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Merkel, right, with Turkish premier Ahmet Davutoglu at a refugee camp in Gaziantep

Part of the job description of any political leader is to do your best to make it look like you get along with people who you actually can’t stand. But when does that willingness to grin and bear it boomerang and make a leader look weak for not standing up for his or her principles?

German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s lightning visit to the Turko-Syrian border on Saturday, where she roundly praised Turkey’s willingness to take in millions of Syrian refugees, was just the latest example of the effort she is prepared to make to sustain the EU’s fragile deal with Ankara on returning asylum seekers from Greece. Her problem is that, try as she might, Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is going out of his way to make it as hard as possible to be nice to him.

The heart of the problem is Mr Erdogan’s hair trigger when it comes to feeling insulted, slighted or provoked. From the beginning, Ms Merkel has had to deal with manifold criticisms from human rights groups about the refugee plan and doubts over Turkey’s status as a safe country to send people back to from Greece. But repeated rows pitting Mr Erdogan’s tendency to take legal or diplomatic action against critics versus the EU’s fundamental principle of free expression are threatening to overshadow the refugee crisis itself.

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Inga Ulnicane

‘Crisis should not be wasted’. Since the beginning of the global economic crisis in 2008, this idea has been repeated many times suggesting that crisis should rather be used as an opportunity for innovative solutions and necessary reforms. One of such potential changes emphasized by European institutions has been prioritization of research and innovation as sources of sustainable growth and a way to avoid similar crisis in future.  What actually happened to research and innovation policies in Europe during the times of crisis? Which measures have European institutions taken to facilitate research and innovation? Has the crisis been used as an opportunity to facilitate research and innovation? These are some of the questions I address in my recent article ‘Research and innovation as sources of renewed growth? EU policy responses to the crisis’ (Ulnicane 2016). The article is part of a special issue ‘EU policies in times of crisis’ comparing the impact of crisis on nine EU policies, e.g. energy, migration, and health.

The article primarily analyses EU research and innovation policy which during the recent decades has considerably expanded (see e.g. Chou and Gornitzka 2014; Chou and Ulnicane 2015; Metz 2015) and combines a number of funding and coordination instruments. However, as research and innovation policy is a shared competence between the EU and national level and most research and innovation funding is allocated nationally, it is also important to look at developments at national level.

 

Increasing expectations vs. decreasing or stagnating budgets

While expectations that research and innovation will help to solve major societal and economic challenges increased during the crisis, funding for research and innovation at the same time decreased or stagnated in a number of countries. Although according to Eurostat data overall share of research and development funding within the European Union increased from 1.85% of GDP in 2008 to 2.03% in 2014 (which nevertheless is still far from declared target of investing 3% of GDP in research and development by 2020), there are huge differences across European countries. The table below shows the data from the Public Funding Observatory 2015 (page 11) of the European University Association. According to these data, during the times of crisis from 2008-2014 public funding for universities continued to increase considerable in Norway, Sweden, and Germany, where it also was part of economic stimulus package. In some other countries like in Austria the increase in funding continued but at a slower pace than before the crisis. At the same time, in many countries in Southern and Eastern Europe public funding for universities has experienced smaller or larger cuts. This has led to growing concerns about increasing innovation divide in Europe among leading and catching-up countries. However, in recent months austerity measures have also affected universities in leading innovation countries – Finland and Denmark.

 

Evolution   of public funding for universities 2008-14 (adjusted for inflation) Countries   Between 20% and 40% increase Germany, Norway, Sweden Between 10% and 20% increase Austria, Belgium, Denmark,   Poland Between 5% increase and 5%   decrease France, Netherlands, Portugal Between 5% and 10% decrease Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia Between 10% and 20% decrease Czech Republic, Serbia, Spain,   Iceland, Italy Between 20% and 40% decrease Ireland, Lithuania, United   Kingdom More than 40% decrease Greece, Hungary, Latvia

 

At times when national public funding is cut, universities are increasingly looking for other sources of funding either from industry or from international programs such as EU Structural Funds or Horizon 2020. Although an overall EU budget for 2014-2020 was cut for the first time, funding for Horizon 2020 program increased for 30% in comparison to the previous Framework Program 7 and reached almost 80 billion euros (which is less than 10% of the overall EU budget). Since then some funding has been redirected to the European Fund for Strategic Investments. First predictions about the next post-2020 EU Framework Program do not foresee a big increase in budget.

Since World War II research and innovation funding and system has expanded tremendously in many European countries. Might the prolonged and predicted stagnation in many European countries and potentially also at EU level imply that in future expansion of research and innovation activities in Europe will slow down? Would expansion of knowledge-based activities move to other world regions like Asia?

 

Reinforced focus on fast and quantifiable impact

In times of austerity, idea of doing ‘more with less’ became more popular expecting research and innovation system to become more efficient and deliver more economic and societal impact with limited resources. Representatives of European research and innovation stakeholder organizations interviewed (Ulnicane 2016) recognize importance of impact but also pointed out challenges of quantifying it and choosing appropriate time horizons for evaluating it. While idea of research impact has been widespread also before the crisis, experts have experienced that during the times of crisis focus on impact increases. One of them explains: ‘Pressure to have to demonstrate that your research is going to produce that many euros in return, it comes and goes but during the times of crisis this is very strongly present.’ A leader of a stakeholder organization tells that research and innovation organizations increasingly have to prove their impact using quantitative indicators:

‘You have to prove your value even tougher in the environment where the budgets are lower. Am I paying for research which may bring something back in years or am I paying for health care? The national governments and politicians have to answer. If you are going to pay money which is long-term and not helping cohesion of society today, you need to prove your impact much more. So research organizations are even more scrutinized by the national governments with very strong knowledge indicators. And reporting on institutional funding they get is getting more and more detailed every year: How many patent applications? How many cooperations you developed with industry? How many contracts you get from industry? How many researchers go to the industry? [...] They have to give numbers. When I talk about impact, it is real economic impact. And how do you show that in research? It is tough. It is not an easy question. And they are asked to prove that more and more.’

Moreover, times of crisis, fast solutions are expected. An expert explains: ‘Science is expected to deliver next iPhone or innovation that creates jobs, that strengthens industry. Science can do all this but this is a long-term investment [...]. There would not be tangible results tomorrow. And in times of crisis this is a thinking that disappears completely, everyone wants a quick solution.’ Focus on impact and efficiency priotizes applied research and puts fundamental science under more pressure. There might be some good opportunities to increase effiency of existing research and innovation systems but at some point there might also be limits how much more can be done with less.

 

Old tension in Europe of Knowledge: excellence vs. cohesion

Crisis reinforced one of the long-standing tensions in the Europe of Knowledge, namely, between excellence and cohesion. Since the early EU Framework Programs in the 1980s and 1990s, major share of highly competitive and excellence oriented Framework Program funding has gone to the Northern countries, while catching-up countries (at that time Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal) mostly benefited from research and innovation support within the EU Structural Funds allocated to less developed regions. Similarly, in the EU budget 2014-2020 the Horizon 2020 provides competitive funding primarily based on excellence, while a considerable share – 83 billion Euros – of Structural Funds goes to research and innovation and small and medium size enterprises in less developed regions. When 12 more recent EU member states released a common position that Horizon 2020 should address the needs of all member states, a specific objective of ‘spreading excellence and widening participation’ was added to the Horizon 2020.

Taking into account that this division – the Framework Program funds go mainly to the northern countries (share of FP funds in national budgets can be higher in catching-up countries because their overall research budgets are lower), while the EU Structural Funds support research and innovation predominantly in catching-up countries – is some 20 or 30 years old, some questions can be asked: Is this a productive division, does it work, and what might be alternative approaches? Have the EU Structural Funds for research and innovation helped to build capacities in southern member states and are they now more successful participants in the competitive Framework Program?  Can there be any lessons drawn from the experience of southern members (e.g. under which conditions Structural Funds help to build research and innovation capacities) that can be applied to ‘new’ members? What are the first results of the EU Structural Funds for research and innovation in eastern member states which have been receiving them for twelve years since 2004? Do new features of the Structural Funds such as ex-ante conditionality of implementing country specific recommendations from the European Semester before receiving the Funds help to increase their role in reforming research and innovation systems in catching-up regions?

 

New paradigms or gradual change?

Although crises are seen as good moments to carry out radical transformations and paradigm changes, developments in EU research and innovation policy in times of crisis can be characterized as incremental and path-dependent. New priorities and funding and coordination instruments largely built on earlier Framework Programs and the Lisbon strategy. Does it mean that crisis has been wasted? Is there a need for radical changes and new paradigms in EU research and innovation policy or is gradual change a more productive way for improving it? What would these new paradigms be? – More considerable shifts of EU funding from agriculture to research and innovation or of competences from national to EU level? Are there any innovative ideas for solving excellence vs. cohesion tension? Will ongoing discussions on Open Science and the European Innovation Council lead to radical or incremental changes?

The study of EU research and innovation policy in times of crisis suggest a number of academic and policy-relevant questions for further investigation including new developments in multi-level governance (e.g. conditionality, European Semester) and their effects; the role and interests of and interactions among the main actors and institutions (European Commission, Parliament, national governments, and stakeholder organizations); and implementation of new and revised policy priorities and instruments. The special issue on EU policies in times of crisis demonstrates that comparison of changes across different policy fields is a powerful approach with a great potential for deepening understanding of recent developments in European integration. I am looking forward to engaging with others interested in these questions also in future and creating novel spaces and forums for addressing them.

 

Dr. Inga Ulnicane is an Assistant Professor at the Institute for European Integration Research, University of Vienna (Austria), where she undertakes research and teaching on European and international knowledge policies and governance. Her recent research on the role of ideas in European science, technology and innovation policy, European integration in research and innovation policy, and international research collaboration has appeared in Journal of European Integration, Journal of Contemporary European Research, and Science and Public Policy. She is one of conveners of the ECPR European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group ‘Politics of Higher Education, Research, and Innovation’ which at the moment has more than 200 members from around the world.

 

References:

Chou, M.-H. and A.Gornitzka (eds) 2014 Building the Knowledge Economy in Europe. New Constellations in European Research and Higher Education Governance  Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Chou, M.-H. and I.Ulnicane (eds) 2015 New Horizons in the Europe of Knowledge. Special issue.  Journal of Contemporary European Research 11(1): 1-152.

Metz, J. 2015 The European Commission, Expert groups, and the Policy Process. Demystifying Technocratic Governance Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ulnicane, I 2016 Research and innovation as sources of renewed growth? EU policy responses to the crisis Journal of European Integration 38(3): 327-41. doi: 10.1080/07036337.2016.1140155

The post Austerity, impact and divided Europe of Knowledge appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On 21 April, SEDE held a public hearing to address the cyber defence and resilience from the CSDP perspective at the EU level and national levels. How to build the resilience and efficiently protect critical infrastructures? Which are the cyber warfare capabilities in our changing world? Given that cyber security stays high on the European agendas and is one of the Presidency priorities, it will be extremely interesting to gather different experts and hear which their insights are.
Further information
Hearing programme
Presentation by Steve Purser, Head of Core Operations, European Network Information Security Agency (ENISA)
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

At its meeting on 21 April, SEDE held and exchange of views with Jacek Bylica, Principal Adviser and Special Envoy for non-Proliferation and Disarmament, on the results of the Nuclear Security Summit which took place in Washington D.C. on 31. March and 1. April 2016. The 2016 Summit marks the end of the Nuclear Security Summit process in this format. However, the Work Plan of the 2010 Summit will continue to guide the participating States efforts in the future.
Further information
Draft agenda and meeting documents
Speech by Jacek Bylica, Principal Adviser and Special Envoy for non-Proliferation and Disarmament, EEAS
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

will take place on Monday 30 May, 15:00-18:30 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

Further information
watch the meeting live
Access rights for interest group representatives
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Tensions have been growing between Greece and the IMF, including a highly controversial Wikileaks leaked conversation between the IMF Mission Chief for Greece and the Head of IMF’s European Department that raised issues at the highest level, with letters being exchanged between IMF’s Managing Director Cristine Lagarde and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras. Amongst these concerns, the Greek Prime Minister has questioned both the demands of the IMF, but also, indirectly, whether its participation in the 3rd Greek program is necessary or even desirable.

A brief background: The Greek Prime Minister is the leader of the Party SYRIZA, which won the majority in the January 2015 Greek elections – the first left-based, anti-austerity Party to be elected into government across the EU since the beginning of the crisis. Its electoral mandate was to renegotiate the financial assistance (loan) agreements, to sharply reshape the austerity-based conditionality of this assistance (so-called Memorandums of Understanding or MoUs), and to not accept the supervision of the programs by the so-called Troika, i.e. the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF. There were long and arduous negotiations and a Greek referendum (6 July 2015) with an outcome against further austerity measures but of questionable outcome value. On the eve of the referendum (30 June 2015), the Greek PM requested a new, 3rd Greek financial assistance program and an accompanying MoU, officially initiated in August 2015, in a somewhat dramatic policy drift from the electoral mandate of this government. Despite such drift, SYRIZA obtained a majority again in the September 2015 snap elections following through with the 3rd program.

Why, all the fuss in relation to the IMF? As opposed to the previous two Greek programs, in which the IMF participated through corresponding funding, this 3rd one was agreed only with the Eurozone Member State-based, international assistance mechanism ESM, and did not involve the IMF (the last IMF program for Greece expired on January 2016). However, the IMF participated in the drafting of the MoU with a view of providing financial assistance in the future upon satisfaction of two conditions:  (1) a detailed fiscal package that provides a sustainable economic trajectory (focus on pension reform), and (2) the provision of “significant debt relief, well beyond what has been considered so far,” since “Greece’s debt has become unsustainable and that Greece cannot restore debt sustainability solely through actions on its own.”

It is clear that none of the two aforementioned conditions have been fully met. On the structural adjustment side, the Greek government is unwilling to implement even more austerity measures, especially in relation to a further reduction of pensions, after almost 6 years of consolidation. On the debt relief side, the Eurozone Member States, and particularly some such as Germany, essentially oppose any debt relief (which has been reiterated as a necessary action by the IMF), least of all any that would go further than what has already been considered (i.e. a mediocre extension of Greek debt maturities). In the meantime, the IMF considers the targets set by the Greek program as unachievable for the medium to long terms to achieve a sustainable fiscal position.

Is IMF participation then really necessary? It is worth noting on a theoretical level that IMF participation in the Eurozone in the beginning was considered unthinkable and amounting to a testament of the Eurozone’s failure, among others because of the Eurozone’s levels of growth (IMF interventions focused mostly on developing nations), as well as their antagonistic presence (in monetary/finance terms) to the USA /USA dollar. This, however, has long been abandoned as a taboo.

In the current situation, a Eurozone Member State seeking ESM assistance has to request IMF assistance too. Legally, there are two legislative instruments on the EU’s side that govern the request of financial assistance from a Eurozone Member State: the ESM Treaty, upon which the ESM is based, and the Two-Pack EU Regulation 472/2013, laying down the EU-based process relevant to a Eurozone Member State receiving financial assistance. The ESM Treaty, an international treaty concluded outside the EU legal framework, stipulates that not only is the ESM to cooperate with the IMF very closely, with the latter participating both at a financial and technical level, but also that “a euro area Member State requesting financial assistance from the ESM is expected to address, wherever possible, a similar request to the IMF” (Recital 8). Similar provisions are included in Article 13(2)(b) of the Treaty. In addition, the Troika, i.e. wherever possible the IMF as well, is formally tasked with drafting the policy conditionality outlined in the MoU and monitoring its implementation (ESM Treaty Article 13). Similar are the provisions of Regulation 472/2013, whereby a Eurozone Member State requesting financial assistance either from the ESM or the IMF is subject to Troika supervision (Recital 12, Article 7).

Pursuant to the above legal observations, there was also a clear political commitment in the Eurosummit of July 2015 (where the 3rd Greek program was agreed upon) that Greece would request a new IMF financial assistance, to run parallel to the ESM program, stipulating that “Greece will request continued IMF support (monitoring and financing) from March 2016” (emphasis added by author).

So is it necessary for the IMF to partake in the Greek program? For the IMF itself, certainly not. The legal provisions do not contain any type of reciprocity clause, and do not commit the IMF to accepting the request of the Eurozone Member State concerned; in this case Greece. However, on the EU’s side, it seems necessary for a Eurozone Member State that receives financial assistance through the ESM – such as Greece – to request similar assistance from the IMF. In either case, Greece already committed at the highest level (Eurosummit) to requesting IMF assistance and is, therefore, restrained in perceiving a request for IMF participation as optional, especially considering the importance that some Eurozone Member States, such as Germany, place on the IMF’s participation as a guarantor for the program’s efficiency and success. This is, after all, the reason for the close cooperation between the ESM and the IMF as outlined above. However, in the case that the IMF denies the provision of assistance, then there is no stipulation as to how the process unfolds, although it would seem logical that the ESM-based program would continue. What happens remains to be seen. However, clear legal limitations exist as to the options of the Greek government to reject or not apply for IMF participation.

First published on April 20, 2016 at EUI Constitutional Change Through Euro Crisis Law

The post Is the IMF necessary for the 3rd Greek Program? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

A straightforward comparison between Britain remaining in the EU and leaving isn’t possible.

That’s because we know what ‘Remain’ in the EU means – it’s the status quo and we’ve experienced it for four decades.

But Leave?

Nobody knows; nobody can say for sure. Even those campaigning for Britain to leave the European Union cannot agree with each other on their different visions of Brexit.

And even if the ‘Leave’ campaigners could agree with each other, none of them can promise to deliver.

They are not in power, and even if they were in power, their (different) dreams of Brexit would require the agreement of over 50 countries, which would take years to negotiate, with no guarantee of the outcome.

With the exception of Russia, no major country in the world backs Britain to leave the EU.

On his visit to Britain, USA President Obama said that the EU Single Market “brings extraordinary economic benefits to the United Kingdom.” He added that being in the EU “magnifies” British influence.

If Britain left the EU, however, the President warned that it could take up to ten years to negotiate a new trade agreement between the USA and  Britain.

These sentiments were echoed by US Presidential hopeful Hilary Clinton, whose spokesman told The Observer newspaper today that, “She has always valued a strong United Kingdom in a strong European Union. And she values a strong British voice in the EU.”

There are many lists showing the benefits of Britain remaining in the EU that are credible and evidence-based.  That’s because we’ve been a member of the EU (previously called the EEC) for 43 years. We know what we get in the EU. We already have it.

But any lists of the benefits of Brexit have to be entirely hypothetical. Nobody knows for sure. No member state has ever left the EU.

The only honest answer is that there would be years of disruption and uncertainty before we discovered for sure what would be the advantages, if any, of Britain outside of the EU.

And now that the official Vote Leave campaign has indicated that it also wants other countries to leave, how would Britain’s Brexit negotiations fare with the EU?  Our former European allies would know that Brexiters didn’t just want to close a deal with them, but to close the EU itself. (See my other article, ‘What they really want: End of the EU’)

The benefits of Britain in the EU are extensive. Here’s a summary of just some of them:

Free trade

Top of the list is that it’s only because of EU membership that Britain enjoys full free trading status with all the other member states – representing the world’s most lucrative market place, and by far our most important trading partner. As such, almost half of our exports go to the EU, and over half of our imports come from the EU.

The EU has an iron tariff wall against non-members; so would we really want to be on the wrong side of that wall as an ex-member? Even non-European countries that have negotiated ‘free trade’ agreements with the EU don’t enjoy full free trade access to Europe’s internal market, as Britain does now.

Could Britain continue to participate in full free trade if we left the EU?

We don’t know for sure, but it’s less likely.

Unless, like Norway, we were accepted as a member of EFTA/EEA. However, like Norway, we would still have to obey the rules of the EU single market (including free movement of people) and we would still have to pay an annual contribution to the EU.

And like Norway, we would have no say in those rules or the size of our annual contribution to the EU. Would there be any point to leave the EU for that?

A say in Europe

Next on the list is that as a leading member of the EU, we have a say – and votes – on the rules, laws and future direction of our continent, Europe.

Would we have that as a non-EU member?

No non-EU member has a say or vote in those rules, so it’s highly unlikely that an exception would be made for Britain. Otherwise, what would be the point of an exclusive club offering exclusive benefits for members?

Living in the EU

The right to live, work, study or retire across our continent is  a precious membership benefit that around two million Britons already enjoy.

Would that right continue if we left the EU? Nobody really knows, but it’s unlikely.

The residence and other rights of Britons already living across the rest of Europe, and citizens from the rest of Europe already living in Britain, would be thrown into doubt and confusion if ‘Leave’ wins the referendum vote.

Free health care whilst travelling on business or holiday in Europe is another cherished benefit of Britain’s EU membership – that would be unlikely to continue on Brexit.

EU protection

EU laws protecting the rights of workers, consumers and travellers across the continent are probably among the most important reasons for Britain to remain an EU member.

For example, 4-weeks paid holiday a year; the 48 hour working week; anti-discrimination law; guaranteed rights for agency workers; guaranteed worker consultation – all of these protections exist because of the EU.

Would we retain those rights if Britain left the EU?

We don’t know, but it’s unlikely.

If we took away the strong armour of EU employment law, workers’ rights would be at the mercy of a Conservative government. Anyone who believes they would then be in safe hands might be in for a rude shock upon Brexit.

Consumer and traveller protection laws are also arguably much stronger as a result of EU laws than we would have enjoyed under national legislation alone.

In any event, how can a national government assure safety and protection across a continent?

The simple fact is that it can’t – it needs the reach of a pan-European intergovernmental organisation to achieve that (albeit with the democratic consensus of member states).

For example, comprehensive passenger compensation when, say, an Icelandic volcano seriously disrupts air travel – such compensation is only possible because of EU law, not national law.

Abolishing exorbitant mobile-roaming charges across Europe was also only possible because of EU law – no nation state alone could have achieved that. Europe-wide consumer protections, such as when buying products online or by phone, came about because of EU law rather than national law.

Negotiating power

Because the EU is the world’s richest, biggest market-place, and the world’s biggest exporter and importer of manufactured goods and services, it can negotiate the best trade deals with other countries.

It’s often said that when negotiating, you get better deals if you’re the same size or bigger than your opposite number. The EU is the biggest economy – bigger than the USA, bigger than China, bigger than Japan. It has the muscle to negotiate extremely favourable trading terms with the world’s countries.

Could Britain, being considerably smaller and less important than the EU, achieve similarly good trade agreements with the world’s countries?

It’s unlikely, but in any event, it would take many years to find out after we had left the EU.

Collaborations

There are many collaborations that take place between scientists, doctors, lawyers, accountants, etc, between EU member states that are made much easier and more effective because we’re all in the same club.

Could that continue on the same level if Britain left the EU?

Who knows..?

And of course, because of agreements and directives agreed between member states, there is considerable Europe-wide sharing of intelligence, information and practical collaboration in the fields of policing, security, defence and the prevention and combat of crime.

On BBC’s Andrew Marr show today, Home Secretary Theresa May confirmed that Britain doesn’t have open borders, not even to EU citizens. She said:

“We check people at our borders, but what matters at our borders is that  you have the information about people that enables you to make that decision about whether somebody should be allowed into the UK or not.

“We are more likely to have that information if we’re inside the European Union.”

Could that co-operation continue with our EU allies if Britain left the EU? Again, nobody knows – it might, but at this stage, nobody can guarantee that it would.

Is the British electorate likely choose Brexit and all the uncertainties that option offers?

Anything is possible. However, in all the referendums so far in Britain, the electorate has never voted against the status quo.

What will be important is that everybody who can vote in the referendum does vote. That way, at least the decision about Britain’s future will be decisive. 

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Other stories by Jon Danzig:

• EU is the not the USSR
• What does Brexit look like? Nobody knows
• They want their country back, not yours
• List of the latest articles by Jon Danzig

To follow my stories please like my Facebook page: Jon Danzig Writes

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Good evening. Let me first of all thank Prime Minister Davutoglu for the invitation to Gaziantep today. We last met in Brussels on 18 March, when we concluded an ambitious agreement between the European Union and Turkey with an aim to stem irregular migration and to create a legal avenue for refugees to seek and obtain asylum in Europe. Our visit here today is part of the follow-up to that agreement.

Combined with other actions we have taken together with the Western Balkans countries, in Greece and by stepping up our support to refugees in third countries, we are starting to see results.

Since the March agreement we have seen a sharp reduction of the illegal migration flows across the Aegean. Our return operations are working in tandem with resettlements of Syrian nationals from Turkey to EU Member States, demonstrating the desired shift from illegal to legal migration.

This is a big and complex undertaking and much work still lies ahead of us. Our visit here today gives us the opportunity to discuss with Prime Minister Davutoglu the further implementation and next steps.

Today I  also had another opportunity to assess the situation with regard to the Syrian refugees in Turkey. After visiting a refugee camp in Nizip, I was pleased also to participate in the inauguration of a child protection centre in Gaziantep on the occasion of the National Sovereignty and Children's Day in Turkey. A number of other projects are currently being launched through the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey.  Programming under the Facility has been accelerated.

Beyond our cooperation on the migration crisis, we will take stock of our revitalised bilateral relations. It also includes an accelerated roadmap for visa liberalisation. The way I see it, Turkey has made good progress ahead of decisions to be taken this summer, provided that Turkey meets all the agreed benchmarks.

One of the most crucial subjects of our discussion will be the conflict in Syria and the need for political talks to get back on track. Recent attacks on civilians and the prevention of humanitarian access are cynical attempts to derail the only real chance to stop the bloodshed.

Let me conclude, Prime Minister Davutoglu, dear Ahmet, by thanking you once again for your invitation, but also for your involvement and determination.

I would just like to add that, and it is not only a formal and political assessment but it is also my very private, personal feeling also after today's visit, that today Turkey is the best example for the whole world on how we should treat refugees. No one has the right to lecture Turkey what you should do. I am very proud  that we are partners. I am absolutely sure that we will succeed. There is no other way.

http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_7e18a1c646f5450b9d6d-a75424f262e53e74f9539145894f4378.r8.cf3.rackcdn.com/7c6f7e9a-095f-11e6-a57c-bc764e092fac_76.47_thumb_169_1461422202_1461422202_129_97shar_c1.jpg

Donald TUSK, President of the European Council, visits Gaziantep, Turkey, together with Angela MERKEL, German Federal Chancellor and Frans TIMMERMANS, European Commission Vice-President, on 23 April 2016.

Download this video here.

The mandate and budget of Frontex has consistently been enhanced since its inception in 2004. Since the Agency’s role under EU law has expanded, the capacity of Frontex to deal with possible violations of fundamental rights should be strengthened as well. In this regard, the European Ombudsman and the Parliament recommended that Frontex introduced an individual complaint mechanism to handle violations of fundamental rights alleged to have occurred in the course of its operations. Moreover, the European Commission’s proposal of 15 December 2015, designing a European Border and Coast Guard System, included such a complaint instrument. Consequently, this paper analyzes to what extent the individual complaint mechanism guarantees the protection of fundamental rights and ensures that potential incidents are effectively handled by Frontex. Particularly, the strategy and instruments designed by the Regulation nº 1168/2011 of Frontex to promote the protection of fundamental rights is firstly examined. While these instruments promote respect for fundamental rights in all activities of the Agency, they do not provide individuals with an effective remedy to file a complaint against Frontex should they believe their rights have been violated. Secondly, this paper analyzes the degree to which the creation of a complaint mechanism would strengthen control of Frontex operations, given the current limitations of immigrants and asylum seekers to seek judicial redress at the Court of Justice of the European Union. Lastly, the complaint mechanism introduced in the European Border and Coast Guard System is studied as well as the limitations it presents.

–

See, David Fernandez Rojo, “The Introduction of an Individual Complaint Mechanism within Frontex: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back”, Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht, forthcoming. This paper will be presented in the doctoral conference named “Democratic legitimacy without Parliament: fact or fiction?” on May 20, 2016 in the University of Antwerp.For more information and the program, see website. For more information on the authors and TBP’s special edition, see www.legalworld.be

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Under an U.S. Army airborne exercise in Germany (Hohenfels) a Humvee broke free of its rigging and plummeting to the ground, followed by another — and another. The scene starts serenely as equipment is dropped by parachute April 11 from planes with the 173rd Airborne Brigade flying across blue skies until the first Humvee breaks free and crashes to the ground.
It's followed by a second and then a third Humvee crashing to the ground and increasing laughter on the video. The Army says nobody was hurt, and it's investigating what went wrong — and who shot the video.

Tag: Humvees173rd Airborne Brigade

So now the truth is out. The ‘Leave’ campaign don’t just want Brexit – they want to see the end of the European Union.

Justice Secretary, Michael Gove, said as much in his keynote speech this week for Vote Leave, the official campaign which he leads, fighting for Brexit in Britain’s EU referendum.

Mr Gove said:

“Britain voting to leave will be the beginning of something potentially even more exciting – the democratic liberation of a whole continent.”

He described Britain’s departure from the EU as “a contagion” that could spread across Europe.

Reporting on Mr Gove’s speech, the BBC stated:

“Leaving the EU could also encourage others to follow suit, said Mr Gove.”

Commenting after the speech, a senior aide for the Leave campaign indicated to the Herald Scotsman that Mr Gove would be, ‘happy if Britain’s in-out referendum sparked similar polls across Europe.’

The Herald Scotsman reporter asked if Brexit would lead to the break-up of the EU as we knew it and the aide replied, “Yes.” When asked if the Out campaign hoped that it would trigger “the end of the Brussels block” the aide replied, “Certainly.”

In his speech, Mr Gove suggested that far from being the exception if Britain left the EU, it would become the norm as most other EU member states would choose to govern themselves. It was membership of the EU that was the anomaly, argued Mr Gove.

The Guardian headline was:

‘Brexit could spark democratic liberation of continent, says Gove’

The Telegraph headline:

‘Michael Gove urges EU referendum voters to trigger ‘the democratic liberation of a whole continent’

The Express headline:

‘BREXIT WILL BREAK-UP EU: Leave vote to spark domino effect across bloc, says Gove’

The Bloomberg headline:

‘U.K. Brexit Vote Would Be End of EU as We Know It, Gove Says’

The Irish Times headline:

‘Michael Gove says other EU states may leave EU’

The right-wing of the Conservative Party, which makes up the biggest support for the Vote Leave campaign, is now in tune with UKIP’s long-held ambition to see the end of the European Union.

On Talk Radio in Spain three years ago, UKIP leader Nigel Farage said that he not only wanted Britain to leave the European Union, he also wanted to see “Europe out of the European Union” – in other words, the complete disintegration of the European Single Market.

This week, Mr Farage shared a Brexit rally platform with Conservative cabinet minister, Chris Grayling, who backed Mr Farage’s chant of, “We want our country back.”

The battle lines are now starkly clear. Britain’s EU referendum is not just about whether Britain should remain in the European Union. It’s now a referendum about whether the European Union itself should continue to exist.

This is no doubt going to wake up all pro-EU supporters across the continent. What happens in Britain on 23 June could result in Brexit and EU breakup.

Britain chose not to be one of the founding members on the Union back in 1957 but joined later, in 1973.

Now Britain might be the first member state to leave the Union, with the open aspiration of the ‘Leave’ campaigners that some or all of the other EU members will follow to the EU exit.

It now seems impossible for ‘Leave’ campaigners to continue with their rhetoric that Britain could negotiate a ‘good deal’ with the European Union if the referendum results in Brexit.

EU leaders will no doubt be in a state of heightened alarm that not only could Britain’s departure from the EU trigger the downfall of the EU, but that this is actually the stated aim of Brexit campaign leaders.

For all of us who cherish the European Union as one of the most successful post-war projects, this is now a battle to ensure that Britain’s EU referendum doesn’t result in either Brexit or the end of the EU.

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Other stories by Jon Danzig:

• EU is the not the USSR
• What does Brexit look like? Nobody knows
• Can’t vote or don’t vote?
• List of the latest articles by Jon Danzig

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