According to Prime Minister, David Cameron, Britain doesn’t need EU funds to help areas devastated by floods because ‘it’s quicker and better’ to use the country’s own money.
So it seems that Britain is so flush with cash that it can turn down around £125 million in EU emergency help for areas of the country devastated by record levels of rain. Really?
Labour MP for Bury South, Ivan Lewis, asked David Cameron in Parliament, “When are the Government going to apply for the European solidarity fund money?” (Hansard, Column 41)
Mr Lewis explained, “Hundreds of my constituents in Radcliffe have had a terrible Christmas due to the flooding that has devastated so many people’s homes and businesses in Greater Manchester and across the north of England. Bury and other councils have to pick up the infrastructure costs.
“The European solidarity fund exists to help in such circumstances. It would be unforgivable to put Tory party management and posturing on Europe ahead of the national interest.”
Mr Cameron responded, “First of all, I send the hon. Gentleman’s constituents my sympathy for the flooding that they suffered”
But he made clear, “I think it is quicker and better to give people the help they need from our own resources.”
Mr Cameron explained, “I have looked very carefully at the question of EU funding; we looked at it previously in 2013. It takes a very long time to get hold of any money and it is very uncertain whether you get it. Indeed, you end up paying for it in many ways as well.”
He added, “Let me say that we will do everything we can, including through the Bellwin scheme, to make sure that his council is fully reimbursed for all the emergency measures that it had to take. We will also make sure that we put in place the flood prevention measures and investment that are coming down the track.”
As I reported here last week, EU member states are entitled to apply for money from the EU Solidarity Fund when a natural disaster causes substantial damage, calculated as a percentage of Gross National Income.
According to calculations by accountants, KPMG, the floods have already caused over £5 billion of damage, meaning that the UK is entitled to apply for emergency EU help.
Catherine Bearder, Liberal Democrat MEP for south-east England, said that EU officials told her that the UK government could apply for £125m in grants for flood victims, 10% of which could be available within six weeks.
Although some of the grants would be clawed back from our EU rebate, the European Commission explained to me today that this would only affect a proportion of the funds, and overall Britain would gain a net benefit from the receipt of the emergency money.
I asked Defra, the UK’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, whether the Prime Minister’s reply definitely meant that the UK would not be applying for EU funds to help with our floods disaster.
Defra emailed me a reply from ‘a government spokesperson’ that I could use as a quote for my story:
“We are committed to supporting communities hit by the recent flooding. We have opened the Bellwin scheme for local authorities, with 100% of eligible costs to be met by the Government, and our investment in recovery from Storm Eva and Storm Desmond now stands at nearly £200m.
“This will help people directly affected by the floods, support homeowners protect their properties and ensure flood affected businesses that have had their trading disrupted can get back on their feet.”
I immediately complained to the Defra Press Office:
“Thank you, but the quote doesn’t even mention the EU Solidarity Fund, which seems somewhat odd. Is the government going to apply for the fund or not? Is it the case that the country is rich enough not to need the EU emergency help?”
I will report back here if I receive a reply.
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According to @David_Cameron UK doesn’t need EU funds for floods. My Facebook report: https://t.co/IAPuIcXx3vpic.twitter.com/fAHnKsFv6k
— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) January 8, 2016
The post Britain doesn’t need EU help for floods, says PM appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
The Netherlands is facing Europe’s toughest stress test for Member States – the EU Presidency. The task of the Netherlands Presidency is to give Europe its mojo back, as the continent is faced with a refugee crisis, internal security issues, a looming Brexit, remnants of an economic crisis and an ongoing problem in Greece.
Generally speaking, EU presidencies are memorable when they manage to conclude difficult or valuable dossiers, to overcome barriers in advancing legislation, or to promote a transformation in the direction or spirit of the EU. The rotating Presidency has an influential position among the institutions, as its role is to chair Council meetings and set its work programme, but, most importantly, to lead negotiations on important legislative files with the European Parliament and the European Commission. The Netherlands Presidency is under significant pressure to be successful, since it is a highly respected country, with a strong reputation for efficient administration, focused on pragmatism and problem-solving. The country also enjoys a high degree of geopolitical strength, making it fit to play the role of an ‘honest broker’.
What is the Dutch Presidency’s focus?
It is usually the case that the Presidency’s work programme is closely aligned to the Commission’s work programme and the Dutch Presidency is no exception. The Netherlands Presidency has announced that it will focus on four major areas: migration and international security; making Europe stand out as an innovator and job creator; finance and the economy; climate and energy policy.
What about digital?
What is less straight-forward are the Dutch Presidency’s plans for the tech industry and the Digital Single Market (DSM). One of Commissioner Juncker’s flagship initiatives, the DSM is set to put the European Union on the digital map, but, if regulated too heavily, it can handicap its potential to be a technology leader. Thus, many hope that the Dutch will lead the agenda in the right direction, with their ‘no-nonsense’ approach to politics and pro-business attitude.
