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It was a mixed victory for outgoing Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. For the first time since 2014, the government strongman and his BJP party have lost the absolute majority they held in Parliament. With a clear increase in the number of votes cast, the opposition, and in particular the Indian National Congress party, is calling this a ‘moral defeat’ for Modi and the BJP. The outcome of 77 days of voting raises a number of questions. How were the elections conducted? What lessons can be drawn from the results? Could this have an influence on India’s international positions? Olivier Da Lage, Associate Research Fellow at IRIS, specialising in India and the Arabian Peninsula, provides some answers.

What was the political, economic and social context in which the Indian legislative elections were held? With 970 million voters expected, the largest elections in history, how did the voting go?

The actual polling took place in seven phases between 19 April and 1 June, a total of 77 days! This was an exceptionally long period, even though it is usual in India for voting to take place in several phases, given the size of the country. This means that the security forces responsible for ensuring that the electoral process runs smoothly can be deployed to the various States in turn. But this extension of the voting period has the effect of changing the tone of the campaign as it progresses. Some candidates have not yet been declared, and operations have already been completed in other parts of the country. The campaign themes also evolve according to how the campaign is perceived at the start (and of course also according to the themes specific to each region). All in all, the elections themselves took place in a calm and orderly manner, apart from a few localized incidents of violence that are customary in the country’s electoral history. However, the operations were also marked by the opposition’s strong defiance of the Election Commission, a constitutional body made up of three people appointed by the government and which had just been reshuffled by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The fact that the Election Commission, contrary to custom, refused to publish the absolute figures for voter turnout, contenting itself with giving percentages – before changing its position, abruptly and without explanation, added to the confusion, as did the refusal to confirm, until the day before the count, that the ballot papers sent in by post would be counted before starting to count the results from the voting machines. At the end of the campaign and at the start of the voting process, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP was tipped as the clear winner, even announcing that it was aiming for 400 of the 543 seats in the Lok Sabha (National Assembly). In the outgoing legislature, the BJP had an absolute majority with 303 seats, making the NDA alliance with subsidiary parties that were not in a position to influence decisions superfluous. But as time went by, feedback from the field showed that the BJP candidates were encountering more difficulties than expected and that the Modi ‘magic’ was no longer working as well as it had in the past. The BJP’s entire campaign was based on the Prime Minister’s personality and his programme for the next five years was very general and largely summed up in the slogan ‘Modi ki guarantee’ (Modi’s guarantee). There was growing nervousness in the ranks of the outgoing majority as the Prime Minister, in his rallies and interviews, accused the Congress Party of borrowing its programme from the Pakistan Muslim League and of wanting to strip Hindu women of their gold jewellery and give it to Muslims. While Modi’s 2014 campaign was based on the theme of good governance and his 2019 campaign on the security of the country’s borders, in 2024 he gave the impression that he was attacking India’s 200 million Muslims, while at the same time defending himself.

With Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) widely tipped to win a third term in office, what analysis can be made of the results? What other lessons can be drawn from these elections?

The BJP lost the absolute majority it had held since 2014 and strengthened in 2019. It must have sensed the risk, because during the campaign it resurrected the NDA Alliance, which had been virtually non-existent since 2014. Shortly before, however, the BJP president had hinted that, in time, there would be only one party in India: the BJP. With his allies, including the unpredictable head of the Bihar government Nitish Kumar, who had been at the origin of the alliance of 28 opposition parties united within the INDIA coalition before joining the ruling coalition in a turnaround of which he is a master, Narendra Modi can still count on a majority in parliament. But on the one hand, his allies are likely to pay dearly for their support and limit Narendra Modi’s alleged desire to radically transform India into an officially Hindu state. On the other hand, this Pyrrhic victory is a personal slap in the face for the outgoing head of government, whose power was also personalised. For its part, the Congress party escaped the fading that threatened and its electoral strategy of alliance with regional parties paid off for it and its partners, enabling the opposition to return in force to the Lok Sabha, even if it remains in the minority.

What influence will these elections have on India’s international ambitions?

