European Union

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
to wind up the debate on the statements by the Council and the Commission
pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure
on the 2015 report on Serbia
(2015/2892(RSP))
David McAllister
on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Sunday 31 January 2016
London
18.30 Meeting with Prime Minister David Cameron

Tuesday 2 February 2016
17.00 Meeting with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg (photo opportunity)

Thursday 4 February 2016
London - Supporting Syria and the Region conference

(local time)
11.00 Intervention at the Supporting Syria and the Region conference

11:25 Meeting with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
12.30 Meeting with Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron
13.00 Meeting with President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz
14.30 Meeting with Prime Minister of Slovenia Miro Cerar
15.00 Meeting with Prime Minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoğlu, German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte, Prime Minister of Greece Alexis Tsipras and Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann

Talk about the calm before the storm!  The silence is deafening as both Brussels and Washington DC holds its breath days before the February 1st deadline for an agreement on a new Safe Harbor framework.

At the moment both sides of the Atlantic continue to stare hard at each other waiting for the other side to blink. Senior level negotiations occurred behind closed doors during Davos but very little was revealed. The EU is standing firm as Commissioner Jourova said she is clear that ‘when a European’s personal data travels the equivalent protections also need to go with it’. While Penny Pritzker, U.S. Secretary of Commerce said they have a comprehensive offer being refined ‘…that creates what’s called ‘essential equivalents’ which is the standard that needs to be met in order for Safe Harbor to receive what’s called an adequacy determination’.

What we can assume by next Monday is that some sort of agreement will be announced notwithstanding a complete breakdown in negotiations. Which is a possibility.

What would such an agreement look like? Hard to say, but here are some areas that have been discussed. Clarity on the use of legal mechanisms recognized by the High Court in Europe to allow the transfer of data from the EU to the US. In particular, Standard Contractual Clauses (SCC) and Binding Corporate Rules (BCR). There has even been discussion on potentially introducing new ‘creative’ mechanisms such as Codes of Conduct and Certification. However, some Data Protection Authorities in Germany have said they will challenge SCCs and BCRs and any new mechanisms would take several years to be develop, accept, and implement.

But what if the negotiations fail? Where does that leave companies that are directly impacted by the absence of Safe Harbor (of which many are European, by the way)?

We would hope that, in absence of an agreement, the European Commission and Data Protection Authorities will provide clarity and specific ways for companies to transfer data overseas. Unfortunately this does not exclude investigations being started by the Data Protection Authorities.  We can hope these authorities will recognize the good faith companies have shown to date. Companies have repeated throughout the process that they do not have the competency to change how US laws are applied but have offered to make unilateral commitments such as providing transparency reports, developing compliance processes, implementing specific technical or organizational measures.

The real test will be that whatever is announced will need to stand up to European Data Protection Authorities. But it will also need to survive another challenge most likely to come from the High Court and the ‘Schrems’ of the world. A perfect acceptable solution will mean a seismic change in US domestic policy to halt its intelligence services and provide assurances that will need to be entrenched somehow in law. This is not likely in the current US political climate which is very sensitive in the run up to the Presidential elections. The current administration will not want to give Republicans more ammunition with an agreement that may be seen to appease the EU in exchange to sacrificing some of its national security. In addition, the EU would need to provide a credible message to the US explaining why it is ok for Member States, like France and the UK, to introduce new mass surveillance laws. The US will be less enthused to hear Brussels’ response that it does not have the competency to issue orders to Member States, especially not to the likes of the UK with Brexit on the horizon.

Unfortunately the only conclusion is that 1 February will not be the end of the painful discussions that will still be needed to ensure data can flow across the Atlantic. We can only hope cooler heads will prevail and factor in the benefits the free flow of trans-Atlantic data can have in bringing prosperity, jobs and important innovation. Maybe wishful thinking on my part.

