SWP

A number of companies from the US and China plan to build networks of several thousand satellites each to enable access to the Internet from any point on Earth. These satellites will be stationed in low Earth orbit.

If these plans are put into practice, the global Internet infrastructure will acquire a whole new dimension. This would have far-reaching consequences for Internet access, the security and resilience of Internet infrastructure, and power relations in global Internet governance.

The home countries of the leading companies – above all the US, followed by China – would have extensive potential for political influence. They would be able to control, at the level of the Internet’s global infrastructure, the worldwide flows of information.

This research paper draws two scenarios to illustrate the range of possible developments and the corresponding potential responses: one describes the development of global oligopolies, the other a form of politically regulated global competition.

German and European political decision-makers should use regulations and public funding to work towards a future Internet infrastructure that is secure and reliable. The basis for this is the redundancy and diversity of the underlying technology. To this end, the new satellite constellations can be an important part of an appropriate mix of technologies.

It would be both politically and economically desirable for Europe to build its own constellation.

A number of companies from the US and China plan to build networks of several thousand satellites each to enable access to the Internet from any point on Earth. These satellites will be stationed in low Earth orbit.

If these plans are put into practice, the global Internet infrastructure will acquire a whole new dimension. This would have far-reaching consequences for Internet access, the security and resilience of Internet infrastructure, and power relations in global Internet governance.

The home countries of the leading companies – above all the US, followed by China – would have extensive potential for political influence. They would be able to control, at the level of the Internet’s global infrastructure, the worldwide flows of information.

This research paper draws two scenarios to illustrate the range of possible developments and the corresponding potential responses: one describes the development of global oligopolies, the other a form of politically regulated global competition.

German and European political decision-makers should use regulations and public funding to work towards a future Internet infrastructure that is secure and reliable. The basis for this is the redundancy and diversity of the underlying technology. To this end, the new satellite constellations can be an important part of an appropriate mix of technologies.

It would be both politically and economically desirable for Europe to build its own constellation.

Since the parliamentary elections in October 2020, Georgia’s government and oppo­sition have found themselves in a political deadlock. This is evidenced above all by the fact that the majority of elected opposition parties have boycotted entering par­liament. The country is not only facing domestic political challenges. The war over Nagorno-Karabakh has also changed the regional constellation. While Russia and Turkey have positioned themselves as influential actors in the region, the EU has been barely visible. For Georgia, which is the only country in the South Caucasus to have clear EU and NATO ambitions, this change is a potential threat to its pro-Western course. Tbilisi continues to have high expectations of the EU, which claims to be a geopolitical actor. Both the new regional context and the Georgian domestic political crisis should be an inducement for the EU to engage more with its eastern neighbourhood, and especially to give new impetus to its relations with Euro-Atlantic orientated Georgia.

Since the parliamentary elections in October 2020, Georgia’s government and oppo­sition have found themselves in a political deadlock. This is evidenced above all by the fact that the majority of elected opposition parties have boycotted entering par­liament. The country is not only facing domestic political challenges. The war over Nagorno-Karabakh has also changed the regional constellation. While Russia and Turkey have positioned themselves as influential actors in the region, the EU has been barely visible. For Georgia, which is the only country in the South Caucasus to have clear EU and NATO ambitions, this change is a potential threat to its pro-Western course. Tbilisi continues to have high expectations of the EU, which claims to be a geopolitical actor. Both the new regional context and the Georgian domestic political crisis should be an inducement for the EU to engage more with its eastern neighbourhood, and especially to give new impetus to its relations with Euro-Atlantic orientated Georgia.

With the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on 15 November 2020, the announcement of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on 30 December, and the prospects of enlarging the Compre­hensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), trade policy with and within Asia is gathering speed. In the greater East Asia region, consisting of Japan, South Korea, China and the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN), economic integration via trade, investment, supply chains and digital connectivity will accelerate. In contrast, regions that remain on the outside – i.e. North America, Europe and India – surely fear that trade flows will be diverted. At the same time, geo­politics have become a determining factor of trade policy. Any agreement also represents political positioning in the context of the Sino-American rivalry, or at least a reinsurance against the risks of economic or technological decoupling. What are the economic and political perspectives of these trade and investment agreements? What goals and strategies are the relevant actors pursuing? And what are the con­sequences for Europe’s trade policy?

With the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on 15 November 2020, the announcement of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on 30 December, and the prospects of enlarging the Compre­hensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), trade policy with and within Asia is gathering speed. In the greater East Asia region, consisting of Japan, South Korea, China and the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN), economic integration via trade, investment, supply chains and digital connectivity will accelerate. In contrast, regions that remain on the outside – i.e. North America, Europe and India – surely fear that trade flows will be diverted. At the same time, geo­politics have become a determining factor of trade policy. Any agreement also represents political positioning in the context of the Sino-American rivalry, or at least a reinsurance against the risks of economic or technological decoupling. What are the economic and political perspectives of these trade and investment agreements? What goals and strategies are the relevant actors pursuing? And what are the con­sequences for Europe’s trade policy?

Turkey’s new Presidential System has failed to realise the goals that it was said to achieve with its introduction despite the disapproval of half the population.

Contrary to the ruling party’s claims in favour of the new governance system, two and a half years after its introduction, parliament is weaker, separation of powers is undermined, the judiciary is politicised, institutions are crippled, economic woes are mounting and authoritarian prac­tices prevail.

Despite the almost unlimited and unchecked power that the new system grants to the President over institutions, his space for political manoeuvre is, surprisingly, narrower than it was in the parliamentary system.

Providing the otherwise divided opposition a joint anchor of resistance, the Presidential System unintentionally breathed life into the inertia of Turkey’s political party setting.

The formation of splinter parties from the ruling party, primarily address­ing the same conservative electorate, alongside the changing electoral logic with the need to form alliances to win an election, poses a serious challenge to the ruling party and its leader – the President.

Despite the oppositional alliance’s electoral victory in 2019 local elec­tions, it is at the moment unclear whether the forming parties share a common vision for steps towards democratic repair.

Together with the institutional havoc caused by the Presidential System, the blurry outlook of the opposition requires caution about an easy and rapid positive transformation. While the European Union should be realistic in regard to expectations towards democratic reform, it should also strike a balance between cooperation in areas of mutual benefit and confronting Ankara when necessary to protect the interests of the Euro­pean Union and its member states.

Mit dem ersten »Fünfjahresplan über den Aufbau von Rechtsstaatlichkeit (2020–2025)« konkretisiert Chinas Führung ihre Vision eines kohärenten, genuin chinesischen Rechtssystems. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei der Begriff »sozia­listische Rechtsstaatlichkeit chinesischer Prägung«. Bis 2035 soll sie im Wesentlichen etabliert sein. Marxistisch-leninistische Rechtskonzepte bleiben funda­mental. Durch das Recht als Instrument soll der Staat effizienter werden. Willkür bei der Rechts­findung soll für den Großteil der Bevölkerung reduziert werden, unter anderem mit Hilfe von Hoch­technologie. In ausgewählten Teilbereichen, zum Beispiel bei pro­zessualen Fragen, lässt sich Beijing für den Aufbau der chinesischen »Rechtsstaatlich­keit« vom Westen inspirieren. Eine unabhängige Justiz und das Prinzip der Gewaltenteilung aber lehnt die Parteistaatsführung weiterhin strikt als »fehlerhafte west­liche Gedanken« ab. Beijing geht es explizit darum, auch international für Chinas Rechtsvorstellungen zu werben, Standards zu etablieren und Interessen mittels des Rechts durchzusetzen. Daher sollten Berlin und Brüssel ihr besonderes Augenmerk auf chinesische Rechts­vorstellungen richten. Vertiefte Kenntnisse darüber sind zwingend notwendig, um die strategischen Implikationen von Chinas Rechtspolitik zu erfassen, die Hand­lungs­logik besser zu verstehen und adäquat darauf zu reagieren.

Turkey’s new Presidential System has failed to realise the goals that it was said to achieve with its introduction despite the disapproval of half the population.

Contrary to the ruling party’s claims in favour of the new governance system, two and a half years after its introduction, parliament is weaker, separation of powers is undermined, the judiciary is politicised, institutions are crippled, economic woes are mounting and authoritarian prac­tices prevail.

Despite the almost unlimited and unchecked power that the new system grants to the President over institutions, his space for political manoeuvre is, surprisingly, narrower than it was in the parliamentary system.

Providing the otherwise divided opposition a joint anchor of resistance, the Presidential System unintentionally breathed life into the inertia of Turkey’s political party setting.

The formation of splinter parties from the ruling party, primarily address­ing the same conservative electorate, alongside the changing electoral logic with the need to form alliances to win an election, poses a serious challenge to the ruling party and its leader – the President.

Despite the oppositional alliance’s electoral victory in 2019 local elec­tions, it is at the moment unclear whether the forming parties share a common vision for steps towards democratic repair.

Together with the institutional havoc caused by the Presidential System, the blurry outlook of the opposition requires caution about an easy and rapid positive transformation. While the European Union should be realistic in regard to expectations towards democratic reform, it should also strike a balance between cooperation in areas of mutual benefit and confronting Ankara when necessary to protect the interests of the Euro­pean Union and its member states.

Mit dem ersten »Fünfjahresplan über den Aufbau von Rechtsstaatlichkeit (2020–2025)« konkretisiert Chinas Führung ihre Vision eines kohärenten, genuin chinesischen Rechtssystems. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei der Begriff »sozia­listische Rechtsstaatlichkeit chinesischer Prägung«. Bis 2035 soll sie im Wesentlichen etabliert sein. Marxistisch-leninistische Rechtskonzepte bleiben funda­mental. Durch das Recht als Instrument soll der Staat effizienter werden. Willkür bei der Rechts­findung soll für den Großteil der Bevölkerung reduziert werden, unter anderem mit Hilfe von Hoch­technologie. In ausgewählten Teilbereichen, zum Beispiel bei pro­zessualen Fragen, lässt sich Beijing für den Aufbau der chinesischen »Rechtsstaatlich­keit« vom Westen inspirieren. Eine unabhängige Justiz und das Prinzip der Gewaltenteilung aber lehnt die Parteistaatsführung weiterhin strikt als »fehlerhafte west­liche Gedanken« ab. Beijing geht es explizit darum, auch international für Chinas Rechtsvorstellungen zu werben, Standards zu etablieren und Interessen mittels des Rechts durchzusetzen. Daher sollten Berlin und Brüssel ihr besonderes Augenmerk auf chinesische Rechts­vorstellungen richten. Vertiefte Kenntnisse darüber sind zwingend notwendig, um die strategischen Implikationen von Chinas Rechtspolitik zu erfassen, die Hand­lungs­logik besser zu verstehen und adäquat darauf zu reagieren.

Frankreichs Präsident Emmanuel Macron hat das Ziel ausgegeben, die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen zu revitalisieren und eine »neue Partnerschaft« zwischen Paris und Berlin zu begründen. In der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik sowie in Teilen der Europapolitik konnte dieser Anspruch jedoch selten eingelöst werden.

Hauptgrund hierfür sind strukturelle Veränderungen in den internatio­nalen Beziehungen, auf die Frankreich und Deutschland unterschiedlich reagieren: Paris sucht neue Wege, seine verteidigungspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit zu erhalten und das strategische Vakuum zu füllen, das entstanden ist durch das nachlassende Interesse der USA an Europa und seiner Peripherie. Berlin setzt auf die Weiterentwicklung von Nato und EU als grundlegenden Organisationen deutscher Außenpolitik.

Zudem erschweren nationale Alleingänge, Desinteresse und ein ungenügender Erfahrungsaustausch einen bilateralen Interessen­ausgleich.

Eine neue Intensität der bilateralen Zusammenarbeit setzt erstens voraus, dass sich Paris und Berlin in ihren bestehenden außen- und sicherheits­politischen Kooperationsformaten einer Gesamtschau der internationalen Gemengelage stellen. Sie müssen ihre jeweilige Betroffenheit sowie ihre Interessen offen besprechen und aus ihnen konkrete Maßnahmen ableiten.

Zweitens müssen sie sich darauf verständigen, dass nationale Alleingänge unterbleiben und ein Desinteresse an den außen-, sicherheits- und europa­politischen Druckpunkten des Partners nicht geduldet wird. Die Deutsch-Französische Parlamentarische Versammlung sollte die Exekutiven beider Länder dazu anhalten, den Élysée-Vertrag wie den Vertrag von Aachen zu erfüllen.

Zu diesen Ergebnissen kommen die sechs Fallstudien zu Libyen, zur Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, zur Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, zu Russland, zur Nato und zur Türkei.