Probably none. On the one hand, the foreign policy that would have been pursued by a government led by the Congress party would hardly have been very different from that pursued by Narendra Modi. On the other hand, the fact that the opposition obtained a more than honourable score can be presented as a denial to those who claimed that the ‘largest democracy in the world’ was no more than an ‘electoral autocracy’. But above all, the geopolitical realities have not changed with the results published on 4 June: China is still India’s neighbour and its power is perceived as a threat by both India and Western countries. The latter will therefore continue to court New Delhi, while India will pursue its policy of ‘multi-alignment’, which consists of remaining friendly with Russia and Israel while being close to Arab countries and the West. So far, this policy of tightrope walking has been fairly successful for India, whose growth rate (8.2% for the 2023-2024 financial year) is attracting a great deal of commercial interest from its partners, particularly in the West.

 

Translated by Deepl.

En juin 1944, des troupes composées principalement de Britanniques, d'Américains et de Canadiens ont envahi la France occupée par les nazis. Voici 10 choses que vous ne saviez peut-être pas sur ce jour, huit décennies plus tard.

Summary and Key Points: The modern aircraft carrier, once a symbol of naval dominance, faces obsolescence due to advancements in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems by adversaries like China.

-These systems can easily target and destroy carriers, making them liabilities rather than assets.

-To maintain naval superiority, the U.S. Navy should pivot towards more resilient platforms such as unmanned underwater vehicles and space-based systems like the X-37B spaceplane.

-Submarines and advanced drones should become the primary power projection platforms until effective countermeasures against A2/AD threats are developed.

The Decline of Aircraft Carriers: Are They Becoming Obsolete in Modern Warfare?

The modern aircraft carrier is the equivalent of a floating coffin. Its size, speed, and presence dangerously close to enemy shores were once benefits for the platform, but they have all been converted into liabilities. 

Such is the case with modern warfare. Platforms that created overwhelming advantages in previous conflicts can quickly become obsolete. Even worse, they can become strategic liabilities that adversaries exploit, and so it is with aircraft carriers today.

The Aircraft Carrier is This Era’s Battleship

In the case of large-scale conflict, the greater the gap between defining events, the more likely strategic platforms like aircraft carriers have become downright dangerous to operate in the interim. 

The British Royal Navy at the outset of the Second World War believed battleships were the essential platform for power projection. They invested heavily in this capability. 

Their most iconic battleship, HMS Hood, was the envy of the world during the interwar years. Most other navies assumed Hood, like the other battleships of the age, was the pinnacle of naval power projection.

Hood was sunk after minutes in its first major engagement of WWII with the far less capable German navy. The Brits had to lick their moral, psychic, and strategic wounds for much of the rest of the war over that loss. 

Sure, they ultimately won WW2. But the victory over the Axis Powers for the British Empire was pyrrhic. The massive defense expenditures on legacy systems that failed to live up to their hype, such as HMS Hood, ensured the glory days of empire were behind the British by the end of the war. 

Something similar may be afoot today with the United States. That is certainly what America’s enemies in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, Pyongyang, and Caracas all think. So do non-state terror groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. 

America’s Enemies Aren’t Stupid. There’s a Reason They’re Investing in A2/AD

That belief is one of the reasons these foreign actors have spent so much time and money developing arsenals of anti-ballistic missiles and wider systems, such as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD), predicated on negating America’s aircraft carrier advantage. 

After decades of development and proliferation, these A2/AD systems are now ready for showtime. 

For a few million dollars, an anti-ship ballistic missile, or any element of China’s A2/AD systems, could damage or sink an American flattop worth tens of billions of dollars and housing thousands of sailors and dozens of aircraft. This is a humiliating blow that the self-styled anti-imperialists of the Chinese-led world fantasize visiting upon the United States. 

Will America Go the Way of Britain or Will It Chart a New Course?

The Americans have to decide whether they will play according to the old British Empire’s rules, where they ignore reality right up until the moment they no longer can, or if Washington will turn to the dynamism that made the United States the power it is today. 

Namely, will the U.S. Navy (and its supporting political leaders) have the courage to restructure the surface fleet away from a severe dependence on the highly vulnerable aircraft carrier, and toward something else entirely? 

The way forward is not massive, floating coffins such as the aircraft carrier. These systems are not entirely useless, but their worth is vastly decreasing as A2/AD systems become more widespread. 

