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Indian Shivalik Class Frigate

The Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has reportedly awarded a $1bn contract to Boeing to deliver four additional P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft for the Indian Navy.

Sikorksy Aircraft, a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin, has completed the critical design review (CDR) of the VH-92A Presidential Helicopter Replacement Programme.

Leidos has completed the initial performance trials of the US Navy’s first unmanned surface vehicle Sea Hunter, built as part of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) anti-submarine warfare continuous unmanned vessel (ACTUV) program…

A series of four Project 21180 multi-purpose vessels are being built by JSC Admiralty Shipyards, a company headquartered in St. Petersburg, Russia, for the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy.

The recent NATO commitment to position troops in the Baltic states follows several years of Russian aggression, with NATO previously reluctant to make such a commitment. The move is seen as a symbolic gesture of support for the region; however, the commitment is not seen as a significant challenge to Russia’s military strength and question marks remain about whether it will act as a significant act of deterrence.

The post NATO decides to ‘troop the colours’ as symbol of deterrence in the Baltics appeared first on European Geostrategy.

SAGE Automation and Navantia Australia have executed a joint venture (JV) agreement to create the Navantia SAGE Automation Group (NSAG), creating local capability in naval automation and monitoring.

"On 26 July 2016, Mrs. Kirsi Henriksson, a senior diplomat from Finland, was appointed Head of the European Union mission in Niger, EUCAP Sahel Niger. She will take up her duties on 1 September 2016. She will replace Mr Filip de Ceuninck who had been in the position since 2013.

EUCAP Sahel Niger was launched in 2012 to support capacity building of the Nigerien security actors. The mission provides advice and training to support the Nigerien authorities in strengthening their security capabilities. It contributes to the development of an integrated, coherent, sustainable, and human rights-based approach among the various Nigerien security agencies in the fight against terrorism and organised crime. On 18 July 2016 its mandate was amended to also assist the Nigerien central and local authorities as well as the security forces in developing policies, techniques and procedures to better control and combat irregular migration.

Since 2014, Ms Henriksson has been the Deputy Head of Mission for EUCAP Sahel Mali. She has a background both from civilian CSDP, Crisis Management Centre Finland, Ministry of Interior and from academia. She has previously held positions such as: Acting Chief of Staff EUBAM Libya (May-Aug 2014); Head of Planning and Evaluation, EUBAM Libya (2014); Planning and Evaluation Officer, EUBAM Libya (2013-2014); Rule of Law expert, Evaluation and Best Practice Officer, EUJUST LEX Iraq (2010-2011); Head of Development, Crisis Management Center Finland (CMC Finland), Ministry of the Interior (MoI) Research CMC Finland, MoI (2007); Researcher and lecturer at the Department of History and Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, University of Tampere, Finland (1996-2006). She speaks Finnish, English, French, Swedish, German, and has a basic knowledge of Arabic.

The decision was taken by the Political and Security Committee."

(European Council - Press Release)

Tag: EUCAP Sahel NigerKirsi Henriksson

Az elmúlt időszakban a migráció és a terrorizmus vált legmeghatározóbb történelemformáló jelenségévé Európában, és az előttünk álló években is bizonyosan meghatározóak lesznek a hozzájuk kapcsolódó kihívások. E kérdések megítélése nemcsak a hagyományos politikai törésvonalak mentén gerjeszt folyamatos vitákat, hanem a hazai jobboldalon belül is. E rendkívül komplex politikai – társadalmi jelenségek okaira és lehetséges megoldásukra azonban széles körben elterjedt leegyszerűsített féligazságok akarnak útbaigazítást adni. Ennek fényében a következő tíz pontban a migrációval és a terrorizmussal összefüggő 10 leglényegesebb kérdés körültekintőbb és árnyaltabb megvilágítására tesznek kísérletet.

(Második rész)

6. A közelmúlt nyugat-európai terrorcselekményeit – az ISIS általmás térségekben elkövetett terrorcselekményekhez hasonlóan – értelemszerűen semmi nem igazolja. A nyugati államok közel-keleti politikája és elhobázott bevándorlás- illetve társadalompolitikája ugyan részben magyarázatot adnak rá, de korántsem teljesen.

Az un. Iszlám Állam elleni fellépés nem tűr halasztást, mint területi entitással rendelkező terrorszervezetet minél előbb fel kell számolni. Az iszlám nevében gyilkoló terroristákat és támogatóikat semmi nem menti fel felelősségük alól. Ugyanakkor ez nem jelenti azt, hogy ne terhelné a nyugati kormányokat felelősség abban, hogy olyan közeg jött létre a nyugat-európai városok peremén, amely a szélsőséges radikalizmusnak tág teret enged, a tolerancia és a politikai korrektség jegyében a társadalom egészének biztonságára és stabilitására veszélyt jelentő emberek, mozgalmak, közösségek visszaélhetnek a nyugati társadalmak szabadságával. Természetesen fontos tényezők a radikalizálódásban a szociális kérdések, az esélyteremtés lehetőségének előségítése, ám ennek csakis a jogok és kötelezettségek egyensúlyában lehet kerete és eredménye. Vagyis a párhuzamos társadalmakat fel kell számolni, a nyugati államok nem tolerálhatják azokat a szervezeteket, intézményeket, egyének tevékenységét, amelyek ellentmondanak az európai kultúra talaján álló joguralomnak, szabadságjogoknak, nemek közötti egyenlőségnek és vallási türelemnek.

A nyugati országok közel-keleti politikája tekintetében az elmúlt évtizdekre visszatekintve elsősorban az Egyesült Államoké a fő felelősség a közel-keleti muszlimok Nyugat-ellenességének az előretörésében. Ebben benne van Izrael egyoldalú támogatása, egyes muslim többségű országok elleni szankciós politika civil áldozatai, az Iraki háború, az Abu-Graib börtön, Guantanamo, a drónokkal vívott terror elleni háború nagyszámú civil áldozatai, és a sor sajnálatosan folytatható. Az “Iszlám Állam” nevezetű szörnyeteg ebben a kontextusban tudott létrejönni, ám esetleges elpusztítása nem tünteti el azt a frusztrációt, ellenszenvet és haragot, amely a fent felsorolt politika miatt nem alaptalanul él muszlimok millióiban különösen a Közel-Keleten.

Mindemellett az integráció hiányával összefüggő szociális kérdések közel sem adnak teljes magyarázatot a közelmúlt nyugat európai terrorcselekményeire. A nizzai terrorcselekmény és a bajorországi baltás terrorcselekmény muszlim elkövetői első ránézésre jó úton voltak afelé, hogy integrálódjanak a nyugati társadalomba, munkájuk volt, ill. oktatásban részesültek, segítő közeg vette őket körül, volt pespektíva előttük – mégis az identitásbeli frusztrációk és a szélsőséges iszlamista valláshoz való kötődés simán felülírta a felszínes “anyagi” kérdéseket. Óriási veszélyt rejt tehát magában, ha a migrációt csupán a munkaerő iránti igényként, gazdasági kérdésként közelítjük meg.

7. Migráció: nem az meglepő, hogy 2015-ben ilyen erőteljesen jelentkezett, hanem az, hogy eddig nem.

Az Európába irányuló migráció régóta velünk élő jelenség, ám 2015-ös év több olyan tényező is jelentkezett, amely sokszorosára gyorsította azt. Az Iszlám Állam 2014. évi sikerei újabb menekülthullámot indított el Szíria és Irak területéről. A törökországi, libanoni, jordániai menekülttáborok túlterheltsége krónikussá vált. Ehhez hozzájárult, hogy ezen menekülttáborok működtetéséhez szükséges évi kb. 4-5 milliárd dollár helyett csupán 1,5-2 milliárd dollár érkezett meg időben a donor országok (többek között a nyugat-európai államok) részéről. A szíriai polgárháború harmadik évében, az Iszlám Állam előrenyomulása, és a szíriai harcok változatlan inténzitása láttán sok százezer menekültben megalapozottan fogalmazódhatott meg az akarat, hogy a kilátástalan és túlzsúfolt menkülttáborokból a jobb élet reményében Európa felé veszi az útját. A szervezett bűnözés, az embercsempészhálózatok és akár terrorista csoportok is erre a növekvő igényre akaszkodtak rá és gyorsították a folyamatot. Németország és egyes más európai országok kormányainak, valamint a nyugati értelmiségi és media elit egy részének megengedő és sok szempontból felelőtlen magatartása pedig olajat öntöttek a tűzre. Az afganisztáni, pakisztáni, iráni migránsok a szíriai menekültek tömegeire, illetve a velük szemben mutatott engedékeny európai politikára támaszkodva keltek útnak a korábbiakban jóval nagyobb számban.

Mindemellett nem lehet kizárni, hogy egyes államok titkosszolgáltai is hozzájárultak a folyamat gyorsításához. Amenniyben azt nézzük, mely államok nyerhettek, nyerhetnek a migációs válságon, akkor Szaúd-Arábia és Törökország merülhetnek fel leginkább. Utóbbinak jelentősen javultak az alkupozíciói az Európai Unióval szemben, ráadásul csökkenthette is az eltartandó migránsok számát, előbbi pedig hosszútvon nyerhet azzal, hogy nő a muszlim népesség befolyása Európa országaiban.

Izraelnek és az Egyesült Államoknak ellenben nem áll érdekében ez a tömeges és ellenőrizetlen migráció. Előbbi vonatkozásában megjegyzendő, hogy a nyugat-európai zsidóság már eddig is a szélsőséges muszlim terroristák egyik legfontosabb célpontja volt, az USA-nak pedig nem érdeke Európa stabilitásának aláásása a fő riválisokra, Oroszországra és Kínára tekintettel, függetlenül attól, hogy gazdasági kérdésekben a rivalizálás is jelen van kettejük kapcsolatában az óriási egymásrautaltság mellett. Az USA továbbá nincs abban a helyzetben, hogy Törökországnak és Szaúd-Arábiának minden téren diktáljon, mert a terrorizmushoz képest lényegesebb stratégiai kérdés számára az alapvető szövetségesi kapcsolatok fenntartása e két ország jelentős erőforrásai, az olajkitermelés zavartalansága, az amerikai fegyverexport jelentős felvevőpiacának megtartása, valamint Irán sakkbantartása és Izrael biztonsága miatt. Ha a 10 milliós, kevés erőforrással rendelkező Magyarország bizonyos kérdésekben ellen tud állni az amerikai nyomásnak, akkor ezen jóval erősebb országok miért ne lennének képesek erőteljesebben ellenállni bizonyos amerikai igényeknek? – miközben ettől még számos más területen együttműködnek.

Egyes befolyásos nyugati “filantróp” személyek és szervezetek szintén tevékenyen támogatják a bevándorlást, ám az ő szerepük a fenti tényezőkhöz képest korlátozottabb, másrészről ők valóban meg vannak arról győződve – az USA félrevezető példájából kiindulva - , hogy Európát erősebbé teszi a már korábban Angela Merkel által is temetett multikulturalizmus és a bevándorlók által okozott népességnövekmény.

8. A migráció nem egyenlő a terrorizmussal – de van összefüggés a kettő között.

Abból kiindulva, hogy a közel múlt nyugat-európai terrorcselekményeknek mindegyik elkövetőjének bevándorló háttere volt, továbbá az elkövetők közül többen is a migránsok közé vegyülve közlekedtek Kelet- és Nyugat-Európa között a merényletet megelőző hónapokban, tény kérdés, hogy a mostani rendezetlen, nagytömegű migráció és a terrorizmus között van közvetve összefüggés. Az újabb migráns tömegek nagy száma, jellemzően iskolázottságuk alacsony foka, eltérő kulturális-vallási normáik, adott esetben a biztos szocilális kötődések hiánya miatt instabil pszichés állapotuk, a befogadó országok túlterheltsége és a korábbi integrációs modellek sikertelensége alapján nagyon is megalapozott a félelem, hogy az újabb migránsok jelentős száma társadalmilag periferizálódik és radikalizálódik, akár olyanok is vagy azok gyerekei, akik a közelmúltban valóban csak a jobb élet reményében érkeztek Európába.

Természetesen a migránsok döntő többsége nem terrorista, de ez nem jelenti, hogy nincs összefüggés a migárció és a terrorizmus között. Egyrészről ma már napnál világosabb, hogy a tömeges migráns áradatot terrorszervezetek és ártó szándékú személyek mennyire kihasználták és kihasználják. Másrészről, és hosszabb távon ez a veszélyesebb, olyan tömegű, akár korábban átélt traumákkal összefüggő pszihológiai problémákkal, identitáshoz kapcsolódó frusztrációkkal, beilleszkedési zavarokkal, gyökeresen eltérő értékrenddel bíró személy özönlött Nyugat Európába, amelyet képtelenség kezelni és ellenőrizni. Sok esetben ezek a deviáns jegyek éppen Nyugat-Európában fognak sokakban kialakulni, az eltérő kulturális közeg, az esetleges személyes kudarcok, kirekesztettség érzés, a nyugati kultúra iránti ellenszenv és a szélsőséges vallási tanok hívő szavának hatására.

9. A migráció kezelésében sem a problámától való teljes bezárkozás és elzárkózás, sem a nyitott kapuk elve nem megoldás.

A harmadik világból érkezett bevándorlók társadalmi integrációjának elmúlt évtizedekben tapasztalt kudarcai, a párhuzamos társadalmak jelentette veszélyek, szociális kapacitások túlterheltsége, a terrorizmus kockázatai a legfőbb okok, amely miatt a tömeges és rendezetlen migárció rövid és hosszútávon is óriási kockázatokat rejt magában Európa országai számára. A migrációhoz és a harmadik generációs bevándoroltakhoz kapcsolódó, korábban is létező társadalmi konfliktusokra tekintettel is 2015 nyár végén óriási történelmi léptékű felelőtlenség és hiba volt Nyugat-Európa vezetői részéről beengedni migránsok százezreit, ráadásul ellenőrizetlenül.

Az elmúlt hónapok terrorcselekményei is azt bizonyítják, hogy ezen ellenőrizetlen és felelőtlen tömeges migárcióval összefüggésben pont azon tényezők válnak egyre inkább veszélyeztetetté Európában, amely miatt Nyugat-Európa vonzó (volt) a harmadik világ számára és amelynek segítségével az elmúlt évtizedekben számos téren segítetni is tudott fejletlenebb és válságok sújtotta régiókon.

Ugyanakkor nyilvánvaló, hogy a teljes tétlenség sem megoldás. A migrációs nyomás ugyanis várhatóan nőni fog a népességrobbanás, háborúk, politikai-hatalmi versengés és a klímaváltozás hatásai miatt. Az eddig viszonylag stabil közel-keleti országok működőképessége – Törökország, Libanon, Jordánia - könnyen veszélybe kerülhet, ha magukra maradnak a menekültek és migránsok okozta kihívások kezelésében. A jelenlegi krízis csupán gyenge előszele lenne annak, ami ezen borús forgatókönyv bekövetkezte esetén jelentkezne Európa számára.

Segíteni azonben elsősorban helyben, a válságok súlytotta régióban kell. A tömeges migrációval összefüggő terrorcselekmények, a közrendet tömegesen veszélyezettő jelenségek, várhatóan növekvő társadalmi konfliktusok mind az európai őslakosság, mind az újjonnan érkezett migránsok tömegei számára óriási tehertételt és veszélyeket rejtenek magukban. Minden felmérés arra utal, hogy a beérkezett migránsok elenyősző része képes vagy lesz képes évek múlva egyáltalán munkához jutni, és akkor még nem is beszéltünk arról, hogy kulturális és normatív értelemben megvalósul-e az integrációjuk. A jelek nem erre mutatnak, és ez történelmi tragédia lesz minden Európában élő ember számára vallástól, származástól függetlenül.

10. A migrációs válság éles látleletet ad arról, hogy a demokrácia és a liberalizmus nem egy és ugyanazon fogalmak.

A mai nyugati liberalizmusnak a migráció kapcsán szembe kell néznie azzal, hogy az elvei akkor érvényesülhetnek, ha azokat antidemokratikus módon eröltetik rá a nyugat-európai társadalmakra. Ráadásul a változatlanul növekvő tömeges bevándorlás és párhuzamos társadalmak hosszútávon nemcsak az európai demokrácia, hanem a liberalizmus végét is jelentené. A liberalizmus tehát meglehetősen önsorsrontó ideológiának tűnik tehát ahhoz képest, hogy a demokráciával kéz a kézben egyetemes érvényességet követel magának… A mai liberalizmust a demokrácia mellett továbbá ne tévesszük össze a polgári szabadságjogokkal, jogállamisággal, törvények uralmával sem, a politikai korrektség, a korlátlan relativizmus és szabad(os)ság nem következnek ezekből az értékekből, sőt, aláássák azokat.

Természetesen fontos szem előtt tartani, hogy a többségnek és a tömegeknek nincs mindig igazuk, ezzel együtt a tömegek jogosan vágynak biztonságra, védelemre, törvényeik, hagyományaik és szokásaik tiszteletére. Azok az európai tömegek, akik ma rendpárti jobboldali mozgalmakat támogatnak, többségében nem a demokráciától, a jogállamiságtól, a szabadságjogoktól akarnak elfordulni, hanem azoktól az elitektől, akik nem nevezik nevén a dolgokat, és nem vállanak felelősséget azon döntéseikért, amikkel politikájuk költségeit és kockázatait folyamatosan a társadalom alsóbb és középső rétegeire tolják rá. Legfőbb ideje lenne felelősséget vállalni döntéseikért azoknak az eliteknek, politikai vezetőknek, médiumoknak, véleményformáló értelmiségieknek, akik támogatták az ellenőrizetlen tömeges migrációt és démonizáltak minden olyan lépést, ami azt korlátozta (volna), még akkor is, ha esetleg sokukat valóban humanitárius megfontolások vezettek.

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A migráció keresztényi szemmel: a keresztényi szeretet általános érvényű parancsolat, ám mégis elsősorban közvetlen környezetünk, majd szűkebb, végül tágabb közösségeink felé kell, hogy megmutatkozzon.

A felebaráti szeretetre, a befogadásra, áldozatvállalásra vonatkozó bibiliai igék éppen úgy érvényések, mint a saját közösség keresztényi normákat tükröző rendjének, normatív értékeinek, identitásának védelmét szolgáló bibliai rendelkezések. Noha Európa számos dolgot elhagyott már e keresztényi normákból, számos tekintetben tovább él az öröksége, a szokásaiban és a törvényeiben, a nemek közötti egyenlőségben, a társadalmi szolidaritásban, a joguralomban és sorolhatnánk. E két szempontrendszer együtt teljes, egységben tükrözi a Biblia tanítása szerint Isten akaratát, hogy milyen módon éljen az ember egyénként és a számára adatott közösség tagjaként. Másfelől e két szempontrendszer összeegyezetése mégis valóban sokszor embert próbáló feladat, ez tükröződik keresztény közösségeken belül is jelentkező vitákon a migrációval összefüggésben.

