European Union

In the run-up to the Swedish parliamentary elections on 9 September polls are pointing to a deadlock with neither the left nor the conservative Alliance winning a majority, because the Sweden Democrats are likely to garner almost 20 percent of the vote. Commentators believe it will now be virtually impossible to ignore the right-wing populist party and its arguments.

So today sees the publication of the first tranche of ‘no-deal’ preparedness notices from the British government.

I’m writing ahead of this, so maybe this’ll be out of date within a few hours, but let’s see what we can piece together so far.

The basic issue for the government is that it’s now caught on the horns of a dilemma.

On the one hand, it wants to demonstrate that ‘no-deal’ is a viable option for the UK to pursue, in order to given credibility to the ‘no deal is better than a bad deal’ line that has been poo-pooed for so long by observers. In so doing, it might be able to leverage more concessions out of the EU in the Article 50 process.

On the other, it doesn’t want to make ‘no-deal’ look too unproblematic, for the simple reason that the government recognises that it would be very substantially worse than any likely agreed deal. Detoxifying ‘no-deal’ might encourage backbench pressure to actively pursue that route.

Add in much talk about (another) resurrection of ‘project fear’, plus the negative reaction to the impact assessments finally released earlier this year, and it’s not hard to see why this element of the process has been one the government might not be particularly enthused about.

And yet, pursue it, it must.

Just as the EU has been working on its own contingency planning, it was always necessary that the British government do the same.

In purely abstract terms, it is necessary both to know what your alternative to a negotiated outcome might be and to prepare for it, just in case. That’s necessary because a negotiation is definitionally not only in your hands, but also in the hands of others: if they falter, for whatever reason, then you have to be covered.

In the case of Brexit, that fundament is very much more important for a number of reasons.

Firstly, the structure of Article 50 means that the critical decision has already been taken at the point of notification, which means that the default outcome is the UK’s exit from the EU without a deal next March: only an active decision and agreement by both sides will change that.

Secondly, the novelty of the process raised the likelihood of difficulties in negotiating.

And finally, the lived experience of Article 50 has further raised the chance of problems, with the exciting mixture of a lack of British strategic intent and a repeated willingness to lose negotiation time to domestic political battles.

As a result, not only should we expect preparation for ‘no-deal’, but we should have been more concerned if that preparation didn’t take place.

Of course, there’s preparation and there’s preparation.

Here, the track record doesn’t look so good for the government. The impact assessments were cursory and successive White Papers have been largely devoid of the level of detail required to operationalise a contingency plan.

That said, the volume of notices – some 80 in total – suggests more work has gone into this round of work. So the bigger challenge is how to handle the uncertainty of what will be what come 30 March.

This is really the weakness of going ‘no-deal’: the fundamental uncertainty about what will hold and what will give.

From the limited leaks so far, the government appears to be suggesting unilateral maintenance of pre-exit rules and regulation in many areas, plus some short-term emergency stock-piling to get through the critical first weeks. That suggests a model of emergency talks with the EU to resolve critical systems, before a much longer-term reconstruction of relations.

Put like that, it rather makes sense: don’t frighten the horses any more than they already are, while working on a fix in the background.

But this model runs in various problems. Most crucially, while it might address internal activity within the UK, it cannot fix cross-border activity, again for the reason that the EU’s actions will be in the hands of the EU, not London.

Keeping pre-exit rules in place is one thing, but it doesn’t – and can’t – mean that the EU (or anyone else) has to extend the same regime, or accept UK compliance, which would be operating on a unilateral basis.

So even before we get into businesses’ concerns about supply-chain disruption (or even the possibility of stockpiling in the first place), there’s a big question mark over the entire approach.

All of which brings us back to the dilemma.

While contingency planning is to be welcomed, it shouldn’t be taken as a mark of the British government giving up on securing a deal on the Withdrawal Agreement. The costs, and the uncertainties about the costs, of ‘no-deal’ are already generally understood in both economic and political terms, and have already pushed the UK towards a much more robust pursuit of an agreement.

