European Union

Tony Blair’s call to spirits to rise up from the deep to throw off Brexit was worthy of Owen Glendower’s faith in his magical powers. So too is the reply that Shakespeare gave Hotspur: ‘Why so can I or so can any man. But will they come when you do call for them?’ Blair’s cosmopolitan audience showed there are people in the City of London welcoming his call to remain in the European Union. But his talk gave no hint of how troops raised in the Square Mile could successfully capture Parliament.

The most straightforward way to repudiate the Brexit referendum result is to call a second referendum in which some who voted to leave would change their minds as signs emerge of the difficulties and uncertainties entailed in de-integrating the UK from the EU. It would require a swing of less than 2.0 percent to turn the minority vote for remaining in the EU into a majority.

For this to happen, Parliament would have to approve another referendum. Remainers could try to emulate the successful campaign of their opponents and seek an MP among the 20 qualified to introduce a Private Member’s bill in this session of Parliament. A mischievous Scottish National Party MP could speak from conviction of remaining in the EU. Defeat of the bill by an overwhelming mass of English MPs would add fuel to the party’s case for Scottish independence.

One stumbling block to a referendum is the wording of the question. Tony Blair’s call favours the proposition that the United Kingdom should remain a member of the European Union; the Conservative majority favours the opposite. Like the historic Glendower, Blair is ignoring the strength of the troops massed against him in Parliament. In any event, the Government can claim that the courts have given MPs a voice. Earlier in February almost 500 MPs voted to go ahead with withdrawal, including a majority of Labour as well as Tory members.

In a sense, Blair is correct in stating that both the referendum and parliamentary votes have been taken ‘without knowledge of the true terms of Brexit’. These can only become known in autumn 2018, when UK and EU negotiators publish joint recommendations about the rules that should govern the post-Brexit relations between UK and the EU when it officially cases to be a member before Easter 2019. Once these terms are known, Remainers could promote a referendum about whether the terms should be accepted. The government would again reject such a demand on the grounds that a parliamentary vote is sufficient to authorise acceptance.

Theresa May has left open whether the government would recommend accepting a deal with the EU or endorse its rejection if its terms were a bad deal. Conservative MPs critical of the only deal on offer would want to hold the Prime Minister to her pledge that exit with no deal is better than accepting a bad deal. At present, a majority of MPs would prefer to vote for whatever deal was available rather than no deal. In the House of Lords, where the government lacks a majority, a majority of peers would undoubtedly endorse whatever an elected government negotiated and the Commons approved.

Blairite MPs could offer an amendment asking the government to return to Brussels to withdraw its notification of withdrawal. Such a strategy assumes that the EU would allow the UK to rescind its notification of withdrawal. The EU has made it clear that, like pro-Brexit Tory MPs, it wants an end to years of uncertainty about whether Britain is in or out of Europe. Labour MPs would face the awkward choice of voting for the government’s deal as a lesser evil or casting a negative vote that would not lead to better terms but to a complete break with the EU.

In practice, the only way to undo the referendum vote is to have a House of Commons with a majority of MPs in favour of British membership in the EU. If Blair issued a call for a general election before withdrawal is a fact, he would need the votes of 433 MPs for a ballot, or dozens of Conservative and SNP MPs to combine with Labour to form a new government with Jeremy Corbyn as Prime Minister. If Hotspur were a bookmarker, he would offer odds of more than a million to one against this. Once a new House of Commons is elected in 2020, there will be five years for MPs to review the consequences of what Parliament and people have voted for and decide to apply to become an EU member state.

Instead of issuing a call which is  certain to get a parliamentary response only from Lord Mandelson, Tony Blair could achieve more if he tried to work his magic on the devils that are in the details of Brexit and will affect the state of Britain in the world once it no longer belongs to the European Union. For example, he could return to a cause he once advocated when shadow minister for employment a quarter century ago: the need to improve state education and vocational training so that British workers and enterprises can compete better in an increasingly competitive world.

