European Union

Being a member of the EU costs us only around 34p a day each. That’s a bargain, especially as the value of EU benefits far outweigh the cost.

The Confederation of British Industry has estimated that EU membership is worth around £3,000 a year to every British family — a return of nearly £10 for each £1 we pay in.

So, in reality, EU membership costs nothing – it makes Britain, and Britons, better off.

(Source: CBI)

Article continues after one-minute video:

The calculations for our annual EU membership fee have been published by the UK’s Office of National Statistics.

(Source: ONS)

When deducting from the EU membership fee all the money we get back from the EU, including our £5 billion rebate that’s never actually sent to the EU, the net cost of EU membership in 2016 was only £8.1 billion – or £156 million a week, or just 34p per person per day

That’s far short of the claim made on Boris Johnson’s campaign bus that we send £350m a week to the EU. That was entirely incorrect.

But after the referendum, the Vote Leave campaign director, Dominic Cummings wrote:

“Would we have won without £350m/NHS? All our research and the close result strongly suggests no.”

(Source: Spectator)

So, we are leaving the EU based on a whopper of a lie (actually, lots of whopping lies).

Ok, if Mr Johnson had instead put ‘£156m a week’ on his bus, it would still have seemed a lot of money. But something Brexiters never like to do is reveal how much we get back in return for the membership fee.

Back in 2011, this was estimated by the government to be between £30 billion and £90 billion a year – a return of between 800% and 2370%.

(Source: UK government)

Can anyone name any other government expenditure that gives a return of over 800%?

Let’s put this in another context.

In 2016, the government spent £814.6 billion on all aspects of public spending. This means that the net annual EU membership fee represented only 1% of all UK government expenditure. (A miniscule amount).

Furthermore, the EU funds many thousands of projects in the UK every year, that our national government would be unlikely to finance. Such as Liverpool’s John Lennon Airport, or superfast broadband in Cornwall.

(Source: European Commission)

In addition, across Europe, our annual membership fee helps to fund projects that benefit our continent and its people as a whole – such as Galileo, to give Europe its own satellite navigation system.

And the Horizon 2020 project – the world’s biggest multinational research programme, funding leading-edge research in all aspects of science and innovation that will directly benefit all EU citizens.

Individual European countries could not afford to take on the projects that the EU helps to fund for the welfare and prosperity of its half-a-billion citizens.

The advantages of EU membership considerably outweigh the cost of membership. So, why are we leaving?

I cannot find one valid or validated benefit for Brexit. Not even one.

Indeed, by NOT paying the annual EU membership fee, we will all be poorer, according to the UK government’s own impact assessment reports.

(Source: The Guardian)

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Britain’s vote to leave the EU has produced a wealth of books, which should come as no surprise given the unprecedented challenges and debates it has led to in the UK, the rest of Europe and around the world. Recently published in International Politics Review, ‘Brexitology: delving into the books on Brexit’ covers almost 60 books. It looks at the full range of books published in the run-up to and after the referendum, ending with books published in late 2018.

It offers a way of breaking down the literature into seven manageable topics: how to study Brexit; the history of UK–EU relations; the referendum campaign; explaining the result, Britain’s Brexit; Europe’s Brexit; and Global Brexit. The review identifies some common themes in the books so far published and looks at what the future holds for this topic.’

Full article – Brexitology: Delving into the books on Brexit – can be found here– https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41312-018-0069-1