Ray Pinto 

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Mr Cameron and Mr Juncker at the prime minister's official country residence last year

David Cameron, the British prime minister, is due in Brussels today for a meeting with Jean-Claude Juncker – a session so important that he cancelled a trip to Denmark and Sweden in order to sit down with the European Commission president in person. The two men have a famously difficult relationship – Mr Cameron actively opposed Mr Juncker’s election as president, and was one of only two leaders to vote against him at a 2014 summit. But it’s less than three weeks before a high-stakes EU summit where Mr Cameron hopes to get a renegotiation deal that changes the UK’s relationship with Europe. So Mohammed must go to the mountain.

For months, the main sticking point in the British renegotiation talks – which have taken Mr Cameron on a grand European tour from Berlin to Bucharest – has been benefits for EU workers in the UK. Mr Cameron wants to prevent EU migrants from receiving in-work benefits for four years, something that would appear to run directly counter to EU treaties’ non-discrimination requirement.

The latest option under consideration is actually one that has been debated for several months – an “emergency brake”. The original idea would have allowed Britain (and other countries) to limit immigration from other EU members if it can prove government services like healthcare or schools were becoming overwhelmed by the strain. As our Brexit watcher Alex Barker reports, the new twist is that the “emergency break” would allow countries to limit work benefits, rather than immigration. In the past, Downing Street has been lukewarm to the “emergency brake” idea, especially since it would likely need vetting from Brussels before the brake can be pulled. But with time running out, and alternate “Plan B” options limited, Mr Cameron may be warming to the idea.

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The 2007 European Union (EU) Strategy for Central Asia was reviewed for the fourth time in 2015. Over the last eight years, the EU has successfully established several institutionalised mechanisms for strengthening relations and working with Central Asian governments, including an increased presence on the ground. Despite this, the EU’s engagement in Central Asia is one of limited to no impact. The region has become more unstable; forecast gas deliveries from the region to Europe have so far not materialised; trade is minimal with the exception of EU-Kazakhstan links, democracy is seen by the Central Asian regimes as a threat to their survival; corruption severely undermines economic development and siphons off much of the development aid; and the human rights situation has been backsliding. The EU should not and cannot compete with Russia and China in the region. The EU would do best to focus on a few key areas where it can achieve concrete results. Besides broader economic and some security cooperation, the EU should focus on education in supporting the region’s development while further emphasizing human rights and strengthening political and financial support to civil society.
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Central Asia, located at the centre of the Eurasian continent and straddling the borders of some of the world’s most pressing hot spots, offers economic opportunities and natural resources but also remains insecure and troublesome. For the European Union, the region is not a priority. It is too distant and Brussels experiences difficulties in executing its democratic and value-based agenda on the ground. Regional dynamics have been significantly influenced by many players present in the region; Russia, China and the United States are the most significant. Russia’s position relies on a holistic approach, including military might and the more recent Eurasian narrative. China, pursuing its Silk Road ideas, has no equal in trade and energy. The US has partially retreated from Central Asia and is reviewing its security-centered strategy. Under these circumstances, what should the EU regional approach look like? What are the shared interests and divergent objectives of the actors present in Central Asia? With what actors could the EU cooperate and with whom should it abstain from regional rapprochement? Finally, what options does the EU have to strengthen its posture in the region from a regional and geopolitical perspective?
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The 2007 European Union (EU) Strategy for Central Asia was reviewed for the fourth time in 2015. Over the last eight years, the EU has successfully established several institutionalised mechanisms for strengthening relations and working with Central Asian governments, including an increased presence on the ground. Despite this, the EU’s engagement in Central Asia is one of limited to no impact. The region has become more unstable; forecast gas deliveries from the region to Europe have so far not materialised; trade is minimal with the exception of EU-Kazakhstan links, democracy is seen by the Central Asian regimes as a threat to their survival; corruption severely undermines economic development and siphons off much of the development aid; and the human rights situation has been backsliding. The EU should not and cannot compete with Russia and China in the region. The EU would do best to focus on a few key areas where it can achieve concrete results. Besides broader economic and some security cooperation, the EU should focus on education in supporting the region’s development while further emphasizing human rights and strengthening political and financial support to civil society.
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP