European Union

Debate on 2021-27 budget is underway

The EU Commission wants to have agreement on the guidelines for the budgetary framework period 2021-27 by the planned summit in Romania on May 9th2019, based on proposals it made in May this year. Although agreement that early is unlikely, the debate on this issue of fundamental importance is underway and hardly anyone is paying attention. It is true that the EU budget at close to 1% of GDP is small in relation to total public expenditure at all tiers of government, of 40-50% of GDP, and that it is smaller in relative terms than most people in the EU think it is. However, the absolute amount of money is large at about €1trn proposed over the period 2021-27 and the image of the EU amongst voters is and will be affected by where the money goes.

As argued in by last blog, the priorities for spending need radically changing from the priorities of the early 1990s when the present structure of the budget was established under Jacques Delors, in line with present day priorities like migration and climate change.

 

Commission links budgetary compliance to rule of law

Another issue which the Commission rightly emphasized in a whole new and separate section of its proposals is ensuring that the money goes where it is intended and thus the link between spending and the rule of law. While the Commission has to authorise spending, its administration and thus ensuring that the funds are spent as intended is mainly in the hands of national and local tiers of government, with the courts taking a role if there are allegations of fraud or corruption. Because of justified concerns of embezzlement by organized crime,  the southern regions of Italy have received less than would otherwise have been their due over decades. However, Italy has been consistently characterised by a judiciary whose actions may have sometimes been controversial but have virtually always been independent of the government of the day. For example, during Silvio Berlusconi’s long periods as head of government over 20 years he was continually been in conflict with the courts.

The separation of powers between executive, parliament and judiciary is a fundamental precondition of the rule of law and of democratic institutions as developed over the last 250 years. Amongst the Copenhagen Criteria laid down at the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, future members  were required to respect the rule of law and under the detailed Conditions for Membership, Chapter 23 on the Judiciary and Fundamental Rights made clear that this required an independent judiciary, since the rule of law must apply to all, including government. But even if the Criteria were met at the time that new members acceded, there was no guarantee that they would continue to be met. And indeed there has recently been a row-back over the Criteria, especially in Poland and Hungary regarding the independence of the judiciary (for example in Poland judges have been made to retire earlier than under previous rules to make way for government appointees). Such backsliding seems of most concern amongst new member states but there should also be no complacency about actual and possible developments in older member states.

The introduction to the section of the May 2nd, 2018 budget framework proposals on Sound Financial Management and the Rule of Law does not pull its punches in linking the two, stating that: “Only an independent judiciary and legal certainty in all member states can ultimately guarantee that money from the EU budget is sufficiently protected”.

 

Murder of journalists investigating corruption and misuse of EU funds

The link between ensuring EU money is spent as intended and the rule of law was tragically illustrated by the murder in February 2018 of the Slovak journalist Jan Koviak, together with his girl-friend, who had been investigating corruption involving the governing party Smer and links between crime in Slovakia and the Calabrian organised crime group N’drangheta, which among other things appears to have been passing on advice on how to embezzle EU agricultural funds. More recently a TV presenter in Bulgaria who had investigated fraudulent use of EU funds was killed on October 6th, although in this case it is possible that the killing was not linked to her work. On October 16th, 2017, the leading independent journalist, who had alleged corruption at a high level in the Maltese government, Daphne Caruana Galizia, was killed. While her work was not specifically concerned with EU funds, if the level of corruption is as serious as she alleged, it would certainly warrant a high degree of concern as to whether the use of EU funds in Malta is or will be free from misuse.

 

Budget debate is central to the future of the EU

The issue the Commission is highlighting is therefore a serious one with concerns not limited to the countries mentioned above. There is little chance that the proposal will be adopted as it stands, given that all member states have to agree to the budgetary framework and some will feel it is directed at them. On the other hand the budget also has to be agreed by member states which are not keen on continuing to hand over large net payments to countries which they do not think share their view of the EU’s values. Agreeing the next budgetary framework is therefore likely to be difficult both for this reason and because there will be big differences on the priorities for the new budgetary period. A long stand-off is probable and a crisis with no budget agreed, or only one to carry on essential administrative spending, is possible. Although non-administrative budget expenditure is not essential to the EU’s functioning it does indicate its objectives and values. The coming debate is therefore crucial to the EU’s future. It is also crucial that be an open debate. @

The post The Link between the EU’s Budget and its Values appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Commission v Poland
Poland must immediately suspend the application of the provisions of national legislation relating to the lowering of the retirement age for Supreme Court judges

The European Union consists of 28 member states. All treaty changes or enlargement of the EU require the unanimous consent of every single member, however large or small.

