European Union

On 17 October, SEDE Members will discuss the Annual Report on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) presented by the Rapporteur MEP Nicolás Pascual de la Parte (EPP, Spain). ...
While the EU is facing multiple and unprecedented threats to its security and new crises in its neighbourhood, especially since Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, this first CSDP Annual Report of the 10th Parliamentary term will set out the European Parliament's assessment of CSDP's readiness to address the challenges in the current complex geopolitical and security context. It also provides recommendations on the main avenues for strengthening policies and actions for the future along several dimensions, including institutional decision-making progress, the joint development of military and armament capabilities and the urgently needed issue of how to finance European defence.
Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Anna P. Lohse

Facilitated by the freedom of movement within the European Union (EU), the Erasmus programme established in 1987, and the Bologna Process initiated in 1999, physical intra-European student mobility has become a taken-for-granted aspect of higher education. Student mobility—whether for a short-term stay or the completion of an entire degree—is the core phenomenon of higher education internationalisation. The latter has gained significant importance on the policy agenda of countries worldwide over the past decades in light of short- and long-term economic goals (e.g., generating tuition fees, recruiting skilled migrants), the strengthening of international cooperation, and an increase of academic quality and students’ intercultural competencies. Internationalisation strategies now exist on national and institutional levels (Crăciun, 2019); outlining goals and measures involving various stakeholders including education ministries, foreign ministries, national higher education agencies such as the DAAD, British Council, or Campus France; university administrations, and interest groups.

 

An age of disruption

Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic greatly disrupted established practices and regulations of higher education internationalisation. After the Brexit referendum, there was uncertainty about whether the United Kingdom (UK) would continue to participate in the Erasmus programme and whether EU students would still have visa-free, discounted access to British degree programs. With the COVID-19 pandemic, global student mobility largely came to a halt for the first time in history. There was speculation about whether Brexit and the COVID-19 crisis would mark a turning point in higher education internationalisation. Regarding Brexit, some predicted, for instance, that British-European higher education relations would never be the same as before the referendum. Concerning COVID-19, there was speculation that the pandemic might usher in an era where physical mobility would no longer be the core focus of internationalisation, but rather transnational online degree programs.

However, when we look at the literature on institutional change and stability (e.g., Mahoney, 2000, Ebbinghaus, 2005), we find that societal institutions such as the church, nation states or higher education systems are relatively resistant to change—even in the face of major disruptive events. This is because of path dependencies, which exist, for instance, due to powerful actors preventing change in order to stay in power or because new policies and practices are not considered ‘normal’ by society.

 

Examining the disruptions’ impact in three major European higher education systems

The uncertainty about the status quo of European student mobility, combined with the diverging expectations of contemporary witnesses and the institutionalist literature, is the setting of my dissertation monograph Higher Education in an Age of Disruption. Comparing European Internationalisation Policies. In my book, I explore how Brexit and COVID-19 impacted student mobility policy and practices in England, France, and Germany between the years of 2016 and 2021. The three selected countries are not only among the top destinations for degree-seeking international and Erasmus students, but also represent different types of higher education systems. England is comparably market-based, while France is more state-dominated, and Germany traditionally follows the Humboldtian tradition of being state-financed while featuring a relatively strong academic self-governance. These differences allow for pertinent insights into how different higher education systems dealt with the disruptions.

 

Analytical approach of the study

The study involved 44 interviews with internationalisation experts from the three country contexts. These experts included heads of international offices of medium-sized to large universities and staff members from national education ministries and higher education internationalisation agencies (British Council, Campus France, DAAD). In addition, 234 documents were analysed, providing insights into events, debates, and changes related to Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic in the higher education sectors of England, Germany, and France. These documents included newspaper articles, parliamentary records, law changes, policy briefs, and statements from higher education stakeholders.

To assess whether and what kind of change occurred in higher education internationalisation, I developed indicators of the institutional dimensions of student mobility. According to Scott (2008), every institution consists of a regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive dimension.

In the regulative dimension of student mobility, country-specific immigration and university admission laws must be followed, as well as the statutes of mobility programmes (e.g., Erasmus). The normative dimension is reflected in the values and norms that internationalisation actors refer to in their daily practice. Of particular interest here is whether student mobility is pursued primarily for academic, political, economic, or cultural reasons (Knight, 2012). Furthermore, specific norms and activities in the higher education system are institutionalized through funding programs (e.g., by the EU or internationalisation agencies). The cultural-cognitive dimension includes fundamental perceptions and approaches that actors consider self-evident. Such taken-for-granted aspects include whether higher education is viewed as a fundamentally public or private good and, relatedly, whether a higher education system is predominantly market-based or state-led. These assumptions, in turn, influence whether higher education internationalisation is primarily conceived within a collaborative or competitive logic.