Saját családunk, közösségünk, nemzetünk védelme és előbbre helyzése a szeretetben nem jelentheti azt, hogy generálisan helyén való lenne az idegent gyűlölni, megvetni, és velük kapcsolatban másokban ilyen indulatokat gerjeszteni. De szemet hunyni a migránsok között széles körben elterjedt olyan magatartásformák, szokások felett, amelyek összeegyeztethetetlenek nemcsak a keresztényi, hanem a részben a kereszténységből kinövő mai nyugati civilizáció értékeivel is ugyanúgy helytelen lenne és önbecsapás. Egyéni felelősség van rászorulókon segíteni, így adott szükséghelyzetben migránsokon is, és az államnak is van dolga ez ügyben, de ez nem jelenti azt, hogy az állam a benne élő, az őt fenntartó nemzeti közösség alapvető biztonságát, rendjét, jólétét ne tekintse továbbra is elsőszámú kötelességének.

Language Undefined Tag: migrációterrorizmusEurópa

The Islamic State’s local franchise in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), has claimed responsibility for the suicide attack on the TUTAP protests in Kabul on 23 July 2016. The attack killed more than 80 people and injured over 230 others in Deh Mazang Square in western Kabul. The target of the attack [on 23 July], a peaceful, civilian protest of Shia Hazaras unrelated to the war and of no military importance, would seem to suggest that this was indeed an IS attack. AAN’s Borhan Osman looks at the emergence and subsequent development of ISKP and its relationship to the Taleban and the Afghan government. Judging by the group’s turbulent past, which saw it cornered in Nangarhar (in contrast to its ambitions of a nationwide expansion), it seems ISKP is now possibly more bent on striking in places like Kabul for the sake of gaining attention and boosting its fighters’ morale.

As of July 2016, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) group has established a secure footing in four districts of Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan. Elsewhere in the country, it has failed (read an analysis of the country-wide situation in November 2015 here). In Nangarhar, over a year ago, the vanguard of the movement was a group of Pakistani militants who had lived there for years as ‘guests’ of the Afghan government and local people. While initially avoiding attacks on Afghan forces, they made their new allegiances known by attacking the Taleban and taking their territory. Since its emergence in Nangarhar, the group has made many enemies and has seen its sphere of dominance shrink considerably.

The vanguards

In late January 2015, the Islamic State announced its expansion into Khorasan province. The elements of what would become IS Khorasan Province’s (ISKP) main contingent had, however, long existed on the Afghan battlefield. Although the first case of an ISKP presence that grabbed public attention took place in Helmand that January (as discussed below), the actual IS vanguards emerged from Nangarhar province. The IS fighters who pioneered the Khorasan franchise of the IS were Pakistani militants who had long been settled in the southeastern districts of Nangarhar, in the Spin Ghar mountains or its foothills, bordering the tribal agencies on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line.

Before choosing to join ISKP, these militants operated under different brands, mainly under the umbrella of the ever-loosening Tehrik-e Taleban Pakistan (TTP). The bulk of these militants had been arriving in Nangarhar since 2010 mainly from the Orakzai, North Waziristan and Khyber tribal agencies. According to local residents, the first groups of Pakistani militants arrived in Nangarhar from Orakzai following an operation by the Pakistani army that year. They moved into Afghanistan, often with their families, apparently to flee military operations by the Pakistani army. They settled in Achin, Nazian, Kot, Deh Bala, Rodat and Ghanikhel districts, among others. Calling themselves muhajerin (refugees) in search of shelter, they invoked support from the local communities in Nangarhar who deemed it their moral obligation to extend a helping hand to their Pashtun brothers escaping violence in their hometowns. The ‘refugees’ also opened madrasas and schools for their children in Achin and Nazian.

Gradually, the muhajerin turned out to be more than solely oppressed civilians in pursuit of humanitarian assistance. They carried weapons and displayed allegiance to Pakistani militant groups. Hoping to use them against Pakistan, the Afghan government started to woo some of these fighters, according to influential tribal elders involved in helping relation-building from the districts that sheltered the guest militants. Tribal elders feuding against their rivals over land or power also sought to get the support of one group or another. The most well-known case of these militants finding a welcoming home in Nangarhar is that of the Lashkar-e Islam group led by Mangal Bagh. (1) Local residents put the number of this group from the Khyber Agency differently, but a general estimation puts them at no fewer than 500 in the past three years.

The Afghan government’s support to Mangal Bagh’s men is an open secret among residents of the Spin Ghar districts near the Durand Line. Residents from Achin recall the generous hosting of groups of long-haired Lashkar-e Islam fighters at the houses of Shinwari tribal elders, such as Malek Usman and Malek Niaz, in Achin. They had introduced their black flag to the area long before ISKP hoisted a flag of the same colour with different symbols and slogans. According to residents, Lashkar-e Islam’s flags were flying over many houses in the Mamand valley in Achin in the summer of 2014. Today, Lashkar-e Islam remains an implementing partner of ISKP in Nangarhar. Mangal Bagh’s fighters, mainly from the Afridi tribe, who predominantly come from Khyber Agency, have not actually merged with ISKP, but they act in such close coordination with it that many locals perceive them as having morphed into a wing of ISKP. In an apparent power-sharing deal, Mangal Bagh’s fighters have obtained control over Nazian district, which looks like a delegation from ISKP. Lashkar-e Islam has long made up the bulk of Pakistani militants in Nazian.

However, efforts by the Afghan intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), to woo Pakistani militants in Nangarhar have not been confined to Lashkar-e Islam or to militants from Khyber. Tribal elders and ordinary residents of Achin, Nazian and Kot testify that fighters from Orakzai and Mohmand agencies belonging to different factions of the TTP have been allowed free movement across the province, as well as treatment in government hospitals. When moving outside their hub in Nangarhar’s southern districts, they would go unarmed. In off-the-record conversations with AAN, government officials have verified this type of relationship between segments of the Pakistani militants and the NDS, as have pro-government tribal elders and politicians in Jalalabad. They described this state of affairs as a small-scale tit-for-tat reaction to Pakistan’s broader and longer-ranging, institutionalised support to the Afghan Taleban in their fight against the Afghan government.

In late 2015, Afghan government sources estimated the number of muhajer families in Nangarhar at over 2,000. Apparently, not all of the men from these families engaged in armed activities. Therefore, the exact number of active ‘guest’ militants at any given point is difficult to quantify. However, in early 2015, their number seems to have been well over 1,000.

The NDS, these sources claim, expected their protégés to fight against the Pakistani government. It also saw a role for them to fight, or at least stand, as a bulwark against the Afghan Taleban in the areas where they were hosted, something only few of them actually did. While Mangal Bagh’s men would engage casually in not-so-bloody confrontations with the Afghan Taleban, other militants under the TTP umbrella initially avoided confronting their Afghan counterparts at all, keeping, at times, rather cordial relations with them. 

The break with the Afghan Taleban

While, since as early as 2010, the mainly TTP militants from various tribal districts on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line existed in Nangarhar’s Spin Ghar districts, their attitudes mirrored the overall lack of cohesiveness within the TTP, which usually had little control and command over the fighters, including those scattered across Nangarhar. As wider splits within the TTP ranks emerged following the death of the group’s leader Hakimullah Mehsud in November 2013, militants in Nangarhar also turned into autonomous, often ruthless factions, further divided in smaller groups. That was the pattern throughout 2014. The chain of command with the TTP centre, as well as relations with the local Afghan Taleban, were stained by the increasingly predatory behaviour of these militants, who started to regularly engage in money extortion, kidnappings and ransom-taking, targeting both Afghans and Pakistanis. They would send messages to actual or presumed rich sympathisers of the Afghan Taleban and of the TTP in Pakistani and Afghan towns, asking them for huge amounts of money. If the recipients failed to heed the request, they would be threatened.

It was from these ‘guests’ that the bulk of the Nangarhar-based ISKP foot soldiers emerged, following the official announcement of IS’s expansion to ‘Khorasan Province.’ (2) Before they openly changed their allegiance (or sympathy) to IS, they exhibited other signs of regrouping under a new modus operandi. From the autumn of 2014, they started to act more autonomously of the TTP and as if trying to establish some sort of control over the areas they lived in, for instance by casually setting up checkpoints. They also appeared to be preparing for a major battle, transporting huge shipments of weapons from Tirah valley in Khyber Agency with unprecedented quantity and frequency. This coincided with a new wave of muhajer families arriving from Khyber Agency and North Waziristan. In part, this was triggered by the Pakistani army’s Operation Khyber 1, which started in October 2014, and the subsequent Operation Khyber 2, which started in March 2015. According to Pakistani officials, the two-phased Khyber operations, which targeted Khyber and parts of Orakzai agencies, were aimed at repelling militants who had fled there from the Zarb-e Azb operation in North Waziristan. This increased relocation was concentrated in Achin, Nazian and, to a lesser extent, Deh Bala and Kot districts. The weapons were transported by mules and spread in the above-mentioned districts, but also ferried as far as into Azra district in Logar. Huge amounts of these weapons were cached in Achin’s Mamand valley. According to the estimate of local residents, more than 30 mule loads of weapons arrived in Nangarhar from or through Tirah to Mamand alone, from (late) summer 2014 to June 2015. They cited the militants as stating that the weapons had been confiscated from the Pakistani army and would be used against it in future operations.

It took the local population several months to understand what their muhajer ‘guests’ were actually up to. In May 2015, they woke up to the fact that the guests had changed their own flags to those of the IS. The militants then turned Mamand, which had been the centre of the increased migration, into ISKP’s headquarters. The highly mountainous terrain, hard to conquer for outsiders but providing easy supply and exit routes to Tirah, was the perfect choice for the command centre of the new group, which had previously cached huge amounts of weapons transported from Tirah in Mamand’s Takhta and Kharawy areas. The castle of a tribal elder, Malek Niaz, who had long fed and sheltered some of these militants, virtually turned into ISKP’s command centre. The group’s leaders were widely reported to be staying in the valley, at least during the initial two months when they oversaw ISKP’s expansion into several districts. However, after the group’s meetings were targeted by drone strikes in early July 2015, they seem to have chosen a more mobile approach.

Mamandis (residents of the valley) remember ISKP’s initial rule from mid-May until early July 2015 as a period of great relief. They initially thought that ISKP was a pro-government force in a new garb and cited the group’s commanders as stating that “we are here to fight the ISI Emirate,” referring to the Afghan Taleban and their link to the Pakistani intelligence service. Their reaction to the ANSF made the new group of old fighters look even more benign to the residents who also cited the ISKP fighters as saying “we have nothing against government forces.” Members of the ANSF who had earlier gone home stealthily and fearing interception from the Taleban, started to roam freely in the area. Government schools remained open and their employees enjoyed free movement. Adding to ISKP’s perception as less troubling than the Taleban was the fact that it provided its own food and shelter. The Taleban, in contrast, would request – or take – it from the residents. The only major policy change that affected people’s lives was the ban on poppy cultivation and drug sales. An Afghan National Army soldier from Mamand told AAN: “We celebrated the coming of Daesh and the disappearance of the Taleban. We could come home and roam around without any fear of being stopped by Taleban.”

In early July 2015, however, things changed drastically and rapidly when a series of popular ‘uprisings’ against ISKP kicked off with the support of the Taleban, marking a shift in the Taleban’s approach towards its rival group, from passive resistance to head-on confrontation.

Facing the Taleban 

In the wake of open TTP factionalism following Hakimullah Mehsud’s death, the Afghan Taleban lost control over most of the Pakistani fighters who would make up the ISKP group. In 2013 and 2014, the Afghan Taleban had expelled, disarmed and banned some of the commanders and groups engaged in extortion (using the Afghan Taleban’s name) and other criminal activities. Despite these measures, the Afghan Taleban were not fully in control of the militant landscape in Nangarhar.

In addition, due to ideological and political differences, the Afghan Taleban had also earned the wrath of another segment of Pakistani militants, according to communiqués obtained from some of these militants as well as from Taleban sources. The Pakistanis would usually criticise the Afghans’ friendly relations with the Pakistani government, as well as their failure to declare the Afghan government (and its employees) apostates. At times, these differences turned violent. Objectors to the Afghan Taleban were not only found in Nangarhar. Sa’id Khan, (3) the TTP commander for Orakzai agency, who would later lead ISKP, was described by Afghan Taleban sources as being at odds with the movement based on what he considered to be the Taleban’s impure creed and lenient attitude towards the Afghan government. According to these sources, Sa’id Khan is a Salafi (trained in a local Salafi madrassa founded in the 1940s with Saudi support). They described him as having a past characterised by virulent sectarianism, as someone who, they said, was involved in attacks on Hanafi ulama in Orakzai when he was the TTP emir for that tribal agency. (4)

When IS in Syria and Iraq announced its caliphate in June 2014, followed by suspicious moves by the Pakistani militants in Nangarhar, the Afghan Taleban began watching them with added concern. The movement was aware that disgruntled militants, should they align themselves with the newly announced IS, could pose a threat to their dominance in the insurgency.

First clashes

Tensions between the ‘guest’ militants and the Afghan Taleban started in December 2014. The Taleban asked the guests to leave the area and close the madrassas where the muhajer children were being trained. They also confiscated a shipment of weapons in Mamand, consisting of six mules and reportedly worth five million Pakistani rupees (50,000 US dollars). A series of negotiations between the two sides kicked off, apparently from March to May 2015. The settlers refused to leave and, when fighting erupted in early 2015, the two sides irreversibly entered into open hostilities. At the same time, the Pakistani militants based in Nangarhar publicised their allegiance to IS.

The first clashes took place in Nazian district, triggered by an ambush by the guests-turned-ISKP fighters against the Afghan Taleban, killing two of their district chiefs. This incident was followed by Taleban attacks on ISKP in Kot and later in the Mamand valley. By mid-May 2015, the Afghan Taleban, being a minority in all three districts, quickly withdrew. ISKP forces went after the Taleban in Bati Kot, Chaparhar, Deh Bala, Khogyani, Sherzad, Pachir wa Agam, Rodat and Ghanikhel districts, capturing or heavily contesting most of their territory in the first five districts. By the end of June, ISKP was in a comfortable position in eight districts – and this represented the peak of the group’s territorial control.

Before the guest militants turned against the Taleban, the latter had kept a more balanced and optimistic outlook about global IS, with many Taleban seeing it as a defender of the Sunnis in Iraq and Syria. After the May encroachment by ISKP fighters on Taleban territory, the movement’s leadership opened communication channels with both the IS leadership in Syria and with ISKP leaders in the Afghan-Pakistani tribal belt. A number of messages were exchanged between the Taleban leadership and the IS centre in Raqqa through personal channels. At the local level, negotiations that had already started in early 2015 between the Taleban governor for Nangarhar, Mir Gul Ahmad Hashemi, and the ISKP governor, Sa’id Khan, resumed. The Taleban tried to convince IS to stay away from Afghanistan and leave it to lead the jihad in this country. Sa’id Khan, on the contrary, demanded that the Taleban movement disband itself and pledge allegiance to the caliphate. The negotiations failed.

On 11 June 2015, Hashemi was assassinated by ISKP in Peshawar. Four days later, the Taleban’s then-acting leader Akhtar Muhammad Mansur sent out a long, impassioned public letter to the IS Caliph Abu Bakr Baghdadi, asking him to either disown those fighting under the IS flag in Afghanistan or to join forces with the Taleban. The IS response came a week later, when its spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani referred to the Taleban as allies of the Pakistani intelligence agencies and asked the movement to repent or face the wrath of the IS mujahedin. Subsequently, the Afghan Taleban’s ulama in Pakistan issued a fatwa allowing the movement’s fighters to act in self-defence against IS, according to Taleban sources. After securing agreements with local ulama and tribal elders, who vowed to support the Taleban’s drive and contribute fighting men if needed, the Taleban started their ‘defensive’ campaign against ISKP in the last week of June.

The Taleban’s counter-attack

The local Taleban fighters were joined by some of the movement’s new elite forces under brutal commanders from Loya Paktia and Loy Kandahar. Within two weeks, ISKP had lost most of its territory to the Taleban in the southwestern districts, such as Pachir wa Agam, Khogyani and Deh Bala as well as in Chaparhar, on the outskirts of Jalalabad. The Taleban also seized a huge ISKP cache of weapons in Deh Bala. The movement’s campaign in the southeastern districts, such as Achin, Kot, Bati Kot and Nazian, however, was less successful. While they managed to mobilise popular support in Achin and reportedly in Kot, and tried to clear these districts of ISKP, only limited or no gains were achieved. This proved disastrous for the population who had supported the Taleban, or were suspected by ISKP of having done so, at least in Achin and Kot. Mamandis recall how their cooperation with the Taleban against ISKP ended the one and a half month-long period of calm under the caliphate.

In early July 2015, Taleban fighters sneaked into Mamand and, during the night of 2 July, talked to their sympathisers about staging a coordinated attack against the ISKP fighters. They managed to secure the help of various tribal elders. One morning during Ramadan, on 3 July 2015, local men (including those not usually sympathetic to the Taleban) and Taleban rose up together against ISKP, with calls by the Taleban via the mosque’s loud-speakers for all men of fighting age to come out and participate, or face seeing their homes burnt down. Taken by surprise, the ISKP fighters retreated from most of Mamand valley by the end of that day.

However, less than a week after being evicted from Mamand, they struck back, suppressing the local population and forcing the Taleban to hide among the people. The ISKP fighters, having broken the Ramadan fast in the middle of the day, were at their cruellest, according to local residents. According to various residents AAN talked to, ISKP gave them ten minutes to leave their houses without taking anything with them. They killed around a dozen Taleban on the spot and detained 80 local men, both young and old. Eleven of the detained were blown up in a field by explosives planted underneath the blindfolded hostages. The scenes of the brutal killings, released in a propaganda film on 10 August (the killing actually happened on the eve of Eid, 16 July), was widely reported in the Afghan and international media and has since become the brand image of the ISKP.

Following the return of ISKP, according to a local Mamand resident, the majority of the villagers from the targeted upper parts of the valley left their homes, cattle and farms and relocated to Jalalabad or other safer areas. The militants confiscated vacant properties as ghanimat (bounty), and new fighters, arriving from Orakzai and Bajaur agencies, settled in these houses along with their families. It became impossible for pro-government people or ANSF members to return to the area. Schools were subsequently closed. ISKP’s previously tolerant stance towards the government was replaced by open hostility to anyone or anything representing the government.

