In January, you gave us an outline on the Swedish Council Presidency, making good use of the “official Spotify playlist” of Swedish songs. So, how would you sum up the last six months?
I would start with quoting one of the most famous songs on that list:
“You’re in the mood for dance, and when you get the chance, you are the dancing queen!”
Let’s apply it to last week’s news around the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. Here I believe we see ourselves a little like the Dancing Queen: of course, we didn’t do a solo, but the Swedish Presidency were able to steer all dancing partners in the right movement, as the agreement reached by all will form the basis of negotiations that the Spanish Presidency can now start with the European Parliament.
I am also slightly more optimistic about our – actually everyone’s – future, especially with regard to the EU’s Fit for 55 climate package, with its focus on decreasing our negative environmental footprints. During the Swedish Presidency, the Council, together with the European Parliament, has reached agreements on renewable energy, energy efficiency, and sustainable aviation fuels to name but a few.
That sounds like a reasonably successful Presidency. How much of it is due to the legendary Swedish “culture of consensus”?
Let’s wait for the researchers to do their job. After each previous Presidency, my fellow academics have written more in-depth analyses and I am already very much looking forward to be reading these. We will then see what where the dancing was successful where it could be improved.
The last time you spoke to us, you also briefly referred to the domestic truce that is traditionally held during a Presidency, and how difficult it could be this time with a government relying on the support from a Eurosceptic Party, the “Sweden Democrats”.
That’s right. The leader of the Sweden Democrats, in a debate article published by the Aftonbladet newspaper on May 2nd, argued that ‘there are great reasons to evaluate Swedish EU membership’; it is, he continues, ‘no longer an issue of what we can do for EU but what the EU can do for us’ referring to the ‘membership fee’ the country pays.
This was later followed up in another article published in Svenska Dagbladet on May 15th in which the Sweden Democrats state that ‘Sweden should prepare to leave the Union’, not necessarily right away, but because ‘the better our preparedness to leave, the more we will gain in future negotiations’. In this perspective, they say, we should explore how Brexit ‘could have been done better’.
That’s a strongly Eurosceptic rhetoric!
It is. At the same time, you should keep in mind that the Swedish general public is today at its most positive and supportive of EU membership since we joined in 1995.
Let me take off my political scientist hat and share my thoughts simply as a well-informed citizen. I would like to ask the Swedish EU presidency team if the domestic quietness has been part of the balancing act in relation to domestic politics. Because this has really been a ‘quiet’ Presidency, and I think it could have been more visible. Holding the presidency is always a chance to explore how we as a member state can influence EU politics, how EU politics influences our daily lives positively, but also to remind citizens that the EU is not something that is distant to us.
I am not saying that as a political system the EU is perfect, no political system is, but we are living in democracies, and I think with an outward glance at political systems elsewhere, living in a democracy is the least worst option. Just as we discuss what is not working within a political system, we should talk about what is working well, and how we today have to work together to reach solutions to common problems/issues/concerns in our societies.
So myself, I am still positive and happy (enough) with how Sweden has handled its EU presidency role.
Can we have one last reference to the playlist?
Of course!
And now it’s time for me to get out So tonight I’m gonna dance again To the morning give it all I can…
Well, at least until June next year, when the European elections will offer the chance to see whether and how our 2023 Presidency has impacted the popular discussions on EU membership and policy.
Many thanks, Malin, for having been with us at the beginning and at the end of the Swedish Council Presidency dance. I recall you are a professor at the University of Karlstad. Entretien réalisé par Laurence Aubron.
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One of your research areas is migration, and the Russian aggression on Ukraine has triggered a forced migration of unprecedented scale in your country. How has Poland responded to this challenge?
Remarkably well. Perhaps it was the speed at which it happened. It may have also been the proximity of the conflict, just next door. It may have been the fact that over 1.5 million Ukrainians were already residing in Poland, and now account for roughly 80% of the foreign-born population in Poland. Or the fact that the people who were arriving in Polish cities were mostly women and children as well as the elderly, fulfilling a sort of “ideal-type refugee” image.
It’s probably all of the above factors that contributed to the unprecedented civic mobilisation in Poland, which has been praised for its speed, effectiveness, grass-roots nature, and longevity.
Has this mobilisation changed over time?
In the first weeks, it is accurate to state that ‘everyone did everything’.
At Krakow or Warsaw train station, amongst others, you would find a hodgepodge of volunteers; from scouts, ladies serving warm soup, volunteer paramedics, to random people holding signs stating that they could accommodate people in their homes.
Amongst this turmoil it was hard to see where the local or regional authorities were, although most often they were there, organising ad hoc registration points and providing information. This ad hoc system of non-systematicness worked, to an extent, because there was a mass mobilisation of very diverse actors: from private individuals to grassroots movements, national and international institutions and NGOs, religious groups, businesses, cultural and educational institutions, and local and regional authorities.
