Africa

The top UN official in Somalia, Nicholas Kay, has strongly condemned today’s attack by Al Shabaab militants on an African Union Mission (AMISOM) base at Janaale, Lower Shabelle Region manned by troops from the Ugandan contingent.

September 1, 2015 (JUBA) - South Sudan's governing Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) would make reconciliation, unity and forgiveness a top priority during the transitional period of the government of national unity, a leading official said on Tuesday.

SPLM chairman Salva Kiir (R) greets former SG Pagan Amum (L) as Riek Machar looks on, January 14, 2010 (SPLM photo)

Former South Sudanese cabinet affairs minister, Deng Alor Kuol, said Tuesday the work of the secretary general of the SPLM, Pagan Amum, as chief administrator in the party, would be dedicated to organising the party.

“The launch of the national reconciliation would be the priority of the SPLM leadership during the transitional period. This work will be spearheaded and supported by the entire secretariat and the leadership of the SPLM to achieve peace, unity, reconciliation and forgiveness,” Kuol told Sudan Tribune in an exclusive interview on Tuesday.

“I am sure comrade Pagan Amum in his capacity as the secretary general will devote time and energy to overseeing any initiative aimed at uniting the party, uniting the ranks of the leadership and our people,” he said.

The leading official underscored that the recently signed peace should not be read as a reward or return to the status quo but rather an opportunity to allow the ruling party to correct itself and accept their actions.

“There can be no agreement with provisions satisfying the wants and desires of all the parties. Agreement world over are means of resolving problems. They are not the end to the problem. We all have to talk about peace and always nurture it for us to success as a nation. We should not let revenge rule our lives,” he added.

While stressing on the significance of the plan for national reconciliation, he left details vague on precise timetable for foreign troops to withdraw from the country, and laws disqualifying former members of the party who may be found to have masterminded and played an important role in fermenting the conflict from important jobs.

He also failed to offer a clear view on any strategy for disarming the militias, which are currently seen as the greatest security threat.

Observers are keen to note that any amnesty for militants will not apply to people who have perpetrated violent acts but would not be possible without mutually transformative engagement with partner organizations and leaders who provide various gifts and resources to the initiative.

He urged state residents to prioritise peace and provide support in the implementation of the peace deal which President Salva Kiir has signed, saying it provides an opportunity to resolving the differences and putting the country on the right path instead of putting personal ambition and interests to jeopardise efforts to bring peace to the country, following the signing of regional backed peace deal.

Kuol was one of former detainees who were detained for months by president Kiir's government following eruption of violence in Juba in December 2013.

He was also dismissed by president Kiir before violence after he was accused of involvement in corruption involving millions of dollars while a cabinet minister.

(ST)

The detection of a new case of Ebola in Sierra Leone over the weekend after the West African country had marked almost three weeks of zero cases has prompted the use of an experimental vaccine to fight the disease, according to the United Nations World Health Organization (WHO).

August 31, 2015 (JUBA) – South Sudanese lawmakers have warned the country's finance and economic planning ministry against spending irregularities after it emerged that some government departments were overpaid and others were deprived of funds.

South Sudanese MPs stand during a parliamentary session in Juba on 31 August 2011 (AFP)

In a heated parliamentary debate that ensured during the second reading for 2015/2016 fiscal year budget on Monday, the MPs said the security sectors of government spent more than it was budgeted for and money had to be cut from the service delivery ministries.

“There is a general disparity in the release of funds by the ministry of finance,” said the parliamentary finance chairperson, Goc Makuac.

“Others [ministries] overspent [and] the committee recommended equitable release of funds to all spending agencies monthly,” he added.

According to the parliamentary findings, the ministry of defense spent 3.7bn South Sudanese Pound (SSP), instead of the approved 3.28bn. The national security ministry in the office of the president took SSP 229m, surpassing the approved SSP 207m.

In sharp contrast to the release of funds for security purposes, the ministry of finance reduced the approved budget for the ministry of health, releasing just SSP 172m of the approved SSP 357m. The roads ministry, on the other hand, got SSP 75m of the SSP 107m, which was approved by the national assembly in the appropriation Act 2014/15.

Onyoti Adigo, leader of the minority in parliament, said the discrepancies violate country's financial laws and was a breach of parliamentary approvals of budgetary allocations to the ministries.

“We call for auditing of all the [government spending] agencies which overspent and accountability must be made,” said Adigo.

“This [overspending and under spending] is a breach of the appropriate Act 2014/2015 and public finance management accountability Act, 2011,” he added in reference to anti-graft laws requiring the finance ministry to operate within approved budgets.

The 2015/2016 fiscal year budget for South Sudan started on 01 July. This year's budget is due for its third and fourth reading this week.

It however remains unclear if the new budget will be approved before the formation of the Transitional Government National Unity (TGNU) in accordance to the IGAD-led peace deal signed by President Salva Kiir and the armed opposition leader, Riek Machar.

(ST)

To Secretary General Ban Ki-­moon
Secretary-­General of the United Nations

Dear Mr. Ban,

Tuesday, 1st September 2015

To the military parade in Beijing on September 3rd you have been invited as an official guest along with other dignitaries including Omar al-Bashir of Sudan. As the survivors of the Genocide perpetrated by Bashir in Sudan, we at the Justice and Equality Movement Sudan openly call on you not to share a public stage with a murderer.

Bashir is wanted by the International Criminal Court on ten counts of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. His actions were declared a Genocide by the United States Government in 2003. Millions of Sudanese have been killed on his orders since he took power in a military coup in 1989. It sends the wrong message for the leader of the United Nations to socialize at events with him while arrest warrants remain outstanding Sent from my iPhone

Mr. Ban, you have highlighted “Advancing the responsibility to protect agenda” as part of your five-year action agenda. Bashir led a violent response to civil war with the south that led to the deaths of million of Sudanese and resulted in the separation of South Sudan from Sudan. He has used Janjaweed militias to murder entire populations in Darfur and continues the scorched earth tactic today. Rape continues to be used by his forces across Sudan as an instrument of war and oppression. It is not responsible to grant Bashir your tacit acceptance by sitting side-by-side with him in the public view.

The United Nations has come under criticism from the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC for not doing enough to help achieve the arrest of Bashir. As survivors of Bashir's Genocide we at the Justice and Equality Movement Sudan beseech you to show your support for the good work of the ICC by not attending the parade in Beijing on September 3rd and instead calling on the Chinese Government to arrest Bashir so that he can be brought to trial.

Yours Sincerely,

Dr. Gibril Ibrahim Fideil Chairman
The Justice and Equality Movement Sudan

By Mahmoud A. Suleiman

It comes as no surprise that the NCP regime President Omer al-Bashir using his fake 'national' dialogue again after apparently felt rest assured that he has recently secured the rapprochement between his regime and the US Administration. The news media reported that the (NCP) regime President Omer al-Bashir declared that he would offer a two-month ceasefire and general amnesty to the rebel movements to participate in the National Dialogue. The reports indicated that the decision comes during the General Assembly for National Dialogue, the third meeting held on Thursday, August 20, 2015 in Khartoum. Here, people of Sudan would say to Omar al-Bashir that the one who tries out something already tried before and proved invalid is an addict par excellence. The Sudanese people ranked them with the political elite group, which became addicted to failure.

The Coordinating Supreme Committee for the National Dialogue 7 +7 of the Republic of Sudan.

The Thursday 20 August 2015 alleged National Dialogue assembly is nothing but a copycat version of its predecessor assemblies, which served nothing for adding credibility to the Wathba Dialogue.

It seems that the members of the National Congress Party met to dialogue with each other about the fate of Sudan amid the economic deterioration caused by financial corruption and nepotism and tribalism, racism and the lavish expenditure on frivolous civil wars of attrition

The members of the National Congress Party (NCP) regime met on Thursday 20 August 2015 to dialogue with each other on the unprecedented determination the economy of Sudan reached through recklessness extravagance and expenditure because of the epidemic corruption, nepotism, tribalism, racism and cost of the absurd civil wars of attrition. The so-called Supreme Coordinating Committee for National Dialogue meeting has provided the opportunity for the NCP membership to dialogue with each other over an array of issues. These issues include the destiny of their regime under the current grinding financial crisis and economic woes faced by the National Congress Party (NCP) government led by their master of grace, the Génocidaire war criminal fugitive from the international justice, Omer Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir.

There are clear contradictions in Omer al-Bashir's intentions behind the national dialogue. While declaring a ceasefire for two months, he has put Sudan's armed forces (SAF) and the Janjaweed militia loyal to the security forces device (NISS) called Rapid Support Force (RSF) on alert and armed them. He has also continued the ongoing aerial bombardment of civilians in the war zones, which is part of the blatant plot to deceive the armed opposition. Meanwhile, the holdout Darfuri armed rebels groups of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Dr. Gibril Ibrahim Mohammed, the Sudan Liberation Army Minni Minnawi (SLA-MM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA- AW) led by Minni Arko Minnawi and Abdel Wahid Mohamed al-Nur respectively are speaking to the Acting Joint Special Representative (AJSR) of the UNAMID to discuss with them ways to reinvigorate efforts for peace in Darfur.

Omer al-Bashir who keeps acting as judge and hangman tried presenting his fake 'national' dialogue swindle to further mislead and cheat the parties in the dispute. The country's crises and issues remained eluding the solutions because of the intransigence of the head of the ruling regime of the NCP Omar al-Bashir and his clique who deliberately fail to offer advice to al-Bashir but instead work to ignite the fire of the problems and increase the complexity.

Al-Bashir kept his alleged ‘fairytale' Wathba Dialogue on hold for more than a year since he announced it in January 2014 and repeatedly delayed it to gain ample time in the face of the opposition's imposed wait.

The dilemma and the irony is that the regime that took power by a military Coup d'état and repeatedly abrogated peace agreements it signed with parties has become impossible to trust. Thus, eternal loss of confidence in the words and promises issued by the President of the (NCP) regime Omer al-Bashir and his entourage became master of the situation.

The methods used by Omer al-Bashir and his clique to deceive the Sudanese people exceeded the borders and became offensive to the memory of the nation of Sudan and the Sudanese people. However, the nimble fiery acumen of the Sudanese people mocks at them. Moreover, the Sudanese people consider that the regime is gasping for breath and happens to be in a pathetic state. It has become the subject of contempt and mockery.

Even worse is that most of the names mentioned as national figures are originally committed members of the National Congress Party (NCP) regime. Moreover, the marathon of political parties who have allegedly attended the Wathba Dialogue are a creation of the NCP regime to give some legitimacy that was originally missing or never even existed , at best; their actual membership does not exceed the party chairperson!

Thus, the meaning of the Saying of the Holy Prophet Peace be Upon Him (PBUH) that says “a person lies and continues to lie until Almighty God writes him a liar”, literally applies on the membership of the Islamist ruling regime, the National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum par excellence.

The people of Sudan have become immune against the (NCP) regime's bag of lies because the President of the ruling (NC P) Omer al-Bashir is negligible and cannot be relied upon. The Sudanese people should not believe the regime nor attach any hopes for returning benefits to them and should refrain from betting upon them. As the poem goes: “This is your era, Oh farces, when the hunting dog was considered among the knights!

Sophistry and philosophy, which one is superior upon the other these days is really a difficult question to answer.

The 2011 arbitrary National Security Act allows the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) unlimited powers of arrest and accountability, inspection and the daily appearance of the accused to the premises of the device in a humiliating manner in a blatant violation and contradiction to the clauses of the 2005 Constitution.

The tyrant Omer al-Bashir seems to have become like the Pharaoh of Egypt who underestimated his people and yet they followed him. and thus the staunch supporters of the National Congress Party (NCP) are such as the people of Pharaoh who used to see only what he sees as al-Bashir and do not listen to the lies of anyone other than the lies of al-Bashir.

As usual, al-Bashir undermined his announcement and knocked it off early on as a preemptive measure to refuse the release of prisoners of war (POWs) one of the liabilities of the opposition as a condition for agreeing to participate in the alleged national dialogue process. This is despite the constant sense of the opposition about lack of sincerity and vacuousness of the promises of Omar al-Bashir. His promises proved as free of credibility consistently over the lean 26 years he ruled Sudan with iron fist and deceit.

Furthermore, Omer al-Bashir put forwards his preconditions that the national dialogue will be inside Sudan and not abroad. The foregoing will increase the likelihood of the opposition refusing to accept engaging in dialogue and this is undoubtedly a great victory for al-Bashir and contributes to buy more time on the account of the opposition cheaply. Moreover, this would stand as an evidence for al-Bashir submitting it to the regional and the international community as a model for non-seriousness of the opposition in the peaceful settlement of the Sudanese crises. This adds to the tactical maneuvering of the dire Sudanese politics by the autocratic Génocidaire Omer al-Bashir and his entourage.

Moreover, of Omer al-Bashir's tactics to divert the opposition components away from participating meaningfully in solving the crisis of Sudan is to create repulsive obstacles such as non-release of political prisoners and prisoners of war and restraining freedoms as well as hindering the passage of relief to citizens in the war zones. Because Omar al-Bashir continues to go solo in his power hegemony in Sudan and feel assured that the hands of the International Criminal Court will not reach him as long as he is in power. Not only that, he is protected by the loyal members of the Sudan armed forces (SAF) and as well as the Janjaweed militia, Rapid Support Force (RSF) which is fighting a proxy war against the armed opposition in lieu for public money and provided it with weapons. The regime continues ignoring the crimes committed by gangs of mercenaries against citizens even in the capital Khartoum.

Recently there are some harbingers that the opposition had agreed to the national dialogue and through it the settlement of crises of Sudan take place. The settlement in question includes the Nuba Mountains, the Blue Nile and the Darfur region. Furthermore, it is understood that the opposition agreed to the new role of the joint mission of the United Nations and the African Union - UNAMID - in the peace process as well as its role in the protection of citizens. Thus, there is a date for the meeting of the Parties in Addis Ababa shortly in this regard.

It is clear since the beginning that in no did Omer al-Bashir way consider any other option than single (NCP) rule in Sudan. All that the ruling regime of the NCP, led by President Omar al-Bashir seeks is to monopolize power forever and ever!