In the following months (and until recently), clashes between the Taleban and the ISKP took up most of the energy that the two groups would otherwise have directed against the Afghan government. In the intense turf war, districts such as Pachir wa Agam, Chaparhar, Bati Kot and Deh Bala, changed hands three to four times. In captured territory, each of the parties resorted to diverse tactics of brutality and purges against their opponents. These included the burning of houses of people allegedly linked to the rival group, public executions of alleged enemy fighters and forcing sympathisers of the rival party to flee their homes.

However, the purging of conquered lands did not always result in the immediate control of those areas. In one instance, in Chaparhar, ISKP fighters, having masked their affiliations and hidden their weapons, remained under the Taleban’s control for months. They suddenly rose up and expelled the movement from most of the district in early December 2015. This coordinated move resembled a counter-uprising. The Taleban suffered a high number of casualties as they tried twice, in vain, to take back lost territory. Only when the movement mobilised elite forces from several provinces in early January 2016, did it manage to recapture Chaparhar.

The fight over Chaparhar reminded the Taleban of ISKP’s resilience and effective fighting ability and prompted it to take its rival more seriously. On 4 January 2016, after receiving a fatwa from the pro-Taleban Afghan ulama in favour of an offensive ‘jihad’ against ISKP, the Taleban mounted a large-scale operation, which involved units of the Taleban ‘elite forces’ dispatched from ten provinces plus Nangarhar, totalling over 3000 fighters. Within three days, they had routed the ISKP from Chaparhar and Bati Kot, restricting the group’s control to Achin, Deh Bala, Kot and the tiny district of Nazian.

ANSF join the fight against ISKP

While the fight over territory pitted ISKP against the Taleban, who had traditionally claimed control in the countryside (the government had long ceased to hold much sway beyond the district centres in the south of Nangarhar), skirmishes also took place between ISKP and the ANSF. However, two months elapsed after the ISKP had established dominance over large swaths of territory before the two sides started to engage in fighting on a regular basis. An exception to this virtual ceasefire was an attack by the police at a Kot checkpoint in early June 2015, which was reportedly unprompted by ISKP. The group lost two of its fighters in the clash, one of them reportedly executed by the police after being wounded. Later, when the two sides started to engage each other, ISKP was able to overrun the ANSF, but also Afghan Local Police and so-called uprising militias’ checkpoints in about 12 cases, killing at least four dozen members of pro-government forces, including a district police chief for Deh Bala in June 2016.

In all these cases, however, ISKP occupation of ANSF positions has been short-lived, serving only as immediate morale boosts. In the largest of ISKP´s efforts aimed at ANSF, the overrunning of about a half dozen posts in Kot in late June 2016, the group suffered a devastatingly high number of casualties resulting from US air strikes and face-to-face fighting. ISKP seems to have lost more than 50 of its fighters (although government sources claim five times that number).

More recently, Afghan government forces seem to have been engaged in their fiercest fighting against ISKP so far, again supported by US forces in Kot district and parts of Achin. This followed President Ghani ordering a decisive operation against the group to eliminate its threat and a visit of the defence minister to Nangarhar province in mid-July. The ANSF operations have, for the first time, overtaken ISKP’s fighting focus from the Taleban to the Afghan government.

The ANSF had been engaged in offensive operations against ISKP several times in Achin, Kot, Nazian and Bati Kot prior to these current operations. In the first two districts, previous operations have, a number of times, led to territory being retaken from ISKP. However, in other cases, the offensives have made no lasting gains, as some retaken territory was again recaptured by ISKP. The government has increasingly relied on so-called popular forces, ie militias raised by local power-brokers and run by the NDS. These forces have proved to be effective, at least in stopping ISKP from further advances. Lately, these local militias have become the prime targets of ISKP’s major attacks. In June 2016, ISKP and its ally Lashkar-e Islam carried out three suicide attacks against these militia commanders, corresponding to one third of all the suicide attacks that ISKP has carried out so far.

No ANSF intervention during ISKP’s formative months

The Pakistani militants did not start fighting the Afghan government immediately after changing their flag. Neither did the ANSF engage in any planned operations against ISKP for two months after its public presence. ANSF and government employees seem to have initially been well tolerated by ISKP, until early July 2015; the fighting in Kot in early June 2015, which killed two ISKP members, one of them after being detained, was reportedly prompted by the police but does not seem to have represented a broader pattern of response on the ANSF’s part. Indeed, in late June 2015, local government and ANSF officials admitted that they were not targeting ISKP fighters. At that time, it seemed as if government officials saw ISKP as a useful tool to undermine the government’s traditional and more powerful enemy, the Taleban.

Throughout May and June 2015, in some areas such as Mamand, ISKP went as far as to openly commend the ANSF, as recalled by residents and members of the ANSF from the area. The first clue that ISKP was about to shift its attitude towards the ANSF, if not the government as a whole, appeared in a propaganda film released on 12 June 2015. The film featured the execution of two alleged ANSF members detained after the Kot battle and provided some insight into the group’s growing grievances against the Afghan government. The film delivered a message, the bottom line of which indicated that the Afghan government had to pay for its initiation of acts of hostility against Pakistani militants with the aim to appease Islamabad. A man overseeing the executions talked about the killing of 17 “mujahedin brothers” instigated by Pakistan’s intelligence agency, ISI. He also talked about the Afghan government handing over Pakistani militants to the ISI.

Some background information on Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation aiming at curbing the militancy in the two countries at this time could shed some light on what may have been, at least in part, behind the decision by ISKP to make a U-turn in its relations with the Afghan government.

ISKP emerged at a time when President Ghani had just signalled an unprecedented level of cooperation with the Pakistani army in apprehending Pakistani militants on Afghan soil. After his visit to the Pakistan army headquarters in November 2014, only a few weeks after he had taken office, and subsequent visit in December that year by the Pakistani army and intelligence chiefs, Ghani vowed to deploy Afghan forces to fight the TTP. (See for background and links, this Wikipedia article) During the following weeks, reports pointed to practical actions taken by the Afghan government in this regard. For example, in December 2014, the ANSF launched military operations that targeted TTP fighters in Kunar province. According to some reports, which the government rejected, these operations on Afghan soil were conducted jointly by Afghan and Pakistani forces. In one reported instance such an operation led to the killing of an unknown number of Pakistani militants (in addition to Afghan Taleban). Also in December, a senior figure of the TTP, Latifullah Mehsud, who had been arrested in Afghanistan by US forces in 2013, was handed over to the Pakistani government along with three other militants from Afghanistan. Although the hand-over was presented as having been conducted by the US, the timing of the move suggested that it could have very much been part of Ghani’s declared increased cooperation with Pakistan. This U-turn by the Afghan government vis-à-vis the TTP militants seems to have contributed to the resentment of their Pakistani brethren affiliated to ISKP. In this reading of events, Kabul was first to breach the ‘friendship,’ in December 2014.

Afghan government responds after US starts bombing campaign  

However, the absence of any attacks by ISKP against ANSF and government employees during May and June 2015 begs an important question: if the Afghan government had already irked a segment of the Pakistani militants in December 2014, why did ISKP not show any signs of opposition to the government during the initial one and half months of its public presence?

While the Afghan government’s (casual) moves against the Pakistani militants apparently sowed the seeds of a divorce from December 2014, they did not seem to amount to a full unravelling of relations. What looks to have upped the ante came months later. Two developments in the first week of July 2015 seem to have been instrumental in triggering an all-out confrontation between ISKP and the Afghan government. The first was the unleashing of a series of deadly strikes by planes or drones by the US from 6 July 2015 onwards; the US air attacks coincided with security agencies in Kabul talking, for the first time, about the need to stop ISKP. On 6 and 7 July, three air strikes targeting ISKP in Achin killed dozens of the group’s members, including three of the most important leaders after Sa’id Khan. They were Gul Zaman Fatih, the second in command to Sa’id Khan, the ISKP military Jihadyar and the former TTP spokesman Shahidullah Shahid, who had been instrumental in liaising between the ISKP and the IS centre when the provincial franchise was launched.

Simultaneously with what quickly became the US’s air campaign (5) against ISKP, government officials from the Ministries of Interior and Defence announced that they were joining forces with the US in order to combat ISKP. The NDS also claimed credit for providing intelligence for the strike that led to the killing of the ISKP leaders. In the meantime, NDS announced the formation of a special unit made up of elements from all three security agencies (MoI, MoD, NDS) with the task of fighting ISKP.

The second development that unfolded in conjunction with the air strike campaign was a series of joint initiatives (if not outright uprisings) by the local population with the Taleban’s offensives against ISKP. In the offensives for retaking territory lost to ISKP in the southwestern districts in late June and the southeastern districts in early July, the Taleban managed to secure support from the local population. The support came from local political elites (including tribal elders), both those already sympathetic to the Taleban and those usually seen as pro-government. According to local journalists, some government officials did indeed incite (and possibly support) the local people to take on ISKP. True or not, ISKP, as inferred from its propaganda later, saw an active government hand behind the popular ‘uprisings’. The fact that ISKP was bloodied by the air strikes on one hand, and by popularly supported Taleban offensives on the other – both happening against a backdrop of the government’s security agencies talking of ANSF’s plans to fight ISKP – led to a turning point in ISKP’s attitudes towards the government.

Today, one year later, the US has stepped up its air campaign, especially after its designation, in mid-January 2016, of ISKP as a global terrorist organisation. The ANSF, together with local militias, have engaged more actively, at least in a number of instances, in ground offensives against the group. US and Afghan forces conduct joint night raids against alleged members of the group, and the Afghan air force has entered into regular ‘pounding’ of ISKP positions in Nangarhar. These developments, together with the Taleban’s unceasing and highly sophisticated campaigns against ISKP, have reversed the group’s initial momentum in Nangarhar. In more than one case, the fight against ISKP has even brought traditional enemies, the Taleban and the ANSF, together in Nangarhar. All this has enhanced the effectiveness of the battle against ISKP.

ISKP’s botched attempts outside Nangarhar

Before the Pakistani militants started operating as a franchise in Nangarhar, local groups elsewhere in Afghanistan also affiliated themselves with the IS in an attempt to be its flag-bearers.

The first verifiable news of an IS emergence in Afghanistan came from Helmand in January 2015, right in the centre of the Taleban’s heartland. The group suffered a first setback when their leader Abdul Rauf Khadem, once the second-most important Taleban commander from that province, was killed in a drone attack on 9 February 2015, less than a month after he announced his affiliation with the IS. It entered a pre-emptive ceasefire with the Taleban and ceased to grow. Fighting erupted again in late September 2015 between the two sides in northern Helmand, in Kajaki district, where the IS cell was based, and the 60-strong group was almost routed in two days of fighting. One sub-commander managed to escape to remote mountains further north in Baghran district. Since then, only one incident involving this IS cell has been recorded (for more background, see this AAN dispatch).

After Helmand, a group of self-proclaimed IS fighters emerged in Farah under the leadership of two disgruntled mid-level Taleban commanders. The Farah group, with over 60 people, was widely reported to be well-equipped and well-funded (while, as in other instances, the source of this funding remains an area of speculation). When the group was trying to expand its presence from Khak-e Safid district to other areas in late May 2015, the Taleban led an offensive against it, putting an end to the Farah cell as well. According to ISKP sources talking to AAN, the surviving commander, Abdul Raziq (aka Mehdi), later re-emerged in Nangarhar as a deputy to Sa’id Khan.

The third failed attempt outside Nangarhar was the closest to Kabul, in Logar province, with a mobile base in Khoshi and Azra districts. It was led by yet another disgruntled Taleban commander, Abdul Hadi aka Saad Emarati, who was officially ousted by the Taleban in 2013 but continued armed activities into 2014 in the Pakistani tribal agencies, as well as amid the Pakistani militants in Nangarhar. His men were reportedly involved in a few cases of sectarian targeting of the local Shia population in Khoshi between April and June 2015. This cell was eliminated in July 2015 by the Taleban, who laid siege to it. In the last moment before the Taleban attacked, Emarati slipped through the siege and fled to Nangarhar.

The fourth attempt took place in Zabul, and saw a bloodier end than the previous three attempts. The Zabul ISKP cell was made up of approximately 200 Central Asian (and perhaps North Caucasian) militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) who had been driven out of their decade-long shelter in North Waziristan by Pakistani army operations in the summer of 2014. From spring 2015, they rebelled against their Afghan Taleban patrons who had helped them to settle among the Zabul population, and rebranded themselves as IS. In the summer of 2015, some of these militants left Zabul to join ISKP in Nangarhar, increasing the number of Central Asians there to more than 100; others left to northern Afghanistan and continued living with the Taleban. The remaining militants, including their leader Usman Ghazi, pledged allegiance to IS. In November 2015, the Taleban brutally crushed this group in clashes that lasted for a week (more background here; for an account by colleague, Kate Clark, of her probably encounter with Ghazi, see here). A small number of fighters who managed to escape the kill-capture fate fled to the ISKP’s headquarters in Nangarhar.

These four events either preceded ISKP’s establishment in Nangarhar or were unrelated to it, calling into question the Nangarhar-based ISKP’s claim that they represent all IS sympathisers in Afghanistan. When, however, the group in Nangarhar remained as the only surviving IS base in the country, it became an area of retreat for survivors from other provinces and later turned out to be the group’s only active stronghold.

ISKP has yet to see whether it can make a comeback in at least one additional province. At least two groups based in Kunar, one that belonged to a district governor of the Afghan Taleban and the other to the Pakistani Taleban originally from Bajaur, have defected to the IS. Most members of these two groups have been fighting in Nangarhar, but their influence back in Kunar seems to have allowed ISKP to establish some sort of a base, albeit not yet an area of expanding influence or control, in that province. Various sources have talked about ISKP training ‘camps’ in Kunar, but there have been no reports of any military activity in that province. So far, it looks as if ISKP might have deliberately avoided raising its profile in Kunar in order to keep it as both a rear area inside Afghanistan and as a ‘human resources’ centre for training, harbouring reserve forces and as a retreat. AAN has been told of Salafi fighters from Kunar leaving for Syria, as well as commanders sent to Nangarhar (where they have subsequently been killed). Indeed, Kunaris make up the third largest contribution to ISKP, after Orakzais (and their Afridi partners) and Bajauris. Further north, Nuristan province is another area of possible ISKP expansion. AAN has heard rumours of ISKP activity there, but has not been able to verify any of these.

From the northeast of the country, reports of ISKP sightings have occasionally been made from various provinces, most notably Kunduz and Badakhshan. However, there are no signs yet of any open ISKP activities in the north. Should ISKP have managed to establish a significant toehold in the north, this would not have gone unseen, especially after the Taleban adopted their approach of zero-tolerance towards the group.

What can, however, lead to mistaken sightings of IS in the north is the relatively abundant presence of foreign fighters and an array of smaller splinter groups, with local members and sympathisers, from or outside the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), like Jundullah, all of which fly black flags. They range from close allies of the Taleban (politically and ideologically) to those who have changed their minds and joined IS, but have yet not openly rebranded. This latter category seems to be waiting for an opportunity to slip away from Taleban control, in order to openly emerge as an ISKP northern branch. The only verifiable example of open ISKP presence has been two short-lived attempts by a single group in Eshkashem district of Takhar and Borka district of Baghlan last year (for more background see this recent AAN dispatch).

Another case of misreading is the mistaking of a non-jihadist Islamist group, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), for ISKP. HT flies a black flag closely resembling that of the IS and calls for a global caliphate, but it was present mostly in urban centres in Afghanistan long before the appearance of ISKP. Officials and local (as well as international) media misreported HT appearances in Taloqan and Jalalabad last year as examples of IS infiltration of urban centres.

In terms of taking over territory, ISKP’s attempts to expand beyond Nangarhar have failed miserably. However, it does seem to enjoy an appeal much beyond Nangarhar and as far as Kabul in part due to the defection of militants who were previously Taleban, as well as to the presence of a more radical Salafi-jihadist cell in the largest urban centre in Afghanistan. There, it seems to be capable of planning and executing occasional operations against not so-fortified targets, with the help of local recruits, that can cause mass casualties, such as the 23 July 2016 attack. The prospect of ISKP establishing a territorial foothold in Kabul is, however, a distant one.

 

 

(1) Mangal Bagh was reported dead as a result of a US drone strike on 24 July 2016, but there has been no confirmation of the news from independent sources.

(2) Khorasan is a historical term for areas populated by peoples speaking Iranian languages in northeastern Iran, the Transoxania part of Central Asia (Mawr-un-Nahr) and Afghanistan, mainly north of the Hindu Kush Mountains. In IS propaganda, it now comprises all of Afghanistan, most of Pakistan as well as Central Asia. Its reaches are felt as north as Kazakhstan and in eastern Turkistan. (For the Indian subcontinent, IS has been talking of creating its own chapter, but has not done so yet.)

(3) He is spelled Saeed Khan in many Pakistani and other English-language media.

(4) The Hanafi fiqh (school of thought; sect) is one of four major schools within Sunni Islam. Most Afghans and Central Asians (and Pakistanis) belong to it. Modern Salafism tries to go back to what it sees as the ‘fundamentals’ of Islam and interpretation of its laws from the early centuries of Islam; it does not accept the different schools of fiqh, and is highly hostile to Shiism.

(5) The US air and drone strikes in early July in Nangarhar were not the first targetings of IS in Afghanistan. Indeed, the deputy governor for ISKP, Abdul Rauf Khadem, was killed in February 2015 in the first drone strike in Helmand.

 

Americas

• The US Navy has cleared Lockheed Martin’s VH-92A program Critical Design Review (CDR). Tasked with transporting the president and vice president of the United States and other officials, the VH-92 will see initial fielding in 2020, and production continuing until 2023. First flight is expected next year.

Middle East North Africa

• Two years since the commencement of deliveries, Israel has received the last of its M-346 Lavi jets from manufacturer Leonardo-Finmeccanica. The $1 billion deal sees the 30 jet trainers delivered to replace the 1960s-era Douglas TA-4 Skyhawk. Equipped with the Elbit Systems Targo helmet, the Israeli Air Force can provide synthetic on-board training for pilots transitioning onto the full range of the IAF’s frontline combat aircraft fleets which will soon include the F-35.