Books reviewed or referenced in the review—

• Adonis, A. (2018). Half in, half out: Prime ministers on europe. London: Biteback.
• Armour, J., & Eidenmüller, H. (Eds.). (2017). Negotiating Brexit. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
• Armstrong, K. (2017). Brexit time: Leaving the EU—Why, how and when?. Cambridge: CUP.
• Ashcroft, M., & Culwick, K. (2016). Well, you did ask… why the UK voted to leave the EU. London: Biteback.
• Bailey, D., & Budd, L. (2017). The political economy of Brexit. Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda.
• Banks, A. (2016). The bad boys of Brexit. London: Biteback.
• Barnett, A. (2017). The lure of greatness: England’s Brexit and America’s Trump. Kansas City: Unbound.
• Bennett, O. (2016). The Brexit club. London: Biteback.
• Bickerton, C. (2016). The European Union: A citizens guide. London: Penguin.
• Booker, C., & North, R. (2005). The great deception: Can the European Union survive?. New York City: Continuum.
• Buckledee, S. (2018). The language of Brexit: How Britain talked its way out of the European Union. London: Bloomsbury.
• Cato the Younger. (2017). Guilty men: Brexit edition. London: Biteback.
• Clarke, H., Goodwin, M., & Whiteley, P. (2017). Brexit: Why Britain voted to leave the European Union. Cambridge: CUP.
• Clegg, N. (2017). In his how to stop Brexit (and make Britain great again). New York City: Vintage.
• Connelly, T. (2017). Brexit and Ireland: The dangers, the opportunities, and the inside story of the Irish response. London: Penguin.
• Diamond, P., Nedergaard, P., & Rosamond’s, B. (2018). The Routledge handbook of the politics of Brexit. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Dinan, D., Nugent, N., & Paterson’s, E. W. (Eds.). (2017). The European Union in crisis. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Drozdiak, W. (2017). Fractured continent: Europe’s crises and the fate of the west. New York City: W.W. Norton.
• Dunt, I. (2016 and updated in 2018). Brexit: What the hell happens now? Kingston upon Thames: Canbury Press.
• Fossum, J. E., & Graver’s, H. P. (2018). Squaring the circle on Brexit: Could the Norway model work?. Bristol: Policy Press.
• Gamble, A. (2003). Between Europe and America: The future of British politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• George, S. (1998). An awkward partner: Britain in the European community. Oxford: OUP.
• Gibbon, G. (2017). His breaking point: The UK referendum on the EU and its aftermath. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Glencross, A. (2016). Why the UK voted for Brexit. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Green, D. A. (2017). Brexit: What everyone needs to know. Oxford: OUP.
• Hannan, D., & Next, W. (2016). How to get the best from Brexit. London: Head of Zeus.
• Hassan, G., & Gunson’s, R. (Eds.). (2017). Scotland and the UK after Brexit. A guide to the future. Edinburgh: Luath Press.
• Hillman, J., & Horlick, G. (Eds.) (2017). Legal Aspects of Brexit: Implications of the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the EU. Washington: Institute of International Economic Law.
• Humphreys, R. (2018). Beyond the border: The Good Friday agreement and irish unity after Brexit. Kildare: Merrion Press.
• Kearns, I. (2018). Collapse: Europe after the European Union. London: Biteback.
• Lyons, G., & Halligan, L. (2017). Their clean Brexit: Why leaving the EU still makes sense—Building a post-Brexit economy for all. London: Biteback.
• MacShane, D. (2015). Brexit: How Britain will leave Europe. London: IBTauris.
• MacShane, D. (2016). Brexit: How Britain left Europe. London: IBTauris.
• MacShane, D. (2017). Brexit, no exit: Why Britain won’t leave Europe. London: IBTauris.
• McGowan’s, L. (2017). Preparing for Brexit: Actors, negotiators and consequences. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Melchior, A. (2018). Free trade agreements and globalisation: In the shadow of Brexit and Trump. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Menon, A., & Evans, G. (2017). Brexit and British politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Mindus’s, P. (2017). European citizenship after Brexit: Freedom of movement and rights of residence. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Morphet, J., & Brexit, B. (2017). How to assess the UK’s future. Bristol: Policy Press.
• Morris, D., & Thomson, J. (2018). Can you Brexit?: Without breaking Britain?. Avening: Spark Furnace.
• Mount, H., & Madness, S. (2017). How Brexit split the Tories, destroyed Labour and divided the country. London: Biteback.
• Oliver, T. (Ed.). (2018). Europe’s Brexit: EU Perspectives on Britain’s vote to leave. Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda.
• Oliver, T., (2018). Understanding Brexit: A concise introduction. Bristol: Bristol University Press.
• Oliver, C., & Demons, U. (2016). The inside story of Brexit. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
• Outhwaite, W. (2017). Brexit: Sociological responses. Cambridge: Anthem Press.
• Owen, D., & Ludlow, D. (2017). British foreign policy after Brexit. London: Biteback.
• Peston, R. (2017). WTF. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
• Rohac, D. (2016). Towards an imperfect Union: A conservative case for the European Union. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Sanders, D., & Houghton, D. P. (2016). Losing an empire, finding a role. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Shipman, T. (2016). All out war: The full story of how Brexit sank Britain’s political class. Glasgow: William Collins.
• Shipman, T. (2018). Fall out: A year of political mayhem. Glasgow: William Collins.
• Simms, B. (2016). Britain’s Europe: A thousand years of conflict and cooperation. London: Allen Lane.
• Smith, J. (2017). The UK’s journey into and out of the EU: Destinations Unknown. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Staiger, U., & Martill’s, B. (Eds.). (2018). Brexit and beyond: Rethinking the futures of Europe. London: UCL.
• Tannam, E. (Ed.). (2018). Beyond the Good Friday agreement: In the midst of Brexit. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Wall, S. (2012). The official history of Britain and the European community, volume II: From rejection to referendum, 1963–1975. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Welfens, P. (2017). An accidental Brexit: New EU and transatlantic economic perspectives. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Young, H. (1998). This blessed plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair. New York: Overlook.

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Baltic Media Alliance
SERV
Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe: the Audiovisual Media Services Directive does not preclude the adoption by a Member State of a measure imposing an obligation to broadcast or retransmit a foreign television channel only in packages available for an additional fee, in order to restrict the dissemination by that channel to the public of that State of information inciting hatred

Amazon EU
Environment and consumers
Advocate General Pitruzzella proposes that the Court rule that an e-commerce platform such as Amazon cannot be obliged to make a telephone number available to consumers

Craeynest and Others
Environment and consumers
Advocate General Kokott proposes that the Court of Justice should rule that national courts must, on application by affected individuals, examine whether air sampling points were sited in accordance with the criteria set out in EU law

Línea Directa Aseguradora
Approximation of laws
Advocate General Bot proposes that the Court should declare that spontaneous burning of a vehicle parked in a private garage for more than 24 hours falls within the concept of ‘use of vehicles’

It might not be the first question on your mind when you think about Brexit, but should French SMEs be better prepared for a no deal scenario?

Pierre Séjourné

Pierre Séjourné certainly thinks so. As the head of the international mission at DIRECCTE, a French trans-ministerial agency for economic development, he politely but very firmly has been pressing business leaders across the country to start realising that ‘no deal’ has become the most likely option, and that there is an urgent need to prepare for the unpleasant consequences that the UK’s messy departure will inevitably have for their activities.

No public comment he makes lacks a reference to the government’s virtual helpdesk brexit.gouv.fr which provides assistance to smaller firms with the necessary risk assessment and mitigation.

As a recent public event held on 7 February at ESSCA School of Management in Angers – dedicated to the impact Brexit on Western France’s Pays-de-la-Loire region – showed, Monsieur Séjourné is not alone in having growing concerns with the relative ‘unpreparedness’ of French business.

The public authorities, regional councils or larger conurbations known as ‘métropoles’ in the French provinces are also increasingly worried, as every single regional policy maker pointed out in the various round-tables of the event

The key word is, of course, uncertainty. Since nobody is capable of providing any clarity on what scenario will prevail at the end of March, SMEs are caught like rabbits in the Brexit headlights.