In view to the bitter fact that the Sudanese country of Sudan, once the largest nation in Africa size wise, has been living at war with itself since before independence from the British colonials of January 1, 1956. In fact, the first war began in the City of Torit in the then south of Sudan on August 18 1955 when Torit military garrison mutinied. The insurgency of the Torit garrison meant to deliver their voices to those responsible in Khartoum and meet their desires to improve the conditions of military camps in the south, similar to the Eastern and Northern Areas of Sudan. Further to that, the southerners demanded during the Juba Conference of a regional rule or a Regional autonomy for the southerners in the southern Sudan, but the authorities rejected their request. The Juba Conference delegates attended the conference held in June 1947 from British and Sudanese in the city of Juba, the capital of South Sudan. The apprehension of the Southerners was realized when 800 administrative posts were vacated by the British in preparation for Sudanese "self-rule" Only four of the government posts went to Southerners. In discussions to determine the future of the modern state of Sudan, the southern provinces were largely excluded from the political process. The same marginalization happened to Darfur when the 800 jobs were allocated to the provinces of Sudan prior to the independence.

Sudan is now a state living in a situation similar to the status under international trusteeship, by the sheer presence of the UNAU force (UNAMID) formed under the 1769 UN Resolution on July 31, 2007 as the largest peacekeeping mission consisting of force of about 26,000 personnel began to deploy to the war-torn Darfur region in October 2007. As of December 2008, it has deployed 15,136 total uniformed personnel, including 12,194 troops, 175 military observers, 2,767 military police officers, supported by 786 international civilian personnel, 1,405 local civilian staff and 266 United Nations Volunteers! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations%E2%80%93African_Union_Mission_in_Darfur

The blockage of the political horizon, cultural famine , the escalation of state violence and interventions in all matters of people's lives are the causes of the crisis in Sudan.

The foregoing factors have forced a large number of Sudanese youth who have completed their university studies and could not find work to ride doom boats across the sea and especially the Mediterranean Sea to get to Europe and to be prey to the human trafficking gangs to sadly die in the English Channel Tunnel. There are a number of examples for those who have gone prey to human traffickers including the late Hussam Osman Zubeir and Abdulrahman Haroun who crossed the Channel Tunnel and were arrested by the British police lately.

It takes a real genius to realise that Sudan under the twenty-six lean years of the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (MBM) is at its worst times since it became a nation. In addition, to respond to the words of one of the staunchly loyal members of the entity that was reported as saying boastfully that had it not been for the coming of the National Salvation Revolution (NSR) the Sudanese people would have been a group of paupers and beggars! He was pointing to the military coup, which was carried out by Islamists in June 30, 1989. The (NSR) is aka 'Ingaz, meaning rescue in Arabic'.

The Claim of cultural and ethnic superiority in Sudan has become rife in the era of the rule of the infamous oppressive (Ingaz) regime.

Sudan is a country characterized by cultural and ethnic plurality (570 tribes that speak 595 languages divided into 75 ethnic groups on the basis of linguistic and cultural characteristics and other ethnographical characteristics).

The principle of my brother and I against my cousin and I and my cousin against a stranger becomes prevalent in communities with cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity which leads to the sovereignty of some and the marginalization of others as happens in Sudan today, unfortunately.

This regime went to general elections solo in April 2015 when Bashir was announced as the winner of 94 percent of the votes overwhelmingly in one-sided elections that were boycotted by the opposition political parties, criticized by the West and even by the African Union (AU) and failed to excite the Sudanese people.

The NCP regime refused to attend the preparatory meeting for the process of national dialogue called for by the African Union (AU) and which the opposition, both armed and civilian, attended. The representatives of the so-called Committee of 'Seven plus Seven', who represent the dialogue committee under the pretext of the elections.

After the series of postponements and delays, followed by postponement, the regime now comes and declares the formation of the so-called Supreme Coordinating Committee for the national dialogue consisting of membership of the National Congress Party (NCP) for the distraction of the opposition as well as deception of the regional and international communities and for more time wasting.

AU Resolution 539

While we commend the positions of the African Union (AU) and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) Resolution No. 539 for 2015, but at the same time we know very well that the regime of the National Congress Party (NCP) will work hard to undermine it as it did over the lean 26-year rule of Sudan.

In spite of our reservations, the Resolution-539 restores some hope after periods of despair of dealing with Omar al-Bashir and his entourage. Moreover, at the same time that this historic decision restores credibility to AU its real role ascribed to it.
The African Union (AU) and its organs are supposed to stand with the African people in their just struggle for freedom, democracy and decent life and for a sustainable peace, justice and equality.

The (AU) should not be the mission to support totalitarian regimes that overpower people to stay in power, as in the case of Sudan where citizens have been suffering under the scourge of senseless wars of attrition that destroy everything good to mankind without paying any consideration to their rights.

Having said the foregoing, one will not be flabbergasted if the Islamist regime rebuffs the resolution 539. The ruling regime of the NCP-led by the genocidal criminal, fugitive from the international justice, Omar al-Bashir who has a long history in the lack of commitment to international resolutions or the peace agreements signed with the parties in the conflict.

Breach of contracts and lack of commitment to the peace agreements signed with the parties in the conflict remained the motto for the Muslim Brotherhood entity in Sudan.

Moreover, we are confident that the solutions to the issues of Sudan remain in the hands of the components of the Sudanese people. They are formed of activist youth and peaceful opposition parties and the armed opposition, students and trade unions and women's organizations are able to resist and compel the military junta to submit to the will of the people.

As expected, the news media reported that the NCP President Omer al-Bashir officially rejected the (AUPSC) call for the 'Pre-Dialogue' conference in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa by saying that he wants his 'Wathba' Dialogue to be Sudanese for the Sudanese inside Sudan! He added saying that while addressing a meeting with the Sudan Armed Force (SAF) at the Wadi Sayedna Military base on 30, August 2015. He reiterated his earlier statement that the dialogue he announced in January 2014 will not be held abroad and nobody will be able to force him to change his decision. He went on saying that he would reject any interference from the AU or the United Nations (UN) and that doors are widely open for participation for those willing to see Sudan's issues resolved. He said addressing (SAF) that the year 2016 will be the end of the insurgents who refuse peace through his 'Wathba' Dialogue. Moreover, the NCP regime's Foreign Minister was reported as saying that the role of the AU High Implementation Panel (AUHIP) chaired by Thabo Mbeki is merely to offer an opinion for success of the Wathba Dialogue and nothing more. This means that the regime does not recognize UNAMID as a 'Peace Maker' and it will remain only as a ‘Peace Keeping' Mission regardless of the UNSC and AU bestowing new powers to the United Nations and African Union Mission for Darfur (UNAMID) lately. By saying that the Dialogue will remain solely a Sudanese affair without need for a foreign intervention, Omer al-Bashir tries to exclude the international community from his dialogue.

In a News conference about the current political situation and the future of the national dialogue held on the same date -30' August 2015 - Omer al-Bashir rejected the AUPSC proposal, some opposition parties described Bashir's position as irrational. The participants in the conference described the opposition taken by al-Bashir as irrational and that he is likely to change his opinion and give in to pressures of the international community as he did on several occasions! Some others have said that this is the typical false heroism and vacuous courage that Omar al-Bashir presents to face up to the predicaments of his irrational decisions. However, it is very likely that al-Bashir unexpectedly bows in acquiescence under the pressure of the international community and especially to the looming big stick waved by the United States of America (USA).

The Sudanese people should not attach any hope for achieving solutions to the crisis of their country and citizens languishing in. All the positions of the regime of the NCP affirm the lack of its seriousness in resolving the crisis in Sudan because all the main concern is directed towards maintaining the power to protect President Omar al-Bashir from the pursuit of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

This ruling regime of the NCP constantly seeks to undermine all peace efforts to resolve the crisis the country suffers from and is working on more complexity. Therefore, any attempt for entering into the alleged national dialogue is considered to be falling in the camouflage of no way out and devoid of any benefit.

Thus, the regime kept continuing in the same policies that have deepened the crisis of the nation with indifference without giving any attention to the seriousness of those policies that threatened national unity. The policies referred to above resulted in the secession of southern region of the country in 2011. The escalation of the crises of the country do not have any remedies but to overthrow the regime across the widest possible public front by a popular uprising and civil disobedience and political strike.

Albert Camus, a French Nobel Prize–winning author, journalist, and philosopher quoted as saying (The only way to deal with an unfree world is to become so absolutely free that your very existence is an act of rebellion). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Camus

Dr. Mahmoud A. Suleiman is an author, columnist and a blogger. His blog is http://thussudan.wordpress.com/

August 31, 2015 (KHARTOUM) - The leader of National Liberation and Justice Party (NLJP) and chairman of Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) Tijani al-Sissi has signed a political cooperation agreement with a splinter faction of Dabajo group.

Tijani el-Sissi (SUNA)

The Memorandum of Understanding on Political Cooperation aims to cement relations between the NLJP and the Justice and Equality Movement of Abdel Rahman Banat who spited from Dabajo group in November 2014.

The signing of the political alliance intervenes as al-Sissi is facing a strong rejection by his peace partners: the Liberation and Justice Party (LJP) of Bahr Idriss Abu Garda and the Justice and Equality Movement led by Bakheit Dabajo (JEM-Dabajo).

Speaking at the signing ceremony in Khartoum, the NLJP leader however stressed that this agreement is not directed against any other party but seeks to bring Darfur to what he called "the wider national space".

He further called on the Darfurians to distance themselves from ethnicity and tribalism, adding "I'm not inclined (to support the idea) that our parties and movements be on the name of Darfur, and that is the problem," he stressed.

NLJP president is embattled in a struggle for the DRA chairmanship. His detractors accuse him of not consulting them in the management of the region's matter. They further say that al-Sissi who is a Fur dignitary ignored the areas of the other ethnic groups in the allocation of development projects.

From his side, Banat disclosed that the memorandum pave the ways for merger of the two groups.

Rifts between the groups signatory of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) have become a source of concern for the government after a recent fight between a group of LJP supporters with NLJP members during the launch ceremony of development projects in Khartoum attended by government officials and diplomats.

President Omer al-Bashir formed a fact-finding committee to investigate the circumstances of the incident as he is expected to issue a number of decisions related to the organisation of the regional authority within two week.

(ST)

August 31, 2015 (JUBA) - South Sudanese government said on Monday that Uganda will not withdraw all its troops from the country as stated in the recently signed peace agreement with armed opposition, claiming the former was in the country at the behest of the latter on bilateral arrangement between two sovereign states.

An unidentified man sits in the gun turret while leading a convoy of armoured vehicles from both the South Sudanese government forces and the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) in the streets of Jonglei capital Bor on 19 January 2014 (Photo: AP/Mackenzie Knowles-Coursin)

In some of the security provisions under transitional security arrangements of the new compromise peace deal signed between president Salva Kiir and armed opposition leader, Riek Machar, all foreign forces are required to leave the country within 45 days from signing of the agreement.

But Mawien Makol, South Sudanese spokesperson for the ministry of foreign affairs and international cooperation confirmed reports attributed to senior officials in the Ugandan government as saying their government and the country will instead continue to support and maintain some of its troops in the country as part of a bilateral agreement between the two countries.

“Of course in the agreement Ugandan People Defence Forces (UPDF) are supposed to leave after 45 days but before that, there was a bilateral agreement between Uganda and South Sudan. This agreement allows UPDF to come here and do the other works which is to pursue and cut down the activities of Lord Resistance Army (LRA). That thing stands there. It is not going anywhere,” Makol told reporters on Monday reiterating earlier comments asking when the Ugandan troops would withdraw.

The diplomat confirmed that reports quoting officials at the Ugandan ministry of foreign affairs were correct.

“If they leave within 45 days given in the agreement still we have to hold on [to] some of them. Not all of them will go. Some forces will have to remain in the country in accordance with the bilateral agreement. So the Ugandan officials are correct, their troops will be here to do the things that they have been doing before the war,” he said.

He explained Ugandan troops were in the country way back before the country descended into civil war, but many believe more troops were deployed in the country following the events of the December 2013 when political debates within the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) turned violent.

Ugandan senior officials made contradicting statements when their deputy foreign minister, Okello Oryem, reportedly said UPDF will not withdraw from South Sudan as it had no part in the agreement, but later on an explaining statement from the Ugandan ministry of defence said the deputy minister was misquoted and that UPDF will leave South Sudan within 45 days with exception AU contingent in Western Equatoria state.

The Ugandan contingent deployed to Western Equatoria state before the war broke out in December 2013 will remain per a previous arrangement under the African Union to hunt for the LRA.

(ST)

By Tesfa-Alem Tekle

August 31, 2015 (ADDIS ABABA) – South Sudan's armed opposition leader, Riek Machar has accused President Salva Kiir's government of allegedly "slaughtering hundreds of political prisoners" in the country.

Riek Machar answers questions during a press conference in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa on July 9, 2014 (Photo AFP/Zacharias Abubeker)

Speaking at a press conference held in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa Monday, Machar alleged that the South Sudanese government killed nearly 600 political prisoners on 25 August, the day before president Kiir signed the final peace deal to end the conflict.

Those allegedly slaughtered, he told reporters, were political prisoners in custody under the government's military intelligence.

He said members of his armed opposition movement were concerned over “mass slaughter” that allegedly happened in the capital, Juba.

The rebel leader demanded for an immediate probe into the alleged incident, further stressing that the mass killings that took place against the political detainees undermines the peace accord.

“We question the political will of the government. Is the government serious to implement the agreement or do they have divisions?” he asked.

Machar urged the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-Plus and the international community to look into the matter.

Sudan Tribune could not immediately verify the rebel leader's allegations on the killings.

Both warring factions have, despite signing a peace deal, accused each other's forces of violating the agreed permanent ceasefire.

The rebel leader, however, reiterated his commitment to respect implementation of peace accord and that his group held talks with South Sudanese in Ethiopia asking them to back the peace process.

He said a rebel delegation was dispatched to Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and Egypt to galvanise minds of South Sudanese to support the peace deal and its implementation.

(ST)

August 31, 2015 (JUBA) – A South Sudanese opposition movement has demanded that the East African regional bloc (IGAD) to initiate fresh peace talks aimed at resolving the conflict in the young nation.