Sadly, pursuits don’t always succeed, so the better we are prepared for the alternative, the better.

The post Giving up on Article 50? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

So far fears that Brexit would lead to the unravelling of the EU have proved unfounded. Nevertheless, the effect of the UK’s withdrawal on the future of European integration remains open to much debate and speculation. Whether Brexit spell boom or doom for European integration was the topic of a recently published report for the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs. The report’s editor, Tim Oliver, sets out some of the report’s key findings. 

Britain’s relationship with the EU and European integration has rarely been smooth. Britain’s decision to leave might, therefore, free the Union of what Sheffield University Professor Stephen George, in his 1990 book, termed ‘an awkward partner’. But note the word ‘might’. As with any Member State, the extent to which the UK has shaped European integration is difficult to accurately measure and assess. Britain might be described as ‘an awkward partner’ but that doesn’t mean it’s ‘the awkward partner’. Other Member States have also been awkward and Britain’s own contributions can often be overlooked in favour of a focus on when it has been difficult.

Nevertheless, with Britain headed towards the exit, the EU needs to assess how it will be changed by the departure of its third largest Member State. Before the UK’s referendum, views were expressed that a vote for Leave could bring about significant changes to European integration. On the one hand stood the prospect of the EU unravelling, with the UK’s vote triggering similar referendums elsewhere in the EU, perhaps even provoking the Union’s disintegration. On the other hand, there was the possibility that the UK’s withdrawal could lead to the strengthening of the Union by facilitating further integration. As of the summer of 2018, fears that the UK’s withdrawal would lead to the unravelling of the EU have proved unfounded. Nevertheless, the effect of the UK’s withdrawal on the future of European integration remains open to much debate and speculation.

To assess what the full effect might be, the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs commissioned a report into the topic that was released recently. ‘The Impact of the UK’s Withdrawal on EU Integration’ was edited by myself and with contributions from Catherine Barnard, Steven Peers, Matthias Matthijs, Linda Hantrais and Garvan Walshe. We approached the question by looking back at the UK’s positive and negative effects on European integration in several areas. From this, we drew up an assessment of how the UK’s withdrawal would affect future European integration. The areas chosen were the internal market, social policy, justice and home affairs, the Eurozone, and foreign, security and defence. These areas were chosen because they cover the EU’s political economy (internal market and the Eurozone), society (social policy), and Europe’s security and international standing (the area of freedom, security and justice, and foreign, security and defence cooperation). Each of these areas has seen varying degrees of integration both historically and more recently. The UK’s involvement also varies in each area, due, for instance, to its non-membership of the Eurozone contrasting with its central role in the internal market and its ambivalent role in defence and security policy.

The full report – which can be found here – was presented to the AFCO committee by Garvan Walshe at a special workshop on 11 July. The report shows that in some areas the UK has delayed or blocked European integration, making it more of an awkward partner in European integration than most other Member States have been. The UK’s opposition to European integration stems from the UK’s domestic politics, where, in contrast with the situation in other Member States, British politicians have rarely if ever pursued anything more than a transactional approach to EU membership. The UK’s departure could, therefore, be an opportunity for the remaining EU to integrate further.

However, it should not be overlooked that, often, the UK’s delaying and blocking tactics have been bypassed. One famous example is in the Eurozone, where Britain’s opposition to the Fiscal Compact led other Member States to establish the agreement outside the EU. The UK’s withdrawal is also not a short-term process; as it continues there is a risk that the UK could become a non-EU alternative that appeals to Eurosceptics in the remaining EU Member States. Furthermore, other Member States have also been awkward partners. Their awkwardness is now likely to play out in a process of differentiated integration, where some Member States integrate more quickly in some areas compared to others.

