Feed aggregator

Boeing Delta IV Heavy
(click to view full)

The EELV program was designed to reduce the cost of government space launches through greater contractor competition, and modifiable rocket families whose system requirements emphasized simplicity, commonality, standardization, new applications of existing technology, streamlined manufacturing capabilities, and more efficient launch-site processing. Result: the Delta IV (Boeing) and Atlas V (Lockheed Martin) heavy rockets.

Paradoxically, that very program may have forced the October 2006 merger of Boeing & Lockheed Martin’s rocket divisions. Crosslink Magazine’s Winter 2004 article “EELV: The Next Stage of Space Launch” offers an excellent briefing that covers EELV’s program innovations and results, while a detailed National Taxpayer’s Union letter to Congress takes a much less positive view. This DID Spotlight article looks at the Delta IV and Atlas V rockets, emerging challengers like SpaceX and the new competition framework, and the US government contracts placed since the merger that formed the United Launch Alliance.

The EELV System

When comparing launch vehicles, note that Geostationary Transfer Orbit (GTO) between 1,240 – 22,240 miles above the Earth’s surface is preferred for high-end satellites. It’s much easier to lift objects into Low Earth-orbit (LEO), up to 1,240 miles above the Earth’s surface. On the other hand, your payload’s coverage will suffer, and its lifespan might as well.

A quick primer on reading EELV configurations is in order. “AF” is the US Air Force, while “NRO” is the USA’s National Reconnaissance Office. The numbers after the rocket type represent its payload cover (fairing) diameter, and the number of boosters attached to the core rocket.

For example, in the Atlas models, 501 means a 5m diameter fairing, 0 boosters, and everything always ends with a 1. If we strapped on 4 boosters, it would become an Atlas V 541.

For Boeing’s Delta rockets, the attributes are broken out more clearly: (4,2) means a 4m diameter fairing and 2 boosters. If we switched to a 5m fairing instead, it would become a Delta IV 5,2.

Delta IV Delta rocket family
(click to view full)

The Delta IV’s history dates back to the late 1950s when the US government, responding to the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik in 1957, contracted for development of the Delta rocket. The first successful Delta launch was NASA’s Echo 1A satellite on Aug 12/60.

Over the years the Delta family of rockets has become larger, more advanced, and capable of carrying heavier satellites into orbit. Design changes included larger first-stage tanks, addition of strap-on solid rocket boosters, increased propellant capacity, an improved main engine, adoption of advanced electronics and guidance systems, and development of upper stage and satellite payload systems.

Following a 1989 contract from the US Air Force for 20 launch vehicles, the newer, more powerful Delta II version emerged. Then, in response to market needs for a larger rocket to launch commercial satellites, Delta III began development in 1995. Its first launch occurred in 1998 and its final launch in 2000, paving the way for the Delta IV.

The Delta IV offers customization options by adding booster rockets, including a Delta IV Heavy that uses 2 additional Common Booster Cores. The Delta IV Heavy has the highest payload rating to Geostationary Transfer Orbit of any American rocket, and also beats the Ariane 5 ECA. It’s expected to stay on top even after SpaceX launches its Falcon Heavy, though the Falcon Heavy will offer greater capacity to Low Earth Orbits.

Delta IV medium-to-heavy launch vehicles became operational in 2002. The first Delta IV launch, of Eutelsat’s W5 commercial satellite, took place on Nov 20/02. The first payload delivered for the EELV program was the DSCS A3 satellite, on March 10/03.

Atlas V Atlas family
(click to view full)

Developed in the late 1950s as the USA’s first operational intercontinental ballistic missile, the Atlas launch vehicle went on to become the first commercial ride to space.

The 1990s opened a new chapter in Atlas history with the first commercial satellite launch. The growing demand for satellite entertainment presented new opportunities in the launch business. The Atlas I was developed to serve these needs and to continue the evolution of the Atlas vehicle.

Launched on Dec 7/91 with a Eutelsat satellite on-board, the first Atlas II ushered in a family of Atlas vehicles that would go on to launch many commercial payloads. The Atlas II family of launch vehicles was retired in 2004.

Developed as an evolutionary bridge, the Atlas III launch vehicle, like the I and II before it, debuted by delivering a commercial payload to orbit. First launched on May 24/00, the Atlas III family was retired in 2005. There was no Atlas IV.

The Atlas V launch vehicle comes in 400 and 500 series variants, and made its debut on Aug 21/02. It uses the Russian RD-180 rocket engine, which has become a problem as tensions between the USA and Russia have reignited. Like the Delta IV, each rocket can be customized by adding boosters, in order to launch heavier payloads. Atlas V can also rise from 1 to 2 Centaur second-stage engines, in the XX2 configuration.

The Atlas V has been used to launch several NASA missions, and a July 2011 agreement with NASA began the process of certifying the design for manned missions as well. ULA partnered with Blue Origin, Boeing, and Sierra Nevada Corp. for NASA’s Commercial Crew program, and Boeing was 1 of the 2 final winners, which helps to ensure additional orders down the road.

Military Satellite Payloads AEHF concept
(click to view full)

A rocket’s key specifications involve how much it can lift to various orbits, and the US military pushed for the EELV program in part to expand that range. There’s controversy over the military’s success in meeting other goals, but lift and range have clearly improved.

EELV rockets are currently being used to launch satellites for a number of the major military satellite programs, including:

• Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) communication satellites that will support twice as many tactical networks, while providing 10-12 times the capacity and 6 times higher data rate transfer than that of the current Milstar II satellites.

• Wideband Global SATCOM satellites that will support the USA’s warfighting bandwidth requirements, supporting tactical C4ISR, battle management, and combat support needs.

• Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-High satellites that will provide a key component of the USA’s future missile alert system, designed to give maximum warning and monitoring of ballistic missile launches anywhere in the world.

• GPS IIF navigation satellites that are an upgrade of the original GPS, which is a worldwide timing and navigation system that utilizes a constellation of satellites positioned in orbit approximately 12,000 miles above the Earth’s surface. GPS-III will also launch using EELV rockets, instead of the Delta IIs.

EELV Budgets & Structure Competition Again? The New “Open” Launch Framework SpaceX Falcon
(click to view full)

Emerging competition from privately developed solutions like SpaceX’s Falcon-9 will give NASA and the US military additional options for all kinds of medium-heavy launch projects. EELV itself may even provide competition for NASA. The Delta IV has been considered as an alternative for a manned return to the moon, and a NASA-sponsored report concluded that using a modified Delta IV capable of human spaceflight could save billions of dollars, in place of NASA’s developmental Ares rocket. It would also provide a quickly-fielded solution to the expected gap in US space lift capabilities, now that the Space Shuttle program has ended.

As of July 2012, NASA and the Pentagon intend to pursue separate rocket buys, within a common framework. That framework is a huge departure from past practice, with big long-term implications for EELV.

In October 2011, NASA, the US National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the US Air Force announced a game-changing development: “certification of commercial providers of launch vehicles used for national security space and civil space missions.” In English: the market for national security launches just opened up beyond EELV, which will have to compete in some segments. That simple change incorporates 4 payload types (A-D), and 3 risk categories (1-3), where 3 is lowest risk. It’s both more, and less, than it seems.

For high-value “Class A, failure is not an option” long-lived national security satellites, whose added presence has a high marginal value to the existing constellation, EELV’s “Category 3″ low-risk certified rockets will remain the only option. Barring a huge national emergency and Presidential orders, A1 or A2 combinations are impossible. At the other extreme, “Class D” payloads could fly on anything, even “Category 1″ launch vehicles classified as high risk or unproven.

Once a new entrant demonstrates a successful launch of an EELV class medium-heavy launch system, the Air Force awards integration studies, and they can begin working toward EELV certification of specified systems and configurations. If no competitor has a certification rating that matches a competed launch, ULA gets a sole-source contract as a pre-priced option.

This framework will help NASA most, but each category now has a specific number of successful launches needed for eligibility, as well as a known set of technical, safety and test data needed to verify that record. Technically, competition exists now. In reality, it will take a while.

On the other hand, the new framework’s flexibility means that every successful launch by a non-EELV platform brings it closer to a new category, which will grant access to a forecastable set of new opportunities. That makes the investment payoff clear, and should spur a long-term sea change toward a number of qualified providers for many of the US government’s launch contracts. The big and obvious potential winner here in SpaceX (vid. May 23/11), whose Falcon 9 is poised to compete in the EELV’s segments once the certification paperwork is done on its 3 qualifying launches. Orbital’s Minotaur family may also benefit at some point.

Going Forward: Block Buys in a Broader EELV Program Delta IV, waiting
(click to view full)

The US military made an EELV multi-year block buy of some kind part of its procurement strategy in November 2011, as an attempt to improve a shaky industrial base and drive costs down. Boeing and Lockheed Martin saw this as their opportunity to push a multi-year deal for 40 ULA rockets and launches from FY 2013 – 2017 inclusive. That would make it much more difficult for other private firms to secure launch orders, regardless of the certification framework, while EELV annual orders nearly doubled to over $2 billion per year.

Their lobbying ended up securing a 35-core block buy from FY 2013 – 2017, but their prices kept rising, and the contract’s exact terms are murky. Note, however, that cores =/= launches. The Pentagon’s FY14 plan involved 29 total launches from FY 2013 – 2017, vs. 45 booster cores. EELV launch services are usually ordered at least 24 months before a planned mission launch, so this multi-year buy actually covers US government missions into FY 2019.

FY 2015 – 2017 was supposed to see the beginnings of competition, with 14 “cores” (about 28%) supposedly open to competition, but there are reports of restrictions in the block buy agreement that essentially remove competition before 2018. Those allegations are now the foundation of a court case involving SpaceX and the USAF.

As of March 2014, SpaceX has completed the required number of successful Falcon 9 certification missions to begin competing for some national security launches. What they don’t have yet is certification, as government employees go over every aspect of their business. The USAF is working hard on this, but SpaceX’s Silicon Valley propensity to keep innovating adds to the challenge of certifying their configurations, even as it helps improve their costs and performance. Their entire approach is a major culture clash with the standard model for space access, explaining SpaceX’s 66%+ cost advantage and better pace of innovation, as well as their solid-but-not bulletproof reliability record. The long-term bet in this race is obvious. In the short-term, it’s a tougher call.

A March 2014 GAO report explained the USAF’s options, which became even more complex after Russia invaded Crimea, and the Atlas V’s dependence on Russian RD-180 engines became a glaring problem:

Contracts & Key Events AEHF-2 launch
(click for video)

Military satellite launches will be covered in their respective satellite type’s articles. This section will generally be reserved for contracts, but significant military-related launches that are not covered elsewhere on DID may receive a pointer here. We’ll also cover EELV rocket-related issues that delay launches, but not external delays stemming from weather issues, ground equipment, etc.

FY 2014 – 2015

FY 2014 base and production contracts to ULA; GAO repport looks at USAF options; SAR report shows program costs down, but still $67.6 Bn; USAF reduces the number of competed launches; SpaceX meets cert. requirements, claims 75% savings are possible, launches lawsuit to force competition; Europe scrambles to compete with SpaceX; ULA also begins to move, hooking up with Bezos’ Blue Origin; Friction with Russia makes access to Atlas V’s RD-180 engines an issue. Launch, Deliver… Compete?

May 14/15: DefSec Carter and DNI Clapper have urged Congress to allow United Launch Alliance, a Lockheed Martin/Boeing joint venture, to use Russian RD-180 engines for “assured access to space.” If the current law were to change from the current 2015 defense authorization law banning the use of Russian engines in US launches, ULA would be capable of competing for 18 out of 34 competitive launches between 2015 and 2022, versus the current 5 as the law stands, with the Air Force pushing for more launches by the private sector.

Feb 26/15: The Air Force is looking nervously at its capacity to meet the congressionally-mandated deadline of 2019 to stop relying on Russian rocket engines. Air Force Secretary Deborah James told senators on Wednesday that to try to meet the deadline by 2019 would mean exchanging one monopoly franchise for another. Except, of course, it wouldn’t be controlled by Russia, a quality that of late has started to have more and more charm. It was an interesting remark given that the new monopoly in question might be that of SpaceX, the firm that has shown unprecedented speed to development. James indicated a decade was more realistic, which sounds more like the preferred timeframe of the Air Force’s long-time partner United Launch Alliance, which has a good record, but not one for sprightliness.

Feb 3/15: In addition to a new GPS III satellite procurement, the new Air Force budget would pay for five launches, two of which would be “set aside” for competition. This follows the very public recent settlement of a SpaceX protest that the Air Force had deliberately prevented competition when it awarded United Launch Alliance a bevy of launches over many years not long before SpaceX was expected to gain certification to compete. ULA uses Russian engines to loft satellites into orbit, and the new Air Force budget also has a line item to reduce reliance on Russian hardware, although the mechanism for doing so isn’t yet clear.

Jan 26/15: SpaceX has said it will call off the legal dogs on the Air Force. SpaceX sued after the Air Force bundled up a great number of future space launches and pre-contracted for the services without letting SpaceX bid. In an odd sort of settlement, SpaceX will drop its suit, and in return, the Air Force will add more launches that will not necessarily go to the Boeing-Lockheed-led United Launch Alliance consortium. When asked directly this morning an Air Force representative said that there was not a specific number of launches attached to that settlement. The Air Force has also agreed to work toward getting SpaceX certified for launches, although it is unclear if that last aspect is actually part of the settlement, as it is something that wouldn’t be properly withheld. When asked, the Air Force referred back to the single-paragraph statement. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk previously accused an Air Force official of seeking employment from the bidders during the process, an offer SpaceX had refused. That accusation made news at the time (May 2014) partly because of the significance of the contract size, but primarily because it is fairly rare for a contractor to speak of such alleged behavior publicly.

Sept 29/14: United Launch Services LLC in Littleton, CO receives a $127 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising an option for 1 Air Force Atlas V 531 (5m fairing, 3 boosters), and the exercise of an option for backlog transportation. It’s a FY 2014 launch vehicle configuration, will all funds committed immediately using FY 2013 and 201 USAF missile budgets.

Work will be performed at Centennial, CO, and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, FL, and is expected to be complete by Aug 15/15. USAF Space and Missile Systems, Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA manages the contract (FA8811-13-C-0003, PO 0055).

Extra Atlas V ordered

Sept 7/14: ULA & Blue Origin. United Launch Alliance partners with Amazon.com founder Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin to jointly complete development of Blue Origin’s 550,000 pound thrust BE-4 LNG/LOx rocket engine, a fuel choice that helps reduce costs and complexity. The announcement hints at coming consolidation of ULA’s rocket lines.

The BE-4 has been under development at Blue Origin for the last 3 years, and the new joint agreement expects another 4 years of development, with full-scale testing in 2016 and a 1st flight in 2019. They won’t discuss the new engine’s costs, except to say that they expect it will cut costs for customers when 2 BE-4s are used to power ULA’s next-generation rocket. What the new engine won’t do, is fix the Atlas V’s reliance on a Russian engine. ULA’s FAQ says:

“The BE-4 is not a direct replacement for the RD-180 that powers ULA’s Atlas V rocket, however two BE-4s are expected to provide the engine thrust for the next generation ULA vehicles. The details related to ULA’s next generation vehicles – which will maintain the key heritage components of ULA’s Atlas and Delta rockets that provide world class mission assurance and reliability – will be announced at a later date.”

The BE-4 will be available to other customers beyond ULA, beginning with Blue Origin itself. If the new CEO (Aug 12/14) was looking to inject a bit of Silicon Valley’s DNA into ULA, in order to compete with SpaceX and lower costs, this is a good start. Sources: Blue Origin, “United Launch Alliance and Blue Origin Announce Partnership to Develop New American Rocket Engine” | ULA, “United Launch Alliance and Blue Origin Announce Partnership to Develop New American Rocket Engine” and FAQ | BE-4 Fact Sheet [PDF].

Sept 16/14: NASA CCiCap. NASA issues its main Commercial Crew Integrated Capability (CCiCap) contracts: up to $4.2 billion to Boeing, which will use the CST-100 on top of the Atlas V, and up to $2.6 billion to SpaceX, which will use its Dragon v2 on top of its own Falcon 9.

SpaceX isn’t certified yet, but by the time flights begin taking place, it will be. Which means that each NASA CCiCap mission will improve production volume, and hence likely prices. Read “NASA’s CCiCap: Can Space Taxis Help the Pentagon?” for full coverage.

NASA CCiCap

Sept 16/14: FY 2015 ELC. Sept 16/14: United Launch Services LLC in Littleton, CO receives a $938.4 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification for FY 2015 EELV Delta IV and Atlas V launch capability. This contract covers mission assurance, program management, systems engineering, integration of the space vehicle with the launch vehicle, launch site and range operations, and launch infrastructure maintenance and sustainment. As one might guess, actual rockets and launches are separate. $231.8 million in FY 2015 USAF missile budgets is committed immediately.

Work will be performed at Littleton, CO; Vandenberg AFB, CA; and Cape Canaveral Air Station, FL, with an expected completion date of Sept 30/15. The USAF Launch Systems Directorate’s Space and Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles AFB, CA manages the contract (FA8811-13-C-0003, PO 0048).

FY 2015 base (ELC) award

Aug 12/14: ULA Leadership. ULA names Lockheed Martin’s VP and GM of Strategic and Missile Defense Systems, Tory Bruno, as its next President and CEO, effective immediately. He will replace Michael Gass, who has held these roles since ULA’s founding in 2006. Former Boeing executive Daniel Collins will remain COO.

In a separate statement, Gass said he had planned to retire “in the near term” but with “the changing industry landscape over the next several years, the Board of Directors and I have agreed that the immediate appointment of my successor to begin the leadership transition is in the best interest of the company.” Lockheed Martin Space Systems EVP and ULA Board member Rick Ambrose praised Gass’ launch record, and stated that:

“Tory is an ideal leader to take the reins at ULA. He’ll bring the same unwavering commitment to mission success that has been ULA’s hallmark, and will apply his proven track record of driving customer focus, innovation and affordability to shape ULA’s future.”

It would seem that ULA is beginning to take the prospect of competition with SpaceX et. al. seriously. Sources: ULA, “United Launch Alliance Names Tory Bruno President and Chief Executive Officer” | Space News, ” United Launch Alliance Taps a Lockheed Executive To Replace CEO Gass”.

Aug 4/14: SpaceX Infrastructure. SpaceX picks a site in Brownsville, TX as its private launch site, beating a location in Shiloh, FL just north of Cape Canaveral. They plan to stage up to 12 commercial launches a year from there, but the need to steer clear of populated areas forces them into a “keyhole” area between Florida and Cuba that restricts missions to equatorial orbits. “Dogleg” maneuvers could expand the range of orbit allowed, but there’s a performance cost. The good news for SpaceX, who wanted a range clear of NASA or USAF restrictions, is that 3 of 4 SpaceX launches from Cape Canaveral since December 2013 would fit Brownsville’s launch profile.

SpaceX plans to invest $85 million in the site, with another $15.3 million coming from the Texas state government: $2.3 million from the Texas Enterprise Fund (TEF), plus $13 million from the Spaceport Trust Fund to the Cameron County Spaceport Development Corp. FAA certification will be part of that development, and the Texas government has already made moves to support that. These Texas investments aren’t coming from out of the blue. SpaceX has operated a Rocket Development Facility in McGregor, TX since 2003. It now has over 250 employees, and a TexasOne visit to California in 2011 launched Texas’ bid for this project.

Government missions under contracts like EELV will still be launched from Cape Canaveral, as will some commercial missions. Sources: Governor of Texas, “Gov. Perry Announces State Incentives Bringing SpaceX Commercial Launch Facility, 300 Jobs to the Brownsville Area” | Florida Today, “Despite SpaceX plans, Nelson pushes for Brevard launches” | Space Politics, “As Texas celebrates winning SpaceX spaceport, Florida regroups”.

July 17/14: Political. The Senate Appropriations Committee approves a $489.6 billion base FY 2015 budget, plus $59.7 billion in supplemental funding. The issue of launch infrastructure, which is currently an almost $1 billion per year award to ULA, gets a small but interesting twist:

“The Committee believes additional competition can be achieved by creating new opportunities within the United States launch infrastructure, including commercial and State-owned launch facilities. Increasing the capability and number of launch facilities helps to ensure our Nation’s ability to launch priority space assets. Therefore, to promote competition at launch facilities, $7,000,000 is provided to spaceports or launch and range complexes that are commercially licensed by the Federal Aviation Administration and receive funding from the local or State government. These funds shall be used to develop the capacity to provide mid-to-low inclination orbits or polar-to-high inclination orbits in support of the national security space program.”

At the same time, however, the SAC directs the USAF to dispose of DSP-20, rather than storing a $500 million satellite for $425 million until its planned 2020 launch. It also votes to add $125 million for a competed EELV launch order in FY 2015, which could help the USAF kill 2 problems with one launch (q.v. July 10-15/14). Note that the FY 2015 budget still has to be voted on in the whole Senate, then reconciled in committee with the House of Representatives’ defense budget, then signed into law by the President. There is no guarantee that this provision will survive. Sources: US Senate Committee on Appropriations, “Committee Approves FY 2015 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill – Report: Department of Defense”.

July 16/14: Disclosure. The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Senate Committee on Armed Services’ Subcommittee on Strategic Forces hold a joint hearing titled, “Options for Assuring Domestic Space Access.” There’s a lot of back-and-forth on a number of issues, including requests from representatives in ULA strongholds of Alabama and Colorado:

“In the interest of full disclosure and accountability to the American taxpayer, we request that NASA publicly release all anomalies and mishap information, un-redacted, so that Congress can gain a better understanding of what has occurred and ensure full transparency”…. They also ask for information “on the various aspects of risk and reliability with these programs” and the agency’s “understanding of the specific technical issues, failures and resulting consequences for ISS.”

That’s trickier than it seems. Export control restriction may prevent unredacted reports, Elon Musk says that no government funding was used to develop Falcon 9, and the SpaceX contracts were carefully set out for cargo services rather than launch vehicles. See also: Space Politics, “House members press NASA for information on “epidemic of anomalies” with SpaceX missions” and “Senators debate RD-180 replacement, EELV competition”.

July 10-15/14: DSP-20 to compete. The USAF got some pushback about the ULA block buy at the House Armed Services Committee hearings on July 10th. USAF Secretary Deborah Lee James is telling reporters that they’re looking to reprogram $100 million, and move the DMSP-20 weather satellite launch into FY 2015 as a competed contract. That would raise the number of purchased FY 2015 launches to 6, but the amount committed strongly suggests that SpaceX would win the deal. Sources: DID, “FY15 US Defense Budget Finally Complete with War Funding” | DoD Buzz, “Air Force Seeks $100 Million for Rocket Rivalry” | Space Politics, “DOD official defends EELV block buy, endorses launch competition”.

July 15/14: SpaceX. USAF Space Command’s Space and Missile Systems Center has declared that SpaceX’s Dec 3/13 and Jan 6/14 flights qualify toward EELV certification, completing the Falcon 9 v1.1’s 3-flight requirement. The rocket must still pass a number of technical reviews, audits and independent verification and validation of the launch vehicle, ground systems, and manufacturing processes before EELV certification is complete. Sources: USAF, “SpaceX Falcon 9 v1.1 Flights Deemed Successful”.

July 10/14: Competition. The ripples of competition are extending beyond the USA. Europe, at least, is taking the competition extremely seriously:

“In June, it became obvious that Europe has made a major collective error, underestimating SpaceX’s capability to successfully market commercial launches at a fraction of Ariane’s costs. Today everyone is trying hard to maximize the impact of an Airbus Group-Safran initiative to form a joint venture and take control of the Ariane program. Jointly, the two groups own two-thirds of the heavy-lift booster and this is most probably just the beginning of a far-reaching consolidation strategy…. In other words, Ariane, despite an excellent reliability record, suddenly appears too complex and far too expensive…. In June, Genevieve Fioraso, the French minister in charge of space, candidly admitted the looming U.S. competition had been underestimated…. Now will come technical disagreements, such as solid propulsion versus liquid fuel…. the upgraded 5ME derivative and the envisioned next-generation Ariane 6. Divergent views on technicalities are expected to make discussions difficult…. The wake-up call is salutary, but devastating.”

They probably underestimated the threat because they focused on the American competitor most like themselves, believing that there wasn’t really any other way to perform this role. There’s a lesson for the whole industry there. Sources: Aviation Week, “Opinion: Arianespace Facing Shake-Up To Compete With SpaceX”.

July 4/14: ULA. ULA is the top aerospace company in Denver, so the locals are understandably concerned about the firm’s viability in light of competition from SpaceX, and a potential squeeze from Russian rocket engines. So, how is ULA reacting? By focusing on their reliability record, and ability at the top-end geosynchronous delivery missions:

“Michael Gass, CEO of ULA [says]…. ULA’s best strategy to keep winning business is to remain the most advanced and reliable rocket-launch company in the world…. “If a new entrant only wants to do a few of the missions and only has capability to cherry-pick a few, that’s not fair and level competition,” Gass said.”

USAF Space Command head Gen. William Shelton has his own take:

“Generally, the person you want to do business with you don’t sue…. Show me an interplanetary mission from NASA that’s contracted with SpaceX – that’s not what they’ve contracted,” he said. “Basically they’ve contracted commercial resupply with SpaceX. It is not putting my most precious assets on top of that rocket and launching it.”

Valid points. The downside of this approach for ULA is that a disruptive innovator who eventually hits a similar effectiveness level will destroy a “business as usual” incumbent. If Falcon Heavy succeeds, ULA will have a serious problem. Sources: Upstart Business Journal (Denver), “Rocket war involving SpaceX upends the space-launch business”.

June 3-5/14: New engine? Aviation Week quotes Gencorp President & CEO Scott Seymour, who says that their Aerojet Rocketdyne subsidiary has spent roughly $300 million working on technologies that will feed into a new AR-1 liquid oxygen/ kerosene booster engine with 500,000+ pounds of thrust, to replace Russia’s RD-180. Hoped-for costs would be about $25 million per pair. He also estimated that finishing development would take about 4 years and cost $800 million – $1 billion.

Gencorp hopes to recoup their investment by getting government funding for the remaining development work, and by fostering AR-1 use on multiple platforms. Their targets include the ULA’s Atlas V, Orbital’s Antares, “and, possibly, Space Exploration Technology’s Falcon 9 v1.1.” SpaceX uses a vertical integration philosophy, so they’d be a very tough sell. On the other hand, the Merlin engines used by SpaceX aren’t seen as an ideal solution for boosts to geosynchronous transfer orbit, and they don’t provide a high-energy upper stage. SpaceX has managed GTO launches, and they will need to prove the doubters wrong re: capacity at higher orbits with the forthcoming Falcon Heavy, which requires 27 of their Merlin 1D engines.

Meanwhile, if the government wants a new engine, why not compete the development phase? Sources: Aviation Week, “Aerojet Rocketdyne Targets $25 Million Per Pair For AR-1 Engines” | Lexington Institute, “Aerojet Rocketdyne Lays Down Challenge To Russian Rocket Engine Monopoly”.