South Sudan's former vice president and opposition leader, Riek Machar, signs peace agreement together with SPLM SG Pagan Amum in Addis Ababa, on July 17 2015 (ST)

In a statement issued Monday, the Revolutionary Movement for National Salvation (REMNASA) asked IGAD to consider the views of the people of South and instigate negotiations between the unified South Sudan ruling party regime and other armed opposition fronts in the country to achieve lasting peace to the suffering population.

“The called “Compromised Peace Agreement” signed by the SPLM-IG of Salva Kirr, SPLM-IO of Dr. Riek Machar and SPLM-FD of Pagan Amum is not worth to bring peace as it has been rejected even by the key members of the conflicting parties that signed the agreement,” partly reads the statement signed by its spokesperson, Col. John Sunday Martin.

The opposition group also castigated South Sudan's main rival factions of violating the signed agreement less than 24 hours after they both declared a permanent ceasefire in respect to the accord.

REMNASA said it was worried the peace agreement concluded last week in Juba may remain on paper without effective implementation, thus making it a “dead” peace deal of IGAD-Plus.

“Peace cannot be brought full in any nation by small portion of warring factions, and never will any peace be sustainable while others warring factions are not involved in sustaining it”, stressed the group.

“REMNASA has disowned this peace agreement and so is Federal Democratic Party (FDP); and therefore, without inclusiveness of REMNASA and any other revolutionary forces, IGAD-Plus must not expect any peace, but full scale war”, further added the statement.

Failure by IGAD to initiate fresh talks, the group warned, could provoke “military” options and full scale war against the Juba regime.

They accused the regional bloc of a selective approach in choosing parties to continue ruling South Sudan, which was allegedly against the will of the ordinary citizens in the world's youngest nation.

FAILED LEADERS

Meanwhile, the revolutionary movement described both President Salva Kiir and opposition leader, Riek Machar as “failed” leaders allegedly responsible for the problems the nation currently faces.

“In fact, they (Kirr and Riek) worked perfectly together to loot our national resources, and failed to work as a team to offer constructive political leadership to this nation, as well deliver services to meet the expectation of the suffering people of south Sudan,” the group further said in their statement, which was also extended to Sudan Tribune.

“We are therefore calling for the two leaders to be excluded from the Transitional Government of the National Unity and should they need to come back to lead, they should wait for the general election, and seek it through popular vote of the people,” it added.

The opposition group, however, says it was willing to seek for alliance with every excluded faction such as FDP to ensure IGAD responds positively to their national calls for fresh peace talks with unified SPLM or else launch full scale war as an option for peace in the nation.

(ST)

August 31, 2015 (KHARTOUM) – A number of foreign ambassadors in Khartoum asked the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) for more details on steps undertaken to ensure the success of the national dialogue progress that is scheduled to formally convene on October 10th.

3rd meeting of the national dialogue national assembly in Khartoum on Thursday 20 August 2015 (Photo - SUNA)

The NCP political sector secretary Mustafa Osman Ismail held separate meetings with the ambassadors of Japan, Sweden and Italy at their request for an update on the dialogue initiative.

Ismail said in press statements on Monday that the three ambassadors stressed their strong support for national dialogue and expressed their desire to see the dialogue make a positive leap that would contribute to bringing about stability and development in Sudan.

"We conveyed to the ambassadors the steps undertaken so far in the dialogue process and the keenness of the government and the parties especially the 7 +7 mechanism to make it a success so that it would address the country's problems and lead to the opening up of Sudan's foreign relations," Ismail said.

He went on to say that he conveyed to diplomats his assurances that the dialogue aims to stop the war and create political consensus and addressing all the problems facing the country.

The NCP official said that consensus in the upcoming dialogue conference will contribute and help in drafting a new constitution for the country that would improve Sudan's foreign relations that would eventually reflect on the people's livelihoods.

"The Sudanese are keen on a dialogue that would bring about a positive shift in light of the tension that the world is witnessing, and a positive shift in security, stability and development in Sudan," Ismail said.

In a speech before the general assembly of the dialogue process this month, the Sudanese president Omer Hassan al-Bashir expressed readiness to declare a two-month ceasefire in Blue Nile, South Kordofan states and Darfur region and renewed his offer of amnesty for the rebel who are willing to join the national dialogue.

(ST)

August 31, 2015 (NYALA) – Security committee at three localities in South Darfur state met on Monday to assess the security situation against the backdrop of the ongoing tribal clashes between Salamat and Falata tribes.

Sudanese tribal leaders attend the Darfur talks at the venue of the Darfur peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria on 2 May 2006 (AP)

Members of security committees of Tulus, Buram and Damso localities met in the headquarters of Tulus locality, 90 kilometer south of South Darfur capital, Nyala to evaluate the security danger posed by conflict between the two tribes.

The commissioner of Tulus locality, Ibrahim Abakar Shamna, told Sudan Tribune that security committees of the three localities besides the local administration discussed in an expanded meeting ways for achieving lasting solution to prevent renewal of clashes between Falata and Salamat.

He pointed that the security committees developed strict security measures to arrest any individuals or groups seeking to wreak havoc particularly robbers and looters who drag tribes to bloody clashes, noting that specific groups became known for stealing cattle.

Shamna stressed that security organs are now equipped more than ever with military gears which allow them to curb any security threat in the area.

The commissioner emphasized that security organs wouldn't hesitate to arrest anyone who seeks to create tensions among tribes residing in the three localities, pointing to coordination among security committees, local administration and ordinary citizens to clamp down on the outlaws.

He noted that a mechanism to heal the rift between the two tribes has been developed, saying it would tackle issues of blood money and reparations in a way that preserves the rights of the victims.

Clashes between the two Salamat and Falata erupted last March following theft of cows in Rajaj area. At the time 67 people were killed. Also, seven people were killed in renewed clashes between the two tribes last month.

The central government admitted the failure of traditional reconciliation approach and decided stop these bloody tribal conflicts by bringing to justice the perpetrators of the attacks and through the massive deployment of troops.

(ST)

August 31, 2015 (KHARTOUM) – Four Sudanese female students have secretly flown to Turkey to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), according to local media reports

FILE - Two ISIS supporters hold flag (ABC News)

Khartoum newspapers reported that the group which includes twin sisters have left the country to join ISIS while other media reports claimed that there five in this group.

ISIS presence in Sudan has made the headlines last March after British media outlets confirmed that nine medical students from Sudanese origins entered Syria via Turkey to work in hospitals under the control of ISIS.

Also, last June 18 college students ran off to join ISIS in Syria including the daughter of senior diplomat.

Security cameras at Khartoum airport have captured images of Aya al-Laythi al-Hag Youssef, a third year medical student at the University of Medical Sciences and Technology (UMST) besides the twin sisters Manar Abdel-Salam, a UMST graduate and medical doctor at Garash Hospital in Khartoum and Ibrar Abdel-Salam, a medical student at the National College.

Cameras also captured images of a fourth female student by the name of Thoraya or Sumaia Salah Hamid.

However, aAl-Sudani daily newspaper on Monday quoted the student affairs official at the UMST as saying the two students are not enrolled at his college.

According to the reports, names of the female students were among the list of the departing passengers on the al-Arabiya airlines heading to Istanbul via Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates, saying that security officers at Sharjah airport sought to stop them but to no avail.

It has been reported that the students might have used Somali travel documents.

Meanwhile, Turkey has pledged to intensify efforts to prevent the flow of ISIS sympathizers crossing its border into Syria.

Turkish deputy undersecretary for foreign affairs, Ali Kamal, stressed importance of the international cooperation to fight against this security threat.

“In order to ensure success of Turkey's efforts to prevent flow of people from 100 countries seeking [to join ISIS], we need the support of the international community by providing information and close coordination,” he told reporters in Khartoum Monday.

Kamal further urged the Sudanese authorities to take the necessary measures to curb activities of those extremists groups.

Earlier this month, Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) re-arrested the Salafist Jihadist preacher and supporter of ISIS, Masa'ad al-Sidairah along with several of his disciples.

Also, On 30 June NISS arrested the general coordinator of the far-right One Nation Movement group and the openly supporter of ISIS, Mohamed Ali al-Gizouli.

Last May, Sudan's minister of Higher Education Sumaya Abu-Kushawa accused unnamed circles of actively recruiting students to join ISIS.

At the time, Sudanese second vice-president Hassabo Abdel-Rahman blamed internal and external parties as well as international intelligence agencies for the phenomenon of extremism in the Arab and African communities.

Last Month, Abdul-Ilah, the son of the late leader of Jamaat Ansar al Sunnah, Abu Zaid Mohamed Hamzah, was killed in armed clashes in the ISIS stronghold of Sirte in Libya.

One week earlier, a Sudanese Jihadist nicknamed Abu Ja'afar al-Sudani blew himself up in a car bomb in the Libyan city of Derna last week, killing 9 people and injuring dozens others.

Also, in June ISIS announced that one of its Sudanese fighters nicknamed Abu al-Fida al-Sudani was killed in their stronghold of al-Riqa.

(ST)

By Tesfa-Alem Tekle

August 31, 2015 (ADDIS ABABA/KAMPALA) – Leader of the armed opposition faction of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM-IO), Riek Machar, on Monday commended Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, saying he has noticed positive approach to ensuring peace in South Sudan.

Riek Machar prepares to address a news conference during the peace signing meeting in Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa, August 17, 2015. (Photo Reuters/Tiksa Negeri)

“When president Museveni was here during the summit I saw a shift in his attitude and his commitment to support the peace agreement,” said former vice president, Machar in a press conference he held in Addis Ababa on Monday.

He said he had dispatched a high level delegation of 11 members to Kampala who met president Museveni last Saturday in a bid to engage the authorities in Uganda on the implementation of the peace agreement he signed with president Salva Kiir to end the 20-month long civil war in the world's youngest country.

“We want to read the mood in Kampala on the implementation of the peace agreement,” said Machar.

“We are satisfied that the Ugandan government is behind the peace agreement which is very important to us because it is part of the conflict and they have troops which they will have to withdraw,” he said.

The Ugandan troops were deployed in South Sudan in December 2013 at the invitation of president Kiir shortly after fighting broke out between forces loyal to Kiir and those allied to Machar.

The latest peace agreement signed between the two rival leaders in general states that the troops of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) must pullout from South Sudan with the exception of those in western equatoria state who came under a different arrangement to hunt for the Uganda rebels of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

According to the peace agreement, UPDF will withdraw from all locations in South Sudan including Bor and Juba, but a number of their troops will remain in Western Equatoria start per the arrangement made with the African Union (AU) as a regional task force to battle the LRA rebels.

Earlier, Ugandan minister of foreign affairs, Henry Oryem Okello, said on Saturday that the UPDF will not withdraw from the South Sudan despite the internationally backed and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediated peace agreement which demanded their withdrawal.

“We are not pulling out. Uganda is not part of the agreement. We have a bilateral arrangement with South Sudan government like U.S. has troops stationed in Japan,” Oryem was quoted as saying by a number of regional media outlets.

Following Saturday's statement by the Ugandan foreign minister the rebels have requested explanation and other Ugandan officials including from the ministry of defense said their deputy foreign minister was misquoted, saying their troops will withdraw within 45 days in accordance with the peace deal.

“When we heard of it we inquired and we were told that the minister was misquoted,” said Machar.

NO GRUDGE AGAINST UGANDA

The spokesperson of the rebel delegation to Kampala, Stephen Kuol told Sudan Tribune he was optimistic of Uganda's positive contributions in implementing the peace agreement.

"Let is be known that the SPLM/SPLA under the able leadership of Dr. Riek Machar does not hold any grudges against the Republic of Uganda and its leadership. We are saying for us to implement this peace agreement, we must everything behind us," said Kuol.

"Let bygones be bygones," stressed the armed opposition official on Monday.

The main focus, Kuol further said, was on how to effectively implement the new peace accord.

"We need the support of the Ugandan leadership, the leadership of the region, African Union, United Nations, the Trioka and all people of goodwill who made it possible for us to get another opportunity for peace in the country," said the rebel delegation spokesperson.

Rival forces in South Sudan conflict have issued statements counter-accusing each other of violations of the permanent ceasefire hours after it came into effect on Saturday midnight as declared by president Kiir and armed opposition leader, Machar.

Meanwhile the rebels accused government forces of continued attacks despite the signed peace agreement which calls on both warring factions to take into effect a permanent ceasefire.

In a separate interview with Sudan Tribune, acting spokesperson of SPLM-IO army, Colonel William Gatjiath Deng, alleged that government forces have launched bombardments on Saturday in Unity state's Leer, Koch, Mayiandit, and Rupkotni counties.

“They are today on their way going to Jonglei state in Fangak county in the river. They have also started bombardments on the river bank in our controlled territories,” he said.

Deng added that the rebel forces did not retaliate but remained standing in their defence positions.

The military official further alleged that the Ugandan troops were fighting against them along side the government even after the peace deal was signed.

The spokesperson of the government forces, Colonel Philip Aguer, on Saturday and Sunday similarly accused the rebels of launching attacks at government controlled territories in Malakal town in what he said was to gain more territories.

“Their intention is to gain more territories. This is the purpose of these attacks. That was why they attacked the positions of our forces in Malakal yesterday (Saturday) and again today (Sunday),” said Aguer.

“For us, our forces will not attack them but they have the right for self-defence,” he added.

(ST)

August 31, 2015 (JUBA) – The newly appointed caretaker governor of the oil-rich Upper Nile state, Chol Thon, has announced readiness of his administration to support president Salva Kiir in the implementation of the peace agreement he signed with former vice president, Riek Machar, the leader of the armed opposition faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM-IO).

Troops from the South Sudanese army (SPLA) have been engaged in an armed struggle with rebel forces loyal to former vice-president Riek Machar since mid-December last year (Photo: Reuters)

Governor Thon, according to Upper Nile state's information minister, Peter Hoth Tuach, was the first senior official in the state to welcome the signing of the agreement and sent his congratulatory messages to the head of state on behalf of the people of the state.

“The new governor and the government of Upper Nile state was the first to welcome and sent congratulatory message to the president on the signing of the peace [agreement]. The governor on behalf of the people of Upper Nile state affirmed readiness of the leadership of the state to stand behind the decision of the president and pledged unwavering support in the implementation because signing the peace is one thing and the implementation is another thing,” minister Tuach told Sudan Tribune on Monday.

He accused the opposition forces of allegedly launching attack on the position held by government in and around Malakal in violation of the permanent ceasefire which the rival leaders declared and came into force midnight, Saturday.

