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This wasn’t the post I was going to write this morning, but frankly after listening to Theresa May grind her way through another less-than-revealing interview, I want to consider one neglected aspect of the current debate on Brexit.

The content of the Withdrawal Agreement.

As May didn’t-really answer John Humphrys’ less-than-incisive questions, I was struck by how little substance there was to either side of the discussion.

May has her talking points; Humphrys’ his clever-clever jibes. But neither presented a close reading of the text that is actually to be voted on next Tuesday.

This has been the pattern of the entire Brexit saga: half- or quarter-understandings of things that people encounter, turned into the be-all and end-all of How Things Are.

Exhibit 1 is that bus, with its highly tendentious reading of, well, of some set of figures possibly related to the EU budget. I completely understand the logic for doing that – and it worked – but it did help to open the door to a much more emotive approach to the entire question.

And emotions do matter: even on much more narrow questions and issues, how we feel about matters of justice or fairness or community counts, in a way that can’t really be reduced to a rational balancing-out.

But here and now we find ourselves with a national debate – and a parliamentary debate – that is driven by more emotion than cold analysis.

Three examples will suffice for now.

Firstly, much of the parliamentary debate is framed by emotional ideals of parliamentary sovereignty: that it only has to say the word and things will happen.

But parliament is only sovereign within the UK: it cannot force the EU to renegotiate, or to change its preferences, any more than it can make other countries sign up to trade deals. Likewise, May can talk about giving parliament more power within the backstop process, but the limits to UK (and thus parliament’s) powers are already clearly set out in the relevant protocol of the Withdrawal Agreement.

Secondly,there continues to be minimal understanding of what the Withdrawal Agreement actually is. It’s not a commitment to the future relationship with the EU, but a resolution of the ending of UK membership of the EU. With the exception of the backstop, there is nothing in the Withdrawal Agreement that requires the UK to follow any particular path of interaction with the EU down the line, so anyone with the intention of an agreed exit from the Union might recognise that there will be an opportunity to change government policy on that future in the hiatus between leaving and the start of future relationship negotiations.

The liabilities from ending membership will be the same, whatever the future relationship, so why the government isn’t selling that as a way of building some more support seems strange.

Thirdly, there is a basic confusion between having the power to do something and that thing actually happening. This seems especially ironic in the week of three government defeats in a day. For all the talk by those who would remain about a second referendum amendment to the Meaningful Vote, that still would requires subsequent approval of a referendum bill and then the fighting of a successful referendum campaign: one does not necessarily lead on to the next.

Indeed, the only decisions you can count on are the ones that have been made already, most important of which is the decision on 29 March 2017 to notify the EU of the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU. Unless and until another decision is reached, that decision will take effect on 29 March 2019.

In large part, this is all a reflection of the lack of trust between all involved.

Look at the forced release of the Attorney General’s advice on the backstop: there was nothing in it that wasn’t already clear in the Withdrawal Agreement itself (and in the copious comment from independent commentators and experts), but the suspicion that something was being hidden contributed to the push to secure it.

People do feel strongly about Brexit, but that shouldn’t be at the expense of having a good grasp of the detail involved. And that should be especially true of those who will be making a key decision on this next week.

The post I feel strongly about Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The EU is trying to deal with two headline issues at present: whether the Brexit deal agreed between the Commission negotiators can be agreed on the one hand by the British parliament and on the other by all 27 member states, the other is whether the Italian government’s budget which has been deemed to breach euro zone rules should be sanctioned and whether it leads to an Italian financial crisis, as would happen if interest rates on Italian government debt continue to rise until they become clearly unaffordable. The Italian crisis differs from the Brexit saga in that Italy is not leaving the EU. Nevertheless the Italian government, especially its most powerful member, the deputy prime minister and interior minister, Matteo Salvini, is hostile to the EU and the overwhelming support in Italy for EU membership until a few years ago has evaporated with only 44% of recently- polled Italians supporting EU membership (although with a lot of don’t-knows, this still exceeds those definitely wanting to leave).

 

In this situation the Commission is danger of setting itself up to be blamed by threatening to fine Italy for non-compliance of the euro zone budgetary rules. This only feeds the government’s narrative that Italy’s woes can be blamed on the EU. In defence of the Commission, it is carrying out its formal duty as defined by the euro zone rules established when the euro was formed, and it is also under pressure from some other euro zone members, such as the Netherlands and Austria overtly  and probably Germany more discretely, to take a hard line. However, the Commission is a political organisation whose duty is not just to blindly enforce rules but to act in the long-term interest of the EU. There is no point in allowing the EU to be portrayed in Italy as a scapegoat. Although so far investors have only higher yields which the government considers affordable, if the government budget plans become clearly unaffordable, investors will at some point refuse to buy government debt so forcing the government to back down. In the meantime the Commission may be right to think that short-term budgetary generosity may cost the Italian public in the longer term. It is entitled to say so but should otherwise stand back.

 

One possible argument for the Commission taking stronger action is the possibility of a government fiscal crisis leading to a banking crisis given that many Italian banks have less strong capital underpinnings than would be desirable. Already higher rates on government bonds have led to higher rates that banks must pay to issue their own bonds. However, banks in other countries have had nine years to rebuild their balance sheets since the euro zone crisis and would be likely to be able to resist. The most vulnerable other country Greece, which has been and continues to comply with strict (many would argue excessively strict) conditions, is still supported through the European Stability Mechanism.

 

The EU is not to blame for Italy’s government debt or general economic problems (some argue that the latter are partly due to euro membership but even if this were so Italy did not have to join the euro). The EU, or more precisely other member state governments, do, however, bear considerable responsibility for the rise of the right-wing Lega based on its hostility  to migration to Italy across the Mediterranean. They did hardly anything to help Italy tackle the issue whether by providing financial support for managing the inflow or sharing those with asylum claims and even blocked migrants crossing borders into Austria and France.  There are no easy answers to how to deal with migrant flows in a way which tries to respect the dignity of these desperate people, but EU countries should try to work together rather than against each other.

The post EU should not set itself up as scapegoat by fining Italy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

will take place on Monday, 3 December (15:00-18:30) in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

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Eschange of views on 'Security situation in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait'
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Exchange of views on "Security situation in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait"
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SEDE organised a public hearing on 'Russian influence in South-East Europe' on Monday 3r December, from 17.00 to 18.30, with external experts
Location : Altiero Spinelli Room 1G-2
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SEDE organised a public hearing on 'Russian influence in South-East Europe' on Monday 3rd December 2018, from 17.00 to 18.30, with three external experts
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Committee and political group meetings, Brussels

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DRAFT REPORT on the state of EU-Russia political relations
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Sandra Kalniete

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DRAFT REPORT on building EU capacity on conflict prevention and mediation
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Considering EU democracy promotion as an integral part of EU foreign policy, Evangelos Fanoulis examines the effectiveness of political conditionality in the EU’s advocacy of democratic reforms in developing countries.

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Since its inception in the 1950, the European Union (EU) has tried to spread its democratic principles and values worldwide. These endeavours are broadly known as “EU democracy promotion”.

To a certain extent, such pursuit has been due to a genuine belief that democracy can lead to peace and prosperity for all. From a more pragmatic point of view, the EU institutions believe that democratic governments are more stable politically and therefore readier to get into trading and diplomatic relations. Some scholars have also interpreted the EU’s democracy promotion as indication of guilt for the colonial past of European societies.

Whether the reasons behind EU democracy promotion are pragmatic, idealistic or psychological, the Union has advocated for democratic reforms in developing countries for many years. It does it primarily by imposing political conditions in trade or exchange for development aid.

This means that the EU provides preferential trade agreements and development assistance to regimes that promise to make democratic reforms for the sake of their citizens. In this way, the EU clearly pushes a certain agenda for example, the abolition of death penalty, fair elections, freedom of speech and of the press, the right to protest, in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe.

One crucial question is whether political conditionality has worked or not. The events of Arab Spring are telling. For example, the EU Commission funded Ben Ali’s regime with the European Neighbourhood Policy instruments in order to secure political stability in Tunisia. However, funds stayed with the country’s elites instead of being spent for the well-being of the Tunisian people. Promised democratic reforms agreed under the title of political conditionality got delayed, unemployment rose and the public uprising against the government followed.

Of course, it is difficult to say what could have happened if the EU had pushed more fiercely and openly for democratisation in Tunisia. Yet, there is a sense that having turned a blind eye for the sake of stability in the region the EU failed in its ambitions abroad.

Tunisia, as with other cases, shows that when country politicians are unwilling to stay firm to the agreed agenda of reforms, democratisation fails (Grugel 2007). For instance, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy criticised Guatemala in 2010 for the potential restoration of the death penalty; she condemned the violent suppression of protesters in Kazakhstan in March 2012; and in January 2013 warned Sri Lanka about maintaining an independent justice system. In all three cases, there were prior commitments by the governments of those countries to promote democracy in the context of their agreements with the Union.

The EU has acted in response where commitments have not been followed.  After the military coup in Fiji in 2006, the EU stopped development funds to the country. But to what extent is this an effective strategy to ensure democratisation? Political conditionality on development aid may eventually deprive people of much needed assistance. I doubt that this scenario can be seen as a success story of EU democracy promotion. At least, not from a normative perspective.

So far, the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion appears pessimistic. Yet, for the EU, both institutions and member-states, democracy promotion remains a policy priority. As I have argued, however, this sometimes fruitless effort is part of who EUropeans are. In an EU of different nations, languages, cultures, and historical experiences, the idea of democracy became a common point of reference. As the EU appears to move from an era of democratic politics to an era of populist politics, let us hope that this common point of reference will endure.

This piece draws on the article The EU’s Democratization Discourse and Questions of European Identification in JCMS Vol. 56 Issue 6.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of  Ideas on Europe, JCMS or UACES.

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Evangelos Fanoulis | @EvansFanoulis

Evangelos Fanoulis is Lecturer in international relations at Xi’an Jiaotong- Liverpool University (XJTLU). His main research interests lie within democracy and populism in the EU, Euroscepticism, European security governance, EU-China relations and post-structuralist IR theory.

 

 

 

The post Beyond Effectiveness? Reflections on the EU’s Democracy Promotion appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Report on Common Foreign and Security Policy
Karski report on Military and Security Companies' Operations
Report on Academic Freedom
Opinion Morocco Agreement
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Opinion European Instrument for Nuclear Safety
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ERRATUM to the report on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine
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REPORT on the Annual report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy
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Ioan Mircea Paşcu

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REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Japan, of the other part
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Alojz Peterle

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