European Union

This week saw UK in a Changing Europe drop a report on public opinion and Brexit.

It’s notable partly because there’s less and less in-depth exploration of this question with the passage of time: even if Brexit isn’t actually ‘done’ in poli-sci terms, it increasingly is in social and party-political ones (as witnessed by the ‘Europe policy’ wasteland of the Labour conference this week).

But it’s also notable because it reminds us that even with something as momentous as Brexit – which was genuinely A Big Deal not so long ago – publics do not hold consistent views.

Consider this:

This is a classic chart of recent years: ‘everyone’ thinks Brexit’s a crock, regardless of voting behaviour or intention. It’s the heart of the Bregret-Rejoin narrative, wherein we realised we’ve done a terrible thing, to which the answer is to undo it all and go back to The Good Old Days.

You can look elsewhere for discussion of why this is a problematic narrative, but let’s leave it with the observation that it was precisely The Good Old Days that led to the 2016 referendum in the first place. Old? yes. Good? debatable.

Anyway, let’s look at the next chart:

For all that most people think Brexit’s been rubbish so far, that doesn’t translate into the longer-term. A clear majority of Leavers think it can all turn the corner in the end, enough that the overall population view is much more ambivalent than the previous data might suggest.

When I tweeted about this at the time, much of the response was one of either “these people are obviously misguided” or “it’s just a minority of the population, so ignore them”.

I can understand where both views come from: the onslaught of evidence about the costs of Brexit continues week after week, while the swing from the referendum result is significant and clear.

However, it all feels like it has fallen once more into the classic traps of this domain.

The leitmotif of British European policy has always been its use to beat opponents; there has consistently been more interest in scoring domestic party political points than in finding broad consensus about the purpose of dealings with European states.

The referendum was much more a device to overturn domestic power structures than it was a considered debate on the situation of the UK in the world. Just as the fights to control the narrative of What Brexit Meant weren’t that much about EU policy but instead about owning the next generation of political discourse.

That this was both wearying and unsuccessful should be clear enough to all involved and – you might hope – would point to trying a different way of going about things. Maybe by looking for ways to reach across divides, instead of trashing those who disagree.

Maybe not.

As the referendum campaign and fallout demonstrated, rationalist arguments about costs and benefits have significant limits. People hold inconsistent views that are often more shaped (and shapeable) by emotion than cold, hard facts. ‘Take back control’ and ‘get Brexit done’ are powerful messages, whatever you think of the politics behind them (which many people didn’t think about particularly).

So yes, most people think Brexit is a mess, and yes, most people don’t think it’s ever going to turn out well. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be looking for ways to build new narratives and approaches that reach out those who disagree. Otherwise, we will find that any new policy choice is neither equitable nor durable.

The post A note on public opinion and Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The EU has unveiled a "toolkit" based on migration, parents, youth and older people, after EU states raised concerns about the impact of an ageing population on public finances — but what does it contain?

Norway is leading a Western restart in science cooperation with Russia in the Arctic — despite a wider EU cordon sanitaire against Vladimir Putin's Mosow, in the wake of the Ukraine invasion.

Representatives from EU governments will discuss and vote on the European Commission's proposal to renew the glyphosate's market license for another ten years this week. But it remains unclear if there is a majority to approve the renewal.

The prospect of Palestinians fleeing the Gaza Strip towards Egypt appears to have spooked the EU commission into fast tracking a possible migrant busting deal with Cairo.

The reality of EU hydrogen expansion is a well-funded, highly-orchestrated greenwashing scam. Some 99 percent of hydrogen produced globally is in fact 'grey hydrogen', made using fossil fuels.

In her strongest wording yet, US secretary Janet Yellen said she supported a European proposal to use the hundreds of billions of seized Russian assets currently held by G7 countries.

Source : © European Union, 2023 - EP

A delegation of AFET Members travelled to Santiago and Valparaíso (Chile) and Brasília (Brazil) from 18 to 23 June 2023. The main goal of this mission was to discuss how to make a qualitative leap in the EU-Latin America strategic bi-regional partnership in view of the CELAC-EU Summit on 17-18 July 2023.
Members held meetings with Chilean and Brazilian authorities to discuss global and regional security dynamics against the backdrop of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the assertive behaviour of China. The visit allowed to exchange views on the state of bilateral relations in view of the forthcoming ratification of the EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement by the European Parliament and reinvigorating the strategic partnership with Brazil.
Location : Chile and Brazil
Interviews to the Chair of the delegation, Mr David MCALLISTER (EPP
     La Tercera (Chile)
     Globo (Brazil)
     Mission report
Source : © European Union, 2023 - EP

Does anyone think a blank cheque to the country which made the Palestinians refugees will create fewer refugees? Or a blank cheque to their occupiers will create less resistance? Is the problem really that Israel has not used enough force?