The post Does Tony Blair have an answer to Shakespeare’s Hotspur? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

DRAFT REPORT on Towards EU strategy for international cultural relations
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Culture and Education
Elmar Brok, Silvia Costa

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

General : The rights of EU citizens living in the UK, access to medicine and visa reciprocity with the US will be dealt with during this week's plenary session in Brussels on Wednesday on Thursday. In addition committees discuss the reform of asylum legislation while the inquiry committee investigating the car emissions scandal presents its findings and recommendations.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

General : The rights of EU citizens living in the UK, access to medicine and visa reciprocity with the US will be dealt with during this week's plenary session in Brussels on Wednesday on Thursday. In addition committees discuss the reform of asylum legislation while the inquiry committee investigating the car emissions scandal presents its findings and recommendations.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

I am pleased to welcome President Sargsyan to Brussels today.

Armenia whose independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity we support is an important partner for the European Union.

I am very pleased to announce today the conclusion of negotiations on the new EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement.

This new agreement will broaden the scope of our relations, taking into account the new global, political and economic interests we share and challenges we want to face together.

We are looking forward to stronger cooperation in sectors such as energy, transport and the environment, for new opportunities in trade and investments, and for increased mobility for the benefit of our citizens.

We have discussed today our shared values including our commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, which underpin the new agreement and our future cooperation.

The EU is already the first trade partner of Armenia, its first international donor and strongest supporter to reforms. We intend to expand these relations further in the coming years and have encouraged Armenia to continue reforms across a range of issues, including economic development, the business environment, the judiciary, human rights, the fight against corruption and measures to ensure free and fair elections.

We also discussed the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The status quo is unsustainable. The conflict needs an early political settlement in accordance with international law. It does not have a military solution. The EU continues to fully support the mediation efforts and proposals of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs.

Mr President, thank you very much for coming to Brussels for your visit, for all your efforts and for our cooperation.

The Maltese Presidency and European Parliament representatives reached a provisional agreement on extending the EU's funding to the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG).

Nearly €14 million will be allocated for the period 2017 to 2020 to ensure the operational continuity of the EFRAG. The EU's contribution to EFRAG's budget accounts for around 60%.

Christian Cardona, Minister for the Economy, Investment and Small Business of Malta, said: "Adequate funding will allow the EFRAG to carry out its mission effectively. EFRAG is now well equipped to continue advising the European Commission on international financial reporting standards in the interest of the European project. Independence and transparency are essential for strengthening the single market of financial services and capital". 

EFRAG's mission is to develop and promote European views in the field of financial reporting. It also tries to ensure that these views are duly taken into account within the International Accounting Standards Board, which is the independent body responsible for developing International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 

In 2009, the EU launched a programme to support activities in the field of financial services, financial reporting and auditing. The beneficiaries of the programme are the IFRS Foundation, the EFRAG and the Public Interest Oversight Board (PIOB). 

The programme was extended under regulation 258/14 for the period 2014 to 2020 for the IFRS Foundation and the PIOB only. 

Concerning EFRAG, the Council and the Parliament decided to wait until a number of reforms in the EFRAG governance were completed. The governance reform of EFRAG to strengthen the EU's contribution to the development of international accounting standards was implemented on 31 October 2014.

Today's provisional agreement has still to be confirmed by the Council and the European Parliament in the coming weeks. Once confirmed, the total allocation from the EU budget to EFRAG will amount to €23 million for the period 2014 to 2020, which matches the Commission initial estimate.

The fifth meeting of the Accession Conference with Serbia at ministerial level was held today in Brussels to open negotiations on chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy, and to open and provisionally close chapter 26 - Education and culture. 

The European Union delegation was led by Mr Louis Grech, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for European Affairs and Implementation of the Electoral Manifesto of the Republic of Malta, on behalf of the Maltese Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The European Commission was represented by Mr Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. The Serbian delegation was led by Ms Jadranka Joksimović, Minister without portfolio responsible for European integration. 

Following today's Conference, Serbia will have opened 8 chapters out of a total of 35 negotiation chapters of which 2 chapters have already been provisionally closed. Further Accession Conferences will be planned, as appropriate, in order to take the process forward. The accession negotiations were launched in January 2014. 

Chapters concerned 

Regarding the chapters on the agenda, the Union has closely examined Serbia's present state of preparations. 

Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy 

On the understanding that Serbia has to continue to make progress in the alignment with and implementation of the acquis in Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy, the EU noted that there is one benchmark that needs to be met for provisional closure of this chapter. The benchmark is as follows: 

• Serbia puts in place and starts to implement a comprehensive industrial strategy, supported by a system of evaluation indicators and benchmarks as suggested by EU policies relevant to industry.

Chapter 26 - Education and culture 

Regarding negotiations on chapter 26 - Education and culture, the EU considered that, exceptionally, benchmarks for the provisional closure of this chapter were not required, given the general good level of Serbia's state of preparedness in the area of Education and culture, and the limited scope and particular nature of acquis obligations in this chapter. The EU therefore noted that, at this stage, this chapter does not require further negotiations.

For both chapters on the agenda, monitoring of progress in the alignment with and implementation of the acquis will continue throughout the negotiations. The EU underlined that it would devote particular attention to monitoring all specific issues mentioned in its common positions. The EU will, if necessary, return to these chapters at an appropriate moment.

On 27 February 2017, the Council adopted a regulation on visa liberalisation for Georgians travelling to the EU for a period of stay of 90 days in any 180-day period.

"This agreement will bring the people of Georgia and the EU closer together and will strengthen tourism and business ties. It follows the completion of the necessary reforms by Georgia, addressing document security, border management, migration and asylum. In addition, the recent adaptation of the suspension mechanism has made this agreement possible." 

Carmelo Abela, Maltese Minister for Home Affairs and National Security

The Council and the European Parliament now need to sign the adopted regulation. The text will then be published in the EU Official Journal and will enter into force 20 days later, at the same time as the new visa waiver suspension mechanism.

The regulation formally amends regulation 539/2001, moving Georgia from Annex I (countries whose nationals need a visa to enter the Schengen area) to Annex II (visa free countries). Georgian citizens with a biometric passport travelling to the EU for up to 90 days for business, tourist or family purposes will no longer need a visa.

These measures will not apply to Ireland and the United Kingdom, in accordance with the protocols annexed to the EU treaties. The visa regime of these member states remains subject to their national legislation.

On 27 February 2017, the Council adopted a regulation to revise the suspension mechanism which can be applied to all existing visa liberalisation agreements.

"Visa liberalisation brings great advantages to the EU and third countries. At the same time, the EU must be able to respond effectively in cases where the rules are not being respected. The revision of the suspension mechanism adopted today makes it easier to tackle abuse of the system."

 Carmelo Abela,  Maltese Minister for Home Affairs and National Security

The objective of the revised regulation is to strengthen the suspension mechanism. It does this by making it easier for member states to notify circumstances which might lead to a suspension, by enabling the Commission to trigger the mechanism on its own initiative, and by tasking the Commission to send annual reports to the European Parliament and Council on the extent to which visa-exempt third countries continue to meet the necessary criteria.

The possible grounds for suspension have been extended, and include a decrease in cooperation on readmission, a substantial increase in the refusal rate of readmission applications, including for third-country nationals in transit, and a substantial increase in the risk to public policy or the internal security of the member states.

The use of the mechanism will also be facilitated by shortening reference periods and deadlines in order to allow for a faster procedure. In particular, the reference period for comparing the circumstances leading to the suspension with the situation during the previous year or before visa liberalisation is shortened from six to two months.

The suspension can be triggered by a notification of a member state or by the Commission. If a simple majority of member states notify, the Commission will have to adopt an implementing decision temporarily suspending the exemption from the visa requirement for certain categories of nationals of the third country concerned for a period of 9 months. During this period, the Commission shall establish an enhanced dialogue with the third country concerned to remedy the circumstances in question.

If the circumstances persist, the Commission shall adopt (at the latest two months prior to the expiry of the 9 months) a delegated act temporarily suspending the visa waiver for a further period of 18 months, for all the nationals of the third country concerned. Before the end of the period of validity of the delegated act, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council. This report may be accompanied by a legislative proposal to transfer the reference to the third country concerned from Annex II (visa free countries) to Annex I (countries whose nationals need a visa to enter the Schengen area).

A monitoring mechanism has been introduced with the purpose of ensuring that third countries which have been granted visa exemption following a visa liberalisation dialogue continue to fulfil the criteria which were the basis for granting visa free status.

Ireland and the United Kingdom will not be subject to the application of these measures, in accordance with the protocols annexed to the EU treaties. The visa regime of these member states remains subject to their national legislation.

Next steps

The Council and the European Parliament now need to sign the adopted regulation. The signed text will be published in the EU Official Journal and will enter into force 20 days later.

Ask not whether the European Union is a federation or not, ask what Europe can teach us about the very concept of federation!

In a nutshell, this is one of my major take-homes from a particularly enriching seminar held in Nantes on 17 February at the Chair of European Philosophy of Alliance Europa. Olivier Beaud, constitutional lawyer at the University of Paris (Panthéon-Assas) and one of France’s best-known theorists of the State, discussed his ‘Theory of Federation’ with Julien Barroche from Inalco and Sciences Po Paris.

Olivier Beaud declared himself absolutely not convinced by the eternal ‘sui generis’ categorisation of the European Union. The widespread use of this comfortable conceptual no man’s land is no doubt due to a certain intellectual laziness (and the desire to keep the poisonous ‘F’-word out of the debate). It keeps the researcher from thinking the idea of federation to the end. Julien Barroche agreed: he called the ‘sui generis’ model a ‘conceptual imprisonment by retroactive rationalisation’.

Oliver Beaud took things even further: for him, the well-known dichotomy between ‘federal state’ and ‘confederation of states’ is yet another ‘obstacle to thought’. The real antagonism lies between ‘federation’ and ‘state’, the former standing for a dualism of structures, the latter for unicity (almost like the difference between stereo and mono :-).

If a federation is a ‘union between states that decide to unify in order to become something else’, a state that enters a federation ceases to be a state strictu sensu. The entities formely known as states do not disappear – they are the creators of a new judicial being, an association in which they remain present and on whose development they maintain an influence.

According to Olivier Beaud, our vision has been blurred by the nomenclature of international law, which has imposed the exclusive domination of the (nation-)state as actor. But this vision is nothing short of an ‘excessive simplification’, because it keeps federations and their specificities out of the radar.

Julien Barroche and Olivier Beaud, welcomed by Arnauld Leclerc from the Chair of European Philosophy.

Of course, the European Union is, despite a series of federative elements, an incomplete federation. Its most striking paradox is that, as federation, it was created on the basis of concerns for security and prosperity with regard to the exterior – Julien Barroche quoted Raymond Aron for whom a federation is ‘resolutely decided to defend its identity towards the exterior’ – while it is exactly this unicity towards exterior threats that is both needed and lacking on the European level.

Taking the historical evolution of the United States of America as a benchmark for how federations behave, Olivier Beaud noted that Europe has not known the same centralising shift from federation to State that the US underwent under the pressure of successive wars. Neither is it capable and willing to ensure, especially with regard to current dramatic infringements on democracy in Hungary and Poland, the minimum homogeneity of political regimes within its federation.

He finished  – of course! – with a thought on Brexit.

In a federation, unilateral secession is by definition illicit. And until the introduction of article 50 in the Treaty of Lisbonne, it was not foreseen in the EU either. Article 50, however, was conceived as an element of compensation during negotiations, as an option permanently available to member state, thus bringing the incomplete European federation one step further back, in the direction of becoming merely an international organisation.

There was another lovely conceptual take-away in waiting at the end of this dense and inspiring seminar. It was offered by Jean-Marc Ferry, who holds the chair in European philosophy in Nantes. In his concluding reflection, he suggested to think about the incompatibility between federation and sovereignty in a different, differentiated light. In reference to the concepts of negative and positive liberty developed by several philosophers from Friedrich Wilhelm to Isaiah Berlin, he proposed the concepts of negative and positive sovereignty, the former being exemplified in Brexit as the kind of (fake) sovereignty that is still available to member-states, while the latter, as capacity to act and take control of one’s destiny, is the one which a member-state has definitely lost when entering the federation and which can only be recovered and enacted collectively.

Given the sheer quality of the debate, I was not surprised to see that among the public no one was looking at their computer screens or smartphone displays (a welcome change from what has become the norm of academic events). A refreshing, good old 20th-century colloquium with an audience of two dozen people actually listening with concentration and attention, and no doubt walking out with the feeling of being more intelligent than when they entered the room two hours earlier. If in addition you can take away thoughts on your TGV home that you know will enrich your teaching and research, you have a brief, satisfying glimpse of what academic life might be.

 

The post Take-aways on federation and sovereignty appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On 27 February 2017, the Council decided to prolong the restrictive measures against Belarus for one year, until 28 February 2018. These measures include an arms embargo and an asset freeze and a travel ban against four people listed in connection with the unresolved disappearances of two opposition politicians, one businessman and one journalist in 1999 and in 2000. The Council also introduced an exemption to the restrictive measures to allow export of biathlon equipment to Belarus, which will remain subject to prior authorisation by national competent authorities on a case by case basis.

Tangible steps taken by Belarus to respect universal fundamental freedoms, rule of law and human rights will remain key for the shaping of the EU's future policy towards Belarus, as stated in Council conclusions of 15 February 2016.

The restrictive measures against Belarus were first introduced in 2004 in response to the disappearance of the four persons referred to above The Council later adopted further restrictive measures against those involved in the violation of international electoral standards and international human rights law, as well as in the crackdown on civil society and democratic opposition.  The arms embargo was introduced in 2011. On 15 February 2016, the Council decided to lift the restrictive measures against 170 individuals and three companies, while maintaining the arms embargo and the sanctions against the four persons. This decision was taken while acknowledging the steps taken by Belarus that have contributed to improving EU-Belarus relations.

Conventional wisdom is that opposition parties perform well and gain ground in by-elections while governing parties don’t. In Stoke Central, Labour managed to retain their seat, albeit with a reduced majority. The Conservative’s win in Copeland, however, was nothing short of a disaster for Labour in a constituency they have consistently held since the 1980s. It is the first by-election gain by a governing party since 1982.

There has been a temptation since the EU referendum to view subsequent electoral contests primarily through the lens of Brexit. Brexit, it is argued, is the new divide in British politics. Voters are aligned to remain or leave. There are remain constituencies and there are leave constituencies. This narrative was present in coverage in the run up to yesterday’s by-elections – to some extent in Copeland and to a large extent in Stoke. Media coverage was keen to highlight that both constituencies voted leave in the referendum. With around 70% voting for ‘leave’ in June’s EU referendum, Stoke attained the status of “the Brexit capital of Britain”, making it a prime target for the new UKIP leader Paul Nuttall, keen to reach out to disaffected Labour voters. Candidates were initially assessed not on their broader appeal to the local electorate, but whether they supported remain or leave in the referendum, whether they would respect the result of the referendum and so on. It’s a narrative that worked well with the Richmond by-election in December 2016, but cannot be applied so readily to yesterday’s by-elections.

Brexit no doubt played a role yesterday, but the result in Stoke in particular challenges the simplistic narrative that constituencies and voters can be neatly divided into “remain” and “leave”. Instead, questions can be raised about a range of other possible factors which have played a role.

For example, what impact has the popularity of party leaders had? Labour’s problems arguably run much deeper than its current leadership, but Jeremy Corbyn is by no means a popular leader. In the latest YouGov poll only 15% think he is best for Prime Minister, compared to 49% for Theresa May. Following her election last night, the Conservative victor Trudy Harrison was explicitly clear in attributing her success in what had been a long-term Labour seat to the fact that voters in Copeland simply felt that “Jeremy Corbyn doesn’t represent them”. This was despite the future of the local NHS hospital being one of the key issues locally, something Labour traditionally should have been able to capitalize on.

What about the quality of the candidates themselves? In Stoke, both Snell and Nuttall were the focus of significant media attention. Snell received significant criticism following the revelation of his less than squeaky clean social media history. And Nuttall too for his claims about Hillsborough and his potential breach of electoral law by failing to list his actual address on the nomination forms. Snell was able to draw on his local connections to Stoke, while Nuttall was never going to be able to shift his status as an opportunistic parachute candidate.