Brexit is destabilising in many ways: this is the first time in most business leaders’ lifetime that intra-European trade has not led to fewer barriers, and it turns back the clock in order to reinstall long-forgotten ones. It is also deeply unsettling on a cultural level.

In France, with its long-standing tradition of high principles often thwarted by practical earthly details and regularly resulting in collective frustration, there has always been a strong belief that pragmatism and phlegmatic down-to-earth problems-solving were the very essence of Britishness.

Giving priority to concrete business interests rather than indulge in grandstanding philosophical dogma was a collective aptitude attributed to the British, despised and envied at the same time.

And now France and the rest of Europe are witnessing how pragmatism is drowned in a sea of collective hysteria, and how clear business interests have been sacrificed on the altar of irrational politics.

This irrationality, to which Hervé Jouanjean, former DG at the European Commission, pointed in his keynote, simply does not fit century-old cultural patterns. There are many business leaders who are convinced that reason will prevail in the very last minute and a sensible solution will be found that will keep consequences down to a perfectly manageable minimum.

As Gérald Darmanin, the French budget minister, recently pointed out, this was the first time in his political career where the public authorities seemed to be better prepared than the corporate world.

At the Angers conference his assessment was indirectly corroborated by the panel dedicated to the transport sector.

Pierre Rideau, director of the customs office for Western France, explained very clearly how they had already been preparing for the worst case for several months and what resources (both human and material) were being mobilised to mitigate the forthcoming problems of cross-border trade.

What they would be unable to avoid, though, was the expected increase in transport costs, which he had no doubt would drive many French SMEs out of the British market.

On each of the round-tables, experts from The UK in a Changing Europe (Raquel Ortega-Argilés, Carmen Hubbard, Christopher Huggins, John-Paul Salter, Ignazio Cabras, and Simon Usherwood) shared their own understandings about the likely disruptions in the different sectors that were addressed by the panels composed of policy-makers, business representatives and researchers.

The agrifood round-table, with Fabrice Sciumbata (Brioches Pasquier), Lydie Bernard (Regional Council Pays-de-la-Loire), Joao Pacheco (Farm Europe), and Carmen Hubbard (UK in a Changing Europe).

One of the major takeaways of the event was the perceived need to give more consideration to regional perspectives.

Just as Scotland feels – understandably – left out of a debate that circles around Westminster issues, so too the French regions, across which the impact of Brexit will vary considerably, have not been helped by a national approach either.

As one the regional councillors, Lydie Bernard, complained, even in a sector as essential to the French economy as the agrifood business, the available data is hardly ever broken down on a regional level.

Beyond the business data and economic prospects, however, the event concluded in a surprisingly humanistic profession of faith in transnational cooperation.

The Pays-de-la-Loire, as provincial as they may seem on a map, have their Brussels representation right on Rond-Point Schuman. Their policy makers and high civil servants are embedded in European networks, the British counterparts they regularly meet with are highly appreciated.

Vanessa Charbonneau

As Vanessa Charbonneau, Vice-President of the Regional Council, repeatedly insisted, they would – ‘of course!’ – be willing to continue to work together with their British neighbours in order to make the best of whatever would be going to happen.

Rather than shoulder-shrugging at the unforced self-destruction of a former premium nation, the overall attitude that seems to prevail in this part of France is one of compassion with a trusted partner whom you would like to help out of an impasse, but are unable to.

