Defence`s Feeds

BAE Systems has secured a contract to design and deliver new technology that will enable US Navy submarines to detect and track other submarines from greater distances.

iXBlue supplies a unique warship electronic chart display and information system (WECDIS) based on an open software design that allows it to meet the individual needs of its users.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Americas

• The US Army has awarded LOC Performance a $49.1 million contract modification to an existing order for Bradley Fighting Vehicle modification kits and installation. Under the terms of the deal, LOC will produce and supply 276 additional Bradley Engineering Change Proposal 1 kits and two sets of spare parts, which will be used to upgrade Bradley Fighting Vehicles weight-bearing systems and underbelly armor. Work will be conducted at Plymouth, Minn. with a completion date scheduled for April 30, 2019. The Engineering Change Proposal 1 installs heavy load-bearing tracks, torsion bars to restore ground clearance and improved underbelly armor on the Bradleys. This in turn improves the vehicle’s capability to handle the stress placed on its chassis caused by the installation of armor upgrades and Bradley Urban Survivability Kits.

• Lockheed Martin will deliver Patriot Advanced Capability-3 anti-ballistic missile systems to several international customers after receiving a $130.3 million contract from the US Army. The order calls for the delivery of 35 missile segment enhancements, 100 launcher modifications kits, parts, software, and missile round trainers. Recipients of the systems include Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Untied Arab Emirates, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan. Work will primarily take place at the company’s Grand Prairie, Texas facility, as well as other sites across the US, and is expected to be completed by June 30, 2020.

Africa

• The Nigerian armed forces have began to receive deliveries of 4×4 armored personnel carriers from the Streit Group. Its first batch of 25 vehicles included the firm’s Spartan APCs and Typhoon 4×4 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles. It’s expected that a total of 177 vehicles will be delivered. The Spartan provides protection against both ballistic and blast threats with crew compartment protection of CEN Level BR6 armor. The Typhoon 4×4 MRAP features a V-shaped armored hull as well as blast protection to STANAG 4569 Level 3. Nigeria will use the vehicles to better tackle the ongoing insurgency by the jihadist group Boko Haram in the country’s north and east.

Middle East & North Africa

• Israel has increased the scope of its Leonardo Aermacchi M-346 “Lavi” advanced jet trainers after the successful upgrade of the aircraft’s software. Additional external fuel tanks have already been added to the trainers with future enhancements to include the addition of live bombs which will allow for the advanced training of air-to-surface strike missions. The aircraft are also being employed to support advanced training involving “fourth-generation” fighters.

• Turkish F-16 Block 30 fighters are scheduled to get structural and avionic upgrades aimed at increasing the fleet’s combat capabilities. A total of 35 aircraft will undergo the modernization, 25 of which will be upgraded jointly by Tusas Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and manufacturer Lockheed Martin, while the remaining ten will be upgraded at a Turkish Air Force support and maintenance unit in Eskisehir in Central Anatolia. Deliveries of the modernized aircraft will begin in 2018 and completed by the end of 2023. This is likely to be the last Turkish F-16 upgrade program as the fighters will be eventually phased out in favor of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Europe

• Swedish truck manufacturer Volvo has two interested buyers for its armored vehicles unit, Renault Trucks Defense (RTD), in a deal estimated to be worth $573 million. The interested parties expected to submit offers by the July 24 deadline include French-German tank maker KNDS and Belgian group CMI. Sources close to the deal added that private equity groups which initially expressed interest in RTD are not expected to take part in the auction, which is organized by Rothschild. Volvo’s decision to shed RTD from its portfolio comes as the firm looks to dump non-core assets as part of efforts to streamline a group that has been built on a series of large acquisitions. It has already sold its aerospace unit and external IT operations as well as a large real estate portfolio.

Asia Pacific

• Indian officials have commenced negotiations to buy ex-French Air Force Jaguar strike fighters. The aircraft had been offered to New Delhi by France about six months ago, and the issue is expected to be discussed during a meeting between both countries’ air force chiefs in India this week. While it remains unknown how much France wants in exchange for the warplanes, Indian officials said that they are actively considering acquiring them after proper refurbishment.

• India’s Dassault Rafale fighters on order from France will be equipped with Israeli firm Rafael’s Litening targeting pod. Yuval Miller, head of the Israeli company’s air and C4I systems division said that the pods, produced to the latest 4I island will be manufactured in India in partnership with a local firm. The Indian air force already uses the Rafael-produced pod on several types of combat aircraft, having acquired the system in the Litening III standard. Rafael also is to supply its advanced 4I version of the system for use by the Aeronautical Development Agency’s Tejas light combat aircraft.

Today’s Video

• MiG-35 at MAKS 2017:

M3A3 Bradley CFV: Charge!
(click to view full)

In the 1970s, middle eastern wars demonstrated that tanks without infantry screens were vulnerable to infantry with anti-tank missiles. Unfortunately, armored personnel carriers were easy prey for enemy tanks, and sometimes had trouble just keeping up with friendly tanks like America’s 60+ ton, 50+ mph M1 Abrams. In response, the Americans rethought the armored personnel carrier, taking a page from the Soviet book. They created a more heavily armored, faster “Infantry Fighting Vehicle” named after WW2 General Omar “the soldier’s general” Bradley, and gave it an offensive punch of its own. M2/M3 tracked, armored IFVs can carry infantry – but they also have 25mm Bushmaster cannons, networked targeting sensors, and even TOW anti-armor or Stinger anti-aircraft missiles at their disposal.

Bradley puts on wear
(click to view full)

Even well-serviced vehicles must suffer the pangs of age and wear, however, and the pace of electronics breakthroughs is far faster than the Army’s vehicle replacement cycle. The US Army plans to keep its Bradley fleet for some time to come, and new technologies have made it wise to upgrade part of that fleet while renewing the vehicles. Hence the remanufacture program, which complements the restore-only RESET programs.

This free-to-view DII Spotlight article explains the differences between the Bradley variants involved, details the re-manufacture process, offers additional research sources, and covers associated contracts from FY 1999 to the present.

Bradley Variants and Sub-Variants: A Quick Guide Bradley Fighting Vehicles: Origins and History

M3A2 CFV: Ad-Dwr, Iraq
(click to view full)

Introduced in the 1980s during the Reagan defense build-up, the Bradleys were a departure from the usual mold of lightly armed Armored Personnel Carriers. They were heavily criticized for their expense, and accused of being both too heavy for rapid transport to crisis points and too lightly armored to hold their own against serious opposition. Even so, over 6,700 were produced. Most were for the US Army, but there was also a minor order on the side from the Saudis.

The Bradley IFV/CFV was finally thrust into battle during the 1991 Desert Storm campaign, where their combination of firepower, mobility, and protection made them a valuable asset, and largely laid the effectiveness controversies to rest. A widely upgraded fleet of Bradleys would reprise this role in Operation Iraqi Freedom, both during the deep in-country push that culminated in the “Thunder Run” into Baghdad, and during subsequent stabilization operations. The 2nd Battle of Fallujah also made heavy use of the Bradley, as documented in Staff Sgt. David Bellavia’s (retd.) excellent book “House to House: An Epic Memoir of War.”