“The rebels are claiming that they were attacked by our forces. It is not true. It is just propaganda to cover their behaviours. You know that rebels are always very fast to come out and accuse our forces even when they are known to have carried out the attack,” he further claimed.

The question remains, is Malakal under whose control, the government or the rebels? Malakal has been in the hand of the government and it is being known by IGAD. The rebel claim is baseless and unfounded because if Malakal is being attacked, who is attacking it? Can the government attack itself,” asked Tuach.

Rebels however dismissed claims that their forces attacked Malakal town, saying it was the government forces in Malakal that shelled their positions on the west bank of the River Nile.

South Sudan's military spokesman, Colonel Philip Aguer, told reporters that government forces were attacked by opposition fighters on Monday in Unity and Upper Nile states.

SPLA-IO REFUTES ALLEGATION

Opposition forces under the leadership of Machar refuted allegations by the government and said they were only fighting in self-defence, blaming the government for violations of the permanent ceasefire.

The newly appointed military spokesperson for the rebels, Colonel William Gatjiath Deng, in a press statement extended to Sudan Tribune on Monday said the opposition forces came under separate attacks in Upper Nile and Unity states.

He also claimed that one of the government's barges carrying troops and mounted with heavy weapons has been destroyed by the opposition fighters.

“The government troops have attacked our forces in Tonga county [Upper Nile state] this late afternoon [Monday]. One of the government's barges has been burned by our forces and the fighting is still going on now,” Deng said in the statement.

He said in Unity state, government troops moving in the river with three barges and 7 gunboats shelled Wathkech payam, accusing the government of carrying out offensive despite peace deal.

“We want to inform the people of South Sudan that government is sabotaging the implementation of the peace deal,” he said.

Deng called upon the IGAD Plus, AU and international community to take action by investigating what was going on as the government continued to violate the ceasefire.

(ST)

Somalia’s humanitarian situation remains “alarming” four years after a devastating famine with the number of people requiring emergency aid rising 17 per cent to more than 850,000 and those in “food-stressed” situations still at 2.3 million, according to the latest United Nations-managed food assessment study released today.

Le 20 juillet 2015, le procès de l’ancien dictateur du Tchad, Hissène Habré, a commencé devant les Chambres africaines extraordinaires au sein des juridictions sénégalaises. Il est jugé pour crimes contre l’humanité, crimes de guerre et torture. Les Chambres ont été inaugurées par le Sénégal et l’Union africaine en février 2013 pour poursuivre « le ou les principaux responsables » des crimes internationaux commis au Tchad entre 1982 et 1990, quand Hissène Habré était au pouvoir au Tchad. Ap rès deux jours d’audience, le procès a été suspendu quand les avocats de Habré ont refusé de se présenter à la barre. La Cour a nommé d’office trois avocats pour représenter Habré et leur a donné 45 jours pour préparer la défense. Le procès reprend le 7 septembre. 

Avec le procès de Hissène Habré, pour la première fois, les tribunaux d’un Etat jugent l’ancien dirigeant d’un autre Etat pour des supposées violations des droits de l'Homme. C'est aussi la première fois que l’utilisation de la compétence universelle aboutit à un procès sur le continent africain. La « compétence universelle » est un concept de droit international qui permet à des tribunaux nationaux de poursuivre l’auteur ou les auteurs des crimes les plus graves commis à l’étranger, quelle que soit sa nationalité ou celle des victimes. Le journal Le Monde a décrit l’affaire comme un «  tournant pour la justice en Afrique ».

Les questions et réponses suivantes fournissent de plus amples informations sur cette affaire et sur les étapes à venir. 

1. Qui est Hissène Habré ?
2. Quels sont les chefs d’accusation contre Habré ?
3. Quels crimes relèvent de la compétence de la Cour ?
4. Pourquoi les efforts pour traduire Habré en justice ont duré si longtemps ?
5. Quel a été le rôle du gouvernement tchadien dans le déclenchement des poursuites contre Habré ?
6. Comment les Chambres africaines extraordinaires mènent-elles leurs enquêtes ?
7. Quelles ont été les conclusions des experts désignés par la Cour ?
8. Pourquoi Hissène Habré est-il le seul à faire l’objet de poursuites par les Chambres africaines extraordinaires ?
9. Qu’en est-il de l’actuel président du Tchad Idriss Déby Itno ?
10. Quels sont les droits de l’accusé ? 
11. Habré refuse de coopérer avec les Chambres. Quelles en seront les conséquences ?
12. Les avocats de Habré disent que leur client ne comparaitra pas. Que peut-il se passer ?
13. La Cour a commis trois avocats d'office pour défendre Habré, et ce contre sa volonté. Etait-ce approprié ? Que va-t-il se passer si Habré cherche à les révoquer ? 
14. Quelle est la peine maximale à laquelle Habré pourrait être condamné ? 
15. Comment les Chambres africaines extraordinaires sont-elles structurées et administrées ?
16. Comment les Procureurs et les juges ont-ils été nommés ? 
17. Comment se déroulera le procès ?
18. Combien de temps durera le procès ?
19. Quel sera le rôle des victimes durant le procès et percevront-elles des réparations ?
20. Quelles dispositions seront prises pour rendre le procès accessible au peuple tchadien ?
21. Qu'en est-il du procès des agents de la police politique du régime Habré ? 
22. Comment les Chambres sont-elles financées ? 
23. Quelles ont été les étapes clés dans la campagne pour traduire Habré en justice ?
24. Quelle est l'importance du procès de Habré pour la compétence universelle ?
25. Comment ce procès repond-t-il aux critiques qui dénoncent le rôle de la justice internationale en Afrique et affirment que les recours à la compétence universelle ciblent les Africains ?
26. Pourquoi était-il nécessaire de créer des chambres spéciales avec un élément international ?
27. Pourquoi Hissène Habré n'est-il pas jugé au Tchad ?
28. Pourquoi la Cour pénale internationale ne peut-elle pas poursuivre Habré ?

 

1. Qui est Hissène Habré ?

Hissène Habré était le président du Tchad, de 1982 jusqu'à ce qu’il soit renversé en 1990 par Idriss Déby Itno, le président actuel. Habré s’est réfugié au Sénégal en 1990 où il vit en exil depuis lors.

Une étude de 714 pages de Human Rights Watch établit que le régime de Habré s’est rendu responsable de milliers d’assassinats politiques et d’arrestations arbitraires et d’un usage systématique de la torture. Ce régime prit régulièrement pour cible les populations civiles, notamment au Sud (1983-1985), et différents groupes ethniques, comme les Hadjeraïs (1987) et les Zaghawas (1989-90), tuant et arrêtant en masse des membres de ces groupes lorsque leurs leaders étaient perçus comme des menaces au régime de Habré.

Une Commission d'Enquête tchadienne a accusé en 1992 le régime de Habré de quelque 40 000 assassinats politiques et de l’usage systématique de la torture. La plupart des exactions furent commises par sa redoutable police politique, la Direction de la Documentation et de la Sécurité (DDS), dont les directeurs rendaient des comptes exclusivement à Habré. Tous appartenaient au cercle étroit des proches de Habré et certains étaient issus de la même ethnie (Gorane anakaza), voire de la même famille.

Les États-Unis et la France ont soutenu Habré, le considérant comme un rempart contre la Libye de Mouammar Kadhafi qui avait des visées expansionnistes sur le nord du Tchad. Sous Ronald Reagan, les Etats-Unis apportèrent en secret, par le biais de la CIA, un soutien paramilitaire à Habré lors de sa prise du pouvoir en 1982. Ils fournirent ensuite à son régime une aide militaire massive. À la fin des années 1980, les États-Unis utilisèrent également une base clandestine au Tchad pour organiser une force anti-Kadhafi composée de soldats libyens capturés. Malgré l'enlèvement par Habré et ses hommes de l'anthropologue française Françoise Claustre en 1974 et le meurtre du Capitaine Pierre Galopin venu négocier sa libération en 1975, la France soutint également Habré avant et après son arrivée au pouvoir, en lui procurant armes, soutien logistique et renseignements, et en lançant les opérations militaires « Manta » (1983) et « Épervier » (1986) afin d’aider le Tchad à repousser les forces libyennes.

2. Quels sont les chefs d’accusation contre Habré ?

Habré a été inculpé le 2 juillet 2013 par les quatre juges d’instruction des Chambres africaines extraordinaires pour crimes contre l’humanité, crimes de torture et crimes de guerre puis placé sous mandat de dépôt. Le 13 février 2015, après une instruction de 19 mois, les juges ont conclu qu’il y avait suffisamment de preuves pour que Habré soit jugé pour crimes contre l’humanité et torture en sa qualité de membre d’une « entreprise criminelle commune » et crimes de guerre sur le fondement de sa responsabilité en tant que supérieur hiérarchique.

Habré a été spécifiquement renvoyé pour :

• homicides volontaires, pratique massive et systématique d’exécutions sommaires, enlèvement de personnes suivi de disparition et torture constitutifs de crimes contre l’humanité commis sur les populations civiles, les Hadjeraï, les Zaghawa, les opposants et les populations  du sud du Tchad ;
• torture ; et
• crimes de guerre d’homicide volontaire, de torture et traitements inhumains, de transfert illégal et détention illégale, d’atteinte à la vie et à l’intégrité physique. 

​3. Quels crimes relèvent de la compétence de la Cour ?

En vertu du Statut des Chambres, ces dernières sont compétentes pour traiter des crimes de génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité, des crimes de guerre et de torture tels que définis dans le Statut. Ces définitions reprennent généralement celles utilisées dans les statuts de la Cour pénale internationale et des autres tribunaux internationaux. Les crimes doivent avoir été commis sur le territoire tchadien entre le 7 juin 1982 et le 1erdécembre 1990, période où Hissène Habré était au pouvoir.

4. Pourquoi les efforts pour traduire Habré en justice ont duré si longtemps ?

L’avènement du procès, près de 25 ans après la chute de Hissène Habré, est entièrement dû à la persévérance des victimes du régime de Habré et de leurs partenaires au sein d’organisations non-gouvernementales. Lorsque Habré a été arrêté en juillet 2013, le Toronto Globe and Mail a salué « une des campagnes les plus patientes et tenaces au monde en faveur de la justice ». Le New York Times a écrit que « l’affaire [Habré] s’est révélée inhabituelle du fait de la ténacité de ses victimes, et de Human Rights Watch, pour tenter de l’amener devant la justice ». Habré a été inculpé une première fois par un juge sénégalais en 2000, mais pendant 12 ans, le gouvernement sénégalais de l’ancien président Abdoulaye Wade a soumis les victimes à ce que l’archevêque Desmond Tutu, lauréat du Prix Nobel de la Paix, et 117 groupes de 25 pays africains ont appelé un « interminable feuilleton politico-judiciaire ». Peu de progrès a été réalisé dans l’affaire jusqu’en 2012 et la victoire de Macky Sall face à Abdoulaye Wade lors de l’élection présidentielle et  la décision de la Cour internationale de Justice ordonnant au Sénégal de poursuivre ou extrader Habré en justice.

5. Quel a été le rôle du gouvernement tchadien dans le déclenchement des poursuites contre Habré ?

Les avocats de Habré affirment que l’actuel gouvernement tchadien d’Idriss Déby Itno est derrière les efforts visant à poursuivre Habré. Cependant, depuis la première plainte des victimes en 2000, ce sont les victimes et leurs défenseurs qui ont fait avancer le dossier, surmontant les obstacles les uns après les autres. Le gouvernement tchadien a depuis longtemps exprimé son soutien à la poursuite de Habré et en 2002 a levé l’immunité de poursuite à l’étranger de Habré, mais il n’a pas participé à l’avancement du dossier avant de contribuer au budget des Chambres et de coopérer avec les juges d’instruction durant leurs quatre commissions rogatoires au Tchad. Récemment, le gouvernement tchadien s’est de toute évidence montré plus réservé à l’égard des Chambres, particulièrement en refusant de transférer deux autres suspects.

6. Comment les Chambres africaines extraordinaires mènent-elles leurs enquêtes ?

Les juges d’instruction ont eu accès à un nombre considérable d’éléments de preuve rassemblés par différentes sources durant les années qui suivirent la chute de Habré, notamment les résultats des enquêtes belge et tchadienne.

En 1992, une Commission nationale d'enquête au Tchad a accusé le régime de Habré d’usage systématique de la torture, a estimé à 40 000 le nombre d’assassinats politiques  et a documenté les méthodes de torture employées. L’un des premiers témoins entendus par les juges d’instruction était le président de la Commission nationale d’enquête, un éminent juriste tchadien. De plus, les juges ont eu accès au dossier préparé par les juges d’instruction belges durant quatre ans, comprenant des témoignages de témoins et « d’insiders » qui travaillaient avec Habré, et des documents de la DDS.

Les quatre juges d’instruction ont surtout mené leur propre enquête approfondie durant 19  mois,  et se sont basés principalement sur des preuves qu’ils ont eux-mêmes recueillies.

Le 3 mai 2013, le Sénégal et le Tchad ont signé un « Accord de coopération judiciaire » pour faciliter l’enquête des Chambres au Tchad.

Les juges d’instruction ont effectué quatre commissions rogatoires au Tchad en août-septembre 2013, décembre 2013 et mars 2014 et mai-juin 2014. Ils étaient accompagnés par le Procureur général et ses adjoints, ainsi que par des officiers de la Police judiciaire. Pendant leurs visites, les juges ont entendu près de 2 500 victimes directes et indirectes et des témoins-clefs comme des anciens membres du régime de Habré. Bien que l’Accord de coopération judiciaire permettait aux juges d’instruction sénégalais de procéder à des auditions en l’absence de représentants des autorités tchadiennes, les juges ont choisi de ne pas le faire.

Les juges ont pris possession des archives de la DDS retrouvées en 2001 par Human Rights Watch, et en ont fait des copies. Parmi les dizaines de milliers de documents trouvés figurent des listes journalières de prisonniers et des décès en détention, des comptes rendus d’interrogatoires, des rapports de surveillance et des certificats de décès. Les dossiers détaillent comment Habré a placé la DDS sous son contrôle direct et comment il maintenait un contrôle étroit sur les opérations de la DDS. Une analyse des données pour Human Rights Watch, a révélé les noms de 1 208 personnes exécutées ou décédées en détention, et de 12 321 victimes de violations des droits humains. Rien que dans ces fichiers, Habré a reçu 1 265 communications directes de la DDS l’informant de la condition de 898 détenus.