While the EU is unlikely to disintegrate because of the UK’s withdrawal, the report notes that significant systemic challenges remain, not least within the Eurozone and in facing a range of international pressures. This means the effect of Brexit on European integration will be determined by a balance between two effects. First, the UK’s success or failure outside the EU and how this is perceived within the remaining Member States. Second, the EU’s ability to overcome its systemic challenges, and so continue to demonstrate to EU citizens that, compared to other options, it can respond to their political demands and provide effective solutions to the problems they face.

This article first appeared on the Loughborough University London blog. 

The post Does Brexit spell boom or doom for European integration? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Susan Robertson

‘Making & Doing Technoscientific Futures Better’ was the title of the sixth CPERI (The Changing Political Economy of Research and Innovation) workshop that took place on the 23rd and 24th July in Lancaster (UK), just before the European Association for the Study of Science and Technology EASST 2018 conference. CPERI presents itself as ‘a unique global forum for the exploration of scholarship regarding the political economy of research and innovation (R&I), and hence at the intersection of STS [Science and Technology Studies], political economy and multiple other cognate disciplines, including geography, sociology, politics, law, education, medicine, engineering, computing & philosophy’. Previous CPERI workshops have taken place in Lancaster (2012), Toronto (2013), San Diego (2015), Liege (2016) and Boston (2017).

 

What is political economy of research and innovation or technoscience? Kean Birch defines the political economy of technoscience by ‘the ways that the economy is ethically, socially and politically organized and configured and how this shapes technoscience and is constituted by technoscience in turn’ (Birch 2013: 49; see also Tyfield et al. 2017). His proposed research agenda ‘is based on the claim that STS needs to take account of contemporary economic and financial processes and how they shape and are shaped by technoscience. This necessitates understanding how these processes might impact on science, technology and innovation, rather than turning STS gaze on the economy’ (Ibid).

 

The 2018 CPERI workshop in Lancaster brought together some 30 established and emerging researchers from around the world. Among them were those who have already attended one or more CPERI workshops as well as newcomers to this growing community. Topics discussed during these two days included technoscience and biomedical futures, responsible research and innovation, platform capitalism and its impact on universities.

Discussion chaired by Janja Komljenovic

 

Responsibility in science, technology and innovation

Discussion of responsible research and innovation futures addressed broader issues of responsibility in science, technology and innovation as well as more specific concept of ‘responsible research and innovation’ (RRI) that in the last ten years has been promoted by a number of research funders in Europe (De Saille 2015; Rip 2016). Stevie de Saille raised important questions for implementation of the RRI concept such as ‘can society really modify the direction of a research agenda, let alone say STOP once a trajectory is in motion?’ and ‘what constitutes ‘responsibility’ in a global field, and how might that change not just in place or time, but in light of other developments along the value chain?’ The workshop participants were particularly interested in her concept of ‘responsible stagnation’ that she defines as a particular configuration of change guided by restraint and living gently and where ethics matters more than growth (see also De Saille and Medvecky 2016). Inga Ulnicane applied ideas of responsibility to dual use research and technology. She argued that ‘responsible dual use’ approach becomes particularly relevant in the context of changing security and research funding landscape in the European Union (EU) where in addition to traditional support for civilian research in the Framework Programme, the EU is also allocating funding for dual use research and developing support for defence research.

 

Overall discussion of RRI touched upon the potential future of this concept considering that current discussions on EU research policy are dominated by concepts such as ‘missions’ and ‘three Os’ of Open Innovation, Open Science and Open to the World. In the long-term, concepts and framings in research and innovation policy tend to change presenting old ideas in novel ways, as it has happened with many ideas before such as ‘triple helix’ or ‘Mode II’ knowledge production (Ulnicane 2015). Recently Arie Rip has suggested that ‘RRI will disappear as a Brussels thing, not at the level of member states and organizations. It might change its acronym’ (Calvert and Rip 2018: 193).