Today, many other nations employ IFVs, from older Russian BMP/BRDMs to modernized and up-gunned M113 APCs, to more modern options like BAE’s popular CV90 family and Germany’s new Puma IFV from KMW & Rheinmetall.

The Bradleys’ high level of protection against anti-tank rockets has proven to be a significant plus, and operational readiness has reportedly exceeded 94%, during urban and cross-country missions that have covered more than 8 million miles. Its major weakness is a 175 gallon fuel tank in the belly, which is typically protected only by aluminum armor, and can become a source of severe burns during land mine attacks. Unfortunately, the Bradleys are not being redesigned to carry fuel externally as part of the remanufacture and upgrade process. Instead, a number of Bradleys are receiving improved mine-resistant belly armor as a stopgap measure, plus BFSS that use a new, lower, fuel cell bladder

Bradley Family Variants

M6 Linebacker
(click to view full)

Bradley vehicles carry a crew of 3 (commander, gunner and driver), plus additional soldiers in some variants. Overall, the Bradleys fulfills 5 critical mission roles for the US Army’s Heavy Brigade Combat Teams: infantry fighting vehicle – carries 6-7 troops (M2); cavalry fighting vehicle – carries 2 scouts (M3); fire support vehicle (A3 BFIST or M7 BFIST based on A2-ODS); battle command vehicle; and engineer squad vehicle (EBFV, or M2A2-ODS-E).

The M-A3s are the most modern variants of the Bradley, with fully digitized computing, navigation, and communications equipment. On-board subsystem monitoring, diagnostics/ prognostics, and segregated electrical power are included in this upgrade, as are improved NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) protection and the addition of a 7th troop seat in the M2A3 variant. The A3 then adds enhanced sensors including IBAS 2nd generation FLIR (thermal imaging) with significantly greater range. Armor Magazine’s March 2005 issue relates this story from Iraq:

“Staff Sergeant Brian Flading, a 19D Operation Iraqi Freedom veteran, remembers an incident when his platoon was mortared one night in Balad. With the new FLIR, the crew was able to see the enemy shooting the mortars. His crew sent rounds downrange within three seconds of the mortar shot…”

The US Army plans to have more than 2,000 total Bradley A3s in its future fleet. Most of those vehicles will be converted to that standard through the remanufacture process.

M-A2-ODS vehicles lack the full electronics, sensor set, and future upgradeability of the M-A3s; instead, they have their own set of off-the-shelf improvements over the base M-A2s that duplicate many of the A3 variants’ essential capabilities, without the cost of a full A3 upgrade. Many remanufactured vehicles are being brought to the “Operation Desert Storm – Situational Awareness” standard, from the base A2 or A2-ODS.

Navigation that allows ODS vehicles to maneuver with more modern variants is provided by the addition of PGS/POSNAV. For ODS – Situational Awareness vehicles, the new laser range-finder is integrated into both the new GPS system, and new FBCB2 (aka. “Blue Force Tracker”) equipment, significantly improving their ability to designate and hand off targets. Survivability gets a boost via the integration of Battlefield Combat Identification System and a Missile Countermeasure device, as well as applique reactive armor from the General Dynamics-RAFAEL partnership. Bench seats help the crew mount up and dismount faster. Finally, a 7th seat has been added to the ODS to support the 3×9 Mechanized Infantry Platoon organization.

M7 Bradley BFIST
(click to expand)

M6 Linebacker. This variant carried Stinger missiles and related sensors to serve as mobile short-range air defense for US armored formations, but for good or ill most Linebackers have been converted into M2A2-ODS vehicles under a February 2005 contract.

The M7 BFIST (Bradley FIre Support Team) is a variant of the M2A2-ODS Bradley. It is used as an artillery forward observer vehicle and laser designator, providing major improvements in first-round artillery accuracy on a platform whose mobility and survivability is the same as the armored maneuver units it rides in. BFIST’s performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom was reported to be impressive. The M7’s successor is simply referred to as the Bradley A3 FIST or A3 BFIST, and incorporates all Bradley M-A3 features in addition to its suite of advanced targeting sensors and electronics.

Beyond the listed variants, the Bradley Urban Survivability Kit (BUSK) III offers a useful set of bolt-on improvements: an Emergency Ramp Release (ERR) to get out of battle damaged vehicles; Bradley Fuel Cell Survivability (BFSS) which increases protection against land mine blasts by using a new, lower, fuel cell bladder; Bradley Advanced Survivability Seats-Driver (BASS-D) energy absorbing seats and foot rests; and a Turret Advanced Survivability System (TASS) that adds floor plates and energy-absorbing foot rests for the gunner and commander.

Bradley Remanufacture Program: Details & Contracts

M2A3 Bradley
(click to view full)

BAE Systems works through its Public Private Partnership with Red River Army Depot (RRAD) in Texas to remanufacture and upgrade these vehicles. Initial disassembly and subsystem rebuild is performed at RRAD. Further disassembly and structural modifications is performed by BAE Systems in Fayette County, PA, with some work done in Aiken, SC. Final assembly, integration and test is conducted at the BAE Systems facility in York, PA.

Unlike RESET programs, designed to replace all defective or worn parts and restore/service a vehicle back to pre-combat condition, remanufacture is a complete rebuild designed to return it to full “zero miles” condition, and install upgrades.

Unless otherwise specified, the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Warren, MI manages the contract, and BAE Land Systems and Armaments is the recipient.

FY 2017

July 19/17: The US Army has awarded LOC Performance a $49.1 million contract modification to an existing order for Bradley Fighting Vehicle modification kits and installation. Under the terms of the deal, LOC will produce and supply 276 additional Bradley Engineering Change Proposal 1 kits and two sets of spare parts, which will be used to upgrade Bradley Fighting Vehicles weight-bearing systems and underbelly armor. Work will be conducted at Plymouth, Minn. with a completion date scheduled for April 30, 2019. The Engineering Change Proposal 1 installs heavy load-bearing tracks, torsion bars to restore ground clearance and improved underbelly armor on the Bradleys. This in turn improves the vehicle’s capability to handle the stress placed on its chassis caused by the installation of armor upgrades and Bradley Urban Survivability Kits.

FY 2013

 

March 21/13: CAV – IFV. BAE Systems Land & Armament LP, York, PA receives a $16.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to convert Bradley Reset Vehicles from M3A3 to M2A3 configuration. In other words, to change them from cavalry scout vehicles with a crew and 2 scouts, to infantry fighting vehicles that carry their crew + 7 soldiers.

Work will be performed in York, PA; Lemont Furnace, PA; and Aiken, SC; with an estimated completion date of Aug 29/14. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by Army Contracting Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-10-G-0003).

FY 2011 – 2012

Orders, including BUSK urban warfare kits; Slow funding forces a furlough at York.

M2 & BUSK armor
(click to view larger)

Aug 14/12: +353 various. BAE Systems in York, PA receives a $306.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to upgrade 353 Operation Desert Storm M2A2, M3A2 and M7 Bradley Fire Support Team vehicles to Operation Desert Storm Situational Awareness (ODS-SA) configurations. This production contract is the flip side of $340 million in funding to purchase upgrade materials, bringing the full contract total for the 353 vehicles to $646 million.

Work will begin in August 2012, with final delivery expected in April 2014, but the contract runs until May 30/14. The upgraded Bradleys will be provided to the Minnesota and Pennsylvania National Guard units, and to Combined Armed Battalions in the Kansas, South Carolina and Ohio National Guard units (W56HZV-10-G-0003). See also BAE Systems.

Aug 13/12: The furlough ends at BAE’s York, PA plant. Source: BAE personnel.

Furlough ends

May 10/12: A $68.7 million cost-reimbursement, no-fee contract modification to reset, and if necessary to convert, Bradley ODS vehicles to the ODS-SA standard. Subsequent conversations with BAE personnel reveal that it did not avert the planned furlough (vid. May 2/12 entry), and was just additional funding for parts due to delays in getting the main contract award. That award came through in August 2012.

Work will be performed in York, PA, with an estimated completion date of May 31/14. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W56HZV-10-G-0003).

May 6/12: A $31.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification will supply material and labor for Bradley ODS (Operation Desert Storm) vehicle conversions. This would appear to be the installation and labor bookend to the Dec 7/11 contract.

Work will be performed in York, PA, with an estimated completion date of Oct 31/12. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W56HZV-10-G-0003).

May 2/12: Layoff. BAE furloughs 210 employees from mid-July to Mid-August 2012, pending the release of more Bradley funds. Furloughed workers will be covered by their company benefits during the 30-day period, and can also choose to apply vacation time to this period and be paid. The firm expects to have everyone back by Aug 13/12. York Daily Record.

Furloughs at York

Dec 7/11: BAE US Combat Systems in York, PA receives a $30.4 million cost-no-fee and firm-fixed-price contract, to buy materials for 247 Bradley ODS-SA vehicles. It looks like this boosts the Oct 5/11 contract.

Work will be performed in York, PA with an estimated completion date of Oct 31/12. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received by the US Army’s Contracting Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-10-G-0003).

Oct 5/11: +245 ODS. A $270.8 million cost-no-fee contract will buy the materials and equipment needed to bring 245 Bradleys to the Operational Desert Storm Situational Awareness (ODS-SA) standard. Work will be performed in York, PA, with an estimated completion date of Dec 30/13. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W56HZV-10-G-0003).

Aug 25/11: BUSK. BAE Systems in York, PA receives a $23.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for Bradley Urban Survivability Kits. Work will be performed in York, PA, with an estimated completion date of March 9/12. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W56HZV-10-G-0003)

April 25/11: BUSK. BAE Systems receives a $53.3 million contract to provide 3,034 Bradley Urban Survivability Kits III to outfit the Bradley Fighting Vehicles to the BUSK III configuration.

Work will be performed in York, PA with an estimated completion date of June 30/11. One bid was solicited with 1 bid received by the Army Contracting Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-05-D-0005).

March 22/11: Components. A $47.7 million cost-reimbursement, no-fee contract for M2A2 ODS-SA(Operation Desert Storm – Situational Awareness) components, to be used to convert Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Work will be performed in York, PA, with an estimated completion date of Oct 31/12. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W56HZV-10-G-0003).

Nov 9/10: long-lead. A $250.1 million cost reimbursement – no fee contract. It covers long lead time materials to make up 247 M2/M3 Bradley Operation Desert Storm Situational Awareness (ODS-SA) conversion kits, with 202 used under the contract to convert vehicles from Bradley ODS to ODS-SA configurations, and the other 45 kept for future requirements. The main buy of ODS-SA kits and conversions is expected in April 2011.

Work is to be performed in York, PA, with an estimated contract completion date of Feb 28/12, but BAE Systems places the end of production work at September 2012. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W56HZV-10-G-0003). See also BAE release.

FY 2008 – 2010

Orders slow down.

M2A3 & squad
(click to view full)

April 1/10: Sub-contractors. L-3 Communications Combat Propulsion Systems in Muskegon, MI received a $16.1 million firm-price with incentive and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for 221 remanufactured Bradley transmissions, 2 control tests and incentive fee pool. Work is to be performed in Muskegon, MI (54%), and Texarkana, TX (46%) with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/13. For the order, 1 bid was solicited with 1 bid received by the US Army TACOM Contracting Center in Warren, MI (W56HZV-09-C-0098).

Sept 23/09: Sub-contractors. L-3 Communications Combat Propulsion Systems in Muskegon, MI received a $33.1 million firm-fixed-price with Incentive and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for 94 remanufactured Bradley transmissions and parts, 20 new Bradley transmissions, 87 repaired Bradley transmissions, 979 parts kits to rebuild Bradley transmissions, 20,000 hours of system technical support, and $5.2 million in management support.

Work is to be performed in Texarkana, TX (43%), Muskegon, MI (42%) and Huddersfield, UK (15%) with an estimated completion date of Dec 30/11. One bid solicited with one bid received by the U.S. Army TACOM LCMC in Warren, MI (W56HZV-09-C-0098).

April 6/09: Sub-contractors. Raytheon Network-Centric Systems in McKinney, TX announces $163.5 million worth of contracts from BAE for 822 advanced thermal sighting systems: a $123 million order for 620 Commander’s Independent Viewer block 1 units on Feb 20/09, and a $40.5 million award for 202 units on Feb 26/09. The systems will be installed on Bradley M-A3 vehicles.

Raytheon’s CIV is a 2nd-generation infrared vision system that provides the commander with a 360-degree battlefield view. It complements sub-systems like DRS’ IBAS (Improved Bradley Acquisition System), and has the same extended-range capabilities. By providing the commander and gunner with independent sights, it allows the vehicle to operate in “hunter-killer” mode, with the gunner engaging one target while the commander surveys the situation and queues up the next victim.

Sept 22/08: +326 various. BAE announces a a $742 million U.S. Army contract to remanufacture and upgrade 326 Bradley vehicles. The award exercises an option in the contract announced on July 8/08, and brings the total value of BAE Systems’ 2008 Bradley remanufacturing contracts to $1.3 billion for 578 vehicles.

Under this award, BAE Systems will remanufacture another 189 M2A3 IFVs (51 of which which will covert to M3A3 cavalry vehicles), 115 M3A3 cavalry vehicles, and 22 M3A3 Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST) vehicles.

These Bradley vehicles will be equipped with improved armor designed to resist land mine attacks, Bradley Urban Survivability Kits, and several engineering changes designed to increase soldier survivability. The company will also provide more than 200 different types of spare parts in varying quantities. Work under the contract will begin immediately by the existing workforce, with deliveries ending in February 2011.