The Union of the United Kingdom consists of four member states: England, Scotland, Wales and the province of Northern Ireland.

In the referendum, two of them voted to remain in the EU: Scotland and Northern Ireland. Yet the UK government is going ahead with Brexit, without the unanimous consent of all the UK’s member states.

That couldn’t happen in the European Union, where all member states of the EU, however large or small, each have an equal vote and a veto on new treaties.

• If the UK was run on the same democratic principles as the EU, then the UK could not leave the European Union without the unanimous agreement of all its four members: England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

But in the 2016 EU referendum, the democratic wishes of Scotland and Northern Ireland were ignored by the UK government, splitting the United Kingdom in two.

Similarly, Gibraltar – a British Overseas Territory which also had a vote in the EU referendum and chose by 96% to Remain in the EU – saw their objections to Brexit ignored.

Why offer Gibraltar a vote in the first place if their vote basically – and literally – counted for nothing?

• Even though Northern Ireland voted for Remain, one party – the pro-Brexit DUP – is being allowed to dictate what future relationship the province will have with the EU (and therefore the entire UK’s relationship with the EU).

That’s because it’s only the DUP that’s keeping the Tories in power, following last year’s general election, in which the Conservatives saw their majority wiped out.

• Theresa May called for a snap general election last year as she said she needed a bigger mandate to push through her brand of Brexit.

But even though she lost her mandate entirely, she’s still going ahead with her hard Brexit plans, as if the general election had never taken place.

• The EU’s remaining 27 member states will have a greater say and vote on the final Brexit deal than the devolved areas of the UK and the overseas territory of Gibraltar, who are being given no say.

Even the European Parliament will have a more meaningful vote on Brexit than our Parliament in Westminster. The European Parliament can withhold consent to the final Brexit agreement, thereby giving it a veto.

• Theresa May has never wanted our Parliament to have a meaningful vote on Brexit – that’s why the issue had to be dragged through the courts, when she tried to pass Brexit by bypassing Parliament (something she’s continued to attempt to do, despite the High and Supreme Courts damning rulings against her).

Nonetheless, Parliament will only have the power to accept or reject the Brexit deal on offer. If Parliament rejects the deal, the government would have to propose a new plan – but Parliament would not have the power to amend such a plan, unless the Speaker of the House decided otherwise.

• Brexiters claim that the EU is ‘undemocratic’.

But in reality, the EU is more democratic than our system in the UK, where we still have an unelected second chamber; where the wishes of devolved UK states can be ignored, and where we still have an antiquated voting system of first-past-the-post (MEPs are voted to the European Parliament using a system of proportional representation).

• Brexiters tell us that the EU is run by faceless bureaucrats.

But the truth is that all EU laws can only be passed by the democratically elected European Parliament, in concert with the Council of Ministers, that comprise the ministers of democratically elected governments of EU member states.

The European Commission is the servant of the EU, and not its master. The European Parliament elects the Commission President, must democratically approve each Commissioner, and has the power to dismiss the entire Commission.

(If that isn’t democratic, I don’t know what is.)

• Brexiters claim that if the EU doesn’t like the result of a referendum, it just calls for another referendum ‘until it gets the result it wants’. But this is entirely untrue.

The EU has no power to call for a referendum in a member state, let alone to call for another referendum if they ‘don’t like the result’. Only a national government, with the consent of their parliament, can call for a referendum or subsequent referendums.

Furthermore, there is nothing undemocratic about having another vote. That’s precisely what democracy is about.

• For example, France and Ireland voted in favour of the Maastricht Treaty. But Denmark did not.

The Danish government subsequently negotiated four significant concessions to the Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union, Union Citizenship, Justice and Home Affairs and Common Defence.