Les juges ont également nommé des experts en analyse de données, en anthropologie médico-légale, en graphologie, sur le contexte historique du régime de Habré et sur la structure de fonctionnement et de commandement de son armée.

7. Quelles ont été les conclusions des experts désignés par la Cour ?    

Patrick Ball du Human Rights Data Analysis Group a mené une étude sur la mortalité dans les prisons du régime de Habré. Selon ses conclusions, la mortalité dans les prisons pour la période étudiée était « des centaines de fois plus élevée que la mortalité normale des hommes adultes au Tchad pendant la même période » et « substantiellement plus élevée que celles des pires contextes du vingtième siècle de prisonniers de guerre » tels que les prisonniers de guerre allemands détenus dans les geôles soviétiques et les prisonniers de guerre détenus au Japon.

Les experts de l’équipe argentine d’anthropologie médico-légale ont mené des exhumations sur un certain nombre de sites susceptibles d’abriter des charniers. A Déli par exemple, au sud du Tchad, lieu d’un supposé massacre de rebelles non armés en septembre 1984, les experts ont localisé 21 corps, presque tous des hommes en âge d’être des militaires, majoritairement tués par balle. A Mongo, au centre du Tchad, les experts ont découvert 14 corps résultant d’un autre massacre survenu en 1984.

Un graphologue désigné par les juges a analysé les documents supposément écrits ou signés par Habré. Il a par exemple confirmé que c’est bien Habré qui a répondu à la demande du Comité International de la Croix Rouge de procéder à l’hospitalisation de certains prisonniers de guerre, en écrivant « Désormais, aucun prisonnier de guerre ne doit quitter la Maison d’arrêt  sauf en cas de décès. »

8. Pourquoi Hissène Habré est-il le seul à faire l’objet de poursuites par les Chambres africaines extraordinaires ?

L’objectif des victimes tchadiennes dans leur quête de justice au Sénégal depuis 2000 a toujours été le procès de Hissène Habré, le chef de l'Etat, principal responsable des actions de son administration et qui contrôlait directement l'appareil de sécurité. Les victimes ont également porté plainte au Tchad en 2000 contre d'autres fonctionnaires du régime de Habré qui y vivaient encore.

En vertu de l’article 3 du Statut des Chambres, les Chambres africaines extraordinaires sont « habilitées à poursuivre et juger le ou les principaux responsables des crimes et violations graves du droit international » commis au Tchad pendant la période du régime Habré. En juillet 2013, le Procureur a requis l’inculpation de cinq autres officiels de l’administration de Habré suspectés d’être responsables de crimes ou de violations graves du droit international. Ces personnes sont :

• Saleh Younous et Guihini Korei, deux anciens directeurs de la Direction de la Documentation et de la Sécurité. Guihini Korei est le neveu de Hissène Habré.
• Abakar Torbo, ancien directeur du service pénitencier.
• Mahamat Djibrine dit « El Djonto », l’un des « tortionnaires les plus redoutés du Tchad » selon la Commission d’Enquête nationale.
• Zakaria Berdei, ancien conseiller spécial à la sécurité de la présidence et l’un des responsables présumés de la répression dans le sud du Tchad en 1984.

Aucun d’entre eux n’a cependant comparu devant la Cour. Saleh Younous et Mahamat Djibrine ont été jugés au Tchad sur la base de plaintes déposées par les victimes devant les tribunaux tchadiens (voir ci-dessous), le Tchad ayant refusé de les extrader au Sénégal. Zakaria Berdei semble également être au Tchad, bien qu’il ne se trouve pas en détention. Abakar Torbo et Guihini Korei sont toujours recherchés et ils n’ont pas été arrêtés suite aux inculpations formulées par les Chambres. Par conséquent, seul Hissène Habré a été renvoyé pour jugement.

9. Qu’en est-il de l’actuel président du Tchad Idriss Déby Itno ?

Idriss Déby Itno était le Commandant en Chef des forces armées de Habré pendant la période connue sous le nom de « Septembre Noir », au cours de laquelle une vague de répression meurtrière se déchaîna pour intégrer le Sud au gouvernement central. En 1985, Déby fut remplacé et, après une période d’études en France à l’Ecole militaire, il revint en tant que conseiller à la Défense avant de fuir le Tchad en avril 1989.

Il est important de souligner que l’article 10 du Statut des Chambres dispose que « La qualité officielle d’un accusé, soit comme Chef d’État ou de Gouvernement, soit comme haut fonctionnaire, ne l’exonère en aucun cas de sa responsabilité pénale […] ». Les juges d’instruction étaient ainsi libres de poursuivre le président Déby pour des crimes internationaux présumés avoir été commis entre 1982 et 1990, mais ne l’ont pas fait.

10. Quels sont les droits de l’accusé ?

Hissène Habré bénéficie du droit à un procès équitable tel que garanti par le droit international. Il est actuellement représenté par des avocats qu’il a choisis. Le Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques ainsi que la Charte africaine des droits de l’Homme et des Peuples définissent les garanties minimales dont doivent bénéficier les accusés dans le cadre de procédures criminelles.

En accord avec ces standards, le Statut des Chambres prévoit expressément un certain nombre de droits à la Défense :

• Le droit d’être présent lors de son procès
• La présomption d’innocence
• Le droit à une audience publique
• Le droit de préparer sa défense dans des conditions de temps et de moyens acceptables
• Le droit à un avocat et à l’assistance juridique
• Le droit d’être jugé dans un délai raisonnable
• Le droit d’interroger et d’appeler des témoins.

11. Habré refuse de coopérer avec les Chambres. Quelles en seront les conséquences ?

Beaucoup d’accusés faisant face à un procès relevant du droit pénal international – comme Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić et Charles Taylor – ont commencé par déclarer qu’ils ne reconnaissaient pas l’autorité du tribunal ou qu’ils ne coopéreraient pas. En pratique, ils ont voulu utiliser le procès comme une tribune pour présenter leur propre version des faits.

Quoi qu’il arrive, la non-coopération ne modifie pas les garanties de procès équitable et les règles gouvernant l’administration de la preuve, en particulier le fait que la charge de la preuve pèse sur l’accusation qui doit prouver la culpabilité de Habré. La Cour ne pourra condamner Habré que si elle a l’intime conviction qu’il est coupable des faits qui lui sont reprochés par l’accusation. Néanmoins, lorsqu’un accusé adopte une position de non-coopération, il compromet inévitablement sa propre capacité à contester les éléments à charge retenus contre lui et l’opportunité de remettre en cause les arguments du Procureur quant à sa culpabilité.

Les juges des Chambres ont la responsabilité de s’assurer que le procès de Habré se déroule en conformité avec ses droits à un procès équitable, mais aussi que la justice soit rendue avec diligence et sans manipulation, y compris de la part de l’accusé.

12. Les avocats de Habré disent que leur client ne compaitra pas. Que peut-il se passer ?

Selon le code de procédure pénale sénégalais, qui est appliqué par les Chambres, si Habré refuse volontairement de comparaitre, le Président de la Cour peut soit continuer les audiences sans sa présence, soit ordonner qu’il soit amené par la force. Lors de son audience préliminaire le 3 juin, la présence de Habré était exigée par la Cour. 

13. La Cour a commis trois avocats d'office pour défendre Habré, et ce contre sa volonté. Etait-ce approprié ? Que va-t-il se passer si Habré cherche à les révoquer ?

Selon le droit sénégalais, la présence d’un avocat pour défendre l’accusé est nécessaire. Quand les avocats de Habré ont refusé de se présenter à la barre, la Chambre d’Assises a nommé des avocats pour défendre les intérêts de Habré et ainsi garantir un procès équitable.

Des juridictions nationales et internationales ont déjà nommé des avocats d’office contre la volonté des accusés pour représenter les intérêts de la défense pendant le procès. Dans le cas de Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza devant le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda (TPIR), l’accusé refusait de donner des instructions aux avocats commis d’office considérant que le tribunal était politiquement biaisé. Le TPIR, rejetant la demande des avocats commis d’office de se retirer, avait considéré que « le conseil a pour obligation de défendre activement son client, à l’effet de préserver au mieux ses intérêts ». La Cour avait ajouté que l’avocat « étant commis d’office et non pas nommé, il en résulte non seulement une obligation vis-vis du client, mais également vis-à-vis du Tribunal, dont l’intérêt est d’assurer à l’accusé un procès équitable ». Le but est que « la défense soit efficace et la procédure contradictoire ». Devant le Tribunal spécial pour la Sierra Leone, l’accusé Augustine Gbao demandait que son avocat commis d’office soit révoqué car il considérait que la Cour était illégitime. La Cour avait refusé en relevant que « les intérêts de la justice ne seraient pas servis si elle laissait M. Gbao ne pas être représenté devant la Cour ». Cette dernière considérait qu’elle devait « protéger les droits de l’accusé et l’intégrité de la procédure ».

Il est fort possible que Habré cherche à récuser ses avocats commis d’office, mais selon le droit sénégalais, seulement le président du Tribunal peut les révoquer. Les avocats commis d’office qui refuse de coopérer encourent des sanctions disciplinaires.  

14. Quelle est la peine maximale à laquelle Habré pourrait être condamné ?

Si elles reconnaissent la culpabilité de Habré, les Chambres peuvent le condamner à une peine de prison allant jusqu’à la perpétuité selon les circonstances et la gravité du ou des crimes. Elles peuvent également lui ordonner de s’acquitter d’une amende ou elles peuvent confisquer toute propriété ou avoirs qui proviendraient directement ou indirectement du ou des crimes. 

15. Comment les Chambres africaines extraordinaires sont-elles structurées et administrées ?

Les Chambres africaines extraordinaires ont été créées au sein des juridictions sénégalaises, à savoir le Tribunal régional hors classe de Dakar et la Cour d’appel de Dakar. Les Chambres sont divisées en quatre niveaux : une Chambre d’instruction composée de quatre juges d’instruction sénégalais, une Chambre d’accusation composée de trois juges sénégalais, une Chambre d’assises et une Chambre d’appel. La Chambre d’assises et la Chambre d’appel sont toutes deux composées de deux juges sénégalais et d’un président ressortissant d’un autre pays membre de l’Union africaine. 

Le Procureur général est Mbacké Fall. Les Chambres ont un administrateur – Aly Ciré Ba – chargé de garantir le bon fonctionnement des activités des Chambres et superviser tous les aspects non-judiciaires de leurs activités. Les responsabilités de l’Administrateur comprennent la gestion financière du personnel, le travail de sensibilisation et l’information des médias, la protection et l’assistance aux témoins et la coopération judiciaire entre le Sénégal et les autres pays, comme le Tchad. 

16. Comment les Procureurs et les juges ont-ils été nommés ?

Les Procureurs et les juges d’instructions ont été nommés par le ministre de la Justice du Sénégal et par le Président de la Commission de l’Union africaine. Le Président de la Chambre africaine extraordinaires d’Assises est Gberdao Gustave Kam du Burkina Faso.  

17. Comment se déroulera le procès ?

Le procès sera mené conformément au Code de procédure pénale sénégalais qui s’inspire essentiellement de la procédure « inquisitoire» du droit civil français, plutôt que de la procédure « accusatoire » utilisée par les juridictions anglo-saxonnes de droit coutumier (« common law »). Le Président de la Cour a un rôle direct en interrogeant lui-même les accusés et les témoins. Le Procureur et les avocats de la défense et ceux des parties civiles peuvent également poser des questions aux accusés et aux témoins, par l’intermédiaire du Président. Le mode d’administration de la preuve est libre à l’inverse des systèmes de droit coutumier où il existe des règles strictes de la preuve. Les plaidoiries finales des avocats revêtent une importance particulière dans ce modèle. 

18. Combien de temps durera le procès ?

Selon un calendrier provisoire, la première étape du procès durera environ deux mois (jusqu’au 30 octobre). Pendant cette période se tiendront les audiences au fond qui détermineront de la culpabilité ou non de Habré. Si Habré est condamné, il y aura une deuxième étape pendant laquelle la Cour se penchera sur les questions liées aux parties civiles et aux réparations.  Le budget des Chambres prévoit le transport de 100 témoins et parties civiles en provenance du Tchad. 

19. Quel sera le rôle des victimes durant le procès et percevront-elles des réparations ?

Les victimes sont autorisées à participer à la procédure en qualité de parties civiles, représentées par un ou des avocats. Plus de 4 000 victimes se sont constituées parties civiles.

Le droit procédural sénégalais régit la participation des victimes. Les avocats des victimes ont participé à l’enquête préliminaire et à l’instruction y compris aux confrontations avec Habré. Durant le procès, les avocats des victimes seront en mesure de poser des questions aux témoins ou à l'accusé et de demander réparation. Il est peu probable, cependant, qu’un grand nombre de victimes témoignent pendant le procès.

En vertu de leur Statut, dans le cas d’une condamnation, les Chambres peuvent ordonner que l’indemnité accordée à titre de réparation soit versée par l’intermédiaire d’un fond qui peut également être alimenté par des contributions volontaires de gouvernements étrangers, d’institutions internationales et d’organisations non gouvernementales. Les indemnités provenant du fonds peuvent être attribuées aux victimes individuellement ou collectivement, qu’elles aient ou non participé au procès de Hissène Habré. Ce fond n’a cependant toujours pas été créé par les Chambres.

La Commission d’Enquête nationale du Tchad a accusé Habré d’avoir vidé les caisses de l’Etat dans les jours précédant sa fuite au Sénégal, et il est largement admis qu’il détient des millions de dollars. Les Chambres ont gelé deux petits comptes bancaires lui appartenant ainsi qu’une propriété dans un quartier chic de Dakar.

En juillet 2013, après l’arrestation de Hissène Habré par les Chambres, le président Déby a déclaré que le gouvernement tchadien indemniserait les survivants et les familles des victimes décédées. Au regard du droit international, la responsabilité du Tchad d’apporter réparation aux victimes de violations flagrantes de droits de l’Homme est séparée et distincte des réparations incombant à l’accusé.

20. Quelles dispositions seront prises pour rendre le procès accessible au peuple tchadien ?

Le Statut des Chambres prévoit que les audiences seront enregistrées et filmées aux fins de diffusion, comme ce fut le cas dans les autres procès internationalisés. L’accès public au procès pour les journalistes et les organisations non-gouvernementales est aussi garanti. L’Accord de coopération judiciaire de 2013 engage le Tchad à autoriser la diffusion des enregistrements des audiences par les radios publiques et la télévision, et à autoriser les médias privés à faire de même. Les ministres de la Justice des deux pays se sont accordés en novembre 2013 pour que le procès soit retransmis.

Les deux premiers jours du procès ont été enregistrés et diffusés en streaming, et retransmis au Tchad. Les enregistrements sont disponibles sur le site des Chambres africaines extraordinaires. 

Human Rights Watch estime que l’enregistrement de la totalité du procès est essentiel pour sa valeur historique. En outre, la retransmission du procès, au Tchad en particulier - soumise aux  mesures appropriées qui pourraient être nécessaires pour assurer la sécurité des témoins -  ainsi que la préparation de résumés du procès et de vidéos, poursuivent un objectif primordial : s’assurer que le procès soit suivi et compris par le peuple tchadien et qu’il participe à la construction de l’Etat de droit, au Tchad comme au Sénégal.

Etant donné le caractère jurisprudentiel de ce procès, il est d'autant plus important de le rendre disponible au plus large public possible. Cela signifie que les images et le son doivent être librement disponibles pour les médias, les cinéastes et le public.

Par l’intermédiaire d’un consortium d’organisations non gouvernementales venant du Sénégal, de la Belgique et du Tchad, les Chambres ont mis en place des programmes de sensibilisation au Tchad et au Sénégal. Le consortium a formé des journalistes dans les deux pays, a organisé des débats publics, a créé un site internet et a produit des documents expliquant le procès.

Le Tchad et le Sénégal ont également accepté de coopérer afin de faciliter à la fois les déplacements des journalistes tchadiens au Sénégal et les déplacements au Tchad de toute personne impliquée dans le déroulement du procès. 

21. Qu’en est-il du procès des agents de la police politique du régime de Habré ?

Le 25 mars 2015, une Cour criminelle tchadienne a reconnu coupables de meurtre, torture, enlèvements, détention arbitraire, coups et blessures et actes de barbarie, 20 anciens agents de la police politique du régime de Habré, à la suite de la plainte déposée par les victimes en 2000 mais qui se trouvait dans une impasse avant la création des Chambres par le Sénégal.

La Cour a condamné sept anciens agents à la perpétuité parmi lesquels figurent Saleh Younous, un ancien directeur de la DDS et Mahamat Djibrine dit « El-Djonto » qui était, selon la Commission nationale d’enquête de 1992, l’un des « tortionnaires les plus redoutés » du Tchad. Ils étaient tous les deux également visés par les Chambres africaines extraordinaires, mais les autorités tchadiennes avaient refusé de les transférer.

La majorité des 20 inculpés avait témoigné devant les juges sénégalais lors de leurs visites au Tchad, et il est probable que les Chambres cherchent à les faire venir au procès à Dakar, ce qui est permis par l’Accord de coopération judiciaire de 2013. La Cour tchadienne a acquitté quatre autres inculpés et a ordonné que les condamnés et l'État versent 75 milliards de francs CFA (environ 125 millions de dollars ou 114 millions d’euros) en réparation aux 7 000  parties civiles. La Cour a également ordonné que le gouvernement édifie un monument pour les victimes du régime Habré et que l’ancien siège de la DDS soit transformé en musée. Ces deux mesures faisaient parties des revendications de longues dates des associations de victimes.

Au cours du procès au Tchad, quelque cinquante victimes ont décrit les actes de torture et de mauvais traitements perpétrés par des agents de la DDS.

22. Comment les Chambres sont-elles financées ?

Les Chambres sont financées en grande partie par des pays donateurs.

En novembre 2012, le Sénégal et un certain nombre de pays donateursse sont mis d’accord autour d’un budget de 8,6 millions d’euros (11,4 millions de dollars à l’époque) pour financer le procès de Habré. Des promesses avaient été faites par : le Tchad (2 milliards de francs CFA ou 3  743 000 dollars), l’Union européenne (2 millions d’euros), les Pays-Bas (1 million d’euros), l’Union africaine (1 million de dollars), les Etats-Unis (1 million de dollars), la Belgique (500 000 euros), l’Allemagne (500 000 euros), la France (300 000 euros) et le Luxembourg (100 000 euros). De plus, le Canada, la Suisse, et le Comité International de la Croix-Rouge ont  fourni une assistance technique. Un Comité de pilotage composé du Sénégal, de pays donateurs et d’institutions, reçoit et approuve les rapports périodiques soumis par l’Administrateur des Chambres.

23. Quelles ont été les étapes clés dans la campagne pour traduire Habré en justice ?

En janvier 2000, un groupe de victimes tchadiennes a porté plainte contre Habré au Sénégal. En février de la même année, un juge sénégalais a inculpé Habré pour torture, crimes contre l’humanité et actes de barbarie. Cependant, suite à des immixtions du nouveau gouvernement sénégalais d’Abdoulaye Wade dénoncées par deux rapporteurs des Nations unies pour les droits de l’Homme, des juridictions d’appel ont annulé les poursuites sur le fondement de l’incompétence des tribunaux sénégalais à juger des crimes commis à l’étranger.

D’autres victimes de Habré, dont trois ressortissants belges d’origine tchadienne, ont alors déposé une plainte contre lui en Belgique en novembre 2000. Les autorités belges ont enquêté pendant quatre ans avant de l’inculper pour crimes contre l’humanité, crimes de guerre et torture, et ont demandé son extradition en 2005. Un tribunal sénégalais s'est déclaré incompétent pour statuer sur la demande d’extradition.

Le Sénégal s’est alors tourné vers l’Union africaine (UA) qui, en juillet 2006, a appelé le Sénégal à poursuivre Habré « au nom de l’Afrique ». Le président Wade a accepté le mandat de l’UA et fait amender le droit sénégalais afin d’investir expressément les tribunaux nationaux de la compétence extraterritoriale nécessaire pour juger les crimes internationaux. Toutefois, le gouvernement sénégalais exigeait le versement d’un budget de 27,4 millions d’euros (36,5 millions de dollars) de la part de la communauté internationale avant d’ordonner le commencement de toute enquête ou poursuite. Trois ans de négociations pointilleuses s’en sont suivis au sujet du budget du procès jusqu’à ce qu’en novembre 2010, le Sénégal et les pays donateurs s’accordent finalement sur un budget de 8,6 millions d’euros (11,4 millions de dollars) pour le procès de Habré.

Quelques jours avant l’accord sur le budget, la Cour de Justice de la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) a décidé que Habré devrait être jugé par « une juridiction spéciale ad hoc à caractère international ». (La décision de la CEDEAO est examinée plus en détail ci-dessous). En janvier 2011, l’UA a répondu à l’arrêt de la CEDEAO en proposant un projet pour des chambres spéciales au sein du système judiciaire sénégalais comprenant des juges nommés par l’UA. Le Sénégal a rejeté le projet et en mai 2011, s'est retiré des négociations avec l’UA sur la création du tribunal.

En juillet 2011, le ministre des Affaires étrangères sénégalais a exclu l’option de juger Habré au Sénégal. Le gouvernement tchadien a alors annoncé son soutien pour l’extradition de Habré vers la Belgique afin d’y être jugé.

En août 2011 et en janvier 2012, une cour d’appel sénégalaise a refusé de statuer sur deux autres demandes d’extradition de la Belgique, concluant que les documents joints à la demande n’étaient juridiquement pas conformes. Dans ces deux cas, le gouvernement sénégalais n’avait apparemment pas transmis les documents juridiques belges intacts au tribunal. La Belgique a soumis une quatrième demande d’extradition aux autorités sénégalaises en janvier 2012.

Le 20 juillet 2012, la Cour internationale de Justice, dans l’affaire « Questions concernant l’obligation de poursuivre ou d’extrader (Belgique c. Sénégal) » a statué que le Sénégal avait manqué à ses obligations découlant de la Convention des Nations unies contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants et a ordonné au Sénégal de poursuivre Habré « sans autre délai » à défaut de l’extrader.

Aucun progrès n’a été réalisé dans l’affaire jusqu’à la victoire de Macky Sall face à Abdoulaye Wade lors de l’élection présidentielle en mars 2012. Le nouveau gouvernement sénégalais a indiqué rapidement qu’il projetait de poursuivre Habré au Sénégal plutôt que de l’extrader vers la Belgique. Les négociations reprises entre le Sénégal et l’Union africaine ont finalement conduit à un accord pour créer les Chambres africaines extraordinaires chargées de mener le procès au sein du système judiciaire sénégalais. Le 17 décembre, l’Assemblée nationale sénégalaise a adopté la loi établissant les Chambres spéciales. Le 8 février 2013, les Chambres africaines extraordinaires ont été inaugurées à Dakar. 

24. Quelle est l’importance du procès de Habré pour la compétence universelle ?

Comme l'a démontré l'affaire Habré, la compétence universelle est un important filet de sécurité pour s’assurer que les personnes suspectées d'atrocités ne puissent jouir de l’impunité dans un Etat tiers quand ils ne peuvent être poursuivis devant les tribunaux du pays où les crimes auraient été commis ou devant un tribunal international.

Au cours des 20 dernières années, l’usage de la compétence universelle, notamment – mais pas exclusivement - par les juridictions de pays européens, est en progrès. Pour renforcer la lutte contre l'impunité pour les crimes les plus graves, il est essentiel que des tribunaux de tous les continents aient recours à la compétence universelle. L'Union africaine a encouragé ses Etats membres à adopter une législation donnant à leurs tribunaux nationaux une compétence universelle pour les crimes de guerre, les crimes contre l'humanité et le génocide et a pris des mesures pour initier un réseau de procureurs nationaux travaillant sur des cas de crimes de guerre. Plusieurs enquêtes ont été ouvertes en Afrique du Sud et au Sénégal sur le fondement de la compétence universelle.

25. Comment ce procès répond-t-il aux critiques qui dénoncent le rôle de la justice internationale en Afrique et affirment que les recours à la compétence universelle ciblent les Africains ?

Le procès de Habré est une avancée cruciale dans la démarche de pays africains prenant la responsabilité de poursuivre les crimes internationaux les plus graves. Toutefois, le procès Habré ne dénigre pas l'importance de la CPI ainsi que  l'utilisation de la compétence universelle par les États non-africains, y compris par les tribunaux européens, pour juger des crimes commis en Afrique. Ces outils sont souvent le seul espoir dont disposent les victimes africaines demandant justice.

Il est vrai que la justice internationale a été appliquée de façon inégale. Les Etats puissants et leurs alliés ont souvent pu échapper à la justice alors même que des crimes graves sont commis sur leur territoire, notamment en s’abstenant de ratifier le traité de la CPI et en jouant de leur influence politique au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies.

Les organisations non gouvernementales ont activement fait campagne pour que les gouvernements africains travaillent pour améliorer la justice internationale et sa portée – et non pour la saper - afin de limiter l'impunité lorsque des atrocités sont commises.

26. Pourquoi était-il nécessaire de créer des chambres spéciales avec un élément international ?

Habré a déposé une plainte auprès de la Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO en octobre 2008, affirmant que son procès au Sénégal, sur la base des changements législatifs opérés au Sénégal en 2007-08, constituerait une violation du principe de non-rétroactivité du droit pénal.

Le 18 novembre 2010, la Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO a rendu son arrêt dans lequel elle déclare que, afin d’éviter de violer le principe de non-rétroactivité, Habré devrait être jugé devant « une juridiction spéciale ad hoc à caractère international ». Des experts en droit international ont mis en doute cette décision car le principe de non-rétroactivité ne s’applique pas à des actes qui, au moment de leur commission, étaient déjà interdits par le droit international conventionnel et coutumier (comme, dans le cas présent, la torture, les crimes de guerre et les crimes contre l’humanité). Dans sa décision de 2012, la Cour internationale de Justice a précisé que le Sénégal, qui a ratifié la Convention des Nations Unies contre la torture en 1987, était dans l'obligation d'enquêter et de poursuivre les allégations de torture contre Habré.

Néanmoins, le Sénégal s’est conformé aux prescriptions de la Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO en mettant en place les Chambres africaines extraordinaires, « juridiction spéciale ad hoc à caractère international ».

En avril 2013, les avocats de Habré ont déposé une nouvelle requête devant la Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO, afin d’obtenir la suspension des activités des Chambres. Dans une décision du 5 novembre 2013, la Cour a jugé que les Chambres africaines extraordinaires étaient un tribunal à caractère international et qu’elle n’était pas compétente pour statuer sur la requête de Habré car les Chambres furent créées sur la base d’un accord conclu entre l’Union africaine et le Sénégal.

27. Pourquoi Hissène Habré n’est-il pas jugé au Tchad ?

Le Tchad n’a jamais cherché à extrader Habré et il existe de sérieux doutes quant à la possibilité pour lui d’avoir un procès équitable au Tchad, où il a déjà été condamné à mort par contumace pour son rôle supposé dans la rébellion de 2008. En juillet 2011, le président Wade a menacé de renvoyer Habré au Tchad avant de se rétracter, quelques jours plus tard, face au tollé international qu’aurait entrainé le risque que Habré puisse y  subir de mauvais traitements ou même y être tué.

28. Pourquoi la Cour pénale internationale ne peut-elle pas poursuivre Habré ?

La Cour pénale internationale a une compétence temporelle limitée aux crimes commis après le 1er juillet 2002, date à laquelle son Statut est entré en vigueur. Or les crimes reprochés à Hissène Habré auraient été commis entre 1982 et 1990.

Topic

• International Justice
• Torture

• English

Questions and Answers

On July 20, 2015, the former dictator of Chad, Hissène Habré, will stand trial on charges of crimes against humanity, torture and war crimes before the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegal court system. The chambers were inaugurated by Senegal and the African Union in February 2013 to prosecute the “person or persons” most responsible for international crimes committed in Chad between 1982 and 1990, the period when Habré ruled Chad. After two days, the trial was adjourned when Habré’s lawyers refused to appear and the court appointed three lawyers to represent him and gave them 45 days to prepare the case.  The trial will resume on September 7.

Habré’s trial is the first in the world in which the courts of one country prosecute the former ruler of another for alleged human rights crimes. It is also the first universal jurisdiction case to proceed to trial in Africa. Universal jurisdiction is a concept under international law that allows national courts to prosecute the most serious crimes even when committed abroad, by a foreigner and against foreign victims. The New York Times has called the case “a Milestone for Justice in Africa.”

The following questions and answers provide more information on the case and what lies ahead.

1. Who is Hissène Habré?
2. What are the charges against Habré?
3. What crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the court?
4. Why has it taken so long to bring Habré to justice?
5. What has been the role of the Chadian government in bringing about Habré’s prosecution?
6. How did the chambers carry out their investigation?
7. What did the court-appointed experts find?
8. Why is Hissène Habré the only person standing trial?
9. What about Déby, Chad’s current president?
10. What are the accused’s rights?
11. Habré is refusing to cooperate with the chambers. What effect will that have?
12. Habré says he will not appear in court. What will happen?
13. The Court has appointed counsel to represent Habré against his wishes. Was this proper? What will happen if Habré objects to the lawyers?
14. What is the maximum punishment Habré could receive? 
15. How are the Extraordinary Chambers structured and administered?
16. How are the prosecutors and judges assigned?
17. How will the trial be conducted?
18. How long will the trial last? 
19. Will victims have a role in the trial, and will they receive reparations?
20. How will people in Chad know about the trial?
21. What about the trial in Chad of Habré-era security agents?
22. How are the chambers funded?
23. What were the key steps in the campaign to bring Habré to justice? 
24. What is the significance of Habré’s prosecution under universal jurisdiction?
25. How does this trial fit into critiques of the role of international justice in Africa and claims that universal jurisdiction cases target Africans?
26. Why was it necessary to create special chambers with an international element?
27. Why isn’t Habré prosecuted in Chad?
28. Why can’t the International Criminal Court prosecute Habre?

 

1. Who is Hissène Habré?

Habré was president of the former French colony of Chad from 1982 until he was deposed in 1990 by Idriss Déby Itno, the current president. Habré has been living in exile in Senegal ever since.

A 714-page study by Human Rights Watch found that Habré’s government was responsible for widespread political killings, systematic torture, and thousands of arbitrary arrests. The government periodically targeted civil populations, including in the south (1983-1985), and various ethnic groups such as Chadian Arabs, the Hadjerai (1987) and the Zaghawa (1989-90), killing and arresting group members en masse when it was perceived that their leaders posed a threat to Habré’s rule.

A 1992 Chadian Truth Commission accused Habré's government of 40,000 political murders and systematic torture. Most abuses were carried out by his dreaded political police, the Documentation and Security Directorate (DDS), whose directors reported directly to Habré. The directors all belonged to Habré’s inner circle, and some belonged to the same ethnic group, Gorane anakaza, or even the same family as Habré.

The United States and France supported Habré, seeing him as a bulwark against Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, who had expansionist designs on northern Chad. Under President Ronald Reagan, the United States gave covert CIA paramilitary support to help Habré take power in 1982 and then provided his government with massive military aid. The United States also used a clandestine base in Chad to organize captured Libyan soldiers into an anti-Gaddafi force in the late 1980s. Despite Habré’s abduction of the French anthropologist Françoise Claustre in 1974 and the murder of Captain Pierre Galopin, who went to Chad to negotiate her release in 1975, France also supported Habré after he arrived in power, providing him with arms, logistical support and information, and carrying out military operations “Manta” (1983) and “Hawk” (1986) to help Chad push back Libyan forces.

2. What are the charges against Habré?

Habré was indicted for crimes against humanity, torture and war crimes by the chambers’ four investigating judges on July 2, 2013. On February 13, 2015, after a 19-month investigation, the judges found sufficient evidence for Habré to face charges of crimes against humanity and torture as a member of a “joint criminal enterprise” and of war crimes on the basis of his superior responsibility. Specifically, they charged Habré with:

• The massive practice of murder, summary executions, kidnapping  followed by enforced disappearance and torture, amounting to crimes against humanity, against the Hadjerai and Zaghawa ethnic groups, the people of southern Chad and political opponents;
• Torture; and
• The war crimes of murder, torture, unlawful transfer and unlawful confinement, and violence to life and physical well-being. 

3. What crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the court?

The chamber’s statute gives it competence over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture as defined in the statute. The definitions generally track those used in the statutes of the International Criminal Court and other international tribunals. The crimes must have taken place in Chad between June 7, 1982, and December 1, 1990, which corresponds to the dates of Habré’s rule. 

4. Why has it taken so long to bring Habré to justice?

The advent of the trial, almost 25 years after Habré’s fall, is entirely due to the perseverance of Habré’s victims and their allies in nongovernmental groups.  When Habré was arrested in July 2013, the Toronto Globe and Mail  lauded “one of the world’s most patient and tenacious campaigns for justice.” The New York Times wrote that the “case has proved unusual for the tenacity of his victims, and of Human Rights Watch, in seeking to bring him to justice.”  Habré was first indicted by a Senegalese judge in 2000, but for the next 12 years the Senegalese government of former President Abdoulaye Wade subjected the victims to what the Nobel Peace Prize winner Archbishop Desmond Tutu and 117 groups from 25 African countries described as an “interminable political and legal soap opera.” It was only in 2012, when Macky Sall became president of Senegal and the International Court of Justice ordered Senegal to prosecute or extradite Habré that progress was made toward the trial. 

5. What has been the role of the Chadian government in bringing about Habré’s prosecution?

Habré’s lawyers claim that Deby’s government is behind the effort to prosecute him.  However, since the victims’ first complaint in 2000, it has been the victims and their supporters who have pressed the case forward, overcoming one obstacle after another. The Chadian government has long expressed its support for Habré’s prosecution, and in 2002 it waived Habré's immunity from prosecution abroad, but it did not otherwise contribute to advancing the case in a meaningful way until it agreed to help finance the court and cooperated with the investigating judges during their four missions to Chad. More recently, the Chadian government has seemingly cooled toward the chambers, particularly in its refusal to transfer additional suspects.

6. How did the chambers carry out their investigation?

The investigating judges began with access to a considerable amount of evidence collected in the years since Habré’s fall, including prior Belgian and Chadian investigations into Habré’s alleged crimes.

A 1992 National Truth Commission in Chad accused Habré’s government of systemic torture and an estimated 40,000 political assassinations, and documented the methods used to carry out torture. One of the first witnesses the chambers’ investigating judges interviewed was the former Truth Commission president, a leading Chadian lawyer. In addition, the chambers’ judges obtained the extensive file Belgian investigators prepared on Habré during four years, which contains interviews with witnesses and “insiders” who worked alongside Habré, as well as DDS documents.

Most important, the chambers’ four investigating judges conducted their own thorough 19-month investigation, and for the most part relied on evidence they developed themselves. 

On May 3, 2013, Senegal and Chad signed a “Judicial cooperation agreement” to facilitate the chambers’ investigation in Chad.

The investigative judges conducted four missions (“commissions rogatoires”) to Chad - in August - September 2013, December 2013, March 2014, and May - June 2014. They were accompanied by the chief prosecutor and his deputies as well as police officers. During their visits, the judges gathered statements from 2,500 direct and indirect victims and key witnesses, including former officials of the Habré government. Although the Judicial cooperation agreement allowed the Senegalese investigative judges to interview people with Chadian authorities not present, the judges chose not to.

The judges took copies of DDS files that Human Rights Watch had uncovered  in 2001. Among the tens of thousands of documents were daily lists of prisoners and deaths in detention, interrogation reports, surveillance reports, and death certificates. The files detail how Habré placed the DDS under his direct control and kept tight control over DDS operations.  Analysis of the data for Human Rights Watch revealed the names of 1,208 people who were killed or died in detention and 12,321 victims of human rights violations. In these files alone, Habré received 1,265 direct communications from the DDS about the status of 898 detainees. 

The judges also appointed experts on data analysis, forensic anthropology, handwriting, the historical context of Habré’s government and the functioning and command structure of Habré’s military.

7. What did the court-appointed experts find?

Patrick Ball of the Human Rights Data Analysis Group conducted a study of mortality in Habré’s prisons.  His conclusion was that, for the period he studied, prison mortality was “hundreds of times higher than normal mortality for adult men in Chad during the same period” and “substantially higher than some of the twentieth century’s worst POW contexts” such as German prisoners of war in Soviet custody and US prisoners of war in Japanese custody.

Experts from the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team carried out exhumations at a number of potential mass grave sites. In Deli, in southern Chad, for instance, the site of an alleged killing of unarmed rebels in September 1984, the experts located 21 bodies, almost all military-age men, most of whom were killed by gunshot. In Mongo, in the center of Chad, the experts uncovered 14 bodies from another 1984 massacre.

A handwriting expert appointed by the judges looked at documents allegedly written or signed by Habré. He confirmed, for instance, that it was Habré who responded to a request by the International Committee of the Red Cross for the hospitalization of certain prisoners of war by writing “From now on, no prisoner of war can leave the Detention Center except in case of death.”

8. Why is Hissène Habré the only person standing trial?

The Chadian victims’ goal in seeking justice in Senegal since 2000 has been a trial of Habré, the head of state who directly controlled the security apparatus and had primary responsibility for his government’s actions. The victims also filed cases in 2000 in Chad against other officials of Habré’s government who were still in Chad.

Under article 3 of the chambers’ statute, the Extraordinary African Chambers can prosecute “the person or persons most responsible” for international crimes committed in Chad during Habré’s rule. In July 2013, the chief prosecutor requested the indictment of five additional officials from Habré’s administration suspected of being responsible for international crimes. These are:

• Saleh Younous and Guihini Korei, two former directors of the DDS, Habré’s political police.  Korei is Habré’s nephew;
• Abakar Torbo, former director of the DDS prison service;
• Mahamat Djibrine, also known as “El Djonto,” one of the “most feared torturers in Chad,” according to the National Truth Commission; and
• Zakaria Berdei, former special security adviser to the presidency and one of those suspected of responsibility in the repression in the south in 1984.

None of them have been brought before the court, however. Younous and Djibrine were convicted in Chad on charges stemming from the complaints filed by victims in the Chadian courts, and Chad has refused to extradite them to Senegal.  Berdei is also believed to be in Chad, though he is not in custody. The location of Torbo and Korei is unknown, and they have not been arrested under the chambers’ indictments. As a result, only Habré was committed to trial.

9. What about Déby, Chad’s current president?

President Déby was commander in chief of Habré’s forces during the period known as “Black September,” in 1984, when a murderous wave of repression was unleashed to bring southern Chad back into the fold of the central government. In 1985, Déby was removed from this post, and after a period of study in a military school in France, was appointed a defense adviser until he left Chad in 1989.

It is important to note that Article 10 of the chambers’ statute provides that “[t]he official position of an accused, whether as Head of State or Government, or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility….” The chambers were thus free to pursue charges against President Déby even though he is currently a head of state, but they did not.

10. What are the accused’s rights?

Habré is entitled to the right to a fair trial in accordance with international law. He is represented by legal counsel of his own choosing. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights outline the minimum guarantees that must be afforded to defendants in criminal proceedings. 

In accordance with those standards, the chambers’ Statute provides a number of rights to defendants, including:

• the right to be present during trial;
• the presumption of innocence;
• the right to a public hearing;
• the right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense;
• the right to counsel and legal assistance;
• the right to be tried without undue delay; and
• the right to examine and call witnesses.

11. Habré is refusing to cooperate with the chambers. What effect will that have?

Many defendants facing trial before tribunals for alleged crimes under international criminal law – such as Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić and Charles Taylor– asserted that they did not recognize the authority of the tribunal or that they would not cooperate, or have sought to use the trial as a platform to present their version of events. 

The burden always remains on the prosecution to prove Habré’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, if an accused decides to not cooperate in his own trial, he inevitably undermines the exercise of his right to an effective defense, which includes the ability to challenge the evidence against him and his opportunity to call into question the prosecution’s case.

The judges of the chambers have the responsibility to ensure that the trial against Habre proceeds in accordance with his rights to a fair hearing, but also that justice is dispensed expeditiously and without manipulations, including by the accused.  

12. Habré says he will not appear in count. What will happen? 

Under Senegalese procedural law, which is applied by the Chambers, if Habré refuses to appear willingly, the court president has the choice of either going forward with the trial in his absence or of ordering that he be brought to court by force. At his preliminary hearing on June 3, and at the trial itself Habré’s presence was ordered by the court.  

13. The Court has appointed counsel to represent Habré against his wishes. Was this proper? What will happen if Habré objects to the lawyers?

Under Senegalese law, the presence of defense counsel at trial is necessary.  When Habré’s lawyers refused to appear, the Chambers appointed counsel to act on his behalf to ensure a fair trial.

Both national courts and international criminal tribunals have appointed counsel against the will of defendants to represent the interests of the defense during trial. In the case of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the defendant refused to give instructions to the appointed defense lawyers, claiming that the tribunal was politically biased. The ICTR refused the appointed counsel’s request to withdraw, stating that “Counsel are under an obligation to mount an active defence in the best interest of the Accused,” and that the lawyers also “represents the interest of the Tribunal to ensure that the Accused receives a fair trial. The aim is to obtain efficient representation and adversarial proceedings.”  The  Special Court for Sierra Leone refused a similar request by Augustine Gbao to have his appointed counsel dismissed because he considered the court illegitimate, noting that “the interest of justice would not be served by allowing Mr. Gbao to be unrepresented before this Court. ... [The court] must safeguard the rights of the accused and the integrity of the proceedings.”

It is possible that Habré may seek to recuse his court-appointed lawyers but under Senegalese law only the presiding judge can remove a court-appointed lawyer. Appointed lawyers risk disciplinary sanctions under Senegalese law if they refuse to cooperate.

14. What is the maximum punishment Habré could receive?

If Habré is found guilty, the chambers could impose a sentence of up to life in prison, depending on the circumstances and the gravity of the crime(s). They could also order him to pay a fine or forfeit any of the proceeds, property or assets derived directly or indirectly from the crime(s).