Yet this initial adrenaline rush wore off, and we saw a significant decline in volunteerism after about 3 to 6 months. Those groups that carried on formalised themselves into foundations to keep up with demand and to legitimise their finances. This is also when we saw a specialisation of help. Some organisations focused on psychological support; others specialised in providing housing options. Others are still focused on sending humanitarian aid to Ukraine. This specialisation was in part channeled through cooperation with international NGOs as well as United Nations bodies like UNICEF, UNHCR, and the IOM. While the cooperation of local NGOs and big international donors was very much needed and often produced positive results, this cooperation was not without its difficulties and sore points.
What does this landscape of mobilisation look like today, in the summer of 2023?It’s different. The number of people hosted in private homes has come down to a trickle, the material aid has in large part been rerouted to Ukraine, and organisations have diversified their activities. This is the moment when the next, critical stage is upon us, that of adaptation of both the host society and incomers. Now is the time to deal with the effects of trauma, educational challenges, as well as critical housing shortages, and growing tensions within society.
While there are some remarkably good practices within local communities, cultural spaces, NGOs, and businesses, it is a drop of water in the ocean of what is needed in this next phase, which may last years. Yet it is also the time when big international organisations are starting to pull out and with them some longer-term funding schemes.
Does that mean that we have reached a critical moment?Yes, Poland is in the difficult context of record-high inflation, a deep sense of geo-political insecurity, and looming parliamentary elections. While according to a public survey conducted in December 2022, 79% of Poles think that Poland should still accept refugees from Ukraine, downward trends can already be traced, particularly when it comes to anxieties about access to social and public services.
Overall, however, it can be observed that civil society has been successfully activated, gained valuable collective experience and accumulated social capital as a result. Together with the extension of the EU Temporary Protection Directive until August 2024, which represents an unusually proud moment in EU asylum policy, this is a good basis for the time to come.
I recall you are professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow.
Entretien réalisé par Laurence Aubron.
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Photo credit: South African Radio Astronomy Observatory (SARAO)
Anna-Lena Rüland, Nicolas Rüffin, Katharina Cramer, Prosper Ngabonziza, Manoj Saxena, Stefan SkupienScience diplomacy, broadly defined as all activities at the intersection of science policy and international relations, has become somewhat of a buzzword during the last 10 years. Initially coined and put on the international agenda by prominent US-American policymakers and institutions, it has by now gained popularity across the globe and made its way into the scholarly discourse. Yet, so far, much of the literature on the topic has sidelined the science diplomacy practices, capacities and experiences of the Global South. This has only begun to change quite recently, reflecting a broader trend to better describe and understand the role of the Global South in international relations. In line with this trend and as part of a special issue on science diplomacy in the Global South, we – a research team spread over three continents – analyzed the interests of Southern emerging powers in a distinctive science diplomacy setting, namely in what we dub ‘intergovernmental science organizations’ (IGSOs).
IGSOs as a science diplomacy arena
What are IGSOs and why are they an important science diplomacy arena for Southern actors? Essentially, IGSOs resemble international organizations (IOs) like the United Nations. They are founded on intergovernmental treaties, have executive bodies and a council, in which governmental and scientific representatives negotiate all matters of fundamental importance to the organization. Just like other IOs dominate the issue areas that they oversee, IGSOs form central nodes in the fabric of the scientific fields and communities that they serve. At the same time, they are of high interest to policymakers because while IGSOs often have hefty price tags, they promise considerable political prestige for the involved countries, not least because IGSOs are seen as critical in addressing many pressing global challenges. In recent decades, some emerging powers of the Global South have joined several existing IGSOs in the Global North and have helped establish new ones in the Global South. Although the Global South is increasingly visible in the global IGSO landscape, we know surprisingly little about its role and interests in IGSOs. In a recently published study, we addressed this blind spot by comparing Southern participation in four different IGSOs, each characterized by a unique configuration of member countries, institutional set-up and research field. Specifically, we focused on:
In each case, we concentrated on the participation of one particular Southern emerging power and examined which interests it pursues in the IGSO under investigation. We also addressed the question under which conditions emerging powers of the Global South are likely to achieve their objectives in IGSOs. In doing so, we used a broad institutional perspective and a pragmatic conceptualization of science diplomacy.
Southern emerging powers in IGSOs
In our study, we found that Southern emerging powers pursue a multitude of scientific and political objectives in and through IGSOs. Most of these interests resemble those that established science nations of the Global North aim to advance through and in IGSOs. Specifically, our comparative analysis showed that the key priority for most emerging powers of the Global South is to strengthen their science and technology capacities through IGSOs. Moreover, some Southern emerging powers get involved in IGSOs to (re-)establish connections between their political and scientific communities as well as their global counterparts. Finally, participating in IGSOs allows countries of the Global South to strengthen their burgeoning reputation as regional science and technology powers and to settle regional political and scientific rivalries.
Our analysis further revealed that emerging powers of the Global South are likely to achieve their objectives in IGSOs if four, in some cases five, conditions are met. These conditions relate to a country’s scientific community, domestic politics, industrial capacities, geographic location and an IGSO’s institutional maturity.
The institutional maturity of an IGSO conditions which interests countries of the Global South can pursue because in established IGOSs like CERN, founding members, typically from the Global North, have successfully cemented their institutional rights and privileges. Countries of the Global South are rarely among the founding members of matured IGSOs because when these were set up after World War Two few countries of the Global South had the economic or scientific capacity to participate. As a result, Southern actors often lack the institutional rights and privileges to shape important decisions in established IGSOs.
To get involved in mature IGSOs but also to found new IGSOs, an active and outspoken scientific community is often needed. Such a community is crucial because it can strengthen a country’s reputation in science and technology as it gets involved in an IGSO on an ad hoc basis. Moreover, a well-connected scientific community can lobby local and foreign policymakers as well as scientists to support the establishment of an IGSO. Continuous domestic political support and long-term national contributions, in-cash and in-kind, are equally important for countries of the Global South to attain their political and scientific objectives in IGSOs because such contributions signal commitment to other members and can be leveraged during diplomatic negotiations. However, given that many countries of the Global South face more acute political, economic, and human resource constraints than countries of the Global North, it can be difficult for them to provide the necessary in-cash and in-kind contributions for IGSOs. For similar reasons, there are only few countries of the Global South that have the industrial capacities to take on substantial contracts for the large infrastructures that many IGSOs rely on. In contrast to these scientific, industrial, and political capacities which are needed for almost all IGSOs, a country’s geographic location only comes into play if an IGSO has specific climatic or environmental requirements. This is typically the case for IGSOs in the field of astronomy.
Lessons learned
North-South asymmetries continue to shape IGSOs, particularly those with a high degree of institutional maturity. Given the great economic, scientific and human capital requirements of IGSOs – be they matured or not – only few Southern actors can afford to participate in this type of science diplomacy arena. What further complicates matters is that, much like other IOs – or almost any formal organization for that matter – IGSOs generally resist change.
Yet not all is lost for IGSO newcomers. Our analysis indicates that there are two strategies that could help diplomats and scientists of Southern emerging powers mitigate North-South asymmetries in IGSOs. First, it may prove useful for countries of the Global South to adjust their science diplomacy objectives to the institutional maturity of an IGSO. To do so, they are well advised to map out their objectives before getting involved in an IGSO. For instance, if a Southern country’s goal is to take up a leadership position, then it should seek to join an IGSO as early as possible, ideally as a founding member, as this will endow them with the necessary institutional privileges and rights to actively shape an IGSO. Should a Southern country’s objective be less ambitious, for example because it ‘only’ wants to strengthen its science and technology capacities, it may suffice for it to get involved in an IGSO at a later stage. Second, it could prove useful for Southern actors to invest strategically into IGSOs instead of taking a scattergun approach to IGSO funding. In practice, this means that countries of the Global South should fund IGSOs in research areas that are of high interest to them or in which they have a competitive advantage. This also increases chances that they can meet the political and economic commitments to an IGSO.
It goes without saying that our study only provides a small snapshot of Southern science diplomacy. To get a more holistic understanding of Southern science diplomacy, additional studies on, from and with the Global South are needed. We call on the science diplomacy community to contribute to this emerging line of research and underline its potential to turn science diplomacy into a more inclusive field of study that recognizes its multiple and diverse foundations.
About the authors:
Anna-Lena Rüland, PhD researcher at Leiden University
Nicolas Rüffin, Research fellow at the University of Bonn
Katharina Cramer, Senior fellow at the University of Bonn
Prosper Ngabonziza, Assistant Professor at Louisiana State University
Manoj Saxena, Visiting researcher at King’s College London
Stefan Skupien, Visiting researcher at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center
References:
Büyüktanir Karacan D and Ruffini P-B (2023) Science Diplomacy in the Global South – An Introduction. Science and Public Policy. Online first. https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scad028
Rüland A-L, Rüffin N, Cramer K, et al. (2023) Science Diplomacy from the Global South: The Case of Intergovernmental Science Organizations. Science and Public Policy. Online first. https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scad024
N.i. (2021) Hidden in Plain Sight. Nature Reviews Physics 3(11): 721-721.
SESAME (2004) Foundation of a Synchrotron Light Source in the Middle East. Available at: https://www.sesame.org.jo/about-us/historical-highlights/2004-foundation-of-a-synchrotron-light-source-in-the-middle-east (accessed 28 June 2023).
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