What about the local campaigns? The Conservatives put a lot of effort into the on-the-ground campaign to win Copeland, and it clearly paid off. Labour similarly had a heavy presence on the ground in Stoke, while UKIP’s efforts there were hardly a model for an efficient party campaign machinery in action. Again, Nuttall’s failure to list his correct address on his nomination form, along with his absence from some local hustings events are illustrations of this.

And what about the issues that resonate with local people (all politics is local after all)? Much has been made of the importance of the nuclear industry as a major employer in Copeland. To what extent did the current Labour leadership’s perceived ambivalence and lack of commitment to nuclear play on voters’ minds there? In Stoke, despite the high leave vote in June’s referendum, Brexit barely got a mention in the local campaign. Rather the performance of the local hospital, the future of other local public services and a general dissatisfaction with Westminster politics were key issues on the doorstep. This was even recognized by UKIP, and Nuttall was keen to point out in hustings (those that he attended) that Brexit wasn’t the most important issue at stake in the by-election.

Yes, certain areas voted predominately to leave, and others to remain. But yesterday’s by-elections show us the picture is far more complex than this simple characterization would have us believe. Leave vs. remain becomes rather more murky when you throw in the dynamics of party competition, for example. For those of us that study politics, this reaffirms the complexity of electoral contests, and the need to consider a range of local and national factors that have the potential to influence voter behaviour and the outcome of elections. Brexit and the proportion of leave/remain voters in any given area may be one of a number of explanatory factors explaining electoral outcomes, but it is important not to lose sight of local context.

The post Yesterday’s by-elections weren’t all about Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This year’s Munich Security Conference took place under the theme ‘Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order?’ and hoped to steer the direction of politicians and policy-makers into facing the wave of fake news and fake facts. Originally, the purpose of the Munich Security Conference is for senior politicians, diplomats and military experts to discuss current issues in the field of security and defence. The agenda sounded promising, especially for those interested in the future of the Atlantic Alliance, politics of the West and EU-US relations. If you looked for discussions on pressing and highly important security and defence issues, you were in the wrong place.

Speeches and roundtable discussions by the representatives of the most powerful states reflected the same blah-blah as every year. It was the first performance by the newly formed US administration represented by a delegation around Vice-President Michael Richard Pence, Secretary of Defence James Mattis and Senator John McCain. All three US representatives stressed the importance of NATO, the United States’ commitment to collective defence and to the transatlantic partnership. Mattis criticised the European allies for the lack of commitment terms of defence spending and Pence especially demanded an increased contribution by France, Germany and Italy.

As a reaction, German minister of defence, Ursula von der Leyen, called for a more ‘responsibly minded America’ and demanded that Europe should not always rely on the United States, instead it should be responsible for itself in these times of uncertainty. Newly appointed Sigmar Gabriel – it seems on behalf of the European allies – proclaimed that ‘we must not leave Europe to those who want to destroy it’.

While these speeches and calls sound all too promising and appealing in times of uncertainty, populism and increasing crises in and around Europe, these talks have not changed. And, what are the results? It is the same procedure as every year. It is the same rhetoric and the same lack of concrete measures and actions.

What the main criticism here is that, while the Munich Security Conference is supposed to be a forum to discuss and find solutions of crises and conflicts, the most pressing ones have been neglected and pushed towards the end of the agenda. The main talks circulated around new US administration under Donald Trump – despite his absence – and how ‘obsolete’ NATO might be. More urgent security issues have not been touched upon, such as, above all, how to deal with the increasing authoritarian style of government in Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the next crises lurking in South Sudan and the Central African Republic, and how to actually solve still ongoing crises and conflicts in Eastern Europe (Ukraine and Russia), the Middle East (Iraq, Syria) as well as in North and Sub-Saharan Africa (migration, migration, human rights violations).

In addition, there was not much talk about the future of the relations of the West with Russia, which is severely needed to tackle some of these issues. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov called NATO an institution of the Cold War era and demanded a post-West world order because he sees the West as outdated. It is time for NATO to finally get hands on, and get to grips with the increased aggression by Russia and thus to ‘rethink Russia’.

Almost all speakers called for unity and cohesion, but, as finally vocalised by Anne Applebaum in her article for the Washington Post, what has been forgotten was ‘that one of the gravest dangers facing the Western alliance is the president of the United States’. So, one thing that the Munich Security Conference has shown, however, is how representatives of the current US administration have to carry the can for what their president is not capable of: doing politics.

