Defence`s Feeds

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© kemaltaner / Fotolia

A long-running discussion on reforming the European Union’s budget gained momentum when the High-Level Group on Own Resources, led by former Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti, presented its report in January 2017. The report proposes simpler methods for funding the EU, to make it less reliant on direct contributions from Member States, and recommends that spending be focused on areas where the highest European added value can be achieved, now, for example migration and security emergencies.

The report, entitled ‘Future financing of the EU‘, lists and examines several options for new own resources, such as a reformed VAT-linked resource, an EU corporate tax, a financial transaction tax or taxes linked to efforts to fight climate change. It also proposes to explore other revenue sources stemming directly from the EU policies and programmes. The report will be taken into consideration by the European Commission and EU Member States when they work on the EU’s next long-term budget after 2020.

This note offers links to reports and commentaries from some major international think tanks and research institutes on the EU budget. Some papers also discuss whether the euro area should have its own, dedicated budget.

Brexit et budget de L’UE: Menace ou opportunité
Jacques Delors Institute, Bertelsmann Stiftung, January 2017

The future of the EU budget: Between dream and reality
Clingendael, December 2016

Reforming the EU’s Budget Revenue: The case for a visible VAT-based resource
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2016

The multiannual financial framework post-2020: Balancing political ambition and realism
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2016

The EU Budget’s mid-term review with its promising reform proposals the Commission lays the groundwork for the next, post-2020 budget
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2016

A sustainable finance plan for the EU
E3G, October 2016

What are the prerequisites for a euro-area fiscal capacity?
Bruegel, September 2016

Can the EU spend more green? The CAP and the environment in future EU budgets
Policy Network, September 2016

The Impact of Brexit on the EU budget: A non-catastrophic event
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2016

Is Horizon 2020 really more SME-friendly? A look at the figures
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2016

Keeping Europeans together: Assessing the state of EU cohesion
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2016

The potential and limitations of reforming the financing of the EU budget
Centre for European Policy Studies, CATT/UPPA, University of London July 2016

Brexiting yourself in the foot: Why Britain’s eurosceptic regions have most to lose from EU withdrawal
Centre for European Reform, June 2016

EU budgetary responses to the ‘Refugee Crisis’ reconfiguring the funding landscape
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2016

The budget of the European Union: A guide
Institute for Fiscal Studies, April 2016

The economic strategy of stateless nations in the framework of the European cohesion
Centre Maurits Coppieters, March 2016

Which fiscal union for the euro area?
Bruegel, February 2016

Federalising the Eurozone: Towards a true European budget
Institute Affaire Insternazionali, December 2015

Flexibility in the EU Budget: Are there limits?
Clingendael, December 2015

The political economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy: An imperfect storm
Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2015

Reforming the financing of the European Union: A proposal
Centre for European Economic Research, May 2015

Filed under: EU Financing / Budgetary Affairs, PUBLICATIONS Tagged: At a glance, EU budget, financing, Marcin Grajewski, what think tanks are thinking

Written by Monika Kiss,

© kantver / Fotolia

Information and communications technologies (ICT) play an increasingly important role in our professional and private lives, and digital competence is of growing importance for every individual. In the future, nearly all jobs will require digital skills.

However, European Commission figures show that two fifths of the EU workforce have little or no digital skills. In addition, despite continued high levels of unemployment, there could be 756 000 unfilled jobs in the European ICT sector by 2020.

This situation is even more challenging in certain geographical areas (such as south-eastern Europe), among socially vulnerable groups (in particular, the unemployed and the disabled) and the elderly. Despite favourable developments in the digital literacy of citizens, the digital gap needs to be narrowed further.

Digitalisation has several impacts on the labour market. On the one hand, new business models, products and machines create new jobs, while on the other hand, automation contributes to the elimination of jobs or their relocation to countries with lower labour costs. To remedy this situation, developing the digital skills of the EU workforce is essential.

Reducing the mismatch between the skills available and those demanded for the digital transformation of the economy has been a key EU-level priority over the past decade. For instance, a 2008 communication entitled ‘New skills for new jobs’ emphasised the increasing need for digital skills in the shift to a low-carbon economy. Furthermore, the 2010 Digital Agenda recognised the need for indicators to measure the extent of digital competence in the EU. This was implemented through the development of the Digital Competence Framework (‘Dig Comp’), enabling citizens to evaluate their digital skills, and the Digital Economy and Society Index (‘DESI’), summarising relevant indicators on Europe’s digital performance and tracking the evolution of EU Member States in the area of digital competitiveness.

The Grand Coalition for Digital Jobs, a multi-stakeholder partnership created in 2013, aims to facilitate collaboration between business and education providers, and between public and private actors, and has already created 60 functional pledges in 13 countries.

The 2016 New Skills Agenda aims to improve the quality of skills training and to make the skills acquired more visible and comparable from one country to another. Data on ICT skills should also be improved in order to better anticipate developments and help people make better career choices. Skills acquired in non-formal ways should also be assessed and validated.