While the DSM has not been called out as one of the Netherlands Presidency’s top four priorities, it is included in almost each one of them, as it is one of the most far-reaching initiatives. The main reason for the lack of outspoken support for the DSM is that the process has already started, leaving the Dutch Presidency with the not-so-sexy job to put together the nuts and bolts to finally create a digital single market.
More specifically, there are still quite a few legislative proposals left for the Netherlands Presidency to finalise, and even though they might not be as controversial as the General Data Protection Regulation completed during the last days of 2015, there are still important consequence for citizens and businesses alike.
Perhaps one of the most burning issues at the moment for the technology industry, especially in light of the current internal security question, is encryption – a means through which privacy is protected by encoding private messages, emails and others, so that only authorised parties can read them. After the Paris attacks in November, concerns of national security in a digitalised world grew. As a consequence, national governments called for restricting encryption, as it can lead to back-doors which can be used for criminal purposes. The Dutch government has released its position recently, and it has taken a strong stance against weakening encryption programmes, saying that tech firms will not be forced to share encrypted communications with the Dutch security agencies. The position of the Dutch government provides an indication that there will be no EU-level plan on weakening encryption, at least not on their watch.
When it comes to the DSM, the Netherlands Presidency will mainly plan to:
Last but not least, the Dutch Presidency has also inherited Safe Harbour. The European Court of Justice ruled in October that the Safe Harbour data transfer agreement between the EU and the US is invalid, as it believed that EU citizens’ data was not properly safeguarded in the US. Following the ruling, the European Commission is working to create a ‘safer’ Safe Harbour, and it will fall under the Dutch Presidency’s term to facilitate negotiations if a proposal from the Commission is presented during its term.
What are the engagement opportunities for businesses during the Netherlands Presidency?
The Dutch Parliament is set to have an influence, thus making engagement at a national level valuable. Furthermore, national delegations linked to the Dutch government can also play a very important role in the European Parliament and can prove to be influential during negotiations. However, at this time, engagement with the Council is low during the Netherlands Presidency, as it is vital for them to be seen as facilitating compromise and they cannot take a strong stance on any issue.
Even though most EU Presidencies come and go and are quickly forgotten, the Netherlands Presidency seems to meet the necessary criteria to make significant contributions during its six months term. As a business-focused Presidency, it is noticeable from their work programme that each priority area, including digital, is planned with a business-friendly approach in mind. As such, on critical issues such as geo-blocking, spectrum and data transfers, this type of approach might prove to be beneficial for the tech industry.
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It wasn’t so much what she said, it was how she said it. On Monday, Margrethe Vestager, the European Commission’s feared competition chief, announced her latest in a series of cases cracking down on sweetheart tax deals offered to multinationals by ordering Belgium to claw back €700m in illegal tax breaks to at least 35 companies.
The decision itself had been flagged up a month ago by Belgium’s finance minister, Johan Van Overtveldt, so it wasn’t really a surprise. But in announcing the decision, Ms Vestager went out of her way to highlight a common trait of those able to avoid taxes through the Belgian scheme (about €500m of the €700m). “Most of the companies benefiting are European; it is also European companies that avoided the majority of the taxes under the scheme, which they now have to pay,” she said at a midday news conference.
The statement stood out because it comes after American officials have privately raised concerns over the fact that three of the four initial cases in her corporate tax crackdown targeted US companies: Apple, Amazon and Starbucks. Last month, she expanded the list to include McDonald’s. The private grumbling became public in September when Robert Stack, the US Treasury’s man in charge of international tax policy, broke cover to complain about how the investigation would affect American corporate tax revenues, and Ms Vestager acknowledged that she had flagged up European companies in the Belgian scheme to emphasise her services’ impartiality.
Read moreThe revelations that Volkswagen was rigging emissions tests have left a trail of destruction in their wake: a once proud European champion has seen its reputation dragged through the mud, millions of owners of “clean diesel” cars have found out they were hoodwinked and – most importantly for Brussels – the EU’s current system for policing auto manufacturers has been exposed as deeply flawed.
EU officials and politicians now regularly lament that it was the US’s powerful Environmental Protection Agency, rather than any European authority, that revealed the company’s use of illegal defeat devices to cheat in emissions tests – even though the practice was going on right under everyone’s noses on both sides of the Atlantic.
Although most of the power to test and certify vehicles falls to national regulators, the European Commission has come in for its share of the blame in failing to better enforce rules in this area. As we reported last week, it is preparing plans for overhauling the EU’s moribund car approval system. But will they go far enough?
A draft of the measures, obtained by Brussels Blog and posted here, makes it clear that the commission views the VW scandal as a game changer. Prior to the revelations, the commission was planning a limited overhaul of EU requirements; much more far reaching options are now on the table.