Then, what to make of all of this? Europe needs to rethink itself. It is slowly realising that the United States as a reliant partner in foreign, security and defence policy is slowly ceasing under the current administration. NATO is not ‘obsolete’, although it is obviously an institution from the Cold War era. Thanks to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s realistic assessment, NATO needs to adopt not only to the external security environment and the current security challenges, but also to the internal changes and (security) challenges. Increased defence spending is one thing, but willingness, ideological commitment to the alliance’s core values and actually taking action to address there threats and challenges is another.

It is about time to go beyond all this rhetoric and to deal with the current security challenges and threats that North America and Europe are facing.

 

Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters is a PhD Candidate and Teaching Assistant at the University of Kent and a Visiting Scholar at KU Leuven.

The post What lessons learned from the Munich Security Conference? by Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Monday 27 February 2017
12.30 Meeting with President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan (press statements ± 14.40)
19.00 Meeting with President Emma Marcegaglia and Director General Markus Beyrer of BusinessEurope

Tuesday 28 February 2017
17.15 Meeting with General Secretary Luca Visentini of European Trade Union (ETUC)

Wednesday 1 March 2017
11.30 Meeting with President Katherina Reiche of European Centre of Employers and Enterprises providing Public Services (CEEP)

Thursday 2 March 2017
11.00 Meeting with Taoiseach Enda Kenny

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The European Union never wanted a ‘hard’ Brexit. The British government, under Prime Minister Theresa May, chose it without consultation and convinced a reluctant Parliament.

May brought into her government die-hard ‘Leave’ supporters who can continue to rely on the Eurosceptic media and who make hay with the result of the binary referendum. So it is hard to see how one can please the British government without bringing into question the EU’s structures and body of law (and causing havoc within the EU).

It’s time to be tough: if Britain unexpectedly ends up remaining within the single market, it should be granted none of the opt-outs it had obtained in the past (which were testimony to the EU’s efforts to keep the UK on board, no matter the difficulties these exceptions caused).

But this is not about ‘punishing’ the UK for following a democratic mandate. Brussels – whose main purpose is to uphold EU law and to keep its troops together in difficult circumstances – has simply noted that the referendum did not indicate that a majority wanted a hard Brexit. Brussels has now to react to May’s personal interpretation of the result and her aggressive decision (which Giles Merritt calls “baffling”) to go the hard way despite the lack of a national consensus.

“It’s time to be tough: if Britain unexpectedly ends up remaining within the single market, it should be granted none of the opt-outs it had obtained in the past”

It is May’s position, not the referendum result, that has antagonised people in Europe, occurring as it does after years of British ambiguities, diffidence, equivocations, misgivings and grievances that started with the 1975 referendum. It is worth noting that in the run-up to that referendum the government of then prime minister Harold Wilson allowed Commission officials to directly inform British voters about the EU; I was one of the two-dozen who regularly spoke in Britain during the campaign. The Cameron government opposed a repeat.

We Europeans have had enough disputes about money, by far the most well-known being Margaret Thatcher’s arrogant demand of “Give me my money back”. When I oversaw the budget in the cabinet of Commission president Gaston Thorn, my proposal for a solution failed to foresee a sunset clause.

The result was that the UK, one of Europe’s richest countries per capita, pays relatively much less than others, including the Visegrád Four countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). Britain refused to recognise the more recent realities of EU contributions because none of Thatcher’s successors would dare give up what she had won.

Giles Merritt’s suggestion to start with the “easy” part – defence and security cooperation – is wishful thinking. It is true that in this realm the UK has much to offer and the EU much to gain, but why didn’t Britain offer it during 40 years of membership? Besides, it has opposed European defence union objectives, a European defence fund and the creation of an autonomous EU military headquarters in Brussels. It has refused to participate in the European Defence Agency.

Even after Brexit, it has continued to cause trouble. The German Defence Minister, Ursula von der Leyen, recently had to warn the UK not to interfere with European plans to strengthen defence integration. And don’t forget that the Saint-Malo agreement between the UK and France was nothing but a ploy to prevent any attempt at substantial defence integration.