July 8/08: +252. BAE announces a $538 million U.S. Army contract to remanufacture 252 Bradley vehicles: 160 M2A3 vehicles, 60 M3A3 cavalry vehicles and 32 M3A3 Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST) vehicles in conjunction with the Red River Army Depot. The company will also provide 200 different types of spare parts, in varying quantities.

Work under the contract will begin immediately, with deliveries ending in June 2010.

Sept 15/08: IED kits. BAE Systems announces an $11 million contract from the U.S. Army to purchase and install Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Mine Armor Kits on 433 Bradley Combat Systems vehicles. This award also includes the installation work for 116 kits previously purchased under this contract. When combined with previous awards, this modification brings the total contract value to $96 million for Bradley IED Mine Armor Kits.

Work under the contract will be conducted at various field installation sites with deliveries scheduled from December 2008 through March 2009.

March 31/08: Sub-contractors. L-3 Communications Corp. received a $20.8 million firm-fixed price contract for remanufactured Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems transmissions. Work will be performed in Muskegon, MI and is expected to be complete by Aug 4/09. Web bids were solicited on Oct 17/07, and 1 bid was received by U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-08-C-0119).

FY 2005 – 2007

Heavy orders, as wars take their toll.

M2s, Sadr City
(click to view full)

July 23/07: +172 various. BAE announces a pair of contract modifications from the U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command, totaling $411.7 million.

Under the first contract, BAE Systems will upgrade 172 Bradleys to the A3 baseline: 108 M2A2 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 60 M3A2 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles and 4 M7 FIST Fire Support Team Vehicles. The second contract calls for BAE Systems to provide spare parts for Bradley A3 Combat Systems. Deliveries for both contracts are scheduled to begin in October 2009, and continue through February 2010.

These contracts, when combined with the $1.16 billion contract awarded in November 2006 for the remanufacture and upgrade of 610 Bradley Combat Systems, bring the total value of BAE Systems Bradley work to $3.9 billion for Fiscal Years 2005 – 2007. BAE Systems release.

Feb 14/07: +8 A3. The full delivery order amount of $16 million as part of a firm-fixed-price contract for the remanufacture and upgrade of 8 Vehicles to M2A3 standard, and return to 0 Mile Condition. Work will be performed in York, PA (60%), Fayette, PA (8%), Santa Clara, CA (28%), and Aiken, SC (4%), and is expected to be complete by May 31, 2009. This was a sole source contract initiated on Feb. 10, 2006 (W56HZV-05-G-0005). See also BAE Systems release.

Nov 27/06: +490 various. BAE Systems in York, PA receives the full delivery order amount of $1.01 billion as part of a firm-fixed-price contract to remanufacture of 490 total Bradleys into M2A3 Infantry Fighting Vehicle, M3A3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle scouts, and A3 BFIST targeting and fire control vehicle configurations. Work will begin immediately, and will be performed in York, PA (60%), Fayette, PA (8%), Santa Clara, CA (28%), and Aiken, SC (4%). Deliveries are scheduled to begin in April 2008, and the contract is expected to be complete by May 31, 2009. This was a sole source contract initiated on Feb. 10, 2006 (W56HZV-05-G-0005).

Nov 27/06: +120 ODS. BAE Systems in York, PA receives the full delivery order amount of $118.7 million as part of a firm-fixed-price contract to remanufacture 120 total Bradleys to M2A2-ODS and M3A2-ODS configurations. Work will begin immediately, and will be performed in York, PA (60%), Fayette, PA (8%), Santa Clara, CA (28%), and Aiken, SC (4%), and is expected to be complete by May 31, 2009. Deliveries are scheduled to begin in April 2008, and the contract is expected to be complete by May 31, 2009. This was a sole source contract initiated on Feb. 10, 2006 (W56HZV-05-G-0005). See BAE release re: its Nov 27/06 contracts.

July 28/06: +96 various. The 2 orders announced on this day included full delivery order amounts of $192.6 million and $30.9 million [TL.= $223.5 million] as part of a firm-fixed-price contract for FY 2006 remanufacture and upgrade of Bradley vehicles. Work will be performed in York, PA (83%), Aiken, SC (5%), San Jose, CA (8%), and Fayette, PA (4%), and is expected to be complete by Dec. 31, 2008. This will be performed under a sole source contract initiated on May 17, 2006 (W56HZV-05-G-0005).

BAE Systems, in partnership with Red River Army Depot (RRAD), will remanufacture and upgrade a total of 96 vehicles whose final configurations will be: 57 Bradley A3 vehicles in infantry (M2A3) and cavalry (M3A3) configurations, 16 Bradley A3 Fire Support Team (FIST) vehicles, and 23 M7 BFIST vehicles based on the M2A2-ODS. See also BAE’s release.

June 27/05: +533. See BAE’s June 27, 2005 release covering all of the remanufacturing work announced on DefenseLINK June 23, 2005. DID also covered this set. Over $1.1 billion worth of contracts encompassed:

• 450 older Bradleys remanufactured to Bradley A3 status – the total value of this delivery order also incorporates 55 vehicles and $71.5 million awarded in March, 2005.

• 50 vehicles remanufactured to Bradley A2-ODS status, plus kits to convert 100 more vehicles to the A2-ODS configuration.

• 33 vehicles remanufactured to Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST) vehicles

• Spares for Bradley A3 vehicles (not noted below, as not part of the remanufacture program)

• BAE Systems will also provide 120 Commander’s Independent Viewers for 120 Bradley vehicles ordered under a contract modification.

June 23/05: A3. United Defense LP (now part of BAE Systems) in York, PA receives a delivery order amount of $896.4 million as part of a $967.9 million firm-fixed-price contract for the remanufacture of Bradley A3 vehicles. Work will be performed in York, PA (83%), San Jose, CA (8%), Aiken, SC (5%), and Fayette, PA (4%), and is expected to be complete by Jan. 31, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on March 1, 2005 (W56HZV-05-G-0005).

June 23/05: ODS. United Defense LP (now part of BAE Systems) in York, PA receives the full delivery order amount of $78.4 million as part of a firm-fixed-price contract for the remanufacture of M-A2 Operation Desert Storm vehicles and conversion kits. Work will be performed in York, PA (83%), San Jose, CA (8%), Aiken, SC (5%), and Fayette, PA (4%), and is expected to be complete by Jan. 31, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on March 1, 2005 (W56HZV-05-G-0005).

June 23/05: M7 BFIST. United Defense LP (now part of BAE Systems) in York, PA receives the full delivery order amount of $31.4 million as part of a firm-fixed-price contract for the remanufacture of M7 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicles. Work will be performed in York, PA (83%), San Jose, CA (8%), Aiken, SC (5%), and Fayette, PA (4%), and is expected to be complete by Jan. 31, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on March 1, 2005 (W56HZV-05-G-0005).