• As US and Israeli officials move to finalize talks over the upcoming military aid package, a former IDF general has warned against his government looking to increase the amount sent. Maj. Gen. (Res) Gershon Hacohen called the increased dependence on US financing as suiting and expanding US interests and a reduction in such dependence would be better for all over time. Lamenting what he sees to be an addiction to advanced US platforms, US aid merely institutionalizes IDF reliance on air power, at the expense of innovative and daring ground maneuver warfare.

Europe

• French aerospace laboratory Onera has released details on their test of the A400M transporter. The company had been contacted by manufacturer Airbus to conduct the studies of a new hose and drogue configuration designed to permit helicopter refueling from the airlifter. Customers involved in the A400 program’s development have experienced frustration over the lack of helicopter refueling capabilities, with France having already bought two Lockheed Martin KC-130J tankers to perform the task, and Germany considering a similar acquisition.

• Greece’s P-3B Orion aircraft are to undergo a $142 million mid-life modernization program. Work to be carried out as highlighted in the deal include the reactivation of one of the navy’s P-3Bs and the procurement of software and hardware kits for the upgrade and modernization of a total of four aircraft. Greece operates six of the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) P-3Bs.

• Leonardo-Finmeccanica is expecting to deliver the first of its ATR-72 maritime patrol aircraft to the Italian Navy within the next few weeks. A total of four will be delivered and are to conduct missions including aiding navel vessels searching for migrants crossing the Mediterranean. The $397 million deal does not give the Navy any ASW capabilities, with budget shortfalls after the 2008 economic crash causing Rome to ditch plans to look at Boeing’s P-8 Poseidon.

Asia Pacific

• China has hailed the US deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) batteries to South Korea as harming the “foundation of their trust.” THAAD’s presence on the Korean peninsula as a counter to North Korean nuclear missile testing also caused Chinese officials to warn that the government in South Korea “should think twice about the deployment and value the good momentum of ties between Beijing and Seoul.” Meanwhile, the North moves ahead with the construction of fortified submarine pens for its ballistic missile submarines.

• Larsen & Toubro (L&T) is to partner with South Korean giant Samsung to produce 100 tracked 155mm howitzer guns at Indian facilities. The contract, at $700 million, constitutes India’s largest ever order for the domestic private sector, and could lead to further orders of wheeled guns for the Indian Army. Offering the K-9 Vajra-T gun, the winning team beat out Rosoboronexport’s MSTA howitzer.

Today’s Video

• Coming soon the the Indian Army, the K-9 Vajra-T:

Israeli A-4Ns
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After more than 40 years operating the A-4 Skyhawk, a maintenance scandal led Israel to conclude that its remaining Skyhawk’s needed to be replaced as advanced trainers. That triggered a $1 billion advanced trainer competition, and a major geo-political decision.

In 2012, Israel made up its mind. The Italian M-346 “Lavi” will be their new trainer.

IAF Replacement Candidates IAF F-16B
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After a long competition, a 2-way military deal was signed with Italy in July 2012. Israel should begin receiving its M-346 trainers and simulators at Hatzerim Air Base, beginning in mid-2014.

Candidates to replace the Skyhawks reportedly included converted IAF early-model F-16Bs, Boeing’s license-produced T-45TS Goshawk used by the US Navy, Finmeccanica’s M346 variant of the Yak-130, and Korea’s supersonic T-50.

Winner: Alenia’s M-346 Elbit simulators

Militarily, the chosen M346’s performance profile, and theoretical ordnance-carrying capability in a pinch, are probably the closest to the Skyhawk’s. It was also designed with Italy’s F-35A/B purchase in mind, which reportedly gave it an advantage in Israel. Unlike its Russian Yak-130 counterpart, however, the M346 hasn’t been built and tested in a light attack version. Some Israeli systems will be added to the IAF’s trainers, in order to allow full pilot training, but the public-private TOR (IAI/Elbit joint venture) arrangement creates barriers to re-purposing the jets for operational missions.

Beyond the military sphere, Finmeccanica has had to overcome doubts regarding Italy’s long-term political stability as a supplier, and its long-term economic stability as a customer. The latter is especially relevant, as future Italian purchases of Israeli equipment were the key to winning the deal. The Israelis believe that they have negotiated appropriate safeguards for that risk, and the July 2012 deal featured signed contracts for specific offsetting military purchases by the Italian government.

The jets will offer just one part of the training system. The new flight syllabus will use more Ground Based Training System (GBTS) training for both fighter pilots and back-seat Weapon Systems Operators, with a “high” percentage of training done at the GBTS on a “daily” basis up to advanced weapon/mission training. Israel’s Flight Training Center at Hatzerim AB will use a simulator network based on Elbit’s SkyBreakerTM concept and technology, with 2 Full Mission Simulators and 2 Operational Flight Simulators all linked together to provide full multi-participant mission simulations. Similar systems equip Israel’s active fighter squadrons, in line with global trends among advanced militaries.

IAI/Elbit’s joint “TOR – Advanced Flight Training” consortium has picked Elbit Systems to provide GBTS support for the center over 20 years, though they’ll need to call on expertise from their build partners Alenia Aermacchi and Selex ES, and Canada’s CAE simulator firm.

Other Candidates T-45 Goshawks
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The F-16s were reportedly a low-ranking option, because of the difficulty of transitioning pilots from a primary jet trainer like the Fouga Magister or its T-6A turboprop replacement. They did not make the shortlist.

The T-45 Goshawk would have offered a welcome boost for Boeing’s closing production line, and could have been purchased with American military aid dollars. The flip side is that the US Navy hasn’t invested in giving them secondary mission capabilities beyond their training role. This option didn’t make the shortlist, either.

KAI T-50
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South Korea’s supersonic T-50 family came in 2nd, even though it offered the best aerodynamic performance of the available planes, with existing weapons integration that gave it the ability to operate as an “F-16 Lite” beyond its training role.

It also had the apparent advantage of building on a wider base of defense industrial cooperation. Italy may hold aerial exercises with the IDF, but Israeli firms have made notable inroads into the Korean market with their UAVs, missiles, and radars. A TA-50 order could have represented the next step for both countries, initiating deeper cooperation, and mutual trade that might have included Israeli cooperation toward a TA-50 with even broader light attack capabilities. An improved TA-50 trainer & light fighter would has the potential to carve out a strong place in the global arms market, and would have aligned Israel with both KAI and Israel’s close supplier Lockheed Martin. That high potential upside would have come with a corresponding cost, however, as this would have been Israel’s most expensive option.

See Appendix B for more in-depth coverage of Israel’s decision, and its attendant military and geo-political considerations.

Contracts and Key Events 2013 – 2016

1st jets arrive; Ground-based center opens. M-346
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July 27/16: Two years since the commencement of deliveries, Israel has received the last of its M-346 Lavi jets from manufacturer Leonardo-Finmeccanica. The $1 billion deal sees the 30 jet trainers delivered to replace the 1960s-era Douglas TA-4 Skyhawk. Equipped with the Elbit Systems Targo helmet, the Israeli Air Force can provide synthetic on-board training for pilots transitioning onto the full range of the IAF’s frontline combat aircraft fleets which will soon include the F-35.

December 17/15: The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has just retired their fleet of A-4 Skyhawks after 48 years of service. The aircraft have taken part in every single military campaign since 1967. In total, 236 have been in operation over the years and after their replacement as active fighters by the F-15s and F-16s, they remained as trainer jets. Thirty of the jets remained in service until they were retired from service on December 13.

Sept 29/14: A team led by Elbit systems opens Israel’s Flight Training Center at Hatzerim AB, whose simulator network is based on Elbit’s SkyBreakerTM concept and technology that’s used in Israel’s active fighter squadrons. The new flight syllabus will use more Ground Based Training System (GBTS) training for both fighter pilots and back-seat Weapon Systems Operators, with a “high” percentage of training done at the GBTS on a “daily” basis up to advanced weapon/mission training.

The new center includes 2 Full Mission Simulators and 2 Operational Flight Simulators, all linked together in order to provide full multi-participant mission simulations when necessary. Similar systems equip Israel’s active fighter squadrons, in line with global trends among advanced militaries.

IAI/Elbit’s joint “TOR – Advanced Flight Training” consortium has picked Elbit Systems to provide GBTS support for the center over 20 years, though they’ll need to call on expertise from their build partners Alenia Aermacchi and Selex ES, and Canada’s CAE simulator firm. Sources: Elbit Systems, “Israel Air Force Inaugurates Flight Training Center for the M346 Advanced Trainer”.

Ground-based FTC opens

July 9/14: Delivery. The first 2 M-346 Lavis produced for the Israeli Air Force (IAF) arrive at Hatzerim Israeli Air Force Base. Another 6 IAF M-346s are completing final assembly, and 5 are in the process of structural part assembly. All 30 aircraft are expected to be delivered by the end of 2016. Sources: Alenia Aermacchi, “First two M-346 aircraft delivered to the Israeli Air Force”.

Deliveries begin

Rollout

March 20/14: Rollout. Rollout of the 1st Israeli M-346 Lavi (q.v. July 19/12) at Venegono Superiore, Italy. Official delivery is scheduled for summer 2014. Sources: Finmeccanica, “Roll-Out of first M-346 for Israeli Air & Space Force” | Varese News, “Il traino dell’M346 dopo il RollOut” [YouTube].

Nov 7/13: The IAF’s 1st M-346 aircraft has begun final assembly in Italy. Alenia says that the program is on time and budget so far, and delivery is still scheduled for mid-2014. Sources: Alenia, Nov 7/13 release.

July 2/13: “Lavi”. Flight International reports that the IAF has designated its new M-346s as “Lavi.” That name was last used for an advanced 4+ generation fighter project that was canceled in 1987, but the name is also appropriate to the new platform. Translated, it means “lion cub,” which fits a lead-in fighter trainer jet very well. Sources: Flight International, “Israel’s Lavi reborn as renamed M-346” | IAF Picture Gallery: IAI Lavi (Lion-cub).

IAF M-346 becomes “Lavi”

Jan 7/13: Support. Alenia Aermacchi announces a $140 million sub-contract from Elbit Systems, Ltd./ TOR, covering Alenia’s share of logistics support (CLS) services for Israel’s 30 M-346I advanced trainer aircraft.

The CLS services include supply, maintenance and overhaul of spare parts, and will be performed jointly with Elbit Systems.

2012

M-346 deal. TOR joint venture. Winner.
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Nov 27/12: Skyhawks for sale. The Israeli MoD’s SIBAT department is advertising and promoting the sale of the country’s 44-plane T/A-4 Skyhawk fleet.

Some of those planes have been used in combat recently, though their latest service during the 2010 Gaza skirmish saw them dropping leaflets over the Gaza Strip. Israel will reportedly withdraw them from service in 2013, and if there’s no response by 2018, the aircraft will be scrapped. Israel’s SIBAT, incl. Presentation [PDF] | Israel Defense

Nov 7/12: Sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman announces that its LISA-200 Attitude Heading Reference System (AHRS) has been picked by prime contractor Alenia Aermacchi to equip Israel’s M-346 trainers. They’ve been an M-346 supplier for 5 years, but this contract with Northrop Grumman Italia reportedly builds on the existing arrangements.

“The LISA-200 uses fiber-optic gyro technology, with additional features like high-speed data refresh rates and output. Northrop Grumman Italia has delivered more than 4,000 LISA-200 systems worldwide. NGC.

Sept 10/12: TOR. The Israeli Ministry of Defense reaches a $603 million agreement with the IAI/Elbit TOR consortium, which will operate and maintain the Future Trainer Program’s M-346 jets and associated facilities. Overall, the workshare breaks down to about $420 million for Elbit, and (by inference) $183 million for IAI.

Elbit has received an initial $27 million interim purchase order to get things moving, and the full contract will be signed in the next few weeks, once the government finishes lining up the financing. During the program’s Establishment Phase, Elbit Systems will set up the support and maintenance infrastructure, as well as the simulators and the rest of the ground training array. They will also provide the jets’ advanced avionics systems. Total value for this phase is $110 million over 3 years.

During the operational phase, Elbit Systems will provide about $310 million (current dollars) of support services over the agreement’s 20-year lifespan. Elbit Systems.

O&M contract with TOR JV

July 19/12: M-346 Deal Finalized. Italy and Israel sign a set of 2-way defense deals. Israel will get 30 M-346 trainers, for delivery beginning in mid-2014. It’s a $1 billion deal, with Alenia’s share announced at around $600 million. Israel will join Italy and Singapore as M-346 operators.

Going the other way, Israel’s IAI will supply 2 Gulfstream 550 “Eitam” Conformal Airborne Early Early Warning & Control (CAEW) planes, which can monitor airspace and even maritime areas in a wide radius around the aircraft,while performing ESM geo-location of emitters and ELINT communications interception. IAI’s share is 750 million, while Finmeccanica’s SELEX Elsag will supply $41 million worth of NATO standard C4 equipment. Italy is familiar with these aircraft, which have participated in a number of multi-national exercises at Decimommanu AB in Sardinia. Italy will join Israel and Singapore as G550 CAEW operators.

The last component of the deal is a shared IAI/Finmeccanica project for a high-resolution Italian OPTSAT-3000 surveillance satellite. Finmeccanica’s Telespazio is the prime contractor, with a $200 million contract to deliver the high-resolution optical OPTSAT-3000 satellite and ground segment, manage launch services, test the satellite on orbit and then operate it. IAI’s share is $182 million, to supply the core OPTSAT satellite. Read “Italy & Israel: A Billion-Dollar Offer They Didn’t Refuse” for full coverage and details.

Deals signed: M-346, G550 CAEW, Satellite.

July 1/12: Ministers approve. Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Avigdor Lieberman visits Alenia Aermacchi in Varese, Italy, ahead of this week’s expected signing of a deal for 30 M-346, and sees a demonstration of the aircraft. Meanwhile, an Israeli ministerial committee has reportedly approved the deal. Arutz Sheva | China’s Xinhua.

Feb 16/12: M-346 picked. Technically, Alenia is just the preferred bidder to IAI & Elbit’s TOR joint venture, with governmental approval required, and a contract award for 30 planes scheduled for later in 2012. If the expected billion-dollar contract is signed, deliveries would be expected to begin in the middle of 2014.

Globes sums up the situation:

“[Israeli MoD] director general Uri Shani made the decision to buy the M-346, and that Minister of Defense Ehud Barak still has to approve it… The Air Force found that the M-346 cost less, and a defense official said that it better meets the Air Force’s needs. The defense establishment said that the officials responsible for the deal were well aware of Italy’s shaky economic conditions, and that measures for dealing with this have already been coordinated with the Ministry of Finance to prepare a package of guarantees for reciprocal procurements.”

With respect to those “reciprocal procurements”, Italy is rumored to have pledged to buy IAI’s CAEW 550 AEW&C jets, and to jointly develop a new reconnaissance satellite with Israel. The IAF adds its own comments:

“I flew the Korean plane and it’s a lot like the F-16. In that aspect it has many advantages, seeing as it is easy to get used to the plane and… [move] directly to the F-16… The Italian plane is a combination. It integrates the F-16, the F-15 and the Eurofighter. It’s a dual-engine aircraft while the Korean plane has one engine, which is an important security aspect, but has less experience than the Korean aircraft… the conclusion that in spite of the lack of experience, the Italian plane… already looks on to the F-35 and can be compatible with training for it. It prepares us better for the future… We’re planning on adapting the plane to our needs, as well as adding Israeli systems that the cadets can get to know and practice on before they are acquainted with operational combat planes”.

There never was a formal RFP, and South Korea is reportedly quite unhappy. IAF in Hebrew | English || Finmeccanica release | Arutz Sheva | Israel’s Globes | Italy’s AGI | Chosun Ilbo || Flight International | Reuters.

M-346 picked

Feb 10/12: South Korea. Flight International reports that South Korea is upset at the process being used for the Israeli trainer deal – or rather, the lack of same:

“Speaking on 9 February, a South Korean source said officials from the country will use the meeting to express their anger at what they have defined as an “unfair” competition between the Korea Aerospace Industries T-50 and Alenia Aermacchi M-346. The South Korean government will demand that Israel’s defence ministry issue a formal request for proposals before making a selection, and that the latter is made according to the “known and fair practice”, the source said.”

Jan 19/12: Competition. Flight International:

“The South Korean government has been given until 28 January to update its industrial cooperation package… A South Korean source said on 17 January that Israel had received a “very generous” offer from Italy and that his country would make an effort to match it.”

Jan 17/12: Competition. UPI is cautious about relaying a report that Italy has won the deal:

“Israel’s air force has reportedly recommended buying Italy’s M-246 Master advanced jet trainer, rather than South Korea’s T-50 Golden Eagle… The Israeli Defense Ministry is expected to announce which aircraft it has chosen “within a few weeks,” the Haaretz daily reported… The contest has taken bizarre twists, so it might be premature to consider that the Italians will win the contract.”

The article correctly notes that just a couple of weeks ago, the T-50 was being talked about in similar terms. To the mix of geopolitical calculations underway, Israel must now add economic and financing prospects for Italy and the Eurozone, which could put a large dent in future cooperative deals.

2010 – 2011

TOR JV. Delayed RFP. KAI’s TA-50
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Oct 10/11: T-50. The Jerusalem Post reports that KAI has formally partnered with Lockheed Martin in its bid to sell T-50 trainers to Israel, citing the advantage of being able to use American military aid funds. That possibility has been a live option since September (vid. Sept 15/11 entry), but this makes it official.

Oct 7/11: Italy. The Jerusalem Post reports that the Italian government is making an interesting offer of its own: 23-35 M-346 trainers, in exchange for 2 Israeli AWACS aircraft. The exact type of AWACS plane is not clear. IAI makes the Gulfstream 550 Nachshon CAEW jet, currently in service with Israel and Singapore. They can also convert existing passenger jets into Phalcon AWACS planes, as they’ve done for Chile (Boeing 707) and India (IL-76).

The Post quotes South Korea’s Ambassador to Israel Isloo Kim, who denied reports that South Korea would end a wide range of military deals with Israel if its planes loses:

“This is a commercial deal and the companies involved are negotiating. It will not affect the relations between our countries.”

Sept 19/11: Late RFP. The expected RFP is late, as it was expected in August. Flight International:

“Sources said on 19 September that the delay is “of a few weeks”, but added that a bigger delay may follow. This could be a result of pressure to shrink Israel’s defence budget and allocate money to solve social issues, the sources said.”

Sept 15/11: T-50. The Korea Herald reports that Lockheed Martin is setting up a T-50 final assembly plant in the USA. That makes perfect sense as it competes for the USA’s pending T-X trainer competition, and it also affects Israel’s buy. If the T-50 series can be considered an American product, that means Israel could buy it with American foreign aid dollars. The M-346 is unlikely to be able to offer that, which would give the Korean jet a significant edge.

The existing T-50 Golden Eagle contract reportedly states that KAI takes 70% percent of the production work, while Lockheed takes the rest.The firms would not address speculation that this ratio might be adjusted for the US T-X and /or Israeli competitions.

March 16/11: TOR JV. Elbit Systems Ltd. and Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd. sign a founder’s agreement, establishing a 50/50 joint venture called TOR to buy and maintain advanced training aircraft for the Israeli Ministry of Defense. The joint firm would:

“…supply the MoD with the products and services required for the Project’s execution… in accordance with a work sharing plan determined by the two sides. To the best of Elbit Systems’ knowledge, the MoD is currently reviewing contractual possibilities with regards to the Project, and in this context has provided to Elbit Systems and IAI a request for information (RFI). It is the intention of the two companies to submit a response to the RFI in the coming days through the Joint Entity.”

IAI is 100% state owned, so while it’s fair to call TOR a public-private partnership, there’s more state ownership here than meets the casual eye. See Elbit Systems.

TOR JV

Nov 24/10: Finalists. Flight International reports that Israel’s shortlist is down to the KAI/Lockheed T-50 and Alenia’s M-346. Both firms have received RFIs, but the planes would be bought and operated by an IAI/Elbit joint venture that would sell flight hours on the type to the IAF. The companies “also want to assemble parts of the chosen type in Israel and equip it with some locally made systems.”

2008 – 2009

Skyhawks will be retired. M-346 “Master”
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Sept 21/09: Flight International reports that Alenia Aermacchi’s M-346 Master and the Korea Aerospace Industries/Lockheed Martin T-50 have emerged as the leading candidates to replace the Israeli Cheyl Ha’avir’s TA-4 Skyhawk advanced jet trainers.

Aug 2/09: T-50. As reports of Israeli radar cooperation to equip KAI’s TA-50 and F/A-50s swirl around the media, Israel has sent a formal delegation to evaluate and test-fly the T-50 as a potential replacement for its Skyhawks. During their 5-day stay, the delegation will test-fly the advanced trainer at the KAI headquarters in Sacheon, and visit an air force base in Gwangju to check a ground-based flight training system.

The 20-30 plane Lead-In Fighter Trainer order marks the first time in 40 years that Israel is considering purchasing a fighter jet not made either locally, or in the United States. Ha’aretz | Korea Times | Korea’s Dong-a Ilbo | China’s Xinhua.

Dec 10/08: Skyhawk. The Jerusalem Post reports that the Israeli Air Force has finally decided to retire its Skyhawks. It quotes a “top IAF officer”:

“The plane is old and we are discovering problems… Because of its age we are finding ourselves investing a lot of attention and resources and therefore we have started the process of searching for a new plane to replace the Skyhawk.”

Skyhawks to go

Oct 5/08: Scandal. Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reportes that:

“TheMarker found that the contractor failed to conduct checks on the system responsible for maintaining the aircraft’s altitude, as well as its exhaust and brakes systems. Moreover, when technicians found tire and wheel fractures, they were instructed to cover them with lubricant rather than mend the rifts.”

It is, perhaps, a testament to the aircraft’s ruggedness that no Skyhawk has yet been grounded, or suffered an accident, due to a safety malfunction. Nevertheless, the IAF isn’t about to push its luck. The service conducted a surprise inspection of the maintenance facility following the media reports, and in early October 2008 IAF chief Maj. Gen. Ido Nehushtan grounded the Skyhawk fleet based on what they had found.

IAI says they have offered complete cooperation with the government since the matter was brought to their attention. The situation remains in limbo, with no reports as yet of charges laid, other punitive action, or the lifting of the flight ban.

Appendix A: On Wings of Skyhawks – Service in Israel IAF A-4N – note
extended tailpipe
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McDonnell Douglas’ A-4 Skyhawk, aka. “Scooter” (Navy) or “Dog” (Top Gun school) is best known for its long and storied career as a carrier-based attack aircraft; Sen. John McCain [R-AZ] was flying one when he was shot down over North Vietnam.

It also had a storied land-based career with the Israeli Air Force. Beginning in late 1967, the IAF used this simple, pilot-friendly aircraft as a versatile attack aircraft with surprising air-air teeth. In one engagement during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, an Israeli A-4 Skyhawk found itself facing 3 MiG-21s. The maneuverable little Skyhawk turned on them and brought 2 of them down, and was reportedly on the 3rd Fishbed’s tail when an IAF Mirage IIIC zipped through and blasted the MiG out of the sky.

The little A-4’s surprising maneuverability was coupled with an equally surprising ability to take battle damage, which made it a popular and reliable choice through several wars. The type’s last frontline role was the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the Israeli fleet took correspondingly heavy loses: of 102 aircraft lost, 53 were Skyhawks. Per mission losses in 1973 were actually just 0.6%, which was lower than the previous 1970 War of Attrition with Egypt. Nevertheless, the writing was on the wall.

Israel’s induction of F-16s was a turning point for the Skyhawk, which declined in importance, but never vanished entirely from service. Some A-4s participated in the 1982 Lebanon War, and one even scored a MiG-17 kill. By that time, however, squadron migrations to the F-16 had already begun, and 33 of the Skyhawks had been sold to Indonesia. By the mid 1990s, almost all of Israel’s fighter squadrons had migrated, and 2000-2001 saw a handful of Israeli Skyhawks sold to corporate operators like BAE and ATSI.

M-346 in Singapore
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A number of Israeli A-4E/H/N aircraft are currently stored at Ovda Air Base, some planes have been used as electronic warfare support aircraft, and others have been sold or leased to contractors like ATAC.

Meanwhile, the “Flying Tigers” of 102 Squadron at Hatzerim Air Base still use their A-4Ns and 2-seat TA-4Js for advanced IAF pilot training. Those planes needed maintenance, which was being provided by the contractor Kanfei Tahzuka, via Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). Unfortunately, the little plane that could appears to have finally met its match. A combination of time’s wear and questionable maintenance performance grounded Israel’s Skyhawk fleet – and forced a replacement buy.

Appendix B: A Geo-Political Decision IAF Mirage IIIC:
A cautionary tale?
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Israel’s finalist list narrowed its jet trainer options, but expanded the political considerations involved in the deal.

On the one hand, there’s South Korea. Israeli firms are cooperating with South Korea on a wide range of defense projects, from mini-UAVs to ballistic missile defense radars. The ROK is quietly emerging as a significant military export market for Israeli firms, and that cooperation has the potential to grow further, via South Korean interest in Iron Dome rocket interceptors and other products. Unlike Europe, South Korea has good prospects for economic growth, and the country is steadily building a very credible defense industry of its own.

Israel needs military exports to keep its military industries strong, and to lower prices for Israeli equipment through volume production. That means acquiring at least 1 new client per decade who looks… well, a lot like South Korea.

On the other side of the deal, the T-50 Golden Eagle is an important national project for the Koreans. Their initial export sale to Indonesia took some of the pressure off, but they’re still very keen on exporting their jet to gain credibility abroad, and want to pick up momentum in America ahead of the USAF’s possible T-X decision. An Israeli “yes” would add credibility to their American ambitions, and would also help in places like Europe (vid. Poland). Israel is known as a careful buyer who insists on quality, and Israeli jets with offensive capabilities have good odds of gaining the coveted “combat proven” label. That, too, has value in the global market, especially when one of your jet’s key selling points is its high-end capabilities.

The ROK ambassador has said that this relationship would survive an Israeli “no”. The arms it buys from Israel are needed, and there’s an unexpected cultural connection in South Korea through the Jewish Talmud, of all things. The question is whether the relationship would remain as strong. Or, whether other relationships might grow to supplant it.

There is no shortage of candidates. Turkey is South Korea’s biggest arms export customer, and its Ottomanist Islamic government is hostile to Israel. Indonesia became the first export buyer for the T-50, and followed that purchase by buying Daewoo-built U209 submarines. The United Arab Emirates is still seen as a possible destination for the T-50. Etc. If the bilateral relationship with Israel doesn’t keep growing, and defense relationships with countries hostile to Israel do keep growing, that’s likely to begin affecting South Korea’s foreign policies, as well as its defense ties.

That prospect must concern Israel, as it contemplates both potential partners.

Even if Israel does buy Korean, their experiences with France in the 1960s taught them that the risk of partner flips needs to be taken seriously. France went from Israel’s top weapon supplier to an arms embargo, as the country decided to seek favor and contracts with hostile Arab regimes instead. Lockheed Martin’s role as a co-bidder means that Israel needn’t worry about a T-50 embargo, as was the case with their Mirages – but Israel could conclude that a T-50 buy wouldn’t really change their future with South Korea.

Hydrocarbon rights
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On the other hand, there’s Italy. Under former Prime Minister Berlusconi, relations were friendly, and Italy has been a supportive ally. Israel needs allies in Europe, which is not a great future defense market, but is their main market for general economic exports. Europe becomes even more important following Israel’s discovery of huge gas fields off its Mediterranean coast. That gas must be exported, and Europe would be the prime destination. Currently, Russia and Turkey are key supply chokepoints for natural gas pipelines to Europe, though Italy’s pipeline to Algeria and Libya has some offsetting value. A pipeline through Turkey doesn’t make much sense for Israel, and even its plans to cooperate with Cyprus/Greece still leave Italy and Germany as next-step distribution hubs.

Berlusconi has stepped down, but even out of office, he will retain significant influence through Italy’s media. Israel will want long-term relations with Berlusconi, and Italy, to remain good. That could become tricky, given the European Left’s growing hostility toward Israel and Jews, but it’s not impossible.

Berlusconi’s exit removed some of that pressure, because it weakens the case for, and expectation of, a reward for long-standing ties. On the other hand, Italy has reportedly taken steps to expand the potential deal. A reported swap of M-346 trainers for Israeli AWACS jets is one way to strengthen those long-term ties, by making Israel both a high-profile export client, and the supplier of strategically important military hardware. The agreement reportedly included joint development of satellite projects, and the sale of Israeli UAVs. In the end, the AWACS and satellite rumors proved to be true.

Reports in Ha’aretz suggested that Israeli MoD Director-General Udi Shani inked a preliminary deal with his Italian counterpart in May 2011. That upset the Koreans, as did the lack of a formal RFP process before the Israelis announced the M-346 as their choice in February 2012. There were consultations, bids, and deadlines to improve offsetting industrial packages, but never a formal RFP.

Before the decision, DID wrote that:

“If Israel decides that their South Korean relationship is worth fighting for, the question may come down to whether or not they can find a way to keep the Italians close, and retain Berlusconi as a friend, while keeping the Koreans closer. If not, a hard choice lies ahead.”

Israel has made that hard choice, and must now wait to see if it was a wise choice. For all anyone outside the process knows, the decision may have been made on straight economics, based on the countries’ respective industrial commitments. There are early indications, however, that the decision is not being seen that way in South Korea. What happens next will bear close scrutiny, extending far beyond the confines of a single jet deal.

Additional Readings

Thanks to Mark Chen for his authorization to use his M-346’s Singapore photo.

Background: The Deal

• DID – Italy & Israel: A Billion-Dollar Offer They Didn’t Refuse. Details the final sale’s offsetting deals.

• DID FOCUS – Finmeccanica’s M-346 AJT: Who’s the Master Now?

• IDF – IAF to switch to new instructional airplane

Background: Other Aircraft

• Israeli Air Force – McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawk – Hebrew nickname: ‘Ayit’ (‘Eagle’).

• IAI – A-4. Covers the maintenance program.

• DID FOCUS – Korea’s T-50 Spreads Its Wings. Reports indicate that advanced F/A-50 versions are likely to include EL/M-2032 derived radars, developed with Israel Aerospace Industries.

• DID – T/A-50 Golden Eagles for Iraq? Israel isn’t the only Middle Eastern country considering it – Iraq ended up buying FA-50 fighter variants as their high-end jet trainers.

• DID FOCUS – US Carrier Pilots’ T-45 Training System

News & Views

• IAF (Feb 5/14) – Coming Soon: M-346 Simulator

• UPI (Nov 14/11) – Israel, South Korea scrap over jet deal. More specifically, over allegations that Israel has already signed a preliminary deal with Italy.

• DID (Feb 25/09) – UAE Gives M346 a LIFT. UAE = United Arab Emirates. The M346 beat the T-50 in the finals, but the UAE hasn’t signed a contract yet.

Greek P-3B
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Greece’s Hellenic Air Force currently operates 4 older P-3B Orion maritime patrol aircraft, which were delivered to the HAF from 1993 – 1996. They are reaching the limits of their airframe life, but Greece is nearing the end of their fiscal rope. In 2008, the odds appeared to tilt toward new aircraft, with at least EUR 250 million (then about $350 million) reportedly set aside for the winner of a 5-aircraft maritime patrol competition. In 2014, it became clear that Greece was considering another option…

Greece’s Options P-8A Poseidon: cutaway
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In May 2005, “P-8A MMA Could Become a Multinational Program” said that:

“European nations operating the P-3 may gravitate toward smaller maritime patrol aircraft … Initial designs are even appearing in this class for executive jet aircraft equipped with maritime surveillance radars and related gear. Given that many nations’ maritime surveillance and attack requirements make the P-8’s range and endurance parameters unnecessary, it’s very possible that the EU’s moves will successfully bifurcate the global maritime patrol category into a broad class of nations who buy smaller aircraft, and an elite few with more extensive requirements who buy aircraft in the P-8A [Poseidon] class.”

Greece seemed to be firmly in that broad class who could buy smaller aircraft, and expected competitors are described in Appendix A. A different option also existed. The Orion has upgraded to P-3C designation, and has received a slew of updates since the P-3Bs were fielded. Efforts like Lockheed Martin’s reopening of P-3 wing production have made it possible for countries like Norway to keep upgraded P-3 aircraft in service.

In 2008, Greece had reportedly decided not to buy P-8s, or refurbish the Orions. By 2014, they had changed their minds.

Contracts & Key Events Wing replacement
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July 27/14: Greece’s P-3B Orion aircraft are to undergo a $142 million mid-life modernization program. Work to be carried out as highlighted in the deal include the reactivation of one of the navy’s P-3Bs and the procurement of software and hardware kits for the upgrade and modernization of a total of four aircraft. Greece operates six of the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) P-3Bs.

Oct 7/14: P-3 overhaul. The Greeks have changed their minds. The US DSCA announces Greece’s official export request for modification and reactivation of 2 stored P-3B aircraft (bringing the fleet to 6), and the upgrade of up to 5 P-3Bs that will include structural Mid Life Upgrades (MLU) to provide 15,000 more flight hours, Phased Depot Maintenance (PDM), Mission Integration and Management Systems (MIMS), and new flight avionics. Not to mention the usual spare and repair parts, repair and return, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, and US Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $500 million.

That’s quite the shift in policy, considering that it ends up costing Greece more than the previous budget for new acquisitions. The P-3s will also be more expensive to operate. On the other hand, their range will be very useful if Greece wants long patrol times over Cyprus’ offshore gas fields. Then, too, the DSCA statement suggests that things have become dire:

“The proposed sale for overhaul and upgrade would allow the Hellenic Navy (HN) to resume operations of its P-3B aircraft for land-based maritime patrol and reconnaissance, surveillance and protection of areas of national interest.”

Airbus performs these kinds of upgrades, and did so for Brazil. In this case, however, the principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company in Marietta, GA. If a contract is signed, the sale will require “multiple” trips to Greece by U.S. Government and contractor representatives for a period of 7 years for delivery, system checkout, training, and program reviews. Sources: US DSCA #14-47, “Greece – P-3B Aircraft Overhaul and Upgrade”.

DSCA request: P-3 reactivation and upgrades

S-3B Viking
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Oct 14/08: Competition. Flight International reports on the expected Greek Maritime Patrol Aircraft competition, and the expected competitors. See Appendix A for even more background. Boeing won’t be offering the P-8, and the magazine also reports that Greece has rejected American offers of refurbished P-3s or of second-hand S-3B Viking jets.

The S-3 is a twin-engine carrier jet whose mission is described simply as “sea control.” Their range fits well with Greece’s needs, and they come armed with advanced surveillance equipment plus the ability to carry torpedoes, missiles, sonobuoys – even refueling pods that let them act as aerial refueling tankers. The US Navy plans to phase out the S-3 by 2010, and is replacing them with MH-60R helicopters whose slow speed and reduced range will shrink the protective anti-submarine “bubble” around American carrier forces.

For Greece, the planes’ age and hard usage in carrier landings creates issues with spares, training, and operational costs. These issues combine to make an S-3B transfer unattractive as a long-term solution. If the current financial crisis pinches Greece’s defense procurement budgets sharply enough, however, a cheap enough S-3 transfer offer might begin to look attractive as a stopgap solution that would compete with P-3 re-winging and/or refurbishment.

Appendix A: Greek MPA Competitors, 2008 ATR-72 ASW
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Greece’s naval focus is limited to the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, a sphere that is well within the capabilities of smaller and less expensive aircraft. A budget of about $350 million might buy 2 P-8As, plus spares and fielding support. It could not buy 5. In October 2008, Flight International reported that the budget for this purchase could increase, but:

“Boeing does not expect to offer its 737-based P-8A multi-mission maritime aircraft, but is promoting a Boeing Business Jet solution for a separate requirement for three VIP and presidential transports.”

An RFP was expected by the end of 2009, and viable candidates for the maritime patrol requirement reportedly included:

ATR-72MP (Alenia/EADS). This large twin-turboprop regional passenger aircraft has been developed into a maritime patrol variant that includes both integrated surveillance equipment and weapons carriage. Its use in civilian capacities creates an independent source of potential upgrades, troubleshooting, service networks, and trained personnel opportunities. In 2006, Turkey ordered ATR-72ASWs; picking this aircraft would give Greece assured platform parity with its rival.

Be-200
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Be200 (Beriev). Greece buys a lot of Russian defense equipment, from armored personnel carriers, to hovercraft, to advanced anti-aircraft missiles. The Beriev jet would be an interesting choice because it is a true amphibian that can land on water. It also comes with a fire-fighting mission module, something that might offer an attractive supplement to Greece’s Bombardier aircraft after the infamous 2007 fires. Beriev does not advertise a full maritime patrol variant, just a search and rescue variant.

If the competition involved only search and rescue aircraft, the Be-200 would have an exceptionally strong case. The Greek request also requires anti-submarine, anti-surface, and surveillance duties, however, which may prove problematic for the Russian design. There have been reports of a Be-40/Be-42 variant for maritime patrol since 1986, but the project’s status remains uncertain. Given Greece’s requirements for NATO commonality, it would also be fair to characterize a Greek Be-40 as a new variant when assessing development and delivery risks.

C-295-MPA concept
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C-295 MPA (EADS). Chile has ordered the C-295MP, a larger derivative of the CN-235MP Persuader surveillance-only aircraft that serves with a number of air forces. These aircraft offer good endurance in a small plane, and economical operating costs. The C-295 MPA version comes with an advanced surveillance system, and can carry torpedoes or Harpoon/ Exocet missile on underwing pylons. It does not appear to carry sonobuoy launchers.

The CN-235/C-295 family is in widespread use with a number of militaries as light transport aircraft, and versions of the smaller CN-235MP maritime patrol aircraft are already in service with 7 countries and the US Coast Guard. Greece doesn’t currently operate the C-235 family, however; it ordered Alenia’s C-27J as its light tactical transport instead.

P-99 MPA concept
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P-99 (Embraer). Like the ATR-72, Embraer’s offer leverages an in-service, popular civilian platform. An unarmed variant of this ERJ-145 based martime patrol aircraft serves with Mexico. Greece currently operates the R-99A Erieye airborne early warning derivative, and uses the ERJ-145 as a VIP transport. Embraer can also be expected to compete in Greece’s VIP/Presidential transport solicitation, where they will offer a potent challenge to Boeing.

A P-99 purchase would offer fleet commonality, and a jet solution offers greater speed and hence coverage at the expense of sustained low-level flight. Greece’s preferences in this regard will either tip it toward the ATR/EADS turoprop solutions, or give the Embraer aircraft a strong advantage. Embraer’s site touts the new P-99 variant as being capable of carrying weapons, and their concept art even shows sonobuoy launchers; but Greece would be the armed version’s launch customer. That creates customization opportunities, but it also makes that first buyer the guinea pig and bill-payer for platform development and integration issues.

Additional Readings

• DID – Meltem-III: Turkey’s New ATR-72 Maritime Patrol Planes. Includes 6 TMPAs, and 2 TMUA transports.

• Balkan Analysis (May 31/12) – Greece and Turkey: Offensive and Defensive Balance of Naval Power in 2012.

• Balkan Analysis (Feb 19/12) – Greece and Turkey: Offensive and Defensive Balance of Air Power in 2012.

• Flight Global (Oct 14/08) – Greek navy prioritises maritime patrol aircraft contest.

Aborted landing
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In January 2005, the U.S. Navy selected the US101 as the new “Marine One” baseline helicopter, for use by the President of the United States. The US101 is an American variant of AgustaWestland’s successful AW101 multi-mission medium helicopter; it beat out Sikorsky’s S-92 Superhawk, which is already in use as a government VIP transport in countries like South Korea.

That $1.7 billion victory was first endangered, and then destroyed, by ongoing changes from the White House staff. In 2008, the program’s ballooning costs and requirements got a temporary reprieve when US Navy agreed to proceed with the VH-71, despite a cost per aircraft equal or greater than the President’s Air Force One 747s. By June 2009, however, the VH-71 program had shot itself down.

Another round of competition is on the way, and back in 2009 the Pentagon said it was considering buying 2 different helicopters in the VXX follow-on program. Faced with an initial Analysis of Alternatives deemed too expensive, the OSD accepted the Navy’s revised approach in May 2012, setting things in motion for a new program of record.

The New Marine One Helicopter Programs: A Quick History VH-3D (top), VH-60N
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The Marine Corps currently operates 11 VH-3D Sea Kings, and 8 smaller VH-60N Black Hawk helicopters. The VH-3Ds were originally placed in service in 1974 and 1975, and the VH-60s entered service in the 1980s. They’re safe and reliable due to low and careful use, but they no longer had the growth capability to incorporate the equipment that George W. Bush’s White House believed was required in a post 9/11 environment.

The new “Marine One” helicopter, expected to be in service for up to 4 decades, was officially designated VH-71A in July 2005. The platform never made it into service. The Presidential office kept adding requirements, the Navy couldn’t or didn’t refuse, and eventually the entire project crashed. Each helicopter had become more expensive than a VC-25 “Air Force One” Boeing 747.

What Now?

When the VH-71 program was terminated, in 2009, the question was what to do with the 9 delivered machines. The President and Pentagon believed that the 5 pilot production VH-71s wouldn’t be useful, long-lived, and cost-effective enough to join the Presidential fleet, while some in Congress still believed the 5 should be fitted out and pressed into service. By September 2011, however, all 9 VH-71 airframes had all been shipped to Canada, for use as spare parts.

In its place, the US DoD plans with a revised “VXX” program that aims to field 21 operational helicopters, divided between Presidential helicopters and associated supply helicopters. In 2012 the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed on a cost-effective revised Analyses of Alternatives, setting things in motion to restart a program of record that won’t be in a position to replace the current fleet until 2020 at the earliest.

The VXX RFP was issued in May 2013. During the EMD phase, the selected contractor will provide 6 test helicopters, 4 of which will transition to front-line service in HMX-1. They’ll join another 17 production helicopters: 4 from LRIP Lot 1, 5 from LRIP Lot 2, and 8 from “full-rate production”. Flight and maintenance training systems and contractor support will also be part of the contract, and the level of security around the project will be very tight.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon moved ahead with a program to refurbish the existing VH-3/VH-60 helicopter fleet, while adding 12 V-22 tilt-rotors that will carry cargo, support staff, and media members. The 1st HMX-1 V-22 was inducted in May 2013.

VH-3/ VH-60 Refurbishment VH-3D
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This section covers efforts underway to improve existing VH-3D/ VH-60N helicopters, or extend their lifespans.

The VH-3D Lift Improvement program consists of the operational level installation of 55 composite main rotor blades on all 11 VH-3Ds. Sikorsky and their partner Carson Helicopters have been working on upgrades to the VH-3D’s commercial S-61 counterpart, using a 5-blade upgrade of new composite main rotor blades, while strengthening the helicopter’s tail pylon and transmission mounts. This costs just $1.25 million per aircraft, while boosting lift capacity by 2,000 pounds (910 kg), increasing speed by 15 knots at regular power, stretching range by 15%, and doubling service life to 20,000 hours.

The Structural Enhancement Program consists of efforts to redesign the VH-3D’s cabin redesign to reduce total gross weight, replace critical aircraft structure on the VH-60N, upgrade the safety of the fuel system on the VH-3D, and perform Service Life Extensions on the VH-3D and VH-60N.

The VH-3D and VH-60N Cockpit Upgrades consists of an upgrade to LCD panels, replacing mechanical dials and gauges. The Communication Suite Upgrade consists of Demand Assigned Multiple Access Satellite Communication radio upgrade, Digital Frequency Modulation radio upgrade, High Frequency radio upgrade, the Presidential redundant secure communications upgrade, Data Transfer capability upgrade, and Crypto Modernization Upgrade.

The Obsolescence Management Program will manage impending Executive Helicopter obsolescence issues. A variety of factors will be addressed including communication, navigation, operational weight, safety, and engine upgrades to remain mission relevant. An H-3 and H-60 will be converted to TH-3D and TH-60N training helicopters, in order to reduce wear on the operational fleet. The addition of VH-22 Osprey tilt-rotors to the squadron as of May 2013 will also help in this regard, though they’re never used to carry the President.

A Sept 15/14 contract aims to refit the VH-3s with new cabin interiors and air conditioning.

Note that other contracts exist for something called “Special Progressive Aircraft Rework.” These are not upgrades, just an enhanced version of the helicopters’ Standard Depot Level Maintenance that occurs after a set number of flight hours or months, whichever comes first. It includes partial disassembly of the airframe, replacement of components, refurbishment of interior furnishings, and repainting the aircraft.

VH-71/VXX Marine One: Contracts & Events

US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) in Patuxent River, MD manages these contracts; exceptions are noted in the text below. Note that this article covers the Presidential fleet only. Ancillary planes like the Presidential squadron’s supporting VH-22 Ospreys will have milestones mentioned, but won’t receive full coverage.

FY 2016

Preliminary Design Review for VH-92A S-92 VIP

July 27/16: The US Navy has cleared Lockheed Martin’s VH-92A program Critical Design Review (CDR). Tasked with transporting the president and vice president of the United States and other officials, the VH-92 will see initial fielding in 2020, and production continuing until 2023. First flight is expected next year.

June 21/16: Sikorsky has announced that its VH-92A Marine One helicopter is on track to fly by Spring 2017. The company was selected to design a replacement for the aging fleet of current presidential helicopters in 2014 after a cancelled attempt by Lockheed Martin/AgustaWestland which saw ballooned costs and requirements running out of control. Up next for the VH-92A program is the subsystem critical design review of the helicopter at the end of next month, and that is expected to take place earlier than scheduled.

November 6/15: Sikorsky has completed a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) for its new Presidential transport helicopter, the VH-92A. The company was awarded a $1.2 billion engineering & manufacturing development contract in May 2014 for development of the helicopter, with options covering 21 operational and 2 test helicopters. The Presidential Helicopter Recapitalization Program (or VXX) saw Sikorsky become the only bidder after other competitors dropped out. The VH-92A is scheduled for fielding in 2020, with the PDR allowing Sikorsky to move into a Critical Design Review (CDR) stage.

FY 2014

VXX development contract; final VH-71 settlement.

Sept 16/14: VH-3s. Sikorsky in Stratford, CT receives a $9.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, firm-fixed-price delivery modification for one-time efforts redesigning the VH-3D’s cabin interior and environmental control system, including VIP seats, a cabin interior kit, and special tooling. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2014 US Navy aircraft budgets.

Work will be performed in Stratford, CT, and is expected to be completed in August 2016. US Navy NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-14-G-0004, DO 4010).

May 7/14: VXX Contract. Sikorsky in Stratford, CT receives a $1.245 billion fixed-price-incentive-firm target contract for the Presidential Helicopter Replacement program’s Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase. The EMD Phase includes 6 VH-92 test aircraft and associated support equipment, with “mature government-defined mission systems” integrated, flight training and maintenance training devices/ simulators, and various forms of support.

$42 million is being committed immediately, using FY 2014 RDT&E funding. Work will be performed in Stratford, CT (62.22%); Owego, NY (19.38%); Coatesville, PA (14.25%); Orlando, FL (1.44%); Phoenix, AZ (.86%); Cedar Rapids, IA (.85%); Vergennes, VT (.53%); and Torrance, CA (.47%), and is expected to be complete in October 2020. US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD received 1 offer (N00019-14-C-0050).

VXX EMD contract

Jan 27/14: VH-71 Termination. Inside Defense reports that Lockheed Martin and the US government finalized the end of the VH-71 helicopter program on Dec 19/13 with a final $91.1 million payout: $38.5 million for completed work and $51.6 million in termination fees. That brings the termination total to about $203 million (q.v. June 2/11).

The contract was terminated on June 2/09, and the total amount paid to Lockheed over the entire contract ends up costing the taxpayer about $2.2 billion. The biggest reason for all that waste is a President’s own office that couldn’t stop adding requirements (q.v. Dec 13/07, Jan 19/08), but enforcing Navy certification requirements on a helicopter designed to commercial aviation standards wasn’t helpful, either (q.v. March 14/08). Sources: Inside Defense, “DOD, Lockheed Settle On Final $2.3 Billion Tab For Terminated VH-71 Program”.

FY 2013

VXX RFP out; 1st V-22 joins HMX-1; 2014 budget highlights VH-3/VH-60 upgrade costs. HMX-1’s V-22
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Sept 6/13: GAO Report. The GAO releases a short report that looks at the Navy’s rationale for waiving competitive prototyping requirements for either the base VXX helicopter, or its equipment suite. That’s normally required by The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, but prototyping can be waived with a justification to the US Comptroller General.

As VXX hit Milestone B, the US Navy had calculated that competitive prototyping would delay fielding by 16 months, and raise development costs by somewhere between FY11$ 782 million – 3.38 billion. At best, spending in the higher end of this range would save FY11$ 542 million in lifetime costs, which is a poor deal.

The helicopter justification is straightforward this time, because the program is insisting on an off-the-shelf helicopter, without huge modifications to change performance. For the mission sub-systems, most of the components are known, and prototyping wouldn’t be a big help to integration. GAO did note that this aspect of the program is likely to be challenging, and may be more challenging than the Navy thinks, but the question is whether competitive prototyping would help. GAO thought the Navy’s documentation and analytical rigor around that question was good, and accepted the Navy’s rationale. That’s good news, if the Navy wants to go ahead with just the VH-92. Sources: US GAO Report #GAO-13-826R.

Aug 2/13: VXX. Reuters quotes “Defense officials” who say that the pullout of AgustaWestland and Boeing won’t change their plans to proceed, “and said there were procedures in place to ensure competitive pricing even in cases involving a single bidder.”

These procedures include re-use of existing equipment in the new airframe, and could involve the CRH search and rescue helicopter approach of requesting more price data from Sikorsky. Sources: Reuters, “UPDATE 1-U.S. Navy defends presidential copter bid format as firms bail out”.

S-92
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July 29/13: VH-92 left. Boeing and AgustaWestland both confirm to Aviation Week that they don’t intend to bid on the VXX RFP. That leaves only Sikorsky & Lockheed Martin’s VH-92. The S-92 is widely used as a head-of-state VIP helicopter, but this probably isn’t the outcome the Navy was looking for. AgustaWestland:

“After a comprehensive analysis of the final RFP…. There are fundamental proposal evaluation issues that we believe inhibit our ability to submit a competitive offering, and that provide a significant advantage to our likely competitor…. we believe we have the best, most suitable aircraft for the President.”

Eurocopter never stepped in. Then there’s Boeing, whose response also removes Bell Helicopter:

“The Boeing Company will not submit a bid for the U.S. Navy’s VXX Presidential Helicopter program. While both the Boeing H-47 Chinook and the Bell Boeing V-22 are often used to transport military and government leaders in theaters of operation, we do not believe these aircraft would be competitive for this program as it is currently structured.”

The downwash issues on the White House lawn made those machines rather improbable from the get-go, and you can’t transport a V-22 in a C-17, unless you remove the wings. Leaving the question: now what? Sources: Aviation Week, “VXX Becomes One-Horse Race”.

May 4/13: VH-22. The 1st of 12 MV-22B Ospreys is delivered to the HMX-1 Presidential Squadron. These Ospreys will never carry the President, just cargo, support staff, and media members.

V-22 flight operations at HMX-1 technically began on April 26/13, but flights with support staff and news media representatives won’t begin until later in 2013. Sources: USMC | US NAVAIR.

V-22 joins HMX-1

May 3/13: VXX RFP. The US Navy issues their VXX RFP. Proposals for the 23 helicopters are due in 90 days with a goal to award a fixed-price incentive engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) contract, with production options, by mid-calendar year 2014. Proposals will be evaluated on “best value,” which means a more expensive proposal can win, and technical factors are “slightly more important” than cost. Vendors can gain an extra 10% for assessed strengths in some or all of Fully-outfitted Performance with Overall Weight Growth Margin; Transportability – C-17 Load/Unload Timeline; Cabin Reconfiguration Timeline; and Reliability. Another 5% premium can be gained by offering risk reduction benefits, for a maximum of 15%.

The government will define the mission systems, which is what crashed the program last time, and choose the interior aesthetics from among options offered by the contractor. One hopes that past lessons have been learned. They do have a cost target, which may seem low:

“The affordability target for unit recurring flyaway VXX Integrated Air Vehicle and support equipment, provided for guidance, is $41M. Unit recurring flyaway is defined as that which is associated with the “end item” (excluding GFE hardware) and is comprised of the Prime Mission Equipment including airframe, propulsion, avionics, and it is also comprised of the Software, Integration, and Systems Engineering / Program Management (SEPM) to repeat build of the end item…. The affordability target for Production Support, provided for guidance, is $12M per option year.”

The thing to remember is that most of the helicopter’s total cost will be tied up in the Government Furnished equipment. The difficult interactions happen when the amount of equipment starts forcing overall design changes to the helicopters that can’t be met by off-the-shelf technologies. Having said that, some requirements like the ability to safely land in very small landing zones, with minimal damage to the surroundings, are non-negotiable. Sources: FBO.gov | US NAVAIR.

VXX RFP

May 4/13: H-92. Sikorsky reiterates that they’ll be submitting a variant of their S-92 for VXX, in partnership with Lockheed Martin. They’ll compete against Northrop Grumman and AgustaWestland (AW101), and Boeing (TBD). Sources: Sikorsky, May 4/13 release.

April 10/13: FY 2014 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage.

Planning changes from FY 2013 to FY 2014 are “directly related to the reprogramming of funds to support the unplanned requirements associated with keeping the existing fleet of Presidential VH-3’s and VH-60’s [sic] safely operating beyond their originally planned service life until replaced by VXX. Requirements include obsolescence issues and safety improvements such as weight reduction efforts, and structural improvements.” Overall, life extension and modernization work on the current fleet of 11 VH-3Ds and 8 VH-60Ns amount to about $708.7 million from FY 2012-2018.

March 28/13: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2012, plus time to compile and publish. The VXX program gets a short 1-page entry, which notes an April 2012 VXX analysis of alternatives (AOA) study:

“The program plans to leverage existing avionic and mission systems and it uses less stringent requirements than those developed for VH-71. In addition, the acquisition approach includes integrating a government developed communication package and mission systems…. A May 2012 Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) memo certifying the AOA study states that the analysis demonstrates that the proposed approach to avoid [requiring flight recertification of the final helicopter] is feasible for a number of options and, if adopted, offers potential for reduced cost and schedule.”

The tradeoff involves reduced requirements from the VH-71 program, and GAO says that the final Capabilities Development Document didn’t make any changes that would destroy the assumptions of the AOA study.

Nov 29/12: Program Support. Engility Corp. in Mount Laurel, NJ received a $9.7 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to provide technical and engineering support services. They’ll help with requirement specification, design, implementation, test, management, and maintenance of laboratory/information system and project/program related software in support of the MH-53 program for minehunting helicopters, the existing VH-3/60 Executive Transportation Program, the VXX program, and general Avionics System Integration.

Work will be performed in Patuxent River, MD (95%), and Lexington Park, MD (5%), and is expected to be completed in November 2013. $2.4 million is committed immediately, and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 by the US Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD (N00421-13-C-0006).

Nov 29/12: VXX. US FBO:

“The VXX Program will conduct a Pre-solicitation Conference on 10 December 2012 at the Southern Maryland Higher Education Center located at 44219 Airport Road, California, MD 20619, from 1:00p.m. to 5:00p.m. EST. The purpose of this event is to provide a brief status update of the VXX Program, inform industry of program requirements, receive industry’s feedback on the draft RFP, and provide a Question & Answer/networking opportunity.”

Nov 23/12: VXX. FBO.gov releases NAVAIR’s draft for the VXX competition, #N00019-12-R-0063. Once the RFP is refined and released, it will be about designing, building, testing, qualifying, and delivering 25 helicopters. The 2 VXX Engineering Development Model (EDM) machines would be delivered within 30-36 months, and 4 System Demonstration Test Article (SDTA) helicopters would be delivered within 42-52 months. They would be followed by 11 Low Rate Initial Production lots, and 8 “Full-Rate Production” lots. Each lot is actually 1 helicopter.

On the one hand, NAVAIR is trying to keep development costs down:

“Offerors will be highly encouraged to propose an existing, in-production helicopter platform from which the VXX will be derived. It is the Government’s desire to hold development to an absolute minimum on the VXX Program and focus the program effort on integration of mature subsystems on a mature platform. While minor changes to the platform to accommodate integration of subsystems are inevitable, change to major components such as drive train, rotors, engines and basic structure is highly discouraged. In keeping with this approach, the Offerors will be encouraged to not propose any design elements that contain immature technology or that might be deemed Critical Technology Elements (CTEs).”

Announced competitors Finmeccanica/Northrop Grumman (AW101) and Sikorsky/Lockheed (S-92) both fit the basic requirements. On the other hand, the VH-71/AW101 fiasco involved an in-production, C-17 transportable platform, led by a US contractor. It needed so many changes to its engine, rotors, etc. because of the program’s equipment and range requirements, which couldn’t be met by any existing helicopter. These aspects of VXX have yet to become public. A pre-solicitation conference will be held in Maryland on December 10. Sources: US FBO.gov, “Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program (VXX) Contract” | Aviation Today, “NAVAIR Sets Ball Rolling (Again) for Presidential Helicopter (VXX) Replacement” | Reuters, “Navy moves ahead to replace presidential helicopters”.

FY 2011 – 2012

VXX Analysis of Alternatives; VH-71s sold to Canada as spares. CH-149 Cormorant SAR
(click to view full)

August 2012: AoA. Navy Public Affairs Officer Capt. Cate Mueller tells DID that the revised Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) was approved back in May. The focus for the program is set on “affordability, cost control and risk reduction” which reflects adjustments asked by the Pentagon after the original AoA was deemed to set an unaffordable path.

The next step in the acquisition process is work on a Capabilities Development Document (CDD), the key deliverable of the Technology Development (TD) phase. This is expected to be submitted for approval to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in 2013. Once that is approved, an Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) has to be made before moving to Pre-Engineering & Manufacturing Development and issuing an RFP.

All told, this puts the program at least “8 years away from when a new helicopter could replace the current fleet” according to Mueller. The Congressional Budget Office, in its July 2012 assessment of the FY 2013-2017 FYDP, assumes a replacement for Marine One will happen “in the second half of this decade.”

Feb 27/12: GAO Report. the Government Accountability Office publishes its second report on DOD’s handling of the VH-71 cancellation aftermath and VXX follow-on. (The first report was released in March 2011.) The GAO conducted a performance audit from March 2011 to February 2012 that reviewed work on the Navy’s AOA and a number of high-level Pentagon and Navy briefings.

The AOA submitted by the Navy in March 2011 was not approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) because of a lack of a cost-effective solution. At least that was OSD’s perception as it is relayed in the GAO report. The Navy apparently believed it had been faithful to DOD guidance in its analysis. OSD then provided additional guidance in December 2011. There won’t be a Milestone A, nor an official program, until that is resolved. The revised AOA is expected to be presented to OSD in March 2012.

Feb 13/12: 2013 Budget. The US Navy is asking for $61M in FY2013 for V-XX program definition.

Sept 12/11: Off to Canada. HW Farren Company announces that it has finished transporting the USA’s 9 VH-71 helicopters to Canada’s Department of National Defence, for use as spare parts to Canada’s CH-149 Cormorant fleet. The CH-149s have had readiness issues, and have been consuming spares at a rapid clip. Hence the mention that the 9 helicopters were “in care of” maintenance contract holder IMP Aerospace in Enfield, NS.

The first 4 VH-71s were broken down for transport, but the last 5 could not be disassembled, and HW Farren had to designed and fabricate special wheel cradles for them. They were loaded on a barge, transported to Baltimore, off-loaded, placed on an Atlantic Container Line Roll-On Roll-Off Vessel for transport to Halifax, then re-loaded onto barges, for transport to Canadian Forces Depot Bedford. CFAD Bedford is technically part of CFB Halifax, but the “Bedford Magazine” is its own major property occupying the entire northern shore of Bedford Basin. It houses all of the weaponry and ammunition for MARLANT vessels, and has a loading jetty and several nearby anchorages. HW Farren | CASR.

VH-71s to Canada as spares

June 2/11: Termination fees. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Owego, NY receives a $53.4 million modification to the previously awarded cost-plus-award-fee VH-71 system development and demonstration contract, which was terminated for the convenience of the government. This modification provides funding for post-termination related expenses, including, but not limited to: physical inventory of contractor acquired property; proposal preparation; security; disposition of contract inventory; subcontractor settlement costs; and termination management activities. When combined with the June 2010 contract, it raises termination expenses to $112 million.

Work will be performed in Owego, NY (36%), and at various subcontractor facilities located within the United States and in the United Kingdom and Italy (64%), and is expected to be complete no later than September 2012 (N00019-05-C-0030).

FY 2010

Teaming for VXX VH-71/ EH101 concept
(click to view full)

June 21/10: Termination fees. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Owego, NY receives a $58.6 million modification for termination-related expenses. The cost-plus-award-fee VH-71 System Development and Demonstration contract (N00019-05-C-0030) was terminated for the convenience of the government, but there are still some associated costs that the government must pay. This modification provides funding for post termination related expenses, including, but not limited to, the physical inventory of contractor acquired property; proposal preparation; security; disposition of contract inventory; subcontractor settlement costs; termination management activities; and applicable fees.

Work will be performed in Owego, NY (36%) and at various subcontractor facilities located within the USA, and in the United Kingdom and Italy (64%), and is expected to be complete by September 2011. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/10 (N00019-05-C-0030).

June 7/10: AW101. The EH101 is back, as Boeing teams with AgustaWestland. Finmeccanica’s subsidiary has produced several Boeing helicopters under license in England and Italy (WAH-64 Apache, CH-47 Chinooks), and now Boeing will return the compliment with the AW101. The license will give Boeing full intellectual property, data and production rights, making its version of a Presidential AW101 bid a Boeing aircraft, built by Boeing personnel, at one of its U.S. facilities. Boeing says that it will respond to the current VXX RFI by the June 18/10 deadline.

This decision is likely to create several ripples. Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute points out that:

“Boeing’s bid could create some embarrassing moments for both itself and Lockheed Martin. Lockheed Martin spent years arguing that the AgustaWestland airframe was superior to the Sikorsky product it now supports… By the same token, Boeing is engaged in a bitter dispute with Airbus concerning European aircraft subsidies, and [the AW101 has received them]… As Christopher Drew noted in today’s New York Times, the government will be selecting between the same two rotorcraft in the new competition that were offered the first time around, albeit with different teams behind them. Whether the government ultimately saves any money… will depend on how it re-writes its performance specifications… the more likely outcome is that… the greater capacity of the EH101 will once again prevail.”

See: Boeing | Finmeccanica [PDF] | AgustaWestland | DoD Buzz | Lexington Institute.

April 20/10: V-22? Boeing and Bell Helicopter are reportedly considering a VV-22 tilt-rotor bid for the VXX competition.

The V-22 offers significant speed and range advantages, but there’s a reason the V-22 didn’t make the finals the first time. Massive downdrafts too strong for the White House lawns didn’t fit the RFP, and a low-ceilinged cabin design didn’t fit the idea of a President walking in without stooping. Not to mention continued jitters concerning its safety, though that can cut both ways as a political statement. DoD Buzz.

April 19/10: H-92. Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin team for VXX. This day, the 2 companies also jointly submit a response to the U.S. Navy’s VXX request for information, detailing how they would design and manufacture the next Marine One. The agreement has Sikorsky as the prime contractor, offering its H-92 Superhawk medium-lift helicopter, with Lockheed Martin as the major integrator of all required electronic subsystems.

In addition to the VXX teaming agreement, the firms also signed a Memorandum of Understanding to explore business opportunities involving “other Sikorsky programs” beyond VXX, or their existing 38-year partnership surrounding the US Navy’s SH-60/MH-60 Seahawk naval helicopters. Sikorsky | Lockheed Martin | Aviation Week Ares.

Feb 16/10: VXX. The USA releases a 27-page RFI for new “VXX” Presidential Vertical Lift Platform(s). Interested parties are asked to provide a 5-page response by March 3/10. The responses will be used to support a new analysis of alternatives, the first step toward a formal Request for Proposal.

One change is that VXX would feature at least 2 versions of the new helicopter: an executive model for VIP transport and a passenger-cargo variant for support. Total buy for both models will track closely with VH-71 plans, at 23-28 aircraft. FedBizOpps #VXX-RFI | Defense News.

“VXX” RFI

Oct 14/09: Politics. US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates sends a letter to Congress [PDF], in advance of House/Senate efforts to reconcile their defense bills into a single agreed budget. It includes the following excerpt:

“The conference bill should not provide funding for weapons that are not working or are no longer needed. To that end, the Department strongly objects to the House’s addition of $400 million to make operational five partially-completed VH-71 helicopters and appreciates that the Senate did not add funds [for the VH-71] to the President’s [budget] request. These helicopters currently have no mission equipment and would require in excess of $2 billion to complete and operate as Presidential helicopter. Even with these funds, they would not meet full operational requirements for the mission. The Department [of Defense] and the White House are conducting a requirements analysis, and the outcome of this effort should not be pre-empted. If the final bill were to include funds that continue the existing VH-71 program, or would pre-judge the plans to re-compete the Presidential helicopter program, I would recommend that the President veto the bill.”

FY 2009

VH-71 cancellation VH-71 MSB simulator
(click to view larger)

June 2/09: It’s official: Arrivederci, VH-71. A Pentagon press release states that:

“The Navy today announced that it will terminate the VH-71 System Development and Demonstration (SDD) program contract. The announcement follows a Department of Defense (DoD) decision to cancel the existing presidential helicopter replacement program… Navy contract N00019-05-C-0030 and associated work with Lockheed Martin Systems Integration – Owego (LMSI-O), Owego, N.Y., awarded Jan. 28, 2005, for the SDD of the VH-71 program, has been terminated for the convenience of the government. The under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics issued a VH-71 program acquisition decision memorandum on May 15, 2009, which directed the program be cancelled, to include both Increment 1 and Increment 2.”

VH-71 terminated

June 1/09: Arabian Aerospace quotes Sikorsky VP of Business Development Frank DiPasquale, who says that:

“We have worked very hard to establish the S-92 in a Head of State role in the Middle East and that has been a great success. The aircraft is performing that mission in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and in Saudi Arabia where the royal family is now flying in the S-92.”

May 21/09: What Next? One of the big problems with the new helicopters was the need to pack all of that communications gear, into a helicopter that can fly nearly 300km without refueling to an emergency airbase at Andrews AFB or Camp David, while remaining small enough to avoid damaging the White House lawn.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told the defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee that the Pentagon is now considering a request for 2 different helicopter types: one for routine shuttle trips, and a more capable escape aircraft designed for use in emergencies. This would allow a much lower-budget fleet of standard helicopters for everyday use, and a much smaller fleet built on a larger design that didn’t have to care about the White House lawn.

May 15/09: Stop work. The VH-71 program receives a stop work order from the Pentagon. Another 225 layoffs are expected at Lockheed Martin’s Owego, NY facility before the end of the month.

The 5 production and 4 test aircraft would still be the property of the US Navy, but many have not had their advanced systems integrated yet. It will be up to the US Navy to decide what to do with the helicopters.

The US Navy said that the $85 million 2010 budget request includes money to cover termination costs, government efforts to develop options for a replacement program, and service life extensions for the current presidential helicopter fleet. Some estimates place termination costs as high as $500 million, but that figure remains to be negotiated between Lockheed Martin and the federal government. Elmira Star Gazette | Ithaca Journal | NY Times op-ed | Wall Street Journal on local impacts | WICZ Fox 40 news | bNet | The Hill magazine | Wall Street Journal on cancellation.

April 28/09: Testing. The 9th and final (4 test + 5 pilot production) VH-71 to be built under “Increment 1” of the US Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program leaves AgustaWestland’s Yeovil, UK facility. It will be sent to the United States for completion by prime contractor Lockheed Martin. AgustaWestland release.

April 28/09: Politics. In a Reuters interview, AgustaWestland CEO Giuseppe Orsi takes issue with the Pentagon’s characterization of the VH-71 Increment 1 helicopters’ expected lifespan. Orsi says that even with the additional armor and modifications, the new VH-71 helicopters are certifiable for a minimum 10,000 flight hours of operation, or about 30 years of service in the Presidential fleet. The firm has agreed to tests with the US Navy to verify that performance.

Those tests may be important, because Orsi also backed a compromise plan being floated in Congress. It would revert to the original budget of $6.8 billion, in exchange for sticking to the VH-71 Increment 1 specifications. Note the March 17/08 entry, below, which explains that a number of original requirements were deferred from Increment 1 to improve affordability.

Since the Increment 2 specifications are not realistic or cost-effective, the question going forward must be which specifications can be cut, even if the competition is re-started. The question is whether the Increment 1 helicopters can serve for the required length of time, and are close enough to the reduced requirements, to justify continuation of the program. The alternative involves termination costs that could run to $200 million, in exchange for a renewed competition and a helicopter that offers a more exact match for the new requirements. Reuters | New York Times.

April 27/09: Layoffs. Lockheed Martin Corp. announces an initial round of 225 job cuts at its Owego, NY plant, with further layoffs expected. About 800 of the plant’s 4,000 workers are dedicated to the VH-71 program, and others have been working on an EH101 derivative for the USAF’s CSAR-X search and rescue competition. AP, via Forbes.

April 6/09: Stop. In an unusual move, American Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announces his FY 2010 budget recommendations to the President. He recommends full cancellation of the VH-71 program, on the grounds that the Increment 2 helicopters will cost more than an Air Force One 747, and “Increment One helicopters do not meet requirements and are estimated to have only a five- to 10-year useful life.”

New options for the future Presidential helicopter are to be developed for a replacement program that’s expected to begin in FY 2011.

March 5/09: Bloomberg reports that the latest estimate and 15-page report, prepared for congressional defense committees, revises the VH-71’s program cost from $11.2 billion to $13 billion – 113% above the original baseline of $6.1 billion. Based on 28 helicopters built, the allocated R&D and purchase cost would be $464.3 million per helicopter.

The report adds that instead of having the first 5 helicopters ready no earlier than September 2010, there would be a delay of 18 months (April 2012), and that the upgraded version with more sophisticated communications and the most advanced defenses would slip from December 2017 – December 2019.

The US Navy would not confirm these changes or comment, because Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has yet to provide a formal certification of cost and justification for the program to Congress, per the Nunn-McCurdy legislation’s review process. Bloomberg News | Congressional Quarterly | Washington Post | Ithaca Journal | Britain’s The Independent discusses the effect in Britain.

Costs rise again

Feb 27/09: Hacked. P2P Intelligence firm Tiversa claims that in Oct/Nov 2008, it traced a file that contains details regarding the VH-60N Presidential Helicopter’s CAAS avionics architecture, and some program financial data, on public-access peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing networks. On Feb 25/09, the file was found on the IP address of an Iranian computer.

The CAAS avionics architecture is slated for use in the VH-71 as well. Read “P2P Network Leaks: The VH-60N Helicopter” for full treatment of this breach, its implications, and the underlying trend at work.

Feb 23/09: Arrivederci? Disparaging comments at the White House fiscal summit by President Obama, and by his Republican Party opponent Sen. John McCain, cast doubt on the VH-71 program’s future. From The Australian’s report :

“Yesterday Mr Obama, as if playing both speaker and leader in the Westminster style, first called on Senator McCain in this version of question time.

“Thank you for doing this,” said Senator McCain, “your helicopter is now going to cost as much as Air Force One. I don’t think that there’s any more graphic demonstration of how good ideas have cost taxpayers an enormous amount of money”.

“I’ve already talked to (Secretary of Defence Robert) Gates about a thorough review of the helicopter situation,” he said.

“The helicopter I have now seems perfectly adequate to me,” he said, generating laughs before adding “of course, I’ve never had a helicopter before … maybe I’ve been deprived and I didn’t know it.”

He said it was an example of the “procurement process gone amok. And we’re going to have to fix it”.

Those comments by both men were widely reported, and triggered a drop in Finmeccanica’s share price. AgustaWestland USA chief executive Stephen C Moss stated his belief that the program will go forward, with changes, and pointed out that in 63 cases of Nunn-McCurdy cost overruns, only 2 programs have been canceled. Changes have been proposed to the VH-71, including reducing the number of helicopters, and removing some of the troublesome requirements. Other proposed changes include putting the program up for rebid, building new VH-3s with updated communications, or simply canceling the program without replacement.

In the current economic environment, more extreme solutions become more likely. Given that the existing VH-3/ VH-60 fleet is not suffering from flying hour fatigue, these comments from Obama and McCain will make the required Nunn-McCurdy justifications to Congress very problematic. See also: Washington Post | CNN Money with Moss statement | MSNBC re: Connecticut delegation’s rebid push | The Hill | AP | Helciopter Association International | Flight International | WIRED Danger Room.

Jan 29/09: Cost breach. The US Navy announces that the VH-71 program is more than 50% over budget, triggering “Nunn-McCurdy” legislative provisions and stopping work on development of the VH-71’s Increment 2 design.

Under those provisions, the Defense Department either must end the program, or certify that it is essential for national security, that the new unit costs are reasonable, that management structure can control future growth, and that no substitutes exist that provide equal or greater military capability at less cost. Reuters, via Forbes.

Nov 26/08: SDD. Another $500 million in System Development and Demonstration (SDD) funds to Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY. Work on this modification to the existing cost-plus-award-fee contract (N00019-05-C-0030) will be performed in Patuxent River, MD (28%); Owego, NY (26%); Yeovil, UK (20%); Cascina Costa, Italy (15%); Rolling Meadows, IL (3%); Lynn, MA (3%); Clifton, NJ (2%); Denton, TX (1%); Grand Rapids, MI (1%); and Rancho Santa Margarita, CA (1%), and is expected to be complete in December 2014.

Oct 9/08: SDD. Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY receives a $173 million modification, raising the January 2005 cost plus award fee contract (N00019-05-C-0030) for the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) of the VH-71 Presidential Helicopter.

Work will be performed in Patuxent River, MD (28%); Owego, NY (26%); Yeovil, United Kingdom (20%); Cascina Costa, Italy (15%); Rolling Meadows, IL (3%); Lynn, MA (3%); Clifton, NJ (2%); Denton, TX (1%); Grand Rapids, MI (1%); and Rancho Santa Margarita, CA (1%), and is expected to be complete in September 2011.

FY 2008

Price inflation; pilot helo. VH-71 Demonstrator
(click to view full)

Sept 22/08: Testing. The first operational pilot production helicopter (PP-1) completes its maiden flight at AgustaWestland’s facility in Yeovil, England. Lockheed Martin release.

March 14/08: New deal. The Pentagon reaches an agreement with the White House re: the VH-71 program, and confirms that the cost of the 28 helicopter program has jumped to $11.2 billion – from $6.1 billion when the contract was signed in 2005. Increment 1 rose from $2.3 billion to $3.7 billion, and Increment 2 jumped from $4.5 billion to $7.5 billion. The price of the Increment 2 helicopters would be over $325 million each – comparable to the current Air Force One 747 fleet, even when adjusted for inflation since 1990.

The original VH-71 program planned to rely on an existing commercial helicopter and make modest modifications, but Pentagon acquisition chief John Young has now acknowledged that no existing medium-lift helicopter can meet all of the requirements crammed into VH-71 Increment 2:

“The Navy and industry team did not clearly realize the full implications of the White House requirements… These issues were further complicated by the enforcement of Navy certification requirements on a helicopter designed to commercial aviation standards.”

That’s a rather startling admission. Now, the Navy and industry teams are will complete a “substantial” redesign of the EH-101 base helicopter to meet Increment 2 requirements. The Day Paper, CT | Aviation Week | Defense News

New deal, costs rise

Feb 27/08: Testing. Test Vehicle 3 makes its initial flight in Yeovil, England marking the 4th program helicopter to enter flight test. TV-3 will be the first vehicle tested that is outfitted with mission systems, which means it will be able to validate in-flight performance data for the helicopter’s equipment, instead of relying on lab tests.

TV-3 is due to arrive at the Presidential Helicopter Support Facility here on March 17/08 and will then travel to Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY for final assembly and mission systems integration. TV-3 will join TV-1, TV-2 and TV-5, which have accumulated more than 650 total hours of flight test so far. One additional test vehicle is scheduled for flight testing and missionization after TV-3, before the initial lot of production aircraft are delivered to Patuxent River. NAVAIR release | Flight International.

Jan 19/08: VH-71 stays. Defense Technology International reports that After considering alternatives to the Lockheed Martin VH-71 presidential helicopter – including upgrading the Sikorsky H-3s – the Navy has reportedly decided to stick with the US101 aircraft and fund an additional $1 billion in modifications in “Increment 2,” on top of the program’s initial $6.1 billion price tag, on the grounds that other alternatives wouldn’t be any better.

DTI reports that White House and Navy requirements are essentially turning the helicopter into another “Air Force One” (Presidential 747), which involves hundreds of specifications not included at the program’s outset. In addition to extra electronics, the changing specifications will include structural modifications to the US101 helicopter, in order to extend its range beyond what the current airframes can deliver.

Adding hundreds of new performance requirements in mid-stride does make successful program delivery very difficult – and being on that ride has cost Lockheed Martin before, during evaluations of another modified US101 for the $10-15 billion CSAR-X combat search and rescue helicopter.

Jan 10/08: Testing. The first 2 VH-71 Increment 1 helicopters (TV-2 and TV-5) have entered the flight test phase with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD. They are the first of 4 Increment 1 test aircraft; TV-3 and TV-4, will undergo additional assembly and missionization at Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY, before being transferred to NAS Patuxent River in 2008 for testing. NAVAIR release.

Jan 3/08: Cancellation? Inside Defense reports that the VH-71 program may face significant cuts:

“The fate of the VH-71 presidential helicopter program is hanging in the balance as senior defense officials privately weigh the elimination of the bulk of the program, according to sources tracking the issue inside and outside the Pentagon…”

Dec 13/07: Cancellation? Gannett’s Marine Corps Times reports that cost increases and schedule problems, “driven in part by nearly 2,000 requirement changes,” (vid. April 2007 entry) forced a meeting with the White House Military Office to discuss the program’s fate.

Rumors of cancellation began shortly after that, though the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Aviation Programs later said that there “has been no decision to terminate the program… We’re continuing to look at all the options. We’ve looked at almost every conceivable option…”

Nov 14/07: Industrial. Lockheed Martin announces that its VH-71 Systems Integration Lab (SIL) is now operational at the Navy’s Presidential Helicopter Support Facility at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, in preparation for the arrival of the first aircraft built for the VH-71 program. The new SIL at Patuxent River will allow engineers to test VH-71 avionics and mission systems prior to installation aboard the aircraft – for instance, ensuring that the President can communicate with several government agencies simultaneously. It consists of test benches to evaluate individual subsystems currently in development. The SIL at Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY, which became operational in August 2007, includes a master systems bench full-scale functional mockup of the VH-71 cockpit and cabin that allows the Navy-Lockheed team to run mission scenarios of the final integrated systems.

Test Vehicle 2 (TV-2) is scheduled to arrive at Patuxent River in mid-November 2007 to commence a comprehensive testing program. Another 3 test vehicles are scheduled for delivery to the U.S. this winter, followed by 5 production aircraft during 2008. Capt. Don Gaddis, the U.S. Navy’s Presidential Helicopters program manager, said that:

“A Systems Integration Lab at the Presidential Helicopter Support Facility will enable the Marine Corps to test the integrated systems more quickly during the flight test phase… Having this on-site test capability is critical to meeting our requirements.”

FY 2006 – 2007

Maiden test flight, full flight. VH-71 1st flight
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July 3/07: Testing. The 1st VH-71 pilot production helicopter makes its maiden flight at AgustaWestland’s facility in Yeovil, UK. Before that TV2 model is delivered to the test facility in Patuxent River, MD in fall 2007 for structural testing, the aircraft will complete initial shake-down flying and embark on flight trials to test the integrated avionics systems and aircraft systems. Lockheed Martin release | GE release.

April 2007: 2,000 changes? A systems requirements review reveals that nearly 2,000 design changes will be needed to meet Pentagon requirements for the VH-71 Increment 2 model – the first model intended to offer the President full command and control capability while in flight. The changes reportedly included a new tail, transmission and rotor blades. Source.

Oct 24/06: Sub-contractors. GE Aviation officially opens its new Presidential Helicopter engine facility at the Lynn, Massachusetts, plant. The dedicated area in Lynn Product Development & Delivery will house the assembly and shipment operations of CT7-8E and CT7-8CE1 engines for the next-generation “Marine One” helicopter that will be used by the President of the United States.

Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY awarded GE a $65-million contract to provide CT7-8E and CT7-8CE1 engines for use during the system development & demonstration (SDD) phase of the Presidential Helicopter Replacement program. GE Aviation release.

June 12/06: Industrial Lockheed Martin formally opens the VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Integration Facility. The new 176,000-square-foot facility features aircraft integration hangars, program management and engineering office space, systems integration laboratories, aircraft parts storage, and maintenance and helicopter paint facilities. The complex also includes a new helicopter flight operations area. Lockheed Martin release.

October 2005: First test flight of the VH-71.

1st test flight

FY 2003-05

VXX/US101 dubbed VH-71A US101, 1st test flight
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July 7/05: VH-71. The next generation US presidential helicopter sheds its generic “VXX” placeholder and contractor’s “US101” moniker and received its mission design series designator of “VH-71A.” A popular name for the VH-71A is still under consideration. NAVAIR release.

VH-71 designation

May 19/05: Politics. The House Armed Service Panel approves the FY 2006 defense appropriations bill, including the Presidential helicopter. Money for the project now is included in the House version of the Defense Appropriations bill. Congressional maneuvering had left this result in some doubt, along with about 750 jobs at the Lockheed Martin Systems Integration plant in Owego, NY. Government Executive.

April 2005: Politics. Sikorsky’s home-state Sen. Christopher Dodd [D-CT] inserts an amendment to a State Department authorization bill that would have prohibited any European companies in “countries that do business with terrorist-sponsoring states” from producing components of the US101 helicopter. The amendment was crafted to target AgustaWestland, but Lockheed Martin home-state Sen. Chuck Schumer’s [D-NY] objections to the amendment kill it. Towanda, PA Daily and Sunday Review

Jan 28/05: Winner! U.S. Navy NAVAIR selects the US101 as the new “Marine One” helicopter for the President of the United States, issuing a $1.7 billion System Design & Development (SDD) contract.

The US101 is a derivative of AgustaWestland’s 3-engine EH101. The reason for such a large contract is that the helicopter may be a tested platform, but there’s a lot of gear to position, integrate, and test, including expensive propositions like electronic interference testing. Team US101 release | Lockheed Martin release.

US101 wins, gets SDD contract

Dec 1/03: US101. The US101 Team competing to provide the president of the United States with a new Marine One helicopter fleet selects GE Aircraft Engines (GEAE) to supply American-made CT7-8E engines for the US101 Presidential helicopter. At more than 2,500 shaft horsepower, the CT7-8E is one of the newest and most powerful derivative of GEAE’s successful T700/CT7 family of helicopter engines. Lockheed Martin release.

Appendix A: VH-71 – The Plan, and the Problems Air Force One
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Given the immense complexity of the electronics involved, the plan was for VH-71 deliveries to involve 2 separate “increments” that separated the full electronics suite from the airframe and basic functions.

In the Increment 1 phase, 4 test aircraft and 5 pilot production VH-71 aircraft were to be delivered through 2009. Increment 1 would answer the urgent need for an air system with enhanced performance over existing VH helicopters, but would not include many of the desired technologies.

Increment 2 was supposed to see a significant increase in helicopter performance, and communications, for the operational helicopters that would remain for many years as America’s Presidential fleet.

According to the Pentagon’s Selected Acquisition Reports, these 28 VH-71 aircraft were initially expected to cost a total of of $6.145 billion, including both R&D and production. Even that worked out to about $219.5 million per helicopter, a sum that could purchase a new civilian 747 jumbo jet.

Tier one of the program’s problems began when it rushed the schedule.

The original schedule for the Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program, known as VXX, had called for an initial operating capability in 2014. That schedule was accelerated by 4 years after the 9/11 attacks, even though it had taken several years to award the contract. Based on the contract schedule, the first US101 that was equipped to transport the President was expected to be available in 2009. The entire fleet of 28 US101s was scheduled for delivered to the Marine One squadron by late 2015.

Tier 2 of the program’s problems are a common refrain in US Navy acquisition programs: a long stream of requirements changes mid-process, creating technical specifications that current technologies cannot meet, with production starting long before a final design is agreed upon. In this case, however, many of the changes were driven by White House staff, not by the Navy.

By March 2008, the Pentagon confirmed a new figure of $11.2 billion, or $400 million per helicopter – comparable to a new buy of the USAF’s VC-25 “Air Force One” 747s. Their next SAR was forced to incorporate that jump, and report the VH-71 program as being in breach of American Nunn-McCurdy regulations. Those laws require cost increases of over 25% to re-justify the program to Congress. That proved to be a very difficult exercise, amidst the meltdown of the global financial system.

VXX 1.0 – Team Lockheed’s “US101” US101 Demonstrator
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This competition had some unique requirements, including rotor wash and helicopter weight that had to avoid being too hard on the White House landscaping. Those requirements had reportedly washed out Bell Textron and Boeing’s V-22 tilt-rotor, which meets a number of the program’s challenging range requirements and offers speed advantages. Aside from its downwash effect on the local flora, the Osprey also had a very low-ceilinged cabin and safety questions, and was never seriously considered for presidential use. Bell Helicopter joined Lockheed’s US101 team.

In 2005, after a long competition, a modified AgustaWestland EH101 beat out Sikorsky’s smaller S-92, which already operates as a head-of-state helicopter in other countries. Team US101 lead Lockheed Martin received a $1.7 billion contract from the Navy for the VH-71 Marine One program’s systems development and demonstration phase.

Team US101 was led by Lockheed Martin as system integrator. AgustaWestlandBell, a joint venture between AgustaWestland and Bell Helicopter Textron, was the principal American subcontractor to Lockheed Martin. Despite being a subcontractor, they would have responsibility for the basic helicopter design, production build, and basic air vehicle support.

While most European EH101s use a Rolls Royce/ Turbomeca RTM322 engine, The VH-71/US101s will be powered by 3 of GE’s CT7-8E and CT7-8CE1 engines, derived from the T700 series that powers many US military helicopters. The CT7-8 delivers 2,520 shp at sea level, and subsequent models were expected to surpass that.

Other key suppliers included ITT, Northrop Grumman, Kaman Aerospace, and Palomar Products. Aircraft final assembly will be by Bell Helicopter in Amarillo, TX, with mission equipment installation and final integration by Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in NY.

New engines, and a rotor downwash that wouldn’t mess the flowers, were only the beginning of the changes to the basic airframe and systems. Another key modification for the new US101 a 6-foot-tall main cabin airstair door, instead of the shorter opening on regular EH101s. Why? It makes for better TV. The taller door matches the height of the cabin, and so the President needs only a tip of the head to get into Marine One, instead of having to duck down.

The VH-71 would retain the EH101’s active control system, which cancels out rotor and transmission vibration to create an airliner-like ride. Sound-absorbing material was also installed throughout, to provide a better work environment. All this would be present in the Initial Increment 1 helicopters.

Increment 2 would add other technical features, including head-up displays in the cockpit, a more robust tail rotor design, a higher power gearbox, slightly redesigned rotor blades for better flight characteristics, and higher performance engines.

The Presidential helicopters’ most important technologies, however, involved an array of EMP (Electro Magnetic Pulse, created by nuclear blasts) resistant communications systems. While VH-71 Increment 1 helicopters would have limited capabilities in this regard, the full production VH-71 Increment 2 birds were expected to feature a wide array of new capabilities, allowing the President of the United States to work while in transit, and exercise command while en route to longer-term crisis transportation. From a temporary transport with some communications capabilities, Marine One was morphing into a platform that began to resemble the USA’s “Air Force One” VC-25s/ 747s.

In VH-71 Increment 2 helicopters, the 4th aircrew member would operate an elaborate, state-of-the-art, open architecture communications suite providing secure access to the White House communications network, along with technical enhancements designed to give the President full command and control capability while in flight.

Unfortunately, advanced EMP-resistant systems of this type are expensive, proprietary, inherently bulky, and draw a lot of power when aggregated together. In a 747, that isn’t a show-stopping problem. It’s a serious engineering problem in a very confined space, however, and also creates weight issues that will bite especially hard with a less-efficient helicopter aircraft. They bite even harder if that helicopter must also have truly unusual range, something that’s rather difficult to do if it’s loaded to the gills with gear, power generators, and other weight-creating equipment.

The 1st flight of a VH-71 pilot production helicopter took place in Yeovil, England on July 3/07.

In March 2008, Pentagon acquisition chief John Young acknowledged that no existing medium-lift helicopter could meet all of the requirements crammed into VH-71 Increment 2, adding the startling admission that “The Navy and industry team did not clearly realize the full implications of the White House requirements…” Following a program reorganization, the Navy and industry teams worked to complete a “substantial” redesign of the EH-101 helicopter to meet those Increment 2 requirements. It was this redesign that drove costs so high, as the helicopter was required to carry tons of extra gear and up to 15 passengers, while flying farther than current VH-3 and VH60 helicopters.

No problem is insoluble, if enough dollars and engineering resources are applied. Projects can and will be killed, however, if those dollars and resources climb too high. In the end, that’s what happened to the US101.

Additional Readings Background: Helicopters & Program

• FBO.gov – Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program (VXX). Solicitation Number: N00019-13-R-0060.

• AgustaWestland – AW101

• Bell Textron – The Bell-Boeing V-22. Didn’t contend in either phase, but VH-22s are becoming HMX-1 Squadron’s associated utility platform, carrying cargo and VIPs other than the President. They’ll eventually supplant the VH-60s.

• Sikorsky – S-92 Superhawk

• GE – CT7-8E and CT7-8CE1. This engine also equips the S-92 Superhawk, and Spanish NH90 helicopters. GE CT7-6 variants power Italian EH101s.

• Lockheed Martin Code One Magazine (Q4 2004) – Landing on the Lawn

Background: Legacy Helicopters

• Wikipedia – VH-71 Kestrel. They were eventually sold to Canada as spare parts for the CH-149 (AW101) search and rescue fleet.

• Lockheed Martin, via WayBack – US101. They’re now part of Sikorsky’s S-92 team.

• Team US101, via WayBack. This was Lockheed Martin’s collaboration with AgustaWestland, for the VH-71.

• GlobalSecurity.org – VH-60 Marine-1

• GlobalSecurity.org – VH-3D Marine-1

Official Reports

• US GAO (Sept 6/13, #GAO-13-826R) – Department of Defense’s Waiver of Competitive Prototyping Requirement for the VXX Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program

• US GAO (Feb 27/12, GAO-12-381R) – Effort Delayed as DOD Adopts New Approach to Balance Requirements, Costs, and Schedule. This is about VXX.

• US GAO (March 25/11, GAO-11-380R) – Application of Lessons Learned and Best Practices in the Presidential Helicopter Program

• Congressional Research Service (Dec 2009) – VH-71/VXX Presidential Helicopter Program: Background and Issues for Congress

News & Views

• Defense News (Feb 7/05) – Lessons of US101 [PDF format]

• IEEE Internet Computing (6(1), February 2002), via – Mapping the Gnutella Network: Properties of Large-Scale Peer-to-Peer Systems and Implications for System Design [PDF]. Explains the system behind the VH-60N avionics leak.

• US Navy, via GlobalSecurity (November 2001, N88-NTSP-A-50-0008/A) – Navy Training System Plan for the VH-60N [PDF]

Cubic Global Defense has been contracted by the US Naval Air Warfare Centre to support aviation training for the US Marine Corps (USMC).

Lockheed Martin and Hellenic Aerospace Industry (HAI) have officially launched the Hellenic Navy’s P-3B Orion maritime patrol aircraft modernisation and upgrade programme.

The Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) Canberra-class landing helicopter dock ship HMAS Canberra (L02) has successfully received the US Navy’s landing craft, air cushion (LCAC) within its internal well dock for the first time.