European Union

REPORT on the 2018 Commission Report on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Ivo Vajgl

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Workshop participants

How do new technological developments influence security in Europe? What role do drones, artificial intelligence and social media play in contemporary European society and security? And what to expect from recent trends in European Union’s (EU) security policy such as plans to fund defence research? These were some of the questions addressed at the workshop ‘Science and Technology Studies and the study of Europe’ that took place at University of Bath, UK on 6-7 November 2018.

 

This workshop was organized by the ‘INTERSECT: Technology-Security-Society Interplays in Europe’ research network that promotes academic research and public debate in this novel area on the interplays between technological developments, security practices, and societal changes in Europe. Its focus includes topics such as cybersecurity, surveillance, counter-terrorism and dual-use research and development. Launched in 2017, INTERSECT is one of research networks supported by UACES – The academic association for contemporary European Studies. The workshop was organized in cooperation with the Nordic Centre of Excellence for Security and Technologies and Societal Values (NordSTEVA). This was the second INTERSECT workshop following ‘Rethinking the Technology – Security Nexus in Europe’ last year in Malmö, Sweden.

 

The programme of this thought-provoking two-day workshop in Bath included a range of interrelated theoretical and empirical topics that explored changing technology and security interplay in Europe by combining insights from Science and Technology Studies (STS), European Studies, International Relations as well as other disciplines and research fields. These were presented and discussed by some 20 researchers from all over Europe in three sessions, a keynote address and a concluding roundtable.

 

In the first session, Derek Bolton discussed information warfare in the modern age, while Tom Hobson suggested to use STS concepts of co-production and socio-technical imaginaries to think more critically about relationship between technology and warfare. In light of EU’s recent developments of setting up defence research programme, Jocelyn Mawdsley asked some timely questions about what can be expected from EU defence research funding and what can be learnt from the United States in this respect.

Keynote by Professor Mireille Hildebrandt

In the second session, Brett Edwards presented his forthcoming book ‘Insecurity and Emerging Biotechnology. Governing Misuse Potential’ discussing ethical considerations and security dilemmas related to emerging technologies. Chantal Lavallée explored the EU’s support for the development of drone sector, while Raluca Csernatoni focused on power dynamics in another ‘hot’ dual use technology field, namely, Artificial Intelligence. In her broad-ranging keynote ‘Law, Science, Technology and Security (LSTS) Studies: Legal Protection by Design’, Professor Mireille Hildebrandt addressed numerous conceptual and empirical questions emphasizing the need to scrutinise security technologies and to involve those who will suffer the consequences.

 

In the third and final session, Inga Ulnicane presented on responsible dual use research and changing research funding landscape in the EU that involves support for civilian, dual-use and since recently also defence research. Two final presentations in the workshop showcased research from the European Research Council funded project ‘FOLLOW – Following the Money from Transaction to Trial’. Tasniem Anwar demonstrated how social media activities such as WhatsApp messages have become essential legal evidence in terrorism financing court cases. Her colleague Esmé Bosma explained her research on how private banks use transaction monitoring system to counter terrorism financing.

Inga Ulnicane talking about responsible dual use in the European Union

In the final workshop roundtable, André Barrinha, Kristofer Lidén, Karen Lund Petersen and Bruno Oliveira Martins took stock of and identified future directions in this highly interesting and relevant research and policy area. One of the themes that emerged was the importance of bringing in public in anticipating and evaluating future technologies, their ethical and legal aspects as well as their potential uses in security field. That would democratize and make the process of developing and applying security technologies more transparent. A number of exciting topics and questions for future research and debate were outlined including the need to overcome gendered nature of security and technology fields, to go beyond artificial distinction between politics and economics of technologies in international relations and to address dilemmas such as security versus academic freedom.

 

The post Making sense of changing relationships between technology, security and society in Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Memoria and Dall'Antonia
Freedom of establishment
The Italian legislation prohibiting private companies from performing an activity of safekeeping of cinerary urns is contrary to EU law

Milivojević
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
Advocate General Tanchev proposes that the Court should rule that a national law that allows loan contracts concluded with foreign lenders who were not authorised to provide credit services in that country to be retroactively annulled is contrary to EU law when the same law does not apply to Croatian lenders

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

On Remembrance Sunday we commemorate the contribution of British and Commonwealth military and civilian servicemen and women in the two World Wars and later conflicts.

November 11, 2018 also marks the 100th anniversary since the end of the First World War, Armistice Day.

Of course, we must never forget those who gave their lives in service to our country. We especially owe a great debt to all those who helped to save this country – and the rest of Europe – from the terrible onslaught of the Nazi regime in the Second World War.

But as well as remembering all those who fought so hard and valiantly during times of war and conflict, we should also remember all those who worked so hard and valiantly to help to avoid wars and conflicts.

The European Economic Community – later to be called the European Union – was started in the aftermath of the Second World War with one purpose and one purpose alone: to avoid wars on our continent ever happening again. (Article continues after 4-minute video).

That was the passionate resolve of those who are regarded as the eleven founders of the European Union, including our own war leader, Winston Churchill.

After all, Europe had a long and bloody history of resolving its differences through war, and indeed, the planet’s two world wars originated right here, on our continent.

So the EU was never just an economic agreement between nations.

It was always also meant to be a social and political union of European nations to enable them to find ways not just to trade together, but to co-exist and co-operate in harmony and peace on many levels as a community of nations.

The goal, in the founding document of the European Union called the Treaty of Rome, was to achieve ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (which is rather different to ‘ever closer union of nations’.)

Just one year after the Second World War, in 1946, Winston Churchill made his famous speech in Zurich, Switzerland in which he said:

“We must build a kind of United States of Europe. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important.”

At the time Churchill did not envisage Britain joining the new Union of Europe, but he was later to change his mind.

In March 1957 the European Economic Community (EEC) was established by its six founding nations, France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg.

This was a remarkable achievement, considering that these countries only a few years previously had been fighting in a most terrible war, and four of the founding nations had been viciously subjugated by another of the founders, Germany, during their Nazi regime.

In a speech four months later in July 1957 at Westminster’s Central Hall, Churchill welcomed the formation of the EEC by the six, provided that “the whole of free Europe will have access”. Churchill added, “we genuinely wish to join a free trade area”.

But Churchill also warned:

“If, on the other hand, the European trade community were to be permanently restricted to the six nations, the results might be worse than if nothing were done at all – worse for them as well as for us. It would tend not to unite Europe but to divide it – and not only in the economic field.”

Maybe this is the point that many Brexiters simply don’t get.

Here in Britain we don’t seem to understand the founding purpose of the European Union – and on the rest of the continent, they don’t understand why we don’t understand.

The European Union isn’t just about economics and trade, and never was.

It’s about peace, and a community of nations of our continent working together for the benefit and protection of its citizens.

We are now rebuffing our allies in Europe, telling them by our actions and words that the precious, remarkable and successful post-war project to find peace and security on our continent isn’t as important to us as it is to them.

Will our friendship and relationship with the rest of our continent ever recover?

• Article and video production by Jon Danzig

• Photo: central Rotterdam on 14 May 1940 after the bombardment by German war planes. Around 900 people died and vast swathes of the city were destroyed in the bombing. Almost 80,000 people lost their homes when parts of the city became ‘a sea of fire’. Photo: German federal archives via Wikimedia Commons.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
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The EU was started for peace

→ On Remembrance Sunday, let's also remember peace – Please shareTHE EU WAS STARTED FOR ONE PURPOSE: PEACE – Video 4 minsOn Remembrance Sunday we commemorate the contribution of British and Commonwealth military and civilian servicemen and women in the two World Wars and later conflicts.November 11, 2018 also marks the 100th anniversary since the end of the First World War, Armistice Day.Of course, we must never forget those who gave their lives in service to our country. We especially owe a great debt to all those who helped to save this country – and the rest of Europe – from the terrible onslaught of the Nazi regime in the Second World War.But as well as remembering all those who fought so hard and valiantly during times of war and conflict, we should also remember all those who worked so hard and valiantly to help to avoid wars and conflicts.The European Economic Community – later to be called the European Union – was started in the aftermath of the Second World War with one purpose and one purpose alone: to avoid wars on our continent ever happening again.That was the passionate resolve of those who are regarded as the eleven founders of the European Union, including our own war leader, Winston Churchill.After all, Europe had a long and bloody history of resolving its differences through war, and indeed, the planet’s two world wars originated right here, on our continent.So the EU was never just an economic agreement between nations.It was always also meant to be a social and political union of European nations to enable them to find ways not just to trade together, but to co-exist and co-operate in harmony and peace on many levels as a community of nations.The goal, in the founding document of the European Union called the Treaty of Rome, was to achieve ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (which is rather different to ‘ever closer union of nations’.)Just one year after the Second World War, in 1946, Winston Churchill made his famous speech in Zurich, Switzerland in which he said:“We must build a kind of United States of Europe. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important.”At the time Churchill did not envisage Britain joining the new Union of Europe, but he was later to change his mind.In March 1957 the European Economic Community (EEC) was established by its six founding nations, France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg.This was a remarkable achievement, considering that these countries only a few years previously had been fighting in a most terrible war, and four of the founding nations had been viciously subjugated by another of the founders, Germany, during their Nazi regime.In a speech four months later in July 1957 at Westminster’s Central Hall, Churchill welcomed the formation of the EEC by the six, provided that "the whole of free Europe will have access". Churchill added, "we genuinely wish to join a free trade area".But Churchill also warned:“If, on the other hand, the European trade community were to be permanently restricted to the six nations, the results might be worse than if nothing were done at all – worse for them as well as for us. It would tend not to unite Europe but to divide it – and not only in the economic field.”Maybe this is the point that many Brexiters simply don’t get.Here in Britain we don’t seem to understand the founding purpose of the European Union – and on the rest of the continent, they don’t understand why we don’t understand.The European Union isn't just about economics and trade, and never was.It’s about peace, and a community of nations of our continent working together for the benefit and protection of its citizens.We are now rebuffing our allies in Europe, telling them by our actions and words that the precious, remarkable and successful post-war project to find peace and security on our continent isn't as important to us as it is to them.Will our friendship and relationship with the rest of our continent ever recover?• Article and video production by Jon Danzig, a campaigning journalist and founder of Reasons2Remain.• Photo: central Rotterdam on 14 May 1940 after the bombardment by German war planes. Around 900 people died and vast swathes of the city were destroyed in the bombing. Almost 80,000 people lost their homes when parts of the city became ‘a sea of fire’. Photo: German federal archives via Wikimedia Commons.• Please re-Tweet, and follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter:twitter.com/Reasons2Remain/status/1061571453169082368• This video is now available on the Reasons2Remain YouTube channel. Please share to your friends who don't use Facebook: youtu.be/7CjzrmUjres Before commenting on the Reasons2Remain campaign page, please read our new Rules of Engagement: Rules.Reasons2Remain.com********************************************► Watch Jon Danzig's 50-minute video: 'Can Britain Stop Brexit?' Go to CanBritainStopBrexit.com********************************************• To follow and support Reasons2Remain just ‘like’ the page, and please invite all your friends to like the page. ********************************************• Please recommend Reasons2Remain in the reviews section. Here's the link: facebook.com/Reasons2Remain/reviews/********************************************• Follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter: twitter.com/reasons2remain and Instagram: instagram.com/reasons2remain/********************************************• Explore our unique Reasons2Remain gallery of over 1,000 graphics and articles: reasons2remain.co.uk********************************************• Reasons2Remain is an entirely unfunded community campaign, unaffiliated with any other group or political party, and is run entirely by volunteers. If you'd like to help, please send us a private message.********************************************• © Reasons2Remain 2018. All our articles and graphics are the copyright of Reasons2Remain. We only allow sharing using the Facebook share button. Any other use requires our advance permission in writing.#STOPBREXIT #EXITBREXIT #PEOPLESVOTE #FINALSAY

Posted by Reasons2Remain on Sunday, 11 November 2018

The post The EU was started for one purpose: peace appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

According to Viktor Yesin, Russian weapons may simply be ineffective in case of an open armed confrontation. The point is about the withdrawal of the United States from the INF Treaty, which regulates the elimination of short and medium range missiles.

The Perimeter functions perfectly and has passed all stages of preparation and verification, the system can be used only if all of Russia's other nuclear weapons are destroyed as a result of the enemy's attack. This Russian system of automatic nuclear retaliation in the West is known as the Dead Hand.

The Perimeter system was put in operation in the USSR in 1985. In a nutshell, the system ensures the automatic launch of nuclear missiles in case of a nuclear attack against Russia, even if there is no one left to be able to give such an order. All the available data about the work of the system is served with such words as "probably," "possibly," and so on. No one knows how the system works exactly. In general, the Perimeter is a form of artificial intelligence that evaluates a multitude of factors about a nuclear attack on the basis of information received from radar stations, space satellites, seismic activity, etc.

Nuclear-capable missiles will thus be launched from silos, mobile launchers, strategic aircraft, submarines to strike pre-entered targets, unless there is no signal from the command center to cancel the attack. In general, even though there is little information available about the work of the Perimeter, one thing is known for sure: the doomsday machine is not a myth at all - it does exist.

The specialist is convinced that the United States can easily destroy Russia's nuclear arms. Without the INF Treaty, the USA will be able to deploy as many ballistic missiles as possible in Europe. According to Yesin, the Americans will thus be able not only to destroy Russian nuclear weapons, but to intercept them if Russia launches missiles to retaliate. The attack led to a massive nuclear exchange between the two countries that caused irreparable damage to the two states and claimed the lives of more than 400 million people.

Russia must revise its nuclear doctrine as soon as possible.

Source : Pravda.ru

Tag: RussiaINF TreatyPerimeter

Committee and political group meetings, Brussels

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

In one of those “politics as cock-up not conspiracy” moments, this week saw the (aggressive) leaking of a document purporting to be the government’s plans for selling the Withdrawal Agreement.

I say aggressive, since the leaker pushed it out to several media outlets at once, so really wanted it out there, spelling mistakes and all.

The government has distanced itself from the paper, and the general view seems to be that – at most – it’s an early draft from someone not that central to the negotiations. Even the reflected glory of seeing the guy I work with get mentioned as a thought-leader doesn’t make it any more valuable than that.

But it does raise the question of how the government will go about selling whatever deal it gets.

In that, the leak does point towards a pretty credible direction.

Rather than trying to pretend it’s all hunky-dory, the suggestion is that it be presented as a “measured success”, where the UK has fought for its interests and done as well as could be expected in the circumstances. That allows defenders/promoters to deflect some of the criticism by saying that while there are indeed some parts that aren’t ideal, they are the price of getting concessions elsewhere and/or they were points that the EU absolutely couldn’t be bidded on.

From that starting point, the plan would then move to a twin-track approach: pushing the necessary legislation hard and fast through Parliament, while simultaneously gridding up media activity to get buy-ins from the great and the good. In essence, the momentum of all of this would be beneficial to getting things over the line, in terms of UK ratification.

But does this stand up?

In one sense, the government isn’t going to have much choice in the matter, since they cannot achieve an agreed text that gives them everything they want, because the EU will not agree to it. That means they have to accept that there are compromises, since it would be completely indefensible to pretend it was an unqualified success, leaving them open to the charge of being out of touch with the realities of the situation.

Given this, and assuming they don’t want to go down the route of pleading for mercy from the Tory backbench and Parliament – also not a hot look – they have to play the line of “we’ve done our very best and we’re pretty happy about it, generally speaking”.

The difficulty comes in whether this necessity can be transformed into a successful ratification.

The first issue will be that of timing: can the government move rapidly from a signed deal to a legislative proposal? Even if one assumes that there is a draft Withdrawal and Implementation Bill floating around, waiting for some Ctrl-C-V action, there will still be a number of delays. Any European Council agreement-in-principle will then need some times – probably weeks – to produce a legally-tight text for signing, just as the draft Bill will need work to review in light of the final deal.

Given the speed of modern politics, that’s a huge window in which opposition can mobilise on specific issues and own the debate.

Secondly, much of the potential support from outsiders is likely to be a bit ambivalent. Yes, a deal is good, for the certainty it provides into the transition period, but by necessity it doesn’t commit the parties to a particular form of future relationship, so there’s a lot of wait-and-see about it. So everyone with a preference about the future will be torn between stressing what they do like about the omens contained therein, and worrying about the bits they don’t like.

Put differently, the Withdrawal Agreement is about ending the UK’s membership, not setting out the future.

Finally, the plan relies on a relatively cohesive Cabinet, willing to go out and sell the deal. While the Chequers reshuffle of the summer removed the most problematic individuals on that front, it’s not hard to imagine further ructions as the grid swings around to the less-enthusiastic members. Any resignations will give an opportunity to opponents to switch the narrative to ‘Cabinet splits’, potentially freeing backbenchers from some of their sense of duty to support the party line (and encouraging opposition parties to prod the wound in the hope of forcing a motion of confidence and early elections).

But notwithstanding all these dangers, we come back to the earlier point: the government doesn’t have much choice in the matter. Right now, as staffers work to produce a similar-but-different version of the leaked document, the emphasis will have to be on how to manage and mitigate the risks that have to be run. And we’ll see how that goes sooner, rather than later.

The post Selling the Withdrawal Agreement appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Before discussing any implications of Brexit for UK standards and regulations, let us remind ourselves what are standards and why are they important.  Standards are a range of powerful marketing and business tools for businesses and institutions of all shapes and sizes. They can be used to adjust performance and manage risks, while operating more sustainably and efficiently. They allow businesses and institutions to demonstrate the proof of quality for their products & services to potential customers and can assist to merge best practices into the corporate structure. Standards represent a range of very coherent ways of information sharing between governments and businesses about what should be considered as a norm.

The British Standards Institution, (aka BSI, which produces technical standards on a wide range of products and services, and also provides certification and standards-related services to businesses), has been appointed by the UK Government (HMG) to act as the UK National Standards Body (NSB). In this role, BSI is responsible for the structures that enable the UK to participate in national, European (please note – ‘European’, not EU) and international standards-making systems and for overseeing the range of these standards which are currently valid in the UK.

Through the BSI, the UK participates in the European  (please note again – ‘European’, not EU) Standardisation System, with BSI as a full member of CEN (European Committee for Standardisation), CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation) and ETSI, as well as in two international standards-making systems ISO and IEC.

This is a very important distinction. Although CEN, CENELEC and ETSI  develop European standards, not ‘EU standards’ (they include NSB from countries outside the EU, including Ukraine, and are not official agencies of the European Union but rather private members associations owned by their members  including BSI, are entirely private bodies, and therefore not part of the EU’s institutional framework), nevertheless, their standards are “EN” EU (and EEA) standards, according to EU Regulation 1025/2012.

Such ‘Single Standard model’ is valid among many industries and enables companies and individuals to work and trade in the EU single market. This principle is called reciprocity, to make business as smooth as possible across national borders.

The overwhelming majority of standards being in existence in the UK are international in nature (over 95%), while the number of UK-only standards is rather small. Over 1,500 of them are withdrawn annually (e.g. there used to be 160,000 British Standards, now reduced to 19,000 Single Standards).

However, some standards are conjoined with relevant EU regulations (less than 20% in Europe) and are known as ‘harmonised standards’ (we have discussed them briefly in a previous blog).

Immediately after the Brexit referendum in 2016, the British Standards Institution , has conducted a webinar on the Brexit implications for standards and regulations in the UK. This webinar was further endorsed/supported in 2018 by another BSI statement.

As regard CEN and CENELEC. the BSI’s continued membership should not accordingly be affected by Brexit. Some adjustment to the internal rules of CEN and CENELEC may be necessary to assure this and steps are in hand to bring this about. There are no such adjustments required in the case of ETSI.

If the UK does not maintain its full membership of CEN and CENELEC through BSI, British stakeholders would lose their influence over the content of the standards used in the 33 other member countries and British industry would face increased barriers to trade (BSI membership of the two international standardization organizations, ISO and IEC, will be unaffected by the UK’s exit from the EU).

In its position paper “European standards and the UK” the BSI raised a series of five principal questions:
1. What are standards and why are they important for industry?
2. What is the European Single Market?
3. What benefits do European standards bring to the European Single Market?
4. How are these benefits delivered?
5. What would be the impact of a UK exit from the EU in terms of UK participation in the European standardization system?

In the same paper the BSI attempted to offer some solutions, which in their opinion will be instrumental in maintaining the status quo. We will analyse some important points of this position paper in the subsequent blogs.

The post Possible outcomes of UK departure from EU and its implications for British standards and regulations appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Professor Amelia Hadfield and Chris Logie
Centre for European Studies (CEFEUS), Canterbury Christ Church University

For keen followers of US politics – and the very many beyond – yesterday’s mid-term elections provided the expected spills and thrills as the results flowed in from east to west. There was a general expectation that the outcome would produce a decent split between a House of Representatives reclaimed by the Democrats and a consolidated Republican Senate.

The House of Representatives: I told you so

© vchalup / Adobe Stock

After a wobble before 2am GMT where the House of Representatives looked close based on the earliest results, the Democrats pulled off a result that largely met expectations. The mid-terms represent the first US-wide elections since the surprise election victory of 2016 when Donald Trump not only assumed the Presidency, but Republicans claimed both branches of Congress.

While it was not precisely the kind of ‘shellacking’ bemoaned by Obama in the 2010 midterm when he lost 63 seats in a Republican wave, the Democrats gain of approximately 34 seats (they needed 23 to ensure a majority) still easily deserves the same ‘wave’ moniker and all the connotations it comes with. The 7% popular margin that the Democrats are estimated to have won with compares very favourably to other ‘Blue wave’-like elections, including 2014 (5.7%), 2010 (6.8%) and 2006 (9.0%). As such the Democratic take-back of the House of Representatives has dealt Trump a clear message from suburban U.S. voters in particular that they are displeased with the ‘toxic rhetoric’ that has characterized Trump’s governing ethos in the past 2 years, and which reached objectionable new heights during the final days of mid-term campaigning. In scooping up these 34 seats, Democrats appear to have been lifted by backlashes in suburban congressional districts, which contain voters who have largely swung back against Trump and the Republican Party from the original 2016 figures.

Indeed, Democrats performed best in districts carried by Mitt Romney in 2012, and Clinton in 2016. A good example of this is the surprise Democrat win in Oklahoma’s 5th district, which registers as 13.5% above the national average in terms of its Republican affiliation, but is also dominated by urban and suburban Oklahoma City, where a range of very different viewpoints helped dilute the overall Trump message. This particular win means that victor Kendra Horn will represent the area as a Democrat for the first time in 44 years. Another seat representative of this same trend is Texas’ 7th district, which voted for Romney by a whopping 21.3% in 2012 but swung dramatically towards Hilary Clinton in 2016, who won it by a mere 1.4%. This year, Democrat Lizzie Pannill Fletcher took the seat from incumbent Republican John Culberson by around 4.7%, which means that the seat has swung even further since 2016. Representing wealthy suburbs near Houston, this seat is something a microcosm of the seats where Democrats did best nationally.

House dynamics for the lower chamber look set to provide some drama. Early this morning, Trump rang Nancy Pelosi, the House Minority Leader to concede defeat. After eight years in the minority wilderness, Pelosi is now a strong bet to reclaim the speaker’s chair, which makes her the single most powerful Democrat in the US, at least until a viable presidential candidate is chosen. What Pelosi chooses to do with this power is key. Can she steer through a batch of new legislation? Or is she destined to be the figurehead of Democrat-instigated gridlock in a Democrat-controlled House, attempting to withstand “the growing pressure on her to step aside for a new generation of Dems”?

The House election was also characterised by the sheer variety of candidates, most notably female representation in Congress, which looks set to reach a record high. This is a trend primarily driven by the Democrats, who fielded more female candidates for congress than any other party has before. The 2018 mid-terms also heralded other exciting female firsts, with Sharice Davids in Kansas’ 3rd district beating the Republican incumbent, to become the first Native American woman in Congress. To this we can add Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar, whose victories in solid Democratic seats are truly ground-breaking, as the first Muslim women in the House of Representatives. US veterans are also likely to do well in the House, with a number of Democratic vets successfully challenging Republican incumbents in seats such as Jason Crow in Colorado’s 6th district, as well as Mikie Sherill in New Jersey’s 11th district, Mike Rose in New York’s 11th district and Elaine Luria in Virginia’s 2nd district. While this representation is very different from 1971, when 73% of Congress was veterans, it is an upswing since 2017, when it was just under 19%.

The Senate: be careful what you wish for

On balance, the image of a Trump bloodied at the ballot box hasn’t precisely come to pass. The anticipated “blue wave” of Democrat support was simply not strong enough to erode key states in Senatorial or Gubernatorial areas, particularly in rural areas, as well as the crucial swing state of Florida. The result is that Republicans have retained control of the Senate. The outcome is nowhere near the blustering assertion by Trump that the entire outcome has been a “tremendous success” for his party (you’d expect him to say that, wouldn’t you), but there is a good chance of tremendous ideological impasses that could gum up American governance between 2018-2020.

The US Senate meanwhile represents a terrain in which the average battleground state was 16% more Republican than the US as whole, and unsurprisingly saw incumbent Democratic Senators in red states like North Dakota, Missouri, and Indiana ultimately swamped by basic partisanship. While some Democrats hoped that the moderate stances of these incumbents would ultimately go their way, what carried the day were the substantial margins in races which that were predicted to be far closer. Of the states carried by Trump in 2016 by double-digits (North Dakota, Missouri, Indiana, West Virginia, Montana), only Senator Joe Manchin in West Virginia and Jon Tester in Montana bucked the trend and held on; arguably testament to the strong personal brand of each candidate and their mastery of retail politics in what are relatively small states.

Democrats will also be bitterly disappointed with the loss of their Senate seat in Florida by the narrowest of narrow margins, along with their probable loss in Florida’s Governor race. Both results highlight clear Democratic underperformance in the Southeast, leaving Floridian Democrats scratching their heads wondering what went wrong.1 Interestingly, the one area where a clear return to base partisanship in the Senate has worked in the Democrat’s favour is Nevada, where challenger Jacky Rosen has beaten incumbent Republican Senator Dean Heller by wider margins than the polls had suggested in the only state with a Republican running for reelection in a state that Hilary Clinton won in 2016.

Meanwhile Arizona’s Senate race is also proving to be a close run thing with Republican candidate Martha McSally still slightly ahead of Democrat Kyrsten Sinema. All in all, Republicans look likely to extend expand on the current 51 Republican, 49 Democrat split in the Senate by around three seats, which is arguably near the higher end of their predictions, but within the bounds of what was expected.

In terms of trends, Democrats’ concentration of support in larger US states is becoming a key structural issue regarding their chances in the Senate, a pattern reinforced once again by these mid-terms. We need to bear in mind that while Donald Trump lost the popular vote in 2016, he won 30 states representing 60 seats in the US Senate. This kind of structural challenge is likely to provoke deep concerns among the Democrats regarding their future chances of achieving a Senate majority in the near future.

Of special note are the results from Texas, where charismatic Democrat Beto O’Rourke ran incumbent Ted Cruz in a surprisingly close race, with Cruz only winning by less than 3% (he won in 2012 by 16%) in what amounted to the most expensive Senate race in US history. Despite the outcome, O’Rourke’s narrow margin will give Democrats hope that Texas might at some stage be added to a future ‘blue splash’, with party members suggesting O’Rourke as a presidential contender for 2020.

Governors: Start your engines

At the gubernatorial level, Democrat expectations of a strong showing where largely borne out. Democrats successfully took Illinois, New Mexico, Michigan, Maine, Nevada, Wisconsin and Kansas out of Republican hands. By taking Wisconsin from Governor Scott Walker, Democrat candidate Tony Evers finally achieved what the party had been seeking to do in 2014 and in 2012, when Scott Walker won a rancorous recall election after being elected in the Republican wave of 2010. Meanwhile in Kansas, Democrats scored a real upset by handily beating Trumpian Republican Kris Kobach (who had beaten the incumbent Republican governor in the primary) by over 5%, in a state that Trump had carried by a whopping 20% in 2016. Democrats’ losses elsewhere proved sobering, including Ohio, Georgia and Florida, all of which were considered to be tight races. Democrats had high hopes in particular for Stacy Abrams in Georgia and Andrew Gillum in Florida, to whom recent polls had given a lead. With Ohio and Florida reinforced as 2020 key swing states, Democrats will be disappointed they could not bolster their chances by having incumbent Democratic governors helping drive those states.

Implications: Déjà vu?

Clearly, a Democrat-controlled House has the opportunity to cause major problems for Trump during the final two years of his term as president. This can take a number of forms: first, in general by blocking his legislative plans; second, and more specifically, by dominating key House committees from January onwards to redress legislative decisions in the previous two years, or refashioning policy ambitions between now and 2020; third, both ad hoc and Committee-based requests that are not primarily policy-specific, but aimed at either impeaching Trump, or making his final 24 months in office as uncomfortable as possible (e.g. using subpoenas to request the president’s unpublished tax returns, to insist on a more robust inquiry into Trump’s links with Russia, or any form of behavior deemed to be ultimately unconstitutional.

More broadly, for America as a whole, the results suggests yet more partisanship in Congress as a whole, and ongoing levels of social acrimony, particularly in closely-fought battleground states. Jody Avirgan from Nate Silver’s prediction website FiveThirtyEight for instance argued that “the election is reflecting just how divided we are — urban, rural, rich, poor, different education levels. That gulf continues to grow”. The key themes are ugly ones: anti-migration, anti-immigration, racism, sexism, corporatism, and even unconstitutional options all vie as leitmotifs capable of being boiled down into the reductivist idiocy that passes for Trump’s tantrum tweets. Any and all of these agendas were ushered into DC in 2016 and they have had precious little opposition from members of both houses. Failing to repudiate these narratives may seem a clever strategy helping to speed the Democratic Party’s suburban ambitions across America for the 2020 campaign, but they represent a dangerous blend of toxic populism that operates as blind nationalism at best and deliberate fascism at worst.

What Now?

For some, this is a wasted two years, with the Republicans destined to close ranks behind Trump, whatever their private opinions, increasing the likelihood of his re-election. For others, the race for 2020 is wide open, and the shopping list of both Democratic and Republican contenders is on. Post-election prognostication is a high stakes game, but some are keen to get the party started as early as possible, including Ohio Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown, whose victory speech focused on celebrating “the dignity of work, how we honor organized labor and all workers”, suggesting that Ohio’s message “is the blueprint for our nation in 2020.”

Facts and Trivia

• • Despite their Republican leaning, Idaho, Nebraska and Utah all voted to expand Medicaid access (US Federal health insurance), created by the Affordable Care Act, a.k.a. Obamacare.
  • In a surprise turn of events, Democrats took South Carolina’s 1st district from the Republicans: a seat 10% more Republican than the US as a whole. Incumbent representative Mark Sanford, who had been somewhat critical of President Trump, lost his primary to Trump-backed candidate Katie Arrington, making this loss something of a Republican own-goal.
  • In California’s Orange County-based 48th district, incumbent Republican Dana Rohrabacher lost his seat to Democrat Harley Rouda. Rohrabacher is notable for his strongly pro-Russian views, and referred to in some quarters as “Putin’s favourite congressman”.
  • Thanks to Max Rose’s upset victory in the pro-Trumpy Staten Island district of New York 11, Democrats now hold every single house district in New York City.

• The three states that lifted Trump to the Presidency in 2016 (Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan), all have swung back and voted for both Democratic Senators and Governors this year.
• While West Virginia voted for Donald Trump in 2016 by a huge margin of over 40% in 2016 (making it the second most Republican state in the US) popular Democratic incumbent Senator Joe Manchin still managed to win his race by defeating his Republican opponent 49.5% to 46.3%.

1 Caveat Emptor: Due to the thin margins, as of late Wednesday, 7 November 2018, incumbent Democrat Bill Nelson has announced his campaign will request a recount. This is likely to be granted; it is however unlikely that the recount could swing the race by the required 35,000 votes.

The post The Blue Splash? Or Resurgent Red? Assessing the 2018 US Mid-Term Elections appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Journal of Contemporary European Research (JCER) recently published a special issue on the role of civil society in European Union policymaking and democratisation. Editors Rosa Sanchez Salgado and Andrey Demidov explain how it constitutes an original account of what is happening in the member states, beyond the world of well-established organisations in Brussels.

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This special issue shows first that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) play a significant role in EU policymaking in a few member states. Research on Sweden, Spain and Slovenia shows that many CSOs predominantly engage in advocacy activities at the national level to influence EU policymaking. Wealthy national CSOs that would have the means to lobby in Brussels still mainly engage in national advocacy when trying to influence EU affairs; they only seem more inclined to go directly to Europe when there are potential conflicts between the EU level and the national level, as can be the case when it comes to gender equality in Sweden.

When civil society beyond Brussels is taken into account, the picture of the role and functions of European Civil Society Organisations becomes much more diverse and nuanced. The Brussels’ bubble often appears as an elite-system of interest representation with a strong business bias, while CSOs are considered to play a small role in the democratisation of the EU. These findings are valid, but just for a relatively homogeneous context: the Brussels’ system.

When national CSOs in new and old member states and third countries are taken into account, the overall picture is much more nuanced. There is evidence that CSOs usually characterised as weak also take an active role in EU policymaking. Even if those CSOs rarely contact EU institutions directly, they are active members of EU umbrella organisations with regular interactions with national decision makers on EU affairs. These CSOs also play a relevant role in the process of implementation of EU policies by serving as communities that inform and educate their electorates. Further, EU-related topics and ideas are often picked up at the national level by social movements to mobilise citizens or increase the level of politicisation and therefore debate on vital matters, as was seen with the TTIP campaign in Spain.

National CSOs have also contributed to the democratisation of the European public space in ways that would be difficult to comprehend from the perspective of the Brussels bubble. Current studies assessing the democratic potential of CSOs focusing on Brussels-based mechanisms of consultation and participation, while interesting, tend to rely on high normative standards. The picture is very different when scholars actually take stock of current practices of participation or when they take into account how CSOs themselves understand their role in the democratisation of Europe. Thus, our work exposes the gap between normativity as rhetoric and normativity in action.

Many studies on the contribution of European CSOs to democratic governance conclude that EU-based CSOs do not sufficiently represent their members and supporters. This special issue contributes to this discussion with an in-depth examination of the relations between national CSOs and EU umbrellas. Different scholars cover environmental CSOs in Belgium, CSOs defending bi-national family rights in France and feminist CSOs in France and Belgium. These studies show that national CSOs’ expectations regarding EU umbrellas are very different from current normative standards. National CSOs value more the function and the effectiveness of CSOs than the degree to which they represent the view of their members. It therefore suggests that we need to refine or expand our views on what is significant in the minds of societal actors.

These studies also show that the degree of participation of national CSOs and their members depends on a variety of factors, including organisational and cultural factors, without neglecting the individual dimension. The level of internal representation is explained by a complex combination of factors including resources, organisational constraints and cultural specificities. Representation and participation is also related to individual personal and professional backgrounds, as well as the specific vision of Europe held by CSOs’ staff and members.

The same difference between high normative standards and perceptions of CSOs is found when the analysis focuses on CSOs’ functions, as is shown by research on CSOs in four central and eastern EU states and CSOs in two third countries (Georgia and Ukraine). While public officials and the EU seem to focus on input legitimacy, partnership and the representative function of CSOs, CSOs see themselves mainly as political watchdogs. The normative orientations of CSOs focus on increasing the transparency and accountability of the policy process and its deliberative quality.

All in all, the focus on national CSOs beyond Brussels shows the predominance of diversity. This requires original approaches to causality, including multiple causal pathways and openness to a plurality of perspectives regarding normative standards.

This article is based on the authors’ introduction to their co-edited special issue in the Journal of Contemporary European Studies (JCER) Vol 14 No 2 (available open-access here).

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, JCER or UACES.

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Andrey Demidov | @anddemidov

Andrey Demidov is a scientific coordinator at the Institute for Advanced Study at Central European University in Budapest. His research interests include European governance, the role of civil society in EU public policy and participatory governance in Central and Eastern European countries. 

 

Rosa Sanchez Salgado

Rosa Sanchez Salgado is Assistant Professor of European Public Policy at the Department of Political Science of the University of Amsterdam. Her research focuses on European politics and civil society organisations and social movements.

The post Beyond the Brussels Bubble? National Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the European Union appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Council gives final approval to audiovisual media services directive.

On 6 November, the Council formally adopted a Regulation on the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders to improve fight against cross border crimes.

The Council extended the targeted restrictive measures in place on Venezuela until 14 November 2019.

On 6 November, the Council formally adopted the amended Regulation on Eurojust.

The Council agreed a proposal allowing member states to apply reduced VAT rates to electronic publications, contributing to the digital single market plan.

The Council removed Namibia from the list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions, bringing the names on the list down to five.

Remarks by President Centeno following the Eurogroup meeting of 5 November on Italy's draft budgetary plan, financial stability in the euro-area and EMU reform.

On 5 November 2018, the Eurogroup discussed the Commission opinion on Italy’s draft budgetary plan (DBP) for 2019, issued on 23 October 2018.