Possible solutions developed in the EU Member States include encouraging and enabling people to acquire the skills needed, enhancing the labour mobility of digitally skilled people and promoting cross-border skills policies. Improving skills supply can be done by encouraging people to offer their skills on the labour market and by retaining skilled people in the labour market. Putting skills to effective use by creating better matches between skills offered and demanded, and by increasing the demand for high-level skills can also contribute to improving the situation.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Digital skills in the EU labour market‘.

Filed under: Economic and Social Policies, PUBLICATIONS Tagged: digital skills, employment and work, In-depth analysis, Information Technology, labour market, Monika Kiss

Assessment of the frequencies and polarisations behaviour of the Radar Cross Section (RCS) of moveable targets with an unpredictable trajectory and / or targets with unrepeatable behaviour is difficult using single frequency / polarisation measuremen…

On 25 January, the SEDE committee invites Brigadier General Daniel Grammatico, Director Operations at the EU Military Staff and Niklas Novaky, visiting researcher at VUB Brussels, to discuss the future of EU battlegroups. In the light of the recent push for more cooperation in the field of European security and defence, these experts will exchange views with the members of the committee on what can be done to make the battlegroups more operational and their actual use more likely.
Further information
Draft agenda and meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

On 25 January, the AFCO Committee and the SEDE Subcommittee will hold a joint meeting to discuss the amendments tabled to the own-initiative report 'Constitutional, legal and institutional implications of a common security and defence policy: possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty'. The report examines the legal possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty as well as the necessary institutional set-up to make CSDP more operational.
Further information
Draft agenda and meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Written by Krisztina Binder (3rd edition),

© boldg / Fotolia`

Since 2011, Jordan’s economy has suffered from the negative spill-overs of the on-going regional conflicts and the Syrian refugee crisis, weakening the country’s fiscal and external financing position. In line with the EU’s objective to support the stability and development of Jordan’s economy, the European Commission has presented a proposal to grant the country a second package of macro-financial assistance (MFA). Amounting to a maximum of €200 million, the assistance would help the country cover a part of its external financing needs. The first MFA package, worth €180 million, was approved in 2013 and fully disbursed in 2015. In addition to the significant resources mobilised by the multilateral and bilateral donors, this second MFA, adopted in December 2016, will, by strengthening the economy, contribute to Jordan’s overall stability, which is a high priority for the EU. The Commission will, if appropriate, put forward a new proposal in 2017 to extend and increase this MFA to Jordan. EU aid will complement the International Monetary Fund’s new programme of about US$723 million, focusing on the country’s economic and financial reform programme.

See also our at a glance note
‘Parliamentary elections in Jordan‘

Versions

• January 2017: ‘EU pledges further aid to Jordan‘ (3rd edition)
• November 2016: ‘EU pledges further aid to Jordan‘ (2nd edition)
• September 2016: ‘EU pledges further aid to Jordan‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council providing further macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Committee responsible:

Rapporteur:

Shadow rapporteurs:

 

 

 

 

  International Trade (INTA)

Emmanuel Maurel (S&D, France)

Salvatore Cicu (EPP, Italy)

Sander Loones (ECR, Belgium)
Marielle de Sarnez (ALDE, France)

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL, Spain)

Klaus Buchner (Greens/EFA, Germany)

David Borrelli (EFDD, Italy) COM(2016)431 of 29.6.2016, 2016/0197(COD)

Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Procedure completed Decision (EU) No 2016/2371

OJ L 352, 23.12.2016, p. 18

Filed under: International Relations, PUBLICATIONS Tagged: briefings, EU Legislation in Progress, European neighbourhood policy, Jordan, Krisztina Binder, Mediterranean and Middle East

US-based Kaman Aerosystems has successfully supplied its first airframe from the re-opened K-MAX production line in Jacksonville, Florida, to its facility in Bloomfield, Connecticut.

South Australia's Flinders University has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with a consortium of France's major graduate engineering schools to foster Australia's $50bn future submarine programme.

Car Nicobar Class fast attack craft (FAC) of the Indian Navy were built by Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) in Kolkata, India, between 2007 and 2011.

Eurotorp EEIG has received a contract to provide operational maintenance support for the French Navy’s MU90 lightweight torpedo system.

Americas

• Investors and traders looking to avoid/gain from the stock market turmoil caused by US President Donald Trump have a new best friend: an app that will generate trading alerts for shares based on comments made by the man on social media. Tweets sent by Trump in December, criticizing big ticket defense programs such the F-35 and the new Air Force One, sent stock prices of Lockheed Martin and Boeing tumbling, and the CEOs of the US’ biggest defense companies scrambling to find ways to trim the fat on program costs. Behind the creation, London-based FinTech firm Trading.co.uk said the Trump signal generator used artificial intelligence technology to differentiate between tweets or other messages that, for example, just mention Boeing and those liable to move markets. Happy Inauguration Day!