"Cutting water, cutting electricity, cutting food to a mass of civilian people is against international law," said EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell in Muscat.

The next ordinary meeting of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) is scheduled to take place on Wednesday, 25 October 2023 from 9.00-12.30hrs and 14.30-18.30hrs and on Thursday, 26 October 2023 from 9.00-12.30hrs in Brussels (SPINELLI 5E2).

The meeting agenda and documents will be published here.

SEDE missions 2023:

• Germany and Poland - 24-26 July 2023
  
• Armenia - 19-22 June 2023
  
• Romania and Moldova - 15-18 May 2023
  
• Djibouti and Somalia - 1-4 April 2023
  
• Bosnia and Herzegovina - 20-23 February 2023
  

SEDE meetings' calendar 2023
EP calendar 2023
Source : © European Union, 2023 - EP

Within the rapidly-expanding area of competition law and healthcare, public hospitals and state aid may seem at first a mundane topic when contrasted with developments in connection with pharmaceutical policy and health technology. Nevertheless, the CJEU’s April 2023 Casa Regina Apostolorum judgment has reignited fundamental questions about the very applicability of EU competition policy which have implications far beyond the case’s focus on the interaction between private providers and public hospitals, and state support to the latter, in Italy.  

This post considers how the Casa Regina Apostolorum case fits within wider analysis of competition reforms in healthcare, and the tensions which now emerge between this judgment and the Commission’s Evaluation of the State Subsidy Rules for Health and Social Services of General Economic Interest which reported in December 2022. 

The four categories of European healthcare and competition reforms: 

The expansion of private sector delivery of public healthcare services might be considered at the heart of competition reforms in healthcare systems across Europe. This closer interaction between public and private healthcare has narrowed the gap where once the two may have appeared distinct. Such developments are found across the typologies of healthcare system in Europe, even though it is considered that insurance-based systems may be more amenable to competition reforms than taxation-funded systems.

Following discussion (by Guy and by Odudu) of competition reforms in English healthcare and the applicability of EU competition law, the interaction between public and private healthcare can be framed as “four categories of European healthcare” thus: 

 

Where once there may have existed a clear distinction between a public healthcare system (category 1) and a supplementary or complementary private healthcare market (category 4), the increasing interaction between public and private healthcare suggests a grey area which narrows this gap. Within this, category 2 represents the activity often underpinning competition law claims: a challenge by a private provider that, for example, state support favours public hospitals. Category 3 activity provides an example of arguments raised in such cases, including Casa Regina Apostolorum:  that public providers charging patients for certain services contributes to evidence that an entire healthcare system has shifted away from its solidarity basis to a competition basis. 

Such category 2 activity has been seen in various cases involving public hospitals across EU member states – notably the IRIS-H network in Brussels, but also in Germany, Czechia, and Estonia, as well as in Italy with Casa Regina Apostolorum. The latter is unusual for proceeding to appeal – these cases are typically handled under the Commission’s SGEI package for health and social services, which is intended to reduce the administrative burden on Member States in meeting compatibility criteria for granting support to SGEI. 

The two iterations of the SGEI package to date (from 2005 and 2012) have both specified hospitals as a candidate for this kind of assessment: this would seem to suggest a degree of intuition regarding the extent to which these particular healthcare institutions are amenable to competition reforms in general and being subject to the application of the Article 107(1) TFEU prohibition on state aid in particular. Here, three specific points are worth noting. 

Firstly, and most fundamentally to these assessments, the focus seems to “buffer” around the question of whether the recipient of the contested aid is an “undertaking”. A positive finding can simply lead to the conclusion of classification as SGEI, as in the aforementioned Brussels Hospitals case, thus an exception to applying the prohibition to other economic activities not so classified. A negative finding – as happened from the Commission, the General Court, and the CJEU in Casa Regina Apostolorum – means total exemption.  