In an ideal world, the flattops would be deprioritized at least until effective countermeasures against the A2/AD threat are in place. 

Rather than blowing billions of dollars on building new Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers, the Americans should be building a fleet of the U.S. Space Force’s unmanned “spaceplane” (it’s a space bomber), the X-37B. 

Not only could a swarm of these beauties in orbit provide precision strikes deep inside enemy territory, but they could also be used for anti-ballistic missile defense. What’s more, such systems might be the key to disrupting the space-based element of China’s A2/AD satellite constellation, which tracks U.S. military targets in real-time.

Meanwhile, the Navy needs to make the submarine, not another surface vessel, the primary power projection platform until the threat of A2/AD can be overcome. And not just submarines, but specifically unmanned underwater vehicles. Drones have already transformed the face of war, and the U.S. military has most directly experienced those changes. Yet the Navy is reticent to fully embrace the drone revolution. It’s inexplicable.

There is a Navy without the aircraft carrier at the center of it. 

But that requires the Pentagon to accept this fact and stop listening to legacy defense contractors who think that their Cold War-era products are still at the forefront of technological innovation. 

They’re not. 

Real innovation is right at our fingertips – and the technologies I’m talking about here are cheaper than flat tops! If we don’t radically reverse course soon, the U.S. will endure the same humiliations that the British experienced at their end of their empire. America will lose its vaunted flattops in battle. 

About the Author

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Alors que le procès de 19 personnes, dont l'ancienne maire de Canteleu (Seine-Maritime), dans le cadre d'un vaste trafic de drogue a déjà pris une semaine de retard, l'un des principaux prévenus n'a pas pu comparaître de nouveau mercredi pour des raisons de santé, il pourrait donc être jugé ultérieurement. Et le procès a une fois de plus été suspendu au grand dam des magistrats.

The global liberal order has long been written off. It was naïve, the argument now goes, to think that trade would bind together countries’ interests and encourage cooperation over conflict. But Europe’s current China contortions suggest that global trade can still keep the peace.

Divisions fantômes composées de chars en caoutchouc, d'avions en bois ou de poupées de toile larguées en parachute : le D-Day n’aurait peut-être pas été possible sans une vaste opération de désinformation destinée à faire douter les Allemands sur la date et le lieu du Débarquement. L'opération "Fortitude" a largement contribué à la réussite de l'Opération Overlord. Tout a été fait pour berner la reconnaissance aérienne allemande et faire croire qu'elle aurait lieu à Calais et non pas en Normandie. Le Débarquement n'aurait pas non plus été possible sans la contribution d'un scientifique de génie, Alan Turing, qui participa à décoder Enigma, le code de la marine allemande.

Argentina unveiled its first certification scheme for deforestation-free beef to European Union authorities in Brussels on Monday (3 June) as the country prepares for a new EU law targeting imports linked to deforestation.

Summary and Key Points: Russian tanks, particularly the T-72 model, have suffered significant losses in the Russo-Ukraine War.

-According to open-source intelligence group Oryx, Russia has lost 1,200 T-72 tanks in just one year. Initially, Russia had an estimated 6,900 T-72s, but recent estimates suggest only about 1,500 remain.

-The T-72, introduced in the 1970s, is outdated, and its high attrition rate may force Russia to rely on even older tank models.

-As Ukraine receives modern weaponry from Western allies, the aging T-72s are increasingly vulnerable on the battlefield, exacerbating Russia's equipment replenishment challenges.

Russia's T-72 Tank Losses Mount in Ukraine War: 1,200 Destroyed in a Year Russian tanks have fared poorly in the Russo-Ukraine War, and the Russian T-72 model has had an especially hard time surviving the battlespace.  According to open-source intelligence group Oryx, the Russians lost 1,200 T-72s in just one year. Such a loss rate will challenge the Russians’ ability to keep fielding the T-72. The Russians were understood to have as many as 6,900 T-72s available initially, but updated estimates suggest that as few as 1,500 might remain. The T-72 was introduced in the 1970s – it is hardly a modern warfighting machine. But if the Russians exhaust their reserve of T-72s, they might have to rely on even older, previously mothballed tank models.  High Attrition for T-72 Tank in Ukraine 

Battlefield losses on both sides of the Russo-Ukraine War have been staggering. The fighting is the most vicious on the European continent since the Allies encircled Berlin, and casualty rates reflect the brutality. Both sides have hemorrhaged troops and equipment. The battlefield has become a graveyard of tanks and armored vehicles.