Consequently, Denmark, with the democratic consent of Denmark’s Parliament, presented these new concessions to the Danish electorate in a second referendum. In this second referendum, the Danes voted in favour of the Treaty, based on the concessions negotiated.

• Similarly, Ireland voted against the Treaty of Lisbon. The Irish government then negotiated significant concessions to the Treaty, and with the consent of Ireland’s parliament, held another referendum, in which Ireland voted in favour of the Treaty based on the amendments negotiated.

None of this was undemocratic. It was democracy at work.

Does anyone really think that the citizens of Ireland, or Denmark, both proud and independent peoples, could be ‘forced’ to vote in a way they didn’t want?

• Just after the referendum, Brexiters mocked that a region of Belgium, called Wallonia, had the power to block the new free trade agreement between Canada and the EU.

But that shows how Belgium, a country only a tenth the size of the UK, has a better democracy than ours.

Unlike in the UK, under Belgium’s constitution, regional parliaments such as the one governing Wallonia, must give their unanimous agreement before Belgium, as an EU member state, can give its consent to any EU Treaty.

The regions of Belgium have much more democratic power than our devolved parliaments of the UK. That’s how Wallonia came to block the EU-Canada agreement, called Ceta.

Eventually, Wallonia sought and received assurances about the Ceta deal, and lifted their objections, so the EU-Canada free trade agreement could go ahead, which it did.

The EU-Canada trade agreement, incidentally, is calculated to be worth an estimated £1.3bn a year to Britain – but of course only whilst we are an EU member.

During 2016, whilst the parliaments of Belgium and all the other EU countries were democratically considering Ceta, the UK’s international trade secretary, Liam Fox, had to apologise to MPs for not allowing our Parliament to have a debate on the Ceta deal.

• There’s something else that makes Belgium arguably more democratically accountable than the UK.

Since 1894 voting in Belgium’s elections has been compulsory. Everyone must vote.

Contrast Belgium’s system of compulsory voting with what happened in Britain’s referendum, where around 20 million people who could vote, didn’t vote.

That included around 13 million who registered to vote but didn’t, and a further estimated 7 million who could have registered to vote, but didn’t.

What a difference 20 million voters could have made to the EU referendum result if it had been compulsory for them to vote.

Polls indicate that those 13 million who registered to vote but didn’t would have supported Remain 2-to-1.

So, in summary:

• The Tory government is going ahead with Brexit, without the unanimous consent of all the UK’s four member states, and without the consent of our overseas territory, the state of Gibraltar.
  
• Only a minority of the electorate voted for Leave, just 37% – the majority either voted for Remain or didn’t vote.  In most referendums around the world non-voters do count, and a  ‘super majority’ is required before change can take place. (Just 37% of members would not be enough to change the constitution of most political parties.  Just 37% of the electorate wasn’t enough to give Scotland its own assembly in a 1979 referendum, even though the ‘Yes’ vote won. Just 37% of MPs would not be enough to call for an early General Election. Just 37% of a trade union’s members – under the law – would not be enough to call for strike action.)
• Many people directly affected by the outcome of the referendum were denied a vote: Britons who’d lived abroad for more than 15 years (even though the Tory manifesto promised them a vote) and citizens from the rest of the EU who had made Britain their home, in many cases for decades.
• Although Northern Ireland voted for Remain, just one small Northern Ireland party, the pro-Brexit DUP, is being allowed to have the final say on the province’s (and therefore the UK’s) future relationship with the EU, because that party is keeping Mrs May and her Tories in office.
• The government has refused to give Parliament a vote on whether Britain should leave the EU, saying the decision was already made by the referendum. Yet, the Supreme Court ruled that only Parliament could make the decision, as the EU referendum was advisory only. This is now a legal challenge against the government. See A50challenge.uk
• The Tory government plans to use ancient Henry VIII powers to prevent Parliament from having a say on which EU laws and protections should be kept, amended or scrapped after Brexit.
• The Tory government does not want our Parliament to have a proper vote on the final Brexit deal – there will be no option for Parliament to reject Brexit if it doesn’t like the deal. Parliament will be able to reject the deal, in which case Britain could end up leaving the EU without any deal.
• The Leave campaign had to rely on lies to win. All the reasons to leave the EU were based on misinformation, mistruths and false promises. (Yes, all of them).
• Evidence is now emerging of alleged fraud, and criminal acts by Vote Leave, Cambridge Analytica, and Aggregate IQ: illegal overspending, psychologically profiling and targeting people with online ads, based on masses of stolen data. All this could have illegally swung the referendum vote in favour of Leave – especially as the margin for Leave was wafer thin.
• Lawyers are consequently calling for the Brexit vote to be declared void for irregularity, but the government has shown no interest.
• Unlike in other democracies that have held second referendums, the government is refusing the give us, ‘the people’, a second say on Brexit, even though nobody knew anything about the final and finer details of Brexit in the referendum (and we still don’t know).

So, which has the better system of democracy: the EU or the UK?

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As @Jon_Danzig writes in his blog today, ‘If the UK was run on the same democratic principles as the #EU, then we couldn't do #Brexit without the agreement of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.’ Please widely share his in-depth report #FinalSay https://t.co/Mw8y3Va7K7

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The post Which is more democratic: UK or EU? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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Plenary session, Strasbourg

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will take place on Monday, 19 November (14:30-18:30) and Tuesday, 20 November (9.00-12:30 and 14:30-18:30) in Brussels.

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SEDE organised a public hearing on 'Artificial intelligence and its future impact on security' on Wednesday 10 October 2018, from 09.00 to 11.30, with four external experts
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The OODA Loop: WHY TIMING IS EVERYTHING by Wendy R. Anderson, Amir Husain, and Marla Rosner
As AI Begins to Reshape Defense, Here’s How Europe Can Keep Up by Wendy R. Anderson and Jim Townshend
As Budget Polemic Drives Headlines, Do Not Lose Track of NATO’s Approach to AI Amir Husain, August Cole and Wendy R. Anderson
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So, no breakthrough, but also no collapse. Not the most ringing endorsement for yesterday’s European Council discussion on Article 50, but given the possible alternatives, certainly not the worst it could have been.

Still the focus remains on the backstop for Ireland.

Usefully, we might remember that this backstop has become an issue for two, interlinked reasons.

Firstly, it’s evident that the period from leaving the EU next March to the end of 2020 is almost certainly not long enough to negotiate a comprehensive new EU-UK relationship that would provide a durable legal basis for keeping the Irish border as open as it is now. Secondly, even if it were long enough, the UK still hasn’t settled on a confirmed consensus view on what that new relationship should be.

Next-to-impossible to negotiate something when you don’t know what you want.

As a result, the EU (driven by Ireland) wants a backstop to protect those parts of the Good Friday Agreement that fall within its competence, not because that’s optimal, but because it can’t rely on the UK to get its act together.

That the UK hasn’t been the most reliable of negotiating partners also hasn’t helped.

In any case, it’s been that time shortage that has been central in driving backstops: neither the EU nor UK wanted an indefinite transition period, so they extemporised.

This past week has seen a revisiting of this assumption, for what seem to be rather obvious reasons.

A longer transition means more time to sort out that new relationship, so less likelihood of needing a back-up plan in the form of a backstop.

Of all the options on the table, it is one of the very simplest, not least because both sides agreed the terms of transition already, so the paperwork is almost entirely ready to go. Indeed, when that was agreed, back in the spring, there was almost no opposition to its existence or form from opponents of Theresa May and it attracted minimal attention from any one (excepting the occasional academic).

Despite what Nigel Farage and others say, transition is not ‘staying in for longer’, because transition’s entire existence is based on the Withdrawal Agreement, which in turn supposes that the UK and EU have agreed terms for leaving. Thus, in strict legal terms, the UK would no longer be a member state.

But…

But yes, there are problems, and some big ones at that.

While May will go with the line that she’s delivered on getting the UK out of the EU on her schedule next March, it will be into a transition that is as close to membership as it’s possible to imagine: literally everything as before, but without representation or a vote. In that sense, Farage would have a point and getting over a line on a technicality is never a good look, even if you’re not already on a caution from your own party.

Moreover, extending transition beyond December 2020 means that the UK will find itself entering a new financial cycle of the EU budget, without a rebate mechanism – so net contributions would go up considerably – and without full planning by the EU for accommodating spending allocations to the UK – so some substantial financial engineering will be required in 2020.

Crucially, a longer transition means more chance of the EU making a decision that causes real problems for the UK, which will undermine the already-thin legitimacy and accountability of the transition system.

And there’s the moral hazard argument: more time is well and good, but it reduces the pressure to reach a timely agreement on the future relationship, so both sides will still be likely to face a situation where another extension to transition is required to avoid a new cliff-edge moment.

So…

The temptation in all this to work just to immediate concerns: what can May get through Parliament, or what will fly for the Irish to sign up?

That’s important, but it can’t be the only perspective. These decisions are going to have lasting impacts on the lives of millions, and the more that they can be discussed and evaluated, the better.

However, one key point is going to have to be accepted in this process.

Brexit is about change, divergence and disentanglement. It necessarily and fundamentally implies costs, primarily in the shorter-term but also beyond that. Whatever form Brexit takes, there will be negativities – opportunity costs to businesses, citizens, politics – and there is no cost-free option. Indeed, even abandoning Brexit entirely isn’t without substantial costs, certainly in reputational terms.

In all the debate about how Brexit proceeds, this basic reality is too often brushed to one side. Maybe now is the time to face up to it.

The post The pros and cons of a longer transition appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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The owner of an internet connection used for copyright infringements through file-sharing cannot be exonerated from liability simply by naming a family member who might have had access to that connection

‘e-Curia’ becomes the only means of exchange of legal documents between parties’ representatives and the General Court with effect from 1 December 2018

Committee and political group meetings, Brussels

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Item 4 - Public Hearing on Artificial intelligence and its future impact on security - The OODA Loop: WHY TIMING IS EVERYTHING - Mrs Wendy R. Anderson, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
Item 4 - Public Hearing on Artificial intelligence and its future impact on security - As AI Begins to Reshape Defense, Here’s How Europe Can Keep Up - Mrs Wendy R. Anderson, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
Item 4 - Public Hearing on Artificial intelligence and its future impact on security - As Budget Polemic Drives Headlines, Do Not Lose Track of NATO’s Approach to AI - Mrs Wendy R. Anderson, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
Item 5 - Exchange of view on Future challenges for The European Union Satellite Centre (EUSATCEN) : Presentation by Mr Pascal Legai, Director EUSATCEN
Item 6 - Exchange of view with Operation Commander Rear Admiral Enrico Credendino on the State of play of Europrean Union Naval Force - Mediterranean EUNAVFOR MED
Item 7 - Exchange of views on Mine action and the European Union's integrated approach with Mr Frank Meeussen Policy Officer, Conventional Arms - Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Arms Export Control, EEAS
Item 7 - Exchange of views on Mine action and the European Union's integrated approach with Mr Juan-Carlos Ruan, Director of the Implementation Support Unit of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
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Report on the 2018 Commission Report on Serbia
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Marietje Schaake

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This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2018 (12-13 July, KU Leuven, Belgium)

In parliamentary democracies the cabinet makes policy decisions. When a cabinet is formed around a coalition of parties, the responsibility for decision-making is shared. However, coalition parties remain politically independent actors, resulting in competition and disagreements over policy issues. Whilst coalition partners may not always disagree, they often do: Saskia Smellie considers recent developments in German coalition politics and its effects on domestic policy-making and international politics.

Reichstag parliament, Berlin © travelwitness/AdobeStock

The ramifications of coalition politics have become starkly apparent during the European Union (EU) migration crisis; not least in the case of Germany in June 2018. The German Minister of the Interior, Horst Seehofer, leader of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s junior coalition partner and conservative sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU), sparked a crisis described as the ‘greatest challenge ever to Merkel’s authority’.

The dispute, which came ahead of elections in Bavaria later in the year, stemmed from a breakdown of emergency talks on refugee policy, related to Seehofer’s so-called ‘master plan for migration’. The 63-point proposal, which falls largely within the Interior Minister’s remit, included measures enabling asylum-seekers registered in other EU countries to be turned away at the Bavarian-Austrian border, without initiating the Dublin regulation.