June 2/14: ULA’s argument. The Lexington Institute, which counts Boeing and Lockheed Martin as funders, makes the case for the ULA block buy. Loren Thompson elides the issue of the latest block-buy agreement removing announced competition, which is a huge hole in his argument, but it isn’t one he can address without inside information. Beyond that, he does make some valid points:

“The Air Force says it has dedicated $60 million and 100 personnel to getting all the steps accomplished expeditiously…. [EELV hasn’t] had an unsuccessful mission in 70 attempts, whereas SpaceX has seen several failures in less than a dozen launches. During the Obama Administration, the launch alliance has met its schedule objectives for when launches occur 87% of the time, while the corresponding figure for SpaceX is 29%…. the Falcon 9 rockets that SpaceX currently uses as its main launch vehicle are severely limited in terms of what kinds of payloads they can loft into which orbits….[and are] also hobbled by the lack of a high-energy upper stage…. According to [HASC Chair Mike] Rogers, various SpaceX missions have delivered a satellite into a suboptimal orbit, experienced multiple spacecraft thruster failures, or failed to successfully achieve a planned second-stage relight…. SpaceX has sought to correct all of the glitches it encountered….. [but] when a company keeps altering the configuration of its launch vehicles… it becomes unclear as to precisely what is being certified.”

Sources: Forbes Magazine, “SpaceX Versus The Air Force: The Other Side Of The Story”.

May 23/14: New engine? The Senate Armed Services Committee inserts an initial $100 million in funding into the FY 2015 defense bill, in order to begin developing an American rocket engine that can replace the oxygen-rich, staged combustion performance of the Russian RD-180. Sources: Gizmodo, “A Senate Panel Just Set Aside $100 Million To Build a Putin-Free Rocket” | Phys Org, “US Senate panel budgets $100 mn for non-Russian rocket”.

May 22/14: Twitter Accusation. Elon Musk’s Twitter account fires a shot at former USAF PEO Space launch Scott Correll, who negotiated ULA’s block contract and is now at Aerojet-Rocketdyne as VP Government Acquisition and Policy:

“Air Force official awards $10B+ contract uncompeted & then takes lucrative job w funds recipient [DID: link]”

“V likely AF official Correll was told by ULA/Rocketdyne that a rich VP job was his if he gave them a sole source contract”

“Reason I believe this is likely is that Correll first tried to work at SpaceX, but we turned him down. Our competitor, it seems, did not.”

“Either way, this case certainly deserves close examination by the DoD Inspector General per @SenJohnMcCain’s request [DID: link]”

SpaceX had made the point in a less directly accusatory way as item 106 in its original legal brief, but retreated even further to an arm’s length statement in their amended legal filing of May 19th (q.v. May 19/14), citing the same National Legal and Policy Center NGO article noted in Musk’s Tweet. Musk’s Twitter volley more then negates any defensive legal benefits of that soft-pedaling. It’s an extremely serious accusation – people have gone to jail for this, which is why Correll’s hiring about a year after the contract’s signing was cleared through the USAF General Counsel.

It’s also logically obvious that trying to work at SpaceX after awarding the block-buy would destroy the idea that the ULA contract was a quid pro quo. Legally, SpaceX had better have some proof that Correll solicited a job with them before he left the USAF, or there’s probably a defamation suit in Musk’s future. One wonders if triggering a defamation suit is the point here, given the additional opportunities it would give SpaceX for legal discovery procedures. Sources: elonmusk@Twitter, Tweet 1 | Tweet 2 | Tweet 3 | Tweet 4 || | Business Insider, “SpaceX’s Dispute With The Air Force Just Got Even Uglier” and “Elon Musk Isn’t Backing Off Some Of His Most Serious Accusations Against The Air Force” | Spaceflight Insider, “Elon Musk suggests former USAF officer got Aerojet Rocketdyne position for sole source contract with ULA.”

May 21/14: Mitchell Report. SpaceNews obtains a summary of the Aerospace Corp. report authored by USAF Maj. Gen. Mitch Mitchell (ret.), and describes scenarios ranging from 9 missions/ 2 years avg. delay/ $2.5 billion cost to 31 missions/ 3.5 years avg./ $5 billion:

“…a bleak outlook for the American launch landscape without the RD-180 engine…. losing the RD-180… would delay as many as 31 missions, costing the United States as much as $5 billion…. The report says 38 Atlas 5 missions are on the manifest, but United Launch Alliance and RD-Amross have only 16 RD-180 engines on hand. That number is expected to shrink to 15 on May 22 with the launch of a National Reconnaissance mission.”

Sources: Space News, “Losing Access to RD-180 Engine Would Prove Costly, Pentagon Panel Warns”.

May 19/14: SpaceX suit. SpaceX amends its original suit in Federal District Court. The overall suit sets out their core rationale. SpaceX claims that the USAF changed the rules for eligibility mid-stride, bent its own rules to remove planned competitive launches, locked in a contract with secret terms that further restrict competition, and will cost the USA more than $6 billion over just 3 years. Read “Sued from Orbit: SpaceX and the EELV Contract” for full coverage.

May 13/14: Russian block? Russian Deputy PM Dmitry Rogozin unleases his Twitter diplomatic notes of Doom (SM) once more:

“Russia is ready to continue deliveries of RD-180 engines to the US only under the guarantee that they won’t be used in the interests of the Pentagon.”

That choice of words rules out fears that Russia would stop delivering US astronauts to the International Space Station, but a subsequent tweet says that will also end after the agreement expires in 2020. A release from ULA says this is all SpaceX’s fault, adding that a 2-year inventory of RD-180 engines (see also May 21/14 entry) should help cushion the blow:

“United Launch Alliance (ULA) and our NPO Energomash supplier in Russia are not aware of any restrictions…. We are hopeful that our two nations will engage in productive conversations over the coming months that will resolve the matter quickly…. [but we] have always prepared contingency plans in the event of a supply disruption…. We also maintain a two-year inventory of engines to enable a smooth transition to our other rocket, Delta, which has all U.S.-produced rocket engines.”

Sources: Twitter @DRogozin, re: RD-180s and re: ISS | ULA, “ULA Statement Regarding Reports of Russian Engine Restrictions” | Washington Post, “Feud between SpaceX and ULA over space contract grows more intense”.

April 25-29/14: SpaceX sues. SpaceX files a formal legal challenge to the USAF’s long-term, sole-source, 36-core EELV contract with ULA (q.v. Dec 16/13). Their release says that EELV is 58.4% above initially estimated costs on each launch, and estimate cost savings of 75% from each SpaceX launch. More to the point, however, they allege that the block-buy deal, which has not been made public, contained clauses that negated the government’s promise of open competition before 2018.

The SpaceX releases also cite The Atlas V’s Russian RD-180 engine, produced by state-owned NPO Energomash, which is overseen by Deputy Prime Minister of Russia in charge of defense industry Dmitry Rogozin. Rogozin is best known to the world as the guy who mocks other world leaders on Twitter when they criticize his government, and he had personal sanctions placed on him by the US government in March 2014. Read “Sued from Orbit: SpaceX and the EELV Contract” for full coverage.

SpaceX sues for competition

April 25/14: Politics. Concurrent with the lawsuit filed by SpaceX, Sen. McCain [R-AZ] is taking actions of his own:

“The first letter is to Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James requesting additional information about her recent testimony regarding the EELV program before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 10, 2014, and conveying concern about the apparently incomplete and incorrect nature [DID: emphasis ours] of some of that testimony. The second letter is to the Department of Defense Inspector General Jon T. Rymer requesting that his office investigate recent developments regarding the EELV program.”

Sources: Sen. McCain’s office, “Senator Mccain Seeks Information On Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (Eelv) Program”.

April 17/14: SAR. The Pentagon finally releases its Dec 31/13 Selected Acquisitions Report [PDF]. The EELV is mentioned, due to significant cost changes:

“Program costs decreased $3,062.7 million (-4.3%) from $70,685.1 million to $67,622.4 million, due primarily to savings realized in the negotiation and award of the new 2013-2017 Phase 1 contract (-$3,770.7 million), revised cost assumptions based on the negotiated contract (-$1,511.5 million), and net decreases from a change in launch vehicle configuration requirements (-$411.3 million). These decreases were partially offset by a quantity increase of 11 launch services from 151 to 162 (+$2,505.0 million).

With that said, it’s worth asking just how much can be saved by opening the process fully to competition (q.v. March 5/14). SpaceX hasn’t been formally certified yet, and it will be interesting to see what changes once that happens.

Cost Reduction

March 12/14: GAO Report. GAO releases GAO-14-382T, “Acquisition Management Continues to Improve but Challenges Persist for Current and Future Programs.” Regarding EELV:

“In December 2013, DOD signed a contract modification with ULA to purchase 35 launch vehicle booster cores over a 5-year period, 2013- 2017, and the associated capability to launch them. According to the Air Force, this contracting strategy saved $4.4 billion over the predicted program cost in the fiscal year 2012 budget [DID: but see March 5/14 entry].

….DOD expects to issue a draft request for proposal for the first of the competitive missions, where the method for evaluating and comparing proposals will be explained, in the spring of 2014…. The planned competition for launch services may have helped DOD negotiate the lower prices it achieved in its December 2013 contract modification, and DOD could see further savings if a robust domestic launch market materializes. DOD noted in its 2014 President’s Budget submission for EELV that after the current contract with ULA has ended, it plans to have a full and open competition for national security space launches. Cost savings on launches, as long as they do not come with a reduction in mission successes, would greatly benefit DOD, and allow the department to put funding previously needed for launches into programs in the development phases to ensure they are adequately resourced.”

March 4-11/14: FY15 Budget. The US military slowly files its budget documents, detailing planned spending from FY 2014 – 2019. In the EELV’s detailed budget briefings, which are split between ELC launch capability and ELV launch vehicles, the USAF has this to say about ongoing competition:

“The number of competitive launch opportunities from FY15-17 changed from 14 to 7 due to launch manifest changes. If competition is not viable at the time of need, missions will be awarded to the incumbent. The Air Force plans to compete all launch service procurements beginning in FY18, if there is more than one certified provider.”

EELV Hearings

March 5/14: Politics. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk is one of several individuals giving testimony to the Senate Committee on Appropriations’ Defense Subcommittee. It’s a wide-ranging hearing, covering the realities of planning and running national security launches, the ELS infrastructure contract’s rationale as national security emergency launch insurance, the prospect of creating segmented monopolies, etc. Musk’s basic message is that once competition is possible, every launch should be competed on a firm fixed-price basis, and ULA’s $1 billion per year subsidy should be removed. His firm isn’t certified for national security launches yet, but he hopes that a very involved and intrusive process involving over 300 government officials will be done by year-end. Key excerpts:

“I commend the United Launch Alliance (ULA) on its launch successes to date. However, year after year, ULA has increased its prices…. In FY13 the Air Force paid on average in excess of $380 million for each national security launch, while subsidizing ULA’s fixed costs to the tune of more than $1 billion per year…. By contrast, SpaceX’s Falcon 9 price for an EELV mission is well under $100M… and SpaceX seeks no subsidies…. had SpaceX been awarded the missions ULA received under its recent non-competed 36 core block buy, we would have saved the taxpayer $11.6 billion…. now we have serious concerns that it may not be the case that 5 missions [planned outside the block buy] will be openly competed [in FY15]…. To be clear, every mission capable of being launched by qualified new entrants should be competed this year and every year moving forward…. Consistent with federal procurement regulations and DOD acquisition directives, when a competitive environment exists, the Government should utilize firm, fixed-price, FAR Part 12 contracts that properly incent contractors to deliver on-time and on-budget. That also means eliminating $1 billion subsidies to the incumbent, as those subsidies create an extremely unequal playing field.”

Air Force data that wasn’t public until the GAO’s report yesterday (q.v. March 4/14) show $2.247 billion in FY13 funding for 11 launches from all EELV customers, which works out to $204 million per launch. The comparison may not be exact – either way, ULA’s problem is that they’re unlikely to be able to compete with SpaceX on a level playing field, now that SpaceX has refined rockets whose significantly lower costs are a product of hardware research & design. The GAO has explained (q.v. March 4/14) why pure fixed-price competition is best for SpaceX, but the implications go farther. ULA’s problem isn’t just competitive, it’s existential. Firm-fixed price competition for every launch, under a structure that eliminated byzantine cost-reporting systems, could turn ULA into a sharply-downsized bit player very quickly.

To survive, ULA has 3 options: (1) Hope that lobbying funds can deliver them contracts by skewing competitive structures, and limiting competition, regardless of costs to the government, even as military budgets shrink; (2) Deliver new designs with different cost points, soon, thanks to major, fast-moving and wide-ranging internal design efforts that are already underway; (3) Hope that future accidents force SpaceX into a lesser launch status, and force Falcon redesigns with higher costs. Just to make things really interesting, and highlight the need for #2, Musk’s testimony makes a pointed reference to the Atlas V’s Russian engine. If supplies depend on President Putin’s permission, the Atlas V cannot possibly be described as providing “assured access to space.”

Competition options
(click to view full)

March 4/14: GAO Report. The GAO releases GAO-14-377R, “The Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Competitive Procurement”. The period from 2002 – 2013 has seen a total of $18.974 billion spent on 55 military and government launches, and the GAO places the total for EELV-type space launches to 2030 at an astonishing $70 billion. They also look at potential competition structures, which is a critical question. There are outside indications that the federal government could save up to half of its costs, as well as risks that the wrong acquisition policy could entrench existing or new monopolies. What’s the right thing to do? The GAO’s competition structure chart is reproduced here.

