European Union

European Parliament President Roberta Metsola addressed today 70 000 participants of the European Moldova Assembly rally in Chisinau.

Source : © European Union, 2023 - EP

The next ordinary meeting of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) is scheduled to take place on Monday, 22 May 2023 from 15.00 - 18.30hrs and on Tuesday, 23 May 2023 from 9.00 - 12.30 and 14.30 - 18.30 in Brussels (room SPINELLI 1G3).

The meeting agenda and documents will be published here.

SEDE missions 2023:

• Armenia - 19-22 June 2023
  
• Romania and Moldova - 15-18 May 2023
  
• Djibouti and Somalia - 1-4 April 2023
  
• Bosnia and Herzegovina - 20-23 February 2023
  

SEDE missions 2022:

• SEDE mission to South Korea and Japan - 18-22 December 2022
  
• SEDE mission to Niger from 31 October - 3 November 2022
  
• SEDE mission to Mozambique from 18-22 September 2022
  
• SEDE mission to France from 19-21 July 2022
  
• SEDE mission to Iraq from 24-28 May 2022
• SEDE mission to Georgia from 10-14 April 2022

SEDE meetings' calendar 2023
EP calendar 2023
Source : © European Union, 2023 - EP

In a moment that could have been an act of polite rebellion, physicist and ecologist Vandana Shiva walked off stage during a speech about the need to 'put a price on nature' in the European Parliament this week.

Hungary is blocking EU sanctions on the jailers of Russian dissident Vladimir Kara-Murza, amid a wider dispute involving its Russian banking arm.

NGOs and lobbyists slammed the EU commission for removing contact details of non-managerial staff from its public register, arguing that the institution is now less transparent.

By Dr Laura Chappell, University of Surrey

This blog post is a longer version based on a podcast published on eu!radio in March.

 

Within the 2022 Strategic Compass, published a year ago, the EU sets out the ambition to create a force of 5000 troops, including pre-identified strategic enablers, built on “substantially modified Battlegroups”. The Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC), which was originally called an initial entry force, was proposed by 14 member states and was subsequently discussed at the Foreign Affairs Council on Defence Issues on 6 May 2021. It gained additional traction after the EU member states had to rely on the US to facilitate the evacuation of their citizens from Afghanistan. Finally, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has focused minds in Brussels on EU member state military capabilities.

 

However, the question is whether the Rapid Deployment Capacity provides the EU with enhanced rapid reaction capabilities. The EU Battlegroups on which the RDC is based have never been deployed despite being fully operational since 2007. The fundamental issues with the Battlegroups come down to three key elements: funding, composition and political will. Regarding funding, costs lie where they fall, meaning participating member states have to pick up the tab for most of the operation costs. Second, the battlegroups are small in size, around 1500 personnel. This limits what the Battlegroups can do on the ground. Their structure was premised on Operation Artemis, however this type of operation has not materialised again, highlighting the issue with a bottom up as opposed to a top down approach to strategy. Whilst the Battlegroups were discussed in what became EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad/RCA, they were too small for the operation which was eventually sent.

 

Finally, there has been a lack of political will to deploy the Battlegroups. Member states have diverse views on when force should be deployed, including being able to sustain different levels of risk, where force should be deployed, particularly as the primary location for Battlegroup deployments is largely focused on the African continent, which is not in every state’s interests, and with whom force is used which highlights Atlanticist and Europeanist visions for European security. Whilst the latter has not played a core role, it has greater significance today. The lack of political willingness is particularly evident in the Battlegroup rotation. Two Battlegroups were on standby and rotated every six months, although this has just recently increased to a year in line with the RDC requirements. However there are no Battlegroups scheduled for the second half of 2023 for example.

 

However, there are advantages to the Battlegroups as they can facilitate military cooperation and training, the reorganisation of national armed forces, and interoperability. This joins the idea of enhancing the EU’s rapid reaction capability as the underpinning rationale and provides a reason regarding why the Battlegroups continue to exist despite not being used.

 

Turning to the RDC, an extension of common costs, which are funded based on member states GDP, was explicitly stated within the strategic compass, however no agreement has been reached beyond agreeing to include the first live exercise for the RDC this year. Structurally the RDC is larger, however it is still based on two Battlegroups plus strategic enablers, which really questions whether it represents an increase in capability. Importantly however it is modular so the RDC can be tailored to the crisis. Finally, the duration has increased to a year. To ensure that the RDC is relevant, two operational scenarios based on rescue and evacuation with an African focus, and the initial stabilisation phase have been created with further scenarios in the pipeline. This will ensure that the RDC is tailored to the types of tasks that the EU envisages conducting. Finally, for the first time, the EU will host live exercises the first of which will take place in Spain this year and will be run by the Military Planning and Conduct Capability which will when fully operational, be able to act as an OHQ for the RDC. This provides an additional value added for member states.

 

Nonetheless, will this resolve the key sticking point, that of political will? Fundamentally, countries still have different visions for European security. Ukraine is particularly important as some countries’ focus is on deterring Russia rather than contributing to the RDC. NATO has also announced a new force model of 300,000 troops and EU member states only have a single set of forces. This really begs the question as to who is willing to contribute to the RDC, whether in terms of strategic enablers, or in filling up the Battlegroup rota. Fundamentally even if common costs are expanded and a suitable scenario comes up, it will still depend on whose Battlegroups are on standby. Whilst the core idea is to make the RDC more attractive to member states as a rapid reaction tool such that they are less likely to say no to deploying it, fundamental issues remain to be resolved.

The post From the EU Battlegroup Concept to the Rapid Deployment Capacity: A Gear Change in the EU’s Rapid Deployment Capabilities? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The press briefing ahead of the G7 summit in Hiroshima (Japan) will take place VIA VIDEO CONFERENCE ONLY on Thursday 18 May 2023 at 09.00 (Brussels time) / 16.00 (Japan time).

Discours du président Charles Michel lors du sommet du Conseil de l'Europe à Reykjavik

Main agenda items, approximate timing, public sessions and press opportunities.

Main agenda items, approximate timing, public sessions and press opportunities.

The Council appointed new Heads of Mission for EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUAM Ukraine.

The EU issued a statement on the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia confirming the EU’s commitment to protect and promote the full enjoyment of human rights by LGBTI persons in all aspects of their lives, within the EU and around the world.

The Council reached agreement on its position (general approach) on the ‘DAC8’ proposal which introduces updates to the directive on administrative cooperation in the area of taxation.

The Council gave the final go-ahead to a regulation that aims to minimise the risk of deforestation and forest degradation associated with products that are placed on or exported from the EU market.

The Council adopted a regulation which will make it more difficult for criminals to misuse crypto-assets for money laundering purposes.

The EU brings crypto-assets and crypto-assets service providers under a regulatory framework for the first time. The Council today adopted a regulation on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA).

Remarks by Paschal Donohoe after the Eurogroup meeting of 15 May 2023, focusing on the spring economic forecast, the European banking system and the digital euro.

The presidents of the European Council and the European Commission spoke to the press ahead of the Council of Europe Reykjavik summit, the G7 summit in Hiroshima and the EU-Korea summit in Seoul.

The Council appointed Luigi Di Maio as EU Special Representative for the Gulf from 1 June 2023 until 28 February 2025.

The Council has approved conclusions on the social dimension of a sustainable Europe for young people.