Under the Dublin regulation asylum seekers claim asylum in the first country through which they enter the EU and can be sent back to that country to make a claim. Turning away asylum seekers at the German border without implementing the Dublin return procedure would effectively mean suspending the regulation and reinstating an internal EU border. With the CSU supporting Seehofer’s plans, the junior and arguably more ideologically driven coalition partner held the more moderate and senior conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party to ransom. If Merkel were unable to reach a satisfactory deal with other EU member states to reduce immigration, Seehofer and the CSU threatened to act unilaterally and impose the border checks in Bavaria against the chancellor’s will. The crisis deepened still further when Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz stated that he planned to reinstate Austrian borders if Seehofer went ahead with his proposals.

This is not the first time that disagreement between coalition partners on immigration policy has had far-reaching consequences in Germany. Refugee policy is cited as one of the reasons for the collapse of coalition negotiations after the German federal elections in September 2017, which left the country without a government until March 2018. When a new Grand coalition between CDU/CSU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was finally formed, the leader of the CSU secured the cabinet post of Interior Minister. Seehofer has been Merkel’s harshest critic since the summer of 2015, and the most vocal member of the government to come out in opposition of Merkel’s Willkommenskultur. In his new role as Interior Minister he has greater power to oppose, contest and constrain Merkel’s immigration policies.

It is striking that the crisis incited by Seehofer’s controversial migration ‘master plan’ threatened not only the German coalition government but also negotiations on the future of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker hosted a mini-summit on migration in Brussels on 24th June 2018, ahead of a European Council summit, reportedly on Merkel’s request. The initiative provoked anger from the Italian government when the Commission sent out a draft EU accord, ahead of the summit, which included key measures Merkel required to placate Seehofer and the CSU.

The perception was that greater priority had been given to Germany’s domestic crisis than to member states experiencing a high influx of migration on the eastern and southern EU borders. Moreover, the Commission was seen as overstepping its remit in a policy area reserved to the European Council. The Visegrad Group (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic), which are united in their anti-immigration policy and opposition to the redistribution of refugees in the EU, chose not to attend the mini-summit at all. Nevertheless, Merkel appeared to secure a commitment from Macron that France would take back returned asylum seekers, in an agreement with Germany, suggesting a possible resolution to her domestic crisis through bilateral means. In the end, Seehofer was persuaded to soften the language in his plan and remove the point on turning back asylum seekers, in return for the coalition government agreeing to introduce tougher asylum policies.

This episode demonstrates the impact that coalition politics can have not only on domestic politics but also on international negotiations and relations. In the case of immigration policy, a junior coalition partner that holds the role of Interior Minister and demonstrated arguably more populist views on immigration ahead of a regional election, not only came close to collapsing the coalition government but also directly affected negotiations at an EU level. Within the context of the EU migration crisis and the increasingly salient and international nature of migration politics – with a growing focus on controlling borders, push and pull factors between neighbouring states, and outsourcing immigration controls to third countries – this example of domestic actors constraining international negotiations is one of many.

The ongoing consequences of Germany’s coalition disputes on immigration, for both the federal government and future negotiations on the Common European Asylum System remains to be seen. However, the incident does clearly demonstrate how a dispute between coalition partners in a cabinet can quickly escalate to have ramifications for international relations and negotiations on the international stage.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Saskia Smellie | @S_Smellie

Saskia Smellie is a PhD researcher in Politics & International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Her research interests include comparative immigration policy, EU asylum and refugee policy, ‘burden-sharing’ and foreign policy analysis. She is a co-author of the report ‘Scottish and UK Immigration Policy after Brexit: Evaluating Options for a Differentiated Approach’.

 

The post Merkel, Coalition Politics and Negotiating the Common European Asylum System: Constrained by Domestic Actors? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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There will be a lot of talk about the extreme right’s entry into the Bavarian parliament and the impact of yesterday’s election on the federal government in Berlin. But the most important fall-out may reside in a significant shift in political semantics.

For as long as I can remember, Bavaria has always been described to me as a very particular Bundesland. Not because it was my parents’ favourite holiday destination during my childhood (and has remained, indeed, a blessed corner of Europe), but because the Bavarians insisted on being ‘different’ from the rest of the bunch (to which they generically referred to as ‘Prussians’).

Strictly speaking, it’s not even a Bundesland, since it’s officially called a Freistaat, as if it wanted to remind the others that they could quit the federation any time. Some Germans consider the Bavarians as ‘arrogant’, but that’s the kind of reproach you earn mainly by performing better than anybody else. And they do, in practically all statistics: economy, security, health, education, employment, football, you name it.