The GAO also covers significant changes in the EELV contract structure. Projected escalations in EELV costs were so high that they forced a new acquisition strategy in 2011, and the Pentagon & NRO’s homework included both intrusive and detailed pricing data for ULA rocket components, and scrutiny of the government’s own launch processes. A June 2013 contract for 35 cores was finalized in December 2013, leveraging insights gained to improve government bargaining, combining the 2 previous launch & infrastructure contracts into 1 framework (but 2 budget lines), and creating a touted $4.4 billion in relative savings, according to the USAF. Even so, nailing down exact costs per launch remains tricky, because about 75% of cost-reimbursement items still aren’t broken out per launch. Other key excerpts:

“…DOD officials say the administrative burden of renegotiating every year will be substantially lessened due to the new contract’s simplified structure…. ULA periodically sells launch services to customers outside of the EELV program, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and to commercial customers. Because DOD pays for ULA’s fixed costs, DOD receives compensation… on a per-launch basis for launches ULA sells to non-DOD customers. Prior to the December 2013 contract modification, compensation amounts were loosely based on an average of 30 days of launch pad use… DOD was reimbursed through price reductions on ULA invoices submitted to DOD at the end of the fiscal year. Under the new contract, compensation is based on some actual costs, including factory support and direct labor hours, and is approximately three times the dollar amount per-launch of reimbursements under previous contracts.”

As for the new competition regime, which is expected to start in FY15, it’s worth noting that some of the questions involve the byzantine reporting systems demanded by cost-reimbursement approaches. ULA had to install them, raising their costs and lowering corporate flexibility. SpaceX hasn’t, and a firm-fixed price per launch cost wouldn’t force them to. The US government may move to systems that would force such systems on SpaceX, despite firm-fixed costs half as much as ULA’s. Cost alone won’t be the decider, either:

“DOD officials told us they intend to use a best value approach in evaluating proposals from all competitors… may also consider mission risk, taking past performance into account, and satellite vehicle integration risks…. DOD is currently developing its methodology for comparing launch proposals, including establishing how proposals are to be structured, and what the specific evaluation criteria will be…. “

Jan 6/14: SpaceX. SpaceX launches the THAICOM 6 satellite from Cape Canaveral’s Space Launch Complex 40. It’s a successful launch that reaches a targeted 295 x 90,000 km geosynchronous transfer orbit at 22.5 degrees inclination.

More to the point, it’s the 3rd of 3 required certification flights for EELV qualification. Looks like there’s going to be a new competitor in town. Until then, the company says that “SpaceX has nearly 50 launches on manifest, of which over 60% are for commercial customers.” In case anyone was still wondering, ULA and Airbus Defence & Space have a serious competitor on their hands. Sources: SpaceX, “SpaceX Successfully Launches Thaicom 6 Satellite To Geostationary Transfer Orbit”.

Dec 16/13: FY14 Production. United Launch Services LLC in Littleton, CO receives a $530.8 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, which finalizes the multi-year FY 2014 – 2017 contract, and sets the FY 2014 buy (q.v. June 16/13, Oct 18/13: TL $2.558 billion). Which may explain why $679 million in FY 2014 funds can be committed immediately.

Recall that the FY 2014 budget (q.v. April 10/13) begins a split between EELV Launch Capability (ELC) and Launch Services (ELS). This is the ELC award. ULA will produce the following configurations: Air Force Atlas V 501, Air Force Atlas V 511, Air Force Delta IV 4,2, Air Force Delta IV 5,4, and a National Reconnaissance Organization Delta IV Heavy. Orders for FY 2015 – 2017 will have to be exercised separately.

Work will be performed at Centennial, CO; Vandenberg AFB, CA; and Cape Canaveral Air Station, FL, and is expected to be complete by Q2 2018. The USAF’s Launch Systems Directorate at the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), Los Angeles AFB, CA manages the contract (FA8811-13-C-0003, PZ0001).

ULA Rockets bought, Block buy finalized

Dec 3/13: SpaceX. SpaceX successfully launches a civil SES satellite into geostationary transfer orbit. SES-8 is the Falcon 9’s 1st GTO launch, the 1st commercial flight from Cape Canaveral in over 4 years… and the 2nd of 3 certification flights needed to certify the Falcon 9 to fly EELV national security missions. Sources: SpaceX, “SpaceX Successfully Completes First Mission to Geostationary Transfer Orbit”.

SpaceX SES-8 to GTO

Oct 18/13: FY 2014 ELC. United Launch Services LLC in Littleton, CO receives a $939.1 million sole-source contract modification covering FY 2014 support work, including integration of the space vehicle with the launch vehicle mission assurance, program management, systems engineering, launch site and range operations, and maintaining the launch infrastructure. The contract’s structure is cost-plus-incentive-fee, with cost-plus-fixed-fee and firm-fixed-price contract line items.

$294.3 million is committed immediately. Recall that the FY 2014 budget (q.v. April 10/13) begins a split between EELV Launch Capability (ELC) and Launch Services (ELS).

Work will be performed at Littleton, CO, Vandenberg AFB, CA, and Cape Canaveral Air Station, FL and will run until fiscal year end on Sept 30/14. The USAF Launch Systems Directorate at the Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles AFB, CA manages the contract (FA8811-13-C-0003, PO 0002).

FY 2014 ULA base (ELC) award

FY 2013

Major program changes: Multi-year block buy is a huge windfall to ULA, but opens 28% of EELV to competitors; SpaceX begins Falcon 9 certification process. Falcon Heavy
click for video

June 26/13: United Launch Services LLC in Littleton, CO receives a maximum $1.088 billion sole-source letter contract for “production services in support of” 7 launch rockets: AF Atlas V 401; AF Atlas V 501; AF Delta IV 4,2; AF Delta IV 5,4; NRO Atlas 401; NRO Atlas 541; and a NRO Delta IV 5,2. $525 million in FY13 funds is committed immediately.

A quick primer on reading these configurations is in order. “AF” is the US Air Force, while “NRO” is the USA’s National Reconnaissance Office. The numbers after the rocket type represent its payload cover (fairing) diameter, and the number of boosters attached to the core rocket. In the Atlas models, 501 means a 5m fairing, 0 boosters, and everything ends with a 1. If we strapped on 4 boosters, it would become an Atlas V 541. For Boeing’s Delta rockets, the attributes are broken out more clearly: (4,2) means a 4m fairing and 2 boosters. When we use a 5m fairing instead, it becomes a Delta IV 5,2.

Work will be performed at Centennial, CO, and is expected to be complete by 2015. The USAF Space and Missile Systems Center’s Launch Systems Directorate at Los Angeles AFB, CA manages the contract (FA8811-13-C-0003).

ULA Rockets bought

June 11/13: SpaceX. The USAF’s Space and Missile Systems Center signs a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with SpaceX, to begin certifying Falcon 9 v1.1 for National Security Space (NSS) missions according to the New Entrant Certification Guide (NECG).

The NECG process will monitor at least 3 certification flights, after looking at the Falcon 9 v1.1’s flight history, vehicle design, reliability, process maturity, safety systems, manufacturing and operations, systems engineering, risk management and launch facilities. The CRADA will be in effect until all certification activities are complete, and the USAF has made a decision. USAF SMC.

May 24/13: SAR. The Pentagon finally releases its Dec 31/12 Selected Acquisitions Report [PDF] describes and costs out the major shifts underway (vid. April 10/13):

“Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) – Program costs increased $35,717.0 million (+102.1%) from $34,968.1 million to $70,685.1 million, due primarily to a quantity increase of 60 launch services from 91 to 151 launch services (+$16,040.5 million) resulting from an extension of the launch manifest from FY 2018 to FY 2028 and the program life extension from FY 2020 to FY 2030 that was directed in Space Command’s Strategic Master Plan (+$20,987.5 million). These increases incorporate cost saving methodologies implemented in the revised contracting strategy, to include incentivizing the contractor, enabling the government to implement cost cutting initiatives during technical evaluations and contract negotiations, improving insight into the contractors’ costs, and enforcing better cost management. These increases were partially offset by cost savings realized in the FY 2014 President’s Budget Future Years Defense Program due to a revised acquisition strategy and other initiatives (-$1,671.6 million).”

SAR – big program changes

April 10/13: FY14 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage.

This budget describes major changes in the EELV program, whose components have been moving into place for a couple of years now. These changes include the use of the Open Launch Framework to compete almost 30% of planned launched through FY 2017, as described above. In addition, beginning with the FY 2015 budget submission, EELV Launch Services (ELS) and EELV Launch Capability (ELC) support will become separate budget lines.

Major shifts for EELV

Dec 5/12: SpaceX. SpaceX announces that USAF Space and Missile Systems Center has awarded them 2 “EELV-class” missions. DSCOVR (Deep Space Climate Observatory) is slated for launch by a Falcon 9 in late 2014, while STP-2 (Space Test Program 2) would be launched aboard a Falcon Heavy in mid-2015. The Falcon Heavy launch is significant, as the rocket hasn’t flown yet, but SpaceX also says that “the awards mark the first EELV-class missions awarded to the company to date.”

Both missions fall under Orbital/Suborbital Program-3 (OSP-3), and aren’t directly part of EELV. OSP-3 is its own contract for small and medium-class military payloads. Orbital Science’s Minotaur rockets had been the staples for those missions, but they’re going to have more competition now. OSP-3 is also partly designed to provide new entrants an opportunity to demonstrate their vehicle capabilities, as part of the path to EELV certification. These 2 SpaceX missions are expected to launch from Space Launch Complex 40 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, FL. Sources: SpaceX, “SpaceX Awarded Two EELV-Class Missions From The United States Air Force” | Aerospace Blog, “SpaceX Bests Orbital Sciences In First OSP-3 Duels”.

FY 2012

Certification framework opens EELV to competition; Launch contracts; Boeing sues for pre-ULA costs; NASA’s CCiCap a boost to ULA and competitors. Dream Chaser & Atlas V
(click to view full)

Sept 28/12: FY 2013. United Launch Services in Littleton, CO receives a $1.168 billion cost plus incentive fee and cost plus fixed fee contract for 4 Delta IV and Atlas V launches.

Work will be performed in Littleton, CO, and the contract will run through FY 2013 to Sept 30/13. The USAF Space and Missile Systems Center in El Segundo, CA manages the contract (FA8811-13-C-0001).

Aug 3/12: NASA CCiCap. NASA issues about $1 billion in contracts under its Commercial Crew Integrated Capability (CCiCap) program. These “space taxis” will rely on heavy-lift rockets to make it into space, and 2 of the 3 winning entries have picked Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V, which was the subject of a ULA-NASA agreement in July 2011. That’s good news for the Atlas industrial base, and for the Pentagon. Seven firms entered, and the 3 winners are:

Boeing in Houston, TX – $460 million for their CST-1000 capsule, which will launch using Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V.

Sierra Nevada Corporation in Louisville, CO – $212.5 million for their Dream Chaser space plane, an evolution of a NASA’s former HL-20 test vehicle that’s boosted into orbit on an Atlas V.

SpaceX in Hawthorne, CA – $440 million for a manned version of the Dragon capsule that recently docked at the International Space Station. They will continue to use their own Falcon 9 booster. Read “NASA’s CCiCap: Can Space Taxis Help the Pentagon?” for full coverage.

NASA CCiCap

July 26/12: GAO report & EELV plans. The US GAO releases “Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing Knowledge Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy.” The Pentagon plans to spend about $19 billion on launch services from FY 2013-2017, and $35 billion through 2030.

The question is how that will be divided up, and the Pentagon hasn’t made a decision about the length or amount of any block buy. They’re trying to get a very clear picture of EELV costs, down to the sub-component level, and won’t decide until they have that. Meanwhile, they plan a FY 2013 EELV bridge buy. The ULA will present its certified block buy pricing proposal later this summer, with price proposals for its Atlas V and Delta IV booster cores to cover different launch quantities across several contract lengths. The Defense Contract Audit Agency will be involved in reviewing contractor and subcontractor proposals and cost or pricing data.

The idea of joint NASA/Pentagon EELV buys is out the window, as DOD and NASA plan to continue to acquire launch vehicles on separate contracts. The GAO thinks the US government isn’t getting as much benefit or leverage as it could, and launch technology R&D is also a concern. Existing R&D programs are receiving minimal funding. Less than $8 million of the roughly $1.7 billion in the FY 2013 EELV budget is R&D, for instance, with no R&D funding budgeted after 2014. This naturally leads to the question of other launch providers, who are working with NASA already and developing new technologies. This excerpt makes it seem like an afterthought, rather than an avidly pursued solution, but time will tell:

“Another assessment that will take place prior to EELV contract award is an evaluation of the potential production capability and technology development status of a new launch provider, and potential competitor of ULA. DOD has authorized an assessment of a launch vehicle provider who may in the future be certified by the Air Force to compete with ULA for EELV-class missions. The assessment is being conducted by retired Air Force personnel with launch expertise. The results of this assessment are expected to be finalized by the end of the fiscal year.”

July 20/12: Atlas V & NASA. The United Launch Alliance has completed a review of its Atlas V rocket to assess its suitability for NASA human spaceflight, under the Commercial Crew Development Round 2 (CCDev2) agreement with NASA’s Commercial Crew Program (CCP). NASA provided technical consultation during the ULA’s System Requirements/Design (SRR/ SDR) reviews. This is a follow-on to the July 2011 co-operation agreement between ULA and NASA.

Atlas V was picked because it had already launched numerous satellites and robotic missions into space for NASA, including the Mars Science Laboratory Curiosity rover and the Juno probe to Jupiter. That gives it a strong baseline that it doesn’t need to test, but human spaceflight is a step beyond that. ULA has partnered to launch Boeing’s CST-100 capsule, Sierra Nevada’s Dream Chaser spaceplane, and Blue Origin’s Space Vehicle on missions to low Earth orbit and the International Space Station. NASA | ULA.

July 20/12: We Sue. Boeing is suing the USAF for $385 million, to recover “legitimate, allowable costs of the Delta IV program that Boeing incurred prior to the creation of ULA in 2006.” Boeing and the ULA filed the joint complaint on June 14/12 “to preserve their rights to recover these costs,” since ULA is the legal “successor-in-interest” to the relevant contracts and agreements.

This isn’t a surprise to the USAF. Boeing reportedly made the recovery of those costs a condition of accepting the EELV restructuring and joining ULA, back in 2006. Reuters.

May 14/12: United Launch Services, LLC in Littleton, CO receives a $398 million firm-fixed-price contract for an Atlas V EELV launch carrying the narrowband MUOS-4 communications satellite, and a Delta IV EELV launch carrying a GPS satellite.

Work will be performed in Decatur, AL, and the contract runs until Nov 30/14. The USAF’s SMC/LRK in El Segundo, CA manages the contract (FA8811-11-C-0001 PO 0018).

March 26/12: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics redesignates the EELV Program as an Acquisition Category ID (ACAT ID) Major Defense Acquisition Program, and removes it from the “sustainment phase” designation. Source: USN budget documents.

Program shift

Jan 10/12: Launches. United Launch Services, LLC in Littleton, CO receives a $1.516 billion firm-fixed-price contract for Atlas V EELV launch services in support of Defense Meteorological Satellites Program satellite DMSP-19, the narrowband UHF Mobile User Objective System satellite MUOS-3, and 3 National Reconnaissance Office missions. It also buys Delta IV EELV launch services in support of Air Force Space Command-4, 2 GPS satellites, and the DMSP-20 weather satellite.

Work will be performed in Decatur, AL, and the contract runs until June 30/14. The USAF’s SMC/LRK in El Segundo, CA manages the contract (FA8811-11-C-001 PO 0012).

December 2011: Industrial. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD (AT&L), Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy office, completes a study of the liquid rocket engine industrial base. It’s part of their efforts to estimate independent cost estimates for 2 EELV engines.

The bad news is that the Space Shuttle had been stabilizing this industrial base, and now it’s gone. Unless military missions get an alternative launch vehicle, these engines are necessary for national security – but all of the liquid rocket engines currently supporting these requirements are associated with EELV. The report provides evidence of instability in the supplier base, and adds that the current lack of design opportunities make it difficult for industry to sustain a skilled workforce for future liquid rocket engine development programs.

The study is used to highlight the need for an EELV block buy, in order to provide certainty for these companies. It could also highlight the need for private alternatives, in order to remove dependence. US GAO.

Nov 28/11: Launch. United Launch Services, LLC in Littleton, CO receives a $150 million unfinalized firm-fixed-price contract, for launch services in support of Wideband Global Satcom satellite F5. The USAF Space and Missile Systems Center in El Segundo, CA manages the contract (FA8811-11-C-0001).

Oct 14/11: Competition – and Politics. NASA, the US National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the US Air Force announce an agreement this week to establish clear criteria for “certification of commercial providers of launch vehicles used for national security space and civil space missions.” In English: the market for national security launches just opened up beyond EELV, which will have to compete in some segments.

For high-value “Class A, failure is not an option” long-lived national security satellites, whose addition has a high marginal value to the existing constellation, EELV’s “Category 3″ low risk certified rockets will remain the only option. There are no A1 or A2 launches, barring a huge national emergency and Presidential orders. At the other extreme, “Class D” payloads could fly on anything, even “Category 1″ launch vehicles classified as high risk or unproven (to keep symmetry, shouldn’t that have been the Cat 3?). This will help NASA most, but each category now has a specific number of successful launches needed for eligibility, as well as a known set of technical, safety and test data needed to verify that record.

The new framework’s flexibility means that every successful launch by non-EELV platforms brings it closer to a new category, which will grant access to a forecastable set of new opportunities. The big and obvious potential winner here in SpaceX (vid. May 23/11), whose Falcon 9 is poised to compete in the EELV’s segments. Orbital’s Minotaur family may also benefit.

In response, Boeing and Lockheed Martin are seeking to close the opened door by pushing a multi-year deal to buy 40 ULA rockets and launches from FY 2013 – 2017 inclusive. This would make it much more difficult for other private firms to secure orders, regardless of the certification framework. The stakes are high. Some estimates see the deal as being worth more than $12 billion, and the ULA’s 2016 budget could grow to around $2.0-2.2 billion, from its current 2011 figure of $1.2 billion. ULA claims that their deal would still leave 20% of the US government launch market up for grabs. SpaceX doubts those projections, and says that it could deliver saving far above the ULA’s advertised 15% – possibly up to $1 billion per year. In response, Congress has asked the GAO to report on this issue. NASA | USAF | Aviation Week | TMC’s Satellite Spotlight | Space News | The Space Review | Washington Post.

Competition?

FY 2011

Launch contracts; Atlas V for manned spaceflight?; EELV R&D plan to improve engine and replace obsolete parts; Contract type shifting; Hearings showcase SpaceX’s cost advantage over NASA. Lynx XR-5K18 nozzle test
(click to view full)

July 28/11: ULA R&D. United Launch Services in Littleton, CO receives a $34.4 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification to complete the development of the RL10C-1 engine. The RL-10 is the EELV’s upper stage rocket engine, made by Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne. The RL10A-4-2 powers the Atlas V’s upper stage, and the RL10B-2 powers the Delta IV’s upper stage.

The USAF’s Space and Missile Systems Center, Launch and Range Systems Directorate in El Segundo, CA manages the contract (FA8811-11-C-0001).

July 18/11: Atlas V & NASA. The ULA and NASA sign an unfunded Space Act Agreement that will begin certifying the Atlas V for manned spaceflight. Success could make NASA a larger customer, which would make the Pentagon happy too.

NASA gave ULA some minor contracts in 2010, designed to help them develop monitoring systems for the rocket that could feed information to astronauts. Under this next step, ULA will provide Atlas V data to NASA, which is already a customer for Atlas V launches. In turn, NASA will share its human spaceflight experience with ULA, and tell them what it wants in terms of crew transportation system capabilities, and draft certification requirements for the accompanying booster. ULA will provide NASA feedback about those requirements, including providing input on the technical feasibility and cost effectiveness of NASA’s proposed certification approach. Eventually, they’ll agree on a certification path, and work toward checking off those requirements. NASA.

June 2011: R&D plan. The EELV program provides a sustainment plan to Congress, identifying required technology and investments to maintain the program’s current capability. From a GAO report:

“The investments identified in the plan include $80 million for the RL10C engine conversion activities, $500 million in non-recurring costs over 5 years to develop a new or evolved upper stage engine, and $100 million each year to sustain and replace avionics, ordnance, ground command, control, and communications, and launch infrastructure. The plan states that due to the limited demand for some types of materials and components for propulsion, avionics, and ordnance systems, which can include complex materials, electronics, and computers, special emphasis must be placed on designing and qualifying new designs to mitigate obsolescence issues. Many of the parts across the systems either have designs that have become obsolete or are no longer produced.”

R&D plan

June 30/11: ULA FY12. United Launch Services in Littleton, CO receives a $1.13 billion cost-plus-incentive-fee contract to cover EELV launch capability, engineering support, program management, launch and range site activities, mission integration, and mission specific design and qualification from July 1/11 through Sept 30/12, the end of the 2012 fiscal year.

This is a change from previous contracts, which were cost-plus award fee- frameworks. The contract includes a mission performance incentive plan, and the change in contract type is intended to encourage the ULA to deliver mission success at a lower cost.

Work will be performed at Littleton, CO, and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, FL. $300.4 million has been committed, which includes $187,500 that will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11. The SMC/LRK at Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA manages the contract (FA8811-11-C-0002).

Contract type shifting

May 23/11: Private competition. Congressional hearings shine a light on an emerging EELV competitor, from the American private sector. Aviation Week says that “SpaceX Might Be Able To Teach NASA A Lesson, after it spends under $400 million to do what experts estimate would have taken NASA around $4 billion. A May 4/11 update from SpaceX founder and CEO Elon Musk lays out their competitive position:

“I recognize that our prices shatter the historical cost models of government-led developments, but these prices are not arbitrary, premised on capturing a dominant share of the market, or “teaser” rates meant to lure in an eager market only to be increased later. These prices are based on known costs and a demonstrated track record… The price of a standard flight on a Falcon 9 rocket is $54 million… The average price of a full-up NASA Dragon cargo mission to the International Space Station is $133 million including inflation, or roughly $115m in today’s dollars, and we have a firm, fixed price contract with NASA for 12 missions. This price includes the costs of the Falcon 9 launch, the Dragon spacecraft, all operations, maintenance and overhead, and all of the work required to integrate with the Space Station. If there are cost overruns, SpaceX will cover the difference…

“The total company expenditures since being founded in 2002 through the 2010 fiscal year were less than $800 million… The Falcon 9 launch vehicle was developed from a blank sheet to first launch in four and half years for just over $300 million. The Falcon 9 is an EELV class vehicle that generates roughly one million pounds of thrust (four times the maximum thrust of a Boeing 747) and carries more payload to orbit than a Delta IV Medium… The Dragon spacecraft was developed from a blank sheet to the first demonstration flight in just over four years for about $300 million… The Falcon 9/Dragon system, with the addition of a launch escape system, seats and upgraded life support, can carry seven astronauts to orbit, more than double the capacity of the Russian Soyuz, but at less than a third of the price per seat. SpaceX has been profitable every year since 2007, despite dramatic employee growth and major infrastructure and operations investments. We have over 40 flights on manifest representing over $3 billion in revenues.”

SpaceX’s Falcon 9 Heavy, aims to challenge EELV heavy lift platforms, offering higher payloads and lower costs.

May 6/11: Launches. United Launch Services, LLC in Littleton, CO receives a not-to-exceed $575 million firm-fixed-price contract to provide EELV launch services in support of the following missions: Mobile User Objective Services 2; Wideband Global Satellite Communications 6; and National Reconnaissance Office Launch 65. At this point, $245.25 million has been committed.

Work will be performed in Littleton, CO. The contract is managed by the Space and Missile Systems Center/Launch and Range Systems Directorate, at Los Angeles AFB, CA (FA8811-11-C-0001).

March 31/11: Extension. ULA in Littleton, CO receives a $293 million cost-plus-award-fee contract modification, to extend the EELV contract by 3 months. Work will be performed at Littleton, CO. The USAF’s Space & Missile Systems Center in El Segundo, CA manages the contract (FA8816-06-C-0002, P00275).

March 17/11: R&D. ULA and XCOR Aerospace announce successful hot-fire demonstrations of a lighter-weight, lower-cost vacuum nozzle design for liquid-fueled rocket-engines. They used aluminum alloys and innovative manufacturing techniques to create a cheaper nozzle that’s hundreds of pounds lighter, and tested it on a modified Lynx XR-5K18 LOx/Kerosene engine. The nozzle was developed under a 2010 joint risk-reduction program, and aims to create lower cost space launches for ULA, and ULA has now launched a follow-on program with XCOR to develop a liquid oxygen (LOX)/LH2 engine in the 25,000 – 30,000 pound thrust class.

The companies structured their LOX/LH2 engine development program with multiple “go / no-go” decision points and performance milestones, while leaning on XCOR’s small-company environment to achieve fast turnaround and performance. ULA | XCOR.

March 11/11: NROL-37. A Delta IV rocket lifts off from the Cape Canaveral Space Launch Complex-37 launch pad at 6:38 p.m. EST, with a National Reconnaissance Office NROL-27 national defense satellite. This is the 4th NRO satellite launch by United Launch Alliance in 6 months: NROL-41 aboard an Atlas V from Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) on Sept 20/10; NROL-32 aboard a Delta IV from Cape Canaveral on Nov 21/10 (see entry); and an NROL-49 aboard a Delta IV from VAFB on Jan 20/11. United Launch Alliance release.

Feb 11/11: Budget spikes. WSJ reports that the Obama administration is increasing by 25% the budget projection for the Delta IV and Atlas V heavy lift rockets, reaching $1.8 billion for FY 2012. Over 5 years, that budget line would climb to a total of about $10 billion, a roughly 50% jump from earlier projections.

Dec 20/10: A $101 million contract modification to provide launch services for the NROL-36 mission. At this time, all funds have been committed by the SMC/LRK in El Segundo, CA (FA8816-06-C-0004; P00019).

Dec 2/10: R&D. United Launch Services in Littleton, CO receives a $21.2 million contract modification, adding the “fleet standardization program core effort” to the EELV launch capability contract. At this time, $1.3 million has been committed by the SMC/LRK in El Segundo, CA (FA8816-06-C-0002; P00219).

Dec 1/10: ULA 4th Anniversary. The ULA celebrates its 4th anniversary, which includes 45 launches in its 48 months of operation. 2020 saw the launch of 4 Atlas-V, 1 Delta-II and 3 Delta-IV rockets.

Anniversary

Nov 21/10: NRO satellite. A United Launch Alliance Delta IV rocket lifted off from the Cape Canaveral Space Launch Complex-37 launch pad at 5:58 p.m. EST, with a National Reconnaissance Office satellite, which is reported to be the largest spy satellite ever launched. This was the 4th Delta IV launch and the 351st launch overall in the Delta program history. United Launch Alliance release

FY 2010

Extensions, launches, R&D. Atlas V w. AEHF-1
(click to view full)

Sept 24/10: Extension. United Launch Service in Centennial, CO receives a contract modification for up to $461.6 million, exercising an option to extend the EELV contract by 6 months. At this time, $58.5 million has been committed by the SMC LRSW/PK in El Segundo, CA (FA8816-06-C-0002; PO0237).

June 2/10: United Launch Services, LLC in Centennial, CO received a $90.2 million contract which will “provide launch services for a medium-plus lift launch vehicle,” on the National Reconnaissance Office’s Launch 38 mission. Other documents establish that the rocket will be an Atlas V. At this time, the entire amount has been committed by the LRSW/PK in El Segundo, CA (FA8816-06-C-0004). See also FedBizOpps solicitation.

March 4/10: GOES launch. A United Launch Alliance Delta IV rocket lifted off from its Cape Canaveral Space Launch Complex-37 launch pad at 6:57 p.m. EST, with the 3rd and final GOES weather satellite in the GOES-N series on board. Following a nominal 4 hour, 21-minute flight, the Delta IV successfully deployed the GOES-P spacecraft. GOES-P was scheduled to be placed in its final orbit on March 13 and renamed GOES-15. The multi-mission GOES series of satellites provides NOAA and NASA with data to support weather, solar and space operations, and enables future science improvements in weather prediction and remote sensing. The next-generation GOES satellite program, called GOES-R, is expected to launch its 1st satellite in 2015. United Launch Alliance release | NASA release

Feb 10/10: R&D. Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne, a United Technologies company, announces that it completed the initial step in certifying the RS-68A rocket engine by hot-fire testing the 1st certification engine. The RS-68A is an upgrade of the RS-68, a liquid-hydrogen/ liquid-oxygen booster engine for the Delta IV family of launch vehicles. Each RS-68A engine will provide 702,000 pounds of thrust, or 39,000 more pounds of thrust than the RS-68 engine.

During the hot-fire test at John C. Stennis Space Center in Mississippi, the 1st RS-68A certification engine burned for 190 seconds, with operating time split between 102% and 55% power levels. The company will hot-fire test the 1st RS-68A certification engine a minimum of 12 times through February and follow that with a similar series of hot-fire tests on its 2nd certification engine in March and April. Engine design certification review and acceptance of flight readiness are currently planned for July 2010.

Oct 2/09: United Launch Services, a Littleton, CO-based subsidiary of United Launch Alliance, received a $927.7 million contract to provide the FY 2010 EELV launch capability effort for the Delta IV and Atlas V rockets. United Launch Alliance is a joint venture of Boeing and Lockheed Martin. The USAF Space and Missile Systems Center’s Space Launch and Range Systems Material Wing at Los Angeles Air Force Base, in El Segundo, CA, manages these contracts (FA8816-06-C-0001, FA8816-06-C-0002, P00149).

FY 2008 – 2009

Program formally extended to 2030; WGS-2 launch scrubbed; Contracts. Delta IV w. WGS-3
(click to view full)

March 17/09: Leak. WGS-2’s launch is scrubbed, when an anomalous leak rate was detected in the Centaur upper stage oxidizer valve. A follow-on review of the time needed to inspect the Atlas V rocket, fix the identified problem and prepare for a rescheduled attempt revealed it could not take place prior to the Delta II launch date on March 24/09, so the schedule will be moved back beyond that. That date was later set for March 31st, but the satellite ended up launching on April 3/09.

Nov 4/08: Lockheed Martin Space Systems received a maximum $27.5 million contract modification, to provide launch services and hardware coverage for the AFSPC-2 mission and to protect the current launch schedule under the Evolved Expendable Launch Capabilities (ELC) contract. This contract modification covers the Atlas V geo-synchronous orbit and the ELC portions of the AFSPC-2 mission. The contract has a required minimum lead time of 24 months to build and deliver a launch vehicle. Delay of this action will adversely impact the launch manifest for a critical national security AFSPC mission and the contractor’s ability to meet its lead time requirements. The USAF Space and Missile Systems Center’s Space Launch and Range Systems Material Wing at Los Angeles Air Force Base, in El Segundo, CA, manages this contract (FA8816-06-C-0002, Modification P00121).

Oct 17/09: Industrial. Lockheed Martin Space Systems received $19.9 million contract modification to perform supply chain management and technological improvement task to minimize the risk of launch failure by establishing subcontracts with common suppliers and addressing new capabilities to support the upcoming government EELV launches. These projects include lithium ion battery development for flight safety and development of a replacement resin for solid rocket boosters. Any delay in these projects will have detrimental effects to mission capability and schedule. The USAF Space and Missile Systems Center’s Space Launch and Range Systems Material Wing at Los Angeles Air Force Base, in El Segundo, CA, manages this contract (FA8816-06-C-0002, P00095).

Sept 18/09: R&D. Lockheed Martin Space Systems received a not to exceed $30.7 million contract modification to provide a program for the development and implementation of a Global Position System metric tracking to include a detailed program acquisition/execution plan and Integration Master Schedule supporting a September 2011 initial operational capacity (Atlas configurations) and 2012 (Delta configuration) availability. Identified milestones will be evaluated at the time the individual statements of work are resubmitted. This is an initial study that will lay the foundation for the actual development of the launch requirements. The USAF Space and Missile Systems Center’s Space Launch and Range Systems Material Wing at Los Angeles Air Force Base, in El Segundo, CA, manages this contract (FA8816-06-C-0002, P00097).

Aug 8/08: Extension. On Feb 12/08, Boeing’s not-to-exceed amount to support the USA’s Delta IV rocket program was raised to $582.3 million, as its contract was extended. The goal was and is to “maintain critical engineering and integration skills and the infrastructure necessary to support the Delta IV Program and our nation’s space assets.” The Delta-IV Heavy rocket, developed under the EELV program, made its first flight on Dec 21/04.

Now the USAF is modifying that cost-plus award fee contract, adding up to $516.1 million to extend the contract to Sept 30/09 (end of FY 2009) and raising the contract’s maximum value to $1.656 billion. In addition, the contract has a $557.1 million option; if exercised, it would extend the contract through FY 2010.

The USAF Space and Missile Systems Center’s Space Launch and Range Systems Material Wing (LR) at Los Angeles Air Force Base, in El Segundo, CA, manages this contract (FA8816-06-C-0001, P00024).

June 27/08: Extension. The USAF is modifying a cost plus award fee contract with Lockheed Martin Space Systems Co. of Littleton, CO for $1.384 billion. The Evolved Expendable Launch Capability (ELC) contract is being modified to cover a number of things. Part of the modification involves continued support for the last 2 months of FY 2008, which are August and September. This procurement will also extend the contract’s period of performance through FY 2009, and incorporate a one year priced option for FY 2010.

Lockheed Martin will provide standard and mission unique integration and development, systems engineering, program management, transportation, and launch and range operations for Cape Canaveral Air Force Station and Vandenberg Air Force Base, as required to launch American space assets. At this time $144.7 million has been obligated. The Space and Missile Systems Center’s Space Launch and Range Systems Material Wing in El Segundo, CA manages this contract (FA8816-06-C-0002, P00076).

March 31/08: MUOS-1. Lockheed Martin Space Systems Co. of Littleton, CO receives a modified firm fixed price contract for $124.1 million to purchase EELV launch services and Atlas medium-plus rocket (Atlas 5510) to launch the Mobile Users Objective System (MUOS)-1 Satellite. At this time all funds have been committed (FA8816-06-C-0004, Modification Number P00002).

See also Lockheed Martin’s March 27/08 release “Lockheed Martin Team Achieves Major Milestone On U.S. Navy’s Mobile User Objective System.” With all options exercised, the contract for up to 5 MUOS satellites delivering 3G voice/data transmission has a total potential value of $3.26 billion. The first MUOS satellite along with the associated ground system are scheduled for on-orbit hand over to the US Navy in 2010.

Feb 12/08: Extension. Boeing Launch Services of Huntington Beach, CA received a contract modification that changes the scope of contract #FA8816-06-C-0001/P00011 by adding an additional 4 months to the time period, and $288 million to the not-to-exceed (NTE) amount. This change brings the NTE amount to $582.3 million, and is considered “necessary to maintain uninterrupted support of the Delta IV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Capability contract.” At this time, $216 of the additional $288 million has been committed by SMC/LRK at Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA (FA8816-06-C-0001, P00017).

Feb 12/08: Extension. Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company of Littleton, CO received a contract modification that changes the scope of contract #FA8816-06-C-0002 by adding an additional 4 months to the time period and $210.4 million to the not-to-exceed (NTE) amount. This change brings the NTE amount to $459.3 million, and is considered “necessary to maintain uninterrupted support of the Atlas-V Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Capability contract.” At this time, $157.8 million of the additional $210.4 million has been committed by SMC/LRK at Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA (FA8816-06-C-0002, P00075).

Jan 23/08: Boeing Co. of Huntington Beach, CA received a contract for $505.3 million. This contract covers launch services using Delta IV heavy and medium launch vehicles under the EELV program; the rockets will launch the US National Reconnaissance Office’s missions #27, 32, and 49. At this time $252.7 million has already been obligated by the Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles CA (FA8811-08-C-0005).

Oct 31/07: The AFSPC’s Routine Spacelift Enabling Concept Document formally extends the EELV Program an additional 10 years, from 2020 through 2030. Source: USN budget documents.

Extension

FY 2006 – 2007

Contracts; 1st ULA Atlas V rocket launch. Atlas V
Orbital Express Launch
(click to view full)

March 15/07: Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne in West Palm Beach, FL received a $10 million undefinitized firm-fixed-price contract against the McDonnell Douglas Corporation’s other transaction agreement, for the RL-10 assured access to space projects. “At this time, a total of $896.7 million has been obligated.” Solicitations began November 2006, negotiations were complete March 2007, and work will be complete December 2007. The Headquarters Launch and Range Systems Wing at Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA issued the contract (F04701-98-9-0005-0080).

In English: Boeing subsidiary McDonnell Douglas and subcontractor Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne will increase the producibility and reliability of the RL-10 upper stage engine, thus enhancing mission assurance for the Delta IV and Atlas V rockets on the EELV Program. As PW Rocketdyne notes, the RL10B-2 powers the upper stage of Boeing’s Delta IV, and the RL10A-4-2 powers the upper stage of Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V.

March 8/07: United Launch Alliance Successfully Launches First USAF Atlas V. This was their 9th successful Atlas V launch and 1st ULA Atlas launch, as well as the 1st EELV Atlas launch for the US Air Force. The mission used the new ESPA (EELV Secondary Payload Adapter) which is designed to integrate multiple smaller satellites; the 6 satellites on this mission (DARPA’s Orbital Express x2, MidSTAR-1-1, STPSat-1, Cibola Flight Experience, and FalconSAT-3) were delivered into two distinctly different orbits.

EELV launches Atlas V

Feb 28/07: Lockheed Martin Corp. in Littleton, CO receives a $108 million firm-fixed-price contract to launch the first AEHF military communications satellite using an Atlas V Launch Vehicle under the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. At this time, total funds have been obligated and work will be complete February 2009. The Headquarters Space and Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA issued the contract (FA8816-06-C0004).

Jan 10/07: Boeing subsidiary McDonnell Douglas Corp. in Huntington Beach, CA receives a $20 million firm fixed price contract modification is for pre/post mission engineering and critical components under the Assured Access to Space program. McDonnell Douglas will perform supply chain management and technological improvement tasks to minimize the risk of launch failure for the Delta IV Rocket on the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program (EELV) under the Launch and Range System Wing.

At this time, total funds have been obligated. Work will be complete December 2007. The Headquarters Launch and Range Systems Wing at Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA (F04701-98-9-0005-0079).

Nov 17/06: Boeing Co. of Huntington Beach, CA, receives a $674.1 million cost-plus-award fee contract for Delta IV Launch Capability for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) rocket program. This effort includes a number of components: launch and Range Operations for Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, FL.; Mission Integration; Mission Unique Development and Integration; System Engineering and program management; subcontractor support; factory support engineering; and special studies. Solicitations began April 2005, negotiations were complete June 2006, and work will be complete September 2007. At this time, $405.2 million have been obligated. The Headquarters Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA issued the contract (FA8816-06-C-0001).

Additional Readings Firms & Platforms

• USAF, Los Angeles AFB – Fact Sheets: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle.

• United Launch Alliance site.

• Lockheed Martin – Atlas Launch Vehicles.

• Boeing – Delta IV overview.

• GlobalSecurity.org – EELV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle.

• SpaceX – Falcon 9. Approaching EELV certification.

• SpaceX – Falcon Heavy. Claims a payload to low earth orbit roughly equal to a loaded 737 jet. Tremendous competitive margin at LEO erased at higher GTO altitudes.

• Orbital Sciences – Minotaur Space Launch Vehicles. Comes in Minotaur I, IV, V, and VI.

Some Key USAF Payloads

• DID – Next-Stage C4ISR Bandwidth: The AEHF Satellite Program.

• DID – The USA’s GPS-III Satellites.

• DID – Despite Problems, SBIRS-High Moves Ahead (updated).

• DID – The Wideband Global SATCOM Program.

Launch Tracking

• SpaceflightNow.com – Worldwide Launch Schedule.

• Wikipedia – United Launch Alliance. Includes an updated table tracking past and planned ULA launches.

Official Reports & Legal

• DID – Sued from Orbit: SpaceX and the EELV Contract.

• US Court of Federal Claims (Amended May 19/14) – Civil Action No. 14-354C, SPACE EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. THE UNITED STATES and UNITED LAUNCH SERVICES, LLC. This is the legal suit as filed.

• US GAO (March 12/14, #GAO-14-382T) – Space Acquistions: Acquisition Management Continues to Improve but Challenges Persist for Current and Future Programs.

• US GAO (March 4/14, #GAO-14-377R) – The Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Competitive Procurement.

• US GAO (July 26/12, #GAO-12-822) – Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing Knowledge Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy.

• US GAO (Oct 17/11, #GAO-11-641) – Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs to Ensure New Acquisition Strategy is Based on Sufficient Information.

• US GAO (Sept 28/08, #GAO-08-1039) – Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges.

News & Views

• Slate (Aug 12/14) – Three Congressmen Are Using Red Tape to Bind SpaceX to Earth. Wait – a left-wing magazine is defending private contractors against attempts at government scrutiny, while that company contests federal decisions? Well, the Congressmen are all Republicans. Then again, so are Sens. Cruz [R-TX] and McCain [R-AZ], who are unhappy with the ULA block buy.

• Space News (May 21/14) – Losing Access to RD-180 Engine Would Prove Costly, Pentagon Panel Warns.

• SpaceX (March 5/14) – Elon Musk’s Statement to US Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense. Says that the block-buy didn’t save $4.4 billion, it cost about $7.2 billion extra. Says it’s time to end ULA’s $1 billion subsidy per year, and includes a sharp reminder that since Atlas V depends on a Russian main engine, it can no longer be considered low-risk at the strategic level.

• Florida Today (Aug 12/09) – Dumping NASA’s New Ares I Rocket Would Cost Billions.

• Flightglobal.com (July 13/09) – Return to the Moon.

• AviationWeek (June 15/09) – Study Finds Human-rated Delta IV Cheaper. Than Ares I.

• NASASpaceflight.com (April 20/09) – Study finds EELV capable of Orion role – Griffin claims alternatives are fiction.

• DID (Oct 5/06) – The US FTC Clears Boeing-Lockheed Space Launch Merger.

• National Taxpayer’s Union (Dec 19/05) – “3 … 2 … 1 … Rip-Off!” Taxpayer Group Blasts Boeing/Lockheed Launch Vehicle Plan.

• DID (May 4/05) – Boeing & Lockheed Merge Rocket Divisions. Discusses some of the EELV program’s issues, and consequences.

• UPI op-ed (May 19/05) – US Space: A Shrinking, Timid Industry.

• Washington Post (May 3/05) Boeing, Lockheed Join Rocket Divisions.

• Crosslink magazine (Winter 2004) – EELV: The Next Stage of Space Launch.

• Manufacturing & Technology News (July 7/04) – News Analysis: Redesigning The Space Industrial Base: Reflections On The Aldrige Commission Report.

• WIRED Magazine (December 2001) – From Russia, With 1 Million Pounds of Thrust: Why the workhorse RD-180 may be the future of US rocketry.

Non, ceux qui meurent par milliers en Méditerranée ne sont pas des « migrants qui cherchent une vie meilleure » mais des gens en danger de mort dans des pays livrés à des bandes armées ou des pays mouroirs où l'« espérance de vie » est très réduite. Il ne s'agit pas d'individus épris d'aventure, qui ne prennent généralement que des risques calculés, mais de familles entières, y compris les nourrissons et les femmes enceintes, réduites au désespoir, fuyant l'horreur au risque de se précipiter dans une autre (...) - 246 - mai 2015 / Pillages des ressources, Migrations, Franc CFA, Immigration, Édito, Economie, Armée française, Une

In the absence of a major announcement on a security pact or missile defense shield, this week’s summit between the United States and six Persian Gulf countries is likely to fall back on a time-honored tradition: a series of expedited arms transfers from Washington to the oil-rich Arab states and a joint-statement highlighting America’s “renewed commitment” to the Gulf.

In the past, such weapons transfers have prompted major concern in Israel and Capitol Hill about Jerusalem losing its military edge over its Arab neighbors. But this time is different.

According to an official with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee — the most powerful pro-Israel lobbying organization in the U.S. — the group is not trying to lobby Congress to block arms deals with the Gulf. The Israeli government has also refrained from weighing in, according to Hill staffers who maintain routine contacts with the Israelis.

“Israelis have been silent,” said a congressional aide familiar with the issue. “AIPAC was asking a lot of questions, but I wouldn’t characterize our interactions on this as lobbying.”

One reason, according to State Department and congressional sources, is that the Obama administration is carefully assessing how it can help Gulf allies deter a threat from Iran without overstepping Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME), a calculus the executive branch is required by law to take into account as it licenses the transfer of weapons to Middle East governments.

Another reason for Israel’s relaxed temperament is its newfound kinship with Arab countries who share its concerns about Iran’s rise in the region. “The Israelis have cared less about the deals happening this week because there’s a feeling in Israel that they now have an undeclared ally in the GCC against Iran,” said David Ottaway, a Gulf expert at the Wilson Center, using an acronym for the six countries that makeup the Gulf Cooperation Council.

But satisfying all sides equally is easier said than done — and at least some of the top weapons systems on the GCC wish list are not expected to be supplied due to QME considerations, including the F-35 Lightning II, a “fifth-generation” fighter jet designed to be virtually invisible to enemy radar, and BU-28 bunker buster bombs, which Washington has only provided to Israel. Instead, the Gulf countries are likely to walk away with promises to expedite the transfers of long-sought munitions and radar equipment.

“The Emiratis and to a certain extent the Saudis had wanted to build this session into a much more robust agreement on both security guarantees and specific arms transfers,” said a congressional staffer familiar with the issue. “The U.S. side had to manage those inflated expectations back down to something more realistic.”

The summit itself, a gathering of senior officials from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, isn’t likely to produce a statement that details a laundry list of weapons deals. However, leaders are expected to discuss ways the U.S. can expedite long-desired equipment that will help Gulf countries deter Iran and replenish arms used in the Saudi-led bombing campaign against Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Those items are likely to include new avionics equipment for F-15 and F-16 aircraft, upgraded radar systems that reach greater distances and identify smaller objects, and an increased flow of ordnance to Gulf militaries, such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions or JDAMs, which are one of Saudi Arabia’s main weapons in that air war. Upgraded radar equipment, in particular, is seen as important for spotting incoming Iranian small boats or surveillance and armed drones.

Obama invited the GCC countries to Camp David in April with the goal of easing Arab concerns about the emerging nuclear deal with Iran and five world powers. Ahead of the summit, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had been pushing for the U.S. to agree to a mutual defense treaty, a proposal Washington now says is not in the cards.

In an interview with al Jazeera Wednesday, Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes said that a formal defense “treaty is not what we’re looking for.”

“It took decades to build NATO and the Asian allies but we can provide clear assurances that we will come to their defense,” he said.

Some have attributed the decision by Saudi Arabia’s monarch, King Salman, not to attend this week’s summit to Washington’s refusal to commit to a defense treaty.

For its part, Washington wants to avoid making ironclad security guarantees in a region marred by perpetual instability.

As an alternative, Obama is expected to push for a regional defense shield aimed at guarding against the Iranian missile threat, but while Saudi Arabia is supportive of the project, other GCC countries, such as the UAE, have raised doubts about the feasibility of the effort. An easy fallback is additional arms sales.

Any new weapons deals would accelerate Riyadh’s ongoing push to grow and modernize its armed forces. Last year, Saudi Arabia passed India and became the world’s top importer of weapons, aircraft, and other military equipment, according to IHS’ annual Global Defense Trade Report. Riyadh’s imports jumped 54 percent between 2013 and 2014, and IHS projected a further 52 percent increase this year.

In the last 20 years, Saudi Arabia has invested nearly $500 billion into its military, according to Jean-Francois Seznec of Johns Hopkins University. With nearly three-quarters of that cash going to the United States, Riyadh is one of the most lucrative sources of income for U.S. defence companies.

Riyadh isn’t the only Gulf power opening its wallet wide: the IHS report noted that Saudi Arabia and the UAE spent $8.6 billion on defense imports in 2014, an amount bigger than that spent by all of Western Europe put together.

The UAE, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are already in the process of upgrading existing Raytheon Co Patriot missile defense systems to utilize new PAC-3 missiles. The UAE is also buying another missile defense system from Lockheed Martin: a longer-range Terminal HIgh Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.

By next year, Qatar could close a $6.5 billion deal for a THAAD system, which could be followed by a similar purchase by Saudi Arabia.

Over the years, the massive flow of arms to Gulf allies has caused a number of flare ups in the U.S.-Israel relationship. A particularly heated battle surrounded the Reagan administration’s $8.5 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia in 1981, the largest foreign arms sale in U.S. history at the time.

The sale, which included the transfer of AWACS reconnaissance planes to Riyadh, was loudly protested by Israel and its allies in Congress. Though President Ronald Reagan ultimately cleared the sale, he denounced the meddling of Israel in U.S. politics in ways unfathomable in the current political context. ”It is not the business of other nations to make American foreign policy,” Reagan said at a news conference that year.

Ottaway, the Gulf expert, said much has changed since that historic dispute. “Almost all these more sophisticated American arms going to the Gulf are pre-negotiated with Israel,” he said. “If AIPAC doesn’t like the deal, you can be sure that nobody’s seriously thinking about providing it.”

For its part, the State Department insists it has no problem managing the interests and concerns of all parties involved, despite the groundswell of mutual distrust that is synonymous with the Middle East. “Our close engagement with GCC member states is not incompatible with our unwavering commitment to Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge, as evidenced by our substantial military cooperation with both Israel and the GCC,” State Department spokesman Jeff Rathke told Foreign Policy.

Getty Images

Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), positioning himself for a run at the GOP presidential nomination, appears to have flip-flopped on the Iraq war.

For years, Rubio maintained he would have still gone to war knowing what we know today: that Iraq didn’t actually possess the purported weapons of mass program that George W. Bush used to justify the invasion. In a question-and-answer session after a speech outlining his foreign policy vision at the Council on Foreign Relations Wednesday, he reversed course.

“Not only would I not have been in favor of it, President [George W.] Bush wouldn’t have been in favor of it and he said so,” Rubio told journalist Charlie Rose, who was leading the session.

Rubio’s reversal adds him to the growing list of GOP contenders trying to come to terms with how to talk about the Iraq War, which sharp majorities of Americans from both parties regard as a mistake. In recent days, Jeb Bush said he would still go to war in Iraq. Under fire, he changed his answer and insisted he wouldn’t.

Rubio’s comments are at odds with at least two of his previous statements. In March, he said on Fox he would have gone to war and that the world is a safer place without Saddam Hussein. This is a claim he repeated in 2010 during an interview with CNN.

He took a different stance Wednesday.

“Ultimately though, I do not believe that if the intelligence had said Iraq does not have a weapon of mass destruction capability, I don’t believe President Bush would have authorized to move forward,” Rubio said.

Photo Credit: Andrew Burton/Getty Images

The House just passed a White House-backed National Security Agency reform bill Wednesday, but it faces an uphill battle in the Senate, where lawmakers say the legislation would make America less safe, and an key electronic privacy group is pulling its long-time support for the proposal.

The issue for both Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and the Electronic Freedom Foundation is Section 215 of the Patriot Act, a provision that allows for the bulk collection of American phone records by the NSA. A federal court ruled the program illegal last week, but left the door open for Congress to allow it with new legislation. The House bill removes Section 215, while the legislation being considered by the Senate contains it.

McConnell’s problem with the House version of the disingenuously-named USA Freedom Act is that it doesn’t give the government the authority to continue mass collection of American data. He maintains eliminating the program would make the United States less safe, despite little evidence that the data collected by the government has stopped terror attacks.

Wednesday’s House vote is the latest episode in a two-year struggle to pass intelligence reform in the wake of Edward Snowden’s leaks about the NSA’s broad surveillance operations. Tech companies, Obama, civil liberty groups, and many lawmakers support reform efforts, but getting a bill Congress and the White House can agree on has so far proven elusive. The House vote approving the measure by an overwhelming 338 to 88 margin also comes as intelligence and defense officials debate the ground rules of cyberwar.

Still, the bill could die a quick death in the Senate, where a similar measure failed to garner enough support to even make it to the floor for a vote. McConnell, along with other Republican hawks like Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), are promising to fight the bill once it arrives in the upper chamber.

The EFF, a group that has been advocating for electronic privacy since 1990, supported the bill as recently as last week. Now, though, it’s singing a different tune, saying the court ruling finding the surveillance program illegal changed their position. In a blog post Monday, EFF’s civil liberty director, David Greene, and its legislative analyst, Mark Jaycox, argued the ruling should compel Congress to revert to a 2013 version that contained stronger provisions outlawing mass surveillance.

Other privacy advocates are also opposed to the bill. Daniel Schuman, policy director of the progressive group Demand Progress, said the legislation does not address the controversial Section 706 provision allowing the government to collect email and internet traffic information

“Taking a bite of a poisoned apple is not going to address the underlying issues,” he said. “You don’t ask for the bare minimum.”

Photo Credit: Win McNamee/Getty Images

 

Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor was one of the few bright spots on the United States’ much-maligned rail system. Connecting Boston to Washington via major cities including New York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, the route was both profitable and enjoying a steady rise in ridership numbers. The deadly Amtrak accident Tuesday night, which killed at least seven people and injured dozens more when it derailed in Philadelphia, will change that, at least in the short term. Philadelphia Mayor Michael A. Nutter called the accident “an absolute disastrous mess,” adding: “Never seen anything like this in my life.” And in an ironic case of timing, on Wednesday the House Appropriations voted to cut Amtrak’s public funding in 2016, from $1.4 billion to roughly $1.1 billion.

How do you solve a problem like Amtrak, which has bled money practically since it began operating in 1971? Tokyo thinks it has a solution, at least for the Northeast Corridor: a high speed rail, built with Japanese technology and funded, at least in part, by Japanese money. In September, an investor group told Maryland state regulators it had lined up more than $5 billion from Tokyo, “which hopes to showcase the technology behind superconducting magnetic levitation or ‘maglev’ trains to an American audience,” according to The Washington Post. And in October, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said that if Tokyo built the train, “you could travel from Washington to Baltimore in 15 minutes, and to New York within less than an hour.”

It would also help solve Amtrak’s problem of reliability. That’s what people want from Amtrak and especially its high-speed Acela line, according to R. Richard Geddes, director of Cornell’s infrastructure policy program: for a train scheduled to arrive at 10:30 a.m., for example, to actually arrive at 10:30 a.m. Amtrak’s express Acela line, which takes just under 3 hours to travel from Washington to New York City, was on time 69 percent of the time over the past year, compared with near 100 percent for Japan’s high speed rail the Shinkansen, according to The Wall Street Journal.

Safety-wise, Tokyo’s train system certainly is not any worse than Amtrak — though it might not be much better, either. “Amtrak is certainly not a notoriously dangerous mode of transportation,” said Clifford Winston, a transportation expert at the Brookings Institution think-tank. “We’re not behind the curve here.” And Tokyo has had its share of rail accidents, most notoriously in April 2005, when a commuter train derailed and crashed into an apartment building, killing 107 people on the train and injuring hundreds more.

Tokyo’s proposal is not out of the blue. Besides potential developments in the Washington-to-New York City route, there’s also a company trying to develop a high speed rail between Dallas and Houston. And in January, the state of California broke ground on a high-speed rail connecting Los Angeles to San Francisco – though it’s not expected to be operating until 2028. While emphasizing that the cause of Tuesday’s accident is still unknown, Geddes said “there’s consensus that Amtrak needs to be upgraded and modernized.”

So is high-speed rail the way to go? Probably not – because of the cost. Even if Tokyo does pay for more than $5 billion of the D.C.-to-Baltimore route, the entire project would reportedly cost at least $10 billion. And citizens of Baltimore and Washington aren’t exactly clamoring for the ability to travel quicker between the two cities. The tens of billions of dollars needed to build a maglev line between Washington and New York, the only connection that would make sense for the system, is so huge that the project won’t get built, Andy Kunz, president and CEO of the U.S. High Speed Rail Association, told The Washington Post late last year.

Why don’t we spend the tens of billions of dollars to upgrade our rail system? As New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio pointed out in a recent interview, China spends 9 percent of its GDP on infrastructure, while the United States spends only 1.7 percent. In March, Beijing announced that it will be spending roughly $128 billion on domestic rail construction in 2015, whereas the United States typically only spends $50 billion annually on road and transit projects.

Winston said the U.S. doesn’t spend tens of billions of dollars on rail projects because it would be a huge waste of money. China and Japan, with their extensive network of high-speed rail, “are making huge sacrifices for the systems they have – the billions and trillions they’re spending on these systems are costing them elsewhere.” High-speed rail, he said, doesn’t make sense in a country with a population as spread out, and as dependent on planes, and automobiles, as is the United States.

Rather, instead of relying on foreign government money, bring in the private sector. Upgrading the Northeast Corridor, Geddes said, can be done with a public-private partnership. This allows for more innovation and accountability – two qualities Amtrak sorely lacks. “The best practices come from the private sector,” said Winston. Trying to find government best practices – including with Tokyo — “is a race of the bottom.” Amtrak’s history “is a long and sad one,” said Winston. Its future doesn’t have to be.

 

 

JIJI PRESS/AFP/Getty Images

Ten years ago, Uzbekistan’s security forces shot dead hundreds of unarmed people demonstrating for greater economic and political freedom in the eastern city of Andijan. Initial international condemnation came quickly, but as is too often the case, world interest has evaporated like drops of water in the Central Asian sun. Repression in Uzbekistan has only intensified since then.

The Andijan massacre of May 13, 2005, belongs to a shameful global list of missed opportunities for justice and accountability. World leaders by and large did little to censure the government of President Islam Karimov. Tashkent’s dictator stared them all down — and the world blinked.

The course of events not only reveals a great deal about Karimov, whose iron-fisted rule has lasted since the Kremlin installed him as Communist Party boss in 1989. It also shows the consequences of the world’s failure to insist that justice be done — or anyone be held accountable — for such a shocking abuse of power. And 10 years later, the human rights violations perpetrated by the regime remain a blot on the world’s conscience.

The massacre began on the night of May 12, 2005, following weeks of protests in connection with the trial of 23 local businessmen for “religious extremism” — a charge regularly used by authorities to neutralize dissent. Arrested in June of 2004 on these trumped up charges, their trial, which was punctuated by protests, had for many come to embody the key injustices of life in Karimov’s Uzbekistan: grinding poverty, corruption, widespread rights abuses, and a campaign of persecution against religious Muslims. When the verdict was finally read on May 11, the long-simmering tensions in Andijan that had permeated the trial boiled over into open violence. A group of 50 to 100 men, mainly supporters of the jailed businessmen, attacked several government buildings and broke into the city prison to release them, along with hundreds of other prisoners.

Following the prison break, in the early hours of May 13, thousands of residents began to gather in Andijan’s central Bobur Square to protest what they saw as an unfair trial and the wider economic and political injustices in the country. Many expected that Uzbek government officials, including even President Karimov himself, might come to address the throng.

But in the morning on May 13, Uzbek security forces fired machine guns into the crowd from armored personnel carriers (APCs) and sniper positions above the square without warning. Surrounded, protesters were unable to escape. Troops blocked off the square and opened fire, killing and wounding unarmed civilians en masse. Security forces later swept through the area and executed some of the wounded where they lay. The massacre lasted hours.

As U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights at the time, I first called for an independent investigation into the Andijan events on May 18, five days after the killings took place. The report by my office in the immediate aftermath concluded that “consistent, credible eyewitness testimony strongly suggests that military and security forces committed grave human rights violations in Andijan,” even a “mass killing.” The report was based on interviews with eyewitnesses in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, where some of the survivors had fled immediately after the violence.

The events in Andijan initially attracted widespread international condemnation. In addition to my office, other U.N. bodies — as well as the European Union, the United States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the NATO Council — condemned the response by Uzbek security forces and called for an independent international investigation into the events, demanding unhindered access.

After the Uzbek government adamantly rejected these calls and refused to cooperate with the international community, the EU imposed sanctions on Uzbekistan, including an EU-wide visa ban for high-ranking officials “directly responsible for the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in Andijan,” and an embargo on arms exports to the country. The United States didn’t go that far, but it did further tighten restrictions it had placed on military assistance.

But the pressure wasn’t enough — and Karimov didn’t budge.

In the years that followed, condemnation subsided and the outside world seemed as anxious to move on and forget the massacre as the regime did. Within a couple years — without giving the sanctions any chance to have serious impact — the EU eased and then dropped its economic restrictions. Germany was a key actor in the phasing out of sanctions, seeking to hold on to its military base in the town of Termez. The United States didn’t stand firm either. In 2012, keen to maintain good relations with Karimov in order to receive his assistance in transiting supplies in and out of neighboring Afghanistan, the Obama administration waived all restrictions on military assistance even as Uzbekistan’s rights record continued to worsen: Ever more political prisoners were hauled into jails and labor camps, where torture is systematic.

In short, the Uzbek government got away with mass murder because, as is often the case, interests prevailed over principles, and the world was willing to forget the victims in order to work with the killers. It’s the worst lesson possible for aspiring tyrants.

Still, it’s never too late to change that message and start sending the right signal to Karimov and other murderous autocrats. Those responsible for these kinds of atrocities should be forever afraid that the time for reckoning will come. Given the appalling human rights situation that remains in the country — no media freedom, political opposition is forbidden, thousands of political prisoners are imprisoned, the security services use systematic torture, and slave labor is used in the cotton fields — a coordinated international response remains urgent.

Members of the U.N. Human Rights Council should mark the 10th anniversary of the Andijan massacre by establishing a special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Uzbekistan to hold the government accountable for ongoing, egregious abuses and to ensure sustained scrutiny. It’s role would be similar to the one for North Korea.

It may seem a small measure in the overall scheme of things, but for a country so averse to independent scrutiny, such a mechanism would place consistent and public pressure on Tashkent to account for its abuses. It would also be a modest corrective to the injustice done to the victims of Andijan and send a crucial message of support to the millions of other Uzbeks whose human rights have been denied these past 10 years.

DENIS SINYAKOV/AFP/Getty Images

Since assuming power in 2011, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has presided over a brutal consolidation of power, executing his perceived enemies with incredible frequency and morbid creativity. At least 70 officials have been executed during this time, and the latest victim was his defense chief, Hyon Yong Chol, who was executed using an anti-aircraft gun, according to South Korean spies. His crime: insubordination and allegedly falling asleep during an event attended by Kim.

North Korea typically executes traitors, spies, and other disloyal subjects by firing squad, but Kim’s brief reign has been replete with reports of grisly execution methods. The use of anti-aircraft guns to carry out executions hints at the use of public brutality as a means of repression in North Korea. (Incredibly, one such execution — perhaps even Chol’s — may have been captured on publicly available satellite imagery.) High-caliber anti-aircraft guns of the variety used in the latest execution are enormously powerful machine guns capable of slinging what are the equivalent of U.S. 50-caliber rounds miles into the sky. When directed at the human body at close range, the destruction would be devastating and a human body likely pulverized.

Why use such a weapon? South Korean spies say that a large crowd had gathered for Chol’s execution. Presumably the spectacle of a human body being destroyed by high-caliber machine gun fire is one the crowd will not forget anytime soon.

And Hyon’s execution isn’t the first time that North Korea has used anti-aircraft guns as a method of execution. Before executing his powerful uncle, Jang Song Thaek, in 2013, Kim Jong Un had the man’s two top lieutenants killed with the weapons. Jang was later executed by firing squad, though some spurious reports described him being killed by a pack of hungry dogs.

This kind of brutality appears to be becoming more commonplace under Kim’s rule. In 2012, the North Korean leader executed a deputy defense minister using mortar rounds after the military official allegedly broke a prohibition on drinking alcohol during the mourning period for Kim’s father.

There’s reason to believe Kim learned from his father’s own creativity in executions. After North Korea’s 6th Army Corps rose up against him in 1995, Kim Jong Il reportedly tied up the officers responsible for the attempted coup in their headquarters, and then burned down the building, according to one account of uprising. Another description of the event claims the soldiers responsible were executed by machine-gun brandishing firing squads.

Today, the threats arrayed against Kim appear far less serious than the 6th Corps uprising. Rather, Kim’s reign of terror has appeared geared toward amassing power and eliminating perceived rivals to the throne. There have been no credible reports during his reign of a coup being attempted, though it’s certainly likely that North Korea would not publicize such a plot if one had been launched and subsequently crushed. This year alone, Kim executed a senior official who dared complain about his forestry policy. Another official charged with economic planning was killed after complaining about the design of a roof on a building being built in the North Korean capital. Separately, four members of the Unhasu Orchestra were killed on espionage charges.

For Kim, apparently, even orchestra pits become snake pits that must be tamed — sometimes with anti-aircraft guns.

ED JONES/AFP/Getty Images

Begun shortly before his death and later completed and released by Russian opposition figures, the “Putin. War” report of Boris Nemtsov alleges Russian involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Speaking to Radio Sputnik, author Stephen Lendman explains how the West has seized on the report to strengthen its propaganda war against Moscow.

Après la rencontre média annuelle d'Airbus qui était prévue lundi et mardi à Séville, une autre
Plus d'infos »

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Háromnapos békeműveleti szemináriumot tartanak május 11-étől Szolnokon. A kurzuson a négy visegrádi tagország 2016. január 1-jén megalakuló közös harccsoportjába delegált kulcsbeosztású személyek vesznek részt. A konferenciát az MH Összhaderőnemi Parancsnokság javaslatára az MH Béketámogató Kiképző Központ szervezte.

Moszkva Washington támogatására számít Kijev és a kelet-ukrajnai szakadárok közvetlen kapcsolatfelvételében - hangzott el Vlagyimir Putyin és John Kerry május 12-i, keddi tárgyalásán Szocsiban. Az amerikai külügyminiszter óvta Kijevet és a szakadárokat egyaránt a katonai műveletek felújításától.

Az amerikai tengerészgyalogság egyik helikoptere hat amerikai és két nepáli katonával a fedélzetén tűnt el kedden, miután a személyzet üzemanyag-problémáról beszélt.

Bemutatkozott a dél-koreai haditengerészet új, 214-es (Son Won-II) hajóosztályba tartozó támadó tengeralattjárója. Az osztály hatodik egysége az SS078 számot és a japánok ellen küzdő legendás harcos után, első dél-koreai hajóként női nevet, a YU GWAN-SUN-t kapta.

Moszkva kész a konstruktív együttműködésre Washingtonnal, de csak abban az esetben, ha az egyenlőségen alapul és mentes a nyomásgyakorlástól - hangsúlyozták május 12-én, kedden az orosz külügyminisztériumban azzal kapcsolatosan, hogy John Kerry amerikai külügyminiszter megbeszéléseket folytatott Vlagyimir Putyin orosz elnökkel és Szergej Lavrov külügyminiszterrel.

A Honvédelmi Minisztérium felajánlásával terjedelmes könyvcsomaggal bővült a hátrányos helyzetű térségben működő abaújkéri Wesley János Többcélú Intézmény könyvtára. Az általános és középiskolai osztályokkal is rendelkező iskola már több éve részt vesz a KatonaSuli-programban, így a katonai alapismeretek tantárgy tanulói számára rendkívül hasznos adomány érkezett május 11-én.

Legalább húsz ember meghalt, közöttük gyerekek, amikor a szíriai kormányerők egyik helikoptere kedden buszpályaudvarra dobott hordóbombát az ország északi részén fekvő Aleppó egyik felkelők ellenőrizte negyedében - közölte egy nem kormányzati szervezet.

Nem a 300 volt az első képregény-adaptáció a filmtörténelemben, de kétségtelenül úttörő szerepet vállalt egy olyan látvány kidolgozásában, melynek kapcsán egy pillanatra sem tudunk elvonatkoztatni a képregénytől. És nincs több kérdés azzal kapcsolatban, megöli-e a filmművészetet a digitális technika.