As equipment is destroyed, the two nations turn to different sources for replenishment. The Ukrainians have been fortunate enough to have Western backers willing to resupply Kyiv’s resistance with everything from F-16s to NLAWs to HIMARS. Russia has had to rely “on its stockpiles of Cold War and World War II-era relics,” according to Maya Carlin. Unfortunately for Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kyiv’s Western replenishments “have crucified Russian tanks” like the T-72.

Oryx’s figure – 1,200 T-72s lost – may well be an undercount. The intelligence firm uses verified footage and imagery to arrive at its numbers, meaning Oryx’s standards for verification likely leave destroyed tanks unaccounted for. 

Either way, the Russians have a problem.

What is the T-72? 

The T-72 is somewhat out of place on a modern battlefield, as this main battle tank was designed in the late 1960s. In production since 1968, 25,000 T-72s have been built. 

The T-72 is an improvement on the T-62 model, built with both steel and composite ERA armor, a 125 mm smoothbore gun, and a V12 diesel engine. With a 320-gallon fuel capacity, the T-72 enjoys an operational range of 290 miles (or 430 miles with external fuel drums). The T-72 can achieve speeds of 47 miles per hour, but it only travels 2.5 mph in reverse.

Perhaps the most notable feature of the T-72 is its weight. At just 41 tons, the tank is small and compact relative to Western contemporaries, and this is not by accident. The Soviets designed their tanks to be small, then built their roads to match. The roads were thus big enough for Soviet tanks to use, but too tight for Western tanks. The original T-72 is underpowered, which might be part of why the tank has fared so poorly in Ukraine. 

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

Thirty years after the creation of the Single Market, Europe’s strongest antidote to discontent and rising nationalism remains Cohesion Policy. To secure the Union, this principle - essential in the progressive agenda - must be central in the next mandate.

by Monika Brusenbauch Meislová (Masaryk University)

My article, recently published in JCMS, looks into how ongoing policy processes are discursively legitimated. It argues that that in order to satisfy complex demands on their legitimacy, policy makers tend to legitimate them not only by referring to the status quo (the current – new – state of affairs), but also by legitimating the status ad que (the future state) and delegitimating the status quo ante (the previous state). The article applies this original typology to the empirical case of Brexit, not least because the question of how Brexit is being legitimized is of immense European-wide relevance. Indeed, Brexit acts as a benchmark for citizens’ evaluations of EU membership in other member states, with the literature showing that positive information about the Brexit outcome leads to substantial increases in optimism about leaving the EU.

I specifically focused on the official communications of the UK Conservative government under Boris Johnson published on its website. The findings demonstrate that the government did seek legitimacy of Brexit through its current performance but also legitimated Brexit heavily through an anticipatory future promise and delegitimation of its previous EU membership and the EU as a result. While doing so, it (re)produced particular pasts, presents and futures (and the relations between them) and constructed a distinct sense of place and (non)belonging between self and the EU as the ex-community. Let’s now have a look at how exactly the Johnson’s government did that.

Legitimating the presence

The UK government strongly claimed the output legitimacy of Brexit through its current performance, framing it as a highly effective policy that had achieved all its goals.

There were two dominant narratives within this temporal regime: the narrative of success and the narrative of emancipation. The narrative of success functioned to construct the image of Brexit as a sheer triumph. The main topic here was that of gain. Appealing to people’s collective feelings of national pride, this narrative conveniently served the function of highlighting the great many advantages that Brexit had already brought to the UK and that ‘everyone’ in the country could now reap. With Brexit having already proved a ‘great success’, arguments here were built on a very simple cause and effect logic: the end of EU membership was the direct cause of the UK’s current successes.