June 23/05: Components. United Defense LP (now part of BAE Systems) in York, PA receives a $30.6 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for the commander’s independent viewers. Work will be performed in York, PA (83%), San Jose, CA (8%), Aiken, SC (5%), and Fayette, PA (4%), and is expected to be complete by Jan. 31, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on March 1, 2005 (DAAE07-01-C-M016).

FY 1999 – 2004

123 vehicles – but this list may not be exhaustive.

M2A3 & squad, Iraq
(click to view full)

Sept 24/99: +53. United Defense LP (now part of BAE Systems) in York, PA receives a $43.8 million modification to cost-plus-fixed-fee contract DAAE07-96-C-X036, to acquire the effort necessary to remanufacture/ convert 53 Bradley Fighting Vehicles from an M3A0 configuration to an M3A2-ODS configuration. Work will be performed in York, PA and is expected to be complete by Nov. 30, 2001.

Dec 21/98: +70. United Defense LP (now part of BAE Systems) in York, PA receives a $114.6 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for the remanufacture of 27 M2A2 vehicles to the upgraded M2A3 configuration, remanufacture of 43 M3A2 vehicles to the upgraded M3A3 configuration, and the purchase of material/support for 3 M2A3 vehicles (the price for an option to build these three vehicles is not included in this contract action). Work will be performed in York, PA and is expected to be complete by March 31, 2001. This is a sole source contract initiated on Jan. 30, 1998 (DAAE07-96-C-X036).

Additional Readings & Sources

• Army Technology – Bradley M2 / M3 Tracked Armoured Fighting Vehicles, USA

• GlobalSecurity.org – M2 and M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems (BFVS)

• Association of the United States Army, Army Magazine (June 2005 – DEAD LINK) – Bradley A3. Good overview of the Bradley modernization program. See this 2012 document from PEO GCS [PDF] instead.

• BAE Systems – Command and Control Vehicle (C2V), M4. Via Wayback.

• Army Technology – Bradley Linebacker Short Range Air Defense Vehicle, USA

• BAE Systems – Bradley Fire Support Vehicle, M7. Via Wayback.

• Association of the United States Army, Army Magazine (July 2002) – M7 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle

• Ft. Sill, OK – Fire Support Branch (re: M7 Bradley BFIST). Via Wayback.

• Defense News (Sept 23/13) – Industry Pushes Back Against Army Report. “BAE Systems CEO Linda Hudson, the heads of 40 suppliers that help sustain the company’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle program and several labor unions penned a highly critical letter to Army Secretary John McHugh on Sept. 19…”

• Breaking Defense (March 14/13) – BAE Storms Hill For Bradley Funding To Keep Penn. Plant Alive.

• Lt. Col. James L. Miller, Field Artillery Magazine (Sept-Oct 2002) – How to Develop the Best-Ever Fire Support System [PDF]. Good explanation re: the doctrinal, training, and support elements that go into this effort. See also his maintenance notes re: the M7 Bradley BFIST.

After years of attempts at inner-party reform, dissidents of Jombesh, one of Afghanistan’s major political parties, have given up. They have left and created a new party; not very surprisingly it is called the “New Jombesh.” The recent departure to Turkey – officially for ‘medical treatment’ – by ‘old’ Jombesh leader (and First Vice President) Abdul Rashid Dostum indirectly facilitated this step. AAN’s co-director, Thomas Ruttig (with input by Ali Yawar Adili), takes a closer look at this emerging competition for the leadership over Afghanistan’s Uzbeks.

A new political party has been launched by dissidents from Abdul Rashid Dostum’s Jombesh. Jombesh-e Nawin-e Afghanistan (New Movement of Afghanistan) officially declared its existence – the step traditionally taken by new Afghan parties before officially registering – at a press conference on 11 June 2017.

The new party’s launch happened only a month after the ‘old’ Jombesh’s leader Abdul Rashid Dostum, a former warlord of Uzbek ethnicity who is also the country’s First Vice President, left Afghanistan for Turkey. Ostensibly, this trip was for ‘medical treatment’. In fact, it amounted to an all-but-official dismissal from his position in response to Dostum’s involvement in a high-profile case of violence against a former political ally (more on this below). (1) While in Turkey, Dostum joined a new tripartite Etelaf bara-ye Nejat-e Afghanistan (Alliance for the Salvation of Afghanistan) forged in his Ankara residence; it is a coalition between his ‘old’ Jombesh, Jamiat-e Islami and the wing of the Hazara-dominated Hezb-e Wahdat led by Muhammad Muhaqqeq (see here). (A separate AAN dispatch on this issue will follow soon.)

The removal of Dostum from the scene and the establishment of yet another opposition alliance are additional expressions of the multi-faceted crisis that the National Unity Government (NUG) has faced since it was established almost three years ago. This crisis is now increasingly underpinned by ethnic and political polarisation, both within the NUG and beyond (for information about earlier episodes of the crisis see AAN analysis here, here and here).

With the overshadowing figure of Dostum away and his return unclear, the dissidents dared to do what they had tried to avoid for more than a decade whilst pushing for reform (and, without saying it aloud, trying to sideline the volatile Dostum) – they made a break with the mother party. (For more on the reform attempts in Jombesh, see this 2012 AAN report)

While the new party still has to register, the new Jombesh is, for now, led by a temporary executive council. The first party congress will be held “soon” according to Muhammad Alem Sa’i, the party’s current leading figure. Sa’i is a former governor of Jowzjan (2009-13) and, at the time, has led an interesting group of younger Turkish-educated reformers called the Aidan Group. The members of this group owe their careers to Dostum after he had selected them for scholarships abroad. They tried, after their return to Afghanistan, to win his support for their own claim to the party leadership, but this failed. In 2013, Dostum and Sa’i fell out over the latter’s refusal to join the opposition alliance to which Dostum then still belonged, the National Front of Afghanistan. After protests staged by Dostum’s followers against Sa’i, and an attack on his residence, (media report here), the central government decided to replace Sa’i as governor.

According to Sa’i, the new party has already been unofficially operating and recruiting members in Kabul and the provinces for four years. He claimed it had branches in 25 provinces and members from all ethnic groups.

The original Jombesh, officially called Jombesh-e Melli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan), is one of the country’s main tanzims, ie the military-political networks that emerged during the fight against the Soviet occupation (1979-98). This one, however, was originally set up by the communist regime as a security guard (a “group for the defence of the revolution”) around the oilfields of Sherberghan in Jowzjan province and Dostum’s home area. (2) Jombesh had, and still has, its main basis drawn from among the Turkic-speaking population of northern Afghanistan. These are mainly the larger Uzbek ethnic groups and fewer Turkmens.

However, Jombesh’s and Dostum’s clout does not solely come from a successful appeal to ethnic loyalties. Dostum has also, consistently and successfully, prevented contenders for the leadership emerging from within his party and the wider ethnic community. If necessary, he acted ruthlessly, even vis-à-vis his own close followers, if they deviated from his line or threatened to become too much of a challenge. In the past, there were also hand-outs to his followers and to Sheberghan’s population (such as free gas supply, a feature that now appears to have ceased). Such hand-outs were financed from his control over the Sheberghan gas fields and, according to reports that are difficult to verify, payments from regional allies in Central Asia and beyond, including, at least for some time, the US (see, for example, this report, p 4). Dostum was also among those warlords who were re-mobilised with CIA money as allies against the Taleban in 2001; the Washington Post, at that time, called him “America’s man in Afghanistan”.