15. How are the Extraordinary Chambers structured and administered? 

The Extraordinary African Chambers have been created inside the existing Senegalese court structure in Dakar, namely the Dakar District Court and the Appeals Court in Dakar. The chambers have four levels: an Investigative Chamber with four Senegalese investigative judges, an Indicting Chamber of three Senegalese judges, a Trial Chamber, and an Appeals Chamber. The Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber each have two Senegalese judges and a president from another African Union member state. 

The chief prosecutor is Mbacké Fall. The chambers have an administrator – Aly Ciré Ba – to ensure the smooth functioning of their activities and to handle all non-judicial aspects of the work. The administrator’s responsibilities include financial management of personnel, outreach and media information, witness protection and assistance, and judicial cooperation between Senegal and other countries, such as Chad. 

16. How are the prosecutors and judges assigned?

The prosecutors and investigative judges were nominated by Senegal’s justice minister and appointed by the chairperson of the AU Commission. The President of the Trial Chamber is Gberdao Gustave Kam of Burkina Faso.

17. How will the trial be conducted?

The trial will be conducted in accordance with the Senegalese Code of Criminal Procedure, which essentially follows the French civil law “inquisitorial” model rather than the “adversarial” model used in Anglo-Saxon common-law systems. The presiding judge assumes a direct role, examining the accused and witnesses. The prosecutor and the lawyers for the defendants and the victims may also have questions put to the accused and witnesses. There are no strict rules of evidence as in common-law systems. The lawyers’ final summations, or plaidoiries, assume a particular importance in this model.

18. How long will the trial last?

A provisional calendar envisages that the first stage of the trial, to determine Habre’s guilt, will last approximately two months, until October 30. If Habré is found guilty, there would be a second stage to look at the question of civil parties and reparations. The Chambers’ budget provides for transportation from Chad of 100 witnesses. 

19. Will victims have a role in the trial, and will they receive reparations?

Victims are permitted to participate in proceedings as civil parties, represented by legal counsel. More than 4,000 victims have registered as civil parties.

Senegalese procedural law governs participation by the victims. The victims’ lawyers participated in pre-trial proceedings, as when victims’ accounts were contrasted with Habré’s. At trial, the victims’ lawyers will be able to have questions put to witnesses or the accused, and to seek reparations.  It is unlikely, however, that more than a small number of victims will testify during the trial.

Under its statute in the event of a conviction, the chambers may order reparations against the accused to be paid into a victims’ fund, which can also receive voluntary contributions by foreign governments, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations. Reparations from the victims’ fund will be open to all victims, individually or collectively, whether or not they participated in Habré’s trial. The chambers have not yet created such a fund, however.

Chad’s truth commission accused Habré of emptying out the national treasury in the days before his flight to Senegal, and it is widely believed that he has millions of dollars. The chambers have frozen two small bank accounts belonging to him and a property in an upscale Dakar neighborhood.

In July 2013, after the chambers arrested Habré, President Déby said that the Chadian government would compensate survivors and relatives of those who died. Chad’s responsibility under international law to provide reparations to victims of gross human rights violations is separate and distinct from reparations against the accused.

20. How will people in Chad know about the trial?

The chambers’ Statute provides for filming and recording trial proceedings for broadcasting purposes, as with other internationalized trials, and for public access to the trial by journalists and non-governmental organizations. The Judicial Cooperation Agreement commits Chad to broadcast the recordings of proceedings on public radio and television and to allow private media entities to do the same. The justice ministers of both countries agreed in November 2013 that the trial would be broadcast.

The first two days of the trial were recorded and streamed, broadcast in Chad and are available on the Chambers’ web-site.

Human Rights Watch believes that filming the entire trial is critical for the historical record. In addition, subject to appropriate measures that may be necessary to ensure security of witnesses, retransmission of the trial, to Chad in particular, as well as the preparation of abstracts of the trial and video summaries, serves the key purposes of ensuring that the trial is meaningful to, and understood by, the people of Chad and helps to build the rule of law in both Chad and Senegal. The landmark nature of this trial makes it all the more important to make it available for viewing by the widest possible audience. This means that the footage and sound should be freely available, to media, filmmakers and the public.

The chambers, through a consortium of non-governmental organizations from Senegal, Belgium and Chad who received a contract from the court, have undertaken outreach programs to both Chad and Senegal. The consortium has trained journalists in both countries, organized public debates, created a website and produced materials to explain the trial.

Chad and Senegal have also agreed to cooperate to facilitate both the travel of Chadian journalists to Senegal and the travel to Chad for all those involved in the trial proceedings.

21. What about the trial in Chad of Habré-era security agents?

On March 25, 2015, a Chadian criminal court convicted 20 Habré-era security agents on charges of murder, torture, kidnapping and arbitrary detention, based on complaints filed by the victims in 2000 but that were stalled until the Senegal created the chambers. The court sentenced seven men to life in prison including Younous, a former director of the DDS, and Djibrine, described as one of the “most feared torturers in Chad” by the Truth Commission. Both men were also wanted by the chambers, but Chad declined to transfer them.  Most of the 20 gave their testimony to the chambers when they visited Chad, and it is likely that the chambers will seek to have them come to Dakar for the trial.  The Chadian court acquitted four others and ordered that the Chadian government and the convicted persons each pay half of US$125 million in reparations to over 7,000 victims. The court also ordered that the government within a year erect a monument to those who were killed under Habré and that the former DDS headquarters be turned into a museum. These were both among the long-standing demands of the victims’ associations. During the Chad trial, about 50 victims described their torture and mistreatment at the hands of DDS agents.

22. How are the chambers funded?

The chambers are funded in large part by donor countries. In November 2012, Senegal and a number of donor countries agreed to a budget of €8.6million (US$11.4 million at the time) to cover Habré’s trial. Commitments were  made by: Chad (2 billion CFA francs or US$3,743,000), the European Union (€2 million), the Netherlands (€1 million), the African Union (US$1 million), the United States (US$1 million), Belgium (€500,000), Germany (€500,000), France (€300,000), and Luxembourg (€100,000). In addition, Canada, Switzerland, and the International Committee of the Red Cross have provided technical assistance. A Steering Committee consisting of Senegal and the donor countries and institutions receives and approves periodic reports from the administrator.

23. What were the key steps in the campaign to bring Habré to justice?

In January 2000, a group of Chadian victims filed a complaint against Habré in Senegal. In February of the same year, a Senegalese judge indicted Habré on charges of torture, crimes against humanity, and “barbaric acts”. However, after political interference by the new Senegalese government of President Abdoulaye Wade, which was denounced by two UN human rights rapporteurs, appellate courts  dismissed  the case on the ground that Senegalese courts lacked jurisdiction to try crimes committed abroad.

Other Habré victims, including three Belgian citizens of Chadian origin, then filed a case against him in Belgium in November 2000. The Belgian authorities investigated the case for four years, then indicted Habré in 2005 and sought his extradition. A Senegalese court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to decide on the extradition request.

Senegal then turned to the African Union (AU), which in July 2006 called on Senegal to prosecute Habré “on behalf of Africa” before its own national judicial system. President Wade accepted the AU mandate and Senegalese law was amended to give the country’s courts explicit universal jurisdiction over international crimes, including torture and crimes against humanity. However, Wade contended that Senegal needed full up-front international funding of €27.4 million (US$36.5 million) before beginning any prosecution. Three years of halting negotiations over the trial budget ensued, until Senegal and donor countries finally agreed in November 2010 to a budget of €8.6 million (US$11.4 million) for Habré’s trial.

Just days before the budget agreement, the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ruled that Habré should be tried before a “special ad hoc procedure of an international character.” In January 2011, the AU responded to the ECOWAS court ruling by proposing a plan for special chambers within the Senegalese justice system with some judges appointed by the AU. Senegal rejected the plan, and in May 2011, withdrew from negotiations with the AU over creation of the tribunal.

In July 2011, Senegal’s foreign minister ruled out holding Habré's trial in Senegal. The Chadian government then announced its support for extraditing Habré to Belgium to face trial.

In 2011 and 2012, Belgium issued three more extradition requests, which were not properly transmitted to the courts by the Senegalese authorities.

On July 20, 2012, in response to a suit brought by Belgium, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN’s highest judicial organ, found that Senegal had failed to meet its obligations under the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and ordered Senegal to prosecute Habré “without further delay” if it did not extradite him.

The new Senegalese government of Macky Sall reacted quickly to the ICJ decision, expressing regret that Habré’s trial had not taken place sooner and reaffirming its commitment to begin proceedings quickly. Negotiations resumed between Senegal and the AU, which ultimately led to an agreement to create the Extraordinary African Chambers to conduct proceedings within the Senegalese judicial system. On December 17, the Senegalese National Assembly adopted a law establishing the special chambers. On February 8, 2013, the Extraordinary African Chambers were inaugurated in Dakar.

24. What is the significance of Habré’s prosecution under universal jurisdiction?

As demonstrated by the Habré case, universal jurisdiction is an important safety net to ensure that suspects of atrocities do not enjoy impunity in a third state when they cannot be prosecuted before the courts of the country where the crimes were allegedly committed or before an international court. There has been an increase in the use of universal jurisdiction over the past 20 years, notably but not exclusively by courts in European countries. To strengthen the fight against impunity for the most serious crimes, it is critical for courts on all continents to use universal jurisdiction. The African Union has encouraged its member states to adopt legislation to give their national courts universal jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide and has taken steps to initiate a network of national prosecutors working on war crimes cases.  Several investigations have been open in South Africa and Senegal on the basis of universal jurisdiction.

25. How does this trial fit into critiques of the role of international justice in Africa and claims that universal jurisdiction cases target Africans?

Habré’s trial is an important step forward in African states taking responsibility to prosecute serious international crimes. However, the Habré trial does not negate the importance of the ICC and the use of universal jurisdiction by non-African states, including European courts, for crimes committed in Africa. These tools are often the only available hope for justice for African victims.

It is a reality that international justice has been applied unevenly. Powerful countries and their allies have often been able to avoid justice when serious crimes are committed on their territories, notably by failing to ratify the ICC treaty and wielding their political influence at the UN Security Council.

Nongovernmental organizations have actively campaigned for African governments to work to improve international justice and its reach —as opposed to undermining it— to limit impunity for atrocities.

26. Why was it necessary to create special chambers with an international element?

Habré’s complaint with the ECOWAS Court of Justice in October 2008, contended that his trial in Senegal, on the basis of Senegal’s 2007-08 legislative changes, would violate the prohibition against retroactive application of criminal law.

On November 18, 2010, the ECOWAS court ruled that to avoid violating the principle of non-retroactivity, Habré would have to be tried before a “special ad hoc procedure of an international character.” International law experts have questioned the ECOWAS court decision because the prosecution of acts that, at the time of their commission, were already prohibited by international conventions and customary law does not violate the principle of non-retroactivity. In this case, examples include torture, war crimes and crimes against humanity. In its 2012 decision, the ICJ made clear that Senegal was under an obligation to investigate and prosecute torture allegations against Habré since it had ratified the UN Convention on Torture in 1987.

Nonetheless, Senegal complied with the ECOWAS court ruling by creating the Extraordinary African Chambers, a “special ad hoc procedure of an international character.” 

In April 2013, Habré’s lawyers filed a new application with the ECOWAS court seeking the suspension of the chambers’ activities. In a November 5, 2013 decision, the court held that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the application because the chambers were established under a treaty between Senegal and the African Union. 

27. Why isn’t Habré prosecuted in Chad?

Chad never sought Habré’s extradition, and there are serious doubts that Habré could get a fair trial in Chad, where he has already been sentenced to death in absentia for his alleged role in a 2008 rebellion. In July 2011, President Wade threatened to expel Habré to Chad but, days later, retracted his decision in the face of an international outcry over the risk that Habré would be mistreated or even killed.

28. Why can’t the International Criminal Court prosecute Habre?

The International Criminal Court only has jurisdiction over crimes committed after July 1, 2002, when its statute entered into effect. The crimes of which Hissène Habré is accused took place between 1982 and 1990.

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August 30, 2015 (JUBA) – The Japanese ambassador to South Sudan, Kiya Masahiko, concluded a visit to South Sudan's Upper Nile state last week to show solidarity with the refugees and appreciate the impact of Japan's aid contribution to their living conditions.

Sudanese refugees wait to board a truck heading to Batil refugee camp in South Sudan's Upper Nile state on 15 July 2012 (Photo: Paula Bronstein/Getty Images)

A delegation of local authorities and partner organisations, including the country representative of the United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR), Ahmed Warsame accompanied Masahiko.

During the trip, the Japanese envoy reportedly visited some of the projects funded by the government of Japan in Doro camp, including classrooms at the Nur primary school, a solar-power borehole and the mud-plastered transitional shelters for vulnerable refugees.

Masahiko, UNHCR said, also visited Maban county hospital, which has been equipped with a X-ray room, two operating theatres, three paediatric wards and a pharmacy over the last two years, courtesy of funding from donors, including Japan.

"This hospital serves more than 200,000 people from the refugee and host communities and remains the only functioning hospital in the entirety of Upper Nile State since the start of the conflict in December 2013," UNHCR said in a statement.

Japan, UNHCR's second largest donor globally has reportedly contributed more than $16 million since 2014 to support UN refugee agency's efforts to protect and assist refugees and extend a helping hand to host communities in the world's youngest nation.

"Japan's support has been key in improving the living conditions of tens of thousands of Sudanese refugees who have found shelter in camps in Upper Nile and Unity states as well as many South Sudanese living within and around Maban camps," said Warsame.

"We were able to build better shelters for families and ensure higher standards in health, water, sanitation and education," he added.

The Japanese envoy reportedly met the refugee leaders to hear the concerns of their community. Access to higher education, health care, food and shelters were said to be top priorities for the refugees as do Internet connectivity for education and access to labor-saving modern farm technologies like tractors to increase agricultural production.

"Resources are limited, but we are committed to continue our support for refugees and host communities in South Sudan," said ambassador Masahiko.

"It is important that the contribution of the people of Japan reaches the most needy refugees and makes substantive improvements in their livelihoods," he stressed.

Currently, South Sudan reportedly has some 265,000 refugees of which nearly 90% are from South Kordofan and Blue Niles states and live in Unity and Upper Nile state camps. The remaining 10% are refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and Ethiopia who live mostly in Central and Western Equatoria state.

(ST)