David Tyfield

 

Platform capitalism, academic capitalism & digital knowledge capitalism

One of the main topics of the workshop was the development of platform capitalism and impact of digital platforms on universities. Janja Komljenovic analysed the case of Linkedin demonstrating how it has been strategically targeting higher education sector and building digital market place for skills (Komljenovic 2018). In her keynote ‘The University in an Age of Platform Capitalism’, Susan Robertson set out an innovative research agenda to study different kinds of platforms in the academy. Her approach to comparing platforms focused on the purposes and processes of knowledge production, for example, curating, publishing and learning. By looking at platforms as infrastructures, she asked major questions about what kind of futures are being created and do these new infrastructures create and make ‘better futures’ for whom.

 

Further changes in academic capitalism were discussed by Elena Simukovic in her presentation on politics and realities of facilitating open access and their impacts on the science system. Tereza Virtova’s talk on chronopolitics in experimental physics focused on implications of project work in contemporary academia. Mark Carrigan’s keynote discussed the institutionalisation of social media use in the higher education sector. Ismael Rafols presented his approach to help pluralising decision-making in science policy and aligning research priorities to societal needs. Luca Marelli discussed the EU General Data Protection legislation as a novel tool for biomedical research. David Tyfield argued for a new social contract for university in the times of digital knowledge capitalism. After the workshop, the Institute for Social Futures and the Centre for Higher Education Research & Evaluation hosted a public debate between Phil Mirowski and Steve Fuller. They debated if neoliberalism is a threat or an opportunity for the future of universities.

 

Debates and talks of the workshop sketched out some of the most urgent questions in contemporary political economy of research and innovation as well as many ideas for making and doing tehnoscientific futures better would it be by moving to open and responsible knowledge platforms or to new social contract for research and innovation.

 

References:

Birch, K. (2013) The political economy of technoscience: An emerging research agenda’ Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 7(1):49-61.

Calvert, J. and A.Rip (2018) “Things Can Be Done Here That Cannot So Easily Be Done Elsewhere”. Jane Calvert Talks with Arie Rip. Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 4: 183-201.

De Saille, S. (2015) Innovating innovation policy: the emergence of ‘Responsible Research and Innovation’. Journal of Responsible Innovation 2(2): 152-168.

De Saille, S. and F.Medvecky (2016) Innovation for a steady state: a case for responsible stagnation. Economy and Society 45(1): 1-23.

Komljenovic, J. (2018) Linkedin, platforming labour, and the new employability mandate for universities. Globalisation, Societies and Education. Published online 2 August 2018.

Rip, A. (2015) The clothes of the emperor. An essay on RRI in and around Brussels. Journal of Responsible Innovation 3(3): 290-304.

Tyfield, D., R.Lave, S.Randalls and C.Thorpe (eds) (2017) The Routledge Handbook of the Political Economy of Science. Oxon: Routledge.

Ulnicane, I. (2015) Broadening Aims and Building Support in Science, Technology and Innovation Policy: The Case of the European Research Area. Journal of Contemporary European Research 11(1): 31-49.

The post Making and Doing Technoscientific Futures Better appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The European Parliament is in recess over the summer holidays from 23 July 2018 to 26 August 2018

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

President Donald Tusk congratulated Marjan Šarec on his appointment as Prime Minister-Designate of the Republic of Slovenia

Last May in Parliament, Prime Minister, Theresa May, summed up her promises for Brexit in just 15-seconds: no hard border on the island of Ireland, and as frictionless trade as possible with the rest of the EU.

Of course, we already have that now. And of course, this cannot be delivered after Brexit.

The Brexit promised by the government – to offer the same benefits of EU membership as an ex-member – is impossible to deliver

The former Brexit Secretary, David Davis, promised a trade and customs agreement with the EU “that will deliver the exact same benefits as we have.” Of course, he could not deliver that. That’s probably why he walked away.

Prime Minister, Theresa May, also said that Brexit can have “the same benefits” as we have now for free trade with the EU. It’s pie in the sky.

Also promised by the government:

• an agreement with the EU that’s fully negotiated by March next year;
• no payment for access to the EU market;
• a complete end to EU rules and regulations;
• converting around 40 EU trade agreements with 65 countries into UK bespoke deals “one second after midnight” on 30 March 2019.

Promises, promises, promises.

And the truth? These promises cannot be delivered. Brexit cannot work.

Last month, Jacob Rees-Mogg, indicated that it could take 50 years before the benefits of Brexit were fully realised.

He told Channel Four news:

“We won’t know the full economic consequences for a very long time, we really won’t.”

He added:

“The overwhelming opportunity for Brexit is over the next 50 years.”

50 years? Is he having a laugh?

Many people reading this will be dead and buried before then. We should instead bury Brexit. It’s dead. It cannot be revived, because it was never a viable living entity in the first place.

Because it’s now obvious that Brexit cannot work and cannot be delivered, Brexiters are starting to blame the EU for its obvious and impending failure.

• It’s the EU’s fault that Britain cannot keep membership benefits as an ex-member!
• How dare the EU turn Britain away, such an important country!
• We saved Europe from two world wars, don’t you know!
• We used to have an Empire that ruled half the world, don’t you know!
• For goodness sake, we even invented eggs and bacon for breakfast!
• The rest of Europe clearly needs us more than we need them, with their stupid rolls and jam for breakfast!
• You wait, you just wait, at the last minute the EU will cut us a deal, they will give Theresa May everything she wants, because it would be cutting off their noses not to.

But the EU won’t.

Their Union, their Single Market, their customs union, that took decades to create, is more important to them than it is to us. And that’s something many people in Britain, especially Brexiters, simply don’t understand.

The only countries that enjoy frictionless trade with the EU are those countries that are part of the EU Single Market or in its customs union.

The EU has already stated from the start that the UK cannot cherry pick.

If the EU allowed the UK frictionless access to its market, without being subject to all the EU rules and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (all red lines of the government), it would unravel the entire ‘raison d’être’ of the European Union, and put at risk all its existing agreements with other ‘third countries’.

It’s not going to happen.

Of course, the UK could have a free trade agreement with the EU similar to the ones signed recently with Canada and Japan. But those agreements don’t include frictionless access to the EU, and those agreements don’t cover all the goods that go between the UK and the EU, and they don’t cover services or free movement of people.

It begs the question as to why we are leaving, as clearly we have the best deal now, as a full member of the EU.

That is just one of many reasons why Reasons2Remain is campaigning for a democratic reversal of Brexit.

Last month, Prime Minister, Theresa May, told the House of Commons Liaison Committee that the UK could have frictionless borders with the EU, without being in the Single Market or the EU customs union.

SNP MP, Angus MacNeil, told the Prime Minister that her plans were “pie in the sky”.

Not only is he right, but Theresa May knows her Brexit plans are pie in the sky.

Before the referendum, Mrs May said clearly and persuasively:

“It is not clear why other EU member states would give Britain a better deal than they themselves enjoy.”

Yet that’s exactly what Mrs May now wants. She says she aims to achieve a new trade agreement with the EU that’s unique to us, that no other country in the world has ever achieved.

Of course, it’s not going to happen. Of course, it’s not going to work.

What’s the point of a club if you are going to allow non-members to enjoy the same or better benefits as members? What club allows that?

The EU most certainly will not accept Mrs May’s pie in the sky proposals.

► So, here’s the bottom line:

• Britain needs frictionless trade with the EU.
• We need free movement of goods, services, capital and people for our country not just to survive, but to thrive.
• We need to continue with the status quo: the arrangement we have now.

  ► And yet:

• We’re leaving all the benefits of the EU, only to desperately try and get back as many of those benefits as we can after we’ve left.
  
• We are leaving for no good reason, not one.
  
• We are paying around £40 billion (money the UK has agreed we owe to the EU) to settle our debts with the EU, to enable us to have an inferior deal.
  
• We will be poorer, and with less sovereignty, fewer rights and protections, restricted trade, and diminished power after we’ve left.

What’s the point? There’s no point.

There is no pie. There is no cake. There is no Brexit dividend. There is no Brexit that can work. It’s all built on sand.

Has this sunk in yet?

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

________________________________________________________

• Join and share the discussion about this article on Facebook:

(function(d, s, id) { var js, fjs = d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0]; if (d.getElementById(id)) return; js = d.createElement(s); js.id = id; js.src = 'https://connect.facebook.net/en_GB/sdk.js#xfbml=1&version=v3.1'; fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js, fjs);}(document, 'script', 'facebook-jssdk'));

Brexit is built on sand

→ 1-minute video: Brexit is built on sand – Watch and shareWHY BREXIT WON’T WORK Last May in Parliament, Prime Minister Theresa May summed up her promises for Brexit in just 15-seconds: no hard border on the island of Ireland, and as frictionless trade as possible with the rest of the EU. Of course, we already have that now. And of course, this cannot be delivered after Brexit.The Brexit promised by the government – to offer the same benefits of EU membership as an ex-member – is impossible to deliverThe former Brexit Secretary, David Davis, promised a trade and customs agreement with the EU “that will deliver the exact same benefits as we have.” Of course, he could not deliver that. That’s probably why he walked away. Prime Minister, Theresa May, also said that Brexit can have “the same benefits” as we have now for free trade with the EU. It’s pie in the sky. Also promised by the government: an agreement with the EU that’s fully negotiated by March next year; no payment for access to the EU market; a complete end to EU rules and regulations; converting around 40 EU trade agreements with 65 countries into UK bespoke deals “one second after midnight” on 30 March 2019.Promises, promises, promises.And the truth? These promises cannot be delivered. Brexit cannot work.Last month, Jacob Rees-Mogg, indicated that it could take 50 years before the benefits of Brexit were fully realised.“We won’t know the full economic consequences for a very long time, we really won’t,” he told Channel Four news. He added, “The overwhelming opportunity for Brexit is over the next 50 years.”50 years? Is he having a laugh?Many people reading this will be dead and buried before then. We should instead bury Brexit. It’s dead. It cannot be revived, because it was never a viable living entity in the first place. Because it’s now obvious that Brexit cannot work and cannot be delivered, Brexiters are starting to blame the EU for its obvious and impending failure. • It’s the EU’s fault that Britain cannot keep membership benefits as an ex-member!• How dare the EU turn Britain away, such an important country!• We saved Europe from two world wars, don’t you know! • We used to have an Empire that ruled half the world, don’t you know! • For goodness sake, we even invented eggs and bacon for breakfast!• The rest of Europe clearly needs us more than we need them, with their stupid rolls and jam for breakfast!• You wait, you just wait, at the last minute the EU will cut us a deal, they will give Theresa May everything she wants, because it would be cutting off their noses not to. But the EU won’t. Their Union, their Single Market, their customs union, that took decades to create, is more important to them than it is to us. And that’s something many people in Britain, especially Brexiters, simply don’t understand.The only countries that enjoy frictionless trade with the EU are those countries that are part of the EU Single Market or in its customs union.The EU has already stated from the start that the UK cannot cherry pick. If the EU allowed the UK frictionless access to its market, without being subject to all the EU rules and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (all red lines of the government), it would unravel the entire ‘raison d'être’ of the European Union, and put at risk all its existing agreements with other 'third countries'. It's not going to happen.Of course, the UK could have a free trade agreement with the EU similar to the ones signed recently with Canada and Japan. But those agreements don't include frictionless access to the EU, and those agreements don't cover all the goods that go between the UK and the EU, and they don't cover services or free movement of people.It begs the question as to why we are leaving, as clearly we have the best deal now, as a full member of the EU. That is just one of many reasons why Reasons2Remain is campaigning for a democratic reversal of Brexit.Last month, Prime Minister, Theresa May, told the House of Commons Liaison Committee that the UK could have frictionless borders with the EU, without being in the Single Market or the EU customs union.SNP MP, Angus MacNeil, told the Prime Minister that her plans were "pie in the sky". Not only is he right, but Theresa May knows her Brexit plans are pie in the sky. Before the referendum, Mrs May said clearly and persuasively:“It is not clear why other EU member states would give Britain a better deal than they themselves enjoy.”Yet that’s exactly what Mrs May now wants. She says she aims to achieve a new trade agreement with the EU that’s unique to us, that no other country in the world has ever achieved.Of course, it’s not going to happen. Of course, it’s not going to work.What’s the point of a club if you are going to allow non-members to enjoy the same or better benefits as members? What club allows that?The EU most certainly will not accept Mrs May's pie in the sky proposals.► So, here’s the bottom line. Britain needs frictionless trade with the EU. We need free movement of goods, services, capital and people for our country not just to survive, but to thrive. We need to continue with the status quo: the arrangement we have now.► And yet: We’re leaving all the benefits of the EU, only to desperately try and get back as many of those benefits as we can after we’ve left. We are leaving for no good reason, not one. We are paying around £40 billion (money the UK has agreed we owe to the EU) to settle our debts with the EU, to enable us to have an inferior deal. We will be poorer, and with less sovereignty, fewer rights and protections, restricted trade, and diminished power after we’ve left.What’s the point? There’s no point.There is no pie. There is no cake. There is no Brexit dividend. There is no Brexit that can work. It’s all built on sand.Has this sunk in yet?• Article and video compilation by Jon Danzig• Please re-Tweet, and follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter:twitter.com/Reasons2Remain/status/1028734556369838080********************************************► Watch Jon Danzig's 50-minute video: 'Can Britain Stop Brexit?' Go to CanBritainStopBrexit.com********************************************• To follow and support Reasons2Remain just ‘like’ the page, and please invite all your friends to like the page. ********************************************• Please recommend and review Reasons2Remain. Here's the link: facebook.com/Reasons2Remain/reviews/********************************************• Follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter: twitter.com/reasons2remain and Instagram: instagram.com/reasons2remain/********************************************• Explore our unique Reasons2Remain gallery of over 1,000 graphics and articles: reasons2remain.co.uk********************************************• Reasons2Remain is an entirely unfunded community campaign, unaffiliated with any other group or political party, and is run entirely by volunteers. If you'd like to help, please send us a private message.********************************************• © Reasons2Remain 2018. All our articles and graphics are the copyright of Reasons2Remain. We only allow sharing using the Facebook share button. Any other use requires our advance permission in writing.#STOPBREXIT #EXITBREXIT #PEOPLESVOTE

Posted by Reasons2Remain on Sunday, 12 August 2018

The post Brexit is built on sand appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Fingers are being pointed after the collapse of the motorway bridge in Genoa. Economic Development Minister Di Maio has blamed the motorway operator Autostrade, and Interior Minister Salvini complained that EU budget constraints were making Italy unsafe. Commentators take a closer look at these accusations.

Mobile phones will be prohibited in French schools when classes begin this autumn. Internet-enabled devices will be banned in most schools, while lycées (upper secondary schools) will be allowed to decide for themselves whether to impose the ban. The move is a bid to improve pupils' concentration in class. Scientists and journalists also take a critical view of how smartphones are influencing our lives.

The conflict between Ankara and Washington is escalating on the trade front. Turkey has raised import tariffs on certain US products by up to 140 percent and announced a boycott on US electronic components, after the US doubled tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminium last week. What course will the relations between the two countries take?