Read moreFor Brits with an interest in public policy and the UK’s place in the world, 2016 will inevitably be overshadowed by the forthcoming referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU. Whilst the political debate in the UK is currently dominated by issues of migration and benefits, it’s worth taking a step back and considering the potential impact of a ‘Brexit’ in specific industry and policy areas, beyond the wider issue of the UK’s access to the single European market.
EU and UK energy and climate policy are currently locked together
Energy and climate policy in particular poses some interesting questions in the case of a Brexit. Not least because of the domestic climate legislation that binds the UK to a similar emissions reductions trajectory to the EU, and the gas and electricity interconnectors that physically connect the UK to the EU single energy market. Considering the broad swathe of energy and climate policy that binds the UK to the EU, it is far from clear in the case of a Brexit which of these policies, or parts thereof, the UK would not continue to be heavily involved in.
Climate policy – domestic policy first and foremost?
Looking at climate policy, the real changes that leaving the EU would mean for the UK seem fairly limited. As noted above, the UK’s own Climate Change Act means that British governments are bound domestically to cut emissions in at least a similar trajectory to the EU’s 2020 and 2030 GHG targets. Even in the case of a Brexit, it’s difficult to see how the UK would not wish to utilise an emissions trading system (ETS) – whether it’s the EU ETS, or a separate UK system that would likely be linked to the EU one. Putting aside the impact on hard policy, there is of course the question of influence. A UK outside of the EU would conceivably have lower levels of influence on wider international climate negotiations.
Energy policy – an area that seems obvious for cross-border co-operation
Concerning energy policy, it is difficult to find areas where post-Brexit, the UK would not want to co-operate with its neighbours. Take the example of Gas security of supply. Following the 2009 gas crisis, the EU constructed a set of rules to govern emergency situations, by ensuring that countries work with their neighbours to develop emergency and preventative action plans. Presumably, this is an area that a British government outside of the EU would still wish to engage in with its neighbours in Ireland, Belgium, France and the Netherlands. Of course they could try to do so outside of the EU framework, but the plans they would seek to agree with their neighbours would still be constructed under the EU mechanisms, so in all likelihood – for ease of implementation – so would the UK’s.
The internal energy market
Perhaps the major issue of course is the internal energy market where the UK has been instrumental in pushing for an increasingly liberalised energy market, greater competition and cross-border trading. An increasing proportion of the UK’s electricity capacity will be reliant on the electricity interconnectors going under the Channel and North Sea. These interconnectors will at least partially be controlled by the EU’s Third Internal market package where they are located in an EU member state, and are likely to have an increasingly important contribution to the UK’s overall capacity and security of supply. Even if the UK left the EU completely (the WTO-only option), something like 10% of our overall electricity capacity by 2020 would effectively be under the control of EU market rules. In the short-term there might be a limited impact – the interconnectors and the market would continue to function – but over a longer-period, there would be nothing to prevent a divergence of policy between the UK and the EU, potentially impacting on the functioning and the commercial viability of the interconnectors. In this scenario, a UK outside of the EU would have no control over the outcome of such policy developments.
Bearing in mind the influence of the UK in developing the single energy market so far (plus the influence of actors such as Ofgem and National Grid at an EU-level), a future EU energy market without the UK could look very different to the one developing now. As Amber Rudd, the UK’s Secretary of State for energy and climate change noted in early January on the issue of Brexit and the possibility of the UK leaving the EU, “We are probably the largest influencer in terms of setting out the plan and delivering on the energy market. So we can’t help shape it – shape it in the best way for the UK consumer and UK businesses. That would be a loss because you would be going into an area of uncertainty.”
It would also remove the UK’s voice from discussions where historically it has been very strong – a good example of this being the 2012 Offshore Drilling Safety directive, proposed following the Macondo accident. The Commission originally proposed a directly applicable regulation which could have had significant impacts on the post-Piper Alpha North Sea safety standards – which were widely viewed as the global gold standard. The UK, working with allies in the Netherlands and Denmark, ensured that instead, a directive was agreed that would enable those Member States with an effective system already to continue on that basis, avoiding unnecessary costs and disruption in the North Sea.
Renewable energy targets
Of course, there is the question of renewable energy targets. It would be difficult to argue that technology specific targets are particularly popular with any British policymakers – but given the UK’s success in 2014 in working to move the 2030 target system away from any binding national targets for renewables and energy efficiency, the UK has already achieved its aim in changing the system to a much more flexible one, so would have little to gain from being outside the 2030 system.
Policymaker to policy taker?
Either way, when thinking about Brexit and energy and climate policy there are real questions to be answered – both in terms of what the UK would seek to leave, and where the benefits would be. In both a WTO-only situation or a Swiss/Norway style solution, the UK could move from being (one of the most important) policymakers to the policy taker. Other alternative models that would allow the UK to access and influence the internal energy market whilst not being in the EU, are yet to be elaborated upon and raise serious questions of viability.
Published by Matt Hinde