 

This post was initially published
on “The UK in a Changing Europe”

The post Business interests and cultural perception patterns. A French region’s view on Brexit. appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

REPORT on the 2018 Commission Report on Turkey
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Kati Piri

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

REPORT on building EU capacity on conflict prevention and mediation
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Soraya Post

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

REPORT on the post-Arab Spring: way forward for the MENA region
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Brando Benifei

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, of the other part
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Anna Elżbieta Fotyga

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

REPORT on the state of EU-Russia political relations
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Sandra Kalniete

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

INTERIM REPORT on the draft Council and Commission decision on the conclusion by the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a Partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Turkmenistan, of the other part
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Ramona Nicole Mănescu

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

REPORT on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, to the Commission and to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the association agreement between the EU and Monaco, Andorra and San Marino
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Juan Fernando López Aguilar

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

Associação Peço a Palavra and Others
Freedom of establishment
The conditions set by the Portuguese Government for the reprivatisation of TAP are compatible with EU law with the exception of the requirement to maintain and develop the existing national hub

Committee meetings and delegations, Brussels

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

European Peace Facility
New comprehensive agreement between the EU and Uzbekistan
Institutional Framework Agreement between EU and the Swiss Confederation
Report on the 2018 Commission Report on Turkey
Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

Rimšēvičs v Latvia
Law governing the institutions
The Court annuls the decision suspending the Governor of the Central Bank of Latvia from office

So here we are. In little more than one month, Britain is due to crash out of the EU without an agreement as the single outcome a strong majority MPs abhor because of the damage it would do to jobs, tax receipts and relations to European and international partners. The agreement actually negotiated by the government was strongly rejected by two thirds. Instead, a fragile majority of MPs demand ill-defined ‘alternative arrangements’ to the Irish backstop, or want it gone completely. Labour insists on a permanent customs union that is a matter for the future relationship and is perfectly compatible with the withdrawal agreement, while the party’s ‘six tests’ can realistically only be met by staying in the single market with all the obligations this brings or remaining.

Those who know how the EU works such as the former UK permanent representative in Brussels, Ivan Rogers, are tearing their hair out over the level of ignorance and his sense of frustration is widely shared among the community of people who study the EU professionally. I don’t wish to rehash the critique of the government approach to the negotiations, but want to explore why so many MPs, both Tories and Labour, misjudged the degree of the EU’s unity, what the core interests of EU member states are, the asymmetry of power in the negotiation, and how to best influence it. If we consider insights from research into foreign policy and intelligence failures, four main reasons stand out:

Firstly, the EU-related knowledge basis and professional connections have been eroding over years, because of declining priority and associated career incentives of being successful in Brussels. During the Blair years the government was keen to and proud of setting the policy agenda in the EU in economic strategy, counter-terrorism and security and defence policy. This started to change already under Gordon Brown who showed little interest in or appreciation of Brussels politics.

Labour’s loss of knowledge continued the longer it stayed out of power, but also because those MPs with experience of governing under Blair were being side-lined by the new front-bench under Jeremy Corbyn. Mr Corbyn himself, a lifelong Eurosceptic as well as his key advisors and some on the front bench, tend to see the EU as an unreformable neoliberal project and, erroneously, think that delivering the 2017 Labour manifesto requires freedom from EU state-aid rules. From this perspective, there is no need for coalition building with the socialist parties in Europe who called to stay and reform.

The Conservatives’ understanding of the EU suffered from Cameron’s early decision to withdraw his party from the conservative grouping in the European parliament in exchange for Brexiteer support for his leadership. This cut off the Conservatives from the European mainstream, damaged relations to sister parties such as the German CDU, and disrupted information flow and influence. As a result, British MPs overestimated both Germany’s capacity as well as its willingness to help accommodate British demands, which were increasingly about stopping things rather than setting the agenda for new policies. The 2011 watershed failure of the government to block the Fiscal Compact designed to save the Eurozone was the first sign of misreading EU partners, closely followed in 2015 by futile efforts to block Jean-Claude Juncker becoming Commission President after his party grouping won the European Parliament elections.

The second explanation for the misjudgement is confirmation bias. This is a problem affecting not just MPs but many commentators and members of the public with the most passionately held political beliefs. Confirmation bias involves seeking and accepting information, because it supports actions that are in line with ones’ beliefs and disregard evidence that contradicts them, regardless of reliability, relevance or track-record of the source. One can always find some “expert opinion” from an ideologically compatible “think-tank” that supports ones’ view and avoid or discard those that jar or contradict it.