The narrative of emancipation served to cast Brexit as having empowered the UK, almost in all every way imaginable, with the topic of control restoration being central to this construction. The main discursive thrust here was the representation of the control which the government had now managed to take back from Brussels (on a plethora of issues, including democracy, borders, waters, money, the economy etc.). Brexit was explicitly marketed as a tool by means of which the UK had restored its national pride. It was only now, with the country ‘finally out of the EU single market and customs union’, that the UK had become a ‘sovereign country’, able to make ‘sovereign choices across a range of different areas of national life’.

Legitimating the future

Despite having become a reality, Brexit (still) functioned heavily as a future imaginary. Representing it as a future benefit, the government foregrounded various aspects of its numerous upcoming (solely positive) implications.

Two dominant narratives here were those of a bright future and that of opportunity. The narrative of a bright future served to convey the vision of UK’s post-Brexit amazing future. A prominent topic was that of better prospects. Replete with pledges for a better future and a bold new future Britain, this promissory discursive construction was characterized by offering up a vision of the expected future of the UK, unhampered by EU membership, which was full of possibilities. Relying on the symbolism of hopeful future-oriented performance and values, the Johnson’s government routinely exploited this topic to send the message that Brexit would increase prosperity in all parts of the UK, across all levels of society.

The narrative of opportunity, built around the topic of potential, functioned to depict Brexit as a source of huge opportunities. The government was eager to cast the end of EU membership as a key precondition for creating a forward-looking, entrepreneurial, and globally ambitious country. Constantly evaluating Brexit’s potential as ‘enormous’, it was only due to Brexit that the UK would ‘thrive as a modern, dynamic and independent country’ and ‘seize new opportunities available to a fully independent global trading United Kingdom’.

Delegitimating the past

Even though the government highlighted its efforts to create a ‘new relationship’ with the EU ‘as friendly trading partners and sovereign equals’, it very much deplored the country’s former EU membership (and the EU as such) in its pursuit of Brexit legitimation.

Two central narratives were those of the oppressive EU and freedom (re)gain, both driven by the exclusionary rhetoric of othering. The former narrative, built around the topic of subjugation, functioned to delegitimate the EU as an outside force which used to prevent the UK from seizing the worldwide economic (and other) opportunities that it was rightfully entitled to. EU membership was invariably construed as a constraint, restricting member states’ actions and unacceptably interfering in domestic affairs.  The government repeatedly refereed to the need of rebuilding the country from the ‘distortions created by EU membership’ and ‘EU restrictions.’ Accordingly, the delegitimation acts are dotted with targeted allusions to the previous EU-imposed burdens, realized mainly via the ‘burdensome’ and ‘excessive red tape’ expressions.

Intimately related to the previous narrative was the narrative of freedom (re)gain. The main topic here was that of independence, conjuring up the idea that the UK was imprisoned and unsovereign as an EU member. The metaphor of imprisonment played a key role here. Typically, Brexit was characterized by the UK government as ‘freeing’ Britain from the EU, its policies, and various EU restrictions. The ‘newfound freedoms’ were inseparably connected to Brexit, as they were called ‘Brexit freedoms’. As such, Brexit was habitually presented as the sine qua non of the country’s ability to control its own domestic affairs. It is only now, after leaving the EU, that the UK had become ‘an independent nation’.

Problematic practical implications

Johnson’s government’s legitimation discourse of Brexit was problematic for many reasons, but two in particular. Firstly, according to the UK government’s discursive logic, Brexit had produced only winners and no losers. Obvious here was the strategic silence on adverse effects of the EU withdrawal. The government deliberately deployed a discursive strategy of omitting the inconvenient costs that are inherent in (any) disentanglement from the 47-year-old relationship. In doing so, it did not pass on the information necessary to facilitate the (British but also wider European) public’s understanding of the implications of the EU withdrawal.

The second problem pertains to the highly contradictory nature of the official legitimation discourse, with the UK government willingly demonizing the very actor with whom it proclaimed the desire to build a new friendly relationship. The official governmental communication was exceedingly radical in its explicitly exclusionary construction of the EU, promulgating anti-EU sentiment and countenancing mutual polarization. Such discursive handling of relations undermined the trust between the two actors and hampered the advancement of mutual talks.

Dr Monika Brusenbauch Meislová is an Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations and European Studies, Masaryk University, Czech Republic. She is also a Visiting Professor at Aston University in Birmingham, United Kingdom, and one of the coordinators of the UACES research network ‘The limits of EUrope’. Her research work covers issues of British EU policy, Brexit and political discourse. Her most recent research has been published in various journals, including The Journal of Common Market Studies, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, European Security, British Politics, Europe-Asia Studies, and The Political Quarterly. She can be followed on X here.

The post Spinning Brexit as a success story: Three temporal regimes of Brexit legitimation by Boris Johnson’s government appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Summary and Key Points You Need to Know: On June 3, travelers at Japan's Aomori Airport witnessed a rare event when two Lockheed Martin F-35A stealth fighters made emergency landings.

-The Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) aircraft were on a training flight from Misawa Air Base when one developed a mechanical problem.

-The runway was closed for 20 minutes, but there were no injuries or damage to the aircraft.

-This incident follows a series of recent aerial mishaps, including a U.S. Marine Corps F-35B crash in New Mexico and a Japan Maritime Self Defense Force helicopter collision in April.

Mechanical Issue Forces F-35A Fighters to Land at Aomori Airport

Travelers at Japan's Aomori Airport in northern Honshu were treated to a rare sight on June 3 as two Lockheed Martin F-35A stealth fighters made emergency landings. 

Both aircraft are in service with the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF). They were on a training flight from Misawa Air Base when one of the Lightning IIs developed an unspecified mechanical problem and requested an emergency landing, the Associated Press reported.

The airport was forced to close its runway for about 20 minutes due to the emergency landing. There were no injuries and no damage to either of the F-35As – conventional takeoff and landing variants of the Joint Strike Fighter.

According to manufacturer Lockheed Martin, "As a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) participant, the JASDF has an established program of record of 127 F-35 Aircraft, consisting of 105 F-35 A models and up to 42 F-35 B models. Japan is acquiring the most of any international customer." Misawa is one of three air bases that host the fifth-generation multirole fighter. According to Simply Flying, Misawa AB hosts Japanese and American troops, including the U.S. Air Force's 35th Fighter Wing, which operates and maintains two squadrons of F-16CM (C and D model) Block 50 Fighting Falcons.

The incident in Japan comes just days after a U.S. Marine Corps F-35B – the short/vertical takeoff and landing variant – crashed near Albuquerque, New Mexico, during a flight from Fort Worth to Edwards Air Force Base.

Series of Aerial Mishaps

Fortunately no one was hurt on Monday, but this mishap followed another involving a C-2 transport aircraft that was forced to make an emergency landing at another commercial airport – this time in Central Japan – after a cockpit window reportedly slid open during a training flight. Eight people were on board, but there was no damage and no injuries were reported.

In April, two Japan Maritime Self Defense Force SH-60K Seahawk helicopters collided during a night-time anti-submarine warfare training drill. The two rotary aircraft crashed into the Pacific Ocean south of Tokyo, killing one crew member while another seven were lost at sea. 

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Pertussis, otherwise known as whooping cough, cases are increasing in France, with almost 6,000 cases reported since the start of 2024, according to data published by the Pasteur Institute, the rench biomedical research center, on Tuesday (4 June).

Summary and Key Points: The war in Ukraine has revived the possibility of nuclear warfare for the first time since the Cold War. During the early months of the conflict, there was significant concern that Russian President Vladimir Putin might order a tactical nuclear strike to avoid defeat.

-Although the situation has stabilized somewhat, the U.S. and Western governments remain vigilant, with contingency plans in place for a possible Russian nuclear strike. The Russian nuclear arsenal is extensive, including 1,710 deployed warheads and thousands more in storage, with a robust nuclear triad comprising land-based missiles, submarines, and strategic bombers.

-The potential use of nuclear weapons by Russia, while currently seen as unlikely, remains a serious concern, especially if the conflict turns against Moscow again.

The war in Ukraine has made nuclear warfare a possibility for the first time since the Cold War. 

During the first months of the war, when the situation looked especially bad for Russian forces – not that it is great now, but things have stabilized – there was a real fear in the United States and the West that Russian President Vladimir Putin would order a tactical nuclear strike on Ukraine to prevent a humiliating defeat. 

By late 2022, the CIA and other government departments and agencies had contingency plans for a Russian nuclear strike against Ukraine. Such a strike would most likely be a tactical one, meaning that it would directly target part of the battlefield, rather than taking out a city. 

But what is the state of the Russian nuclear arsenal today, and is Moscow still considering a nuclear strike against its adversary? 

Nuclear Weapons and Decisions 

In its latest report on Russia’s nuclear arsenal, the Congressional Research Service assessed that the Russian military currently has 1,710 deployed nuclear warheads (and many additional thousands stored). In addition, the U.S. government estimates the number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons between 1,000 and 2,000 warheads. 

The Russian military has a nuclear triad. On the ground, Moscow has 326 intercontinental ballistic missiles. At sea, the Russian Navy fields 12 ballistic missile submarines that can pack a total of 192 ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. In the air, the Russian Aerospace Forces flies 58 strategic bombers capable of launching or dropping a nuclear munition. 

Even though the war is going more favorably for the Kremlin right now, the U.S. government still believes that if Russia’s fortunes flag again, Putin and his Kremlin advisers would resurface the option of a nuclear strike. 

"Given the potential desperation of President Putin and the Russian leadership, given the setbacks that they've faced so far, militarily, none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons," CIA Director Bill Burns said in a recent event in Atlanta.

Clearly, the Russian military has the capabilities to conduct a nuclear attack. Much then depends on the political will of Russia. A nuclear strike would likely have serious consequences on Russia, including the potential of a retaliatory strike by the U.S.

"We're obviously very concerned. I know President Biden is deeply concerned about avoiding a third world war, about avoiding a threshold in which, you know, nuclear conflict becomes possible," added Burns, who specialized in Russia and served as a U.S. ambassador in Moscow. 

A Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine would be the first nuclear weapon detonation in warfare since the U.S. military dropped two bombs on Imperial Japan during the final days of World War Two. 

About the Author: 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons. 

The European federation of organic agriculture and its French members obtained a judicial agreement on 4 June to put an end to labels using the name 'Eco-score' for food products, as it can be misleading for consumers.

The U.S. special envoy for Sudan warns that the geopolitical fallout from the spiraling civil war could be immense.

Dans le cadre des commémorations du Débarquement, Emmanuel Macron prendra la parole dans les journaux de 20 heures de France 2 et TF1. Les oppositions sont vent debout dénoncer l'omniprésence médiatique du chef de l'État à quelques jours du scrutin des européennes, à commencer par le Rassemblement national, qui continue de faire la course en tête des intentions de vote.

Economics pundit Noah Smith reports that a meme has been circulating among China-watchers of late. The meme holds that if you would just travel to China you would realize that China doesn’t want a war in the Taiwan Strait, or anywhere else. This is a form of argument from authority or, as Noah puts it, argument from tourism. Now, he and I don’t run in the same circles, but I’ve been hearing variants of the same storyline in recent months. Some who tout it claim, like Noah’s interlocutors, that China doesn’t want war. If not, they imply we should all heave a sigh of relief and stop preparing for Pacific combat. Other travelers maintain that China has burgeoned into such an industrial and military colossus that no eyewitness could countenance opposing it. Abandon all hope. Etc. The common denominator among these arguments from authority is their upshot: stand down. You need not—or cannot—buck China’s will.

To which I reply: Of course China doesn’t want a war over Taiwan. So what?

After all, wannabe conquerors love peace! They want to win without fighting. They long to cow their antagonists into submission, inducing them to lay down arms without putting up a fight. In so doing they spare themselves the ravages and unintended consequences inherent in the clangor of arms. That mode of proceeding has been baked into Chinese strategic culture since antiquity—witness the writings of Sun Tzu. Or ask Western martial sage Carl von Clausewitz. Writes Clausewitz, who took the field against Napoleon, the French god of war, “the aggressor is always peace-loving (as Bonaparte always claimed to be); he would prefer to take over our country unopposed.” Bottom line: to prevent an aggressor from triumphing without firing a shot, “one must be willing to make war and be prepared for it. In other words it is the weak, those likely to need defense, who should always be armed in order not to be overwhelmed. Thus decrees the art of war.” 

Take it from the art of war. Taiwan and its friends had better arm themselves—pronto—lest freedom-loving islanders suffer a Napoleonic fate.

Seldom do senior officials speak so plainly. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin was correct to tell this year’s Shangri-la Dialogue that “war or a fight with China is neither imminent” nor “unavoidable.” That comes as cold comfort. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) magnates may not, and in all likelihood do not, relish war. But that doesn’t mean they are prepared to forego or indefinitely postpone their goals for the sake of regional concord. Just the opposite. The CCP leadership has made it glaringly clear that it will unsheathe the sword should it see fit. Short of that, it pursues warlike policies and strategies on a 24/7/365 basis, on the logic that peacetime politics is war without bloodshed.

Any strategy premised on communist goodwill is a strategy fated to fail. China will not relent in the Taiwan Strait. America, its allies, and its partners must deter it by mounting concerted, convincing, day-in-and-day-out displays of power and resolve.

Defense commentators are blunter than officials on occasion. Over at Defense One, science and technology editor Patrick Tucker hints at how China’s winning-without-fighting strategy works. The inauguration of William Lai, Taiwan’s latest Democratic Progressive Party president, occasioned the latest military outburst out of Beijing. Following Lai’s inauguration People’s Liberation Army warships and warplanes fanned out around Taiwan’s environs for two days of drills dubbed “Joint Sword 2024.” Chinese officialdom crowed that the maneuvers had meted out “strong punishment” for “separatist acts” on the part of the leadership in Taipei. According to Tucker, Beijing has talked itself into believing that it can overawe the balky island through domineering conduct underwritten by shows of naval and military might.

The conceit being that Taiwan’s government, society, and armed forces would rather yield to China’s blandishments than fight against daunting odds to perpetuate their de facto sovereignty.

In other words, Chinese leaders believe playing head games with Taiwan’s leadership could deliver their most treasured goal, rule over the island, without firing a shot. If that happened Communist China would have scaled to the pinnacle of strategic excellence, achieving its aims at minimal cost, danger, and diplomatic and economic blowback. Clausewitz would instantly grasp China’s approach. The Prussian soldier-scribe declared that there are three ways to prevail in martial strife. One, vanquish the foe on the battlefield and impose terms. That charts the swiftest and surest route to victory, but also the one entailing the most forbidding hazards. Two, convince hostile leaders their predicament is impossible. The conviction being that rational but disheartened decisionmakers will decline to fight a fight they deem unwinnable. Or three, persuade hostile leaders they can’t win at a cost that’s affordable to them. Again, the Clausewitzian proposition is that rational cost/benefit analysis could net victory without violence. 

The latter two methods operate in encounters short of violence as well as in open war. These are Beijing’s methods of choice in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere in maritime Asia. They inhabit the realm of coercion and deterrence.

But the CCP leadership has a problem. Namely, the leadership seems to have little idea of how to bring about a Taiwanese capitulation without unleashing violent force. Think of strategy as a theory of cause and effect. Strategy postulates that if friendly forces do X, Y, and Z they will generate desirable effects A, B, and C—the ultimate effect being military victory. Now consider China’s theory of success, such as it is. CCP overseers demand that Taiwan consent to its own death as an independent polity simply because China’s armed forces now outclass Taiwan’s by almost any conceivable measure. But what precisely does staging a military deployment—no matter how menacing—do to induce President Lai’s, or anyone else’s, leadership in Taipei to commit assisted suicide?

Precious little.

No obvious mechanism explains how cause begets effect in Chinese strategy, and so China’s theory of success fails the test of strategic and political reality. Beijing demands everything from the islanders yet offers them nothing. It has placed Taiwan on “death ground,” to borrow from Sun Tzu, and the revered general of yore advises a combatant bestriding death ground to fight to its utmost. Taiwan will. You would think Sun Tzu’s disciples on the mainland would get this intuitively. But they don’t.

It turns out nonstop bombast backed by cavalier displays of firepower makes a futile strategy for China, and yet that’s the only trick the CCP leadership knows how to play. Through misbegotten strategy, in short, China has deprived itself of options short of war. It may not want war, but years of overbearing diplomacy may compel it to go to war. It has little alternative.

That’s what we in the biz call self-defeating behavior. Nice work, Xi & Co.

About the Author: Dr. James Holmes, U.S. Naval War College

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Distinguished Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

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