I coded both the expert interviews and documents according to the institutional dimensions and developed an analytical framework involving different types of overall institutional change. I classified no substantive change in all three institutional dimensions as overall institutional stability, change in one or two dimensions as partial change and change in all three dimensions as radical change.

 

Key findings

In all country-disruption combinations, I found partial change. That is, the regulative and/or the normative dimension of higher education internationalisation were altered in response to Brexit/the COVID-19 pandemic, but the cultural-cognitive frameworks underlying higher education internationalisation remained stable.

 

The regulative impact of Brexit on higher education internationalisation

Brexit was accompanied by substantive regulatory changes for student mobility. After years of protracted negotiations, the United Kingdom (UK) left the EU on February 1, 2020. Since January 1, 2021, EU students are required to apply for a paid visa for studying in the UK. Additionally, European students lost their right to reduced tuition fees. On December 24, 2020, the British government unexpectedly announced its withdrawal from Erasmus and the creation of its own mobility program. The non-reciprocal Turing Scheme, which solely provides scholarships for British outgoing students and not for incoming students, was presented as an optimized Erasmus program that would offer taxpayers “greater value for money” (Department for Education and The Rt Hon Sir Gavin Williamson CBE MP 2020).

For Germany and France, Brexit resulted in the UK being re-categorized as a third country. As a consequence, British students in France now need to apply for a visa, while in Germany, they require a residence permit.

 

Normative impact of Brexit

In terms of normative aspects, the British government, in the wake of Brexit, intensified its focus on exporting educational offerings to non-EU markets. In the second national internationalisation strategy, “Global potential, global growth,” adopted in 2019, Europe hardly finds mention. Leaving the EU is portrayed as an opportunity to reposition the UK as an educational provider in the European and especially global market. In student exchange, the focus is shifted to Commonwealth countries and the Anglosphere, which also play a central role as target regions in the Turing Scheme. While the British government distanced itself from the EU and non-economic internationalisation motives, the English higher education sector intensified its efforts towards European university partnerships and exchanges. English universities emphasized the shared European history and values, openly expressing criticism of the British government’s actions through position papers and symbolic protests, such as flying the EU flag on university buildings.

Both the French and German higher education sectors reacted with dismay to Brexit. However, this initial dismay quickly gave way to a defiant attitude regarding the importance of European cooperation. In both countries, Brexit led to an increased pursuit of partnership agreements with Northern and Eastern European countries. These countries’ offerings of English-language programs were seen as an attractive alternative to the lost British Erasmus partnerships. French President Emmanuel Macron’s 2017 speech at the Sorbonne University provided the impetus for the creation of the European Universities Initiative (EUI). The rapid implementation of this proposal, which by mid-2024 has resulted in over 60 university alliances involving more than 500 universities, is considered the most significant European internationalisation policy since the Bologna Process.

 

Cultural-cognitive impact of Brexit

While Brexit-induced changes occurred on both the regulatory and normative levels in all three countries, the changes remained anchored in culturally-cognitive, institutionalized societal perceptions. The normative clash between the British government and the pro-European higher education sector represents a continuation of the divided post-war British politics and identity, characterized by British exceptionalism—representing idea of the UK’s special role within Europe and the world—while simultaneously being involved in European integration processes. While the British government used Brexit as an opportunity to institutionalize the departure from the EU through new regulations, English universities actively worked against this, for example, by joining the EUI.

Thus, the central cultural-cognitive conflict between British exceptionalism and competitive internationalisation on the one hand, and European integration and collaborative internationalisation on the other, continues to persist. In the case of France and Germany, the regulative and normative changes signal a continued commitment to a higher education internationalisation fundamentally oriented towards Europeanization and collaborative activities

 

The regulative impact of COVID-19 on higher education internationalisation

The COVID-19 pandemic posed very different regulatory challenges for the English higher education sector compared to the German and French higher education sectors. The key factor here is the market-based nature of the English higher education system. Since international students represent a vital source of income for English universities, the expected long-term decline in international student numbers at the beginning of the pandemic posed an existential threat to the financial stability of the sector.

In response, English universities began compensating for the anticipated loss of international students by gaming established admissions practices: they sent an unusually high number of study offers to domestic secondary school graduates to outcompete other universities. This approach threatened to throw the entire higher education sector into chaos, prompting the British government to temporarily reintroduce the student number cap, a limit on the number of students universities can admit. This cap had been abolished in 2015, thereby introducing full-on market conditions. However, when international student numbers unexpectedly increased rather than decreased during the pandemic, this regulatory change was abolished, and the sector returned to the previous conditions of a fully market-based system—despite the pandemic highlighting significant weaknesses in the system and triggering widespread calls for reform from within the sector.