One of the benefits of confirmation bias for true believers is that you can never be disproven by real world events. If the EU did not blink and yield as David Davis and other Brexiteers argue it must have been because it was intransigent, arrogant and out to “punish” Britain – not because the UK harboured unrealistic ideas. If the deal was somehow approved at the last second and negotiations about a post-Brexit trade-deal turned out not to be “the easiest in history” it was because the Commons had lost its nerve to fight for a better deal. If the EU did not respond positively to a new approach from a potential Corbyn-led government it was because the Tories had destroyed trust through the negotiating tactics, rather than Labour engaging in wishful thinking.

The third problem is mirror-imaging whereby uncertainty about the intentions of the other side is filled by imagining what is rational from ones’ own point of view. From the perspective of many British MPs the EU insisting on the backstop even if it risks a no deal is an irrational strategy given the economic damage a no-deal would incur. Many also do not understand why Britain could not enjoy the same kind of access to the Single Market as before as it creates new barriers to European businesses. This reflects a strong tendency in British political discourse to see evaluate policies and the EU in particular from a narrow “bottom-line”, cost-benefits perspective.

In contrast, EU institutions and the overwhelming majority of its members see Brexit not just on its own terms, but as precedence creating and future credibility-defining. Cutting an economically favourable deal with a country wanting to be politically more distant would come at an unacceptable price of weakening the Union at a time when populist parties in government attempt hard-ball tactics. The integrity of the Single Market is at stake if Northern Ireland was outside the customs union without border controls or by allowing Britain to undercut standards to gain competitive advantage whilst enjoyed good access to the Single Market. The EU is determined to defend the Treaties as its quasi constitution, which is something difficult to understand in a country without a written constitution. The difficulty of arriving at a legally-binding text among 27 member states also helps to explain why such texts, once agreed, become very difficult to change and why the EU says it will not reopen the withdrawal agreement shaped around and agreed by the British government and the EU 27 at the end of last year.

Beyond the immediate issue of the Brexit negotiations, many British MPs struggle to understand the compromise-nature of EU politics. They see Brussels through the lens of their own confrontational system with strongly whipped parties and underpinned by first past the post elections. Many continental European countries are run by coalition governments and problem-solving-focused parliaments, making it easier for them understand the give and take in Brussels. The EU is a compromise-making machine geared towards building the broadest possible support even when majority votes are allowed. This works only because members agree on informal rules on how to act and share a minimum level of trust not abuse their rights. Casting vetoes, going into battle with publicly announced red-lines and reneging on agreements made has lost the UK trust and good-will even among the most Anglophile countries. The lack of trust has now become a major obstacle for negotiation success.

Finally, assumption drag helps to explain why many MPs still do not realise that their perceived understanding of how Brussels works does no longer apply. Not just MPs, but also many journalists remember long EU summit negotiations and the late-night compromises that typically enable a deal to made. Indeed, in the now distant past, Britain won some special concessions at these negotiations over new Treaty texts. However, this is not a normal EU summit over a new treaty or a major agreement where everyone needs to have prizes to sell at home. By voicing its intention to leave Britain has placed itself in a fundamentally different position of a prospective “third country” against which the remaining EU members defend their interests. While the EU is keen to get Brexit over with and passed and will show flexibility, particularly on the political declaration, it is not going to let either Ireland or its mandated negotiator, the European Commission, stand in the rain on such a high-stakes issue. Smaller member states in particular will watch this closely as a test-case.

The need to address these misunderstandings rises whatever the outcome of Brexit. It will be central to making a success of the coming negotiations about future relations if May’s deal passed. Remain will require a change of attitude. And even if Britain crashed out, it will still remain strongly connected to and impacted by the European Union by virtue of geography, economic links, law, security cooperation and, indeed people. As long as the EU exists and confounds Brexiteers predictions of its imminent demise, Britain without a seat at the table and voting rights will have an even greater need to understand how the EU works in order to influence it from the outside.

 

*Christoph Meyer is Professor of European and International Politics at King’s College London. An abbreviated version of this text was published under the title ‘Brexit turmoil: five ways British MPs misunderstand the European Union’, in The Conservation and Uk in a Changing Europe, on 7 February 2019.

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What is Communicating Europe?

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 License, created by Niaz.

Communicating Europe really started as an idea, or rather a reflection, after watching the BBC Great Debate in June 2016 between representatives of different UK-based political parties regarding whether to leave the EU, or to stay inside and make it stronger.  The reflection I had at the time was that, for all the importance of the issues being discussed and indeed the importance of EU membership more generally, here were several politicians speaking past each other on these issues, all with very different understandings of what the EU is, how it functions, what it does, and why it does it.  What is the EU?  What are its values?  Is it an oppressive, distant bureaucracy, crushing the sovereignty of its composite members?  Is it a neoliberal economic project, seeking instead to extract whatever financial value there may be from its workers, to the detriment of their welfare, quality of life and happiness?  Is it instead a compromise between states, flawed or otherwise, that nevertheless stands for certain fundamental principles such as the rule of law, equality, human rights and social democracy?  Is it none of these things?  Or perhaps is it a complex amalgamation of all these things?

Communicating about the EU

The EU fundamentally changes, depending on who you speak to, and what they say.  The same individuals may even speak differently about the EU depending on their audience.  We are all familiar with the political actors who support the EU and its project in Brussels, taking full part in its activities and policy-making, who then decry it in domestic politics.  The trade unionist who talks of making stands against the onslaught on workers’ rights by a removed technocracy in public speeches to delegates, who realises the importance of compromise and shared responsibilities when attending closed stakeholder meetings.  We know of traditional media, becoming increasingly balkanized in their communications to their target audience, dividing themselves into camps that could almost be considered ‘EUrophiles’ and ‘EUrophobes’.  So too are we aware of new ways of communicating about Europe, far from the language and rules traditional media.  Online citizen campaigning about Europe, academics engaging in ‘public intellectualism’ through short YouTube videos or symposiums, and somewhat more shady, unknown entities going beyond expressing views or opinions on the EU based on the facts as they see them, instead seeking to deliberately mislead through the creation of extreme narratives and ‘false facts’.  The various ways and means of talking about the EU and its actions, policies, values and value are becoming increasingly complex, emotive, and yet, incorporating a greater number of actors than ever before.  How can we understand what is happening?

About the Research Group

Communicating Europe is the attempt to explore these fascinating interactions between different actors and audiences in far more detail.  Coordinated by Dr Benjamin Farrand at Newcastle University, Dr Isabel Camisão at the University of Coimbra, Dr Katjana Gattermann at the University of Amsterdam, and Professor Catherine de Vries at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, this UACES Research Network seeks to bring an interdisciplinary perspective to bear on the questions of who talks about the EU; how; why; and with what effect, bringing insights from international relations, law, sociology, politics and communication.  Through its activities in workshops and panels at international conferences, Communicating Europe will create a larger network of researchers considering how the EU is communicated, what influences the mode and content of communications, how it relates to broader trends, and how, if at all, these communications should be regulated by legal systems.  This first blog post, as the reader is no doubt aware, does not shed any particular light on any of the issues raised – it instead constitutes a statement of intent, a beginning of a conversation, and perhaps, a call to action.  Communicating Europe welcomes any and all academics, whether established Professors or Early Career Researchers just beginning a PhD to become involved.  We will be publishing information shortly regarding our initial UACES conference panels on these topics, and a call for papers for an opening event to take place in late May or early June 2019.  We look forward to working with all of you.  If you are interested in finding out more, do not hesitate to contact uacescommunicatingeurope@gmail.com to be added to our mailing list.

Benjamin Farrand, on behalf of Communicating Europe.

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