• Speaking of costs, the price of the F-35 looks set to take a tumble, as the US DoD and Lockheed Martin come close to an agreement on a new contract for the Joint Strike Fighter. While talks on the warplane’s tenth batch are still ongoing, sources close to discussions say the fighter will drop below its current $100 million per-plane price tag for the first time. Believed to be in the range of $9 billion, an official announcement on the 90-plane deal is expected to come at the end of the month.

Middle East North Africa

• The Israeli Air Force has received delivery of their first Arrow-3 missile defense battery. A joint-development effort by Boeing and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), the Arrow-3 interceptor will form the upper-tier layer of Israel’s multi-tiered Arrow Weapons System (AWS), and is designed to fly nearly twice as high at half the weight of the Arrow-2 interceptor, which covers the lower-tier segment of the network. Arrow-3 missiles will allow the IAF to shoot twice against a single ballistic target, assess for battle damage and, if needed, divert to other approaching threats, with the Arrow-2 operating as a back-up.

• Warplanes from Turkey and Russia have conducted their first joint air-strike. In what is a strange development for a NATO member to coordinate so closely with Russia, the raid comes just fourteen months after Ankara downed a Russian Su-24 for allegedly crossing into Turkish airspace. Focusing on the town of al-Bab in Aleppo province, the strike included four Russian Su-24s, four Su-25s and an Su-34, joined by four F-4s and four F-16s from Turkey. Al-Bab, located just 12 miles from the Turkish border, has been the focus of a five-month Turkish-backed Syrian rebel campaign aimed at pushing back both IS and Kurdish forces.

Europe

• Polish Defense Minister Antoni Macierewicz has said that his government is considering a 2017 splurge on new military hardware. Macierewicz name-dropped Lockheed Martin’s Sikorsky subsidiary, Leonardo, and somewhat surprisingly Airbus, as potential suppliers of 14 helicopters to the Polish army. While both Sikorsky and Leonardo have plants located in Poland, relations between Airbus and the ruling Law & Justice Party soured last year following the cancellation of a $3.2 billion deal to provide 50 H225M Caracals. The ministry has also proposed a plan to buy between 50-100 F-16s as well as three new submarines with contracts to be signed by either the end of the year or in early 2018.

• Thales will update the master radars for the Swiss Air Force in a deal worth $78.90 million. The five-year upgrade is part of a life extension project to keep the former’s FLORAKO system running until the 2030s. Thales said the project will involve development of a new radar signal and upgrading the radar’s data processing and antenna system.

Asia Pacific

• Indonesia’s government has approved a $2 billion plan to purchase five A400M transport aircraft from Airbus. News of the deal marks a significant leap in the country’s modernization plans and provisions included in the deal will allow Indonesian engineers to study and observe the assembly of various major aircraft components, including wings and fuselage shells, for the first two airframes in Seville, Spain. State-owned firm PT Dirgantara will then conduct the final fit-out of the last three airframes at its plant in Bandung.

• A Royal Thai Air Force plan to purchase Mil Mi-17V-5 helicopters has paved the way for the potential setting up a production and maintenance facility in the kingdom. The facility will help support the new helicopters as well as five models previously purchased by Bangkok; once established, the facility would look to provide maintenance support to other Mi-17V-5 operators in Southeast Asia. Once a strong US ally, relations between the two have gone south in recent years following a 2014 coup, resulting in a reorientation toward Russia for defense and industrial ties.

Today’s Video

Unveiling of the Arrow-3 to the IAF:

ThalesRaytheonSystems (TRS) received $120 million in contracts from the Swiss defense procurement agency, ARMASUISSE, to provide the Swiss Air Force with advanced Link-16 connectivity for their fighter aircraft.

The funding represents a continuation of work by TRS on the FLORAKO command and control program. Phase VII will add voice and data transmission over an encrypted link, nation-wide Link-16 coverage, allow aircraft to acquire Link-16 information before take-off, and incorporate multifunctional information distribution system (MIDS) technology. DID has covered the significance of MIDS and Link 16 technology before; in Switzerland, MIDS technology will be especially useful for overcoming the challenges of maintaining full situational awareness at all times, even when flying aircraft within the mountainous Swiss terrain. With respect to the FLORAKO program generally…

Link 16 Display

TRS’ fully distributed FLORAKO comprises master surveillance radars, a data and communication system, a new airspace management system and new air command and control centers.

FLORAKO went into operation on Feb. 2, 2004, after successfully completing final tests and operating in parallel with the previous Swiss air defense system. It’s replacing Switzerland’s older Hughes FLORIDA with a system whose main functions include:

• Joint civil-military airspace management
  
• Air surveillance with multi-sensor tracking (military and civil radars)
  
• Identification
  
• Sensor management
  
• Threat assessment
  
• Air mission Command and Control

Phase VII is slated for completion in late 2008. Work will be performed by ThalesRaytheonSystems employees in Fullerton and Massy, France. Swiss industry will also participate in the system’s deployment. Read corporate release.

Future upgrades to FLORAKO will integrate more real time data and to interface with more sensors and reconnaissance assets.

ThalesRaytheonSystems is an equally owned transatlantic joint venture between Raytheon Company and Thales Group, with offices in Massy Cedex, France and Fullerton, California, USA.

Update

January 20/17: Thales will update the master radars for the Swiss Air Force in a deal worth $78.90 million. The five-year upgrade is part of a life extension project to keep the former’s FLORAKO system running until the 2030s. Thales said the project will involve development of a new radar signal and upgrading the radar’s data processing and antenna system.

Arrow test concept
(click to view full)

In a dawning age of rogue states, ballistic missile defenses are steadily become a widely accepted necessity. Iran is widely believed to be developing nuclear capabilities, and Israeli concerns were heightened after Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad urged that Israel be “wiped off the map” (the fact that America was also placed in that category went largely uncovered).

Because missile defenses are so important, states like India and Israel have taken steps to ensure that they have the ability to build many of the key pieces. The Arrow project is a collaboration between Boeing and IAI to produce the missile interceptors that accompany the required radars, satellites, command and control systems.

NOTE: Article capped and coverage suspended in 2011.

The Arrow System

Arrow launch
(click to view full)

In general, the Israeli Arrow is a more advanced weapon than the Patriot and possesses far more range, undertaking high altitude interceptions and covering a wide area (est. 90km/ 54 mile range, maximum altitude 30 miles/ 50 km for Arrow 2) as a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system. Unlike the USA’s THAAD, PAC-3, or SM-3 which all use “hit to kill” technology, Israel’s Arrow relies on a directed fragmentation warhead to destroy enemy missiles. It can work in conjunction with a number of systems, but its main Israeli partner is the Green Pine long-range, ground-based fire control radar. The system and its engagements are controlled by the mobile Citron Tree battle management center. Since the launchers are also mobile, and the radars are semi-mobile, the system is resistant to pre-emptive strikes if good discipline is maintained.

The exoatmospheric, 2-stage Arrow-3 will use pivoting optical sensors and its own upper-stage kick motor, instead of separate control rockets for final steering. The goal is a highly maneuverable missile that can reach more than double the height of existing Arrow-2 interceptors, using a lower-weight missile. This will also have the effect of extending the missile’s range.

In contrast, Israel’s Patriot PAC-2s are more of a local point defense system with a range of about 40km/ 24 miles. They were all Israel had during the 1991 Gulf War, but these days, Israel’s Patriot PAC-2 GEM+ missiles will only be launched if the Arrow missile fails, or the target is outside the Arrow’s protective umbrella. In that respect, the Arrow/Homa system will play a role similar to the longer-range naval SM-3 Standard missile that forms the high end of Japan’s planned ABM shield (and seems destined for Europe and other states in a land-based role), or the US Army’s THAAD.

Overall responsibility for Arrow lies with the U.S. Missile Defense Organization (MDA) in Washington, DC, and the Israel Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv, Israel. The program is executed by the Israel Missile Defense Organization in Tel Aviv, and the US Army Program Executive Office for Air and Missile Defense’s Arrow Product Office in Huntsville, AL. Key contractors include:

• Israel Aircraft Industries (prime contractor, Arrow missile, Green Pine fire control radar)
  
• Tadiran Electronics in Holon, Israel (Citron Tree battle management center)
  
• Boeing (about 35% of the Arrow missile, manages many US subcontractors)
  
• Lockheed Martin Missiles & Fire Control in Orlando, FL (radar seeker)
  
• Raytheon in Santa Barbara, CA (Infrared seeker)
  
• Other American subcontractors include ATK in Iuka, MS and Clearfield, UT; Manes Machine, in Fort Collins, CO; Ceradyne Thermo-Materials, Inc., in Scottsdale, GA; and Sanmina SCI, in Huntsville, AL.
  
• Rafael Armament Development Authority, Haifa, Israel (Black Sparrow air-launched target; joint U.S./Israel effort).

EL/M-2080 “Green Pine”
(click to view larger)

Israel deployed the first battery of Arrow-1 missiles on March 14/2000, and has continued to upgrade the system. The summer of 2005 marked delivery of the first co-produced Boeing/IAI missiles. Israeli and US troops engaged in pre-training for the biennial Juniper Cobra exercise in 2007, and part of that process includes working out interoperability issues between the Patriot PAC-3 system (ad PAC-2 GEM+ that Israel deploys) and Arrow.

On July 29/04 Israel and the USA carried out joint experiment in the USA, in which the Arrow was launched against a real Scud missile. The experiment was a success, as the Arrow destroyed the Scud with a direct hit. In December 2005 the system was successfully deployed in a test against a replicated Shahab-3 missile. This feat was repeated on February 11/07.

Despite some international interest in the Arrow, the USA has blocked export initiatives so far. Although India purchased an Arrow-capable “Green Pine” radar from Elta in 2001, and has expressed interest in deploying its own battery of Arrow interceptor missiles, U.S. concerns regarding compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR, an international agreement limiting the proliferation of ballistic missile technology) have effectively halted such plans for the time being. This did not stop India from using the Green Pine technology in its own November 2006 anti-missile test, using a modified Prithvi short-range ballistic missile with an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle and a hit to kill warhead.

Contracts & Key Events, 2004-Present

Arrow-3 development
click to play video

The section is still being updated.

January 20/17: The Israeli Air Force has received delivery of their first Arrow-3 missile defense battery. A joint-development effort by Boeing and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), the Arrow-3 interceptor will form the upper-tier layer of Israel’s multi-tiered Arrow Weapons System (AWS), and is designed to fly nearly twice as high at half the weight of the Arrow-2 interceptor, which covers the lower-tier segment of the network. Arrow-3 missiles will allow the IAF to shoot twice against a single ballistic target, assess for battle damage and, if needed, divert to other approaching threats, with the Arrow-2 operating as a back-up.

June 16/15: Joint US-Israel missile programs may benefit from additional funding under a Defense Appropriations Bill, following a vote in the House. The programs covered by the increase in funds include the Iron Dome, Arrow, Arrow 3 and David’s Sling systems. The last of these will receive the most significant boost, with an additional $286.5 million allocation.

Feb 22/11: An Arrow System successfully intercepts a ballistic target missile during a flight test conducted at Pt. Mugu Sea Range, CA. This test is part of the Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP) and was conducted jointly by the Israel Missile Defense Organization and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency.

The test represented a realistic scenario, and all the elements (Arrow, Green Pine radar, Citron Tree BMC) performed in their operational configurations, using new Block 4 software designed to improve their ability to discriminate targets. US MDA release | video || Defense News.

July 27/10: The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense votes to fund Israel’s missile defense programs at $422.7 million for 2011, nearly $96 million above the original White House funding request. This represents a doubling of aid for missile defense from 2010, in the wake of an emerging consensus that the CIA’s 2007 estimate of Iran’s nuclear weapons program was wrong, and underestimated Iranian progress.

On the other hand, the structure of that funding is less good for the Arrow program. While the HASD added $58 million to the administration’s original FY 2011 Arrow-3 request, that provisional $108.8 million is actually less than FY 2010 funding of $157.4 million ($60M request + $97.4M Congress added). Likewise, the complementary medium range RAFAEL/Raytheon David’s Sling/Magic Wand dropped from $134.7 million in FY 2010 to $84.7 million requested in 2011. The net increase comes from a one-time, $205 million grant for the procurement of 10 RAFAEL Iron Dome batteries for defense against short-range missiles. HASD Chair statement [ PDF] | HASD Table [PDF] | AllGov | Jerusalem Post | Israel’s Globes business news.

July 26/10: Israel and the United States sign a deal to develop and field the Arrow 3 system. It will be capable of tracking and shooting down ballistic missiles at a higher altitudes, including fully exoatmospheric threats. US MDA | China’s Xinhua.

March 22/10: Defense News reports that U.S. and Israeli government and industrial partners will press ahead with Arrow 3 work through good faith understandings, until formalized government-to-government accords catch up. The goal is to deploy the new missile by 2014.

Production of the Arrow-2 is winding down, and final deliveries are planned by the end of 2010. Government and industrial partners have apparently been working together on Arrow-3 for nearly 2 years, moving the program through at least 4 of the US Missile Defense Agency’s required technology “knowledge points, and validate critical subsystems. A first fly-out is planned for 2011.

Manufacturing
(click to view full)

April 7/09: The Israeli Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency conduct a successful test of the Arrow ballistic missile defense system. The operationally realistic test was conducted in Israel, using an ASIP interceptor co-produced by Boeing and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). The event marked the co-produced Arrow II’s 2nd intercept in 2 attempts, as well as its 3rd successful flight test. Boeing.

Jan 4/09: Israel’s Arutz Sheva news service reports that the Arrow missile defense system has been deployed near Ashkelon, in part because IAI has worked with American firms and developed an updated radar system named MC4. The new radar can also deal with smaller missiles, such as the Hamas government’s Kassam or Grad rockets being launched from Gaza. Using GPS and camera sensors, the MC4 system tracks the flight path, and within a minute of launch, it can determine both the launch site and projected landing site of the missile.

At the same time, pressure is building to add Northrop Grumman’s SkyGuard laser system to Israel’s defenses, a system whose technology is based on joint US-Israeli research:

“Supporters claim that the Skyguard laser based system is more suited to Israel’s needs than the rocket-based Rafael solution. Firstly, the laser can intercept short range missiles such as the Kassam rocket which hit their targets in less than 10 seconds. The rocket-based Rafael system can only hit medium-range rockets which reach their targets in more than 20 seconds. In addition, each laser round fired costs approximately $3,000. In contrast, defensive rockets for the Iron Dome system are estimated to cost over $100,000. Supporters also claim that the Skyguard system could be deployed in a short amount of time, whereas the completion of the Iron Dome rocket system is not foreseen in the near future.”

Sept 29/08: The USA has deployed an unspecified X-band radar system in Israel, manned by around 120 American personnel. Reports hint that the system may be similar to the radars deployed to Japan, or the AN/TPY-2 used as part of the THAAD system. The Guardian:

“One key feature of the system is that information from early-warning satellites – which greatly increases the radar’s ability to pinpoint launches – would remain in US hands. The satellite ground station would be in Europe and transmit data to Israel.

…The high-powered X-Band system, manufactured by Raytheon Company, would allow Israel’s Arrow II ballistic shield to engage an Iranian Shehab-3 missile about halfway through its 11-minute flight to Israel, six times sooner than Israel’s existing Green Pine radar can. The X-Band can track an object the size of a baseball from 2,900 miles away.”

Feb 14/08: IAI announces that The Israel Ministry of Defense (IMOD) / Missile Defense Organization (IMDO) has awarded a follow-on production contract to Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI)’s MLM Division for an undisclosed number of additional Arrow 2 Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) system interceptors. The interceptors will be assembled in Israel at IAI’s MLM Division, the Arrow prime contractor, with major portions coming from Boeing IDS, the U.S. prime contractor in Huntsville, AL., ATK in Luka, MS., and various other subcontractors across the U.S.

Aug 23/07: The Jerusalem Post publishes “IDF modifying Arrow deployment in the North.” Key quote:

“Following this past summer’s war and the recognition that the next war will involve Syrian and Iranian missile barrages, the Air Defense Forces decided to adopt a “wide deployment” for its Arrow missile batteries.”

Aug 6/07: Jane’s Defence Weekly: “Israel is leaning towards upgrading its own anti-ballistic missile Arrow Weapon System (AWS) rather than acquiring the US Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system. While no formal decision has yet been taken, Jane’s has learned that officials from the Israel Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO) have informed the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) about potential complications with integrating THAAD into the country’s missile-defence alignment.”

March 26/07: An improved Arrow II missile, with modifications to its hardware and electronics under the Arrow System Improvement Program, is successfully test-fired this afternoon at Palmahim Air Force Base. The interceptor performed successfully according to design specifications, meeting all expectations and objectives. This is the 1st successful test of the improved configuration, and the 2nd test overall of a co-produced interceptor. Testing is managed by the Israeli Missile Defense Organization, in close cooperation with the U.S. Missile Defense Agency.

Test objectives were to collect flight engineering data for future test events, and to test the capabilities of the improved Arrow interceptor. This test marks the U.S./Israeli Arrow II program’s 14th success in 16 attempts. US MDA [PDF].

Feb 12/07: A successful ballistic missile intercept test by the Arrow missile defense system, conducted at night over the Mediterranean Sea. It’s the 1st test of a co-produced Arrow intercept missile fired from an improved launcher, using 2 Arrow batteries separated from each other. The target, called “Black Sparrow,” was launched from an F-15 fighter aircraft at which point the Fire Control Radar acquired the target and notified the Battle Management Center. A defense plan was issued and a mission command was sent to the Launch Control Center to fire the interceptor missile. This test marks the U.S./Israeli Arrow II program’s 13th success in 15 attempts. US MDA [PDF].

Spring 2005: The 1st co-produced Arrow 2 interceptor is delivered by IAI to the MoD. Source [PDF].

Feb 2/05: Israel Defense Forces carry out a successful test of the IAI/Boeing Arrow anti-missile system at a secret location in the center of the country. The Jerusalem Post reports that “an F-15 fighter jet flying over the Mediterranean dropped a Black Sparrow test missile specially designed to simulate an incoming Iranian Shihab 3 missile headed toward the Israeli shore.” The successful interception occurred at a higher altitude than previous efforts, and tested recent improvements made to the Arrow 2 system.

Israeli Air Force Patriot missile batteries also participated passively in the test, following the incoming missile with their radars. The Times of India notes that this was the 14th test of the system, which has included joint tests in the USA and advanced tests simulating advanced separating warheads. As evidenced by the Patriot batteries’ participation in this latest test, Israel is working to integrate all of its key assets and connections to US data into one national system, rather than relying on fragmented local control. Jerusalem Post | copy at United Jerusalem.

Pt. Mugu launch
(click to view full)

Aug 26/04: US Missile Defense Agency [PDF]:

“The Arrow anti-ballistic missile system was used today in a joint Israel/United States test exercise as part of the ongoing Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP). The test was the second in a series conducted at the Point Mugu Sea Range in California. It was the thirteenth Arrow intercept test and the eighth test of the complete weapon system. The Arrow interceptor was launched toward the target but no intercept was achieved. Many of the test objectives were successfully completed, and the test data is being analyzed by test engineers to determine why an intercept did not occur.”

July 29/04: A modified Arrow System Improvement Program anti-ballistic missile successfully intercepts and destroys a ballistic missile target today, west of San Nicolas Island on the Pt. Mugu Sea Range in California. Point Mugu was used, in order to offer a realistic scenario that could not have been tested in Israel due to test-field safety restrictions.

The objective of the test was to demonstrate the Arrow system’s improved performance against a target that represents a threat to Israel. This was the 12th Arrow intercept test, and the 7th test of the complete Arrow system. US MDA [PDF]

April 1/04: Boeing announces a $78 million contract from Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) to produce Arrow II interceptor components. The contract, effective immediately, runs through 2006 with options for additional production until Q2 2008. The total contract value could exceed $225 million if all options are exercised.

Boeing and IAI signed a teaming agreement in 2002 to co-produce the interceptor for the Arrow weapon system. The firm is responsible for production of the electronics section, the radome, motorcases for the booster and sustainer, and the canister that holds the interceptor in the missile launcher. Boeing production and program management will be conducted in Huntsville, AL. IAI, the prime contractor of the Arrow system, is responsible for system integration and final interceptor assembly in Israel.

Boeing will manage several major subcontracts to support the Arrow interceptor production including Alliant-Techsystems in Iuka, MS and Clearfield, UT; Manes Machine, in Fort Collins, CO; Ceradyne Thermo-Materials, Inc., in Scottsdale, GA; and Sanmina SCI, in Huntsville, AL.

Sept 14/2000: The Israel Ministry of Defense, in cooperation with the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the U.S. Army, conduct the 2nd successful intercept of a target ballistic missile by the Arrow Weapon System (AWS) in Israel. This was the 8th overall Arrow-2 flight test, but the 1st intercept for the against a new air-launched, in-bound target called the Black Sparrow.

The Arrow interceptor took off and flew in a nominal trajectory, acquired the Black Sparrow target, then locked on and homed on the designated threat. The warhead was fused at the proper range and the Arrow interceptor destroyed the target. The Green Pine fire control radar and Citron Tree battle management center participated fully in the test, performing battle planning, launch operations, and up link/down link message applications, as well as post intercept verifications. Both assets worked according to plan and fulfilled all test objectives. Analysis of all data is underway to evaluate and confirm results. US MDA [PDF]

Additional Readings & Sources

• Israeli MoD – Arrow Weapon System site.

• US MDA – Arrow gallery. Covers joint tests to 2004.

• Boeing – Arrow Interceptor

• Israeli-Weapons.com – Arrow. Profiles the entire Homa system, including Green Pine and Lemon Tree.

• Claremont Institute MissileThreat.com – Arrow Missile

• Claremont Institute MissileThreat.com – Shabab-3

• Wikipedia – Arrow Missile

• yNet News – Iran: We will build 20 new nuclear plants. also discusses the Arrow system test, and the larger efforts underway on the international front.

• BBC News (Feb 11/07) – Israeli missile test ‘successful’

• Jerusalem Post (Dec 2/05) – ‘Arrow’ Scud buster test a success

• India Times (Dec 2/04) – Israel successfully tests Arrow missile system

• Claremont Institute MissileThreat.com (Nov 17/04) – Aegis Test Successful: Marks First Attempt Against More Advanced Separating Target. This had been a key concern re: the system.

• Globes Online (Nov 7/05) – Jane’s: First IAI-Boeing “Arrow 2” missile delivered to IAF

• US Army News Service (Nov 2/05) – Air defenders train with Israeli counterparts

• A Daily Briefing on Iran (Oct 29/04) – Why Haven’t We Seen This? Sometimes a picture really is worth 1,000 words, and it’s worth looking at this one from Ahmadinejad’s infamous speech… but the thousand words in documents like Hassan Abbassi’s “War Preparation Plan” can be at least as chilling.

• MEMRI Translation Special Dispatch Series (Oct 28/05) – Translated excerpts from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speech

• UPI (Aug 27/04) – Arrow anti-ballistic missile test fails. It was tested against a separating warhead. The articles gives details re: what happened – but the most fascinating part to me was the difference between American and Israeli weapons testing philosophies.

• JINSA (Aug 4/04) – First U.S. Test of Arrow Missile Defense System Goes ‘Beautifully’. Adds useful background re: the overall US-Israeli program.

• Israeli IDF (Aug 2/04) – The ‘Arrow’ System Test- A Strategic Accomplishment

French ACMAT VLTP-NP Light Utility Vehicle

Written by Mihalis Kritikos and Nera Kuljanic,

Sergey Nivens / Fotolia

Scientists have new technological answers to the twin challenges of limiting emissions and feeding a growing population which is simultaneously shrinking the space left for cultivation. However, these answers in turn pose their own ethical and risk management questions. Societal actors and a wide range of stakeholders have long sought to broaden the scope of authorisation and regulation of agricultural biotechnologies to take into account the relevant socio-economic impacts. Assessing the socio-economic sustainability, societal benefits and ethical acceptability of agricultural biotechnologies in the frame of the established risk assessment procedures has, for a long time, been debated at both EU and international levels. However, the increasingly rapid developments in the field of genetic engineering and synthetic biology trigger a need to re-examine the traditional risk assessment model and explore the deployment of methodologies that may further reinforce the responsiveness and inclusiveness of the current framework.

On 25 January 2017, STOA is organising a workshop to discuss these issues, continuing STOA’s practice of discussing the socio-ethical dimensions of techno-scientific developments. The workshop will be chaired by Marijana Petir, MEP and STOA Panel member. Former President (2010-2016) of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), Julian Kinderlerer, will give the opening presentation on innovation and bioethics, and will moderate the event.

What to expect from the event?

The workshop will provide space for a debate on this challenging aspect of public policy and will offer the opportunity to analyse the feasibility and necessity for inclusion of socio-economic considerations into the current framework.

The various methodological options for assessment, the role of participatory involvement in risk governance and the practical steps and indicators that could be introduced in risk assessment and decision-making related to synthetic biology and genetic modification in agriculture will be discussed by Helge Torgersen, of the Institute of Technology Assessment, Austrian Academy of Sciences, and Anne Ingeborg Myhr, of the Genøk-Centre for Biosafety, Tromsø, Norway. For example, in Norway, sustainability, benefit to society and ethics are important criteria in GMO assessment prior to cultivation, import, and use as food or feed. The workshop will look at how this has evolved.

Put simply, if a measure, an action or a policy could harm the public or the environment, and there is no scientific consensus that it is not harmful, then one willing to act must prove the absence of danger. This is known as the precautionary principle, which belongs to the domain of risk management. However, there are differences in the way this is defined and applied across the world. Amir Muzur, from the School of Medicine, University of Rijeka, Croatia, will speak on the comparison between application in the EU and the USA.

How could policy-makers in the EU deal with socio-ethical considerations, as well as the regulatory challenges raised by scientific uncertainty, the speed of technological advance, technological complexity and issues related to public perception? How is this shaping decision-making in the field of agricultural biotechnologies? Register for the workshop before 20 January 2017 and take part in the discussion.

Filed under: BLOG, Events Tagged: agriculture, events, Mihalis Kritikos, Nera Kuljanic, STOA

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Written by Angelos Delivorias,

© blende11.photo / Fotolia

Crowdfunding is a relatively ‘young’ form of financing – especially for SMEs and start-ups, but also for not-for-profit projects – that is developing fast in Europe. While researchers point out its benefits, among them the fact that project owners have greater control, and financial risk is spread among a larger number of people, they also note its drawbacks. The latter include a high cost of capital, occasional displays of a ‘herd mentality’, capable of depriving potentially worthier projects of adequate funding, and risks for investors from incompetence or fraud on the part of the project owners, and unclear regulations.

The European Commission (through a communication and two reports) and the European Parliament (through three resolutions) have taken an active interest in this form of financing. As a result, the Commission recently conducted a study on the state of the European crowdfunding market. It found that, while crowdfunding is developing fast, it is still concentrated in a few countries (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands), which have introduced tailored domestic regimes, and that it remains, for the time being, a national phenomenon with limited cross-border activity. The study therefore concluded that for the moment there is no strong case for EU-level policy intervention. Nonetheless, given the encouraging trends and the potential of crowdfunding to become a key source of financing for SMEs over the long term, the Commission noted that it will maintain regular dialogue with European supervisory authorities, Member States and the crowdfunding sector to monitor and review its development.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Crowdfunding in Europe: Introduction and state of play‘.

Filed under: Economic and Social Policies, PUBLICATIONS Tagged: Angelos Delivorias, briefings, credit, crowdfunding, EPRS briefings, financing, investment, small and medium-sized enterprises

CBG Systems are pleased to inform you that we have expanded our product range to include Moonraker products.

Written by Nora Milotay and Giovanni Liva,

© laufer / Fotolia

Strengthening the social dimensions of European Union policies, in general, and of the economic and monetary union, in particular is an increasingly important discourse across the Member States, particularly since the 2008 financial crisis. Social innovation, which is gaining increasing importance in the public, private and third (i.e. voluntary, non-profit) sectors, can greatly contribute to addressing the growing challenges, such as migration, poverty and global warming. The European Union particularly promotes social innovation through employment and social policies as well as policies on the single market.

The main initiatives explicitly target the governance and funding mechanism of social innovation, including its regulatory environment, powering public-sector innovation, the social economy, as well as providing policy guidance and fostering new policy practices. Due to the complexity of the concept and ecosystem of social innovation and its very diverse contexts in the Member States, European Union policies have varied impact: regulations can have controversial effects in terms of visibility of initiatives, and many organisations still cannot access sufficient funding. To make these initiatives more effective it is important to know more about the impact of social innovation, including its social and environmental value and the importance of these for the economy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Fostering social innovation in the European Union‘.

Filed under: Economic and Social Policies, PUBLICATIONS Tagged: briefings, EPRS briefings, Giovanni Liva, Nora Milotay, social innovation, social policy

The United States conducted air strikes against Islamic State camps in Libya on 18 January, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced. The strikes, which were carried out in conjunction with the Libyan Government of National Accord, saw the destruction of two remote desert camps some 45 km