wedding or other party at a hotel in Kabul.” Also, the Qatari government seems to have objected to the unusually large delegation.

 

Bulletproof Vests: What You Should Know Before Buing One

At a time when the US Army is moving out with plans to field the next-generation of ground combat vehicles and helicopters, it is also examining what will be required of the network to support these weapons systems. During a 10 April interview with Jane’s , the programme executive officer for

Americas

The Navy awarded Raytheon a $28 million contract modification for integration and production support for the Air and Missile Defense Radar AN/SPY-6(V). The AN/SPY-6(V) next-generation integrated radar will be featured on the Flight III Arleigh Burke Guided Missiles Destroyers. According to Raytheon, the SPY-6 is built with so called Radar Modular Assemblies, each of them a self-contained radar in a 2’x2’x2’ box. They can stack together to form any size array to fit the mission requirements of any ship, which would make the SPY-6 the Navy’s first truly scalable radar. In January, the radar completed an important milestone when it successfully tracked a ballistic missile target in the system’s final development test. The radar is on schedule for delivery to the Navy in 2020, replacing the SPY-1 radar. The contract includes support for continued combat system integration and testing, engineering, training, software and depot maintenance as well as field engineering services. Raytheon will perform work at various locations within the US. The estimated completion date is in December this year.

Raytheon successfully completed a static test of its new DeepStrike missile rocket motor. The next-generation, long-range, surface-to-surface precision strike missile will replace the Army Tactical Missile System. Raytheon won the $116.4 million contract to build the missile in June 2017 under the technology up-gradation and risk trimming phase of the Long-Range Precision Fires (LRPF) program. The missile will be compatible with two launch systems of the US Army, the M270 multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) and the M142 high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS). The rocket motor test brought the weapon one step closer to its maiden flight test, scheduled for this year. A previous milestone for the DeepStrike was the successful preliminary design review, in which the Army evaluated every aspect of the new missile’s design, from its advanced propulsion system and innovative lethality package to its guidance system.

Middle East & Africa

Israeli company Rafael dropped out of Switzerland’s $8 billion air defense tender. Rafael had initially offered its David’s Sling system. David’s Sling is an Israeli system developed with the United States that is designed to defend against short-range and theater ballistic missiles, large-caliber rockets, and cruise missiles. However, the Israeli Department of Defense did not give the company the necessary permit to go further in the tender. Reasons for this decision are unclear. Companies still participating in the tender are Raytheon with the Patriot system and Eurosam with the SAMP/T.

Europe

Contributing to NATO’s increased presence in the Baltic states, the UK deployed five Boeing AH-64 Apache attack helicopters to the Amari Air Base in Estonia. The AH-64s are expected to participate in upcoming NATO military exercises and provide defense coverage for a military base near the Russian border. Defense Secretary Gavin Williamson commented on the deployment: “It’s a very credible threat that we see from Russia and part of the reason that we’re deploying five Apache attack helicopters is making sure that we’re constantly adapting to a changing situation.“ According to the British Army, the Apaches will be working in tandem with the Wildcat battlefield reconnaissance helicopters to provide valuable training opportunities to NATO allies on Estonia’s annual Exercise Spring Storm and to the UK-led battlegroup deployed on NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence.

Asia-Pacific

The US and the Sri Lankan Navy ended the Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training (CARAT) exercise four days earlier than scheduled due to the recent attacks in the Asian country. “All US personnel involved in CARAT are accounted for and redeployment is in progress,” it says in an updated news release. Several bombers carried out six coordinated attacks at churches and hotels on Sunday, killing at least 290 people. The government declared a state of emergency to take effect at midnight Monday. The declaration allows police and military forces to detain and interrogate potential suspects without a court order. The US-Sri Lanka CARAT exercise was slated to take place for a week and was based off the southern port city of Hambantota. Hambantota was not targeted in Sunday’s attacks, but the suspension of exercises will allow Sri Lanka to reallocate military resources should they become necessary in the aftermath. The CARAT is the US Navy’s oldest and longest continually-running regional exercise in South and Southeast Asia. Participants conduct partnered training focused on building interoperability and strengthening relationships.