New Jombesh’s political positions

The New Jombesh has clearly put itself in the government’s camp. In its first statement in mid-May 2017 (still before its official launch) published over social media – the communication channel of choice for many Afghan politicians, political parties and social groups – the party declared its unequivocal “support for the government under the leadership of President Ghani,” adding that the government should “complete its term.”

In the on-going debate about the failures of the National Unity Government and the demands by the opposition for reforms (demands that are often primarily aimed at the re-distribution of government positions) or even a change in the political system (AAN analysis here), the New Jombesh has rejected demands for resignation of the National Unity Government and early presidential elections. It also announced that it would take part in the recently scheduled 2018 parliamentary elections.

On the subject of the recent terrorist attacks and protests in Kabul (see AAN analysis here, and here), the New Jombesh tried to take a balanced position, as it called for “deep and fundamental reforms to the security agencies,” the avoidance of “any political, ethnic and regional taste” in the demands of the opposition, and the identification and prosecution of the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks. Muhammad Alem Kohkan, the secretary of the New Jombesh, even offered up the party as a mediator between the protestors and the government. (3)

The new party’s first official statements do not distinguish it much from other Afghan political parties. The catchwords used are familiar: supporting national unity, reform and political pluralism with this based upon “the principles of Islamic and human ethics” and aspiring to “consolidate the democratic system.”

The name of the new party suggests that the dissident’s break with the mother-party is not that clear-cut and that it probably intends to, in the first place, recruit among the ‘old’ Jombesh’s core base: the northern Afghan Turkic-speakers or turk-tabaran (4). In order to do so, it has raised Jombesh’s old battle cry over the Uzbeks’ (or Turks’) under-representation in the government institutions demanding a “fair representation of different ethnic and social groups.” With its potential connections to the (resources of the) government – from which Dostum once more has become estranged – this amounts to a veritable challenge to the so far unchallengeable Dostum.

At the same time, the new party – just as the ‘old’ Jombesh did – tries to reach out to other ethnic groups, not least because Afghanistan’s laws governing political parties exclude purely ethnicity-based parties. The new party called upon “all well-natured and patriotic countrymen, including respected ulema, tribal elders, civil and media activists, traders, business people, farmers, workers, women and youths, who wish to participate actively and constructively in the political struggle” to join. It remains to be seen, though, whether the provincial branches of both Jombeshs have really managed to recruit significant numbers of non-turk-tabaran. (5) Although the ‘old’ Jombesh also always aspired to develop a base among non-Turks, it was never overly successful.

Unsurprisingly, and probably correctly, Sa’i portrayed the establishment of the new party as a continuation of earlier attempts to reform Jombesh from the inside (read AAN analysis of the earlier attempts here and here). In a 18 June 2017 interview with Kabul-based newspaper Madanyat, he said that, as deputy head of the old Jombesh, he had tried to bring reforms to the party, but there had been “no open ear to pay attention to these ideas and programmes” and that in the party “flattering is heeded more than thought, talent and programme.” He also criticised the old party for being “monopolised by one family,” adding that “no role is granted to people outside the family of General Abdul Rashid Dostum.” Therefore, he said, a council, not an individual, would lead the new party.

Esmatullah Raghib, a columnist for the Ghor-based Jam-e Ghor website, criticised Dostum for having allowed both Karzai and Ghani to repeatedly “deceive” him “without learning from the experience”. Indeed Karzai, for example, had given Dostum the title of “Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Afghan National Army,” a grandiose-sounding position without staff, mandate or budget. Raghib also accused Dostum of “suppression” of the younger, educated generation of Uzbeks who wanted to become politically active outside Jombesh.

 A chain of allies-turned-foes

Known politicians among the new party’s leaders who are mentioned in the media include Jamahir Anwari (a Turkmen and former Minister of Refugees and Repatriation Affairs), Hashim Ortaq (an MP from Faryab), Nazari Turkman (a former deputy speaker of the Wolesi Jirga from Kunduz) and Ezzatullah Amed, former head of Kabul Polytechnic. Former Minister of Mines Wahidullah Shahrani has denied his reported association with the party.

Ahmad Eshchi, son of an arbab (rich landlord), and former governor of Dostum’s home province Jawzjan in the 1990s, and a son who is a member of Jowzjan’s provincial council have also joined, as photos on social media show. Eshchi – formerly and better known as Engineer Ahmad – was involved in a widely reported personal conflict with Dostum in late 2016, after which Eshchi accused Dostum of serious physical assault and abuse (see, for instance, one media report here).

The case was never fully investigated, although there were arrest warrants issued for a number of Dostum’s bodyguards and Afghanistan’s donors reportedly strongly supported such a move. When Dostum refused to cooperate with the attorney general, government security forces surrounded his residence and then stood down after he mobilised his own armed supporters.

This was only the latest outbreak in a long-standing political rivalry between Eshchi and Dostum. Having joined Jombesh in the 1990s with a small, but well-organised, northern, left-leaning faction of the 1980s’ ruling People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, called Groh-e Kar (Labour Group), Eshchi had already once tried to set up a rival party to Jombesh in the north. In 2003, together with former left-wingers including Groh-e Kar, he launched Jombesh-e Hambastegi-ye Melli Afghanistan (National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan). His attempt to run for president one year later was prevented by Dostum who feared a split of his vote bank. Eshchi temporarily returned to Jombesh but, in 2016, Dostum accused him of financing “the opposition” and being involved in “security problems”. Both were references to cooperation with the Taleban, or other personal enemies, as Dostum’s convoy had been attacked twice by insurgents while he was personally leading anti-Taleban operations in the north (see media reporting here and here).

Somewhat similarly, another former Dostum ally-turned-foe became part of the New Jombesh: Gul Muhammad Pahlawan who, together with his family, fell out with Dostum after he allegedly ordered the assassination of his brother, Faryab-based commander Rasul Pahlawan in 1996 (Rasul, a Dostum ally, had refused to give up ‘autonomy’ to the latter with his stronghold in Jowzjan). Another brother, General Abdul Malek Pahlawan, who had risen to become Dostum’s deputy, turned the guns against him in revenge in 1997 and helped the Taleban take over Mazar-e Sharif. Later, in 2004, Malek was part of a first attempt to wrest at least part of the northern Turkic electorate from Dostum’s control when he set up Hezb-e Azadi (Freedom Party). (6)

Legal action and elections

Dostum interpreted the investigation against him and his bodyguards in the Eshchi case as an attempt by the president and his allies to sideline, not just himself, but the Uzbeks in general. A few months after he became First Vice President of the country – the highest position ever taken by an Uzbek in Afghanistan – he had accused the president of only giving him unimportant tasks, such as the oversight over the National Olympic Committee. He was “not Ronaldo,” he was quoted as saying then, referring to the Portuguese football star, “You can’t just throw a football at me.”

This was followed by complaints that the government had not supported him when he was attacked during his 2016 anti-Taleban operations, and that National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar and intelligence chief Massum Stanaksai (both Pashtuns) had conspired against him and wanted him killed – implicitly accusing them of being part of a “fifth column” within the government (quoted from this Dari video). He accused Ghani of favouring Pashtuns in his government, particularly from his home province Logar.

The Eshchi case was not the first time legal action was sought against Dostum for violence against a former ally. In 2008, Ghani’s predecessor Karzai suspended Dostum from office and wanted him arrested after a similar case of “kidnap and torture” of Akbar Bai. (7) The latter had accused Dostum of planning the murder of political rivals in his ethnic group, but was also preparing a challenge to Dostum’s political leadership among the turk-tabaran. (8) Dostum’s guards prevented a planned arrest by shooting at the police. In a similar move as that involving the recent departure of Dostum, Karzai and his US allies persuaded him to take a ‘vacation’ in Turkey. (9) One year later, he was brought back, in what the Telegraph called “a last minute gambit by Mr Karzai to secure an ethnic bloc vote which had seemed likely to split in recent weeks.”

The embarrassment potential of the Eshchi case for president Ghani comes from the fact that he had put Dostum on his 2014 presidential ticket in the first place, while full-knowing his background and volatile character. Although Ghani had forced Dostum to half-apologise for his civil war atrocities (see AAN reporting here), the alliance was criticised – particularly as Ghani, during his first attempt at the presidency in 2009, had called Dostum, then a Karzai ally, a “known killer” (quoted here). In order to get Dostum on his side, Ghani had to extract Dostum from an opposition alliance that, in the run-up to this election, united almost all political forces that were considered as the main representative of the three largest non-Pashtun ethnic groups: the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras (see here and here). To do so, Ghani offered Dostum the first vice-presidency, so far always held by a Tajik – with ‘his’ Uzbek vote block that numerically was large enough to have swung the 2014 result in Ghani’s favour. (10)

The publicity generated by the Eshchi affair enabled President Ghani to generate enough pressure to make Dostum leave on a pretext while, at the same time, avoiding a public break with him and deepening the on-going government crisis. (Some Afghan media reports quoted a spokesman of the president as saying that, if Dostum was proven innocent in the investigations in the Eshchi case, he could resume working in his position (see for example here). 

‘Old’ Jombesh’s reaction

The old Jombesh party reacted with derision to the establishment of the new Jombesh. On the day of its launch, it said it considered the newcomers “affiliated with the government” who would not cause “any disruption or split to the Jombesh party”. Some Dostum supporters went further, calling the New Jombesh “agents of the Palace” and announced on their social media pages that the new party would “not be allowed to operate among the turk-tabaran”. Abdullah Rahimi, a Jombesh representative in Germany, even likened the new party’s leadership with “suicide bombers imported from other side of the border” on his Facebook account.

Already in mid-March, with the Eshchi affair at its zenith, Dostum – who since the last party congress in 2008 officially is ‘only’ Jombesh’s “honorary chairman” – made it clear that he was not willing to rescind control over the mother-party. After years of non-family members being nominal heads of the party, (11) he had his oldest son, Haji Bator Dostum, “unanimously elected” as acting head “until the convening of its fourth congress”, which has regularly been announced since 2011 when it had originally been due. (12)

A Turkey link?

Afghan observers with knowledge of Jombesh’s internal discussions told AAN they believe Turkey played a role in the promotion of the younger generation of Afghan Uzbeks now leading the New Jombesh and supported the removal of Dostum from the Afghan scene by agreeing to host him. A number of the new party’s leaders, including Sa’i, have studied in Turkey – ironically with grants handed out via Jombesh. They also believe that the Afghan government, with possible support by Washington, obtained President Recep Tayyib Erdogan’s support to host Dostum again. (13) In exchange, they say, Ghani conceded control over a network of Afghan-Turk schools to the government in Ankara in February 2017. This was also reported by Afghan media. (14)

There have been good relations between the government in Ankara and the co-Turk Dostum ever since Turkey, after the break-up of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, tried to project some influence, if not political hegemony, over Turkic Central Asia (which, geographically, extends to the northern slopes of the Hindukush, including what used to be called Afghan Turkestan). Also, Turkey had hosted Dostum already and has been home for parts of his family for some years now. By hosting Dostum again, observers argue, this would further obligate Ghani to the Erdogan government and give the latter increasing influence in Afghanistan.

A ticket home for Dostum?

The establishment of the New Jombesh is the result of a combination of genuine, but failed attempts to reform one of the most powerful parties of the country. It is a foreboding of political positioning before the coming elections. Its break with the mother party seems to herald the end of the attempts for inner-party reform in the original party. Given Dostum’s known reaction to inner-party dissent, a way back for its leaders seems out of the question. They obviously hope to gain the support of the president’s camp by providing it with a platform to mobilise Uzbeks and Turkmens of northern Afghanistan independently from Dostum for the parliamentary elections in 2018 and the next presidential election in 2019.

Whether the president’s side will take up this offer depends on whether it wants to use Dostum’s absence from the country to sideline, or at least weaken, an unloved ally without losing face and to create a political alternative in his ethnic stronghold – or whether it chooses to patch up the conflict with Dostum, as Karzai did before the 2009 presidential election. The reports of his possible return, if the investigation against him (or rather, his bodyguards) proves his innocence, seem to point to the latter. Such an outcome would appear to strengthen Dostum’s hand, as he would, not only return to his vice-presidential position, but also could likely increase the price for his support for the Ghani ticket in the upcoming elections. The fact that Dostum has joined the tripartite “Alliance for the Salvation of Afghanistan” suggests that he is positioning himself to either challenge the government or to use this challenge as a bargaining chip. (A separate AAN dispatch on this issue will follow soon.)

The return of a strengthened Dostum would cement his quasi-monopolistic role as “the Uzbek leader” – a role he is consistently given by the country’s leadership and its allies, as well as the media – and would be another backlash for the emergence of more pluralistic (party) politics in Afghanistan. The new Jombesh, in that scenario, is likely to end up in the margins of Afghanistan’s political landscape. However, the final break of the erstwhile Jombesh reformers with the mother party also shows that there is, both a need, and a niche, for political alternatives in northern Afghanistan.

 

(1) For now, the Afghan government is officially sticking to the medical treatment version and has called rumours about Dostum being sent into exile “baseless”. The Afghan news agency Tolo reported that relatives had “forced” Dostum to have treatment in Turkey.

(2) During the 1980’s civil wars, Jombesh, which was, in essence, a militia, fought on the side of the Soviet-backed Najibullah government (1987-92) against the mujahedin. It quickly became the regime’s unofficial shock troop. Its brutal forays into southern Afghanistan earned Dostum’s fighters the nickname of kelim-jam, meaning “carpet thieves”. (They did more than just stealing, as reported by the Afghanistan Justice Project (pp 49ff). In 1987, Dostum’s militia was upgraded to the 53rd Infantry Division of the army and, in 1990, he officially became a division commander and a general (see this report, p 17). Five years later, in 1992, with the Najibullah government losing Russian financial support, Dostum did a last-minute about-face. His men occupied Kabul airport, joined the mujahedin and handed Kabul to them; they also prevented Najibullah from boarding a plane into exile in India. As a reward, Hazrat Sebghatullah Mujaddedi, the first interim president of the new mujahedin government, officially gave Dostum his general’s rank again. The mujahedin’s mistrust vis-à-vis the ‘former communist’, though, never fully went away.

As a party, Jombesh was created in early spring 1992, immediately after Dostum’s break with the Najibullah government, under the name of Jombesh-e Shemal (Movement of the North) (see this AAN report, p4). Initially, it was designed as an all-northern counterweight to Shura-ye Nazar, the Jamiat commanders’ network set up by late Ahmad Shah Massud. Atta Muhammad Nur, then a local Jamiat commander outside Mazar-e Sharif, was initially actually a deputy leader of Jombesh (see this report, p 2). Periodically, Jombesh also included Tajiks and Pashtuns, depending on the shifts of regional alliances in northern Afghanistan. After a few months, in June 1992, the party officially was renamed “Jombesh.”

(3) Kohkan has been a member of the executive council of the Rights and Justice Party that was headed by National Security Advisor, Hanif Atmar. Before that, he was active in Jombesh’s cultural and publication section. He is said to be a relative of Hashem Ortaq, an MP from Maimana (Faryab province), whose name is also mentioned as a leading member of the new Jombesh.

(4) Turk-tabar can also relate to an even broader ethnic spectrum or Central Asian background, including the Tajiks, for example.

(5) This has not been overly successful, even in the case of old Jombesh. In 2005, for instance, it adopted a fringe party from Nangrahar province – Hezb-e Mobarezin-e Melli-ye Demokrat-e Solh-e Afghanistan (Party of National Democratic Fighters for Peace in Afghanistan) – as its local branch and awarded its leader Zhan Pacha Shinwari with a seat on Jombesh’s political committee. Shinwari was expelled again in 2013 (source: Aina TV, 16 June 2005).

(6) After 1997, Malek (who does not use the takhallos Pahlawan anymore) fell out with the Taleban again and fled to the US. The Taleban were so upset about his ‘treason’ that, when the US demanded the extradition of Osama ben Laden after the October 2000 terrorist attack against a US navy vessel in the Gulf of Yemen, they asked for Malek in exchange.

Malek’s Hezb-e Azadi (Freedom Party) was registered in 2004, but disappeared after the Ministry of Justice’s 2010 re-registration drive. See also this non-AAN report by the author, pp 29/30. Initially the Freedom Party received protection from Dostum’s main northern rival Atta, from Jamiat-e Islami. Later, it was allied with then president Hamed Karzai but, in 2014, Malek supported Abdullah in the election. He currently serves as an adviser to Abdullah.

(7) Another case of violence against a Jombesh dissident was reported by the New York Times in June 2006.

(8) Another leading Turkmen departing Jombesh was Ismail Munshi, from Aqcha in Jowzjan. Munshi was a former deputy head of Jombesh’s Executive Council, who walked out on Dostum and the party at a 2011 political committee meeting (here, p 9). It is striking that those who fell out with Dostum were often Turkmens. As AAN had already written in 2011, the “Turkmen are the group who have particularly struggled for reforms in the party and have their own leaders among the Jombesh leadership.” (see AAN previous analysis here) Also, on the role of the Turkmens in Jombesh see this report, pp 7-9.)

(9) This was not Dostum’s first stint in Turkey. He lived there between 1998 and 2001, after the Taleban ousted him from Mazar-e Sharif, up to his return in 2001 as an US ally (see this report, p 19).

(10) As the 2004 presidential election showed, when Dostum ran and had exactly 10 per cent of the total vote, he has a potential of around 800,000 votes. This is more than double the margin Ghani was over the 50 per cent threshold in 2014. (The total number of valid ballots cast in 2014 was given as 7,120,585, of which Ghani had 3,935,567 and Abdullah 3,185,018. This represents a difference of around 750,000 votes. See the figures here and here)

(11) The non-family member leaders included Sayyed Nurullah Sadat, who had been acting head since either 2004 or 2005 (unclear) and was official head from 2008 to 2013; in a short intermezzo in 2008/09, he was replaced by Mawlawi Kabir, a Sarepul MP. Sayyed Azizullah Kargar has been acting leader since 2013.

(12) Jombesh’s Aina TV reported a 400-strong gathering of the party’s political committee, its secretariat and provincial leaders, did the election. Enayatullah Babur Farahmand, Dostum’s chief of staff, wrote on his Facebook account that the proposal to elect Bator Dostum had come from Kargar himself who – in old ‘communist’ fashion – had tendered his resignation “on grounds of health problems”, but promised to “stand by the side” of the new acting leader to carry out whichever post was designated to him.

Haji Bator Dostum, in contrast to his father, has a modern education. (According to different information he has either graduated in Turkey or the US.) Earlier this year, he travelled to the US in his father’s place (reportedly the US refused to give General Dostum a visa, still a decision of the Obama administration). A Jombesh spokesman said he held meetings with an adviser of president Donald Trump and a potential American ambassador to Afghanistan. (see media reports here and here).

(13) The Turkish president was already personally interested in Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s. One photo recently re-published in Turkish newspapers (see, for example, here) showed him as a young man admiringly looking up to Hezb-e Islami leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, during an un-dated visit to Turkey; next to him is Tunisia’s Islamist leader, Rachid Ghannouchi. In those years, Erdogan was a leadership member and (from 1984 onwards) deputy leader of the (later banned) main Turkish Islamist party, the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party). Erdogan’s currently ruling AKP party emerged from a split in one of Refah’s Islamist successor parties.

(14) The first two Afghan-Turk schools were actually opened in 1995 and 1996 in Shebarghan and Mazar-e Sharif, which were then still under Dostum’s control, while the Taleban were advancing in the rest of the country. The Taleban closed those schools later. In total, six such schools with a total of 5,000 students were active in the country, in Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Sherberghan. They were run by a Turkish non-governmental organisation, Afghan Turk CAG Educational NGO (ATCE), which Ankara sees as linked to the religious Gülen movement outlawed by Erdogan after the failed coup in July 2016. The Turkish government has asked for the schools to be transferred to a government-run educational and charitable foundation. Additionally, according to Tolo news, Kabul agreed to expel “some 150 pro-Gülen Turkish teachers” after the handover. Parents of the students have since then protested the move (see here), arguing that, since the schools had been established by private persons (including Afghans and Turks) and registered as private educational institutions, the government could not hand them over.

 

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