Defence`s Feeds

EVENT Martin Schulz's recent bid for the German chancellorship slightly increases the possibility of an SPD-led centre-left government following the general election in September 2017. On 29 January, the centre-left Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands: SPD) nominated

Communications and defence electronics company Harris Corporation published its second quarter results on 2 February, showing a 2% fall in organic revenue. Sales, adjusted to take account of the company's recent divestitures, totalled USD1.7 billion in the quarter. Operating income also fell to

German firearms manufacturer Heckler & Koch has unveiled a modular rifle, the HK433, chambered in 5.56x45 mm. It will be proposed to the Bundeswehr as a replacement for the currently issued G36 rifle. This is the fourth rifle family being offered by the Oberndorf-based manufacturer after the

Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) unveiled its ADA anti-GPS jamming system on 31 January, saying it recently won an Israeli Ministry of Defense contract to integrate into one of the "main platforms" of the Israeli Air Force (IAF). It added that the ADA system has already been integrated

Indian company Tata Power has acquired the military sensor business activities of another Tata firm Nelco, it was announced on 2 February. In a filing to the Bombay Stock Exchange Tata Power said that it has now "completed formalities" for the acquisition after entering an agreement to

The keel of the US Navy's (USN's) third and final Zumwalt-class destroyer, the future USS Lyndon B Johnson (DDG 1002), was laid on 30 January at General Dynamics-Bath Iron Works shipyard in Bath, Maine. Captain Kevin Smith, the DDG 1000 program manager, said in a statement that the future vessel

Americas

• The Canadian government has commenced talks with the Pentagon over their planned purchase of 18 F/A-18 Super Hornet fighters, with Ottawa requesting first deliveries to commence in 2019. Data received from the Department of National Defense suggests that the acquisition will cost between $5 and $7 billion over the lifetime of the aircraft. Canadian military officials were in St. Louis two weeks ago to visit the Boeing production line, examining how they can customize their aircraft.

• Raytheon has been awarded a $202 million foreign military sales contract to provide engineering services for international operators of the Patriot weapon system. US allies set to receive the support include Germany, Israel, South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Spain, Taiwan and the Netherlands, with work to be performed in various locations and due to be completed by the end of January 2018. The company’s bid was the only one received.

• Lockheed Martin will continue development of services for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system elements following the award of a $345.5 million Missile Defense Agency (MDA) contract modification. Work to be carried out under the agreement includes the continuation of flight and ground tests of the system, and responsive support to warfighter requirements to sustain the Ballistic Missile Defense System throughout the acquisition life cycle. Used primarily by the US Army, THAAD has also been procured by the UAE, Oman and South Korea.

Middle East & North Africa

• With Turkey’s TAI and BAE Systems continuing with their development of Turkey’s TF-X fighter, there have been some concerns about how the program will develop in relation to technology transfers. Ankara had initially insisted on a full know-how and technology transfer during the program, however the full scope of these agreements have yet to be clarified and could be met with severe disagreements. In response to the prospect that they won’t get full transfer demanded, Turkish officials have made clear that they are willing to negotiate the TF-X with Airbus if at any point during contract talks it faces a deadlock with BAE Systems.

• While a military C-130 aircraft’s primary function is to transport  – troops, cargo, medivacs – a model operated by the Pakistan Air Force was recently utilized to deliver a special cargo to the Emir of Qatar. According to a letter reported in local Pakistani media, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sent the gift of a “beautiful horse,” to the Gulf monarch on February 1. Let’s hope the cleaning isn’t too much of a night-mare for the ground crews.

Europe

• The German military will move ahead with replacing their aging short-range air defense systems (SHORAD), following the discovery of a growing capability gap in Europe and the inability to defend against the use of swarms of unmanned aircraft or drones. Initial funding for the program is believed to lie just under $500 million, with a further $2.15 billion to be made available at a later phase. Procurement decisions on the new short-range air defense equipment are not expected until at least 2018, but the ministry could add some 20 million euros to the defense budget this year to fund initial work on the program.

Asia Pacific

• US Congress has been notified of the potential foreign military sales (FMS) for Sidewinder and Maverick air-to-air missiles to South Korea. The two contracts include the provision of 60 AIM-9X Block II and 89 AGM-65G-2 missiles, alongside required containers, spares and missile support. The combined value of both contracts amounts to $140 million with Raytheon acting as the principal contractor. News of the sale’s clearance coincides with US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis’ first visit to South Korea as part of an initiative to assure South Korea and Japan that the Trump Administration is committed to their security. During his election campaign, President Trump suggested that South Korea was not paying enough for the US’ presence on the peninsula.

• Negotiations between the Japanese government, Pentagon, and Lockheed Martin have secured a $100 million reduction in Tokyo’s bill for its participation in the F-35 JSF program. While the news comes shortly after Lockheed Martin slashed $600 million from the next round of F-35 production, defense analysts have downplayed the news of those cuts, saying the discount hailed by Trump was in line with what had been flagged by Lockheed for months and would apply to other countries committed to the program. According to Reuters, four sources confirmed that Japan had further trimmed the price for its latest order, largely on ground support costs such as parts, logistics and technical assistance.

Today’s Video

• US Micro Drones Launched by from 3 F/A-18 Super Hornets.: PERDIX + LOCUST:

The John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) announced that it awarded Metron Aviation one of three prime contracts under the Transportation Planning, Measurement, Modeling and Assessment (TPMMA) project.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

EDA’s continued outreach to industry,  which aims to enhance defence industry interaction and cooperation on defence related REACH issues, took another productive step forward on January 25th. The EDA, the EDA REACH Task Force (comprised of Member States REACH experts) and defence industry representatives gathered to exchange views on the topic of Ammunition Classification under REACH. Discussions focused on specific complex ammunition categories, such as smoke ammunition, and benefited from industry’s substantial experience and past work in this field.

 The meeting was hosted by Nexter Munitions at their industrial facilities in Bourges, France. The agenda for the day included live demonstrations and controlled use of selected types of ammunitions at Nexter Munitions’ testing facilities, providing an in-depth insight into the design of ammunitions as well as the functioning and operating principles of explosives and propellants. 

The discussions helped in establishing a common understanding between governmental and industrial experts on the complexities of specific categories of ammunition and in identifying important factors for their classification under REACH, providing a solid basis for further EDA work in this area.  Representatives from  Nexter Munitions, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), Etienne Lacroix Group, Rheinmetall Waffe Munition and BAE Systems Land also participated in the meeting.

The following day (26 January 2017), the EDA REACH Task Force discussions continued in a Member States only format, at the French Ministry of Defence Training Centre in Bourges, where various types of munitions mock-ups were made available, in view of further elaboration on the design and function of specific categories of ammunition. 

EDA’s work on Ammunition Classification under REACH, aims to build a common understanding of the regulatory provisions and to exchange best practices. An overall list of ammunition types used by Member States (MoDs) together with an assessment of the classification of each type under REACH, using prior related guidance by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) as reference, is currently under examination. 

The targeted outcome of this project is to establish a potential Member States’ common position, which could also serve as a supportive reference for the defence industry (ammunition manufacturers), as well as the Commission and ECHA, when classifying specific ammunition categories under REACH, in the future.
 

More information:

• EDA REACH Project page
• EDA Study on Impact of REACH and CLP Regulations on the Defence Sector

The second round of training conducted by the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med) has been launched for the Libyan Navy and Coast Guard.

The British Royal Navy's amphibious command ship HMS Albion has marked a major milestone in its capability upgrade, as its crew embarked onboard for the first time in nearly six years.

BAE Systems has been awarded a $51.3m contract to deliver maintenance and modernisation services for the US Navy's Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Roosevelt (DDG 80).

Americas

• A new signal processor for the AIM-120 air-to-air missile is being developed by Raytheon. Carried out under the Form Fit Function Refresh program (F3R), the work is aimed at ensuring the continuation of AMRAAM production well into the 2020s. While little else is currently known about the signal processor’s development work, the missile is capable of tracking targets in electronic warfare environments. Already carried on F-16, F-15, F/A-18, F-22, Typhoon, Gripen, Tornado and Harrier fighters, the AIM-120 is also cleared for use on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, making it the munition that has flown on more aircraft worldwide than any other air-to-air missile.

• The USAF has announced the completion of a series of upgrades on 446 Air Force and 10 Navy T-38C advanced trainer aircraft. Work carried out during the modernization saw the installation of a video data transfer system (VDTS) and speed break indicator switch (SBIS), giving pilots and the heads-up display a visual indicator of the speed brake position. The completion of the $50 million VDTS/SBIS program wrapped up its work in December 2016. Talons are expected to be in service until 2034, when they will be replaced by the next-gen T-X trainer.

• Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems have decided not to enter a bid in the upcoming $16 billion T-X trainer competition for the USAF. The official announcement comes days after Northrop CEO Wes Bush told analysts that the company was reassessing their bid and business case for the tender. A joint statement by Northrop and BAE stated that submitting a bid for the T-X Trainer contract “would not be in the best interest of the companies and their shareholders.” The only remaining interested parties are a clean-sheet design by Boeing/Saab and Lockheed Martin/Korea Aerospace Industries’ T-50A.

Middle East & North Africa

• Sales of F-16V fighters to Bahrain are likely to continue under US President Trump, according to Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Bob Corker. Estimated to be valued at $2.8 billion, the sale of 19 of the fighters had been put on hold under Barack Obama until the Gulf kingdom had addressed some human rights concerns against their non-violent opposition. Corker added that “I’m hoping the Bahrain deal is going to roll out without the restrictions,” indicating that the original conditions imposed by the Obama administration may be lifted. Like many nations in the Arab world, Bahrain faced a wave of protests during the 2011 “Arab Spring,” which was met with a brutal crackdown by the ruling King Hamad.

• Turkey’s plan to upgrade of a batch of 200 German- and US-made battle tanks has received five bids from local industry, including surprise bids from military electronics specialist Aselsan and missile maker Roketsan. The $500 million modernization plan to upgrade 40 M60A3, 40 Leopard II A4 and 120 M60T tanks will also see bids from armored vehicles manufacturers BMC, Otokar and FNSS. While the competition is structured to be a local battle, industry sources suggest that due to the advanced technology that will be involved in the program, most business in the contract may involve foreign suppliers. Bidding is expected to be finished by the end of the year.

Europe

• Poland has received a proposal from the Lockheed Martin-led team behind the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), as part of the drive to upgrade air defense capabilities under the Wisla program. MEADS, Israel’s David’s Sling, and a French consortium were initially considered alongside Raytheon’s Patriot system, though all but the Patriot were dismissed by Warsaw due to the fact that they were still in development. However, since the procurement process has dragged on, MEADS is much closer to the fielding stage and was therefore asked to submit a proposal on request from the Polish government, triggering a head-to-head between Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. The proposal includes a potential order for 16 systems and a plan to include a work-share agreement with Polish industry.

• Alongside long-term big-ticket procurement plans for new fighters, maritime-surveillance aircraft and submarine fleets, the Norwegian government is focusing efforts on stockpiling munitions, fuel and spare parts ahead of any potential conflict in the region. The hoarding comes as Oslo is concerned about potential shortages to the support equipment vital to the country’s missions both at home and abroad and will make funding available for these supplies, which also includes development of the Joint Strike Missile. Renewed investment in military procurements and upgrades by Scandinavian and Baltic governments comes amid growing tensions and uncertainty about potential conflicts that may stem from any aggression that may come from neighboring Russia.

Asia Pacific

• The Iranian government has confirmed that they have tested a new missile, but denied claims that the move was in breach of a UN Security Council resolution to curb nuclear development. In response to the test, the new US ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, condemned the move stating that the “United States is not naïve. We are not going to stand by. You will see us call them out as we said we would and you are also going to see us act accordingly.” While Tehran has conducted missile testing since the 2015 nuclear accords, it is the first during the Trump administration. Trump said in his election campaign that he would stop Iran’s missile program.

Today’s Video

MEADS capability notes:

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Since the EU adopted its Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2005, it has focused on forging closer ties with third countries in the fight against terrorism. Cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood in this field is particularly important. Every single country within this region is affected by terrorism to different degrees and terrorist attacks on European soil are increasingly linked with the Middle East and North Africa. The EU adopted a wide-ranging counter-terrorism approach in the South including actions that go beyond the strictly military and security interpretations of counter-terrorism. In line with the UN’s 4-pillar approach, the EU’s counter-terrorism measures can be broadly subdivided into four fields: (i) building state capacity (particularly in the areas of border control, criminal investigation and prosecution, and countering the financing of terrorism); (ii) strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights; (iii) fostering regional cooperation; and (iv) preventing and combating terrorism. This study outlines and contextualises current counter-terrorism activities in the region.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

ATLAS ELEKTRONIK GmbH has received an order from the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) for the modernisation of three minehunting vessels of the Frankenthal class (Type 332) in service wit…

On 6 February, the SEDE committee invites Herbert Salber, EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, EEAS, Natalie Sabanadze, Ambassador of Georgia to the EU and Amanda Paul, Senior Policy Analyst, European Policy Centre, Brussels, to discuss the new developments in the increasing Russian influence in the South Caucasus.
Further information
Draft agenda and meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The Taleban appear to have woken up to the importance of organisational symbols and their political meaning. Compared to how little they cared about their image during the 1990s and the initial years of the insurgency, the Taleban now project an increasing consciousness of their ‘brand’. This is seen in both their media and the actions of fighters and officials on the ground. Borhan Osman traces this change through one phenomenon – the Taleban’s use of their flag.

This piece is part of series looking at the Taleban in transition. Read previous pieces of this series: here, here, and here. This dispatch discusses the heightened importance that the use of the flag has gained among the Taleban as a possible indicator of the movement’s increased self-awareness of its political brand. It first describes the different fields in which the Taleban now assertively showcase their flag and then analyses the apparent reasons for this.  

The proliferation of the flag: from the Qatar office to the battlefield

One area where the Taleban’s sense of a political identity has become most visible is in the use of their flag, which has a white background inscribed with the shahadah, the Islamic statement of faith and sometimes, also, the movement’s official name, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The flag is now on display wherever there is a Taleban presence. This is in sharp contrast with the movement’s years of rule.

During the 1990s, the core of the emerging Taleban movement was drawn primarily from the students of village madrasas who had rarely had any exposure to concepts of protocol used by modern political organisations. Neither fighters or commanders wore uniforms or carried symbols of affiliation. Their clothing was that of any other man from the south ­– black turbans, worn by most men in provinces such as Uruzgan, and loose trousers with particularly long shirts, again normal for southern Pashtun village men. Former fighters recalled in conversations with the author how, on the frontlines, they would have been at risk of losing track of where their own territory ended and that of their enemies began had it not been for the fact that Northern Alliance forces were more distinctively clothed and had flags. The same attitude continued when the Taleban insurgency began around 2003. Until around 2009, as per the author’s observation, it was hard for a stranger visiting the countryside to tell government-controlled from Taleban-controlled territory, unless the Afghan national flag was flown on a government building or armed Talebs were physically in sight. Telling the two sides apart has now become much easier.

In hindsight, the opening of the formal Taleban office in Qatar in 2013 was a landmark moment. For the first time since their fall, the Taleban opened a formal office, in the Qatari capital Doha in June 2013; it was intended to become the movement’s first public face to the world. The office’s opening, with official Qatari hosting and United States endorsement, amounted to some kind of political recognition for the Taleban after they had fought for more than a decade against adversaries – the Afghan government and its foreign backers – who labelled them as mere malcontents and terrorists. The Taleban celebrated the opening of the office as a step in this direction and one towards victory. However, the Afghan government was furious at the way the office was presented to the world as that of some sort of ‘alternative government’ during the inauguration ceremony. At the heart of the dispute was the Taleban’s white flag and the office’s insignia which bore the inscription ‘the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the official name of the Taleban as a movement and its name for the country before it lost power.

Qatari officials, under pressure from Kabul and Washington, lowered the flag and removed the insignia. The Taleban officially closed the office in protest. Although the office has remained de facto open, with officials running their operations not so covertly, the movement’s drastic reaction underscored the value it attaches to its brands of identity, the flag and the name – given how closely it links these to its claim of legitimacy. The proliferation of the flag, however, continued, on the ground and virtually.

The first thing that catches a visitor’s eye when entering ‘Taleban territory’, these days, is their white flag. They are planted on landmarks, such as the rooftops of mosques, the public squares of villages and schools and along major travel routes. When insurgents capture new areas, no matter how small or large, one of the first things they do is mark it by planting their flag. According to the author’s observation and accounts by local residents, in places such as Wardak, Helmand and Ghazni, where the Taleban-controlled territory lies only a stone’s throw away from the bases of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the flags of the two conflicting parties fly almost side by side. At least that is how it looks from a distance.

Nowadays, according to consistent accounts from local residents living in Taleban-controlled areas in a number of provinces (for example, in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Paktika, Ghazni and Nangarhar), Taleban squads rarely travel without carrying a flag even when they consist of only a few motorbikes or cars. Since the Taleban have in recent years seized many ANSF vehicles, such as the police’s Ford Ranger pickup trucks, and the army’s Humvees, the main identifier distinguishing who is driving is the flag carried. The logos of the army and the police on these vehicles are left intact, but the official tricolour flag is replaced with the white one.

In military training and marches, fighters also carry out synchronised flag waving. They carry the flag when marching, fly it over the vehicle’s flagpole in motorcades and plant it in ground if they are at a training site. These practices are not only carried out in front of the camera for the sake of recording and broadcasting, but have increasingly become part of the movement’s routine exercises in the field.

White headbands modelled after the flag have also been trending among those conducting military exercises, and sometimes, among fighters on the frontline. In some cases, small hand-written banners are pinned on the outside of homes frequently visited by the Taleban (whose residents are usually sympathisers). These banners, as seen by the author or reported by locals in Logar and Ghazni in 2016, bear slogans such as, “Long live the Islamic Emirate,” and, “Long live Amir ul-Mumenin Haibatullah Akhunzada,” and are signed by the local commander.

The use of the flag is not confined to the military sphere. Since a Taleban shadow civil administration of sorts has emerged in recent years, the white flag has also entered the ‘civilian arena’. It is an unmistakable feature in meetings with community members, conferences with education officials and other ceremonies that Taleban organise. Whether fixed or makeshift, the offices where Taleban ‘civilian officers’ work are also decorated with the flag. According to accounts from local people and videos seen by AAN, it is also put on display on the sites of construction projects supervised by the Taleban and paid for with money gathered by the movement from local residents. In 2016, these included the paving of sub-district roads in Kunduz, Baghlan and Nangarhar. In addition to being put on display in fixed sites, the flag was also flown for ground-breaking and inauguration ceremonies. This routine use of the Taleban’s flag is a marked departure from the movement’s years of rule when flags were seen ­relatively rarely and even senior officials did not necessarily have them on their desks.

What does the surge in the use of flag mean?  

The proliferation of the flag in recent years can be explained on several grounds.

First, it (possibly) stems from a sense of increased need for unity among the Taleban. That need is obvious when comparing how the Taleban operate today to how they operated during the 1990s. When Taleban were in the privileged position of comprising the state and the ruling party, it was far easier for them to stick together than now, during an insurgency when they are chased as outlaws and rebels by both ANSF and foreign forces. The flag has emerged as a powerful political symbol and an effective tool for enhancing emotional unity in turbulent times.

Second, the flag is also useful for boosting the morale of fighters. This is especially relevant on the battlefield. The more a territory is dotted with flags, the more it persuades fighters of their influence. Such prolific marking of conquered territory is also more significant for the Taleban of today than in the 1990s. During their time in government, the Taleban were in control of most of Afghanistan and their dominance was taken for granted and, away from the frontlines, rarely challenged. Today, territorial control is scattered along very localised geographical lines. Areas remain contested between ANSF and Taleban often down to the district level. Perhaps nothing else can invoke a sense of the expanding presence of the movement as easily as displaying the flag.

Third, flying the flag is a way for the Taleban to try to demonstrate to the population that they, not the government, are the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan. The Taleban constantly frame their campaign as a struggle to restore Afghan sovereignty, rather than just pursuing territorial control. They consider the current government as having been illegally imposed by foreigners. Bringing back their flag is an unequivocal declaration that they are back as the ‘legitimate’ government. This is best manifested in their use of the flag in civil arenas (eg courts and construction works) that they believe signals local governance.

Fourth, the heightened emphasis on the flag arises from the Taleban’s attempts to project their legitimacy to a global audience. The movement craves political legitimacy and recognition not only among the local population, but also from a much broader audience. While it does not have an opportunity to display its flag on international platforms, with the exception of briefly when it opened its office in Qatar, it instead uses its media to showcase this primary indicator of its brand. Taleban media products are directed at various audiences, including foreign governments and nations. Be it visual media, such as films and photographs, or written materials such as magazines and website articles, the white flag is invariably exhibited in a prominent manner.

Conclusion 

The Taleban’s flag has been prominently displayed in their communications in recent years, in evident contrast with the movement’s years in rule, and in a bid to promote the movement’s political brand. The proliferation of the use of flag is based on various rationales and follows practical purposes in different contexts. In general, this is a pattern that, at a macro level, appears to manifest a notable increase in the Taleban’s self-awareness of its political identity as a distinct political force. It may also indicate the Taleban’s enhanced savviness in modern political practices and publicity techniques. This is a phenomenon that also expresses itself through several other trends as well, including the way the Taleban increasingly refer to their movement using its formal name, ‘the Islamic Emirate’, and themselves as ‘Emiratis’. It can also be seen in the concerted way a distinct political identity is promoted on Taleban media and. These other trends will be discussed in future dispatches as part of the Taleban in transition series.

 

Edited by Kate Clark, Thomas Ruttig and Sari Kouvo

 

 

The US Navy has started a new training programme for 2017, Full Speed Ahead, to enhance the navy's existing efforts to prevent destructive behaviours across its fleet.