“That the UK will have to pay more to the EU budget than the Brexiteers imagined is the Brexiteers’ fault”

Giles Merritt’s proposal – that Brexit negotiations should consider defence before money – is simply unrealistic. The reason is threefold: first, for the British, money has always taken priority; second, defence is not the easiest subject; and third, money relates to the current Brexit process, whereas defence relates to what follows.

That the UK will have to pay more to the EU budget than the Brexiteers imagined is the Brexiteers’ fault. It is excessive to label as “perverse” the decision to start with the cost of withdrawal. What is truly perverse is the amount of lies spread by the Brexiteers. While nobody knows in which programmes the UK will wish to continue participating, it is essential to establish early on a general cost of withdrawal. Clear figures can be determined at the beginning of the negotiations. It will then be easy to adjust them in the light of the outcome of the negotiations.

Giles Merritt rightly says that the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States has helped us appreciate the urgency of European defence integration. This has to be discussed further by France and Germany. If Britain joins in, progress will slow. As soon as it is ready, the EU should adopt a dual-track process, involving the revision of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) governance model and a new partnership between CSDP and the UK (as a third party).

For the first time Giles Merritt appeared to take a British position, albeit presented in the interest of the EU as a whole. There might well be a “cash clash”, as you say, but discussing defence first is no alternative and would only allow Britain to make an EU agreement more difficult to reach.

And for the reasons given in the article, we have no time to lose.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / Freestock

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On 27 February 2017, the Council adopted legal acts imposing further restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).  These legal acts transpose the additional restrictive measures imposed by United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2321 adopted on 30 November 2016. 

The measures include restrictions on transactions in coal, iron and iron ore from the DPRK, and a ban on imports of copper, nickel, silver, zinc as well as statues from the DPRK. The measures also include a ban on export of new helicopters and vessels to the DPRK, the tightening of existing restrictions in the transport sector as well as in the financial sector, like a prohibition for a DPRK diplomatic mission and for a DPRK diplomat to have more than one bank account in the EU and restrictions on the use of real estate property by the DPRK in the EU. 

The legal acts also provide for member states to take further measures to prevent specialised teaching or training of DPRK nationals in disciplines which would contribute to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic-missile programmes; as well as to suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK except for medical exchanges. 

Like existing sanctions, these restrictive measures are designed in such a way as to avoid adverse humanitarian consequences for the country's civilian population. They therefore include exemptions for livelihood and humanitarian purposes, where appropriate.

The UNSCR also added 11 persons and 10 entities to the list of those subject to asset freeze as well as travel restrictions for persons. This addition was transposed into EU law by a Council decision adopted on 8 December 2016.

EU restrictive measures against North Korea were introduced on 22 December 2006. The existing measures implement all UNSC resolutions adopted in response to the DPRK's nuclear tests and launches using ballistic missile technology and include additional EU autonomous measures. They target North Korea's nuclear weapons and nuclear programmes, other weapon of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes. The measures include prohibitions on the export and import of arms, goods, services and technology that could contribute to these programmes. 

On 27 February 2017, the Council adopted conclusions on EU priorities at United Nations human rights fora in 2017.

The conclusions reaffirm the EU's strong commitment to the United Nations human rights system. The EU will remain actively engaged at the UN Human Rights Council and the Third Committee of the General Assembly to defend and promote the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of human rights. The EU will continue to draw the attention of these fora to human rights violations and abuses worldwide, and to the need for accountability and efforts to fight impunity. It will also seek to highlight positive experiences where action was taken to prevent or remedy human rights violations and abuses.

These Council conclusions are adopted on a yearly basis. They set out the main lines of action for the EU at UN human rights fora in the coming months.

How much does the EU spend in your country and on what? How does it compare to other countries? And where does the money come from? Find out by using our multimedia application, which has been updated with the latest figures from the European Commission's annual financial report for 2015.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

General : Is the EU still fit for purpose in its current form? With no shortage of challenges facing us the European Parliament has looked into how the EU can be improved. On 16 February MEPs adopted three reports setting out how they believe the EU needs to be reformed in order to boost its capacity to act, restore people’s trust and make the economy more resilient.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP