This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum 2023 (8-9 June, at IBEI, Barcelona).
The European Union’s (EU) innovation policies are characterized by their evolutionary dynamics and remain a subject of substantial scholarly attention. A report of the European Parliamentary Research Service (2016) explains that initially, innovation was primarily associated with the establishment of a research-related policy, which later became connected to industrial policies. The first action plan that aimed to promote innovation at the European level was only adopted 1996. This plan was specifically developed to address the ‘European paradox,’ which refers to Europe’s limited ability to transform scientific advancements into successful industrial and commercial outcomes.
Subsequently, policy recognition of the role of technological innovation has increased, being spurred by rising concerns about Europe’s technological leadership and technological sovereignty. Yet, despite seemingly greater policy attention, in 2012 Lipkova observed that the EU lags behind the world’s leading innovators – the United States, Japan and South Korea. A more recent 2021 analytical report, prepared for the European Parliament, cautioned that Europe faces challenges in commercialising scientific research achievements. According to the report’s global comparative perspective, non-European enterprises are responsible for the bulk of currently successful business models and products.
Fostering Innovation
The EU’s commitment to fostering and promoting innovation has now become a cornerstone of its economic and social policies, driving growth and development. However, understanding the conceptual strengths and weaknesses of pan-European innovation policy requires re-engagement with classical scholarship. Joseph Schumpeter’s seminal work on the theorization of the dynamics of economic change– as a result of long-term technological change and attendant productivity enhancement– is particularly relevant. His concept of ‘creative destruction’ is noteworthy as it captures the process by which new innovations and ideas displace established ones, leading to the destruction of old industries and the creation of new ones. However, despite its merits, Schumpeter’s classical analysis has been criticised for placing technology in a ‘black box’ – i.e., neglecting to theorise it comprehensively. While acknowledging the importance of innovation and technological capabilities for productivity growth, Neo-Schumpeterian scholars argue for a more systemic and broader contextual understanding of the innovation process. Inspired by this approach, this discussion will explore the the relevance of neo-Schumpeterian analytical perspectives on understanding the evolution of European innovation policy.
Smart Specialization Strategy (S3)
One of the key mechanisms through which the EU has sought to promote innovation is the Smart Specialization Strategy (S3), which aims to identify and build on the unique strengths and competitive advantages of different regions within Europe. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), governments adopt the S3 to create policies that are responsive to market signals. This approach enables governments to harness the skills, resources, and competencies of the enterprise sector, thereby fostering innovation and creating new comparative advantages.
Since its conceptualisation in 2009, the S3 has played a significant role in shaping the EU’s regional cohesion and innovation policy. Dominique Foray (2018), an eminent theorist of the strategy, explains that each region is distinguished by its capacities, requirements, and possibilities. The scholar argues in favour of a particular type of regional specialisation: one that capitalises on regional assets or potentials, rather than a strategy that disperses Research & Development (R&D) funding thinly across a number of frontier technologies and research sectors. According to Foray, David and Hall (2009), if European regions attempt to create similar programs in an imitative manner, this could result in an overabundance of duplicated Research & Development and educational investment, ultimately reducing ‘the potential for complementarities within the European knowledge base.’
While existing literature on S3’s strategy suggest that it is grounded in a Schumpeterian emphasis on innovation and economic growth, the mechanism for innovation aligns more closely with neo-Schumpeterian perspectives on the critical roles of technological change and knowledge creation as key drivers of economic growth and development. As a result, the S3 strategy makes several significant contributions to European innovation policy.
The Benefits of the S3 strategy
Firstly, shifting the focus from individual entrepreneurs to regional strengths, S3 re-scales the innovation process from a Schumpeterian entrepreneurial micro-scale or a pan-European policy landscape to the scalar construct of European regions. This encourages regions to focus on their key advantages in order to develop innovative solutions that can create new economic opportunities. The S3 framework also highlights the systemic nature of innovation as a process within Regional Innovation Systems (RIS), while emphasising the need for policy efforts to promote RIS. Moreover, the strategy acknowledges the complex and dynamic nature of innovation by stressing the importance of fostering diverse interactions among various RIS stakeholders.
Furthermore, collaboration is highlighted as an important mode of interaction among the innovation system’s actors– universities, research institutes, and businesses– as it facilitates the development and implementation of innovative solutions to regional challenges. Emphasising the role of knowledge and learning in the innovation process, the strategy valuably recognises the importance of continuous knowledge exchange among stakeholders. Finally, by embracing a symbiotic connection between the key concepts of the S3 strategy, European regions can enhance their competitiveness and innovation in the global market. Adopting this strategic approach enables all actors involved in an innovation system to leverage their strengths and work together more effectively.
Conclusion
This article accentuates the significance of neo-Schumpeterian analytical perspectives for understanding the evolution of European innovation policy. The Smart Specialisation Strategy (S3) has become attuned to the regional diversity of the European innovation landscape, as well as to the diversity of RIS stakeholders and their interactions. In recognising and developing regional strengths and capacities, the S3 policy aligns with neo-Schumpeterian approaches to innovation, thereby emphasising the symbiotic nature of key RIS characteristics. In summary, the S3 framework provides a useful lens for understanding the evolution of European innovation policy and the importance of RIS in driving economic development forward.
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The visit in Wisconsin allowed members to feel the political temperature outside Washington D.C. and particularly in a state like Wisconsin, which is in a very special political situation due to the gerrymandering and the resulting blockages of the legislative process.
The Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) was “a citizens-focused, bottom-up exercise for Europeans to have their say on what they expect from the European Union”. Although organised by the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council, other actors were invited to participate in the CoFoE to “reach every corner of the EU” and “bring Europe closer to the citizens”. Notably, local and regional authorities (LRAs) were involved.
The latter, as the participatory democracy research shows, are in a better position to involve citizens in the decision-making process than their European counterparts, which could contribute to the success of the CoFoE. Yet, this depends on whether the LRAs decided to get involved in the Conference. In this article, I will evaluate the involvement of LRAs in the conference, based on research conducted among Polish local and regional authorities.
Local and Regional Authorities: The Polish Picture
The study aimed to determine if LRAs: (1) informed the citizens about the CoFoE; (2) organised events within CoFoE’s framework and (3) took part in the events organised by other entities. Consisting of 179 selected LRAs, the study population was divided into three categories: (1) LRAs “institutionally involved at the EU level” (through the Committee of the Regions, Regional Office in Brussels or CoFoE’s plenary); (2) LRAs from the chosen Region (Pomorskie Region) and (3) LRAs of the capital cities of the regions. Regarding levels of involvement in the CoFoE conference, I expected the LRAs gathered in the first category to be most active as they have direct ties with the EU institutions.
The results demonstrate a lack of involvement by most LRAs with the CoFoE. Of 179 LRAs, only 26 have undertaken at least one activity (of mentioned above) regarding the CoFoE. This means that 85% of the study population did not get involved. For LRAs “institutionally involved at the EU level”, 19 out of 35 can be classified as active. Furthermore, only 8% of LRAs from the Pomorskie Region, and only 4 of 18 capital cities participated in any CoFoE activities.
EU Institutional Involvement and CoFoE: a Reality?
At first sight it is evident that LRAs involved with “institutional involvement at the EU level” determined a higher rate of engagement within the CoFoE. Yet, this engagement is based significantly on the actions of the 15 regional authorities as participants. If excluded from the “institutional involvement” category, only 5 active authorities would be left. In Poland, it seems that regional authorities have adopted the role of the LRAs “involved” at the EU level, but this is incorrect. A CoR, Regional Office or CoFoE plenary does not mark an involvement with the EU at an institutional level.
Another conclusion that we can draw from the results is that the CoFoE failed to “reach every corner of the EU” – at least in Poland. For instance, out of 80 rural municipalities in the study population, only 1 can be classified as active. None of the 19 urban-rural municipalities got involved. And in the case of the urban municipalities, 7 out of 43 took at least one action. As highlighted earlier, the CoFoE did not even manage to engage the vast part of the “institutionally involved” LRAs. Therefore, more than one initiative (even as big as the CoFoE) is required to break institutional habits.
Changing Outlooks: Europe through the Regions?
I would like to conclude this article by pointing to another reason to engage with this topic: the CoFoE’s new logic in favour of LRAs’ involvement at the EU level. Up to the Conference, the CoFoE’s approach was based on the “Europe with the Regions” model which focused on the authorities alone, and implicitly assumed that it would lead to the involvement of the citizens (which proved not to be the case). On the contrary, the CoFoE’s model explicitly demanded from the LRAs to engage the people. This approach follows the European Commission’s 2022 initiative called “Building Europe with Local Councillors”. Could we be heading for “Europe through the Regions”? That is for the future research to determine.
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