Secondly, the requirement for the aid to give a “selective advantage” has required clarification. Here attention is typically paid to the functions of private providers in delivering healthcare services and where and how these may differ from the functions of public providers. The distinction apparently drawn here relates to questions of continuity and viability of service provision – in other words, where a private provider could exit, a public provider may be deemed broadly either “too big”, or certainly “too politically sensitive” to fail. Such considerations feature in the Brussels Hospitals case, but gave rise to an interesting categorisation of “genuine SGEI” in the aforementioned German hospital case.  

Finally, the apparent preference of patients not to travel for hospital treatment raises questions about the requirement for an effect on trade between Member States. Thus in this regard, contrasts emerge – for example between the aforementioned Brussels and Czechia hospitals cases between where a public hospital may deliver specialist services, or whether it may treat a significant or a negligible number of patients from neighbouring Member States in a border region. 

Taken together, it might be considered that if this diversity of considerations relate to a seemingly self-contained category such as hospitals, then the broader specification of “SGEI…meeting needs as regards health and long-term care” by the 2012 SGEI package could well generate further questions and hurdles. 

The legacy of Casa Regina Apostolorum 

As noted above, the Casa Regina Apostolorum case developed across a Commission assessment in connection with the 2012 SGEI package, and two appeals to the General Court and the CJEU, both of whom upheld the Commission’s finding that the state aid prohibition did not apply. This would seem to follow a range of relevant case law, so is not an unexpected finding. Indeed the absence of an Advocate General opinion would seem to highlight the lack of a new question of law for the CJEU to consider. Aside from the CEPPB approach of further disaggregating activities, it is currently hard to see how new questions of law might be developed in light of a tendency to “compare apples and oranges” with cases on diverse healthcare (and other) topics – notably the experience of the Slovak health insurance system in Dôvera with the situation in Casa Regina Apostolorum (as noted by the appellant in the latter). 

What is particularly notable also is the lack of attention paid by the courts to the relevance of Commission SGEI assessments. This is particularly striking in the case of the CJEU, whose judgment follows the Commission’s December 2022 review. In this, the Commission highlighted the lack of clarity about applying competition law and consequent legal uncertainty as a particular stumbling block. So with regard to state support to hospitals, we appear to be at something of an impasse which seems difficult to overcome. The lack of clarity regarding public hospitals is likely to pose questions about not only other healthcare institutions and practices, but also the effectiveness of the SGEI package more generally. 

For now, Casa Regina Apostolorum appears a niche case with broader implications which will emerge in time from a range of perspectives, not least competition and constitutionalism. 

 

This post is part of work being developed by Dr Mary Guy in the context of the “Public Health, Markets and Law” workshop hosted by Dr Mina Hosseini at University College Dublin in September 2023 and funded by the MSCA COMPHACRISIS project. 

The post State Aid and healthcare: Some (re)starter questions after Casa Regina Apostolorum appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Welcome to our third UACES Graduate Forum podcast in this series. We welcome Neli Kirilova PhD Candidate in Security Studies, Doctoral School of International Relations and Political Science, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary & PhD Fellow at the Doctoral School on CSDP / CFSP, European Security and Defence College in Brussels, Belgium.

 

UACES Podcasts · Neli Kirilova on Power Perception and Conflict Prevention

 

 

Welcome Neli, and congratulations on your recently submitted PhD thesis. This is fantastic news and must be a relief after all of the work that went into your research.

Thank you so much, Niall! I am really happy that I have finally submitted this dissertation and it gives me an amazing feeling and I am happy to share more bout the research with you.

 

Your research topic is on the ‘Power perception and conflict prevention in the Black Sea region: the EU, Russia and Turkey’. So, first of all, could you tell me what relations do you see between your research and the current global situation?

We are currently facing a war in Ukraine which is in the black sea region, but I started my research before that. The current security crisis in Ukraine shows two main facts. First, the Black Sea region is still a zone of competition for influence, which leads to crisis escalation with devastating consequences as we observe nowadays. Second, the reactions of the international community happen too late – instead of waiting until a crisis escalates, the conflicts should be prevented in advance. This is why I focus my research on regional conflict prevention.

 

This definitely shows us the value of understanding conflict prevention. Did you have any particular reasons why you selected this topic?

Yes, the Black Sea region is in close proximity to the European Union. Another such region is the Western Balkans. The EU needs stability and security in its surrounding regions. As a researcher of Bulgarian origin, I have personal motivation to work on the EU preserving regional security in both, the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans. Bulgaria is also a new member and it is located just between these two crisis-intensified regions.

 

Thank you! Can you tell us what you found in your research?

Of course. The Black Sea region has been a zone of competition for regional dominance over centuries. The main regional competitors in relatively recent history have been Russia, Turkey, and the West – comprising of both NATO and the EU. I do examine the regional security crises and conflicts as a result of this competition for influence.

The main literature my research steps on is related to conflict prevention and power measurement in international relations. The classical theories of IR, which I find relevant to the regional competition, are two – balance of power and security dilemma. According to the balance of power theory, conflict is the result of unequal amounts of power and, therefore a lack of balance. According to security dilemma theory, conflict is the result of a misperception of the intentions of the other. Therefore, there are two main problems with these theories. First, a clear classification of the meaning of power is missing, which is needed for measuring power as Baldwin points out. Second, each regional context requires a specific approach, to be relevant to the participating actors, so that a conflict can be prevented before crisis escalation. This is suggested by Lund in 2009 when he speaks about conflict prevention and the necessary regional context.

On this background, I identify a classification of six power elements. These are the basic values that can be measured as suggested by Baldwin. Then, I assess their application by three regional actors as suggested by Lund. The regional competitors I have selected in the Black Sea region are the EU, Russia, and Turkey.

 

Could you tell me more about how your theory was applied to this case?

Of course, I basically analyse power in IR and created its measurements so I could apply it. After a thorough analysis of power in international relations, which I based on the main concepts of hard, soft, smart, and sharp power, I made a new classification which is a theoretical innovation in the field. The newly organised six power elements which I suggest include: Military/Security, Economy/Investment, Energy/Climate, Diplomacy/Politics, Governance/Society, and Information Exchange/Access. These are later applied to the perceptions of competing actors and I suggest could be used in other regions as well.

 

That is very interesting. I understand that you also made conceptual innovations through your research. Could you tell me about that?

It’s my favorite! My conceptual invention is that identifying the perception of power by regional competitors early enough can contribute to conflict prevention in a selected region. There are several criteria for that: a classification of power elements so that it could be applied to all actors who compete. Secondly, the competitors shall be selected as actors with equal status, in my case I call them regional powers and base this on a number of criteria. And Thirdly, a specific time shall be selected, and I selected a time between regional security crises in 2016 and 2021. The assessment of the perceptions of power is based on measurable values in the foreign and security policy concepts of the competing regional actors for the selected time. This conceptual innovation aims to contribute to the theory of conflict prevention. I empirically test it for the case study of the Black Sea region.

 

You focus on the EU, Russia, and Turkey. What practical results did you find about these international relations actors?

As mentioned earlier I asses their strategies between 2016 and 2021. The strategic documents I examine to assess their power perception are the foreign and security policy concepts, corresponding to that time period. My suggestion is that the higher perceived importance of a power element means a higher potential for this actor to trigger a conflict. Respectively, the lower perceived importance of a power element means open possibilities for cooperation.

The actual results for the EU, which I presented in a research paper published in 2022, in a series of annually updated strategies show change of the narrative from norm and governance to security and defence. The main contribution of the EU in the global competition to economic investment, as well as a growing narrative on climate change and energy. The diplomatic and political agreements widen its scope, aiming to manage evolving crises. The geographic interests of the EU change as well, trying to cover bigger world area. Disinformation and civil society grow as a priority.

 

That’s great. Would you tell me about your findings for Turkey?

The results for Turkey, which I presented in a research paper published in 2021 from its active foreign policy strategy show a double perspective. On the surface, it corresponds to the name of the strategy, focusing mainly on society and economy, followed by diplomacy, military, and information exchange power elements. However, the deeper textual analysis shows higher values to military security, diplomacy, and information exchange, only then followed by society and economy. This means that, first, Turkey is showing some power elements as more significant than the actually perceived ones. Secondly, as traditional for foreign policy actors, military security and diplomacy area leading, closely followed by the information and societal power elements. An unexpected factor found in the research was the attitude towards communities with Turkic languages or Muslim religion. Therefore, a reaction of Turkey on these power elements would not be surprising, as long as its regional interests are concerned. This is also shown by the recent name change of Turkey to Türkiye which means the length of the people of Turkish origin and it goes beyond the border of the territory of the country. 

 

That is very interesting! What about Russia?

Derived from the available strategies related to its foreign and security policy, there is a different meaning that I found in the volume of strategies and the content. So, there is a complete dominance in the energy security power element because there is a separate strategy for energy security of IR, and its size is double the strategy of the national security strategy and the foreign policy strategy. Apart from that, Russia also has dual meaning of the results. On the surface, the content of the strategies prioritises diplomacy, then military security, then society and economy, then information exchange. This is similar to Turkey and typical for a traditional IR actor. However, the deeper textual analysis of the combined strategies of national security and foreign policy shows major priority on the power elements of society and governance, only then followed by military security, diplomacy, economy, and information exchange. Finally, a textual analysis of the foreign policy strategy alone shows priority on diplomacy, followed by military, information exchange, economy, energy, and society. In these analyses, surprising is the focus on information exchange and on society perceived as belonging to the concept of Russianness. This means that a specific trigger for a reaction by Russia would be namely the society, information, and energy security as power elements.

 

Thank you for this detailed insight. It certainly seems like your thesis research has had a lot of work put into, and I’m sure you are glad that it’s finished to be able to share some of these very interesting findings. Am I right in understanding that the two papers are open-access?

Yes, this paper has been published and is available open-access and there will be a few more available soon. One will be related to the Russian foreign policy, the other one to the actual six elements of power, and the other one to the status of IR actors. So I will provide access to them as well when they are available and in this podcast, you’ll have access to the ones that are already published.

 

That is fantastic! To wrap up our podcast today, what contribution does your research make beyond academia?

As you mentioned, the first contribution of my research is to academia and to the general knowledge on conflict prevention. And the second one which I targeted EU diplomacy from the beginning, particularly I aim this research to strengthen the EU’s role as a conflict prevention actor in the Black Sea region. It can be particularly used by the European External Action Service.

 

Thank you, Neli, for taking the time to share your insights into your research with us. Congratulations again for submitting your dissertation and good luck with your next steps.

Thank you so much for the opportunity to share the results of my research in this podcast. It has been a pleasure talking to you.

 

Thank you for listening and don’t forget to check the transcript of this podcast for a list of the research mentioned. If you would be interested in sharing your research with our graduate forum community on the podcast, please get in touch with me at nrobb03@qub.ac.uk or check the graduate forum section on the UACES website.

 

 

Additional reading :

Baldwin, D. A. (2016). Power and international relations. A conceptual approach. Princeton NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

Kirilova, Neli (2021). Elementite na vliyanie vyv vynshnopoliticheskata strategiya na Turciya – shest kategorii sila, sred koito obshtnostite i informaciiata se otkroiavat. Nauchna Konfereniia ‘Moreto – granica ili vrata’. pp.16-22. Chernomorski Institut. Burgas, Bulgaria: Izdatelstvo Bryag. [Кирилова, Нели. 2021. Елементите на влияние във външнополитическата стратегия на Турция – шест категории сила, сред които общностите и информацията се открояват. pp.16-22] Available online: blacksea.bg/site/templates/assets/img/the_sea-border-or-door-2021.pdf. Accessed: 15.03.2023.

Kirilova, Neli (2022). ‘Elements of power in the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy’. In: Monár A., Fiott D., Asderaki F., Paile‐Calo S. (Eds.). Challenges of the Common Security and Defence Policy. ESDC 2nd Summer University Book. pp.55-77. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Available online: op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e3706908-db0f-11ec-a95f-01aa75ed71a1/language-en?fbclid=IwAR2Q3z1U8cf-PBAPFlY51IiLGUNCuhBdlUntGG4NQBww0-raIYejzc3IyUM. Accessed: 15.03.2023.

Lund, M. S. (2009). Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice. In: J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenyuk & I.W. Zartman (Eds.). The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (pp.287-308). London, UK: SAGE.

 

 

The post Power perception and conflict prevention in the Black Sea region: the EU, Russia and Turkey appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Source : © European Union, 2023 - EP

Following the meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan, Chancellor Scholz and President Macron in the margins of the European Political Community summit in Granada, President Michel spoke to the press.

Ahead of the informal European Council in Granada, President Charles Michel shared his thoughts on the challenges the EU is facing. The op-ed has been published in a number of newspapers across Europe.

Statement by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia, President Michel of the European Council, President Macron of France and Chancellor Scholz of Germany.

European Council President Charles Michel addressed the members of the European Political Community.

Guatemala: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the situation after elections.