The impressive Bavarian mansion in Brussels.

Even on a European level, it’s difficult not to be impressed with Bavaria. With its 13 million inhabitants it would the 9th biggest member state, and in economic terms, with its GDP of 600 bn Euros, it would even be number seven, before Poland. And they don’t hide their opulence: their wonderfully megalomaniac ‘château’ representation in Brussels, in direct vicinity of the European Parliament, does not go unnoticed.

***

For as long as I can remember, this model region was managed by the CSU, the powerful local variant of the Christian Democrats, whose hyper-domination of Bavarian politics over half a century was shoulder-shruggingly explained by the fact that the country was ‘deeply conservative’. A very appropriate adjective for a region that not only did have quite a few assets worth ‘conserving’, but that had also managed to reconcile, as pointed out in a famous slogan, ‘laptops and leather trousers’. Developing world-class industry, research, and infrastructures was not mutually exclusive with preserving a strong, surprisingly inclusive, cultural heritage embodied in ostentatious identity markers (including a nightmare dialect).

Yesterday’s election to the regional parliament in Munich has attracted unprecedented international attention. This was mainly due to the fact that the CSU has been identified as the main problem child of the current coalition in Berlin, at least partly responsible for the stalemate in an increasingly ‘ungovernable’ Federal Republic, as well as for the apparent decline in Angela Merkel’s authority. European media are already wondering whether the Bavarian election results will weaken the federal government even further.

Results as provided by the Bavarian authorities.

And there will be quite some hand-wringing about the extreme right’s entry into the Bavarian Landtag. The AfD went from zero to ten percent – how shocking! Was not Munich the birthplace of Adolf Hitler’s movement? The kind of fear-mongering that shallow international television coverage loves to indulge in. They could just as well point out that 10.2% for an openly xenophobic party with an aggressive single-issue anti-migrant agenda is actually a rather poor result in the very region that has been more exposed than any other to the influx of refugees from the famous ‘Balkan route’ since August 2015. To put it differently: both parties who focused massively on the migration issue were rather unsuccessful in Bavaria. The CSU lost roughly a fourth of their voters in comparison to the 2013 election, and the AfD, which recruited 28% of their electorate precisely from former CSU voters, remained below their score in the federal elections a year ago and way behind current national opinion polls.

In a nutshell: Bavarians proved remarkably resistant to several variants of populism. They rejected the religiously tainted identity populism of current minister-president Markus Söder – whose infamous ‘crucifix law’ backfired even among many Bavarian Catholics – and only a minority of them were ready to embrace the xenophobic and nationalist populism of the AfD. At least that’s my reading, against the very particular backdrop of a soul-searching Germany in the autumn of 2018.

The most intriguing fall-out from this election is, however, the hi-jacking and re-definition of the term ‘conservative’ by the Greens, who doubled their results from five years ago, reaching an all-time high of 17.5%. They managed to do so in proposing a new brand of ‘conservatism’: the one they promote – not unlike their successful neighbours in Baden-Württemberg – shifts the core connotation of the term towards ‘sustainability’. And it carries, mostly implicit, but visibly understood by many, a secondary connotation of urgent change, transposing to their country Tancredo’s famous message to the Prince from Lampedusa’s Leopard: if we want to preserve what made Bavaria a great place, we need to change our ways.

How green has Ms Bavaria become?

Are we witnessing the arrival of climate change and biodiversity worries, in combination with issues of social sustainability, in mainstream politics in Western Europe? It would be about time. It’s probably too early to earmark 14 October 2018 as a ‘potential turning point for Europe’, as Florian Eder suggests in his (always excellent) Brussels Playbook today. In Bavaria, the Greens will remain in opposition, but the fact that they obtained 30% of the vote in the region’s major cities shows that their influence is not likely to decline over the next years. Especially if birds and insects continue to disappear, overhot summers last forever, and the automotive lobby has nothing to offer but big, fat SUVs and threats about job losses.

The future of German politics will be conservative. The question is what people will want to conserve, and who are the politicians who will propose the most credible brand of conservatism.

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