According to reports, China’s Gas Turbine Research Institute designed and tested a prototype of a new turbofan engine for fighter aircraft within 18 months. The team of young engine designers will be given an award during China’s Youth Day on May 4. It took the development team only a year to design the engine, and just six months to finish testing the first prototype. No details of the engine, including its designation, have been revealed, but official statements claimed that the new engine would “rival advanced foreign fighter jets and represents China’s highest technical level in aero engines”. Until now, long-standing difficulties that have hampered China’s production of military aircraft engines forced it to import Russian-made engines for several of its major aircraft projects.

Today’s Video

Watch: New Advanced Version of its F 15 Eagle for the US Air Force, Next Super Fighter Electronic Warfare

The US Defence Information Systems Agency (DISA) has awarded Iridium Communications a contract to continue supporting the Department of Defense (DoD) enhanced mobile satellite service (EMSS) gateway for four and a half years, the company announced on 22 April. The contract for gateway maintenance

Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) unveiled on 15 April its OPAL network system for interconnectivity and data sharing, which company sources told Jane’s is already in service with several air forces. “OPAL is based on forming a decentralised communication cloud for all members on the

Lockheed Martin has opened its new production facility for the F-16 Fighting Falcon in Greenville, South Carolina, with production of the Block 70 variant expected to begin at the site by the end of 2019. Tooling and other equipment that was previously housed in the company’s Fort Worth,

Plans are being developed to introduce magnetic anomaly detection equipment onto US Navy (USN) and Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky MH-60R helicopters, the US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) has revealed. In a sources sought notice issued on 17 April, NAVAIR advised that it

Key Points The US Army awarded contracts to five companies for its FARA-CP effort Contractor teams must be ready to fly by November 2022 The US Army on 23 April awarded contracts to five contractor teams for the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft-Competitive Prototype (FARA-CP) programme,

The US Navy (USN) is looking to equip the Northrop Grumman E-2D Advanced Hawkeye airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft with beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) networking and GPS-protection capabilities for operating in an electronic attack (EA) environment. The Naval Air Systems Command

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has displayed some of its newest platforms in a fleet review held on 23 April in the waters off the northern port city of Qingdao to mark the 70th anniversary of its founding. More than 30 Chinese naval vessels and 18 foreign warships

Lockheed Martin recorded another strong quarter of F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter deliveries, coupled with increased classified order activity, helping to bring the company’s backlog to a record USD133.5 billion at the end of the first quarter. “We are performing extremely

The European Commission aims to eliminate taxes on a broad range of activities linked to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), from multinational exercises to capability projects flowing from the union’s two-year-old Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework. Such

On 23 April 2019, in Makhachkala, Dagestan, and Grozny, Chechnya, the Russian Federal Security Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, FSB) detained five alleged members of the Islamic State, who were allegedly planning terrorist attacks against law enforcement assets, and seized arms,

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced on 22 April 2019 that the US would not extend any waivers for the purchase of Iranian oil after the current ones granted to eight countries expire on 2 May. The US will follow through on its zero-tolerance oil import policy, allowing waiver recipients a few

Pro-government and international military forces in Afghanistan were responsible for more civilian deaths in the first three months of 2019 than the Taliban and Islamic State-Khorasan militant groups, according to a 24 April report issued by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

Russia has launched its first submarine designed to launch the new Poseidon nuclear armed unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk. The nearly complete Project 09852 special-purpose nuclear-powered submarine, Belgorod, was moved out of the Sevmash main assembly hall

The T-72B3 obr.2016, also known as the T-72B3M, is the most modern standard of main battle tank (MBT) in service with Russian Ground Forces. It is an improvement over the T-72B3 and in December 2018 at least 10 were delivered to the 49th Combined Arms Army located in the Southern Military District.

The Portuguese Army will have 126 of its future VAMTAC ST5 (Vehículo de Alta Movilidad Táctico) 4×4 light tactical multi-purpose protected vehicles equipped with Rheinmetall’s 40 mm Rapid Obscurant System-Land (ROSY-L). The systems were purchased via the NATO Support and