In contrast, the state-funded higher education systems of Germany and France faced different regulatory challenges. Since—unlike in England—online teaching was not widely practiced in either country before the pandemic, their face-to-face-based regulations had to be expanded in a very short time. This included, for example, enabling the use of online platforms like Zoom, conducting online exams, and allowing online enrolment for students who would not initially be able to physically enter the host country. In Germany, this involved creating an enrolment status for students who participated exclusively in digital classes. In France, the pandemic accelerated the implementation of the digital visa process for international students, a measure that had already been decided under the Bienvenue en France strategy.

 

Normative impact of COVID-19

In the normative dimension, the COVID-19 pandemic in England reinforced the focus on profitable internationalisation activities, particularly the recruitment of international students, to ensure the survival of universities. In Germany and France, norms regarding the acceptance of digital teaching and administration changed. Virtual exchange and Collaborative Online International Learning (COIL) formats gained significant traction as ways to compensate for the loss of physical mobility. In Germany, the DAAD launched several funding lines shortly after the outbreak of the pandemic to systematically advance the digitalisation of internationalisation. It is noteworthy that the increasing digitalisation of internationalisation was already on the agendas of universities and the internationalisation agencies DAAD and Campus France before the pandemic. However, limited financial and personnel resources had previously hindered the rapid implementation of digitalisation reforms.

 

Cultural-cognitive impact of COVID-19

The observed developments in the three country contexts point to stability of the cultural-cognitive dimension in the three higher education systems. Although the pandemic exposed the risks of a market-based higher education system, England maintained its status quo. Demands for funding reforms demanded by higher education actors fell on deaf ears on the part of the British government.

In France, pandemic measures and the continuation of the Bienvenue en France strategy were largely directed by a crisis management team within the French government, pointing to a comparably strong state involvement. In Germany, coordination of pandemic measures occurred at both the state level and nationally through the DAAD, and there was a comparably strong focus on the pedagogical component of digital internationalisation. Both France and Germany continued to emphasize international collaboration during the pandemic through virtual exchange programmes with partner universities. Contrary to the expectations of some higher education actors, more market-oriented activities, like transnational online programs, did not become a part of France’s and Germany’s internationalisation portfolios during the pandemic.

 

Summary

The comparative study found that Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic did not lead to radical changes of existing internationalisation strategies in the three country contexts. Instead, both disruptions created windows of opportunities that accelerated ongoing gradual changes and reinforced existing internationalisation logics. This was particularly evident in the country-specific stances towards Europeanisation and the digitalisation of higher education.

 

 

Anna P. Lohse is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Education at Technical University Berlin, Germany. She received her PhD from the Hertie School – The University of Governance in Berlin and holds an MA in International Education from New York University.

 

References

Crăciun, D. (2019). Systematizing National Higher Education Internationalization Strategies: Reconceptualizing a Process. PhD thesis. Central European University. https://ris.utwente.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/222724257/craciundaniela.pdf

Department for Education & The Rt Hon Sir Gavin Williamson CBE MP. (2020). New Turing scheme to support thousands of students to study and work abroad. Retrieved March 14, 2023 from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-turing-scheme-to-support-thousands-of-students-to-study-and-work-abroad

Ebbinghaus, B. (2005). Can path dependence explain institutional change? Two approaches applied to welfare state reform. Discussion Paper 05/2. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

Knight, J. (2012). Concepts, rationales, and interpretive frameworks in the internationalization of higher education. In D. K. Deardorff, H. de Wit, J. Heyl & T. Adams (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of International Higher Education (pp. 27–42). SAGE Publications.

Lohse, A. P. (2024). Higher Education in an Age of Disruption. Comparing European Internationalisation Policies. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-57912-7

Mahoney, J. (2000). Path Dependence in Historical Sociology. Theory and Society, 29(4), 507–548.

Scott, W. R. (2008). Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests (3rd ed.). SAGE Publications.

The post Change or stability? How Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic affected higher education internationalisation policies in Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This blog draws on my paper presentation in the Digital Governance: Emerging Technologies and Evolving Accountability Settings in the European Union panel at the 54th UACES 2024 Annual Conference in Trento, Italy. I want to thank the UACES for the Microgrant funding that supported my participation in the conference.

 

My Experience at the UACES 54th Annual Conference:

In September, I had the privilege of attending the UACES Annual Conference in Trento, an enriching experience for any PhD candidate like myself. For doctoral researchers, attending academic conferences is crucial for professional growth and meeting degree requirements. These events offer opportunities to present research, receive feedback, and engage in vital scholarly discussions. However, limited financial resources often make participation in such gatherings challenging, potentially hindering students’ ability to acquire the experiences necessary for an academic career. This is why initiatives like the UACES Microgrant are invaluable—they help PhD students and early career researchers to reach essential milestones. The UACES funding support allowed me to attend this conference, share my research, and actively engage with the European studies community. It marked a major step toward completing my PhD and provided an exceptional platform to network, collaborate, and learn from experts in the field.

 

Presenting My Research:

During the conference, I presented the paper The EU Cybersecurity Strategy: Promise and Paradox of a Human-Centred Approach in the Digital Governance: Emerging Technologies and Evolving Accountability Settings in the European Union panel. The paper sought to explore the human-centred approach to cybersecurity within the EU, examining how the EU has framed these cybersecurity policies within a comprehensive and holistic digital governance framework by asking how the EU framed human-centred cybersecurity policies.

Cyberspace and cybersecurity governance have emerged as one of the most significant geopolitical challenges of the 21st century. The European Union (EU) has prioritised developing a comprehensive framework for cybersecurity governance, focusing on specific rules and institutions related to cybersecurity, the digital economy, and the protection of digital human rights. This approach comes at a time when cyberspace is increasingly seen as the merging of internet technologies with various human activities—such as communication, commerce, education, and even warfare—activities that were once confined to the physical world. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic compelled the migration of daily activities (such as education, healthcare, and work) to the online sphere, resulting in a proliferation of digital threats. This underscored the difficulty of safeguarding individuals and their security in the digital realm.

Recognising the crucial importance of cyberspace and focusing on European values based on democracy, equality, the rule of law, and the promotion of human rights, the EU launched in 2020 the European Union Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade and subsequently, in March 2021, the Digital Compass 2030: the European Path to the Digital Decade, both with a vision focused on the digitalisation of the economy and society. The documents emphasise the EU’s commitment to a secure, protected, sustainable, and people-centric digital transformation in line with the EU’s values and fundamental rights. This strategy aims to strengthen European collective resilience against cyber threats, ensuring that all citizens and businesses benefit from secure and reliable digital services and tools. Nevertheless, this strategy presents the EU’s vision of reconciling market and societal digitalisation, promoting the industrial and technological resources necessary to benefit from its ambitious Digital Single Market.

The Paradox of a Human-Centred Approach

EU has adopted a cybersecurity strategy labelled a human-centred approach in the digital domain, aspiring to be a human-centric digital development model to create a digital environment that prioritises the well-being and rights of individuals. However, the strategy often emphasises frames such as strategic autonomy, geopolitical commission, digital sovereignty, and digital leadership. While crucial for the EU’s competitiveness and influence, these frames create a complex dynamic when positioned alongside a human-centred approach. My paper delved into this paradox, exploring how the EU faces a significant dilemma: maintaining its relevance as a global actor in the digital space while safeguarding its core values, including protecting individual rights and fostering an open, secure cyberspace. The challenge lies in reconciling the EU’s pursuit of digital sovereignty with its commitment to ensuring a safe and inclusive digital environment for all its citizens.

 

A Transformative Experience

Attending the UACES 54th Annual Conference was a transformative experience for me. It provided an opportunity not only to present my research but also to engage in meaningful discussions on the future of digital governance and cybersecurity in the EU. The exchange of ideas and the feedback I received were invaluable for my academic journey, and the connections I made will likely influence my work in the future.

I am deeply grateful to UACES for their financial support, which made this experience possible. As I progress with my research, I look forward to continuing my engagement with the broader European studies community.

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In September 2024, I was delighted to attend the UACES Annual Conference, held at the University of Trento, largely thanks to the financial support I received through a UACES Microgrant. PhD students frequently have issues obtaining funding for such activities, which greatly affects their capacity to participate in academic workshops, seminars, and conferences—key events for their professional growth and degree completion. Thus, opportunities such as those provided by the UACES Microgrant are not only critical for fulfilling graduation requirements but also essential for acquiring the certifications and qualifications needed to pursue an academic career after earning a PhD. UACES’ support allowed me to travel to Trento and witness in person the results of my work as co-convenor of the European Green Deal thematic track, as well as to present my work on Chinese green technology policy and its relevance for the EU in the wake of the myriad of anti-subsidy investigations that have recently been completed or are currently underway. 

The European Union (EU) and China are currently entangled in a critical debate over subsidies in the green energy sector, highlighting the complex intersection of trade, competition, and climate policy. As both sides vie for dominance in the burgeoning market for renewable energy and electric vehicles (EVs), investigations into state subsidies reveal deeper tensions about market fairness, economic competitiveness, and the future of the global green economy.

 

The Rising Tide of Chinese EVs in Europe 

China has rapidly emerged as a global leader in the electric vehicle industry, both in terms of production capacity and technological innovation. Chinese automakers such as BYD, NIO, and Geely have become household names in China and are now expanding aggressively into international markets, including Europe. In fact, Chinese EV brands have been growing their market share in the EU, partly due to their lower price points, which attract budget-conscious consumers. 

In contrast, European automakers, including companies like Volkswagen, BMW, and Stellantis, have faced challenges in scaling up their EV production, particularly due to higher labour costs, supply chain bottlenecks, and less direct state support compared to their Chinese counterparts. As the EU pushes toward its ambitious Green Deal, which includes plans to ban the sale of new internal combustion engine vehicles by 2035, European automakers are under pressure to scale up their EV production quickly to meet both consumer demand and regulatory requirements. 

However, the influx of cheaper Chinese EVs has raised alarms in the European automotive industry. For European automakers, the concern is that their higher production costs—driven by strict labour laws, environmental regulations, and less generous subsidies—are putting them at a competitive disadvantage. Many fear that without protective measures, the European EV market could soon be dominated by Chinese imports, much like what has happened in the solar panel sector, where Chinese manufacturers now control a significant share of the global market.

 

The EU’s Investigation into Chinese Electric Vehicle Subsidies 

In September 2023, the European Union announced a formal investigation into what it claims are unfair Chinese government subsidies for electric vehicle manufacturers. According to the EU, China’s financial support for its domestic EV producers allows them to sell vehicles in Europe at significantly lower prices than European counterparts, undermining the competitiveness of European automakers. 

The investigation, spearheaded by the European Commission, focused on the allegation that Chinese EV manufacturers are able to flood the European market with artificially low-priced vehicles due to the massive state support they receive at home. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, in her annual State of the Union address, framed the issue as one of fairness, asserting that the EU must defend itself against a flood of cheap Chinese products that benefit from state-backed financial advantages. She warned that this practice puts European companies at risk, particularly those working in an already competitive and capital-intensive industry like EV production. 

As a result of the investigation, the EU has proposed provisional countervailing duties on Chinese EV imports, ranging from 17% to 36%. The investigation process allows Chinese automakers and other interested parties to submit evidence, as the Commission seeks a balanced approach that complies with both EU and World Trade Organization rules. Chinese companies, meanwhile, argue that such measures could harm consumers by raising EV prices in Europe and slowing down the region’s green transition. The final determination is expected by the end of October 2024, with any duties likely to remain in force for five years. The EU’s decision will have far-reaching implications for its relationship with China and its ability to protect key green industries from external competition​.

 

China’s Response and Retaliatory Threats 

China has reacted sharply to the EU’s investigation, describing it as a form of protectionism that could damage the otherwise strong economic relationship between China and the European Union. The Chinese government has long maintained that its green energy sector, particularly its electric vehicle industry, has grown largely through technological advancements, economies of scale, and operational efficiency, not solely because of state subsidies. Chinese officials argue that European consumers benefit from the lower prices of Chinese-made EVs, which help accelerate the transition to cleaner energy. 

Beijing has also signaled that it may retaliate if the EU investigation leads to punitive measures such as tariffs or restrictions on Chinese imports. The potential for a tit-for-tat trade conflict looms, which could affect not only the automotive sector but also other areas of economic cooperation between the EU and China, including renewable energy technologies, where both sides are key players. 

China’s Ministry of Commerce warned that the investigation could have a negative impact on EU-China relations and undermine global efforts to combat climate change. China views itself as a critical partner in the global green energy transition and contends that international cooperation, not trade barriers, is essential for meeting global climate goals.

 

The EU’s Broader Concerns About Chinese State Subsidies 

The investigation into electric vehicle subsidies is part of a broader European concern about China’s growing economic influence in key sectors, particularly those related to green technology. Over the past decade, China has made substantial strides in industries like solar power, wind energy, and battery production, often supported by state-backed subsidies and low-interest loans. Chinese companies, benefiting from government policies aimed at fostering innovation and expansion, have gained significant market shares globally, in some cases overwhelming European and U.S. competitors. 

The solar panel industry provides a clear example of this dynamic. In the early 2010s, Chinese manufacturers rapidly scaled up production of photovoltaic panels, quickly becoming the world’s largest producers and exporters. European solar panel manufacturers struggled to compete with the low prices of Chinese products, which many argued were made possible by state subsidies and cheap labor. The result was a wave of bankruptcies among European solar companies, and today China controls the majority of the global solar panel supply chain. 

European policymakers fear that a similar pattern could emerge in the electric vehicle sector. The EU, through its Green Deal, has ambitious plans to lead the world in green technologies and achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. However, this vision is complicated by the reality of China’s competitive edge in industries like EVs and renewable energy infrastructure, where European companies face stiff competition from their Chinese rivals.

 

Conclusion 

The EU’s investigation into China’s green energy subsidies, particularly in the electric vehicle sector, represents a critical moment in the evolving relationship between two of the world’s largest economic powers. While both sides are committed to addressing climate change and advancing the green energy transition, their economic competition in key industries like electric vehicles and solar energy is becoming harder to ignore. 

For Europe, the challenge lies in finding a balance between protecting its domestic industries and remaining open to the benefits of international trade and competition. For China, the investigation is a test of how its growing economic influence will be managed on the global stage, particularly in areas where state subsidies have played a key role. 

As the world shifts toward a more sustainable future, the outcomes of these investigations will not only shape EU-China relations but also set important precedents for how green technology markets will evolve globally.

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Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Author: Pramiti Parwani.

Pramiti Parwani is a PhD Fellow at AIGHD, and is also based at the Amsterdam Law School at the University of Amsterdam (in the Law Centre for Health and Life and the Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance (ACELG)). Her PhD examines how the legal and institutional frameworks in the European Union and India influence the ‘capabilities’ of least developed countries to access pandemic vaccines for their populations. She combines third world approaches to international law (TWAIL) with the Capabilites Approach in her work, to examine barriers at different stages of the vaccine supply chain- from research and development, to manufacturing capacity to regulatory approval.

This blog draws from my PhD thesis, and is based on my presentation in a EUHealthGov panel at the UACES 2024 conference. My thanks to the EUHealthGov network for funding to support my participation at the UACES conference, and to the participants for the insightful discussions during the panels. Any mistakes remain my own.

Following the export restrictions and vaccine hoarding during the COVID-19 pandemic, concerns about global vaccine inequity still remain during the mpox outbreak. These health crises have clearly demonstrated the risks of over-reliance on foreign sources for pandemic health supplies, including vaccines, and underscore the urgent need to strengthen local vaccine manufacturing capacity—especially in regions where local production has been minimal or non-existent. While calls to expand local pharmaceutical production, including vaccine manufacturing, have long been prevalent, these efforts have received a significant boost during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. In Africa, while local vaccine production collectively only meets 1% of the total demand of the continent, a new plan for regional vaccine manufacturing intends to scale up vaccine production to be able to supply 60% of the total demand in the continent by 2040.

Consistent with the stated objective in the EU Global Health Strategy to strengthen its leadership as a global health actor, the EU invests in health-related infrastructure projects around the world. In order to mitigate fragmentation of overseas development cooperation from different Member States, the EU has introduced Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) to develop a streamlined approach to its external financing. Team Europe Initiatives form a crucial part of the Neighborhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe (Regulation (EU) 2021/947). By pooling resources from both EU institutions and Member States, TEIs enhance coordination amongst them, enabling more cohesive and structured overseas development assistance. This approach strengthens the EU’s image as a unified actor in its external actions and reinforces its influence on the global stage.

One of the most politically high-profile TEIs is the Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines, Medicines and Health Technologies (MAV+) programme. With the aim of facilitating equitable access to safe, effective, and affordable medicines in Africa, the MAV+ initiative seeks to provide support for scaling-up vaccine production capacity on the continent. The project was announced in 2021, and  brings together the EU, 16 EU Member States, and the European Investment Bank, to provide financial, technical, and policy support across three components –supply aspect, demand aspect, and a broader facilitating environment for pharmaceuticals production.

The supply side focuses on industrial growth by involving the private sector, maintaining quality assurance systems, and supply chain management. The demand side includes trust-building activities and health promotion to overcome vaccine hesitancy. It also tackles the issue of fragmented market demand, which can impede the expansion of manufacturing capabilities across the continent. Lastly, the initiative also aims to improve pharmaceutical development by improving the underlying enabling environment – by facilitating access to finance in order to foster private investment, strengthening regulatory systems to accelerate pharmaceutical approvals, and intellectual property management. The MAV+ project was launched with a €1 billion financial commitment – an amount that has been the subject of some confusion. While this amount was initially understood by African partners as new funding, in reality, the amount mainly consists of previously allocated funds.

It was further understood that the initiative would be complemented by private funds and efforts, although further details are scarce. The most notable private component comes from  BioNTech, a German company, which in 2021 announced its plans to establish mobile vaccine production units – called ‘BioNTainers’ – in Africa. The BioNTainers are shipping containers repurposed for vaccine manufacturing, and were promoted as a “modular system, scalable and turnkey solution for local manufacturing” to provide a fast-track solution to expanding vaccine manufacturing capacity in Africa. The press release announcing the BioNTainers mentioned that BioNTech staff would initially run the BioNTainers, before providing training to local personnel to take over.

In 2023, the first BioNTainer facility was inaugurated in Rwanda. Although the funding for the facility comes from BioNTech, the MAV+ project provides indirect support by strengthening the business and regulatory ecosystem in Rwanda. In 2022, Team Europe actors launched a twinning project with the Rwandan National Regulatory Authority as part of the MAV+ program, with the aim of enhancing the the regulatory environment for the approval of health products. Around the time of the inauguration of the BioNTainer facility in Rwanda, Team Europe also pledged an additional €40 million through the MAV+ project to support vocational and technical education to cultivate a workforce for pharmaceutical manufacturing in Rwanda, in addition to fostering a start-up ecosystem within the country. Further, the launch of the BioNTainer facility in Rwanda was attended by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and a Vice President of the European Investment Bank, another partner in the MAV+ initiative. In her speech at the inaugration, President von der Leyen highlighted the Team Europe approach.

Such support, even where indirect, to private manufacturers from public funds, should include associated requirements for technology transfer and increased access to affordable medicines. Currently, however, there are no binding obligations for BioNTech to share its technology with other manufacturers. Many observers argue that BioNTech could have more effectively facilitated timely access to safe and effective vaccines in Africa by collaborating with existing African manufacturers through the WHO mRNA technology transfer hub and independent licensing agreements. In contrast, the BioNTainer “cut-and-paste model” of exporting portable, modular vaccine production units does not  support technology transfer, and has been criticized for being little more than a “neo-colonial stunt”. Human Rights Watch had previously identified at least seven manufacturing facilities in Africa, and an additional 100 facilities in other low-and-middle-income countries, which had capacity to establish or expand vaccine production at a short notice, provided that existing vaccine manufacturers would be willing to share their technology.

In light of the concerns mentioned above, and given the EU’s considerable external impact through the Team Europe Initiative, some key points need attention as the MAV+ project progresses. First, to ensure the success of the project, it is essential that African partners, such as the African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (AfricaCDC) and Partnerships for African Vaccine Manufacturing (PAVM), maintain ownership and control over important decision-making processes, considering the unique local circumstances and needs. This approach is crucial for fostering a sustainable production and knowledge ecosystem on the continent while minimizing excessive reliance on external support.

Second, the importance of this ownership becomes even more pronounced when EU support – directly or indirectly – helps establish a favorable business and regulatory environment for EU companies abroad. Further study is necessary to better investigate the indirect market-making effects of overseas development cooperation by the EU.

Third, when EU support indirectly serves the interests of EU private entities, this should be leveraged to better regulate their activities. As discussed above, while BioNTech gains access to new markets in Africa and benefits from an improved drug regulatory authority in Rwanda through the MAV+ project, the BioNTainer model is not best suited for strengthening Rwandan local production capabilities. Therefore, there should be a greater emphasis on technology transfer, which is currently only addressed in a limited and ad-hoc manner in the MAV+ project.

The EU’s commitment to emerging as a global health leader comes with a responsibility to ensure that it oversees development cooperation efforts through the Team Europe Approach to enhance health sovereignty in partner countries. There is a need to optimise efforts under the MAV+ project in a manner that prioritizes local ownership and technology transfer to help foster sustainable health systems.

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Author: Ricardo Pereira, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University. Ricardo Pereira is a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations at Dublin City University. He serves as a data coder for the project ”EXCEPTIUS Exceptional Powers in Times of Sars-CoV-2 Crisis.”. His research has primarily revolved around topics, such as Private Security Companies, EU Health Security, and Securitization studies.

During the 54th UACES annual conference in Trento, the paper about the collective securitisation process of COVID-19 carried out by the European Union (EU) was discussed under the panel The EU as a Global Health Actor – Between Securitisation and Cooperation organised by the EUHealthGov network. The paper aimed to understand how the Union in March 2020 became empowered by the member states to assume the role of coordinator of the EU response against the pandemic and its consequences across social, economic, and health sectors by asking How the EU discourse, particularly the Commission, did reflect the collective securitisation of COVID-19, between 2020 and September 2021. As argued by the literature in EU Health law and policy, the shared competence of the EU on health was bumbling at the time the pandemic emerged. The pandemic instigated the debate about the competence of the EU on health as stated by the president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen as well as by the Commissioner for Health and Food Safety Stella Kyriakides.

The ongoing research has already looked at 52 speeches from the Commission between 2020 and 2021 under discourse analysis. It is possible to identify three paths of securitisation: threat construction; security construction; and announcement of measures. The first relates the EU discourse regarding COVID-19 as a threat to referent objects such as EU citizens, EU values, and EU institutions, while the second describes the call of the Union for a unified front against the pandemic. The third path refers to the implementation of measures. These three paths should be seen as interdependent and overlapped, once the analysed speeches presented the EU’s position as a security actor facing a multidimensional threat such as the COVID-19 pandemic through (extra)ordinary measures.

The present analysis took the work of Bengtsson and Rhinard (2019) about the collective securitisation of health in the EU as the initial status quo to analyse the evolution of the Union’s response to the pandemic. Following the model of collective securitisation of Sperling and Webber (2019), the research aims to analyse how the organisation constructed COVID-19 as a threat; how the Union developed its role as a health security actor capable of responding in a coordinated and cooperative approach to such a threat; and understand the recursive interaction between EU institutions that led to the implementation and possible routinisation of measures into new practices, agendas, and vocabulary.

In this vein, the research has tracked four periods of securitisation carried out by the EU already. The first comprehends the period between February and March 2020. During this time, COVID-19 was described as a test of EU core values of cooperation and solidarity. The Commission discourse constructed COVID-19 as a brutal threat by defining the pandemic as a global health crisis, following the international community discourse of main organisations such as WHO and NATO. Furthermore, the EU called for attention to pandemic consequences for the EU as an institution and its values by highlighting the impact that a sanitary nationalist approach could have. At the same time, the Commission called for a central response to the pandemic by appealing to a European memoir of cooperation and coordination. Historical memories such as the reconstruction of Europe after World War II were used to develop a sentiment of unity across member states. Consequently, this move would result in the beginning of the EU’s empowerment to respond to the pandemic in one voice, despite existing punctual divergences across time such as in the cases of Poland and Hungary. The joint procurement of personal protective equipment based on a stockpile under rescEU, as well as the development of financial mechanisms such as green lanes, and the activation of the general escape clause, are some examples of this move.

The second period between April and September 2020 could be named as the Marshall Plan for the post-COVID-19. Although the decrease in infections and deaths, the concern regarding the damages caused in the economic and financial sectors, led the Commission to describe the pandemic event as “the largest recession in 100 years”. The COVID-19 pandemic should be seen this way as a multidimensional event. It has not just impacted people’s health, but also the social and economic spheres around the globe. The Commission’s construction of COVID-19 as a multidimensional threat, relying on the interdependence between health, economic, social, and environmental sectors, would create a space for the discussion about the competence of the EU on health. In the summer of 2020 mechanisms such as SURE aimed to support jobs across the Union, also, during this time the draft for a European BARDA started. During the third period, the number of infections and deaths rose and the brutal threat discourse was back in the daily EU vocabulary. The role of the EU as an actor in the fight against the pandemic was established and its agenda was focused on strengthening the public health structure of the Union by empowering institutions such as ECDC and EMA, as well as implementing a strategy for vaccination across the EU territory at the end of the year.

During 2021, the fourth and last period of analysis, the Commission framed COVID-19 variants as the new exceptionality of the pandemic. The international role of the EU was coined by the Commission as “the pharmacy of the world” due to its move from scarcity at the beginning of the crisis to one of the main exporters of protective equipment and vaccines in the world. In this regard, the EU’s role in the African continent should be also underlined with the construction of vaccine factories, although critique can be addressed to the process of how it was designed. There has not been effective investment in logistical processes to deliver these vaccines to remote populations, and the know-how has not been shared with the communities where these factories are located. At the EU level, extraordinary measures of surveillance were implemented through the use of the digital certificate or the creation of Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA).

To conclude, preliminary conclusions can be highlighted. Regarding the threat construction, the characterisation suis generis by the EU of COVID-19 as a brutal threat through the classification of a global health crisis. As a securitising actor, the EU showed a more stable process of conducting the process. In the words of Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen, the EU member states during the pandemic agreed to empower the Union to respond to the pandemic under three keywords: coordination, cooperation, and solidarity. Moreover, the pandemic represents a window of opportunity to discuss the competence of health in the EU as well as new approaches to public health in the Union. To conclude, the next steps of this research will contemplate, empirically, the analysis of the following years of the EU4Health programme. The research aims to assess if measures developed to respond to COVID-19 were routinised on the Union structure. Furthermore, theoretically, the present research pretends to look for representations of security integration in the health domain, arguing this way for the utility of collective securitisation for security and integration studies.

The post Between a breeze and a storm of change: EU collective securitisation of COVID-19 appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

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